

VIII BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON GENERAL TRAN VAN QUANG

(AKA - Bay Tien, Tu Bay, Tran Cong, Tran Nam Trung)

1917 - Date of Birth (Source: Nhan Dan Communist newspaper 11/21/92)

He was born in Nghe An Province in the panhandle of Vietnam, a province which was the birthplace of Ho Chi Minh and the home of the 1930 Nghe An Soviet uprising.

1936 - Quang joined Ho Chi Minh's Communist Party of Indochina. (Source: Ibid.) His brother, Tran Van Cung, was an associate of Ho Chi Minh and an early party organizer. His wife, Tran Thi Tu, is also reported to have been a close confidant of General Giap.

1936 to 1945 -- Quang is believed to have been jailed by French authorities and held in various facilities for his political activities.

1945 - Quang was freed from prison by Communist forces during the August 1945 Revolution and joined the People's Army of Vietnam, PAVN
(Source: Ibid)

1946 - Quang is believed to have been appointed concurrently to a staff position, Director of Staff for National Defense, and a political position, Political Officer, Vietnam's Relief Forces.

1947-1950 - According to French records, he was the Political Officer for Inter-Region IV, the area comprising the lower pan-handle of Vietnam down to the 16th parallel where he engaged in guerrilla activities.

1950-51 - Quang was transferred to the position of Deputy Commander and Political Officer of the 304th Main Force Division, an important Communist unit in the Viet Bac Special Region, the area surrounding Dien Bien Phu in the northwest of Hanoi.

Mid-1950's - Chief of the Enemy Proselyting Department, General Political Department, People's Army of Vietnam,

(Note: the Enemy Proselyting Department under PAVN is responsible for the utilization, security, documentation, and exploitation of enemy prisoners and its functions continue to the present day.)

- During this period, Quang is reported to have supervised efforts to integrate stay-behinds of the French Foreign Legion into the "Viet Dung" assassination teams during special training sessions of the Enemy Proselyting/Research Department conducted at "Ba Be" lake in Bac Thai (formerly Bac Kan) Province, North Vietnam.

(Note: see reference to "Ba Be Plan" in Russian document on 15 Sept. 72 report by Quang)

- A former French POW named "Cuc" worked for General Quang at the Enemy Proselyting Department during this period (Source: Ibid)

Pre-1958 - Deputy Commander, 304th Division, PAVN
(Source: U.S. Embassy Saigon Biographical File, dated July, 1972)

1958 - Deputy Chief, General Staff, PAVN (Sources: Ibid and Reuters 4/19/93)

Starting during this period, Quang moved up to the position of Deputy Chief of Staff, PAVN, (the position reported by the GRU in their 1972 translation of Quang's September, 1972 report)

1959 - Deputy Chief, General Staff, PAVN
(Source: Ibid and Nhan Dan 11/21/92)

1960 - Deputy Chief, General Staff, PAVN (Source: Ibid)

*** - In this year, Quang was appointed as a concurrent member of the Communist Party Central Committee and the Ministry of National Defense' Central Military Affairs Party Committee.

1961 - Deputy Chief of Staff, General Staff, PAVN
(Source: Reuters quote from Quang 4/19/93)

- Major General, PAVN
- Member, Central Military Affairs Party Committee
(Source: U.S. Embassy Saigon Bio. File, July, 1972)

1961-1964 - Military Member of the Communist Party's Central Committee Bureau for South Vietnam (Source: Reuters 4/19/93)
- Military Commissioner of the National Liberation Front's Central Committee (Source: Nhan Dan 11/21/92)

1963 - General Tran Van Quang headed an Enemy Proselyting Department, General Political Directorate, PAVN, conference in Bac Thai province in his capacity as Chief of the EPD (Source: 20 Jan. 93 JTF/FA message)

1965-1974 - He became Army Commander of Military Region 4, or Inter-Region 4, and in 1967, when the B-4 Front Regional Headquarters opened to coordinate tactical operations throughout the Tri-Thien-Hue area, Quang concurrently became its political officer. (Sources: Nhan Dan Communist publication 11/21/92 and JTF/FA Jan. 93 message, and other sources.)

He is believed to have passed orders to the field by radio during most of this entire period.

1966 - In January, General Quang wrote a major publication in the communist publication "Hoc Tap" #1 entitled "Develop the Role of Militia and Self-Defense Forces." (Sources: CIA and U.S. Embassy Saigon Biographical File, July 1972, translated copy available, 13 pages)

1966 - In July, General Quang wrote a major publication in the communist publication "Qhan Doi Nhan Dan" (Source: Ibid)

1972 - Deputy Chief of Staff, VPA (Source: Retired North Vietnamese Colonel and former 1972/73 Communist spokesman Bui Tin -- comments made in April, 1993 prior to public disclosure of Russian document.)

General Quang is also believed to have been the operational commander and principal political officer for the April, 1972 "Easter Offensive".

1972 - July - Listed as Member of the Central Military Party Committee and a Deputy Chief of Staff from 1958 onward. (Source: U.S. Embassy Saigon Bio. File, July, 1972)

1972 - Listed as Deputy Chief of Staff, VPA and one of 14 members of the Central Military Affairs Party Committee and one of 5 Deputy Chiefs of Staff, VPA. (Source: U.S. Joint Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), U.S. Embassy, 1972)

1972 - Reported as Deputy Chief of Staff on September 15, 1972 in recently released Russian POW document.

1972 - "Quang told him (Gen. Vessey) he did not visit Hanoi in 1972 until months after the date of the report." (Source: Reuters, 4/19/93, Note: Report date Sept., 1972)

1973 - Deputy Chief of Staff, VPA, Member of Central Military Affairs Party Committee. (Source: JUSPAO, U.S. Embassy Saigon, 1973)

- 1973 - "He said he did serve twice as Deputy Chief of Staff, in 1958-1961 and again in 1973 or 1974. He said he received medical treatment in 1973, and he didn't specify whether he took the staff job that year or the next." (Source: Reuters, 4/19/93)
- 1973 - "He said he went to East Germany for medical treatment in 1973, but gave no details." (Source: Ibid.)
- 1973 - It is reported in U.S. records that Quang secretly became a full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1973 and was promoted to Lieutenant General.
- 1974 - On January 26th, the Hanoi Moi Communist publication is listing General Quang as:
- Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
 - Vice Minister of National Defense
 - Member of the Central Military Party Committee
 - Member of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party (Communist Party) Central Committee
- 1974-1978 - Deputy Chief of Staff of VPA
 Member of Central Military Party Committee
 Vice Minister of National Defense
 (Sources: Nhan Dan 11/21/92, Quan Doi Nhan Dan 3/31/76, Quan Doi Nhan Dan 5/4/76, Nhan Dan 12/4/77, Nhan Dan 3/2/78)
- 1979 - Vice Minister of National Defense (Source: Nhan Dan 12/20/79)
- 1979-1982 - Commander of Vietnamese troops in Laos (Source: Nhan Dan 11/21/92)
- 1980 - Deputy Defense Minister, SRV (Source: Indochina Archive, University of California, Professor Douglas Pike)
- 1981 - Vice Minister of National Defense (Source: Nhan Dan 9/30/81)
- 1982 - Vice Minister of National Defense (Source: Quan Doi Nhan Dan 12/24/82)
- 1983 - Vice Minister of National Defense (Source: Nhan Dan 11/30/83)
- 1984 - "Colonel general Tran Van Quang attended the departure of a Cuban military delegation." (Source: Nhan Dan 12/26/84)

1985 - Vice Minister of National Defense -- Reported as attending a meeting to commemorate the 68th anniversary of the October Revolution (7 Nov. 1917 - 7 Nov. 1985) at the Vietnam-Soviet Culture Friendship House (Source: Qhan Doi Nhan Dan 7 Nov. 85)

December, 1989 -- General Quang is reported to have presided over an Awards Ceremony of the Enemy Proselyting Department.

1991 - Deputy Minister of Defense for External Affairs
(Source: Joint Task Force memo to Select Committee
December, 1991)

- In response to a question posed by Senator McCain to JTF/FA senior analyst Garnett Bell at the Select Committee's November, 1991 hearings, General Tran Van Quang's name was provided to Bell's command and to the Select Committee with other names under the following notation:

"The SRV should make available for interview current and former cadre who were involved in the detention, evacuation, and medical treatment of US POWs. Although the Vietnamese have indicated that senior cadre were only peripherally involved, they should nevertheless be considered as potential witnesses due to their knowledge of policy matters, as well as the identities and current whereabouts of their former subordinates who were directly involved with US POWs. Some of these cadres are..."

1992 - Deputy Minister of Defense as of February 1st during meetings with General Vessey.
(Source: Vessey/Cam Joint Statement following meetings with Ministry officials on January 30/February 1, 1992)

- Deputy Minister of Defense during March, 1992 meetings Hanoi with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon.
- May 26th, 1992 JTF/FA research proposal -- General Quang is listed as one of three persons with approval authority for access to witnesses and records.

