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Report to Ambassador Malcolm Toon, Chairman of the U.S. Side of
the Joint U.S./Russian Commission on POW/MIAs
from U.S. Senator Bob Smith, Commissioner

July 21, 1993

AN INTERIM ANALYSIS

of the

1972 TRANSLATION OF A NORTH VIETNAMESE REPORT CONCERNING U.S. POWS
DISCOVERED IN 1993 IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
AND SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDED TO THE U.S. SIDE OF THE
JOINT U.S./RUSSIAN COMMISSION ON POW/MIAS

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I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Dr. Stephen Morris, the man who first discovered the North Vietnamese report on POWs in Russian language form, deserves special thanks from the United States of America. General Dmitri Volkogonov, head of the Russian side to the U.S./Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, likewise deserves our gratitude for continuing to open the archives of the former Soviet Union in an effort to resolve outstanding humanitarian issues such as the fate of our POWs and MIAs.

B. The report found by Dr. Morris contains numerous statements which can be corroborated by U.S. knowledge. Because of this, I am convinced the presentation took place in 1972. In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary from Vietnam, I can only assume that from 1964 to 1973, the leadership of North Vietnam withheld the total number and identity of American POWs in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia over whom it had direct control.

C. The position of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam that the report in Russian language form is a "pure fabrication" which they "completely reject" is unacceptable to me, and I believe, the majority of the American people. This matter is still wide open.

D. The U.S. Government does not know the fate of many of its missing personnel in Vietnam and Laos, and the U.S. Government should stop believing that it knows the fate of just about everybody. It's time people study the facts, even if it means revisiting "old" issues.

II DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORT AND ITS CONTENTS

The text of the report which has been provided to the United States is in Russian language form. However, the cover page to the report in Russian language is dated "Moscow - 1972" and clearly states that the report is a "translation from Vietnamese into Russian." The Russian language cover indicates that the translation was done by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).

The GRU cover page to the report describes the enclosed report as a "Report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the VNA (Vietnamese People's Army) General-Lieutenant Tran Van Quang at the Politburo Meeting of the TSK PTV 15 September 1972." (TSK PTV is Russian for 'Tsentralnij Komitet Partii Trudyashchikhsya V'etnama' or in english, 'Central Committee of the Workers Party of Vietnam.')

Summary of the Report's Contents

General Quang begins the report by indicating that "today" he will describe measures which have been worked out for implementing the resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the Central Committee which he supports and that he will give an evaluation of victories which have been gained by North Vietnam during the war from "the period from 30 March 72 to the present."

He indicates that the military situation is developing favorably, and he discloses that several meetings have occurred between the United States and Vietnam "aimed at developing measures on resolving the Vietnam issue..." General Quang indicates that proposals offered by the U.S. side had been rejected.

He then discloses that secret meetings in Paris have taken place between the U.S. and North Vietnam, and that these meetings have once again shown the "deranged nature of the proposals put forward by the American side."

Quang goes on to indicate that North Vietnam had maintained its position during these secret meetings, "the essence of which includes the following: if the U.S. truly wants to resolve the Vietnam issue, then above all else, it must refuse to support the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and only afterwards will we engage in a discussion about a cease-fire. This demand is the main tenet in our conflict against the American imperialists. If Nixon continues adhering to his policy of 'Vietnamization' of the war and desires to leave the present Saigon Government of Thieu in power, then the peace negotiations between us and the U.S. will not yield any results."

General Quang then reflects that "during our general offensive", progress had clearly been made, but there had also been shortcomings and mistakes. Quang mentions that he had previously discussed the lessons learned from these mistakes with the Politburo, and that he would now report on "a number of positions regarding the scope of our future offensive."

He then goes into considerable detail on how North Vietnam was succeeding in their plan to win over selected South Vietnamese personalities and "representatives of the Saigon authorities," and that several meetings had taken place. General Quang discusses the details of separate meetings with five South Vietnamese personalities, and how these persons had become critical of Thieu and American policies and actions in Vietnam. Quang sums up by indicating they were also making progress in winning over people from the provinces and towns in the south, and as a result, "we see that we have chosen the correct course. This is also clearly indicated in the resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the Central Committee."

Quang indicates that the "Ba Be" plan had been developed and was being implemented in the South. He states that the goals of the plan were the elimination of people who "oppose our course", to include those in leadership positions at the province-district level and above, as well as disruptive activities against the Saigon governing apparatus, and the acquisition of materials which "testify to crimes by Americans and their puppets with regard to the Vietnamese people..." Quang states they must also attract neutral forces to their side, and describes an incident in which they had succeeded in the "demoralization of the puppet army" through propaganda.

Quang next describes results which "we in the propaganda organization recently achieved among the High Command staff, right up to Saigon Army generals," and he describes meetings they had with two South Vietnamese army generals.

Quang points out that dividing enemy ranks and lowering their will to resist was the goal of the "Ba Be" plan and that this was essential to "help us to attain successes at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam." Quang stresses that forces needed to be inserted as soon as possible so that implementation of this goal would proceed "in the month of October in accordance with indicated deadlines."

Quang concludes with a final pitch for the need to fully implement the "Ba Be" plan by pointing out that "in the Paris negotiations on Vietnam we have met with a series of difficulties in recent days." As a result of "exchanging opinions in private meetings with Kissinger", Quang emphasizes that Nixon was continuing to be stubborn in "continuing the aggressive war and maintaining the status quo." He states that because of this

stubbornness, "peaceful solution of the Vietnam issue is not possible...that is why we are resolved to carry out the Ba Be plan." Quang stresses that this would be their "first military thrust on the front aimed at resolving the complicated political issue at the present stage."

Finally, in reference to the Ba Be plan, Quang reports that there had been a conference "yesterday" with the cadres responsible for carrying out the plan and that everything had been worked out. He concludes this section of the report stating, "In summing up what is stated above, it can be said that we are going in the right direction in carrying out our plans..."

The next part of the report concerns the number of American POWs captured and being held in North Vietnam. Quang states he is reporting "today" on this subject as the Politburo had asked him to. Quang begins this section by stating that their work with American POWs had been contemplated by the Politburo in previous decisions "such as decision No. 21 DST dated 23-3-71, and decision No. 21 E dated 4-4-72." He indicates that both of these earlier decisions concerned exploitation of American POWs. He refers to comrades "among us" who differ from the position of the Politburo, and urges them to understand that the issue is very complex.

He then begins to tell them that they have captured a very large number of American POWs since "5 August 1964" and that the total number has not been made public. He states, "At today's Politburo session, I will report to you, Comrades, the exact number" of American POWs.

General Quang reports that the total number of American POWs captured to date "comprises 1205 people." He then breaks this number down by country and categories of American servicemen. (NOTE: For a detailed analysis of the figures presented by Quang, please see Section "VI" of this interim analysis.)

Following this numerical breakdown, Quang reports that these American POWs are presently in 11 prisons in North Vietnam. He states that after the Son Tay raid in 1970, they had expanded the number of prisons to 11 from 4 large prisons which they used to have, and that each prison now had approximately 100 prisoners.

Quang next indicates that they are holding 16 "colonels" together from whom they are attempting to extract material and information, and that 104 "lieutenant colonels" were being held in another location where they were also attempting to extract information from them. Finally, he states that they have 235 "majors" concentrated in two other locations, and that the rest of the POWs were in other prisons.

General Quang then describes a group of 368 American POWs who were showing "progressive" attitudes, and that these POWs would be released first if the progressive peoples of the world were successful in forcing Nixon to move toward a resolution of the political issue.

Quang informs his comrades that "we are carrying out work with this category of POWs to explain to them the aggressive nature of the war being conducted by the Nixon administration and the nature of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and also to make them understand the unjust character of this war which is inflicting great damage on the American people. One can assert that this group of POWs is progressive in their political views."

Quang then reports that there are an additional 372 American POWs who hold "neutral" views and 465 American POWs who hold "reactionary" views. He points out that the senior officers held "reactionary" views, ie: "they do not condemn Nixon, they do not protest his policies, and they distort our course of action." Quang rationalizes that this is because they are from rich families.

General Quang emphasizes the need to continue their work to make the American POWs understand that U.S. aggressiveness in the war and Nixon's stubbornness only delays their return to their homeland.

Quang notes that they would soon be freeing several POWs to "put pressure on the Nixon administration, observe his reaction and the reaction of the American public, as well as to demonstrate our good intentions in this matter."

He goes on to point out the three principles on which "we may resolve" the issue of the American POWs. The U.S. must comply with a cease-fire and the removal of Thieu, and that while the U.S. was doing this, they would free "several more aviators from the number who are progressively inclined." Next, "Nixon must compensate North Vietnam for the great damage inflicted on it by this destructive war." Quang states that Nixon continues to resist resolving the Vietnamese question, thereby delaying the resolution of the American POW issue.

Quang then repeats that while he has explained this issue to the Politburo, there are still comrades who don't understand the American POW situation correctly. He stresses that the POW issue had to be resolved in the context of settling the military and political aspects of the Vietnamese problem. He emphasizes that they "would lose much" if they took the path of concession toward America and release the POWs.

According to Quang, holding 1205 American POWs had "created certain difficulties for us," but he goes on to point out that this was a great loss to the American military, particularly the Air Force, and that they were succeeding in collecting important data from the POWs. Quang states he is convinced this is the correct position.

He then indicates that 1205 American POWs was a large number, and that "we have officially published a list of only 368" American POWs. He rationalizes that the U.S. government can only speculate on the true number of POWs based on their losses, and that, therefore, "we are keeping the number (of American POWs) secret."

Quang again points out that there were comrades questioning the policy being implemented concerning American POWs. He stresses that "this is not political bargaining but rather a key condition and serious argument for successful resolution of the Vietnam problem. That is why the matter of the American POWs has great significance. Quang then condemns the "mistaken views of individuals among us on this matter".

Quang concludes the section of the report on the American POWs by stating, "We firmly hold to our position -- when the American government resolves the political and military issues on all three fronts of Indochina, we will set free all American POWs. We consider this a very correct course."

The next part of the report is General Quang's concluding comments on the entire presentation he has given to the Politburo. He mentions the areas he has reported on, stating:

"Today on assignment of the Supreme Command, the State Defense Council and the Military Committee of the Politburo, I reported to you on these matters so that the Politburo could study these problems, could express its opinion on them, and set forth forms and methods for their resolution." He mentions that soon they will be developing new military plans for 1973, but for now they were "occupied with matters of mobilization and training of reinforcements for all three Indochinese fronts. We should mobilize 250,000 men, 200,000 of which would be sent to South Vietnam and 50,000 to Laos and Cambodia." He states that at the next politburo session, he would report on the present situation in Laos and Cambodia.

His final statement is an impassioned defense of their present course of action, emphasizing that the course of the party is correct, and that they are fulfilling the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, the desires of Ho Chi Minh, and freedom for the Fatherlands.

The last sentence of the report reads:

"To the current session of the Politburo I wish successful work. I have completed the presentation of the report."

