

U.S. imperialists will have recourse to more brazen and daring maneuvers. In addition to intensifying the aggressive war in the south, they will further extend the war of destruction to the north at a fiercer pace. In addition to using their air force, they will also use warships to shell, infantry to attack, and special forces on a large scale; at the same time cooperate with the reactionary inlanders to carry on espionage war and psychological war activities for the purpose of harassing and destroying our rear.

The militiamen and self-defense corpsmen in the north are hurriedly preparing themselves to cope with any unexpected situation that may develop. Trying to win in the U.S. imperialists' war of destruction is both defending the north and closely coordinating with the liberation struggle of our compatriots in the south, and at the same time preparing the ground for defeating the enemy if the latter dares to widen the aggressive war to the whole of our country.

The development of the present situation requires that our militiamen and self-defense corpsmen fulfill these new needs and tasks:

First, to contribute actively to destroying more enemy aircraft and the enemy's special forces and attacking forces.

This is the most important military task to be fulfilled by militiamen and self-defense corpsmen. Fulfilling this task well will create favorable conditions for the fulfillment of other tasks and deal a heavy blow at the enemy's aggressive will.

For over a year of fighting the U.S. imperialists' war of destruction, our militiamen and self-defense corpsmen shot down a number of aircraft and captured many enemy pilots. Today, after having acquired rich combat experiences and raised their ideological, technical, and tactical capacities, many units are more capable of winning even bigger victories. Military organs of all levels must pay attention to consolidating the cells in charge of shooting at enemy aircraft, securing combat readiness, and raising their own commanding capacity so as to make it full of wisdom, mobility, and flexibility.

In regard to the task of fighting against special forces and attacking forces, particularly against the former, our militiamen and self-defense corpsmen have gained a lot of experiences. In the time to come, it is possible that the enemy will use larger forces of that kind. If the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen are satisfied with their old capacities, they will find their task quite difficult to fulfill. In addition to continual raising their technical and tactical capacities, they need to pay attention to further training in greater mobility, better cohesion in combat, and organizing of better information-collecting work leading to deeper understanding of the enemy's situation.

Second, to fulfill properly the task of serving as the hard core of

the people's base-level antiaircraft work.

Fighting resolutely and avoiding actively (enemy aircraft) are the two aspects of the people's antiaircraft work; however, for the people, the latter is the principal aspect.

Our experiences have indicated that if the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen were concerned only with fighting enemy aircraft while neglecting passive defense work for the people and for themselves, this would adversely affect our fighting the enemy ingeneral and would mean a failure on their part to protect the people's lives and properties. There must be appropriate attention paid to all the aspects of the passive defense work; in public places and where the population density is high, we must have enough shelters made exactly according to specifications, and at the same time improve the people's antiaircraft attacking force in order to reduce to the lowest limit the losses inflicted upon us by the enemy.

Third, to try to maintain safe, uninterrupted, and continuous communication-transportation.

Communication-transportation is the blood stream of the people's economy and greatly affects our national defense task. The north has thousands of kilometers of strategically important roads and railroads and also a pretty large network of sea transportation routes. The U.S. imperialists concentrate a great deal of their force upon destroying our communication-transportation system so as to disturb our people's economy and to prevent the circulation and movement of our army and people. In the time to come, the enemy will continue to bomb and to destroy our roads, thus causing us more difficulties.

The determination of our party and Government at the present time is to secure safe, uninterrupted, and continuous communication. It is also the determination of all our army and people to defeat an important part of the enemy's war-of-destruction plot, to safeguard the people's living, and to satisfy the ever growing needs for national defense.

Series of problems thus appear: to organize the fight against enemy aircraft, the protection from enemy bombings on our roads of communication, and the transporting and loading-unloading of merchandises; to camouflage bridges; to repair roads; to build secondary roads, etc. Only by relying on the big force of our militia and self-defense and of our people can we fulfill this task properly.

Fourth, to continue developing further the hard-core, attacking role in production.

Production and combat are the two principal tasks of all our party and people at the present time. Being the armed force in charge of both production and combat at the base level, the militia and self-defense corps must see more clearly their responsibility for this matter.

The more the enemy intensifies his destructive activities, the more the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen, along with the rest of the people, try to remedy the losses caused by the enemy and to destroy the latter while protecting their own force in regard to men, properties, machinery, etc. As soon as the enemy is gone, the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen turn to industrial and agricultural production, do their best to improve techniques, and raise labor productivity. Only by doing so can they actively contribute to strengthening the people's economic potentiality and driving our combat to victory.

Fifth, to take an active part in the struggle against the U.S. imperialists' espionage war and psychological war.

Espionage war and psychological war are closely combined with the enemy's war of destruction. They are aimed at undermining and harassing our ranks and paralyzing our people's will to fight. The enemy's maneuver is to deceive, to slander, to take advantage of our difficulties and weaknesses to carry on his destructive activities.

Our experiences indicate that the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen are a propaganda force that actively makes the people have a correct concept of the enemy's real nature and plot, and confidence in the party and Government. If we know how to use the vast limitless force of the militia and self-defense corps in the struggle against the U.S. imperialists' espionage and psychological wars, we will certainly build a politically stabilized and sound rear to help our army and people to devote all their efforts to fighting the enemy from without.

Sixth, to fulfill properly the task of a reserve force and to secure the combat-serving task in support for the main-force troops.

Our people's army today is a regular, relatively modern one. The more the main-force troops grow in strength and destroy the enemy, the more they help the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen to progress in all fields. At the same time, the heavier their combat task becomes, the greater the need of the rear and of other armed forces for such troops. This situation requires that the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen not only focus on their responsibility for daily combat and production, but also be ready to assign, if necessary, some of their men the task of serving combat or joining the main-force ranks without affecting the local productive and combat power.

III

The militia and self-defense corps must be consolidated in every way if they have to fulfill the heavy tasks mentioned above.

Strengthening the work of political education and ideological leadership is the most basic condition for raising the fighting power of our militia.

men and self-defense corpsmen.

The recent achievements of our militiamen and self-defense corpsmen are the unavoidable results of all those efforts to do political-education and ideological-leadership work and to raise the determination among their ranks to fight and to defeat the U.S. aggressors.

Under the conditions of our fierce, bitter fight against an enemy that has plenty of modern means, our militiamen and self-defense corpsmen have been responsible for outstanding feats of arms; the main reason behind such achievements is their deep hatred for the U.S. imperialist aggressors and their determination to defeat the U.S. imperialists so as to protect the fruit of the socialist revolution in the north, to liberate the south, and to move toward reunification of the country. The deep hatred for the enemy and the firm determination to destroy the enemy can be based only on the efforts to raise the understanding of class of the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen, to make them understand the evil nature of imperialism, the superiority of the socialist system, and the glorious responsibility of the people's armed forces for the great revolutionary work of the people.

Militiamen and self-defense corpsmen belong to different age groups; some of them used to be oppressed and exploited by the imperialists and feudalists; some others grew up under the new regime. The second group accounts for a larger and larger proportion in the militia and self-defense corps ranks. As a result, there is a need for paying proper attention to teaching them the concept of class and the way to distinguish friends and foes. We can do this in many ways and by different lively, yet profound, methods like encouraging people to recount their sufferings, comparing two ways of life, revealing the crimes committed by the U.S. imperialists against the people, etc.

A firm proletarian stand and a strong national spirit must be demonstrated in a thorough understanding and resolute implementation of all revolutionary standpoints and lines. Therefore, we need to teach the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen about the current events and policies; and to stress the task of fighting the U.S. for national salvation, defending the north, liberating the south, reunifying the country, and fulfilling international duties as the main content of such teaching. At the same time we need to teach them the revolutionary traditions and national virtues, such as the ability to bear hardships and to overcome difficulties; the will to fight bravely, continually, persistently; the spirit of initiative-taking and creativity; and to overcome any sign of subjective action and impatience, any fear of sacrifices and hardships, and all manifestations of other unhealthy tendencies among the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen.

Under the conditions of combat and production being carried on at the same time, we must cleverly use all propaganda organizations and measures and the teaching tools to mobilize the people in time at the places of production and on the battleground, thus making education lively and realistic.

To build and to consolidate the militia and self-defense corps along a steady and vast line.

The militia and self-defense corps can exist and develop their effectiveness only when the party echelons fully understand the line based on class to be adopted for their building and consolidation.

Recently many local areas launched different phases of the movement to consolidate the militia and self-defense corps. Many party committees of village, factory, and city quarter levels enrolled good party members, enthusiastic youth labor union members, and active soldiers satisfying all requirements in the ranks of our militia and self-defense corps. At the same time, under the real conditions of production and combat, there were measures taken to make them politically sound. However, in some places, many party members, union members, and active soldiers still remain outside the militia and self-defense corps, or if they have joined the latter, it was only a token act on their part, with no real effectiveness being felt. This situation must be put to an end soon.

Fully understanding the line based on class also requires that it be applied appropriately to the political situation of each area, with complete awareness of the adverse effects caused by lack of understanding and preconceived ideas. On the one hand, we must attach importance to political quality, and make sure that the militia and self-defense corps are really a revolutionary armed force of our country's working people; on the other hand, we need to attract all those who satisfy the requirements into this force so as to widen the movement to arm all our people for the fight against the U.S. for national salvation.

We must coordinate this movement with the "three readinesses" and "three resourcefulnesses" movements and, through other political campaigns, make the majority of the people willingly join the militia and self-defense corps. During the war of resistance against the French in the past, up to 15 percent of the population of Hung Yen Province, which was one of the many provinces that suffered the most from the enemy's terrorizing and mopping-up acts, joined the ranks of the militiamen and guerrillas. Today, as we are under more favorable conditions than before, we can organize a much larger body of militiamen and guerrillas.

In the building of the militia and self-defense corps, proper importance must be attached to the role of women. Because of our people's revolutionary struggle characteristics and traditions, the woman members of the militia and self-defense corps must constitute an organization we cannot afford to lack. In addition to developing the militia and self-defense corps activities among women, we must attach utmost importance to further improving and granting promotion to those women who show more potential capacities so that they could be given leadership work and made the commanding officers of the militia and self-defense corps.

Base level cadres have a decisive effect upon the movement. As we have a number of newly-appointed cadres, we must pay more attention to perfecting the body of base level cadres, particularly in vital places. More particularly, we must closely administer and constantly improve the guerrilla cadres and combat corpsmen, who constitute the hard core of our militia and self-defense corps.

Through our combat experiences, we find that the specialized units of our militia and self-defense corps like the engineer, fire-fighting, reconnaissance, information, first-aid units are very necessary and effective. Those units need to be consolidated so as to help serve combat in local areas and to be a source of support for the regular troops.

The militiamen and self-defense corpsmen are better equipped than before, but because of inappropriate distribution and use of equipment in some areas, their effect remains limited. We need to consider an adjustment of the use of equipment in accordance with areas of major importance, and the full use of the capacity of local industry in the manufacture of weapons for our militiamen and self-defense corpsmen to use; this way we shall create favorable conditions for them to fulfill even better their combat task.

At present, the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen must carry out quite heavy production, combat, and combat-serving tasks. Many of them are to face family problems and difficulties in their living. In spite of all that, they are fulfilling their tasks enthusiastically. Our party, Government, and people highly value such qualities. In order to create favorable conditions for them to work better in both production and combat, the responsible organs must study the necessary systems and policies that would help them to reduce the difficulties they face in their everyday life. In addition to the already-adopted policies and systems, there recently appeared new problems created by the wartime, such as the policies and systems to be applicable to the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen directly in charge of shooting at enemy aircraft, the protection of communication and transportation, etc. Generally speaking, the most correct line is still that of the people, which relies on the abilities of the local cooperative and people and at the same time the definite regulations prescribed by the state for certain work, for the purpose of properly consolidating and developing the militia and self-defense corps.

To raise technical and tactical capacities, as well as the ability to organize commanding work, in order to satisfy the need of the combat and security-maintaining task.