- In November, General Quang, presumably retired, was appointed head of the a Vietnam Veterans Association (Source: Qhan Dan 11/21/92)

NOTE: It is my understanding that the U.S. intelligence community believes that based on General Quang's distinguished command background, and eminent political standing, as outlined in this brief biography, "it is completely plausible" that he could be the person who could offer a political thesis to the politburo which involved further future aggressive moves for takeover of the South and political arguments advocated for the toughest deal to be made with American negotiators.

IX ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAMESE REACTION TO THE DISCLOSURE
OF THE 1972 REPORT BY GENERAL QUANG CONCERNING U.S. POWS
(IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE FORM)/(APRIL - JUNE, 1993)

A. STATEMENTS BY VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS.

The following statements, listed in chronological order by date, have been made by Vietnamese officials since delivery of the report to the Vietnamese Mission at the United Nations in New York by the Department of State and Department of Defense on April 12, 1993 (the same date the New York Times and Washington Times broke the stories). (Note: Russian General Volkogov had handed the POW portion of the report to the U.S. side in Moscow on April 8th)

In my opinion, and in view of the information in this Interim Analysis, each of the statements is deeply troubling and vastly inadequate in responding to serious questions raised by the 1972 General Quang Report to the North Vietnamese Politburo, and its subsequent disclosure in former Soviet Union archives 20 years later in Russian language form. Moreover, in view of the fact that another report to the Politburo by General Quang dated June 26, 1972 has been discovered in the Russian archives and authenticated by the Russian Government, we are compelled to continue to pursue this matter, notwithstanding Vietnam's total denials to date.

The statements are as follows:

"I think it is another fabrication of hostile circles in the U.S. who don't want normal relations with Vietnam. This fabrication comes out in order to obstruct the process of normalization of relations between the two countries."

(Source: Reuters Wire Service, Hanoi, 4/12/93 quoting an unidentified Vietnamese source who is reported to be an official of the Vietnam Veterans' Association which General Quang heads.)

"I think it's a false document. We did not share our secrets with the Soviets. We never held that many prisoners. In 1973, we released all the prisoners who were alive. You could see it (the disclosure of the Russian document) as a plot to throw a spoke in the wheels of normalization. The situation is quite complicated in Russia now. Such a document could have been deliberately planted. The KGB may have been formidable elsewhere, but they were not formidable on internal Vietnamese matters." According to the AFP reporter who did the interview, "the official acknowledged that such a report could have been sent from the military command (in North Vietnam) to the Politburo."

(Source: Agency French Press, Hanoi, 4/13/93, citing an unidentified Vietnamese official.)

"Hostile circles in the U.S. want to raise issues to obstruct the administration easing U.S. sanctions against Vietnam in international financial institutions...As far as I know, it (the Russian document) is not true. After 1973, we released 591 POWs, that's all there were." According to the Reuters reporter, the unidentified "senior" Vietnamese official had stated that General Quang was a "field commander" in the central province of Binh Tri Thien in September, 1972, when the secret report was purported to have been written. (Source: Reuters, Hanoi 4/13/93)

"Vietnam totally denies that ill-intentioned fabrication. The truth is that in 1973, after the Paris agreements were signed, Vietnam returned all American prisoners captured in Vietnam. According to documents published by the US Department of Defense and the US Department of State and authenticated by the US Senate Select Committee on MIA/POW issue in its latest report dated January 13, 1993, at the end of the war 1,172 American servicemen were reported missing and their fate was unaccounted for in Indochina, 798 of which in Vietnam. Through its efforts to cooperate with the US side in the humanitarian spirit, Vietnam has so far returned to the US side more than 500 remains and cooperated with the US Government in investigating 70 live-sighting reports and 135 other cases involving unclear dossiers. The results show no evidence of any American being kept living in freedom in Vietnam. Realities prove that the report carried by the New York Times is completely groundless."

(Source: Foreign Ministry Statement, Hanoi, Vietnam, as reported by Reuters and Vietnam News Agency, 4/13/93.)

AP's version of the statement stated Vietnam had "categorically rejected this ill-intentioned fabrication"

"Gen. Tran Van Quang had nothing to do with the general staff of the Vietnamese People's Army. There would be no reason for Gen. Tran Van Quang to have prepared this sort of report."

(Source: Nguyen Xuan Phong, Acting Director of the Americans Department at the Foreign Ministry in Hanoi, quoted in the New York Times, 4/13/93)

According to NYT reporter Philip Shenon, "Mr. Nguyen Ba Hung, a member of Mr. Phong's staff said General Quang had never been deputy chief of staff of the Army." Mr. Hung stated: "That's why it sounded very funny when we heard this report."

Those who have knowledge about the war and about the Army would have a better understanding."

(Source: NYT 4/13/93)

"This is a pure fabrication and we completely reject it."

(Source: Tran Van Tu, Deputy Director of Vietnam's official agency in charge of seeking persons missing from the war (VNOSMP as reported to Associated Press, 4/13/93).

"Vietnam rejects it firmly. I'm worried that one result of this type of information is the criminal creation of unnecessary suffering of the families of Americans missing in action." Mr. Phong stated it was "merely a fabrication."

(Source: Nguyen Xuan Phong, Acting Director of Americas Department, Foreign Ministry, Hanoi as quoted by the Associated Press, 4/13/93.)

"We think that it is a forgery document. It's totally false."

(Source: Vietnam's Ambassador to the United Nations, Le Van Bang, as quoted from CNN 4/13/93) During the same interview, Ambassador Le Bang stated that General Quang was a regional army commander and was not in a position to know the status of US POWs.

"In 1972, General Quang was political commissar of the fourth military region. In that capacity, he was in no position to make such a report."

(Source: Colonel Phan Khac Hai, editor in chief of the Army newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, quoted by AFP, 4/14/93)

"Whenever we see expectations rise that the United States might take some appropriate action, there are always rumors and fabrications that come up...If they don't have any Vietnamese text, I can tell you for sure this is a fabrication...I don't want to speculate about who might be responsible, but the press in the United States itself talks about the 'MIA industry.'"

(Source: Ha Huy Thong, Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry's America's Department as quoted by AFP 4/14/93)

"Ms. Ho The Lan, head of the press and information department said the news carried in The New York Times is a sheer fabrication, the same as the three pictures produced earlier of alleged American prisoners of war or the so-called transfer

of American POWs by Vietnam to the Soviet Union, which once caused such a fuss in the United States. An American paper on April 13 even suggested that Vietnam might have killed 600 American POWs. This is a shameless fabrication which is an affront to the Vietnamese people who have made and are making great efforts to solve the MIA question in the humanitarian spirit. Any sober minded person can see that all these fabrications are intended to block the progress of Vietnam-U.S. relations."

(Source: Official Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, 4/15/93)

B. EXPLANATIONS AND INFORMATION OFFERED BY LEADERSHIP OF VIETNAM AND GENERAL QUANG TO U.S. OFFICIALS (General Vessey's April, 1993 trip + and May, 1993 CODEL trips)

BACKGROUND: On Thursday, April 15, 1993, General Vessey, former Presidential Emissary to former President Bush, left for Vietnam at the request of the Clinton Administration on a previously-scheduled trip to assess Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue. Because the existence of the Quang Report was only disclosed following announcement of his trip, his mission quickly turned to obtaining an explanation from the Vietnamese.

During General Vessey's meetings in Hanoi on April 18th and 19th, the following comments were made by Vietnamese officials:

At a photo opportunity before General Vessey's first meeting with SRV Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai:

"I think during your stay here we will try to make some arrangements for you and other American delegates to get information about this issue...I think it existed somewhere -- in the Russian text or in American text -- but not in Vietnamese...Past experience testifies that it is a concoction and a fabrication. Not only against Vietnam, but against normalization between Vietnam and the United States."
(Source: SRV Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai, as reported by AFP, Hanoi, 4/18/93)

Following this first meeting, Minister Le Mai stated:

"It's a sheer fabrication. It's non-existent."

Asked who faked the report, Mai said:

"It depends on your understanding -- either Americans or Russians...I think it existed somewhere in Russian and American texts, but it does not exist in Vietnam. So it is fabricated completely. It is based on nothing..."

Following General Vessey's first meeting with Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam, Le Mai again stated:

"There's no Vietnamese text of the Russian document."

New York Times reporter Philip Shenon filed the following story after the Vessey meeting with Minister Cam:

[Vietnamese officials said today that after news reports last week revealed the existence of the document in the Russian archives, the Vietnamese Defense Ministry searched its archives for evidence to refute it...Hanoi said the documents presented to General Vessey today included a Defense Ministry census prepared in the early 1970's that showed 386 Americans had been captured by North Vietnam (as of February, 1972).]

"We wanted to find evidence to prove it was fabricated," said Ho Xuan Dich, Director of Vietnam's Office for Seeking Missing Personnel (VNOSMP).

[Asked during a meeting with reporters why the census was being turned over only now, Mr. Dich gave to answers. First, he said that turning over the census had been unnecessary because all American prisoners had been released to the United States in 1973 and their names had been known to Washington for years. But he corrected himself a few minutes later, saying that the census had not been turned over earlier because "we just found it this week."]