III ACQUISITION OF THE REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES

On March 10, 1992, the New York Times reported that the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. was working to set up a conference with officials of the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation, formerly the Archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, located on Il'ynka St. in Moscow. The planning of the conference was led by William Taubman, a political science professor at Amherst College. The conference was described by Professor Taubman as "the first step in opening up the archives." The effort was to be funded largely by a \$1 million grant over three years from the MacArthur Foundation and was to be known as the "Cold War History Project."

The major projects which were to be the focus of the research were: 1.) the Berlin Crisis of 1958-61; 2.) the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; 3.) the Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968; and 4.) the Korean War.

Ironically, during this same period, Senator Kerry and myself had traveled to Moscow as co-chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in an effort to lay the groundwork for the Joint Commission on POW/MIAs which had been proposed by the Russians in January.

By the end of the year, the Joint Commission was making dramatic progress in archival research and oral interviews. However, in retrospect, the unique arrangement between the Russian Government and the Wilson Center, which permitted access to classified records to selected scholars, held a greater, more immediate promise for the discovery of records on the Vietnam War.

In September, 1992, the Wilson Center submitted to the Russians a list of the American researchers who would be participating in the review of classified Russian archived materials in Moscow at the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation.

One of the scholars who later worked side by side with researchers at the Wilson Center project was Dr. Stephen J. Morris, a 44-year old researcher at the Center for International Affairs and the Russian Research Center at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. In April, 1992, Dr. Morris had traveled to Moscow to find out about the possibility of archival access. He was told that access was only being allowed for the period pre-1953, and so

he began to research the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship in the early years, to include Ho Chi Minh's younger years in Moscow (1930's).

In October, 1992, while doing research in the pre-1953 archives, he heard about the Wilson Center project at the other archive and went over to speak with some of the researchers there. In Dr. Morris' own words, "I discovered what the arrangement was and that they had nobody working on the history of the Vietnam War, so I immediately determined that I had to become part of this project because it was vital to the work I was doing."

By December, 1992, Dr. Morris was back in Moscow working side by side with other scholars on the Wilson Center team with the permission of the Russian Archives Administration. He focused his energy on gaining access to selected classified records of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerning Vietnam.

Under the arrangement between the Wilson Center and the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, he requested access on December 14th to a set of "Top Secret" records entitled, "Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for Communications with Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries." The documents, comprising some 2,000 pages in ten folders, were provided to Dr. Morris the next day by Yuri Constantinovich Maalov, the Deputy Director of the archives, and the number three man at this particular archive. In January, 1993, in the course of reviewing the documents in detail, he came across a 1972 report by General Tran Van Quang which contained detailed information on American POWs in North Vietnam.

Realizing the significance of his discovery, he arranged for a copy of the report to be given to him and returned to the United States. He contacted a colleague of his who worked as a Congressional staffer in the House of Representatives. Through this contact, he was able to arrange a meeting with Sandy Berger, Deputy National Security Advisor to President Bill Clinton on February 11, 1993. At the same time, he contacted a colleague at Harvard, Dr. Richard Pipes, a Baird Professor of History. Dr. Pipes contacted Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. Following Dr. Morris' meeting with Sandy Berger, Secretary Aspin wrote a letter to Dr. Pipes on February 16, 1993 indicating that he was aware of the discovery of the document and the information would be pursued. Dr. Morris had also met with former National Security Advisor, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, during this period to allow him to review the document and provide his analysis to him.

In late February, 1993, Task Force Russia, the Pentagon's support element for the U.S. side of the Joint U.S./Russian

Commission on POW/MIAs, learned of the discovery of the document by Dr. Morris. Colonel Stu Herrington, Deputy Director of Task Force Russia, contacted Dr. Morris in an attempt to learn more about the document. During this period, Mr. Edward W. Ross, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs, also contacted Dr. Morris concerning the document.

On March 18, 1993, the Director of Task Force Russia, General Bernard Loeffke, and Norman Cass, an assistant to DASD Ross, traveled to Moscow and were made aware by Lt. Colonel Osipov of the Russian side to the Joint Commission of the existence of the document. General Loeffke, Mr. Cass, and two members of Task Force Russia stationed in Moscow, were able to briefly review excerpted pages from the document but were not provided with an actual copy of the report. They were allowed to xerox the cover page of the record group containing the report. The hope was expressed by the U.S. side that the document could be provided to the U.S. during a scheduled meeting of the Joint Commission in Moscow on April 8, 1993.

On March 22, 1993, the U.S. side to the Joint Commission was briefed on the discovery of the document during a scheduled meeting in preparation for the April 8, 1993 meeting in Moscow. On March 30, 1993, a detailed cable on the contents of the document which had been briefly reviewed by Task Force Russia was sent to Washington from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

On March 31, 1993, I wrote the President's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, urging him to have President Clinton raise with President Yeltsin the issue of access to GRU records on the Vietnam War, and particularly documents pertaining to the numbers of POWs held by Vietnam. The weekend of April 3rd and 4th, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton held their summit in Vancouver. The head of the Russian side to the Joint Commission, General Volkogonov, has subsequently indicated that the subject of POWs was raised at this summit, although I do not know if specific requests were made pertaining to access to the Vietnam-related documents in question.

On April 8, 1993, the U.S. side to the Joint Commission was provided with an excerpt dealing with the subject of American POWs from the 1972 report initially discovered by Dr. Morris. The excerpts from the report were passed to the U.S. side by General Volkogonov during a formal commission meeting in the Kremlin in Moscow. In passing the report, General Volkogonov stated:

"It's a delicate issue, but we can't be quiet about it any longer, since it's a humanitarian issue. The official list reported 368 Americans. But there were 1205, in fact. This document has very detailed information, the number of places -- 11 camps -- and so forth. We will continue our search, but you see,

the Central Committee of the USSR knew the exact number of POWs in Indochina. This information was known, although, in the past, the Central Committee denied any knowledge. But we are talking about men's fates -- a humanitarian issue. There is no political spin -- we want to help the families."

On the weekend of April 9-11th, Dr. Morris returned to Moscow to attempt to gain access to additional archival documents. He allowed a reporter from the New York Times in Moscow, Celestine Bohlen, to review the report and write a story on it which was published in the New York Times on Monday, April 12, 1993. Two days earlier on April 10th, the Russian newspaper Izvestia reported that the document had been discussed at the Joint Commission meeting on April 8th.

In addition to the New York Times, the Washington Times also disclosed the existence of the document on April 12th after an interview with Dr. Morris from Moscow on April 11th.

On the morning of April 12th, the Vietnamese Mission at the United Nations in New York was provided with a copy of the report by the Department of State and Department of Defense.

On April 20, 1993, a team of 8 Task Force Russia, Defense Intelligence Agency, and senior policy Defense Department personnel met with Dr. Morris. During this meeting, Dr. Morris provided a copy of a complete Russian language version of General Quang's September, 1972 report which was subsequently translated into English by Task Force Russia at the Pentagon.

On June 21, 1993, a full copy of the same report by General Quang in Russian language form was formally provided to the United States by Russian General Volkogonov.

IV AUTHENTICITY OF THE REPORT IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE FORM

There is no doubt whatsoever that the 1972 report to the North Vietnamese Politburo in Russian language form is authentic -- that is, it was clearly acquired by the GRU from the Vietnamese in 1972, translated into Russian, and forwarded to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, where it was found more than 20 years later by Dr. Morris. There is overwhelming evidence which conclusively proves this point, some of which is outlined below.

Moreover, the manner in which the document was discovered by Dr. Stephen Morris in the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (formerly the archives of the Central Committee) in Moscow indicates authenticity. According to Dr. Morris:

"I had requested in mid-December a series of about 10 files relating to the events of 1972, a pivotal year in the history of the Vietnam War. One of those files was a file of the Soviet military. The description on the front tells you nothing about what is inside. It read something like Reports of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union about Political and Military Conditions in North and South Vietnam. When I opened the file I saw lots of documents which all were very interesting although not all of them gave me a very exciting account of what was inside. A lot of them were very general descriptions. But reading through that file, a file which may have contained a dozen different documents -- one of 10 files I'd ordered on the same day -- I found a lot of interesting, new information."

"One was a report by a Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang, who was the deputy chief of staff for the North Vietnamese army, reporting to his politburo. There were two documents by this general. The first was dated June 26 and the second, September 15. I read the file chronologically and when I got to his first report I was excited because he had new information about the military situation at that time which nobody new, including a staggering account of the losses they had sustained up to that time, which went far beyond what American analysts of the Vietnam War had estimated...it is important to understand this entire file in order to evaluate the particular document. This was a file of the Soviet military and much of it was Soviet military intelligence. They had a very close relationship with the Vietnamese military."

"I was excited by documents, for example, signed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs in Russia at that time, which talked of politburo meetings about the future overall strategy in the war and the conflict between different members of the leadership in Vietnam and who took what side in the debate. He gave precise locations of the meetings and so on."

"This was information of an extremely intimate kind, and when it's signed off by the chairman of the Soviet army, then I concluded that there must be a very reliable source in the Vietnamese leadership who is providing information to the Soviet military. Before I had found this document I had come to this conclusion. The first document, by Lieutenant General Quang -- and it was one of three documents in the file which were Vietnamese documents -- was a report of speeches made during 1972."

"I could see that the Soviets were acquiring secret reports from the Vietnamese leadership even before I came to this particular document. And when I came to the document, the second report by General Quang, dated September 15, I was fascinated because it had a fairly bland description, it talked about things I did not know about -- secret events. For example, the clandestine meetings between representatives of the North Vietnamese military and security apparatus with the South Vietnamese politicians for the purpose of feeling them out as to their possible future participation in a coalition government, which was Communist strategy up until that moment..."

"...Adam Ulam (of Harvard) also says it looks to him like an authentic document. They are specialists on the Soviet Union and they know what Soviet documents should look like. Mark Kramer, who is also an affiliate at Harvard, was with me in the archives when I discovered it. I showed him part of the document and asked his assistance in deciphering the handwritten Russian (see Appendix). So he knew that I had it even while I was in the archive. Kramer had been reading a lot more documents than I had and had been there a lot longer and knew the procedure whereby, I, like everyone else in the project, acquired documents, so it was inconceivable that this was not authentic."

By February, 1993, Dr. Morris had allowed colleagues of his to review the document (as described in Section III of this Interim Analysis). On February 8, 1993, Dr. Richard Pipes, a Professor of History at Harvard wrote a letter stating, "The document, and the accompanying letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by P. Ivashutin, are, in my opinion, authentic and trustworthy."

Following the official turn-over of the document to the U.S. on April 8th and the subsequent disclosure of the report in the press, several comments were made which further vouch for the document's authenticity.

On April 13, 1993, former U.S. National Security Advisors Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Dr. Henry Kissinger made these comments on the Mac Neil/Lehrer Newshour concerning the document's authenticity:

MACNEIL: Dr. Brzezinski, you've stated publicly, and you're quoted in the New York Times as believing the document is genuine. What convinces you?

BRZEZINSKI: Its style, its content, the cover note to the Soviet Politburo. One would have to assume a really very complex Byzantine conspiracy to reach the conclusion that this is not an authentic Soviet document based on a Vietnamese document.

MACNEIL: Dr. Kissinger, what do you think on the question of authenticity, first of all, of the document?