The purpose of training is to combat. In order to make the training of the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen effective, it must come from the need of the combat and security-maintaining task. In addition to fighting the U.S. piratical aircraft, there are different combat and security-maintaining needs; for instance, some areas must get prepared to fight the special forces, some other areas must fight the enemy along the coast, etc.

Therefore, the training program must suit each local area, and cannot be too ambitious or mechanical. Under any circumstances, the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen must be trained in such a way as to be capable of coping effectively with the enemy's war of destruction and remaining prepared to face more complicated happenings.

In a general way, the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen fight under the conditions of those who are few and fight an outnumbering enemy, who are weak and fight the strong, who use courage and wit to defeat the enemy's modern techniques and weapons. Therefore, while giving technical and tactical training, we must pay utmost attention to promoting courage, initiative, flexibility, and creativity in combat. Because of the need for fighting with the regular troops, in addition to their regular combat-serving activities, specialized units like antiaircraft artillery, regular artillery, engineer, etc. are very necessary.

To learn from experiences and to popularize in time all combat experiences is a very realistic and flexible training method. The extremely rich experiences gained in the struggle of the army and people of the south, the experiences obtained during the war of resistance, as well as the current experiences in our fight against the war of destruction in the north, must be widely popularized and creatively applied so as to heighten further the fighting power of our militiamen and self-defense corpsmen.

To consolidate the existing combat villages and to build more and more combat villages,

From the war against the U.S. imperialist aggressors, our people have created the form of combat villages. They are the fortress of the people's war. Under the leadership of the party, all the physical and moral forces of the people are gathered and fully developed to fight the aggressors, to defend our villages, and to turn to attacking the enemy for destroying him.

The U.S. imperialists' war of destruction is going on on a wider and wider scale and with the help of the most cruel and savage maneuvers. Therefore, the purpose of building combat villages (or combat quarters in cities, combat zones in the highland) is to defeat the enemy in his war of destruction and to prepare ourselves to cope with his plot to widen the war of aggression.

The strength of our combat villages, as it has been proved by reality originates from all our people's will and determination to fight under the sound party leadership to destroy the enemy. The building of combat villages cover various aspects--political, military, economic. The prerequisite condition for this building work is to have good political bases, based on the party chi bo. Moreover, there must be a big force of militiamen and self-defense corpsmen, who fight bravely, do productive work enthusiastically; production must be developed on the basis of our consolidated cooperatives; combat fortifications must be good while shelters and trenches must be suf-

ficient and solid.

As building combat villages is a big job, it can be carried out properly only under the unified leadership of party echelons, with the wide participation of all branches and social groups. We must show the masses the immediate benefits, as well as the long-lasting effect, of building combat villages so that they would resolutely carry out such a job, secure good quality, and satisfy the combat needs of each local area.

To strengthen the complete, direct, and absolute leadership of the local party committees over the militia and self-defense corps.

The absolute, direct, and complete leadership of local party committees is the basic condition for our militiamen and self-defense corpsmen to win victory in all fields of building, combat, and production.

Implementing the party Central Committee resolution dealing with a shift of direction of organizational work, many local party committees have correctly resolved the relations between production and combat, and between economic building and national defense; paid proper attention to strengthening leadership; and assumed direct leadership over the building of the militia and self-defense corps force.

Our experiences have clearly shown that if the party echelons were willing to develop the role of our militiamen and self-defense corpsmen in production and combat, they should attach proper importance to leadership over the various fields of activities of the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen, such as building, training, production, and combat; and continually urge and supervise the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen to execute all the resolutions of the local party committees.

On the basis of a full understanding of the party military line, we must combine the building of "four good" chi ho with the consolidation and development of the militia and self-defense corps; teach all party members to show their pioneering and example-setting role among the militia and self-defense corps ranks, in accordance with the slogan, "party members go first, other people follow"; and make all government organizations, cooperatives, and local people's groups extend their encouragement and assistance to the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen. These are the key problems in connection with strengthening the militia and self-defense corps ranks.

Local military organs, which serve as the staff of party committeemen in military matters, must be further perfected. Those cadres working in these organs must be improved and must raise their basic understanding of leadership and guidance in the war of destruction and guerrilla warfare, of the organization of the joint command among the three arms, and of the behavior and work of the revolutionary military cadres.

The militia and self-defense corps constitute one of the three kinds

of revolutionary people's armed forces. Whether the militia and self-defense corps are strong or weak directly affects other people's armed forces. Therefore, the main-force and local units, wherever they may be stationed, must have the responsibility for helping the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen in both building and combat work.

Our people's fight against the U.S. for national salvation is approaching a bitter decisive period. Party committees of all levels must strengthen the leadership over the militia and self-defense force and develop the latter's big role in the current revolutionary struggle so as to make an active contribution to defeating the U.S. piratical aggressors, defending the north, liberating the south, and moving toward reunification of our fatherland.

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TRAN VAN QUANG

VIETNAM

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THREE GREAT EXPERIENCES
OF MILITIA AND SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Following is a translation of
an article by Brigadier General
Tran Van Quang in the
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Hanoi, 7 July 1966, p. 3/

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1 - Our people are very patriotic, courageous and creative, and so are our militiamen and self-defense corpsmen. Our cadres need only to educate them fully about the revolutionary tasks and arouse their thinking, and they will overcome any difficulty and fulfill any revolutionary task.

The courageous examples set in both production and combat by the people, militiamen and guerrillas of outstanding combat villages, such as village V. (Vinh Linh), village Q. (Quang Binh), village T. (Nghe An), village S. (Ha Tinh), etc., have proved that our people have a deep love for the country and for socialism and are very creative. There is no task they cannot fulfill, no difficulty they cannot overcome.

It is not because people of these villages have something special. Our people everywhere in the country have the same qualities. If the people of the above-mentioned villages made outstanding achievements, it was because, first of all, they were fully educated about revolutionary tasks and their thinking was fully aroused. To have Determined-To-Win unit, first of all there must be Determined-To-Win people; to have Determined-To-Win people, first of all there must be Determined-To-Win thinking. Such is the key to every success.

Arousing the people, militiamen and self-defense corpsmen to become active in fighting the enemy and serving combat and production is a revolutionary campaign, a campaign to encourage the people to participate in

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Arousing the people, militiamen and self-defense corpsmen to become active in fighting the enemy and serving combat and production is a revolutionary campaign, a campaign to encourage the people to participate in

the revolution. This can be successful only when the cadres believe in progress and in the revolutionary capability of the masses, and when we convince them that their interests are attached to the revolutionary path set up by the Party and make them believe in their invincible strength. As for all other means, including plain orders and appeals, they will never be answered by the masses.

A strong factor in arousing the masses is to instill in them a deep love for the country, for socialism and for the South, and on that basis show them the way to progress, the way to associate their self-interests with national and class interests, and instill in each of them a national and class pride. Therefore, the main objective of mass political education and ideological mobilization at this moment is to fully educate the masses about the Party's resolution on the revolutionary situation and task.

Education of revolutionary tasks and ideological mobilization must be carried out deeply, positively and continuously, and not superficially. Education, encouragement and criticism must continue through each phase, each task, in order to raise the masses' political awareness and their determination to defeat the U.S.

Experiences of village V. (Vinh Linh), village Q. (Quang Binh), village T. (Nghe An), village S. (Ha Tinh)...showed that to arouse the masses' thinking, it is necessary to arouse the thinking of party members first. As long as party members still lack understanding and determination, it cannot be said that the masses have the understanding and determination. This is very important. Arousing the party membership first then continuing to arouse the thinking of members of mass organizations has always been the Party's guide-line in mass mobilizing work. In doing this work, it is most important to practice democracy, use such methods as provocation, "arguing," persuasion..., and study the people's state of mind to solve the difficulties they are encountering. Lecturing on the situation in the South, comparing both ways of living and both systems, denouncing the enemy's crimes to arouse hatred, using daily happenings as basis to show the way that should be followed, using real people and developments as examples to give out praise and encouragement...all these are good forms of ideological mobilization that should be carried out carefully and meticulously.

In short, task education and ideological mobilization of party members, militiamen and self-defense corpsmen are the most important works and also the key to all success. If despite bitter fighting conditions, the Con Co fighters, the fighters serving combat in Con Co, and thousands and thousands of fighters on the production, combat, communication-transportation fronts in the military zone passionately performed and fulfilled their tasks, with some of them even using their blood to write applications for very dangerous jobs, it was because they were fully educated on the political tasks and were mobilized ideologically. On the contrary, in places where this movement has not made any progress, we do not have to go far to find out what are the causes. Instead, we should first review the task education among party

members, militiamen and self-defense corpsmen. The successful resolution of this problem would bring about many new prospects, and then every difficulty would be overcome. This is a lesson for everybody and also a lesson for militiamen and self-defense corpsmen.

2 - Firmly grasping the relationship between production and combat; militiamen and self-defense corpsmen are both the key force in base-level fighting and the assault force in production; they are also the principal arm of proletarian dictatorship at the village level and the most active elements in the consolidation and development of cooperatives.

Our entire country is fighting a war, but the war extent in two zones is different. The socialist North is the big rear zone of the entire country. To fulfill the duty of the big rear toward the big front line, the people in the North must not only fight well but also produce well. Production and combat are two tasks that are closely related to each other.

By fighting better, by shooting down more U.S. aircraft and by destroying more enemy rangers, not only will we protect our production in the North, but we will also be able to coordinate effectively with the army and people in the South to destroy the enemy's strength. Good communication-transportation work will not only serve production and life of the people but also serve well combat and the front line.

On the other hand, when striving to step up production — especially grain production — and striving to consolidate and develop the superiority of the cooperatives, we are increasing the rice yield of each hectare by one quintal and creating better conditions for both immediate and long-term fighting. In zone 4 in particular, one additional ton of grain will reduce truck transportation by one shipment, thus shortening the supply routes. An effort to improve production tools and to carry out the slogan "redoubling your efforts" has a practical significance in that it gives more time for everybody to participate in national defense and for every production establishment to transfer its labor to the service of the front line.

Furthermore, under war conditions, every production work carries a fighting nature. As a result, stepping up production at this moment is not simply an economic problem. It is also a very important political and national defense problem directly affecting the strengthening of the defense of the North and the active support of the liberation of the South.

Production and combat give boost to each other and help each other develop. Reading reports made by combat villages, we found that where there was good combat there was good production and where there was good production there were good successes in combat. This fact has proved as false the idea of some cadres that "production cannot be done simultaneously with combat." Combat and production can be strongly developed because when every-

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one's patriotism, hatred for the enemy, and determination to defeat the American imperialists are heightened, not only will he become more determined in combat but also he will become more enthusiastic in production. And as production becomes more active and life becomes more insured, he will strive harder to fulfill his duty to fight for the protection of the cooperatives and the system of the North. It is the love for the country and for socialism which unites combat and production and makes them push each other forward.

The militia and self-defense forces include the most important rural labor elements who have a good political awareness, are well-organized and eager to learn and improve techniques, and know how to associate their personal and family life with the cooperative's. They are the key force not only in combat but also in production. Only by transforming them into the key force, the assault force in production to fulfill such slogans as "plow in one hand, rifle in another," "hammer in one hand, rifle in another," "good combat, good production," will we be able to mobilize and encourage the entire people to participate enthusiastically in both production and combat.

Therefore, we would like to assert here again the tasks of militiamen and self-defense corpsmen as the key force, the assault force in production as well as in combat.

In production, militiamen and self-defense corpsmen must:

- Constantly devote their attention to production and to the cooperative, consider the cooperative as their home and regard production as one of their two main tasks.

- Promote discipline and fighting spirit in production, assume the most difficult jobs and assure most labor points for the cooperative.

- Voluntarily be one of the leading forces in improving techniques, improving production tools and increasing labor efficiency.

- Become a locomotive leading others in staying close to ricefields and the sea to boost production, and volunteer to do production work where there are the most difficulties caused by the enemy.

- Be the hard core, and give assistance to, labor teams in carrying out militarization in production, i.e. be courageous in production, be well-organized and have good self-defense and combat plans when the enemy comes.