On April 18th, following General Vessey's meetings, the official Hanoi Voice of Vietnam had broadcast the following commentary written by Noi Dan, the official Army paper:

"This sensational report has prompted a number of right-wingers, newspapers, and television corporations in the United States to extensively fan up and embellish the issue...Apparently, they hopes that this report would receive strong support from U.S. political circles and that those who spread the news would be awarded big prizes. Unfortunately, the result was to the contrary. U.S. Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on the POW/MIA issue, after learning of the report made a statement that this document must be carefully analyzed, that the translation of the document from Vietnamese to Russian might show there was a mistake on the nationality of the prisoners detained."

"A number of U.S. newspapers also carried reports on a news conference held by Le Bang, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations, on the issue. These newspapers totally

rejected the ill-intentioned report carried by the New York Times and asserted that Vietnam had returned all U.S. POWs right after the signing of the Paris agreement in 1973, and that during the past 20 years, Vietnam has shown its good will and has closely cooperated with the United States in searching for remains of U.S. soldiers who died during the war...Mr. (Bruce) Franklin (author of POW/MIA Mythmaking in America), a specialist in U.S.-U.K. affairs and the Vietnam war said that the document was an awkward fabrication and the facts presented by the document did not confirm with historical reality."

"U.S. newspapers and public opinion have begun to criticize Stephen J. Morris, author of this farce, denouncing him as a partisan who fanatically opposes the normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam...Again, this fake document carries groundless contents as in fake documents revealed in the past. It is possible that the document was produced and spread by the same hostile forces who oppose fine, normal relations between Vietnam and the United States."

(Source: Hanoi Voice of Vietnam 4/18/93)

On the morning after General Vessey's first day of meetings, Voice of Vietnam stated:

"General Vessey said he has obtained important information which clearly proves the inaccuracy of the report last week from Russia that Vietnam was still retaining prisoners. His assessment was in conformity with mass media opinion in the U.S.A. In its issue 15 April, the New York Times remarks: It was common knowledge that the document on the MIA issue provided by Russia was fake."

"...it is believed, during this visit General Vessey will collect good information to clarify the fabrication in the Russian document."

(Source: Hanoi Voice of Vietnam, 19 April 93)

On April 19th, General Vessey met with the reported author of the 1972 North Vietnamese report to the politburo concerning POWs. Following the meeting, General Tran Van Quang is reported to have "reiterated Hanoi's stand that it was a fake and no Vietnamese original existed." (AFP Story, 4/19/93)

According to Quang:

"The intelligence service that manufactured this report was a very bad intelligence service. It was absolutely wrong," he

said, without specifying which one. Asked who was responsible, Quang stated, "You can ask the Russian intelligence service or ask General Vessey."

"I understand that there are a lot of people who are trying to undermine the process of normalization." Quang added that the document had caused "suspicion between the two peoples who desire normalization, not to mention the suffering to the families of the MIAs...I think it's a way to hinder advances in relations between Vietnam and the United States and cooperation in solving the MIA issue and that causes misunderstanding between two peoples who wish normal relations soon."

(Source: AFP, AP, Washington Post, April 19, 1993, Hanoi)

"As I told John Vessey, never in my life did I make such a report because it was not my responsibility. It was not my job. I had nothing to do with American prisoners. During the war, I never met any American prisoners...it's very simple. I was not in Hanoi at that time. I was not in charge of American prisoners."

"The guy writing that report was not Vietnamese at all," said General Quang.

(Source: AP, Hanoi, 4/19/93)

"The style of the report is not Vietnamese. The names and ranks of officials are inaccurate. The number of the prisoners is much higher than that given to us by the U.S.," he said.

(Source: Bangkok Post, 4/20/93)

"I did not write it, I tell you, never in my life have I made such a report, because it was not my area of responsibility."

(Source: New York Times, April, 19, 1993, Hanoi)

[He said he went to East Germany for medical treatment in 1973, but gave no details and didn't specify whether he took the staff job that year or the next. Quang told him (Vessey) that he did not visit Hanoi in 1972 until months after the date of the document] (As reported by Reuters, Hanoi, 4/19/93)

[He said he had "nothing to do with the Russian intelligence service, and the Russians had no right to ask me about that."]

(Source: AP, Hanoi, 4/19/93)

[Quang said he dealt with French POWs in the early 1950s as head of a unit of the army's General Political Directorate. But he said he had nothing to do with American prisoners and never reported on them to the Politburo.]

After the meeting with General Quang, General Vessey's delegation went back to Foreign Minister Cam where they held a joint news conference. During the news conference, Foreign Minister Cam made the following comments (not necessarily in the order they were made):

"During the fierce fighting, we did not have the conditions and enough time to capture so many American prisoners."

"I would like to say something about Stephen Morris, the person who publicized this. He has a long history of opposing Vietnam, since the time he was an Australian student."

Foreign Minister Cam said Morris "had certain intentions when he chose the timing" of releasing the Russian document."
(Source: New York Times, April 19, 1993, Hanoi)

[Foreign Minister Cam cited what he said were eight major inaccuracies in the Russian document. He said that records of North Vietnam's policy-making Central Committee show no Politburo meeting on the date in question, that prisoners were not classified for release according to their attitudes on the war, and that the total number of American POWs was "much higher than in reality."] (Source: Wash. Post. 4/19/93)

Following General Vessey's departure from Vietnam, the official Hanoi Voice of Vietnam broadcast the following commentary (pertinent excerpts) characterizing a New York Times article in the following manner:

"(During General Vessey's visit), the American newspaper, the New York Times, ran a story written by a historian and researcher on the POW issue in Southeast Asia saying that the Russian document contains inaccurate details. The story rejected the Russian document as groundless. The writer said that the Russian document was clumsy and bore no practical details which did not conform to practical reality."

Following General Vessey's arrival back in Washington, the Vietnamese "found" another list in their archives pertaining to U.S. POWs, which was reported by the media in detail, with no mention of the fact that it was literally the same, exact list turned over to the United States by North Vietnam on January, 27, 1973. The cover page to the list, both then and now, indicated that it was a list of "U.S. Pilots Captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam" prepared in January, 1973 by North Vietnam's Ministry of National Defense for delivery to the U.S. side on the day of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords.

In providing the document, Ho Xuan Dich, head of the Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons told Reuters:

"It will prove that the information in the Russian document is wrong. It's virtually the final report of American prisoners captured in the Vietnam Democratic Republic up to the U.S. Christmas bombing raids." (Source: Reuters, 4/21/93)

In reality, the list proved nothing and the public was never told that it was the same, exact list (including the same typing errors and anomalies) given to the U.S. in January, 1973. In fact, Reuters filed two news wire stories on the discovery stating, "Both sides were elated by discovery of a dusty wartime file earmarked for the bonfire that contained a North Vietnamese list of prisoners of war (POWs) that the Americans had long sought."

Reuters quoted the head of the U.S. Pacific Command's Joint Task Force Full Accounting stationed in Hanoi, Gary Flanagan, stating: "This is great. I think it really shows they are cooperating with us." In truth, it was an embarrassment that an American official was reported to have made such a comment concerning the "discovery" of the list referred to by Mr. Dich.

The next day, April 22, 1993, Vietnam's official Voice of Vietnam broadcast two official commentaries by the Army newspaper Nhan Dan and the station itself, both entitled "A Clumsy Cooked-Up Story."

The first broadcast stated, in part:

"Concerning the charge of detaining three American astronauts, the U.S. Defense Department and NASA have affirmed that there were no American astronauts captured in Vietnam. The Russian document is also wrong to say that Vietnam divided the American prisoners into three categories -- progressive, neutral, and reactionary."

In the second Voice of Vietnam broadcast, it was officially stated that the document had been "allegedly" found in the Russian archives.

"After a careful check of this document, it can be said in sure terms that the contents of the document totally do not conform to reality...During such fierce war years as 1972, General Quang was unable to and had no responsibility for reviewing general issues such as the MIA issue. He has never written any document on this issue."

"Moreover, there was no meeting of the Politburo on 15 September 1972. General Tran Van Quang said that all the reports written by him on his assigned duties during the period between 1961 and 1975 carried his cover name, Bay Tien,

and that none of the reports bore his real name, Tran Van Quang. He himself read the Russian document and found that the wording used in the document was not Vietnamese style. Moreover, the American POW issue was then under the responsibility of the VPA Political General Department..."

"it should be noted that the man who found this document, Mr. Morris, is not considered an independent scholar by the American public, but a person who has many political prejudices and who nurtures a great hatred against Vietnam...The truth is as clear as broad daylight. General Vessey himself also asserted...that after two days in Hanoi he became more skeptical about the authenticity of the Russian document and believed the valuable information provided by General Quang was in conformity with reality."

"Mr. Bruce Franklin, a professor at Rutgers University, said the document was a clumsy cooked-up story. There were no events in the document that conform with historical reality."

In mid-May and late May, other U.S. officials visited Vietnam, this time from the United States Congress, along with representative of three veterans organizations. During meetings between the U.S. delegation and General Quang, Quang stated that he had been transferred from Vietnam to East Germany for medical treatment at the same time "Operation Homecoming" was conducted, although this aspect was not discussed further.