KISSINGER: ...I agree with Zbig (Dr. Brzezinski) that those parts that I know something about have an authentic ring...if that document is authentic, and it is hard to imagine who would have forged it, for what purpose, then I think an enormous crime has been committed, and I do not see how we can proceed in normalizing relations until this is fully cleared up...I don't see how we can normalize relations or ease conditions in international agencies until we have cleared up this issue."

(Note: Comments by Kissinger and Brzezinski on the accuracy of the contents of the report, as opposed to the authenticity of the document, are covered in Section VI, Part A, of this Interim Analysis.)

On April 14, 1993, Russian General Dmitri Volkogonov, who formally passed the document to the U.S., was asked about its authenticity and responded as follows:

"We have no doubt this is a real document, a genuine one. This document has been signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Vietnam and it had been officially transferred to the Soviet intelligence...These documents were absolutely Top Secret and thus it cannot attest to the fact that they are false documents...This is an old document. For almost a quarter of a century, over 20 years, it has been in existence. We have found it in a part of the archives of the Central Committee of the party where they never had any fabricated documents. They didn't have such a habit. I personally don't doubt at all the authenticity and the genuine character of this document."

On April 15, 1993, according to General Vessey, the President's Emissary to Hanoi on the POW/MIA issue, "I talked to General Volkogonov..., and he and Ambassador Malcolm Toon assured me that they believed it was an authentic document of the vintage of 1972..."

On April 16, 1993, former KGB official General Oleg Kalugin told the New York Daily News in Moscow that "there is no reason why the (present Russian) government would make it up."

On April 20, 1993, a team of 8 Task Force Russia, Defense Intelligence Agency, and senior policy Defense Department personnel met with Dr. Morris. During this meeting, Dr. Morris provided a copy of a complete Russian language version of General Quang's September, 1972 report which was subsequently translated into English by Task Force Russia at the Pentagon. The conclusion reached by the Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs concerning "authenticity" is described in a memorandum dated the same day as the meeting and reads:

"CONCLUSIONS: By all accounts this document, now more than ever, appears to be authentic...All indications are that the Russian archives of the GRU should have a copy of the original Vietnamese version. In order to resolve the issue, we still need to obtain the Vietnamese version."

On April 21, 1993, General Volkogonov again remarked on the authenticity of the document, stating to the New York Times in Moscow, "My opinion is that the document is completely authentic." Again, in a May 12, 1993 letter to me, General Volkogonov stated, "I am convinced that the document which we passed to the American side on April 8, 1993 is genuine. True, I cannot guarantee that its content is a true reflection of past reality. Only the Vietnamese can know this."

On April 22, 1993, the Russian archive spokesman for the Contemporary Documentation Center was reported by Associated Press as saying that "archive officials believe the document is authentic."

On May 26, 1993, General Volkogonov reiterated his belief that the document was genuine in a meeting with Task Force Russia and the political counselor from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

In a meeting with me on June 22, 1993, General Volkogonov again reiterated his position that this was an authentic document, and only the Vietnamese know if everything General Quang reported to his Politburo was accurate. General Volkogonov stressed during this meeting that there was no reason for the GRU to believe that the document was not accurate, stating why would they lie in a Top Secret message to their own Politburo.

In a letter to me dated June 22, 1993, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Dr. Henry A. Kissinger stated, "From everything I have heard, including from Russian sources, the document which was found in the Russian archives is authentic -- that is, it is a document apparently acquired by the GRU from the Vietnamese."

Finally, the fact that there was some deep-rooted opposition on the Russian side to the Joint Commission on turning the document over to the U.S. side adds credibility to the fact that this was considered to be an authentic document by GRU.

V THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM RUSSIA

To date, the U.S. side has not been provided with copies of any additional documented information which pertains to the 1972 North Vietnamese report in Russian language form. However, General Volkogonov assures us that he is working hard to find additional documentation or information, and that it is "real detective work." I have no doubt, however, that there are literally thousands of pages in the GRU and Politburo archives dealing with the Vietnam War. It is well-known that there are volumes of information dealing with Soviet relations with their allied countries, and we would be foolish to assume that the Soviets did not have both open and clandestine sources placed in Hanoi during the war to collect information, in addition to the Soviet military presence. General Volkogonov has openly acknowledged the reality that there were "highly placed Soviet advisors" in Vietnam who could have obtained the Quang report, and we have only scratched the surface with the discovery of this document.

The following is a synopsis of information which I believe Russia has the capacity to provide to the U.S. pertaining to this report and the POW issue in Vietnam at the end of the war.

1. First, in December, 1992, Dr. Morris reviewed an additional report by North Vietnamese General Quang dated June 26, 1972, but was not able to obtain an actual copy of this report. However, he was able to take extensive notes on the contents of this second Quang report which he subsequently provided to the U.S. Government. The report was presented at a North Vietnamese politburo session on June 26, 1972, and General Quang is listed as "Deputy Chief of Staff" of the Vietnamese National Army, the same position described in the September, 1972 report. It is imperative for the U.S. to obtain a complete copy of this report in order to fully evaluate current Vietnamese statements that General Quang never addressed the politburo and did not hold the title of Deputy Chief of Staff in 1972. The U.S. formally requested this document on June 4, 1993 and I asked General Volkogonov for a copy on June 22, 1993.

This second report is contained in the same file as the September 15, 1972 report. The file is labeled, "File No. 5, Inventory No. 62, Case No. 4-78"

2. Next, the cover note to the Soviet Politburo enclosing the Russian translation of the report was signed by P. Ivashutin, head of the Soviet GRU, now deceased. Undoubtedly, there were several individuals within the GRU apparatus who were involved in the preparation of this report for Ivashutin's signature. Moreover, the fact that it had been decided by the GRU to send the report to the Central Committee indicates the importance of the preparation of this product and the need for it to have been accurate.

We can reasonably assume that analysts, translators, their supervisors, and others were part of the "quality control" process in passing the report to the Politburo. Moreover, the possibility exists that the GRU footnotes were added to the document in Moscow, as they attempted to determine additional background information on some of the South Vietnamese personalities mentioned in the report, such as Dinh Dzu. (Note: There are two Dinh Dzu's described in the report, although the GRU mistakenly refers to them both as the same person. The U.S., therefore, needs to request access to GRU officials in Moscow who reasonably would have been involved with the preparation of this report in 1972, such as retired Southeast Asia desk officers and analysts.

The actual note by the GRU head to the Soviet Politburo begins with, "I am reporting: Translation of the report of..." The tone of the cover memo and its identification markings suggests that this was but one of many GRU intelligence reports on the situation in North Vietnam and the status of the war there. Therefore, we can assume that there are other reports and speeches from North Vietnamese party and military members. More importantly, this was clearly not the first time the GRU has obtained information from the North Vietnamese politburo. If it was, this would almost certainly have been mentioned in the cover memo.

There is a note on Ivashutin's cover sheet to the Quang report which he sent to his superiors at the Politburo. The handwritten note back to him is signed by Konstantin Katushev and is written on his cover memo. In other words, as in many offices, a memo is sent into the boss, and the memo comes back out with the boss' response, often handwritten on the memo that had been sent to him. Konstantin Katushev was a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. His response to Ivashutin, presumably after reviewing the entire Quang report is "please prepare a short report for the Politburo of the TsK KPSS (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) about the Prisoners of War." If this is what transpired, then the GRU would have prepared a separate report in response to the Politburo's request focusing on their analysis of the American POW information in the Quang report. The U.S. side needs to request a copy of this report from the GRU through General Volkogonov. If the report cannot be located, the U.S. should obtain a convincing explanation as to why not.

3. Ivashutin's cover memo to the Politburo lists the Quang report as an enclosure labeled as "1 brochure (entry No. 14253, Top Secret, Copy No. 6.) This is a good starting point for pursuing additional information about this report and other reports on Vietnam sent to the Soviet Politburo by the GRU. This may also shed light on the manner in which similar reports were collected in

Vietnam. These reports may be traceable by examining GRU logs with lower and higher reference numbers close to No. 14253.

4. The Soviets undoubtedly obtained information from interrogations of American POWs in Vietnam, either directly or through the Vietnamese. U.S. evidence indicates that in some cases, the Soviets submitted detailed technical questions for the Vietnamese to ask American POWs. In other cases, there is evidence that the Soviets directly participated in these interrogations. The GRU must be asked to provide these records to the United States, as they can shed light on the American POW/MIA situation in Vietnam during the war.

5. General Volkogonov has mentioned the possibility that the speech from General Quang may have been translated from a recorded tape of the speech. The GRU should be asked whether any of their collection activities in Vietnam during this period involved recording devices. If the U.S. intelligence community believes this is a real possibility, then the matter should be further pursued by the U.S. side to the Joint Commission with Russia.

6. General Volkogonov indicated in a meeting on June 22, 1993, that the Russian side to the Joint Commission raised the document with a Russian interpreter who might have worked with it in Hanoi. The interpreter, according to General Volkogonov, stated he translated thousands of documents over ten years and had no way of remembering the documents he translated. He would translate documents and then go on to the next one, according to General Volkogonov. The U.S. should aggressively push for access to pertinent POW/MIA information in these "thousands" of other reports translated in Hanoi, to include direct access to the former Soviet translators in Hanoi referenced by General Volkogonov.

7. According to a November 16, 1972 document from the Russian archives, former Soviet Army Chief of Staff N. Ogarkov spoke of "...the expanded meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the (North) Vietnamese Workers Party, which took place at the beginning of October this year in the province of Hoa Binh..." The U.S. has independent information indicating Politburo sessions were held at the "alternate" meeting place at Doc Cun in Hoa Binh Province. The U.S. should request independent confirmation from the Russian side of the dates on which North Vietnamese politburo sessions were reported to have taken place in 1972.

8. In response to a request by the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in November, 1991, former North Vietnamese Colonel Bui Tin informed the committee in writing of people in the Soviet Union who might know about the POW issue. He specifically referenced a "Mr. Andre (Andrew), translator, Russian-Vietnamese in charge of relations with Vietnam, working in the Defense Ministry (before 1967, he was in the State Department in Moscow.)"

The U.S. should seek to further identify and interview the "Mr. Andre" referenced by Bui Tin in an effort to shed additional light on the Quang report and other POW/MIA related matters.

(Note: Ironically, Tin also referenced General Tran Van Quang as someone who "should" know about Russian involvement with American POWs during the war -- and this was over one year before the Russian language report by General Quang had been found in the archives in Moscow.)

Conclusion. I believe the 1972 North Vietnamese report by General Quang in Russian language form is perhaps the most direct piece of evidence obtained by the U.S. to date which shows the extent of GRU collection activities during the Vietnam War. The numbering system and the manner in which the report was provided to the Politburo clearly indicate that GRU files contain additional information. There is no question that the information exists. The question is how do we convince the GRU, KGB, and others to be more cooperative in rapidly providing all relevant information to the United States.

VI GENERAL INTERIM ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THE REPORT

Before an examination of specific statements in the report, I would like to note my concurrence with the position of Task Force Russia, mainly that the internal structure, tonal unity, and philosophical development of the Russian language text are such that it appears to be a translation of an authentic North Vietnamese presentation made by General Quang.