To fulfill these tasks, militiamen and self-defense corpsmen must be educated so that they understand clearly the important tasks and meanings of production and combat. Praises and encouragement must be given everyday

to individuals and teams that prove to be outstanding in both production and combat. The "chi bo" and the cooperative management board must, on one hand, provide leadership and assistance to militia and self-defense groups in their combat performance and, on the other hand, know to mobilize them to play their assault role in production and to become a solid base for the consolidation of the cooperative.

Production and combat provide each other with thrust and help, but there remain some problems that must be solved in order to insure the fulfillment of these two tasks:

- The first problem is a balance between production labor management and national defense labor management. According to local reports, this problem has been partly solved. Cooperative management boards have firmly grasped the needs for labor in every aspect (direct, indirect and national defense) to plan work assignments and work order. What is important is how to improve production tools so as to raise labor productivity (by improving transportation for instance), and to combine closely the benefits of national defense with those of production (for instance, combine planting of trees with camouflage, trenches with irrigation canals).

- The second problem is to give credit points to persons who perform guard duty or air defense work, etc. Several ways have been suggested to solve this problem. Three solutions have been suggested in reports presented to this meeting:

1 - The cooperative helps these comrades guards-men by providing them with working conditions so that at the end of the year if they do not have enough credit points they would be given additional points by the cooperative in order to be classified as category A labor. This system is being currently used by many villages. Its advantage is to insure production and its disadvantage is that the cooperative's interests will be affected if there are too many people on guard duty.

2 - Guard teams are assigned to do production work on the spot (growing crops, raising animals). Although it does not separate militiamen with production, this way is of a larger scale and can only be done by cooperatives which have all the conditions necessary; and if they remain in their job too long, these guard teams can easily become separate labor teams.

3 - The people will take turn to provide daily food to militiamen and self-defense corpsmen. This way is not good, for on one hand it cannot heighten the combattant's position and on the other hand it cannot develop the cooperative's role in combat.

The problem of giving credit points to combat teams is solved differently from one place to another, but the following principle must be firmly maintained:

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- Militiamen and self-defense corpsmen can perform both production and combat. They are good in combat, but they must also be good in production. It is therefore necessary to train them to take turn to perform their combat duty so that their production duty will not be affected.

- Waste must be avoided as much as possible in combat. The number of people used for defense work must correspond exactly to the requirement of the job. There must be organization, management and improvement of working techniques and methods. Any waste, especially labor waste in transportation, must be overcome.

- The cooperative must create conditions for the militiamen and self-defense corpsmen to fulfill their production task and insure their credit points, although they use part of their time to prepare for combat. If because of combat duty, a number of them cannot accumulate enough credit points the cooperative should pay attention to their living by giving them an additional number of credit points so that their income can reach the level of category A laborers.

These are a few suggestions. It is necessary to consider the situation in the cooperative and the enlightenment of cooperative members to solve effectively the problems of combat, production and unity. If we have good labor organization, avoid waste of labor, improve techniques, mobilize everybody to participate in national defense, and develop the key role of the militia and self-defense forces we will certainly be able to solve any problem and fulfill any task. Recently, in villages where many battles had taken place, each militiamen and self-defense corpsmen has set aside from 90 to 100 labor days for combat and village defense, yet production still remained good and their living was not only insured but also reached a high level. This is a good achievement that should be followed.

3 - Strengthening regularly the leadership of base-level party committee in combat and combat serving.

The recent combat experience in many villages has shown clearly the importance of the leadership of base-level party committee on both production and combat fronts. All directives and resolutions of the Party Central Committee, Government, zone, province, etc., are finally concentrated in base-level party committees for implementation. Now, everyone has seen clearly that the masses have great abilities and a high revolutionary enthusiasm; they can fulfill every task assigned them by the Central, branches, departments and levels. But if the base-level party committee fails to mobilize and arouse the masses' thinking and fails to stay close to the masses, all resolutions and directives will just stay in one place; village cadres will have to work hard and their work will have not much result.

The leadership by the base-level party committee is an overall leadership in all political, economic, military, cultural and social fields, as

well as in building the Party and mass organizations... Here, we would like to speak of certain aspects concerning the leadership over military work and militia and self-defense forces:

1 - The base-level party committee's requirement is to firmly grasp the three present principal tasks of production, combat with combat serving and Party building. Every meeting of the party committee or of the "chi bo" must discuss these three matters, review what has been done, plan the next steps, and set up the tasks, goals and implementation measures for each of these fields. As we all know, combat, production and Party Building are the primary tasks closely related to each other: we fight to protect and to boost production, and we carry out production to insure combat. Through combat and production, we train our party members, develop the Party, build "four-good chi bo," etc.: In short, the village party committee and the "chi bo" must provide regular guidance and issue resolutions on combat, production and Party building. The Youth Corps must also grasp firmly these three tasks of combat, production and Corps building in every of its activities.

2 - To have a good leadership in these tasks, the party committee and the "chi bo" must have a firm control over the militia and self-defense forces, educate and foster them so as to make them the key force in production, combat and consolidation of the cooperative... In other words, the base-level party committee and the "chi bo" must do exactly what the Party Central Committee and Politburo do in dealing with national defense and in controlling and guiding the army, except that their work is on a smaller scale. Recent experiences showed that to control the militia and self-defense forces and to develop their role, the base-level party committee must:

- Ask all members (except old and weak ones) to participate in militia and self-defense work, with most of party committeemen in charge of the leadership. Party members and committeemen should not participate just for the sake of participating, but should participate with all their enthusiasm and should show that they really are the nucleus of these forces. The Labor Youth Corps must also mobilize its members to join the para-military forces and to strive to become the best militiamen and self-defense corpsmen.

- Constantly carry out political education and ideological leadership among militiamen and self-defense corpsmen, and develop to the highest extent their brave fighting spirit in both production and combat; at the same time, know well the state of mind of each of them so as to work out measures to overcome backward and rightist thinking and to create among them a real progressive revolutionary thinking, transforming the militia and self-defense forces into a school to train good combatants loyal to the Party and regime.

- Have a strict control over cadres and fighters and firmly maintain the class stand. The "chi bo" must review the application of every militiaman and self-defense corpsman who asks to join the party, foster and promote cadres, and through combat and other works train party members, accept new

party members and build "four-good chi bo" (scheduling the review of achievements made by every combatant and cadres to work out plans for training and promotion).

- Guide various branches and groups to implement the resolutions of the "chi bo," and through this mobilize and foster them and make suggestions on the building of militia and self-defense forces; lead various branches and groups to coordinate closely with militia and self-defense forces in combat and production; make them consider the militia and self-defense forces as their own para-military forces and encourage their members to participate in or support these forces. From time to time it must be pointed out clearly that what are the plan, the duty and the requirement of the cooperative management board...and what are the duty and requirement of such groups as youth, women, culture, etc., concerning the militia and self-defense forces and national defense.

- In its leadership, the base-level party committee must illustrate its determination to implement the tasks and directives issued by the Party Central Committee, district and provincial party committee, with political education and ideological leadership as the foremost tasks; and it must also grasp firmly the relations between combat and production.

To help the party committee and the "chi bo" fulfill these tasks, the village militia and self-defense command must serve as the Party staff. It must use the resolutions and general tasks as a basis to report any problem to the party committee. It must act on its own and at the same time adhere to the resolutions by the party committee. On the other hand, the party committee must know how to use the village command as its staff: by asking it to make reports on the situation, set up tasks and plans, etc.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

GENERAL OUTLINES ROLE OF MILITIA, SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 1, Jan 78 pp 28-47, 55

[Article by Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang: "The New Stage of the Revolution and the New Stage of Development of Local Military Work"]

[Text] Local military work plays a very important strategic role in our country in both war time and peace time, in a war of liberation and in the effort to strengthen the national defense system as well as in a people's war to defend the fatherland.

As we enter the new stage of the revolution, the people of our entire country are focusing their intelligence and energies on the task of building and protecting the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. Local military work now involves new tasks and very high requirements and, at the same time, involves new capabilities and new, very favorable conditions. To successfully perform each task of local military work, we must have a thorough understanding of the political line and the military line of the party and apply these in a manner consistent with the specific conditions and circumstances of each locality. Only through practice, through work and through research can we gain the correct and full understanding of the new requirements, the new advantages and the new difficulties in order to, on this basis, resolve new problems better with each passing day.

This article deals with a number of matters concerning the effort to thoroughly implement the line on the socialist revolution of the 4th Congress of the Party in local military work and discusses the main elements of the several major tasks. In the process, light is shed upon the new stage of development of local military work in our country, the local military work of the period of building and protecting the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

The resolution of the 4th Congress of the Party pointed out that the strategic task of our country's revolution today is to "carry out the socialist revolution and advance to socialism in a rapid, strong and steady manner." The congress also set forth the line on building the socialist economy: "accelerating socialist industrialization, building the material and technical bases of socialism, advancing our country's economy from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production..."

cooperation and federation among basic units and throughout the district; building the districts into agro-industrial economic units and the district level government into a comprehensive management level; and building the provinces and subordinate municipalities into industrial-agricultural economic units which develop in a manner consistent with the strengths of each locality and the common requirements of the national economy. Therefore, local military work must be carried out in a manner closely linked to the process of advancing the provinces and districts to large-scale socialist production; the buildup of the national defense system within the locality must be carried out on the basis of the success of this process. The pilot project districts in the mechanization of agricultural production and the building of districts into agro-industrial economic units, such as Quynh Luu District, Nam Ninh District, Dong Hung District and so forth, have provided us with many valuable initial experiences. Within these districts, the long-term plan for the military buildup of the district was set forth in the project plan for advancing the district to large-scale production. On the basis of the project plan for the economic construction of the district, the capabilities and guidelines for building the district into a strong fortress were established. In Quynh Luu, when formulating the plan for rearranging the population centers and economic areas within the district, the district party organization relied upon the new capabilities and conditions resulting from the reorganization of production to formulate the plan for establishing the deployment of military forces and establishing the guidelines for coordinating the economy with the defense of the nation and building up the local army, the militia and the self-defense force. For example, when seeing that the project plan for the development of the enterprises, tractor stations, farms and vocational schools of the district will increase the number of workers to 30,000, including nearly 300 engineers and 1,000 middle level technical cadres, the party committee echelon and cadres within the district gave their attention to resolving many new problems arising in local military work. For example, in conjunction with developing the militia in a manner consistent with the requirement of developing cooperatives to large scale, very much importance must be attached to developing the self-defense force and establishing the correct structure and scale of organization as well as mode of operation for the self-defense forces within the district.

In the localities of the southern provinces, there has been and continues to be a struggle to thoroughly abolish feudal ownership of cropland, carry out the socialist transformation of private capitalists, reorganize the artisan and handicraft trades, cooperativize agriculture, reorganize agricultural production, advance to large-scale socialist production, etc. In conjunction with transforming production relations and reorganizing production, these localities must strengthen the organizations of the government and the mass organizations. Therefore, one of the major tasks of local military work in these localities is to protect the revolutionary struggle of the people within the locality, defeat each plot and activity of imperialist spies, suppress reactionaries and thwart each of their plots of sabotage and opposition. Facts have shown that in those localities which place local military work within the struggle to transform production relations, accelerate production, improve the life of the people and maintain political security and social order, success

is achieved in the effort to teach the concept of national defense and the spirit of vigilance and combat readiness to the people, build and develop the militia and self-defense forces and satisfactorily carry out the military draft and other national defense policies.

The 4th Congress of the Party set forth the military line and task of our country in the new stage: "Always attaching importance to the task of strengthening the national defense system, maintaining political security and social order and insuring that the country is always ready and able to smash each act of aggression and each counter-revolutionary activity."