According to a report by Vietnam Veterans of America, in a meeting they attended with Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam on May 31, 1993, "Senator Kerry requested a copy of the Politburo calendar for that time period, so a comparison could be made. The Vietnamese misunderstood the request, believing Senator Kerry wanted Politburo minutes. They became very upset and almost canceled the rest of the meeting. The misunderstanding was corrected and order was restored." (Source: VVA report, June 1993)

On June 1, 1993, the delegation met with General Tran Van Quang who again stated that the document was not authentic. "He provided a promotion document that supposedly proves he was not promoted to Lt. General until 1974...General Quang stated that although he helped formulate POW policy during the French occupation, he never had anything to do with POWs during the war with the U.S. (Source: VVA report, June 1993)

X EPILOGUE...

From July 7, 1993 to July 11, 1993, I raised several of the issues in this interim analysis directly with Vietnamese officials, to include General Tran Quang. General Quang denied any involvement with the presentation, although he admitted, in response to a question, having been present in northern Vietnam to brief a politburo session in early 1972. He further denied any involvement with the June 26, 1972 presentation on offensive actions in the South and other non-POW matters even though it has been authenticated by Russian General Volkogonov. During the meeting, General Quang was also hesitant to discuss any of the details in the September, 1972 report (on the 1,205 U.S. POWs) and maintained that since he did not write it, there was nothing to discuss. He even denied knowledge of the list of 368 POWs given to Senator Kennedy in December, 1970 which had been referenced in the September, 1972 report.

At the same meeting, however, Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phong, Acting Director of the Americas Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agreed to my request that the SRV conduct a separate "line by line" review of the September, 1972 report to determine which portions of the presentation were factual and which were not according to SRV information. For example, the Vietnamese should certainly be able to tell us whether or not the references in the 1972 report to earlier Politburo decisions on American POWs are accurate or not (see page 6 of this analysis). They should also be able to tell us when, if at all, any presentations were given to their politburo on the results of interrogations of American POWs and other related matters.

It is reported that the U.S. delegation to Vietnam, which followed my visit, also had the opportunity to meet with General Quang, although I have not been briefed on the contents of these discussions. I hope the U.S. side continued to push for more complete explanations from the Vietnamese. As I said earlier, Vietnamese statements to date on this matter are wholly inadequate.

It has been twenty years since our cease-fire agreement with Vietnam and the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. Unfortunately, many troubling questions persist concerning our POW/MIAs, and human lives may well be hanging in the balance. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Senate's Select Committee in 1991 have led to remarkable opportunities through the U.S./Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. Our ability to obtain answers on our missing and captured men from the Vietnam War is slowly, but dramatically, being enhanced, as evidenced by the surfacing of the Quang report and other reports from Soviet archives.

Our approach to the Quang report will be a critical moment in our history. It should impact our future relations with our former adversaries, and it will impact our nation's commitment to its own armed forces. I trust the Joint Commission on POW/MIAs will continue to pursue additional information pertaining to these matters, and I hope that the Vietnamese will make the decision to be forthcoming in explaining the Quang report. For the sake of our POWs and MIAs, we must not let this moment pass us by. If we do, then we will never truly heal the wounds of war, and I cannot see how we can ever begin building a sustainable relationship with Vietnam.

Секретно
ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ КНЕС

СВЯЗЬ С КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКИМИ
И РАБОЧИМИ ПАРТИЯМИ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ СТРАН

Фонд № 5

Опись № 64

Дело № 178

Информации Генштаба Вооруженных Сил СССР о положении в ДРВ, о плане "Ба Бе", проводимом ДРВ в Южном Вьетнаме.

Переводы докладов и выступления секретаря ЦК ПТВ перед работниками пропаганды и руководящим составом центральных учреждений, заместителя начальника Генштаба Вьетнамской Народной Армии на заседаниях Политбюро ЦК ПТВ "Об итогах наступательных действий ВНА" в Южном Вьетнаме и задачах дальнейшей вооруженной борьбы", доклада на заседании Правительственного Совета о государственном плане развития народного хозяйства ДРВ на 1972 год.

Top Secret

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for Communications with Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries

Fund No. 5

Inventory No. 64

Case No. 478

Information from the General Staff, Armed Forces of the USSR on the situation in the DRV^{*};

[Information] on the "Ba Be" plan conducted by the DRV in South Vietnam.

Translation of:.

reports and speeches of the Secretary of the TsK PTV^{*} before the propaganda workers and leadership of central institutions;

[reports and speeches] of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Vietnamese People's Army in TsK PTV Politburo sessions "On the results of VNA^{*} offensive actions" in South Vietnam and on goals of further combat actions;

a report of the Governmental Council session on the state plan for the development of the DRV's 1972 national economy.

^{*} DRV - *Demokraticeskaya Respublika V'etnama*, Democratic Republic of Vietnam

TsK PTV - *Tsentralnij Komitet Partii Trudyashchikhsya V'etnama*
Central Committee of the Workers Party of Vietnam

VNA - *V'etnamskaya Narodnaya Armiya*, Vietnamese Peoples Army

Handwritten note on cover memo from Pyotr Ivashutin, head of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) states:

"Please prepare a short report (special delivery) for the Politburo of the TsK KPSS (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) about the Prisoners of War."

signed,

Katushev

* (Konstantin Katushev was a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party who handled relations with communist countries)

Top Secret
Copy No. 1

[stamp "TsK KPSS
1 Dec 72 38995
SUBJECT TO RETURN
TO THE GENERAL SECTION
OF THE TsK KPSS"]
[handwritten "15/D12"]

TsK KPSS [Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union]

I am reporting:

Translation of the report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Vietnamese People's Army, General-Lieutenant Tran Van Quang, at the Politburo session, TsK PTV [Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam], 15 September 1972.

This report outlines the measures which are being carried out by the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in South Vietnam to develop opportunities for cooperation with, and for recruitment of representatives of the Saigon government and army to the side of the Patriots. With this in mind, contacts have been established and meetings conducted with several civilian and military leaders, to include generals Ngo Dinh Dzu (Commander, 2nd Regional Corps), Nguyen Khanh and Duong Van Minh (former leader of the Saigon administration), Khoang Xuan Lam (former Commander, 1st Regional Corps) and others.

According to the speaker, during these meetings many of the generals have spoken against the Thieu regime and against the U.S. policy of "Vietnamization", have acknowledged the major victories of the Patriotic forces and also agreed to be part of the future coalition government for South Vietnam. The leadership of the DRV is convinced that even though they have anticommunist views, such people will be able to greatly assist the Patriots in overthrowing the Thieu dictatorship and in forming a coalition government.

Tran Van Quang has presented the contents of the plan "Ba Be" which is planned for execution in South Vietnam. This plan envisions the resolution of a number of tasks, the principal one of which is the physical extermination of the reactionary leaders

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of the Saigon administration who have harshly criticized DRV policy.

The development of plan "Ba Be" was undertaken jointly by the DRV Ministry of National Defense along with the Ministry of State Security. They were assigned responsibility for the management of its execution.

It was noted that preparation for execution of "Ba Be" is going successfully. Up until the middle of September of this year, 406 people, who have received special training and know the local conditions well, have been sent from the DRV to South Vietnam. These people were also assigned the task of carrying out operations according to plan "Ba Be". The insertion into South Vietnam of specially trained agents is scheduled for completion by the end of September.

The report states that conduct of operations in accordance with plan "Ba Be" is scheduled for October of this year. It is assumed that its successful execution will assist in the realization of combat operations plans to a significant degree and will lead to the development of an improved situation in South Vietnam for the Patriots. In addition, substantial influence will be exerted on the negotiations in Paris.

Tran Van Quang explained the American POW issue in detail. The total number of American POWs captured in combat actions and who are now in the DRV are 1205, of which 671 were taken prisoner in North Vietnam, 426 in South Vietnam, 43 in Laos and 65 in Cambodia.

There are 767 aviators among the prisoners, 3 of which went through training for space flights, and 15 of which have more than 4000 flight hours each.

All of the American POWs are held in 11 prisons and were assigned according to military rank (there are 16 colonels, 104 lieutenant colonels, 235 majors and the remaining prisoners are of lower rank).

It was noted that, during the interrogations of the prisoners, the NVA command succeeded in collecting valuable information on the US Armed Forces, on combat equipment and various types of weaponry, including chemical weapons, which provides the opportunity to develop countermeasures against the enemy.

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According to the speaker, the US government does not know the precise number of POWs in the DRV since the NVA command holds this information in strict secrecy. Until now, a list of only 368 prisoners has been published officially. There are indications that the leadership of the DRV considers the issue of releasing American POWs as a part of the whole Vietnamese problem and can be settled only after the resolution of the political and military issues.

Enclosure:

1 brochure (entry No. 14253), Top Secret, Copy No. 6.

[Signature] P. IVASHUTIN
P. IVASHUTIN

"29" November 1972
№ 313/001286

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GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR
MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE [GRU]

Top Secret
Copy №. 6

REPORT

OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
VNA [VIETNAMESE PEOPLES ARMY] GENERAL-LIEUTENANT TRAN VAN QUANG
AT THE POLITBURO MEETING OF THE TSK PTV
15 SEPTEMBER 1972
(translation from Vietnamese into Russian)

Moscow - 1972

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Moscow - 1972

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Dear comrades!