In addition, an examination of speeches, reports, and articles by General Quang from 1966 to 1988 show that there are compelling similarities to the speaking style and phraseology exemplified in the September, 1972 presentation (ie: references to protecting the fatherland against the American imperialists, etc...)

(Note: Copies of the following speeches and articles by General Quang are contained at the end of this Interim Analysis following the english-language version of the 9/15/72 report)

- * January, 1966 -- "The Big Role of Militiamen and Self-Defense Corpsmen in the War Against U.S. Imperialists."
- * July 7, 1966 -- "Three Great Experiences of Militia and Self Defense Forces."
- * January, 1978 -- "The New Stage of the Revolution and the New Stage of Development of Local Military Work."
- * January, 1988 -- "On the Direction of the 1968 Spring Offensive and Uprising in Tri Thien-Hue (Twenty years ago)."

The reader of this report is encouraged to examine the contents of the above-mentioned speeches and articles and compare them with both the September 15, 1972 presentation by General Quang and the excerpts from the June 26, 1972 presentation by General Quang now being reviewed by the U.S. Government.)

In evaluating this report and its collection by the Soviets, it is also critical to study the facts pertaining to the close relationship between the Soviets and North Vietnamese during the war. It strains credulity to believe that President Nixon and President Brezhnev, Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Gromyko would have spent the time they did in 1972 discussing proposals pertaining to the war in Vietnam if they did not believe the Soviets had a close relationship with North Vietnam. Indeed, the record will show

that Dr. Kissinger had extensive discussions with the Soviets in Moscow concerning the Vietnam War on May 24, 26, 30, and September 13, 1972, just two days before the reported date of the Quang presentation. Declassified White House/NSC transcripts show that the U.S. was literally presenting proposals to the Soviets which were then discussed in detail and passed on to the North Vietnamese.

In Hanoi, there also continued to be a close relationship with the Soviets, as evidenced by numerous cables and reports uncovered in Russian archives from the former Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, all of which are available from my office. In fact, these documents show that only the Soviets and the Chinese were briefed in Hanoi on the substance of the final Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks in January, 1973 just days before the Paris agreement was signed. The record shows, that because of the sensitivity involved, only the Soviets and Chinese were briefed, and not other socialist allies.

This close relationship continues to the present day as evidenced by the May 25, 1993 trip to Hanoi by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Yarov and his meeting with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Do Muoi. According to the official Vietnam News Agency, during the meeting, Secretary Do Muoi "reaffirmed that the Vietnamese people have unswervingly been thankful to the formerly Soviet and now Russian people for their invaluable assistance extended to them in their past and present efforts."

Finally, it should be noted that General Quang himself recognized the closeness of the relationship by visiting the Soviet-Vietnamese Culture House in past years to commemorate Soviet Communist holidays and anniversaries. These visits by General Quang were publicized in Communist publications available to the U.S. Government. Perhaps, the most fascinating aspect of all is the fact that former North Vietnamese Colonel Bui Tin, a prominent North Vietnamese spokesman at the end of the war, indicated to our Select Committee in writing in 1991 before this document ever surfaced that General Quang was someone to talk to concerning Soviet involvement with American POWs during the war.

The following interim analysis of statements by General Tran Van Quang in the 1972 report to the North Vietnamese politburo is in the order in which they appear in the presentation, from beginning to end. (Note: A summary of the report appears in Section II of this Interim Analysis, and the entire English translation of the report from Russian appears in Section X),

A. Statements which are corroborated by U.S. wartime and postwar knowledge.

1. North Vietnam's Policy Toward the South -- General Quang's description of the North Vietnamese government policy toward the South, particularly North Vietnam's infiltration efforts and contacts with South Vietnamese leaders, is corroborated by U.S. intelligence information. If it has not already been done, this intelligence should be immediately assembled and publicly disclosed by the U.S. intelligence community. In addition, former National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger stated to me in a letter dated June 22, 1993: "Having read the document carefully I can only say that the description of the North Vietnamese government policy toward the South...conforms with what we knew to be their position at the time."

2. The Secret Meetings in Paris During this Period -- General Quang refers in his September 15, 1972 presentation to the secret meetings in Paris between North Vietnam and the United States which had taken place, and that North Vietnam had been rejecting the U.S. proposals. He also states that they have met with a series of difficulties in the Paris meetings "in recent days" and he refers to the exchanging of opinions in private meetings between North Vietnam and Kissinger where they understood "Nixon as before is being stubborn on settling the situation."

While the existence of earlier secret Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks in Paris had been publicly disclosed by President Nixon on January 25, 1972, it is noteworthy that several meetings had, indeed, taken place "in recent days."

According to declassified White House/National Security Council records provided to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, private meetings in Paris took place during this period on the following dates:

- * July 19, 1972
- * August 1, 1972
- * August 15, 1972
- * September 15, 1972
- * September 26, 1972
- * September 27, 1972

Thus, three, potentially four, meetings had been completed at the time of the presentation by General Quang on September 15, 1972.

Dr. Kissinger's analysis of General Quang's references to the status of the negotiations shows that Quang was accurate. Dr. Kissinger, the principle U.S. negotiator during these private meetings, stated the following during MacNeil/Lehrer on April 13, 1993:

"When they (General Quang) described what their negotiating tactics were, those were the tactics they were using in negotiating with us...they say in this document that their proposals were first a cease-fire and the overthrow of President Thieu, after which they would use the prisoners to negotiate whatever other concerns they had. Now, as of the date of that document, those were their proposals. A month later they changed it but I could see if you make a report to the Politburo in the middle of September and you want to summarize what the negotiating position is, this was exactly the negotiating position they had as of the date of that document. To be precise, on October 8th, about three weeks after this document, they changed their position, but up to that time, they had insisted on exactly the conditions that are in that document, and they certainly wouldn't have told anybody that they were proposing to change it. That (negotiating position) could only have been know to a very few people. And they didn't change it for another three to four weeks."

Additionally, on June 22, 1993, Dr. Kissinger stated to me in writing, "Having read the document carefully I can only say that the description of...the North's position on negotiations with the United States conforms with what we knew to be their position at the time."

Quang's comments are highly accurate in referencing the North Vietnamese negotiating position in important ways which can be corroborated by U.S. documents. For instance, General Quang notes "We intend to resolve the American POW issue in the following manner: 1. The U.S. Government must demonstrate compliance, ie: a cease-fire and the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu, and then both sides can begin discussing the matter of returning POWs to the Nixon government. 2. While the American side is resolving the above-mentioned problems, we can free several more aviators from the number who are progressively inclined... 3. Nixon must compensate North Vietnam for the great damage inflicted on it by this destructive war. Here then are the principles on the basis of which we may resolve the American POW issue...when the American government resolves the political and military issues on all three fronts of Indochina, we will set free all American POWs."

In the August 15th Paris meeting, the North Vietnamese had rejected the January 25th US/GVN proposal on the grounds that it would leave Thieu in power. We know this because a declassified White House transcript of an August 17th meeting between Kissinger

and Thieu reads: - Kissinger to Thieu: - "At our last meeting, he (Le Duc Tho) said they had not accepted the January 25th proposal because you would still be in power -- this is not unreasonable from their point of view..." Thieu: "About the prisoners of war, you have nothing?" Kissinger: "I think they are keeping the prisoners as blackmail..."

On August 18th, according to a transcript of another meeting between Kissinger and Thieu, Dr. Kissinger stated to Thieu: "They (the North Vietnamese) think they can use the prisoners of war to overthrow you."

Additionally, a declassified White House transcript of a Paris meeting on September 26, 1972 (11 days after the date on the Quang report) notes the following comment by Le Duc Tho: "Regarding the question of prisoners of war, as I told you last time, that the American prisoners in Cambodia, there are none. In Laos, there are very few. But if you satisfactorily solve the political question and the question of reparations then we can find an understanding."

The next day, Dr. Kissinger sent a Top Secret memo to General Haig at the White House stating, "We met with DRV delegates for a total of 11 hours on September 26 and 27. There was no significant progress...we held firm on our basic program including political questions...in other areas, it emerged clearly both from DRV document and discussions that we remain far apart on a number of major issues..."

Thus, it can be seen that the U.S. was privately being told by the North Vietnamese in Paris precisely the same things General Quang discussed with the Politburo during the same time period. The U.S. was holding firm, or being "stubborn" as Quang referenced, and the U.S. was hearing first hand in private from Le Duc Tho exactly what Quang had stated their position to be. It is important to note that neither the content of Quang's report or the content of the Paris meetings in August/September had been publicly disclosed at the time, yet they matched in many important respects. This adds considerable merit to the case that a presentation was, in fact, prepared or presented by General Quang on these matters in September, 1972, despite recent Vietnamese denials.

3. The "BA BE" Plan -- The description of the BA BE plan is described in the report by General Quang in considerable detail. It is obviously a plan which General Quang felt was essential to achieving North Vietnam's objectives in the war, and from the report, he appears to have had personal involvement in designing the plan. The plan itself called for the elimination of political figures in the South at the province-district level and above, the organization of other disruptive events in the South, and the

acquisition of materials to prove the "crimes" of Americans. The plan was to be carried out through the insertion into the South of specially trained cadre from the North.

Unclassified records of U.S. interviews with Vietnamese personnel show that General Tran Van Quang had been Chief of the North Vietnamese Enemy Proselyting Department (EPD), part of the General Political Directorate, in the mid-1950's, and he had headed a conference of the EPD in 1963. During this earlier period, he had supervised efforts to integrate stay-behinds of the French Foreign Legion into the "Viet-Dung" assassination teams. Strategy sessions and conferences were held at the Enemy Proselyting camp at "BA BE" lake in Bac Thai (formerly Bac Kan) Province, North Vietnam. It is probable, though not yet confirmed, that the training conference referenced by Quang in the report as having taken place on September 14, 1972 was at "BA BE" lake, and this is why the plan was called the "BA BE" plan. There is certainly a precedent and evidence that similar assassination planning and training took place at "BA BE" lake as late as 1963. Moreover, General Quang is believed by some to have been involved in directing specific massacres carried out during the Vietnam War. Finally, information from other U.S. sources indicates that the plan described above came to the attention of the United States during 1970 or 1971, and the Phoenix Program/Provincial Reconnaissance Units were deployed to counter it.

4. The Reference to the Impending Release of Some POWs -- General Quang makes reference in his presentation to the fact that several POWs would shortly be released "to put pressure on the Nixon Administration, observe his reaction and the reaction of the American public, as well as to demonstrate our good intentions in this matter."

On July 25, 1972, actress and anti-war activist Jane Fonda had returned from a trip to Hanoi where she had met with seven POWs. Immediately following Fonda's trip, former Attorney General and anti-war activist Ramsey Clark visited North Vietnam for two weeks. Upon his return, Clark stated to the press on August 14, 1972, "I urged them (the North Vietnamese) to release some prisoners, and I say frankly, I think they will -- a few, I don't know when. But what they tell you -- and you know I have a little difficulty arguing with it -- is "we can't release pilots when pilots are bombing our children."

On September 2, 1972 (the 27 anniversary of the DRV), the Chief Political Directorate of North Vietnam's People's Army announced that three U.S. POWs would be freed "as a sign of gratitude to that part of the progressive American public which has been calling for the immediate end to U.S. aggression in Vietnam."