The new stage of development of local military work, which is part of the overall military work of the party, is closely linked to the thorough implementation of the military line and task of the party in the new stage, the thorough implementation of the viewpoint that all of the people participate in the defense of the nation and the thorough implementation of the viewpoint of a people's war to protect the socialist fatherland. Our national defense system must be "a strong, stable defense system of all the people"; "the task of building and strengthening the national defense system is the task of all the people, of the entire army, of the entire dictatorship of the proletariat system under the leadership of the party." To have a strong national defense system, we must have a strong economy; building and strengthening the national defense system must be carried out on the basis of gradually building an independent, autonomous economy within our country. The strength of our national defense system must be the strength of the political line and the military line of the party, the combined strength of the three revolutions, of the effort to develop the economic, political, military and scientific-technical potentials of the country; the nucleus of the national defense system must be the people's armed forces consisting of all three military elements, all of which must be truly powerful.

Thus, the political line and the military line of the party and the specific conditions and circumstances of our country in the present stage of the revolution deeply control all local military work and cause it to reflect more new developments with each passing day compared to local military work over the past several decades, new developments encompassing everything from objectives and tasks to the specific content of this work, from the organization of forces to the mode of operation.

In past years we gained many valuable experiences in local military work performed under the conditions of a war of liberation; at the same time, we gained much rich experience in the local military work of the socialist North during the years of peace as well as in the fight against the wars of destruction to protect the North and liberate the South. We must develop upon these experiences and creatively apply them to the new conditions which exist in order to perform good local military work in the period of building and protecting the socialist fatherland.

Now that our country has been completely liberated, the objectives and tasks of local military work are to help complete the military task of the entire

country, firmly protect each locality, protect the socialist revolution within the locality and help protect the independence and sovereignty of the nation, the territorial integrity of the fatherland and the construction of socialism throughout the country. We must utilize the strength of military organization in economic construction within the locality, build a strong, stable national defense system within the locality and help increase the national defense potential of the entire country. We must insure that the locality is always combat ready during peace time and win victory in a people's war to defend the fatherland if such a war should occur. We must be fully aware of the plots of aggression and sabotage of the imperialists and domestic and foreign reactionary powers against the peaceful labor of our people to build socialism; we must be fully aware of the new, very large capabilities and the new, very high requirements of a modern people's war to defend the fatherland if the imperialists unleash a war of aggression against our country.

To carry out the tasks mentioned above, it is very important to mobilize all of the people within the locality to build and strengthen the national defense system. Local military work must mobilize the capabilities of all of the sectors and levels within the dictatorship of the proletariat system in the locality under the centralized, unified leadership of the local party organization. We must insure that each locality not only becomes a vast worksite building socialism, but also becomes a strong battle position of the national defense system; we must transform each province into a strong strategic unit, each district into a sturdy fortress and each installation into a strong rear base, a well trained combat force. We must insure that all of the people are combat ready in peace time and that all of the people fight the enemy and win victory in time of war.

The strength of the national defense system within the locality is closely linked to the development of the economy within the locality, it is the combined result of the strength displayed in each aspect of the process of socialist transformation and socialist construction. Therefore, local military work must be based on these achievements in order to build the national defense potential and build the people's armed forces within the locality as well as the entire country. The local armed forces must fully meet the requirement of protecting the locality and protecting the fatherland under the new conditions that exist. The organization of the local army and the militia and self-defense forces must be closely linked to the reorganization of production within the locality along the lines of large-scale socialist production and closely linked to the three revolutions, to the effort to mold the new man who possesses socialist awareness, possesses the ability to organize and manage, has knowledge of modern science and technology, etc.

Through the overall project plan for building the various provinces and districts along the lines of large-scale production, we see very clearly that, on the basis of the victory of socialist construction within each locality as well as the entire country, we are fully capable of strengthening our political forces, economic forces, cultural and scientific-technical forces and, on this basis, strengthen the national defense system within the locality. At present, the

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various localities have begun to implement their plans on building the material technical bases of socialism, stabilizing and gradually improving the material and spiritual lives of the people and building each province and district into an economic unit which develops in a manner consistent with the strengths of each locality and the overall requirements of the economy throughout the country. In this process, many localities have adopted effective, specific plans and measures designed to increase the impact of economic achievements and the reorganization of production upon the effort to increase the fighting strength of the locality. Whenever they formulate a plan for building the economy within the locality, many places give their attention to the impact which economic construction projects have upon the effort to strengthen the national defense system and the effort to build the battle position of the people's war and build up the armed forces within the locality. The situation in a number of districts conducting pilot projects in the reorganization of production and the mechanization of agriculture shows that we can significantly increase the percentage which the militia and self-defense forces comprise of the total population within the locality. The guerrilla militia forces on the village level and the self-defense forces on the district level have undergone extraordinary quantitative and qualitative development.

Thus, compared to the local military work performed during the years of peace in the North and the local military work performed in both the North and the South during the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, the local military work being performed in the present stage of the revolution involves new tasks, new requirements and new contents. Local military work must be conducted through new, suitable modes of activity in order to perform these tasks well. For example, it is necessary to closely link the local military work task and plan to the task and plan for building the economy, carrying out socialist transformation and socialist construction and the other tasks within the locality; it is necessary to closely link the defense of the nation to the economy. We must closely coordinate political and ideological education with the implementation of the systems, regulations and laws promulgated by the state concerning the citizens' obligation to defend the fatherland. We must gradually put each activity involved in local military work on a firm regular force basis, etc.

One very important factor is that the localities of our country differ in many ways in terms of their geography, in terms of their position within the national economy and the deployment of the national defense system; in terms of their political enlightenment and the level of development of their production forces and production relations; in terms of the living conditions, the customs and habits of the people, etc. Some places are located on the border; some are along the seacoast; some are on the islands; some are in the lowlands; some are in the mountainous forests; and some are in the cities. Some localities were only recently liberated, some aspects of their situation are not yet stable and they have only begun the process of socialist transformation. In other localities, the socialist production relations have been established and are gradually being perfected and local military work has been put on a regular basis. Some localities lie within areas of strategic economic and national defense importance. Each locality has its own economic as well as military

strengths. Therefore, in local military work, we must know how to creatively apply the lines and viewpoints of the party on the basis of the specific, overall conditions of the locality and know how to take advantage of the strengths of each locality and establish specific jobs and suitable measures designed to complete each military task of the locality.

To reflect the viewpoints mentioned above in the period of building and protecting the socialist fatherland, local military work must result in the good performance of the following several major tasks:

1. Maintaining a readiness to fight in defense of the locality and the fatherland.

This is the most important task of local military work.

Ever since our people and the peoples of Laos and Cambodia won total victory in the resistance against the United States, the imperialists have looked for every way to sabotage the forces of the revolution at many places and have urgently reconsolidated the forces of their allies and lackeys in Southeast Asia while dividing and opposing the forces of the revolution. They are continuing to use Vietnamese traitors who fled overseas and spies and reactionaries still within our country in a vain attempt to sabotage our people's socialist construction. Therefore, we must attach full importance to the task of maintaining our readiness to fight in defense of the fatherland. Maintaining the country is a basic, permanent task of our people. It originates in the law of our nation which states that building the country must go hand in hand with defending it and the law of modern times that socialist construction must go hand in hand with protecting socialism.

Each locality and our entire country, in general, must maintain a constant state of combat readiness in peace time while preparing to defeat the enemy if they unleash a war of aggression against our country. We must coordinate, in a very efficient and scientific manner, the task of maintaining combat readiness at present and the task of maintaining combat readiness over the long range in order to always keep the fatherland for which generations of our people worked so hard to build and shed so much blood to defend.

In the immediate future, we must maintain combat readiness in order to prevent, stop and thwart the schemes and actions of the enemy against the sovereignty of the country and the peaceful socialist construction of the people and stop and punish the plots and acts of sabotage of domestic counter-revolutionaries and decadent elements who cause a lack of political security and social order within the locality. At the same time, we must make all of the preparations necessary for the people, the armed forces and the various sectors and levels within the locality to rapidly shift from peace time to war time and be ready to wage a victorious people's war to defend the fatherland and defend the locality if the enemy unleashes a war of aggression against our country. The initiative and effort of every locality in organizing and mobilizing each of its capabilities is the matter of most basic significance in performing this task well and only in this way is it possible to lay a firm foundation and create

favorable conditions for building strong standing armed forces for the country.

The changes in the situation over the past several years, especially in strategically important areas, show that all localities must be fully aware of the schemes of the imperialists and counter-revolutionaries against our country and the specific manifestations of these schemes in each locality in peacetime as well as when they unleash a war of aggression against our country.

The position of each locality within the national defense system is not the same. The terrain, population, economic situation, political situation and so forth of each locality vary. The situation along the border, on the islands and along the seacoast differs from the situation deep within the hinterland; the situation in the mountainous forests and rural lowlands differs from the situation in the cities. Each locality has its own specific combat readiness task. Therefore, each locality must have a suitable organization of forces and suitable measures for maintaining combat readiness.

To successfully complete the task of maintaining a readiness to fight in defense of the locality, we must perform many jobs: gaining a thorough understanding of the revolutionary situation and task and the military task of the entire country and each locality; heightening the spirit of revolutionary vigilance of the army and people within the locality; building up the local armed forces; establishing the battle position of the people's war within the locality; providing regular training for the people and the armed forces to insure that the local armed forces are always in a high state of combat readiness and, together with the people's public security force, are ready to smash each act of aggression and sabotage by the enemy, maintain political security and social order within the locality and so forth.

Teaching combat traditions and experiences to the people and the local armed forces is an extremely important matter in maintaining a readiness to defend the locality and defend the fatherland in the immediate future as well as over the long range. In local military work, importance must be attached to giving each citizen and each soldier within the locality, especially the various generations of youths, a clear understanding of and the desire to maintain and constantly develop the valuable traditions and experiences our nation has accumulated over the generations. Many forms and measures, such as establishing museums, establishing associations to research military science, organizing national defense physical education and sports and so forth, must be employed to make the love of military affairs, the consciousness of being the masters of the country and the knowledge of defending the fatherland become the feelings and lifestyle of the citizen, become part of the customs and habits of society.

Every locality must know and predict in detail the plots and acts of aggression and sabotage of the enemy against the locality in the immediate future and which forces, means and measures the enemy might employ if a war should break out to attack the locality. Localities in strategically important areas must know and predict in detail the plots and acts of aggression of

the enemy against our territory, offshore waters and air space and which forces and tactics they might employ. Localities in the mountainous forests where armed reactionaries are still in hiding must truly conduct mop up operations to thoroughly eliminate them. Localities deep within the rear area must know and predict in detail the reaction and sabotage by the overthrown classes of exploiters, spies, decadent elements and so forth in order to be ready to stop and thwart their acts of economic sabotage and their actions to disrupt order and security within the locality.

Every locality must have a plan for organizing its forces and a combat plan to protect the locality under the circumstances of peaceful construction as well as when the country must go into combat and wage a people's war to protect the fatherland. The plan for the organization of forces and the combat operations plan to protect the locality in peace time must give full attention to shifting from peace time to war time under the conditions of a modern war.

The local armed forces, the nucleus in the maintenance of combat readiness to protect the locality, must be strengthened, must receive good military and political training and must always be in a high state of combat readiness.

It is necessary to research the mode of combat of the local armed forces under the conditions of a war to protect the fatherland. As we know, if a war to protect the socialist fatherland occurs, it will be a modern war. It will not be similar in any way to the war of liberation recently waged by our people. The local armed forces must develop in terms of their capabilities, strength, and level of equipment and weapons. The task of fighting to protect the locality is a larger and more complex task. Therefore, a host of new problems have arisen concerning the mode of combat operations to protect the locality, problems which must be urgently researched and gradually resolved in order to promptly meet the requirements of the training, organization and buildup of the present local armed forces.

The strength we display in maintaining our readiness to fight and victoriously fighting to protect the locality is not only the strength of our military forces; rather, it must be the combined strength of all of the people within the locality, of the military, political, economic and cultural sectors and of the local armed forces, militia, self-defense forces and people's public security forces closely coordinating with the main force units stationed within the locality and those that move into the locality when necessary. Therefore, within the local combat readiness plan, it is necessary to establish close coordination among the various forces for the purpose of achieving this combined strength.