I reported to you earlier about the situation which has developed and about the fundamental characteristics of the past stage of our people's conflict against the American imperialists. I will cover the main tasks of the people and the army of North and South Vietnam which were proposed by the 23rd Plenum of the TsK PTV.

These tasks once again confirm our resolve to attain victory. This is a very correct course for our party and people at the present stage of conflict. We have already worked out measures for achieving the resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the TsK. We will also cover a number of the Supreme Command's and the Government Defense Council's positions, in which an evaluation of our victories gained over the period from 30 Mar 72 to the present is given.

The military situation for us is developing favorably on all fronts. A number of profound changes which took place in the military situation demanded that we develop a necessary frame of reference for solving all issues which arise during the war. Several meetings between us and the US aimed at developing measures on resolving the Vietnam issue have already taken place.

We have decisively rejected a number of proposals put forth by the American side. With assistance from a number of countries, there were to be secret meetings in Paris and in other places aimed at drawing up a solution to the Vietnam issue. Such meetings took place. They once again testified to the deranged nature of the proposals put forward by the American side. As before, we have maintained our position, the essence of which includes the following: if the US truly wants to resolve the Vietnam issue, then above all else it must refuse to support the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and only afterwards will we engage in a discussion about a cease fire. This demand is the main tenet in our conflict against the American imperialists.

If Nixon continues adhering to his policy of "Vietnamization" of the war and desires to leave the present Saigon Government of Thieu in power, then the peace negotiations between us and the US will not yield any results.

During our general offensive on the fronts of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the progress which we have attained in implementing our strategic and tactical line [direction, orientation] was clearly evident.

Earlier, I analyzed the activity of our command, elucidated the great victories we have attained and also explained the shortcomings and mistakes that we made during the general offensive. The lessons we learned from analyzing the mistakes we made were also discussed. I stated all of this to the Politburo in order to work out a direction for solving the fundamental principal problems.

Today I will report a number of positions regarding expanding the scope of our future offensive.

We organized meetings with South Vietnamese representatives aimed at preparing a solution of the military and political issues in South Vietnam according to the Politburo's and State Defense Council's plan. These meetings have great significance for us, and we are linking several of our plans with them [South Vietnamese representatives]. A number of our comrades have met with representatives of the South Vietnamese authorities, and it can be said that we have succeeded in winning their sympathy at these meetings. We were able to exchange ideas not only orally, but also in written form during these meetings and contacts. This gave us the opportunity to draw definite conclusions. Recently, we have conducted 8 similar meetings with representatives of the Saigon authorities and South Vietnamese political figures.

First, we will cover meetings with General Ngo Dinh Dzu¹⁾. Earlier Ngo Dinh Dzu was listed as a candidate for president of South Vietnam and fought with Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky for this post. Ngo Dinh Dzu is a prominent South Vietnamese capitalist and well-known political figure. He occupied the post of chairman of the upper chamber of the Saigon Parliament and during the Ngo Dinh Diem government, he was a senator in the upper chamber. Ngo Dinh Dzu, in his own opinion, is a nationalist. He speaks

¹⁾ Commander of the 2nd Regional Corps of South Vietnam, General-Lieutenant (GRU's note).

against American troops on South Vietnamese territory, and also against several policy positions conducted by the Saigon authorities. At the same time, he is characterized as a reactionary, an enemy of communism. Afterwards, as Ky and Thieu attained victory in the presidential elections, the latter undertook all measures to take revenge on General Dzu. Dzu used the pre-election campaign to criticize the Saigon regime and to undermine its security. He spoke against American troops on South Vietnamese territory, for which he was subjected to bitter attacks from Nguyen Van Thieu. General Dzu was forced to leave the political arena after 9 months under pressure from Thieu. Afterwards, General Dzu became an even greater enemy of Nguyen Van Thieu and his government. This is why we tried to win this person over to our side.

Despite General Dzu remaining an enemy of communism, his relations with Nguyen Van Thieu and the present Saigon factions, as well as our meetings with him have allowed him to see the nature of the Americans and the true colors of the Saigon Government.

We sent one of our comrades from the Supreme Command to Saigon for meetings with General Dzu. At the meeting, which lasted 3 hours, General Dzu agreed to enter into a future coalition government and spoke out against the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war carried out by Nixon and also against the Nguyen Van Thieu clique. During this meeting he also stated that he will fight against Nguyen Van Thieu's clique and Nixon's present designs.

Now, we see clearly how significant changes have taken place in General Dzu's life and way of thinking. He is no longer the same ardent anticommunist. Now prevailing in his views are those features such as the conflict against Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" of the war and against Nguyen Van Thieu's clique which he considers as fascist and as expressing the interests of the financial oligarchy which is against freedom and independence. And finally, General Dzu is for the expansion of democracy and freedom over the entire territory

of South Vietnam. Such are General Dzu's basic national qualities which correspond to our present course. This is why we are attempting to win General Dzu over to our side and why we entered into contact with him. After the first meeting, there were three other recent meetings during which he expressed his opinions. During these meetings, we understood what kind of major changes took place in his way of thinking and in the position he has taken and in his approach to solving the problem.

Thus, we can ascertain that these meetings and contacts with General Dzu had very good results. Recently, General Dzu requested to meet with one of the prominent leaders of the NFO [National Liberation Front] of South Vietnam. We are now busy preparing for the upcoming meeting between General Dzu and Hyuyn Tan Phat. This meeting will be conducted in secret to insure the fulfillment of our main principles as we understand that this new person is contradictory - he is among those in the Saigon Government whose number is daily growing.

The second person is Nguyen Khanh. He earlier occupied the post of prime minister for three years after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem. Nguyen Khanh is a representative of the army. Earlier he served in the French Army; now he is a prominent South Vietnamese capitalist whose capital is invested in various foreign enterprises, especially in France. Nguyen Khanh is a representative of the new trend. This is why we have entered into contact with him. These contacts took place in Paris, where we have conducted 5 meetings.

Nguyen Khanh maintains constant contact with military circles in the Nguyen Van Thieu government. After being removed from his post, he left the country, but periodically returns to Saigon where he engages in political activities in the capacity of an emigree representative.

In summarizing the five meetings, we noticed in Nguyen Khanh the following: first, as regards the ruling faction he believes that Nguyen Van Thieu is a dictator and fascist who is not capable of being the head of the government. Khanh considers the present government to be rotten to the core; second, he is against the bombing of North

Vietnam; third, while criticizing the Nguyen Van Thieu faction, speaks against the participation of Saigon troops in combat operations on Cambodian territory. He believes that the Saigon Army is in danger of disintegration and that it has poor morale and combat spirit. Nguyen Khanh speaks for the establishment of a new government which would have authority with the people and which would carry out a nationalist policy, while receiving foreign aid. These are the views of Nguyen Khanh. He says nothing about his feelings toward the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war. This is explained primarily by his connections with military circles. Therefore, we are not striving to directly attract him to our side. Presently, Nguyen Khanh is maintaining connections with the current Saigon generals.

The third person is Duong Van Minh, who also represents the military circles. Previously, he occupied the post of prime minister after Nguyen Khanh, and was then sent out of the country as an ambassador. The political views of Duong Van Min' differ from the political views of Nguyen Khanh. This is first expressed in Duong Van Min' speaking out against Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" and for the independent solution of internal problems by the Vietnamese without US interference. He believes that the US should be responsible for prolonging the Vietnamese War and for its consequences. He subjects the Vietnamese policy of Nixon to sharp criticism, as well as the policy carried out by the current Saigon Government. These are very good political views. He speaks against Thieu's clique, considering it to be pro-fascist, anti-democratic and not capable of carrying out the leadership of the country. These are the primary political views of Duong Van Min'.

As a result of these contacts with Duong Van Minh, we have attained an important victory, which has forced him to reflect. He also met with Nguyen Thi Binh several times in Paris. At these meetings, Duong Van Minh felt that, as before, he was close to the Fatherland and that he is Vietnamese. This is why he began to conduct this great work with us and with the intelligentsia and military circles located outside of the country. He did this with the aim of entering into a coalition government and in the hope of solving the Vietnamese issue

on the basis of conducting consultations and negotiations between the various political factions of South Vietnam. This is Duong Van Min's desire.

The fourth person is the former emperor Bao Dai. At one time the possibility existed that the former emperor would have been behind us. But, under pressure from reactionary factions after the August revolution, he was forced to emigrate to France. As before, Bao Dai holds great influence amongst the political figures in the Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and also in the city of Hue, the ancient capital of Vietnam. This is why we moved to make contact with Bao Dai. We are not hoping that Bao Dai becomes a part of the coalition government, but to attract him to our side is to attract his supporters in the regions where he has influence. As a result of the meetings conducted, we clarified that Bao Dai will come out against the presence of American troops on the territory of South Vietnam, and he also criticizes Nguyen Van Thieu's existing regime. Bao Dai is also calling for all political factions to create a free, neutral, peace-loving government that would resolve the tense situation that has taken form in the country. This is why we entered into contact with Bao Dai and are trying to win him over to our side. We hope that he, in turn, will work with his people in a plan for securing peace and freedom for our country.