The announcement further stated the POWs would be turned over to a peace group that would come to Hanoi from the United States.

On September 17, 1972, there was a ceremony in Hanoi connected with the release of the pilots. In attendance were anti-war activists Cora Weiss and David Dellinger from the United States.

On September 25, 1972, the pilots were released to Cora Weiss and the next day the three pilots departed Hanoi with Weiss, Dellinger, and two other anti-war demonstrators (Coffin and Falk). The POWs and the anti-war group members departed Hanoi aboard a Soviet Aeroflot plane which flew them to China and across the Soviet Union to Moscow where they changed planes for New York, arriving in the United States on September 28th. This was the first release of U.S. POWs by North Vietnam in over three years (since 1969).

Thus, it is certainly clear that General Quang's reference to the impending release of several POWs, and the reasons they were doing this, tracks with known events, and lends credibility to the fact that General Quang made this presentation on September 15, 1972.

5. "FOR NOW, WE HAVE OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED A LIST OF ONLY 368 POWs"

General Quang's statement that North Vietnam had, to date, only published a list of the names of 368 POWs is entirely accurate and tracks with known events.

On December 22, 1970, the North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris Peace talks, Mai Van Bo, released to representatives of U.S. Senators Kennedy and Fulbright a list of the names of 368 POWs, 20 of whom were listed as having died, and nine of whom had previously been released. (Source: Declassified MFR of a 12/22/70 meeting of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam, and a Declassified 12/23/70 Memorandum to President Nixon from Dr. Henry Kissinger referencing the list of "368 names of U.S. POWs" turned over in Paris the day before.)

(Note: a detailed analysis of the total 1205 number of American POWs referenced by General Quang follows in Section VII of this Interim Analysis.)

6. THE ASSIGNMENT OF GENERAL QUANG TO ADDRESS THE POLITBURO

In the concluding paragraphs of General Quang's report, he states, "Today on assignment of the Supreme Command, the State Defense Council and the Military Committee of the Politburo, I reported to you on these matters so that Politburo could study these problems, could express its opinion on them, and set forth forms and methods for their resolution."

It is well known by U.S. intelligence that the Central Military Affairs Party Committee ran the war under the Politburo's supervision. It is also well known by U.S. intelligence that General Quang was, in fact, a member of the Central Military Affairs Party Committee or "Military Committee of the Politburo" as referenced in the 1972 report. He was also known to have been a close confidant of General Giap who headed the committee. Therefore, it makes sense for him to state he is addressing the Politburo on assignment of the Military Committee of the Politburo, of which he was a member. I do not know his relation to the "Supreme Command" or the "State Defense Council."

7. THE REPORT'S LABELING OF GENERAL QUANG AS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

According to the records of the U.S. Joint Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in 1972, General Tran Van Quang was being carried as a Deputy Chief of Staff and a member of the Central Military Affairs Party Committee as of 1972. Thus, there appears to be no inconsistency with the title ascribed to General Quang in the Russian language version of the report based on U.S. records.

It is also important to note Russian General Volkogonov's recent statements in June, 1993, that "the important point is that General Quang made the reports in question, not the job position which he held at the specific time. This is a technicality."

The Russian side has recently relayed information to the U.S. side which has been represented as the "latest information from GRU." According to the Russians, Quang was actually a Lieutenant General in command of the Fourth Military District (Voyennyi Okrug), but was frequently sent to South Vietnam to evaluate activities and returned to deliver reports to the Politburo. The Russians have said that while the cover page to the document (by GRU) may be technically in error, he, nonetheless, did make the reports of June 26, 1972 and September 15, 1972. (Source: July 2, 1993 Memorandum from U.S. side to the Joint Commission stationed in Moscow based on a July 2, 1993 meeting with the Russian side in Moscow.)

(Note: For more information on this, please refer to Section VIII of this Interim Analysis - "Biographical Information on General Tran Van Quang.")

B. ERRORS IN THE SOVIET GRU TRANSLATION OF THE REPORT.

The GRU report on the translation of General Quang's report to the North Vietnamese politburo contains, on its surface, very minor errors. For instance, at the beginning of the report, a GRU footnote improperly identifies a former South Vietnamese political figure as a South Vietnamese general who also had a similar name. However, the South Vietnamese General is properly referred to later in the report. In another area, resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the Central Committee referenced by General Quang in 1972 would not coincide with a report by General Quang in 1988 which references the 21st Plenum as having taken place in October, 1973.

In short, these errors and the spelling of certain names of POWs, or perhaps even their rank, can be readily dismissed, in my opinion, as typical errors in the collection and translation of the report from Vietnamese to Russian, especially if thousands of reports were being translated during the war. GRU errors would not change the fact that this report on the subjects discussed appears likely to have indeed been presented by Tran Van Quang to the Politburo in 1972. They also do not change the fact that the number 1,205 is 1,205 in Russian, Vietnamese, and English, and thus these numbers should not be cast aside as translation problems, or possibly pertaining to South Vietnamese and Thai soldiers as well. It is clear upon reading General Quang's entire report, as well as all his other speeches over the years, that he has consistently and clearly distinguished when he is discussing American POWs and not the "puppets" from the South. Moreover, we should not lose sight of the startling Vietnamese position maintained to date that this report, or any report remotely resembling it, was never given to their Politburo in 1972. It is truly hard to believe that the Soviets would report to their Politburo on a Vietnamese Politburo session that never took place.

Finally, the minor errors in the GRU translation of the report certainly do not change the basic theme of the report -- ie: the withholding of the true number of American POWs by North Vietnam for negotiating advantage.

VII DETAILED INTERIM ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBERS, DESCRIPTIONS, AND LOCATIONS OF AMERICAN POWS REFERENCED IN THE REPORT

I would like to begin this section by stressing that I completely concur with the following analytical assessment prepared by Task Force Russia in May, 1993 -- "The U.S. should conduct a zero-based review of all information about U.S. POWs and consider alternative models to explain the fates of unaccounted for servicemen ranging from the possible existence of a parallel system of prison camps to a reassessment of Vietnamese behavior and motivation. The burden of disproving the document's assertions does not rest with either the US or Russian governments but with the Government of Vietnam."

Therefore, I have concentrated my review in this section on what the United States knew and did not know as of the date of General Quang's presentation in September, 1972 -- ie: a "zero-based review."

A. NUMBERS

The following statements by General Quang concerning the capture and detention of 1,205 American personnel between 1964 and 1972 are examined below in the order they appear (to the extent possible).

1. "At first, the number of American POWs was not large and world public opinion paid little attention to them."

There is no doubt that this statement is accurate. A review of a listing of POW/MIAs by year of loss demonstrates this fact. More importantly, efforts by private U.S. citizens and U.S. Government officials (most notably Secretary of Defense Mel Laird, H. Ross Perot, Sybil Stockdale and other family members) to bring public attention to the plight of POWs did not actively begin until late 1969. For many years, the families had been told not to talk publicly about their loved ones held in Hanoi. Even some U.S. officials had been urged to do likewise.

For example, during a September 21, 1992 hearing of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, former Secretary of Defense (during this period) Mel Laird stated:

"It was the attitude of our Government at that time that we should not discuss the POW/MIA question, and it was felt that it

would somehow hamper the negotiations, the secret negotiations which were going on at the time in Paris. It was my attitude that should be changed...I was urged by many people not to go public on this particular issue. I remember Ambassador Harriman coming to see me urging me not to go public, but I felt as Secretary of Defense, it was my responsibility. These were my people."

2. "The number of American POWs in North Vietnam grew day by day after 5 August 1964 when the U.S. imperialists started massive air bombing and off-shore bombardment by the 7th fleet of the territory of North Vietnam, and after having expanded their aggression onto the territories of Laos and Vietnam."

While most Americans do not agree with General Quang's references to American "imperialism" and "aggression", the statement, taken as a whole, has a basis in fact and is well-documented by the United States Government. Most significant is the date selected by General Quang as the beginning of the war against North Vietnam -- August 5, 1964. On this date, 1st. Lt. Everett Alvarez, U.S. Navy, became the first American serviceman to be shot down over North Vietnam. His capture was kept secret by North Vietnam, and a Vietnam News Agency bulletin shown to him after his capture stated that, according to the U.S. Government, no one had seen his parachute open and the U.S. Navy assumed him to be lost at sea. Lt. Alvarez was held by North Vietnam for the next nine years and was released during Operation Homecoming in 1973.

3. "...the 1,205 American POWs presently in prisons of North Vietnam include 624 aviators captured in North Vietnam; 143 aviators captured in South Vietnam; 47 diversionists and other American servicemen captured in North Vietnam; 391 American servicemen of other categories, which include 283 captured in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and 43 in Laos...The 1,205 American POWs kept in the prisons of North Vietnam represents a large number. For now, we have officially published a list of only 368 POWs. The rest are not acknowledged. The U.S. Government is aware of this, but they do not know the exact number of POWs, or they perhaps only assume an approximate number based on their losses. Therefore, in accordance with the instructions from the Politburo, we are keeping the number secret."

a.) What do U.S. statistics from 1972/73 show? -- General Quang's presentation of these figures was made in September, 1972. U.S. statistics from April 1, 1972 (five months earlier) give the following information: 412 missing U.S. personnel in NVN and 388 captured U.S. personnel in NVN for a total of 800 POW/MIAs in North

Vietnam; 456 missing U.S. personnel in SVN and 96 captured U.S. personnel in SVN for a total of 552 POW/MIAs in South Vietnam (including those lost in Cambodia); 278 missing U.S. personnel from Laos and 5 captured U.S. personnel from Laos for a total of 283 POW/MIAs in Laos. These figures total 1,635 POW/MIAs, and exclude several hundred U.S. personnel listed as killed in action/body not recovered as of April 1, 1972.

From April 1, 1972 to September 14, 1972 (the day before Quang's report), the U.S. lost an additional 56 POW/MIAs in South Vietnam/Cambodia, 7 MIAs in Laos, and 97 POW/MIAs in North Vietnam, for a total of 160 additional POW/MIAs. $1,635 + 160 = 1,795$ POW/MIAs as of the day before General Quang's report. In addition, there were several hundred more servicemen listed as KIA/BNR. Although the majority of these are confirmed dead, we have subsequently learned that a few were actually captured.

Taken in the aggregate, General Quang's total figure of 1,205 U.S. POWs is, therefore, plausible based on an analysis of U.S. statistics alone. It is also plausible when the figures are further broken down.

For example, General Quang refers to a combined total of 671 Americans captured in North Vietnam. As of September 14, 1972, the U.S. listed 897 Americans as captured and missing in North Vietnam. At Operation Homecoming (12 February - 1 April 1973), 405 POWs captured and held in North Vietnam as of September 15, 1972 returned home alive. Using General Quang's September figure of 671 POWs captured in North Vietnam, this means a remaining 266 POWs, referred to as captured and held in North Vietnam as of September 15, 1972, were not returned at Homecoming five months later.