The program for building the battle position of the people's war in the locality even during peace time must reflect the combined strength of the locality. It is necessary to carry out this program in a positive and gradual manner in order to meet the requirements of protecting the locality in a modern war, even in a case in which the enemy employs weapons of mass murder. This will also be a practical contribution to the effort to establish the

strategic national defense and economic deployment of the national defense system and a people's war to protect the fatherland. Within the strategically important areas, in coordination with immediately reorganizing production and accelerating economic construction, we must build the system of combat villages at places where these villages are needed; prepare roads and the signal-liaison system; prepare local rear areas and so forth to support the operations of the armed forces when they are engaged in combat.

The initial experience of many localities has shown that in order to meet the requirement of developing this combined strength, the effort to develop the strongpoints of each locality within the local combat readiness battle position must be closely linked to the process of building the district and the province in every respect.

Due to the results of the process of building the district and province in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the party, each locality will acquire new and very large capabilities; at the same time, they require new requirements and new tasks in the maintenance of local combat readiness. For example, according to the project plan for organizing large-scale socialist production, Quynh Luu District will have 700 kilometers of roads of various types; more than 20 machine enterprises and handicraft installations capable of repairing machinery, producing building materials and processing food products; more than 200 machines of various types, including tractors, trucks, bulldozers, combines and so forth. These new capabilities in the form of material and technical bases create the conditions for providing the district and province with additional facilities supporting the maintenance of combat readiness and combat operations: rear service support facilities, a network of vehicular roads, means of communications, means of combat support, etc. These new capabilities increase local fighting strength and increase the modern nature of the people's war in the locality. In keeping with these new capabilities, Quynh Luu's military position for protecting the locality includes a plan for fighting the enemy at sea and fighting enemy forces land from the sea and a plan for organizing combat zones to protect each area on the mainland. As a result of coordinating the fight against the enemy at sea, on the shore and on the mainland, Quynh Luu District has begun to create a strong, highly developed battle position from which it can fight very effectively. Long Hung and Nam Ninh Districts, densely populated lowland districts located deep within the hinterland, have begun to plan the construction of interconnected battle positions to fight the enemy in many directions and coordinate the movement of forces with the firm defense of each area.

Maintaining combat readiness and fighting to protect the locality are tasks of all the people, tasks performed under the direct leadership of the local party organization. Therefore, building the combat readiness battle position is one of the major jobs of the party organization, the various sectors and the local mass organizations. The local military agency serves as the core staff of the party committee and the local armed forces serve as the nucleus in the construction of the combat readiness battle position. At present, districts and provinces have incorporated their plans for building the battle position for defending the locality within the overall project plan on

construction coordinated with the construction of the national defense system within the locality. This is a very correct step to take. As a result of it, each stage of economic development of the locality has gradually led to new advances in improving the combat readiness of the locality in order to accelerate the building of districts into military fortresses and provinces into strategic units, thereby firmly protecting the locality.

2. Utilizing the strength of military organization in economic construction, thereby helping to build national defense potential within the locality.

This is a new and extremely important task of local military work in the present stage of the revolution.

As mentioned above, our national defense system is a national defense system of all the people; its strength is a combined strength resulting from our political and spiritual potentials, our economic and scientific-technical potentials and our military potential. These potentials are created and constantly increased through the results of socialist transformation and socialist construction in the locality as well as throughout the country.

Building our economic potential for the defense of the nation is of particular importance. With regard to our country today, only by focusing our energies on the task of building an independent and autonomous economy which has a modern industrial-agricultural structure throughout the country and within each locality is it possible to increase the national defense potential and capability of the entire country and each locality.

Local military work has the task of actively utilizing the strength of military organization in economic construction and in socialist transformation and socialist construction within the locality. In this way, economic construction must be coordinated with the strengthening of the national defense system. Only in this way is it possible to help to insure that each stage of development of economic construction, in particular, and the socialist revolution, in general, within the locality has the effect of increasing the national defense potential within the locality and increasing our economic potential throughout the country.

To perform this task, we must, in local military work, know how to utilize the role played by the local armed forces. The militia and self-defense forces must truly be the key, assault forces in productive labor and economic construction within the locality; at the same time, they must maintain combat readiness well. The local troops of the province and district must perform the task of maintaining combat readiness and protecting the locality as well as the task of participating in productive labor and building the economy. Many provinces in the North have had tens of thousands of militiamen and hundreds of village guerrilla units play the assault role in completing emergency economic tasks of the province and district. In Thanh Hoa and Binh Tri Thien Provinces, the militia forces were organized into regiments and divisions to carry out the tasks of completing farmland water conservancy systems and constructing dikes to reclaim land from the sea. As a result,

these tasks were completed ahead of schedule and many construction projects were put into use supporting production earlier than planned. At the same time, through the completion of these tasks the organization of the mass armed forces on the basic level developed. In the centralized industrial areas, at worksites and at newly constructed enterprises, the self-defense force grew regimental size in order to meet the requirement of playing the assault role in increasing the rate of construction, becoming the masters of science and technology and strengthening labor discipline while helping to protect the property of the state and maintain social order. In provinces from the North to the South, the local troops of many provinces, together with a number of main force units of the military region and the forces of concerned ministries, have undertaken the task of building relatively large projects and have fulfilled their key, assault role well.

To contribute to the reorganization of production, the redistribution of labor throughout the country, the construction of our country's system of large-scale socialist production and the coordination of economic construction with the establishment of the strategic deployment of the national defense system, many localities not only have the task of developing the local economy but also have the task of sending persons to build new economic areas in other localities. Local military work must have the militia and self-defense forces play a role in the performance of this task. In many provinces and districts the militia and self-defense forces have been organized into units as large as regiments to serve as the assault force going to build new economic areas. According to district party committee secretary Vu Thu, Vu Thu District in Thai Binh Province has been assigned the task of sending 75,000 persons, 30 percent of the district's population, to build a new economic area in Dac Lac and build a new style cooperative in Kien Giang between now and 1960. The district has established three militia regiments consisting of 6,000 persons who have the task of going to these areas first to prepare the base. These militia regiments are not only the nucleus of the labor force going to build the new economic areas, but they have also become the mass armed forces, a contingent of which have been organized as the local army in the new economic areas.

These are the new factors in the movement to work, produce and build the economy on the local level and reflect a new task of local military work in the present stage of the revolution. We must continue to delve deeply into research and gain experience in leadership, guidance, the organization of and the mode of operation in order to continuously employ the strengths of the military organization within the locality in the process of building the local economy and building the country.

3. Building the local armed forces in order to perform both tasks well.

To perform the task of maintaining combat readiness and protecting the local economy and utilize the strength of the military organization in economic construction within the locality, we must make every effort to strengthen and develop the local armed forces to insure that the militia, the self-defense force and local army performs both of these tasks well.

On the momentum of development of socialist construction and the construction of the local economy along the lines of large-scale socialist production throughout the country and within each province, municipality and district, we have the base, the conditions and many new, very favorable capabilities for increasing the quantity, the quality and the scale of organization of the local armed forces. The buildup, strengthening and development of the local armed forces must be closely linked to the process of carrying out the three revolutions within the socialist revolution in the locality, the process of socialist transformation and the process of reorganizing production and building the local economy in order to utilize the role played by the local armed forces and utilize the strengths of each locality in the task of building and protecting the country.

The militia and self-defense forces must be built up so that they are stable and strong and must be gradually developed in a manner suited to each locality and on a nationwide scale.

The militia is the mass armed force in the countryside, a force closely linked to agricultural production. The buildup, strengthening and development of the militia cannot be separated from the process of reorganizing production within agriculture, carrying out socialist transformation in the countryside, reorganizing production within the scope of the district and the building of strong, stable districts that truly become agro-industrial economic units, become the military fortresses of the national defense system.

Facts have shown that when the basic unit of agricultural production, the cooperative, is reorganized on a large scale and its labor is redistributed along the lines of centralization and specialization and when the district becomes the base for reorganizing production and coordinating agriculture with industry, the farmer with the manual worker and so forth, the militia and guerrilla organization must be strengthened and developed accordingly. This is both an objective requirement and a new facet of the buildup of the militia and guerrilla forces on the basic level. We see this very clearly if we examine the situation surrounding the reorganization of production at cooperatives and in districts. For example, An Thi District in Hai Hung Province had 153 cooperatives before the reorganization of production and 21 cooperatives following it; in the years to come, it might be possible to reorganize these cooperatives on a larger scale with more highly developed material-technical bases, especially with regard to machinery. To be consistent with the new organization of cooperatives, the organization of the militia has been based on the organization of the production units and the militia has been organized into companies and battalions. The management of the activities of the militia throughout the district is another matter that has been raised in order to utilize the assault role of the militia in the building of the agro-industrial economy of the district. At present, many districts and provinces in the North and even a number of districts and provinces in the South have organized militia regiments and even militia divisions to construct large projects requiring a labor force of tens of thousands of persons. This reorganization of the militia and this increase in the scale of organization of the militia are both suitable and necessary.

In conjunction with resolving the organizational problem, we must attach importance to improving the quality of the militia in a manner consistent with the new development of its organization, thereby meeting both the requirements of combat readiness and economic construction. We must immediately concern ourselves with teaching each cadre and soldier of the militia so that everyone has a higher awareness of the role and task of the armed forces in the construction and protection of socialism, of the sense of organization and discipline of a large-scale, centralized military organization and of the uniform combat skills required under the conditions of modern warfare. We must especially concern ourselves with improving the overall qualifications of the militia cadres and militia command staffs on the basic level, on the district and provincial levels so that these cadres and command staffs complete their task of leading and commanding the militia in maintaining combat readiness and building the economy within a larger area, with a more centralized force and by means of more complex jobs.

Due to the development of the process of the industrialization of the national economy, many new industrial centers will be formed and many factories of various types, many enterprises, worksites, machine stations and so forth will emerge in the districts and provinces, consequently, the self-defense force will constantly develop and the role of this force will become increasingly important. Attention must be given to the self-defense forces at factories, enterprises and worksites and the self-defense forces of colleges, vocational middle schools, trade schools, agencies and streets. In the future, once socialist industrialization has been completed and the industrial-agricultural economic structure in our country has been established, the structure of the labor force in society will, of course, undergo a fundamental change. Industrial labor will outnumber agricultural labor. The organization of the self-defense force will be very much different than it is today. Consequently, the buildup of the self-defense force raises many new problems which local military work must resolve.

We must efficiently organize and correctly utilize the self-defense forces within the various sectors of the national economy, the agencies of the state and the social activity sectors in order to utilize the revolutionary qualities of the working class and the strengths which the enterprises, worksites and agencies have in their specialized technology, their organization and discipline and their existing material-technical bases to insure that the self-defense forces can properly carry out both tasks of maintaining combat readiness and engaging in productive labor.

The realities of the improvement of the organization of the self-defense force at a number of industrial centers over the past several years show that when the self-defense force is built up and suitably organized, its ability to maintain combat readiness is increased as is its ability to protect production, protect the factory and worksite and protect the locality; the nucleus, assault role of the self-defense force in productive labor, in enterprise management and in the effort to stimulate the socialist labor movement is strongly developed. Many enterprises have increased the size of their self-defense organizations to regiments and established battalions in the nature of technical branches.

It is very good to increase the size of the militia and self-defense organizations to large units, such as battalions and regiments, and competently use these forces in production. This, of course, is a new matter; therefore, we must continue to research it. It must be understood that the militia and self-defense forces are mass armed forces that are closely linked to production, they are not forces of the local army that have nothing to do with production. On the other hand, the role played by the militia and self-defense forces in the present period of the peaceful construction and protection of the country as well as in a war to defend the fatherland, if one occurs, is not the same as the role played in the war of liberation. Therefore, these forces must be organized in an appropriate manner in order to make use of the capabilities and strengths of the militia and self-defense forces, help stimulate production and protect production in peace time and engage in combat operations on a suitable scale and under a suitable mode to protect installations, protect the locality in a people's war to defend the fatherland.