The fifth person is General Nguyen Van Vi who previously occupied the post of Minister of Defence of South Vietnam. Tkhieu removed him from his post for disorder and chaos in the army's financial affairs. The real reason, however, for Nguyen Van Vi's retirement was the series of serious defeats that the puppet army has suffered. From Nguyen Van Tkhieu's viewpoint, the military circles responded to this move with a specific reaction. We also had contacts with General Nguyen Van Vi which allowed us to understand his political position. He thinks that the US will certainly suffer defeat in this war and that a war in Vietnam is not the responsibility of the American Army. This is why Nguyen Van Vi is also coming out for the creation of a coalition government in order to resolve the Vietnam issue through peaceful negotiation between all of the political factions of South Vietnam.

Nguyen Van Vi is also coming out against Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war. Such are the basic political views of General Nguyen Van Vi. We scored a great victory at the meeting with him; we received his agreement to take part in a coalition government to resolve the Vietnam issue through peaceful negotiation between all of the political factions of South Vietnam. Nguyen Van Vi also officially recognized the victories won by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, i.e. our victories.

As concerns our contacts within the South Vietnamese governing apparatus, it is fitting to mention here the letter from Nguyen Cao Ky addressed to us. In the letter, he lays out his views on the course to a resolution of the Vietnam problem.

I have reported to you today on the contacts with all of these people so that you would know how the Politburo's instructions to win over these people to our side is being carried out.

The strong protest from their side is a result of a growth of contradictions within Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique and of contradictions of Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war. We can use these contradictions to improve the situation in South Vietnam and to resolve the issue in our favor. Their agreement to enter into a coalition government will precisely go in our favor. In addition to a resolution of the issue by military means on the battlefields of South Vietnam, we have engaged in contacts with several South Vietnamese political figures, who may be able to join the ranks of a coalition government. As a result of these contacts we have gained an understanding of the political views of these people and have expressed our point of view on ways to resolve the Vietnam problem.

These contacts with people who occupy high stations, prominent military and political figures, ministers and senators of the upper and lower chambers of the Saigon parliament provide the basis for making the following conclusions:

1. They are against the present regime of Nguyen Van Tkhieu, considering that Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique is dictatorial, pro-fascist, rotten and not

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capable of carrying out the leadership of the country under the present situation that has developed in South Vietnam. They also think that if the US withdraws its troops from South Vietnam and stops aiding the regime, the government would instantly collapse.

2. The majority of them are against Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war, against the escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam, and think that Nixon does not want to resolve the Vietnam issue or the Indochina issue as a whole.

3. They consider that the National Liberation Front has recently scored enormous victories on the military, political and diplomatic fronts. They recognize that on the military front we were able to win over extensive heavily populated regions. They also recognize the National Liberation Front's great success with the strengthening of the army, the increase in its combat ability and leadership level, the improvement in cooperation between the branches of service and many other areas.

We also tried to win over to our side the category of people from the provinces and many towns who occupy less important positions in the state apparatus. It is possible to say that they are also ready to aid in the creation of a coalition government. They are also against the policy of "Vietnamization", against Nguyen Van Tkhiu's clique and want to resolve the Vietnamese issue on the basis of a cessation of war.

Thus, on the orders of the Politburo we have been preparing to conduct meetings with various categories of the South Vietnamese population, aimed at resolving the South Vietnamese issue through peaceful negotiations between all of the political factions of South Vietnam. As a result of the contacts that have taken place to win these people over to our side, conditions have presented themselves so that these people will be able to aid us in the creation of a coalition government and in the overthrow of Nguyen Van Tkhiu's dictatorial regime. We see that we have chosen the correct course. This is also clearly indicated in the resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the Central Committee.

In other words, we should win these people over to our side, and bring them into the coalition government so that we

can use them to our favor in the diplomatic and political plan. In order to create a base for the successful resolution of the issues that stand before us, we specifically want to bring into the coalition government those people who earlier worked in the South Vietnamese state apparatus and held or are holding at the present a high post in the power structure.

If we are successful in resolving these issues, we will be concluding a mammoth case on which we will again report to the Politburo so that you are well informed on these issues and have formed a plan of action for mission completion. Thanks to these meetings, we are able to know who supports us and who is against us in South Vietnam. We have also worked out a new plan for the realization of our new intentions in South Vietnam and now know which representatives of the present South Vietnamese power apparatus are in favor of the war.

The meetings and contacts which we initiated were conducted with complete equality of rights and helped us win over representatives of all strata of South Vietnamese society to our side. This is our grandest victory, won in the course of these contacts with the aim of resolving the Vietnamese issue.

Thus, thanks to these contacts we understand which part of the population considers the course we are taking to be just, i.e. we have exposed all of those who are against Nixon's politics for the prolongation of the war, against Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique and will join with us in the creation of a coalition government.

In addition to the military issues, this is one of the problems we are trying to resolve. We are therefore conducting these meetings and contacts directed at the resolution of political and diplomatic problems.

With the goal of realizing these aims, the Supreme Command, in conjunction with the Governmental Council of Defense, has developed directives for the army to prepare and conduct the "Ba Be" plan, which is scheduled to be executed in October. The "Ba Be" plan provides for the resolution of a number of goals. Four hundred and six individuals [406] were sent to execute the plan in South Vietnam. These individuals had gone through sufficient training and

are well armed. Earlier, these people worked in the governing apparatus of South Vietnam. After the August revolution, during the period of the war of resistance against the French colonials, we left these people behind. They actively worked for the enemy and subsequently joined various organs of the Saigon governing apparatus. We trained and armed them well to carry out the "Ba Be" plan before they left for South Vietnam.

The basic aims of the "Ba Be" plan:

- Elimination of all people who are resistant and oppose our course and of those who occupy leadership positions at the province-district level and above; a full paralysis of the will of such people.

- Conduct of activities to carry out a disruption of the Saigon governing apparatus at the province level and below with the goal of a subsequent replacement of this apparatus with new people. We are attentively observing those people who oppose us and our decision with regards to this group must be very serious and firm. This matter has an important place in the execution of the "Ba Be" plan. We must have lists and full dossiers on these people beforehand in order to conduct the preparatory training to quickly do away with them and disrupt their routine.

- Search for and acquire materials which testify to crimes by Americans and their puppets with regard to the Vietnamese people, so that during opportune conditions, we can accuse them of committing these crimes by publishing the materials.

These are the three basic missions for the people who were dispatched for execution of the "Ba Be" plan. As for the time of completion, it is generally believed that it will be executed simultaneously with the TS-6 plan (Chyong Shon-6), i.e. in the month of October. This plan must be executed well in order to influence the course of the Paris Peace talks on Vietnam as well as the development of the situation in the near future. This is very important task. Its outcome may help us make a more successful advance on the front. We need to increase the pace of development on the front to win great victories in a short span of time. Therefore, the "Ba Be" plan is already being executed and we are continuing to train people to carry it out.

*The TS-6 plan is a VNA plan of military action in South Vietnam with the main effort concentrated in the Hue region (GRU note).

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The pace of the plan must be increased. We have to quickly move these people from North to South Vietnam in order to destroy a large quantity of enemy personnel. In other words, the elimination of all traitors, reactionaries, and counter-revolutionaries who currently make up a fairly significant part in South Vietnam is an important mission of the "Ba Be" plan.

We must attract the neutral forces to our side; those who are fighting for national independence from the USA; those forces who earlier fought against the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem and now fight against the regime of Nguyen Van Thieu. We must do everything necessary in order to successfully carry out the "Ba Be" plan.

Along with that, we must work on the demoralization of the puppet army on all fronts. Under good conditions, such work will lower the fighting spirit of the puppet army soldiers in the future and increase the number of servicemen who defect to our side. This is a basic requirement which helps us create the conditions for revolts in the puppet army. We were faced with this matter after the victory in Quang Tri.

Was there actually a collective anti-military uprising in the puppet 56th Regiment? No, in actuality it was not like that at the front. After we surrounded hill 241, the Regiment command understood the futility of further resistance and surrendered along with its soldiers. However, to increase the effect, we announced that because of good use of propaganda, there was an anti-military uprising in the 56th Regiment. This is a new form of stimulating anti-military uprisings in the puppet army.

The political views of puppet army officers captain and above are very reactionary. Previously they were officers or soldiers in the French Army. Now they are remaining in the army and speak in favor of the previous Saigon government, inciting counter-revolution and anti-nationalism. They hate the revolution. Therefore, applying propaganda amongst soldiers and especially amongst the officer corps is difficult and varied, demanding study from all sides

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and a creative approach in the choice of methods and means.

* The brilliant results must be given their due: results which we in the propaganda organization recently achieved among the High Command staff, right up to Saigon Army generals.

We had contacts and meetings with a number of officers. For example, with General Khoang Xuan Lam, the former 1st Regional Corps Commander. He was very reactionary and spoke against our revolution. After the defeat at Quang Tri, Thieu removed him, and he began to make contact with us. At the meetings, Khoang Xuan Lam told us--if it can be said this way--a number of his views. In his opinion, the Saigon puppet army will not be able to execute missions which the plan of "Vietnamization" of the war places on the army. He believes that the revolutionary forces will achieve victory and that the puppet army will not be able to impede this. The Thieu regime is a dictatorship, is pro-fascist, and does not have the support of the people. These are some of the basic tenets expressed by General-Lieutenant Khoang Xuan Lam.