Moreover, immediately following Operation Homecoming, the U.S. Government listed approximately 430 unaccounted for POW/MIAs lost in North Vietnam prior to September 15, 1972. For General Quang's remaining 266 figure to be accurate, it would mean that slightly more than half of the 430 unaccounted for POW/MIAs lost in North Vietnam before September 15, 1972 survived their incident, were captured, and were held in isolation from the 457 POWs captured in the North by the end of the war who were allowed to return during Homecoming. When a reasonable percentage of the KIA/BNR's from the north is factored in based on subsequent U.S. evidence, as well as the number from the 430 for whom there was evidence of survival or capture (to include recent evidence obtained by the U.S. in Vietnam), we can arrive at a slightly less than 50% survival rate for those men lost in North Vietnam before Quang's report for whom the U.S. had no contemporaneous evidence of capture or death.

Is it plausible that approximately 50% of the 430 missing men could have been captured and held in North Vietnam without the knowledge of the U.S. Government or the POWs who were eventually returned? Again, I believe the answer is yes. Certainly, there were scores of cases during the war where the U.S. did not know for long periods of time whether a particular MIA had, in fact, been captured.

If true, and allowing for a margin of error based on U.S. remains returned by Vietnam since 1973, it would mean Hanoi kept back approximately 25% of the U.S. airmen captured in North Vietnam during the war. When we consider some of the details of the outstanding last known alive discrepancy cases from the North used by General Vessey, in addition to the large number of post-war U.S. intelligence reports beginning in 1973 of pilots allegedly being held after the war, it becomes even more plausible that such an act by Vietnam could have taken place.

On the day of the signing of the Paris accords (January 27, 1973), the U.S. listed over 1,950 personnel as missing or captured in Southeast Asia. North Vietnam returned 591 living U.S. POWs during Homecoming. This left some 1,300 personnel as unaccounted for POWs and MIAs. If General Quang's September 15, 1972 "1,205" number of U.S. POWs is correct, then North Vietnam knew on the day of the signing of the Paris accords that nearly half of all the unaccounted for POW/MIAs not on their January 27, 1973 list of those to be returned were being secretly kept back by them for whatever reason.

In very simplistic terms, we can say that General Quang is reported to have secretly disclosed to his Politburo that a little over 1,200 American POWs were held in September, 1972. About 600 POWs came home 5 months later. That leaves over 600 POWs remaining (how much "over" 600 depends on who was actually captured between September and December, 1972 and not returned.) We can then take this "over 600" or "at least" 600 figure and compare it with the 1,284 unaccounted for American POWs and MIAs listed as of May, 1973. In short, it's about half, meaning there existed a roughly 50% survival rate for those cases where the U.S. government had no idea if the man was alive or dead. (Indeed, on May 24, 1973, the Pentagon's POW/MIA chief had told his superiors that the 1,284 POW/MIA list meant that they didn't know if any of these individuals were alive or dead.) Again, I find this scenario to be plausible.

B. What were U.S. expectations and reactions on POW figures?

In evaluating the numbers in General Quang's report, and the plausibility of a few or several hundred POWs having been held

back, it is necessary to examine U.S. expectations on the numbers of possible POWs to be returned at the end of the war.

On December 22, 1970, Hanoi's representatives handed over an "official" list of the names of 368 POWs to representatives of Senators Kennedy and Fulbright (including 9 previously released POWs and 20 who were listed as having died in captivity.) Quang's report also accurately acknowledges that the 368 figure was the only officially published list. On Christmas Day, North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong told Canadian newsman Michael Maclear that the list was a "complete and full account" of all the Americans who were prisoners of the North Vietnamese, adding "I swear to you that these men are well-treated."

However, as of December, 1970, the official figures from the DoD's Comptroller's Officer showed 462 POWs, 962 MIAs (hostile missing), and 117 (non-hostile missing) for a total of 1,541 POW/MIAs.

Additionally, the U.S. had gathered information both before and after 1970 indicating that this was not true. Almost a year and a half earlier, on August 5, 1969, USAF Captain Wesley Rumble had been released from over a year in captivity in North Vietnam. On August 7, 1969, during a debriefing at Andrews AFB, he provided a memorized list of 370 U.S. POWs supposedly held captive. When it had become apparent he might be released, fellow POWs had passed the names to him in an effort to get word to the U.S. on which of its missing personnel had been captured.

One year after the Dec. 1970 list was published by North Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Mel Laird held a press conference (in January, 1972) to show that North Vietnam was lying on the total number of prisoners. During his press conference, he used several illustrative cases of men known to have been captured by North Vietnamese forces who were not on the list.

In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on June 24, 1992, Secretary Laird stated: "We weren't being critical of the Kennedy list...we were glad to get that information, but it was not complete information and we knew of the existence of other POWs when those lists were delivered to us (through Senator Kennedy)."

Additionally, in a statement prepared for release on May, 1971, yet never published at U.S. request, a recently-defected North Vietnamese Army doctor, Dan Tan, had provided the following information in response to Hanoi's "complete" list in December, 1970 and its policy toward POWs:

"Human beings - American POWs held in North Vietnam are being treated as commodities. According to the policies of the Central Committee, the Lao Dong Party (NVN Communist Party) intends to use these American POW's as hostages in bargaining to achieve its political objectives. Illustrative of this is the statement made by Hanoi's representatives in Paris that North Vietnam now holds only 367 American POWs in captivity. Ladies and Gentlemen, this is untrue. I know that already by mid-1967, when I departed North Vietnam, over 800 American POWs were then in captivity in North Vietnam...when will these American POWs be released? It is possible that some will never be released as they are too valuable to North Vietnam as sources of information and for the technical skills they possess...I am deeply concerned over the fate of all the American POWs in NVN, but most particularly over 500 or more who were not named by NVN in Paris. These unnamed American POWs will continue to be exploited by NVN and will serve as the tool for NVN in blackmailing the USA...My knowledge about American POWs is derived not only from numerous official briefings given by senior cadres of the propaganda and training commission of the Central Committee, but also from discussions with various officials and individuals who were directly and indirectly involved in the exploitation of American POWs."

In a memorandum to Dr. Kissinger on May 10, 1971, the Central Intelligence Agency described that Dr. Tan had "demonstrated himself knowledgeable of North Vietnamese policies with respect to the handling of US prisoners of war," and was reported to have personal acquaintance with "many ranking NVN personalities, particularly Vice Minister of Public Security Pham Kiet and Vice Minister of National Defense, Nguyen Don."

The Defense Intelligence Agency is reported to have listed 1,516 POW/MIAs and an additional 807 KIA/BNRs as of September 30, 1969 when Dr. Tan rallied to the South. Official Defense Department statistics had also shown 847 POW/MIAs at the end of 1967 when Dr. Tan had obtained his 800 figure.

Finally, concerning Dr. Tan's reporting, it is interesting to note his comments in his first CIA debriefing over one year before Hanoi's "official" release of the 368 list. According to CIA, Dr. Tan had relayed the following in November, 1969:

"Names of American POWs, and the number in captivity, are considered to be a state secret and will not be released for political reasons...the DRV is deliberately withholding the names of all POWs...Any names of POWs which may have been publicized have been made only because this serves specific ulterior motives of the DRV. Tan concludes in these cases that the DRV has gained the cooperation of those individuals whose names it has publicized or who are permitted to write letters."

Indeed, six months before Hanoi's official 368 list was published, the U.S. knew that more than 368 POWs were held, and that Dr. Tan's statements had a ring of authenticity. On July 10, 1970, Acting Secretary of the Army Thaddeus Beal wrote the Secretary of Defense stating:

"In December, 1969, DRV officials began stating that all American PW were permitted to correspond with their families, and the DRV post office referred to 320 such correspondents. The flow of letters began to increase. Using (U.S. anti-war activist) Cora Weiss' Committee of Liaison as an intermediary the enemy has allowed some 336 American PW to write six-line letters home. Of these, 202 were writing home for the first time and some were men who had been missing for nearly five years. At present, Cora Weiss maintains that about 334 Americans are detained by Hanoi. But the facts are that 780 Americans are listed as missing in North Vietnam, and 769 in South Vietnam and Laos. We know with some certainty that of this number, 376 are PW in North Vietnam and 78 are PW elsewhere in Indochina. We expect that among those listed as missing, substantial numbers will eventually turn up as captives...To accept Hanoi's indirect admission of responsibility for less than 350 US PW as conduct constituting reasonable, humane, or internationally responsible conduct is to betray those other forgotten Americans." Five months later, Hanoi's "indirect admission" became a "direct admission" when they officially published 368 names, the approximate Cora Weiss number, as a "full and complete" accounting.

The following statement before an August 14, 1993 hearing of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs demonstrates how real the possibility was that persons listed by the U.S. as MIAs had actually been captured:

H. ROSS PEROT: "If when (news correspondent) Murphy Martin had brought Mrs. Singelton (wife of an MIA) into my office (in 1969) I had said prove that your husband went down in Laos. Was there ever a beeper? She would say well, I don't know. I'd say check with the Air Force or I won't talk to you anymore. She came back in a few days and said there was no beeper. I said, well, he was killed on impact, then. Forget it. Instead, we spent 90 days -- this was while the war was going on. We put the Vietnamese feet to the fire -- in a brutal way about Jerry Singelton. And finally they got so sick of us they admitted they had him. And they had to account for him. And when I finally got to visit with him after he came home (in 1973), I said Jerry, there wasn't a beeper. And he said Perot, the dumbest thing I ever did in my life was not check the batteries before I flew the mission."

Indeed, there are several other examples which can be cited to illustrate the possibility that an additional 600-700 POW/MIAs could have been held in North Vietnam without the knowledge of the U.S. Government. (Note: The possibility that they were held without the knowledge of fellow prisoners is addressed below under "C. Locations.")

The first letter Lt. Alvarez (the first captured POW in North Vietnam) eventually received was from his wife who told him that no one knew he was alive, and she was, therefore, writing in the hopes he was alive. The Navy had assumed him to be lost at sea.

POW Bill Franke was informed by a fellow POW in North Vietnam that he had been reported killed in action on August 24, 1965. There had been a memorial service for him at the Miramar Naval Air Station in San Diego. His life insurance had been paid to his wife, and she had bought a new house and set about making a new life for herself. (Source: "P.O.W." by John Hubbell, 1976)

Marine PFC Ronald L. Ridgeway had been reported killed in an ambush near Khesanh in 1968, and a subsequent memorial service had been held for him at Jefferson Barracks, MO. He showed up on the Communist POW lists on January 27, 1973, the day the peace accords were signed. Only then, five years later, was he known to be alive. (Source: Ibid.)

Sgt. First Class Carroll Flora became missing in action on July 21, 1967 during an Army Special Forces night action. For six years, until he was listed as a POW on the January 27, 1973 Communist list, his wife didn't know if he had been killed or captured. (Source: "The Raid" by Benjamin Schemmer, 1976)

Numerous other examples can be found by reviewing POW/MIA and KIA/BNR lists, and recent information uncovered through archival research and interviews in Vietnam and Laos. The point here is to simply point out that there continue to be several hundred cases where the U.S. Government cannot prove if currently unaccounted for MIAs were captured or killed, and thus, we cannot dismiss these facts in analyzing General Quang's total 1,205 number.

Today, there are over 1,160 unaccounted for U.S. personnel who were listed as missing in action during the war, including over 340 lost in North Vietnam and 328 in Laos. For several hundred of them, we still don't know for sure whether they were captured or killed during their incident, and in many cases, we know Vietnam has knowledge concerning what happened.