The buildup of the militia and self-defense forces in the newly liberated areas of the South must be carried out in a positive manner and in exact accordance with the line of the party in order to help strengthen the revolutionary government and carry out socialist transformation and socialist construction within the locality and on the basic level. In the immediate future, the militia and self defense forces must be built up and strengthened so that they are able to undertake the role of a key force of the local people in socialist transformation and socialist construction; together with the people's public security force, they must maintain political security and social order and, together with the local army and the main force units stationed within the locality, they must mop up remnant enemy forces and suppress acts of armed resistance by reactionaries.

The militia and self-defense forces in the newly liberated areas must be improved and gradually increased in size in a manner consistent with the specific situation of each locality. In the buildup of our armed forces, quality is always the factor of utmost importance and the foremost standard is political qualities. The revolutionary armed forces must possess class awareness and socialist awareness. Through the realities of participating in socialist transformation and socialist construction within the locality, we must deepen the "loyalty to the party, fidelity to the people" of the militia and self-defense forces and teach them to clearly distinguish between ourselves and our friends and our enemies, thereby insuring that they fulfill their task of protecting the party, protecting the fatherland, protecting the socialist system and protecting the people.

The mass armed forces can be developed strongly because they are based on the strong political forces of the people. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen and build the mass organizations and develop the militia and self-defense forces through the various revolutionary campaigns, through socialist transformation and socialist construction, through productive labor to build the economy and through the three revolutions in the various localities.

The local army is the nucleus force, the standing combat force protecting the locality; at the same time, it is an assault force in production within the locality. In the present period of peace and in a war to defend the fatherland, the requirements involved in protecting the locality are very much higher than they once were. The role and capabilities of the district, province and municipality in the strategic deployment of the national defense system and a war to defend the fatherland are also much larger. Therefore, the local army must be built up and developed in a corresponding manner to meet the requirements of the task of maintaining its readiness to fight in defense of the locality and its task of engaging in productive labor to build the local economy.

The local army is a component of the modern, regular force standing army, consequently, it, too, must be suitably modernized and conventionalized on the basis of constantly improved political qualities. On the other hand, the local army is also closely linked to the locality in many respects, consequently, it must be built up in a manner consistent with the characteristics and circumstances of the locality in order to meet the specific requirements and carry out the specific tasks of the locality. The troops of the local army in the border area must be organized, equipped and trained differently than the local army troops in the coastal and island areas; those in lowland areas in which there are many rivers and streams must be organized, equipped and trained differently than those in the mountainous forest areas and so forth. The local army must be organized on a suitable scale in the district, province and municipality and must include the necessary and appropriate branches.

At present, a number of places have organized local army units which specialize in economic construction and organized combat readiness units. The local army units specializing in economic work have displayed the strength of military organization in the completion of emergency economic tasks of their localities. The combat readiness units of the local army, in addition to completing their primary task, have also made every effort to contribute to the construction of the local economy. As a result of coordinating the military obligation of youths with their obligation to work, localities are able to increase the size of the local army units specializing in economic work to a certain degree. At the same time, it is necessary to continue to research the matter of organization so that these units can properly support the requirements of maintaining combat readiness and teaching the stratum of new socialists.

4. Building the reserve forces of the people's army.

The fighting strength with which the people's army defends the fatherland is manifested in the standing forces and in the reserve forces. As a result, when strengthening the people's army and strengthening the standing forces, we must also do a good job of recruiting and of building powerful reserve forces.

The realities of the war of resistance against the United States showed that the fighting strength of the people's army was dependent, to a very large degree,

upon our ability to organize and build reserve forces during the years of peaceful construction that preceded the war in the North and our ability to mobilize and supplement these forces in the course of the war. As the percentage of youths who have fulfilled their military obligation increases, this capability increases. As a result, military recruiting in peace time is a job of strategic importance. Today, the military obligation must be coordinated with the labor obligation in order to mobilize youths to participate in protecting and building the fatherland and train youths to be new socialists who fight well and produce well.

Military recruiting is a permanent part of local military work. Due to its importance in the effort to improve our ability to defend the fatherland and the construction of the country, we must focus the full measure of leadership on this work, organize military recruiting in exact accordance with policy and conduct it in a fair, reasonable manner based on the voluntarism of all the people and the laws of the state. In peace time, military recruiting must be put on a regular basis, must be tightly organized and must be carried out under a plan. This is not only consistent with the requirement of building a modern, regular force army, but also consistent with the process of carrying out economic construction within the locality in accordance with the plan of the state and the locality.

The reserve forces consist of all soldiers, non-commissioned officers and technical personnel trained and forged during their period of military service in the standing forces; all officers reassigned to state agencies, enterprises and worksites; and the specialized-technical cadres stipulated in the statutes on the organization of reserve forces. Our reserve forces today must consist of the officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers, cadres and technical personnel needed to meet the requirement of reinforcing the various branches and services of the people's army. The size and quality of the reserve forces will constantly increase as a result of implementing the system whereby all male youths fulfill their military obligation within the standing forces and implementing a number of other systems designed to strengthen the national defense system.

Tightly organizing and managing the reserve forces and constantly providing them with training to improve their skills are a very important matter in insuring the combat readiness of the country and each locality. We must gradually introduce regular force procedures in the management of reserve forces, from the registration for the reserves and the assessment of reserve forces to regular training, the establishment of a plan for mobilizing the reserves when required by the situation and so forth. The management and regular training of reserve forces are designed to meet the requirement of promptly providing the required number of qualified troops of the right types to the various services and branches of the standing army when necessary. We all know that as our army becomes more modern and becomes more of a regular force army, it will consist of more and more branches, services and trades of a specialized-technical nature involving increasingly high qualitative requirements.

The management and training of reserve forces is a complex military job. It is related to many of the activities in society and production.

The project and plan for organizing, managing, training and mobilizing reserves are proposed by the military agency to the state agency for ratification and implemented by the military agency together with the related sectors. In the project and the plan, it is necessary to establish how the millions of reserve soldiers and the hundreds of thousands of non-commissioned officers, reserve officers, cadres and technical workers and personnel within the sectors of the national economy and the agencies of the state are to be organized and managed; register all persons who are eligible; and compile statistics on, classify and tightly manage the various types of reserves, the military occupations, the military technical trades and the various branches and services. In conjunction with organizing the citizen management system, it is necessary to organize the labor management system of the state well in order to keep abreast of changes in the reserve force. For example, it is necessary to closely coordinate the management of labor with the management of reserve troops, closely coordinate military recruiting with the recruiting of students and the recruiting of labor and so forth in order to accurately determine the number of youths and classify their abilities, health and development for the purposes of military recruiting as well as the management of reserve forces.

To build a powerful, complete reserve force and be able to establish unified management and close coordination in the management of the reserve force, we must complete and establish additional regulations, systems and procedures which every citizen and each organization of the state understands and complies with fully.

Our system of colleges, vocational middle schools, party schools and Youth Union schools will be developing more with each passing day. The number of college and vocational students will constantly increase. These are the very valuable reserve officers and technical personnel of the national defense forces; of the standing army. Therefore, it is necessary to rapidly adopt a project plan for the training of reserve officers and high level technical personnel at the various colleges and the various specialized and professional schools.

The teaching, training and supplementing of the reserve force must be carried out in accordance with a unified, systematic program to insure that these persons uphold and enhance the fine traditions of our army and people and are trained in science and technology as well as military art. We must always strengthen and supplement this knowledge to keep pace with the new developments within the military field of our army.

We must attach full importance to providing all the people with a universal military education; accelerating and intensifying the study of military affairs at schools; and providing incentive for the development of the national defense physical education and sports movement in order to prepare all of the people for fulfilling their obligation to protect the fatherland. This will also effectively prepare and strengthen the reserve force of the people's army.

5. Implementing the various national defense policies.

During the war, our party and state promulgated many policies on building the army and strengthening the national defense system in order to mobilize manpower and materiel for the frontlines, strengthen the army's rear area and so forth. These policies played a major role in mobilizing all of the people to wage the war of resistance and defeat the enemy.

In the present stage, we must organize the full implementation of the policies that have been promulgated; in particular, we must resolve the remaining problems concerning the wounded veterans and war dead policy, the policy concerning military dependents, war of resistance families and revolutionary families, the demobilization and reassignment policy, etc. At the same time, we must research and propose new policies and supplement and revise existing ones.

The foremost requirement of the implementation of a policy is that the policy be implemented correctly, fully and promptly. At present, our material conditions are still lacking and we face many difficulties left behind by the war; moreover, these policies reflect the concern and sentiments of the party, the state and all of the people toward those persons and families who have served the country. Therefore, we must propagandize and educate the people so that they have a clear understanding of policies and we must rely upon the people, upon their revolutionary awareness, their capabilities and their potentials in order to overcome our difficulties and find the best possible measures for implementing policies. Many localities have launched movements of all of the people to "repay the debt to war dead," "raise the children of war dead," "care for and help military dependents," etc. These are valuable experiences, ones which we must continue to apply and develop upon.

Today we have the conditions needed to implement the military draft system throughout the country for youths and coordinate the military obligation with the labor obligation. The number of military personnel returning to production and work installations from the army will constantly increase. As an example, let us consider Ha Nam Ninh Province; during the 2 years 1975 and 1976, hundreds of thousands of military personnel consisting of soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers returns to production and work installations.

To these persons, the correct, good implementation of policies is of major importance in many respects. It not only helps to improve the quality of the corps of persons building the economy and building socialism, but also effectively strengthens the powerful reserve forces of the people's army. It requires close leadership and guidance and a plan for organizing implementation in a positive manner.

Many provinces, districts, villages, agencies and factories have comprehensively implemented these policies by caring for political and spiritual lives, providing jobs, resolving the difficulties encountered in everyday life.

providing complete training, utilizing and employing the strengths of military personnel in economic construction, the construction of installations, etc. Many localities, such as Ha Nam Ninh Province, Hai Hung Province, Haiphong and so forth, have adopted project plans for assessing the situation and training and utilizing military personnel returning to installations. As a result, the military personnel returning to installations in these localities have not only continued to play a role as good reserve military personnel, but have also made their own positive contributions in building the economy, building the local party organization and building the local government. A rather large number of those who have returned have become local cadres. For example, in Vu Ban District, Ha Nam Ninh Province, 8 of the 22 cooperative heads are demobilized military personnel; 88 of the 160 party committee members are demobilized military personnel; the majority of the cadres of the district propaganda and training agency are reassigned military personnel, etc.

Correctly and fully implementing the various national defense policies is a matter of tremendous significance in uniting military personnel and civilians, uniting all of the people and enhancing the fine combat traditions of the nation; it also has an important impact in building and strengthening the national defense system as well as preparing for a people's war to defend the fatherland. Through the correct, full implementation of the national defense policies and systems of the party and state, we will show each youth, each citizen, each family, each cadre and soldier of the armed forces their responsibility and honor, their obligation and rights concerning the task of building and defending the fatherland.

Local military work, which is a basic part of the overall work of the party and state within the locality and is organically linked to the other areas of work, must be placed under the centralized, unified leadership of the local party organization.

The requirement of strengthening the party's leadership of local military work in the new stage is closely linked to the requirement of successfully carrying out the political line and task and the military line and task set forth by the 4th Congress of the Party. While focusing their leadership on completing the central task of building the economy, many local party organizations have adopted resolutions on intensifying local military work in the process of accelerating production, reorganizing production and closely coordinating economic construction with the strengthening of the national defense system within the locality. The party committee echelons in many localities, from the provincial to the basic levels, have assigned capable cadres who have a good reputation to the local military agency and as commanders of the militia and self-defense forces. In their leadership and guidance of local military work, many local party organizations have attached importance to planning and have relied upon the overall project plan of the locality and the local economic construction plan to establish the project and plan for military work within the locality in the pressing, immediate tasks as well as in the basic, long-range tasks. As a result, the project and plan for local military work have been closely coordinated with the overall project and plan of the other work sectors within the locality;

at the same time, the initiative and creativity of the local military agency and the local armed forces have been tapped. The mode of leadership and guidance in local military work has been determined by many localities to be the following: the party leads; the people display the spirit of ownership; the government manages and organizes implementation; the military agency serves as the command staff and the local military force serves as the nucleus; the various sectors closely coordinate with one another.