As for the closest person to the Thieu regime--General Ngo Dinh Dzu--in meetings with us, he expressed the opinion that even the 2nd Regional Corps will be lost and that the puppet army will be unable at any cost to withstand us in this region, i.e. the Tay Nguyen region. Thus, Dzu has expressed the same ideas that Khoang Xuan Lam has. He also said that the puppet army will be unable to withstand us if the Americans leave Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Dzu sees an increase in insurgency and revolution in South Vietnam, an increase in authority for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, a rise in the level of our strategic and tactical leadership as well as in the level of combat actions. Dzu understands that Nguyen Van Thieu is a bloody dictator, a fascist and that the regime he created is wholly anti-democratic.

Thus, we see that these meetings with the generals are a great victory for us and will be beneficial to us. In order to successfully manage a resolution of the issues linked to conducting propaganda work with the South Vietnamese Army generals aimed at awakening their consciousness and winning them over to our side,

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It is necessary to understand that the outcome of the coming battle depends upon the solution of these important issues. It is necessary to attain a clear understanding among the generals that the Thieu regime will never employ popular support and cannot exist. Such are the fundamental issues which we should resolve in the near future.

From the utterances of the generals set forth above, we see that the situation is developing in a direction favorable to us. We can bring Plan "BA BE" into being, but for this we should expand the net of communications and contacts with people who will carry out Plan "BA BE," in order to obtain from them all necessary materials. We should likewise search for ways to establish connections with officers and officials of the Saigon government. This matter occupies a significant place in the implementation of Plan "BA BE." The Supreme Command and Ministry of State Security discussed all matters related to successful implementation of this plan and levied new tasks upon the commands of the combat zones responsible for implementation of this plan. We successfully inserted and deployed our forces in all regions and are now conducting the final work in order to complete preparatory measures for this Plan by September 30th of this year. In comparison to other plans, the preparation of Plan "BA BE" is developing well. This is the first time we are implementing such a plan on the territory of South Vietnam. In the course of its realization we will acquire experience which can help us counter the designs of the enemy at the front.

The more savage the bombings and barrages of the enemy may become, the more victories we should grasp at the front, because such victories will aid realization of Plan "BA BE." We are linking great hopes to the implementation of this plan, especially in accelerating the pace at which the offensive at the front develops, of which I reported to you above. The favorable development of the situation will be a huge and significant factor in the collapse of US military designs and of the puppets at the front in South Vietnam. We must thwart the reactionary and treacherous plans of the enemy; successful carrying out of Plan "BA BE" will indeed help us to grasp new victories. These victories will have great strategic significance in implementation of Plans TS-6 and

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Plan S-6, which were topics above.

The goal of Plan "BA BE" is introduction of division into the ranks of the enemy and lowering of his will to resist. Successful implementation of Plan "BA BE" will help us to attain successes at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam. The nearer the victory, the more clearly will appear the treacherous designs of the Nixon-Kissinger-Laird clique, and likewise those of the puppet government of Nguyen Van Thieu. Therefore implementation of Plan "BA BE" will be a great step in the resolution of many issues in the current situation. Because of this, its significance is so great.

For successful realization of this plan we should as soon as possible insert our forces, in order to begin implementation of this plan in the month of October in accordance with indicated deadlines.

In the Paris negotiations on Vietnam we have met with a series of difficulties in recent days. These difficulties are explained by the fact that Nixon being stubborn as before and is trying above all to achieve a solution of the military issue and only then to move to settlement of political issues, which will exercise great influence on the course of development of the contemporary situation in Vietnam. As a result of exchanging opinions in private meetings with Kissinger--Nixon's advisor--Kissinger, we understood that Nixon as before is being stubborn on settling the situation which is developing today in Vietnam. To attain settlement we should conduct careful preparation to counter Nixon's designs. Let him understand: if he does not renounce this war, then precisely the US will suffer defeat in it. However, Nixon is being stubborn in continuing the aggressive war and maintaining the status quo. That is why we think, that with the US taking such a position, peaceful solution of the Vietnam issue is not possible. We see that the US obstinately continues aggression, while Nguyen Van Thieu as before holds to his insolent position. That is why we are resolved to carry out Plan "BA BE," the realization of which will be a turning point in the settlement of the situation at the front.

This would be our first military thrust on the front aimed at resolving the complicated political issue at the present stage.

I) Plan S-6 -- Plan for military operations in the Saigon region (footnote of the GRU)

Until this, the Supreme Command had never tried working out a plan similar to the plan "Ba Be".

Over the course of six months, we prepared to execute this plan. During this time, we gathered everyone who should take part in its realization, and then conducted a thorough training of them. The intelligence directorate of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of State Security conducted the training of these people. We well understand that the better the training of these people is conducted, the fewer the losses we will suffer and the faster we will be able to attain execution of this plan.

Thus, once again evaluating the plan "Ba Be", the thorough training which is now going on, and which will be realized jointly with the plan TS-6 in October, it can be said that its successful realization will assist us to attain new great victories at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam. These are very serious issues which we must devote constant attention to.

Yesterday the State Defense Council directed the Supreme Command to conduct a conference for the cadres responsible for training and carrying out this plan. At this conference, the forms, means and methods were stated, which were worked out according to the organs and confirmed at a Politburo session.

We can now say that we have achieved great successes and we are convinced that this plan will be realized. Presently, this plan is being carried out. We have already succeeded in inserting a portion of our comrades into South Vietnamese territory. We succeeded with difficulty in certain areas and for this we had to procure all possible means. In other areas, this operation was carried out more successfully, and now our people are occupying stable positions in the puppet governing apparatus.

Dear Comrades! In summing up what is stated above, it can be said that we are going in the right direction in carrying out our plans, especially the plans TS-6 and "Ba Be", and also in training for the realization of our plan S-6, the realization of which is slated for the near future.

In addition to these issues, in accordance with the instructions from the Politburo, I will also report to you today on American POWs captured on the various fronts of Indochina.

The work with American prisoners of war has always been within the field of vision of the Politburo and has been reflected in its decisions, such as decision No. 21 DST dated 23 Mar 71, and decision No. 21 B dated 4 Apr 72. Both of these decisions concern the issues of exploiting these American POWs captured during the war. This disturbs the public opinion of the whole world and of the US. There are various thoughts on the American POW issue. Some of these are correct, others are not, but even among us there are a number of comrades whose opinions differ from the opinion of the Politburo. These comrades are not taking into consideration the particulars of the developing situation nor the inherent difficulties in their judgements. These opinions harm us in our search for methods of resolving the American POW issue.

Dear comrades! The American POW issue is very complex. The peoples of the world [world opinion] and the peoples of our fraternal socialist nations [allied popular opinion] as well as our [people] want to know the exact number of POWs located in North Vietnam. Allow me to inform you specifically on this matter. We have captured a very large number of American POWs on the fronts of Indochina since the time that the US introduced their troops into Vietnam, escalated the air war against North Vietnam, and expanded the total scope of their aggression by spreading this aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia. At first, the number of American POWs was not large and world public opinion paid little attention to them. The number of American POWs in North Vietnam grew day by day after 5 Aug 65 when the US imperialists started massive air bombing and off-shore bombardment by the 7th fleet of the territory of North Vietnam, and after having expanded their aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia. The number of American POWs in the DRV has not been made public to this day. We have kept this figure secret. At today's Politburo session, I will report to you, Comrades, the exact number of American POWs.

The total number of American POWs captured to date on the fronts of Indochina, i.e. in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, comprises 1205 people. Of them, 671 people were captured in North Vietnam and 143 aviators [were captured] in South Vietnam. This means the total number of aviators, and diversionists [special operations] (American advisors on diversionary ships and divers), captured on the territories of North and South Vietnam comprises 814 people. In addition, from other categories of American servicemen in Indochina, we have captured 391 people, including: 283 in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia and 43 in Laos; 814 and 391 comprise 1205 people.

Here is more data on the 1205 POWs.

We have captured 624 American aviators in North Vietnam, to include 7 colonels, 85 lieutenant colonels, 183 majors, i.e. the total number of senior US Air Force and Navy officers comprises 275 people. The 624 American aviators include 3 astronauts, i.e. three people who have completed the necessary training for space flight, for instance, Jim Katlo, who was captured in the vicinity of Hanoi. This figure also includes 15 US Air Force aces having more than 4000 flight hours each: Norman Klarvisto, Karmet; Jim Intist Shasht and others. This is the specific data on American aviators captured in North Vietnam.

Among the other 47 prisoners captured in North Vietnam, there are 36 advisors of diversionary detachments who were inserted in the border region between the DRV and Laos; lone diversionists who were conducting reconnaissance of our main transportation routes from helicopters and reconnaissance ships; and several seamen who abandoned their ships that we damaged and whom we picked up. Therefore the figures 624 and 47 add up to 671.

In South Vietnam we have captured 143 US aircrew members, mainly helicopter aviators and some jet aviators.