In looking at General Quang's total 1,205 figure of American POWs, we should bear in mind the reaction of some U.S. officials in January, 1973 when only 591 came home. In detailed testimony

before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on June 24, 1992, Lt. General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr. (USAF-ret), former Director of Intelligence for the U.S. Pacific Command in 1972/73, stated the following:

"As the Paris Peace negotiations neared their conclusion, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC) received tasking relative to his responsibility as Military Commander of Pacific Forces to forward as accurate a list as possible of the military personnel CINCPAC and component commanders expected to be returned by the enemies on the anticipated successful conclusion of the Paris Peace negotiations."

"CINCPAC directed that I assemble a group of senior intelligence officers from my CINCPAC intelligence staff and from the headquarters of the component commanders' staffs to build a master CINCPAC list in response to the request (from the Secretary of Defense and/or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

"Each of the component commanders, CINC Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Army, Pacific, CINC Pacific Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, quickly named a senior intelligence specialist to work under my direction and additional analysts, personnel specialists and clerical personnel as necessary to complete the task. Their role was to assemble all of the records and intelligence available to each of their headquarters, in the CINCPAC intelligence conference room, and to compile a list, by military service, of the names, rank, and other relative data on each missing individual on which sufficient intelligence and other data was available to reasonably expect that he had survived and would be returned on successful conclusion of the Paris negotiations."

"Toward that end, a complete evidentiary dossier was to be compiled on each individual. Altogether, some thirty people were directly involved in the project..."

"For construction of the list, I instructed the analysts to gather any and all pertinent data which could support or deny the possibility of survival of the missing in action. Information and intelligence included operational reports, human reports, eye-witness reports of fellow combat personnel, "jolly green" reports (of attempted rescues) from helicopter crews, communications intercepts, photographs, and other data from the print and other news media and any other data from any other source, which might shed light on the missing. Much of the data had been collected by the individual military departments who were responsible for casualty reporting..."

"They (the lists) were to be as accurately anticipatory as humanly possible. Logistic planning and a great deal of human

endeavor and emotion were tied in to the determination of naming an individual... The very highly classified and sensitive lists were sent to the Commander in Chief -- Admiral Gayler -- to the Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

"I don't remember any feedback from the lists or inquiry on it...I don't remember any reaction prior to the release of names of POWs by the Hanoi Government. I certainly remember the shock and sadness of the paucity of the lists of names we received versus what we expected. I know my boss, Admiral Gayler, certainly reacted and there was lots of discussion of what might be done, etc...I do remember that we discussed all kinds of possibilities including the expectation of separate talks with and extraction of POWs from Laos and Cambodia, etc."

SENATOR KERRY (CHAIRMAN): "What was your expectation about how many should be returning and what did you think when you saw the lists presented by the North Vietnamese, personally?"

GENERAL TIGHE: "My personal view was shock because I had a great deal of faith in the approximate numbers of those lists that we had compiled and the dossiers and my reaction was that there was something radically wrong with the (NorthVietnamese) lists versus our information, that they should have contained many more names. That was my personal judgement and that was a collective judgement of all those that had worked compiling the lists."

SENATOR KERRY: "Did you communicate that to anybody at the time?"

GENERAL TIGHE: "Only to my commander. I had no reason to go beyond that. It had been made very sensitive...we kept reassuring ourselves that there was something yet to come. The whole aura...dealt with a feeling we were only dealing with part of the numbers. There was more to come that we weren't aware of."

(Note: In earlier Select Committee interviews and a deposition with General Tighe, he stated that the list he compiled was entitled "Anticipated PW Returnees" and that it contained names of 900-1,000 men.)

During the same hearing, an exchange took place with Admiral Tom Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1973, on the same issue:

SENATOR REID: "Admiral Moorer, would you give me your reasons why you believed there were POWs still in Southeast Asia?"

ADMIRAL MOORER: "Well, because the scope of the operations and the number of persons that were involved and the number of aircraft that were shot down and so on, where we didn't find immediate information about what happened to the pilot and so on. I thought also, in view of the fact that the war had been going on for 9 years, you know, I certainly would expect it to be more than 591...I didn't think you could clean it up that fast."

In the same hearing, former Secretary of Defense Mel Laird stated in response to the final lists turned over by North Vietnam in January, 1973:

SECRETARY LAIRD: "It was my gut feeling that there were more. I think the last figures we had (when he left office in 1972) were that the lists of POWs probably would contain quite a few more names than that. We were disappointed."

Finally, in examining the numbers and policy outlined by General Quang, we should remember the large-volume of post-war live-sighting reports of American POWs reported left behind in captivity. Several hundred of these reports had already surfaced by the mid to late 1970's prior to the raising of this issue as a highest national priority by President Reagan in 1982. During this period, U.S. collection activities on possible POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia were at an all time low, as described in the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs (January, 1993). Taken in the aggregate, the reports, the majority of which were unconfirmed at the time, represented a compelling reason to believe that large numbers of American POWs could still have been alive in Laos and Vietnam. It was not as if the United States had no information to question whether North Vietnam had returned all POWs following the war. We certainly did have indications, despite the conclusions of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in 1976 and the Presidential (Woodcock) Commission in 1977.

Some of the information came from seemingly credible sources whose stories cannot be easily dismissed today. The discovery of the Quang document should cause the U.S. Government to take a closer look at these reports which corroborate General Quang's references to several hundred more POWs held by Hanoi.

For instance, in November, 1979, U.S. investigators interviewed former North Vietnamese Lieutenant Le Dinh, who had served as an intelligence analyst in 1971 in the General Headquarters of the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense. In 1972, he had become a permanent member of the Lao Dong Party (now the Communist Party of Vietnam.) Le Dinh claimed that his position within the North Vietnamese military intelligence hierarchy provided him access to intelligence on many topics, including

American prisoners of war. U.S. intelligence debriefers determined that "much of the information furnished regarding the personalities in the General Headquarters is confirmed as accurate..." and that he "demonstrated that he had access to information about the North Vietnamese military agency responsible for American prisoners."

Le Dinh stated that following the end of the war, "he heard at staff meetings that about 700 Americans still remained in Vietnam. The information was attributed to remarks by senior officers to the effect that the SRV had retained a "strategic asset" of over 700 American prisoners that could be used to force the U.S. to pay reparations." The conclusion reached privately by the U.S. in 1980 was that "Le Dinh's story is intriguing and not yet fully known." Indeed, there are several hundred reports from refugees which have outlined the same policy outlined by General Quang in 1972. We also know that the North Vietnamese clearly linked "the search for missing Americans" with the U.S. "obligation" to provide economic assistance during the November, 1976 meetings in Paris, and on numerous other occasions.

B. DESCRIPTIONS

1. "The 624 American aviators (in North Vietnam) include 3 astronauts, ie: three people who have completed the necessary training for space flight, for instance, Jim Katlo, who was captured in the vicinity of Hanoi. This figure also includes 15 US Air Force aces having more than 4,000 flight hours each: Norman Klarvisto, Karmet, Jim Intist Shasht, and others."

The North Vietnamese were obviously very proud that they had captured such prized possessions of the United States.

"Jim Katlo" probably refers to Jim Kasler, an Air Force Major shot down and captured on the western outskirts of Hanoi on August 8, 1966. On the day of his capture, TIME MAGAZINE had run an article featuring the career, complete with a photo, of "U.S. Air Force Major James Kasler, 40, of Indianapolis, who is dubbed by his wingmates as "one-man Air Force."

The article, which Kasler had not yet seen but the North Vietnamese had, continued, "A World War II tail-gunner and six-kill ace in Korea, Kasler in five months has limped home four times with his F-105 riddled by flaks or Migs, has seen 30 SAM missiles zoom up in his vicinity, tangled in the longest dogfight with Migs thus far of the war. Six weeks ago, Kasler flew as co-leader of the raid on Hanoi's oil installations...says a fellow pilots, "he is hawk." The four-plane flight that Kasler commands (has) destroyed

or damaged 219 buildings, 66 barges, 53 railroad cars, 44 trucks, 36 fuel tanks, 28 bridges, and 16 flak sites -- a record for any such air unit...says he, "the best way to survive is by being aggressive."

It is certainly plausible that General Quang would highlight this case if indeed Jim Katlo (GRU 1972 Russian language translation) was Jim Kasler.

In addition, General Quang's reference to 3 persons who had completed the necessary training "for space flight" is not absurd from the North Vietnamese point of view. On February 11, 1965, Lt. Cmdr. Robert Shumaker, USN, had been shot down and captured over North Vietnam. A Vietnam News Agency release had stated that Commander Shumaker "had been selected to be an astronaut" (Source: P.O.W. by John Hubbel, 1976, Reader's Digest Press.) Therefore, even if Shumaker, in fact, had not been selected to be an astronaut, the North Vietnamese believed otherwise.

I have also learned that two other returned POWs, Navy Lts. Ned Shuman and Bill Lawrence, had indeed gone through astronaut training in the United States prior to their capture in North Vietnam. Thus, it is certainly plausible for General Quang to state that three people who had completed "the necessary training for space flight" were among those captured in North Vietnam.

Air Force aces named by General Quang as having more than 4,000 flight hours each is also plausible. For instance, the Russian translated name "Norman Klarvisto" could have been Norman Carl Gaddis, an Air Force 06, who could easily have had more than 4,000 hours flight time. "Jim Intist Shasht" appears to be heavily garbled and lends credence to the view that the Quang speech may have been collected by the Soviet GRU via recording devices. However, this name could conceivably translate to Jim Hiteshew, an Air Force colonel shot down over North Vietnam in 1967 who returned alive in 1973. Other POWs with famous histories also had 4,000 hours of flight time, such as USAF Colonel Robinson Risner who had been an ace in Korea and was considered one of the Air Force's best. He had been on the cover of Time Magazine prior to his capture, and North Vietnam was already well-aware of his background when he was captured.

2. "A few words about the political views and attitudes of American POWs...the following is a summation: 368 POWs holding progressive views (according to the North Vietnamese) who can be released first...372 POWs holding neutral positions and 465 POWs holding reactionary views."

Vietnam's attempts to categorize the perceived political views of their POWs into separate categories is well documented, and in

this sense, General Quang's remarks are generally accurate. It is conceivable that General Quang's presentation to the Politburo on this specific area was considered to be the definitive report to date on the results of interrogations of American prisoners of war held in North Vietnam.

In John Hubbell's book, P.O.W., published in 1976, he recounts statements from North Vietnamese interrogators relayed to him through former POWs after the war. They are amazingly similar to General Quang's comments. For example, the following statement was made by one interrogator:

"You must decide whether you are going to take the good path, the path of Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese people, the path of cooperation; or whether you are going to take the bad path, the path of resistance and death."

"Those who take the good path will receive good treatment. They will receive better food and lots of exercise and sunshine. They will have recreation. They will be allowed to read and study. When the time comes, they can expect to be released and go home to their families, perhaps even before the war ends."

"But we know that the vast majority will not be able to take the good path because they have been spoiled by the American system. They will understand the good path, but will not be able to take it because they are set in their ways. We understand that, and they will be treated humanely, because even though they do not take the good path, they will not take the bad path, either. They will receive enough food and medical care, and when the time comes they will be released to go home."