The local military agencies from the provincial to the village levels have been fulfilling their role as the command staff better with each passing day, directly guiding local military work, successfully resolving many new problems that have arisen in the present stage of the revolution, completed their tasks and helped to accelerate the strengthening of the national defense system and economic construction within the locality.

To fulfill their function and task better, the local military agencies must always attach importance to fully understanding and applying the lines and tasks of the party concerning socialist construction and the buildup of the national defense system to the specific circumstances of the locality. The local military agency must gradually be strengthened organizationally; it must develop the capabilities of its staff, political and rear service components in researching and proposing projects and plans concerning local military work to the party committee echelon; it must guide and command the local armed forces in successfully carrying out their two tasks of maintaining combat readiness and participating in productive labor; it must guide the implementation of the systems and policies concerning the military obligation and the building of the army's rear area.

The organization and management of society and the political, economic, military, cultural and social activities of our country are becoming increasingly improved and put under laws and regulations. We must continue to research and establish laws, regulations and regular force procedures governing the guidance, commanding, organization and management of local military work.

Our people and our armed forces possess ardent patriotism and are very earnest about the independence and freedom of the socialist fatherland. During the years of the long and difficult war of resistance to liberate the nation, all of our people and our entire army in the South as well as the North, in the mountains as well as the lowlands, in the countryside as well as the cities, unafraid of sacrifices and hardships, fought under the leadership of the party until total victory was won.

As we enter the new stage of the revolution, all of our people and our entire army, firmly confident in the brilliant future of the Vietnamese fatherland, are working without regard for themselves and displaying a high level of revolutionary heroism in the construction and defense of the country. In this new stage, local military work will surely make a worthy contribution and fulfill the task and function of work of strategic importance in protecting the fatherland and protecting socialism in every situation.

The shelling was reportedly committed by the Khmer Rouge to create a certain situation as the elections approach.

Troops Ready To Retaliate in Future

*BK0205051293 Bangkok THE NATION in English
2 May 93 p A2*

[Text] Thai troops are ready to strike back if further spillovers from the fighting between Cambodian warring factions affect Thai villagers, a senior army officer said yesterday.

Thai soldiers are on alert and confident in their ability to counter any activities that would inflict property losses or casualties on residents in border villages, said the commander of the task force for development of border areas, Col Itsara Watcharapathip.

The officer's statement came one day after 12 stray rockets from Cambodia landed near two Thai border villages in Prachin Buri's Aranyaprathet district as a result of a battle between Phnom Penh troops and the Khmer Rouge.

Thai soldiers and United Nations peacekeepers in Cambodia concluded after inspecting the border areas yesterday that the rockets that fell on the Thai side were the Chinese-made 75-mm type.

The inspectors confirmed that the rockets were fired by the Khmer Rouge from its base in Poipet against about 50 Phnom Penh troops who were approaching them with two 120-mm artillery pieces.

Prime Minister Chuan Likphai yesterday said he had received a report on the incident and local officials were looking into it.

Shelling Intended To Disrupt Cambodian Polls

*BK0205155693 Bangkok Army Television Channel 5 in
Thai 1200 GMT 2 May 93*

[Text] Recent shellings in the direction of Poipet market in Banteay Meanchey by the Khmer Rouge forces have caused confusion among the Cambodian and Thai border people. The Burapha Task Force has been mapping out security measures to maintain law and order, and one of these measures could be the temporary closing of the border.

In coordination with the UN forces in Cambodia, the unit interviewed an arrested Khmer Rouge soldier, (Mi Thi), attached to the 7th Division with its stronghold in (Ban Khla Nguap), opposite Tambon Khlong Nam Sai, in Prachin Buri Province of Thailand. The soldier admitted that Poipet was the target of the recent mortar shelling, but it was saved because of miscalculations by soldiers. He said the Khmer Rouge aimed at Poipet because they wanted to destroy the economy and sabotage the election in Cambodia scheduled late this month.

Officers Comment on Border Situation

*BK0305095393 Bangkok Radio Thailand Network in
Thai 1200 GMT 2 May 93*

[Text] Defense Minister General Wichit Sukmak talked to newsmen today about the situation in Cambodia, which could affect Thai Army engineers repairing highways in that country. He said the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the National Security Council will evaluate the seriousness of the situation in Cambodia and whether the army engineers should continue with their operations. The highway repair mission has been completed. The defense minister said he has not received a report regarding the impact of the fighting in Cambodia on Thai army engineers, but noted that the engineers have effectively carried out their assigned mission.

The defense minister said Thai Army engineers are capable of protecting themselves as necessary, but they do not want to have to fight. Their main mission, as assigned by the Thai Government, is to assist the United Nations to repair highways in Cambodia. In any event, if the situation puts them in danger they are capable of defending themselves.

Talking about the effect on Thailand of the fighting in Cambodia, such as mortar shelling, the defense minister said soldiers along the border already have measures to handle such a situation. Any foreign soldiers intruding into Thailand will be pushed back.

Meanwhile, Army Commander General Wimon Wongwanit said local Thai soldiers have been given instructions about the fighting in Poipet. They are to comply with UN operational regulations, particularly in the suppression of UN-designated contraband. Regarding fighting in Cambodia which affects Thailand, soldiers will take action only when the situation is serious and affects border security. The Army commander said there are limits concerning what soldiers can do.

Vietnam

Tran Van Quang on Tet Offensive in Tri Thien-Hue

*932E0057A Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese Jan 88 pp 27-32, 63*

[Article by Senior Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang, former secretary of the party committee and commander of the Tri-Thien Military Region: "On the Direction of the 1968 Spring Offensive and Uprising in Tri Thien-Hue"]

[Text] Exactly 20 years ago (January 1968), the Army and people of South Vietnam, under the leadership of the party Central Committee, launched "concerted offensives and uprisings" against nearly all U.S.-puppet cities, towns, military bases, and administration agencies throughout South Vietnam. It was a major event, a turning point in the anti-U.S. war of resistance for national salvation.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Tri Thien-Hue Theater (including the Route 9 Front under the charge of main-force troops and the Tri Thien-Hue Front of the local people's war) was one of the two principal theaters of operations of these general offensives and uprisings (the Eastern Nam Bo Theater, including Saigon, was the first principal theater); Hue City was one of the three main targets of the general offensives and uprisings (Saigon-Hue-Danang).

The tasks of the Tri Thien-Hue Army and people were to mount concerted offensives and uprisings; to attack and seize Hue City, various towns and townships...; to set up revolutionary administrations; and to stand ready to strike at counterattacking enemy forces..., thereby creating proper conditions for us to advance toward achieving decisive victory. The tasks of the Route 9 Front were to attract and annihilate enemy forces to enable the entire South Vietnam to launch a general offensive and uprising, and, when conditions permitted, to breach a section of the enemy defense line, thus paving the way for us to advance to the South.

In 25 days and nights (from the night of 31 January to 25 February 1968), and if the phase of diversionary combat activities and isolating enemy forces was also included, then in nearly two months (from 7 January to 25 February), the Army and people of Tri Thien-Hue (excluding the Route 9 Front), with a smaller force than the enemy's, had fought courageously and fiercely, winning great victories:

—They annihilated an important component of the enemy's vital strength and war means (the number of enemies killed, captured, or giving themselves up totalled around 25,000 including nearly 8,000 Americans); shot down or destroyed more than 200 aircraft of various kinds; and set ablaze or wrecked almost 500 military vehicles, more than 40 ships and motorboats, 40 artillery guns.... They attacked nearly all military organs, positions, posts, and logistic bases of the enemy, severed communications, occupied most of Hue, and fought in the city for a long period of time (25 days and nights).

—They annihilated and disintegrated most of the puppet administration and its coercive forces (including the province chief's office and the representation of the central puppet administration); more than 40 provincial services and offices, civil guard and popular force groups, and public security and police units. They seized two prisons and set free more than 1,000 revolutionary cadres and combatants detained by the enemy. During the same period, the people of Hue, the puppet administration's second most important urban center, seized control of almost all the city. The liberated rural areas were expanded to include four-fifths of the hamlets and three-fourths of the population. Of the total 800,000 local people, 530,000 rose up to participate in the resistance in many forms such as giving support to soldiers, attacking the enemy and breaking up his coercive control, building the administration....

—They fought while mobilizing the masses and building up forces. Tens of thousands of youths joined the revolutionary Armed Forces; district local forces and village, hamlet, and city block guerrilla forces rapidly increased. Administrations were set up in nearly all liberated villages and hamlets, as were district and provincial people's committees. A number of progressive personages in the Hue City left for the resistance base area to found the Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces.

The enemy himself had to admit: "The assault on Hue was regarded as one of the heaviest attacks that were beyond imagination. For this reason, it caused a tremendous shock to the local administrations at all levels, which were strongly shaken up when they saw that the majority of the top leaders of the puppet administration had been killed." [Footnote 1] [Quotation from the book entitled: "The 1968 Year of The Monkey General Offensive and General Insurrection of the Vietnamese Communists" by several Saigon puppet Army generals.]

This victory made an important contribution to the 1968 Spring General Offensive and Uprising of all South Vietnam and of the entire country, dealing a decisive blow that bankrupted the U.S. imperialists' "local war" strategy, shook their will for aggression, and forced them to deescalate the war, to halt the bombing of North Vietnam, to begin the process of withdrawing their troops from South Vietnam, and to agree to hold talks with us in Paris. It constituted a historic milestone in the anti-U.S. war of resistance for national salvation of our Army and people in both the North and the South.

The glorious victories of all South Vietnam as well as of Tri Thien-Hue in the Spring of 1968 were attributable first of all to the correct and creative policy of the central echelon, which knew how to highly develop the offensive spirit, to discern the enemy's weaknesses in both the military and political domains, on the battlefield as well as in the United States, to choose the right direction for attacks on enemy-held cities and bases, and to work out a unified plan for simultaneous offensives and uprisings in all South Vietnam.

In the Tri Thien-Hue Front in particular, the party committee and command of the Tri-Thien Military Region displayed good points in leadership, guidance, and command. They had intended and prepared to attack Hue City and enemy logistic bases for a long time (since around the end of 1966). While stepping up fighting, they had actively prepared the battlefield, created an advantageous disposition, and readied on-the-spot armed and political forces in a relatively thorough fashion before embarking on the offensive. From the party committee and command of the Tri-Thien Military Region on down to the contingent of military, political, and commanding cadres and party committee echelons, all showed high resolve, a strict sense of discipline, and a sense of executing orders resolutely and thoroughly. They formulated plans to prepare the battlefields meticulously; chose rational combat tactics in the initial phase; skillfully

carried out political mobilization; and satisfactorily maintained secrecy. All the cadres and combatants of the Armed Forces and political forces, revolutionary bases, and large sections of the masses heartily responded to the appeal of the party and the National Liberation Front by braving hardships and sacrifices and courageously and intelligently fulfilling all tasks. Coordination with the Route 9 Front and the theaters in friendly countries, the assistance given by Group 559, and the guidance provided by upper-level organs (the General Staff, the General Political Department...) were also of decisive significance to the victories of the 1968 Spring offensive and uprising in Tri Thien-Hue.

Marked by our seizing and holding Hue City for 25 days and nights, the victory of the offensive and uprising in Hue in early 1968 was a great inspiration to our Army and people in all theaters of operations. It contributed to strongly shaking up the U.S.-puppet ringleaders and further enhanced the fine tradition of "Gallantry, Staunchness, Offensive, and Uprising" of Tri Thien-Hue.