Among the 391 American POWs captured in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, we have 9 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels and 52 majors. The remaining officers are captain and below,

as well as American enlisted soldiers.

Thus in summary, I want to remind you again that the 1205 American POWs presently in prisons of North Vietnam include:

- 624 aviators captured in North Vietnam;
- 143 aviators captured in South Vietnam;
- 47 diversionists and other American servicemen captured in North Vietnam;
- 391 American servicemen of other categories, which includes 283 captured in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and 43 in Laos.

All of them are presently in prisons in North Vietnam. Currently we have 11 prisons where American POWs are held. We used to have 4 large prisons, however after the American attempt to free their POWs from Ha Tay [Son Tay] we expanded this number to 11. Each prison holds approximately 100 POWs.

Seven Air Force colonels captured in North Vietnam and nine colonels of various branches of service captured in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (16 officers in all) are being held together; through them, we are attempting to gain an understanding of the current situation which has developed in the American Army, extract the material and information we need, and determine our position toward them.

We are also holding 104 American lieutenant colonels in one location and are attempting to extract information - secret information about troop dispositions and information concerning the US Defense Department from them.

We have 235 majors concentrated in two locations.

Thus we have dedicated special prisons for senior officers of the American Army: one for colonels, one for lieutenant colonels and two for majors. The rest of the POWs, captains and below, were placed in other prisons.

A few words about the political views and attitudes of American POWs.

There are 368 POWs who have progressive attitudes.

They understand very well that this war is unjust and unpopular on their part. They condemn the American administration and express a strong protest against this war. We will be able to release these 368 POWs first, if as a result of the struggle of the progressive peoples of the world, including the American people, a favorable international environment will develop, forcing Nixon to move toward a resolution of the political issue. We are carrying out work with this category of POWs to explain to them the aggressive nature of the war being conducted by the Nixon administration and the nature of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and also to make them understand the unjust character of this war which is inflicting great damage on the American people. One can assert that this group of POWs is progressive in their political views.

There are 372 of the POWs who hold neutral views, i.e. their political outlook is not fully progressive, yet not too reactionary. We plainly see that they still do not clearly understand the role of the American administration in unleashing the aggressive war in Indochina.

The remainder of the POWs hold reactionary views. In spite of the work carried on to explain to them the real state of things, they have not changed their reactionary views.

The following is a summation:

- 368 POWs holding progressive views can be released first;
- 372 POWs hold neutral positions;
- 465 POWs hold reactionary views.

All the POWs among the senior officers hold reactionary views, i.e. they do not condemn Nixon, they do not protest his policies, and they distort our course of action. We understand that these officers come from rich families. Their reactionary views are precisely a result of this.

We well understand that the American POW issue has great significance for the resolution of the South Vietnamese problem. We must continue propagandistic and educational work with the American POWs, leading to their understanding

of the nature of the aggressive war which the US is carrying out in Vietnam, as well as the senseless obstinateness of Nixon, which only delays the release of POWs and their return to their homeland. Soon we will free several POWs in order to put pressure on the Nixon administration, observe his reaction and the reaction of the American public, as well as to demonstrate our good intentions in this matter.

Thus, the 1205 American POWs captured on the fronts of Indochina (in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), presently kept in prisons in North Vietnam represent a significant force in the American army, a basic part of which is made up of American aviators.

The large number of American aviators imprisoned during the time of Johnson and Nixon inflicted huge damage on the US Air Force. This should cause the US government and Nixon himself to reflect. We intend to resolve the American POW issue in the following manner:

1. The US government must demonstrate compliance, i.e. a cease fire and the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu, and then both sides can begin discussing the matter of returning POWs to the Nixon government.
2. While the American side is resolving the above-mentioned problems, we can free several more aviators from the number who are progressively inclined. Nixon should not hinder the return of these aviators to their homeland and not undertake any disciplinary measures toward them.
3. Nixon must compensate North Vietnam for the great damage inflicted on it by this destructive war.

Here then are the principles on the basis of which we may resolve the American POW issue. However, Nixon continues to resist resolving the Vietnamese question, thereby delaying the resolution of the American POW issue.

I have reported these specific figures and fundamental aspects of the American POW issue to the Politburo. But we also have these comrades who do not understand this problem correctly.

is necessary to resolve this issue taking into account settling the military and the political aspects of the Vietnamese problem. If we take a path of concession toward Americans and release POWs, then we would lose much. That is why our point of view on this issue remains the same: this issue must be resolved on the basis of military and political aspects of settlement.

Holding 1205 POWs creates certain difficulties for us, but more importantly, the loss of 1205 POWs, particularly aviators, is a great detriment to the American Army, particularly the US Air Force. At the same time, we were able to collect data about American weapons and also valuable scientific materials about the US Army, for instance, material on how to use different types of weaponry, tactical/technical characteristics of aircraft, Air Force directives, as well as materials about other types of armament of the US Army. We have been able to uncover US intentions in the international arena and on a number of other issues which are related to war in Indochina.

That is why we are convinced that our position concerning POWs has and continues to be correct. If we could successfully resolve the POW issue, then the other issues would not exert any influence on our policy toward the US. That is why we are now concentrating on the successful resolution of this problem on the collection and study of materials from interrogations of American aviators who were shot down over North Vietnam and American scientists captured in this war, particularly Air Force specialists, as well as scientists in other technical areas. Their loss is a major liability for the American Army, because in no other war have there been so many captured Americans as there are in this war of aggression.

The 1205 American POWs kept in the prisons of North Vietnam represent a large number. For now, we have officially published a list of only 368 POWs. The rest are not acknowledged. The US government is aware of this, but they do not know the exact number of POWs, or they perhaps only assume an approximate number based on their losses. Therefore in accordance with the instructions from the Politburo, we are keeping the number of POWs secret.

We continue to collect and study materials from interrogations

of POWs in order to have a basis in specific circumstances to expose US designs in the Indochina war of aggression as well as in other matters. Collection and study of these materials has provided us great assistance in studying the scientific discoveries of the US, in developing methods to counter contemporary weapons, including chemical, which have inflicted great harm upon us in this war.

I reported to the Politburo several fundamental aspects related to the matter of American POWs, namely: concerning the policy we are implementing on this matter, I gave the specific number of American POWs seized in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

We still have among us Comrades who think: why do we keep these POWs and not take advantage of the Nixon proposals? Do we really want to resolve this matter after all? It needs to be noted that such a point of view is profoundly mistaken. This is not political bargaining but rather a key condition and serious argument for successful resolution of the Vietnam problem. That is why the matter of the American POWs has great significance in exposing Nixon's designs in this aggressive war in Vietnam. We are completely unanimous in this matter and condemn individualistic mistaken views current among us on this matter. We firmly hold to our position -- when the American government resolves the political and military issues on all three fronts of Indochina, we will set free all American POWs. We consider this a very correct course.

Dear Comrades!

I have reported the following matters to Politburo sessions: the course of our party on the general offensive conducted in South Vietnam from March 30th to the present; our errors and deficiencies in the offensive and summing up results of the offensive in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; positive and negative aspects of the offensive; immediate plans of the enemy and our operations; analysis of errors permitted in strategic and tactical leadership; our contacts with political figures of South

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Vietnam from the Saigon regime; the matter of American POWs, captured on the three fronts of Indochina.

Today on assignment of the Supreme Command, the State Defense Council and the Military Committee of the Politburo, I reported to you on these matters so that the Politburo could study these problems, could express its opinion on them, and set forth forms and methods for their resolution. Soon the State Defense Council, together with the Supreme Command will study matters related to carrying out new operations at the front. The State Defense Council assigned the Supreme Command, and the latter in turn the General Staff, to address matters related to the development of new military plans for the year 1973. At the present time these plans are being worked out with the goal of preparing the necessary forces for their implementation. We are occupied with matters of mobilization and training of reinforcements for all three Indochinese fronts. We should mobilize 250,000 men, 200,000 of which would be sent to South Vietnam and 50,000 to Laos and Cambodia.

Summing up this report it is necessary to say that I have touched on the fundamental features of the situation which has developed in South Vietnam, on our difficulties and successes, and also on the difficulties existing for the enemy. I set out our plans and our course, and also illuminated a series of matters which the Politburo assigned to the State Defense Council and Supreme Command. At the next Politburo session, I shall set forth matters touching upon the present situation in Laos and Cambodia and views on its development.

Presently, the situation is turning out quite favorably. The peoples of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have decisively frustrated the plan for "Vietnamization" of the war and identical plans being implemented in Laos and Cambodia. We hold high the invincible banner of Marxism-Leninism!

We are carrying out the precepts of Ho Chi Minh. The war of resistance against American imperialists for the salvation of the Fatherland will yet be stubborn and hard, yet we will definitely grasp victory. We will decisively frustrate the plans of Nixon or anyone who takes his place and continues the aggressive war!

The course of our party is assuredly correct. Our people are heroic

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people. Our forces are heroic forces!

The three countries of Indochina, closely united one with another, will fight to the last drop of blood for the freedom and independence of their Fatherlands. The Vietnamese people will fully carry out its international duty toward the fraternal peoples of Laos and Cambodia!

To the current session of the Politburo I wish successful work. I have completed the presentation of the report.

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