"But also there will be a very small group of diehards. These people will take the bad path. They will refuse to admit their mistakes and will refuse to apologize and cooperate with the Vietnamese people. They will oppose us and resist us, and lead others against us. That group will be severely punished. We are done with the diehard criminals. Theirs is the path of uncertainty and death."

Captured Viet Cong documents from as early as 1966 show that the approved Communist policy toward U.S. POWs fit the pattern described by General Quang. A January, 1966 directive from the Enemy Proselyting Staff stated, in part:

"...in order not to disclose the identity and number of prisoners and prevent their contact with the enemy, the mail of POWs whose names have not been made public or known by the enemy or who are stubborn, will not be forwarded. Instead, their letters will be kept and studied. Letters of progressive and cooperative

POWs will be forwarded and received for them, but only on the occasions of holidays. Stubborn POWs will not be prevented from writing, but their letters will not be forwarded and their incoming mail will be detained and only delivered when we deem appropriate."

Hubbell goes on in his book to discuss several cases in detail where the POWs were forced into "taking the good path." A few had done it almost voluntarily to the disgust of the majority of strong-willed POWs. It is, therefore, conceivable by Vietnamese standards, that they believed they were succeeding in ascribing attitudes to the POWs based on the results of interrogations.

North Vietnamese defector Dr. Tan, whom I have earlier referenced, also confirmed to the U.S. Government as early as 1970, the categorization of POWs as outlined by General Quang in 1972. Dr. Tan referred to the following categories used by North Vietnam "to meet its objectives":

"A. Those who are considered special or important POWs by virtue of the importance of the information which they have provided or because of the potential which they offer to NVN at some future date."

"B. Hard-core POWs who, because or in spite of their refusal to cooperate or provide information, are considered to have the same potential as POWs in the paragraph A category."

"C. Non-important or "progressive" POWs whose continued presence in NVN, after thorough debriefing, will bring little or no further advantages to NVN and who, therefore, can be released whenever it best serves the DRV's purposes."

"Only the progressive POWs can be exploited for purposes of collection intelligence information through their contacts in the U.S. or by persuading these contacts to engage in anti-war activities. Prisoners of the other two categories cannot be exploited for this purpose because it could lead to the surfacing of their identities. The identities of POWs in the first category are carefully guarded because identifying them as POWs rather than as missing or killed in action would permit the enemy to employ countermeasures to negate the value of the information which they are providing. Similarly, the identities of hard-core POWs are kept secret because they may not survive the application of interrogation and other techniques to make them cooperate."

According to a 1973 Defense Intelligence Agency appraisal of the treatment of the returned POWs based on their debriefs, the 436 U.S. POWs released by the DRV during Homecoming had experienced a "general absence of torture" and "gradually improved living conditions" from 1970 to 1973, whereas torture had been "prevalent"

for the POWs from this group who were held prior to 1969. This group of POWs, therefore, could have included the majority of the POWs whom North Vietnam considered to be progressive by September, 1972, regardless of whether or not they actually were.

We know from an interview conducted by Joint Task Force (Full Accounting) in March, 1993 that evaluation reports were regularly submitted to the political departments concerning which U.S. POWs were considered "progressive" by their interrogators. These reports were meticulously prepared and appear to be part of a well-organized, long-established plan for which there is evidence indicating General Quang played a central role. Thus, General Quang's report fills in a pattern which can be substantiated by U.S. evidence. Obviously, at some point, the Politburo was informed on the results of interrogations, etc, and it is logical to assume that September 15, 1972 was one major reporting session "in accordance with instructions from the Politburo."

Hubbell also tells about statements by North Vietnamese interrogators beginning in 1970 where the POWs began to be referred to as "prisoners" or "prisoners of war" as opposed to the term "war criminals" which had been prevalent in earlier years. Additionally, several returned POWs have recalled specific instances, beginning in 1969, there they were told "you are no longer criminals but prisoners of war." Thus, General Quang's reference to the men as prisoners of war in his report to the politburo appears to have been the correct term used by the North Vietnamese between 1970 and the end of the war. Even in the private Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks, these terms had been used by the North Vietnamese (according to declassified transcripts.)

Finally, General Quang states that through their interrogations of POWs, they had "collected data about American weapons and also valuable scientific materials about the U.S. Army, for instance, material on how to use different types of weaponry, tactical/technical characteristics of aircraft, Air Force directives, as well as materials about other types of armament of the US Army." No returned POW would dispute the fact that information on these matters was provided by POWs on several occasions, although in many instances, the information given was purposely incorrect or a combination of half-truths.

In the book P.O.W., author Hubbell reveals, in some instances, how POWs were interrogated on such matters:

"Letters from your family in return for answering these questions. The offer was made to Bob Shumaker, and was real enough. The letters, one from his wife, Lorraine, and the other from his mother, were shown to him. How badly he wanted them! It had been more than a year since his shoot-down, and he had received

no word from home in a long time. But the questions were not the kind one could play games with. There were thirty-five of them, and they were highly technical, dealing with antimissile warning systems in aircraft, pulse repetition frequencies, band widths, and so on. They implied a knowledge that Bob felt certain far exceeded the technological expertise of the Vietnamese -- even he, with advanced degrees in two technical fields, would not have been able to answer more than half of them. Surely, the questionnaire had been prepared by others, who were not likely to be fooled by any foolish answers he might give. The price for the letters being too high, he declined to pay it. He was seated on a stool for twelve days, and ordered to "think deeply."

Other U.S. intelligence indicates that the Russians and Chinese were directly involved (face to face) in interrogations of U.S. POWs, especially in the mid to late 1960's. Yet none of the POWs who returned in 1973 reported direct contact with Russian or Chinese officers (according to DIA). The issue of who these reports, therefore, pertained to has not been resolved, and should be more closely addressed in view of General Quang's report in Russian language in the GRU archives.

As former DIA Director General Eugene Tighe stated before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on June 24, 1992:

"Something that has bothered me down through the years is if your records show that none of our prisoners of war who returned were ever interrogated by the Chinese or Russians...those nations which had the most reason to interrogate our prisoners...and my suggestion is that until that is all cleared up and we find out, there may have been another track by which our prisoners were routed...that introduces a whole new aspect to the question."

C. LOCATIONS

"All of them (1,205 American POWs) are presently in prisons in North Vietnam. Currently, we have 11 prisons where American POWs are held. We used to have 4 large prisons, however after the American attempt to free their POWs from Son Tay, we expanded this number to 11. Each prison holds approximately 100 POWs."

This is perhaps the most difficult part of the presentation to accept at face value without additional information from the Ministries of Defense and Interior in Vietnam, and the former Soviet GRU in Moscow. This does not mean, however, that this portion of the presentation should be rejected based solely on what the U.S. Government believes it new about the wartime prison system from returnee debriefs and other information.

We now know that as of September 15, 1972, there were six U.S. POW detention facilities holding the POWs who eventually returned at Homecoming (their "nicknames" were Dogpatch, Hanoi Hilton, Mountain Camp, Plantation, Rockpile, and the Zoo.) If General Quang's report is accurate, then there were an additional five camps holding U.S. POWs in September, 1972.

We know from the debriefs of the returnees at Homecoming, that they had been held in 13 different camps in North Vietnam since the war began, yet during this period, the Defense Intelligence Agency only knew of 8 "confirmed" U.S. POW camps "in which there is conclusive evidence that American prisoners are, or were, detained on a permanent basis." During this period, the Defense Intelligence Agency was also closely watching 18 "possible" U.S. POW camps in North Vietnam. In some of these camps, there was compelling information to cause DIA to list them as suspected U.S. POW camps. Yet, no one ever returned from any of these camps, and to date, the U.S. Government has not confirmed that no one was ever held in the camps. Indeed, the record clearly shows we have not even requested to visit many of the suspect camps where the information about possible U.S. POWs was the most compelling.

In my judgement, the possibility clearly exists that some U.S. POWs could have been held in separate camps which were not brought into the consolidation process when it first began and subsequently after the Son Tay Raid in November, 1970. If, in the early stages of the war, the inner and outer Hanoi U.S. POW camp system had been consistently separated from other holding systems, including some well outside the outskirts of Hanoi, then a separate system could have existed. Indeed, it is interesting to note the assessment of some DIA analysts that the POW registry (of 354 visible names of persons lost between 1964 and February, 1972) recently provided to General Vessey in Hanoi in April, 1993 appears to list the individuals in the order they were registered into the Hanoi prison system, not in chronological order according to shutdown.

Finally, according to DIA records, Hanoi did take steps to prevent communications between different groups of prisoners by holding them separately, such as the five U.S. POWs from Laos held separately at Briarpatch in the spring of 1971, and the separation of the 36 POWs captured in North Vietnam who were moved from Hoa Lo to Skidrow in March, 1971 and separated from the POWs already there who had been captured outside of North Vietnam.

Moreover, a study of the confinement chronology of the returned POWs suggests it is plausible that either the Mountain Camp (40 miles NW of Hanoi) or the Rockpile Camp (32 miles South of Hanoi) could have been the location of the 16 officers or colonels which were being held separately in September, 1972 according to General Quang ("Seven USAF colonels captured in North Vietnam and nine colonels of various branches captured in South Vietnam, Laos,

and Cambodia"). The Mountain Camp had been activated only eight months earlier when 8 U.S. POWs from Skidrow and 1 U.S. POW from Hoa Lo had been moved there. Rockpile had been activated over a year earlier when 14 U.S. POWs had been moved there who had been captured outside of North Vietnam. At Homecoming, 3 USAF colonels from the North returned while 4 continued to be listed as missing (ie: it is therefore conceivable, although not definitive, that 7 (4+3) USAF "colonels" captured in North Vietnam and 9 (8+1) colonels from outside North Vietnam could have been held separately. I only point this out in an effort to stimulate serious and thorough analysis of these possibilities.)

Could Hanoi have pulled off keeping other POWs back at Homecoming without U.S. knowledge? According to Dr. Kissinger's September 22, 1992 testimony before the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, "the Vietnamese are certainly capable of such a cynical act, and of lying about it."

These possibilities were clearly expressed in other hearings of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs long before the discovery of the Quang report in Russian archives.

It is fitting to close this section for now with the following exchange that took place in one such hearing on August 4, 1992 between the Defense Intelligence Agency POW/MIA chief, Robert Sheetz, and the Chairman of the Select Committee, Senator Kerry:

SENATOR KERRY: "There were groups of prisoners brought together for the release who only learned of each other being alive by virtue of the process of being brought together, correct?"

MR. SHEETZ: "There were prisoners that were consolidated toward the end."

SENATOR KERRY: "And some were held in different locations, perhaps 10 people in one location. Is that not accurate?"

MR. SHEETZ: "That's accurate."

SENATOR KERRY: "...Is it not possible, however, that a whole group of 10 held somewhere were never brought back to the main group and therefore held back in some other circumstances?"

MR. SHEETZ: "That is possible."

SENATOR KERRY: "So, the mere fact of debriefings not showing that somebody was not accounted for does not in and of itself dispose at all of the notion that somebody else could have been elsewhere?"

MR. SHEETZ: "That's true..."