However, despite these very great successes, in Tri Thien-Hue as well as in all South Vietnam, the offensives and uprisings failed to meet the requirement of "wresting back all power and putting it in the hands of the people." During, and especially after the Tet of the Year of the Monkey offensive and uprising in Tri Thien-Hue, the enemy counterattacked very fiercely, seriously depleting our political and Armed Forces at the grass-roots level. Not only did the enemy retake the Hue but also occupy the countryside and fringe areas and attack the mountain region. Our people's war disposition in Tri Thien was temporarily lost, causing us great difficulties throughout the two-year period from mid-1968 to mid-1970. Coupled with the temporary difficult situation facing us in the entire theater of South Vietnam at the time, that consequence in Tri Thien somewhat prompted the enemy to prolong the Paris talks in the hope of regaining the initiative, to attack Cambodia, and then to launch an offensive on Route 9 and in Southern Laos.

Of course, although the battlefield difficulties we encountered after the Spring of 1968 were great, they could in no way eclipse the glorious victories of the Tet of the Year of the Monkey offensives and uprisings throughout South Vietnam as well as in Tri Thien-Hue. But, as the Resolution of the 21st Plenum of the Party Central Committee (held in October 1973), the scientific conference held by the Ministry of National Defense (in March 1986) to review various campaigns, and many other documents and conferences have clearly pointed out, these difficulties and losses could have been avoided or limited if we had set appropriate requirements or promptly changed our operational formulas to make them more flexible and suitable to the situation at the time.

In this article, I would like to present some of my reflections on the guidance given by the party committee and command of the Tri Thien-Hue Military Region during the offensive and uprising in Tri Thien-Hue in

the hope of contributing some experience to the general review of the Tri Thien-Hue Campaign.

1. The policy of carrying the war to the cities, towns, and townships and selecting Hue City as the main target of the offensive was correct; but the requirement of wresting back all power and putting it in the people's hands was not in accord with the balance of forces between the enemy and us on the battlefield at the time.

We all know that, following the debacle of his two strategic counteroffensives (in the 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 dry seasons), the enemy had showed many weaknesses, his forces were scattered, his "search-and-destroy" and "pacification" strategies were fruitless, and his cities and rear bases were all exposed. On our side, both our forces and disposition had developed, and the masses felt hatred for the enemy while showing confidence in our capability to defeat him. In Tri Thien-Hue in particular, in the wake of our successive victories in 1967, we were in a very advantageous position to attack the enemy in the Hue City and in his rear bases. However, the choice of Hue as the main target of attack and our capability to directly strike at the enemy's nerve center did not mean that conditions were already ripe for us to mount a general offensive and a general insurrection to liberate Hue and wrest back all power and put it in the hands of the people. Morale and surprise were extremely important factors. But destruction of the enemy's vital strength, especially his military forces and main-force blocks, was still the most decisive factor. It was necessary to crush not only the enemy's will for aggression but also his capability to resist. Only by annihilating and disintegrating the bulk of the enemy's vital strength would we be able to ensure the total liberation of Tri Thien-Hue and to wrest back all power and put it in the hands of the people. That was what the resolution of the 21st plenum of the party Central Committee had clearly pointed out: "... We had been subjective in assessing the situation... and we had set requirements that were not really consistent with the actual situation at that juncture."

So, what should our requirements have been at the time? In the Tri Thien-Hue Theater, on the basis of the general situation and specific situation then, we should have advocated continually attacking the enemy both militarily and politically, strongly striking at his rear, his bases, and his communications routes, and selecting the cities and the enemy's rear area as the targets of attack in order to destroy his vital strength, including his high-level vital strength (such as enemy command posts and military and political officers) and war means. We should have upset the enemy's force deployment; turned his rear into a battlefield; liberated district capitals and townships; established a position from which to exert control at different levels in a number of areas in the cities, thus providing a basis for expanding and consolidating the liberated zone—including the countryside and fringe areas—developing our military and political forces, and establishing a position from which to annihilate even more enemy forces, to defeat their two-pronged strategy,

to continue tipping the balance of forces in our favor, and to create conditions for launching a general offensive or mounting a general assault and a general insurrection when conditions were ripe.

The principle of offensive called for continual, widespread, active, and flexible operations, with destruction of the enemy being considered as the main task, and for fighting while building, for attacking the enemy while consolidating our commanding position, and for striking at the enemy in the cities while battling enemy counterattacks outside them. That was the spirit of the April 1967 Resolution of the Political Bureau and also the position of the Tri Thien Military Region's party committee at the October 1967 conference. If Tri Thien had implemented that policy, our victories could have been greater and our losses and difficulties could have been limited. I think that other theaters also faced the same problem.

2. The battlefields were carefully prepared in terms of both disposition and on-the-spot forces, the tactics applied at the beginning were appropriate, and there was satisfactory coordination between attack and insurrection; but preparations were made according to a final plan, and the direction of struggle was not timely shifted when the situation had changed.

Owing to our plan to carry the war to the cities at an early date and our intention to prepare and train for an attack on the cities, which coincided with the central echelon's strategic policy..., battlefield preparations were made urgently and carefully in all respects, including both battle disposition and on-the-spot forces, both military and political forces, especially elite troop units. The combat tactics applied at the beginning and in the early days were appropriate as they were secret, unexpected, and simultaneous, permitting coordination between fighting in and outside the cities, between attacks and insurrection in both the cities and the countryside..., thereby creating a very great force for us to attack the enemy.

However, because of our subjective and mechanical attitude in studying the requirements of the general offensive and general insurrection, we made preparations according to a single plan based on the assumption that the offensive would be successful and decisive and power would be completely wrested back; thus, no backup plans were adopted to deal with different situations according to the three possibilities as instructed by the Ministry of National Defense. Our requirements were high and our plan was ambitious, but we had neither on-the-spot reserves nor sufficient conditions for using the main-force troops sent in by the Ministry of National Defense. In reality, our attack plan as well as our combat formation was only fit for a raid on the cities; there was no plan for a large-scale offensive campaign matching our strategic requirements and the enemy forces present in the local theater and those moving in from other theaters. It is precisely because of this that, after four to five days of successful attacks, we had to

cope with the enemy in a passive manner when he counterattacked. Not only did we fail to wipe out counterattacking enemy units one by one but our forces were also worn out; not only were we unable to develop our initial successes but we also faced difficulties and suffered losses as time went by. In the process of directing combat activities, we failed to firmly control our troops as we did at the beginning, and to timely alter our tactics to suit them to the changing situation. Especially, after one week of fighting, when we realized that we could not seize all Hue City and when a general offensive and a general insurrection were no longer possible, we should have, on the one hand, executed the Ministry of National Defense order to continue fighting in order to coordinate with other theaters, and should have, on the other hand, promptly changed our combat formulas and tactics. Instead, we failed to adopt new, appropriate decisions, positions, and measures. At the time, the most rational thing for us to do should have been reorganizing our forces, leaving just a component to persistently fight the enemy in the city, and using the bulk of our forces to continue broadening our position in the countryside, to seize enemy posts and district capitals, to battle counterattacking enemy forces on the city's perimeter, to shift the masses' struggle to a different position under appropriate forms, to protect revolutionary bases, and to prepare to cope with enemy mopping-up and land-grabbing operations in the countryside.

It is also necessary to deal with the question of whether it was right or wrong to have prolonged the fight in Hue City for 25 days and nights. If we took into consideration the requirements of the Tri Thien-Hue Theater alone, then it was unnecessary and even wrong to have prolonged the fight in the city. But, at that juncture, Tri Thien-Hue had two tasks, namely, to fight the enemy while attracting enemy forces so that we could continue attacking in other theaters; for this reason, prolonging the fight in Hue City for 25 days and nights was the right, necessary thing to do, because it met the general requirements and showed our sense of organization, discipline, order execution, and battlefield coordination.

3. We attached special importance to developing the people's war in localities, but failed to fully understand the role of main-force troops in coordinating with the local people's war to fulfill the strategically significant tasks of the campaign.

In theory as well as in strategy, no one in the party committee and command of the Tri-Thien Military Region had ever belittled the role of main-force corps in the offensive. But, in reality and in Tri Thien-Hue, we had concentrated the bulk of our strength on building and developing the combat disposition and forces of the people's war in our localities. But we had failed to fully realize the significance—and had even made light—of the all-around preparations necessary for closely combining the people's war in localities with the combat operations of main-force corps to fulfill our tasks in a strategically significant direction of attack. The truth is that there were two forces in the Tri Thien-Hue Theater:

the main-force block directly subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense on Route 9 (the B5 Front) and the local forces in the area between Southern Quang Tri and Northern Hai Van (the B4 Front). Both forces were directly subordinate to the high command and had the tasks of destroying the enemy, developing the people's war, liberating Tri Thien-Hue, and preventing the enemy from launching an attack on the area north of the provisional line of demarcation. However, the two forces were stationed in two different directions and had their own separate commands. For this reason, we had made light of the need to study and propose a most suitable use of main-force troops to maximize their effectiveness, and to prepare the battlefields to create proper conditions for main-force troops to conduct large-scale joint combat operations. Although the Tri Thien-Hue Military Region had earlier raised the question of studying and resolving this issue, it failed to work actively and systematically when bringing it up with the upper echelons. The chief cause of this was the lack of a strong sense of combining local forces with the main forces; and there was also the tendency to depend on friendly units and the upper echelons. This error in perception and thinking had affected battlefield preparations in the mountain region of Tri Thien, which resulted in a lack of roads for motor vehicles, a lack of jumping-off positions for large-scale combined forces, a lack of material and technical reserves.... Therefore, in the final days of the Tet of the Year of the Monkey offensive and uprising in Tri Thien-Hue, when the Ministry of National Defense intended to send main-force reinforcements to Southern Quang Tri, the Tri-Thien Military Region was unable to receive them. By 1972, this shortcoming had been overcome, and the theater was satisfactorily organized and the main forces and local forces were placed under unified command. This was one of the favorable conditions enabling us to win great victories in the Spring of 1975, to liberate Tri Thien-Hue, and to proceed triumphantly toward Danang.

The reflections on the 1968 spring general offensive and concerted uprisings, the problems concerning them, and the experience derived from them... such as the appraisal of enemy forces and ours, the application of the law of war and insurrection, the formulation of strategic plans and provision of strategic guidance commensurate with requirements, the execution of orders in each theater, the provision of campaign and tactical guidance... must

continue to be studied. These issues have been initially and partially clarified in various documents of the party and of the scientific conference held by the Ministry of National Defense to review the various campaigns. This article deals with only a limited number of principal issues concerning the Tri Thien-Hue Theater within the confines of the people's war in localities.

Concerning Tri Thien in particular and all the theater as a whole at that juncture, there was another important issue, namely, the leadership and command style. Broad vision and early detection of the new factors favorable to us are an extremely important requirement, but being on the alert to clearly see our weaknesses and to correctly and comprehensively assess the balance of forces of both sides on the battlefield in order to determine appropriate formulas, measures, and requirements is also very important. Thoroughly understanding the requirements of one's tasks and resolutely executing the orders of the upper echelons are a quality and virtue of an executor, but faithfully and persistently reporting the actual situation on the battlefield, proposing optimal plans, listening to the opinions of the lower echelons even though these opinions do not accord with one's initial views, "decanting troubled water and filtering fresh water," and courageously assuming the responsibility to put forward well-founded resolutions are also a qualitative and ethical requirement of a commander.

In the 1968 spring general offensive and uprising and in a number of other cases, we, the Tri Thien Military Region Command, failed to harmoniously combine courage, the will for offensive, and the sense of thoroughgoing service with the responsibility to faithfully report objective realities when the situation changes. A concrete example is, toward the end of the offensive and uprising, many lower-level cadres had reported the difficult actual situation and proposed different solutions, but we, the Military Region Command, failed to really listen to these opinions and thoroughly study them. At the same time, we did not dare to report to the upper echelons those suggestions that were practical. That shortcoming had also contributed to the policy of continuing to launch one wave of general attacks and general insurrections after another without "making a timely reassessment of the situation and without adopting a policy aimed at changing the direction" of operations, as the resolution of the 21st plenum of the party Central Committee remarked.

Ben Morris

The Vietnamese Know How to Count

Challenges to the accuracy of the Russian document don't hold water.

before my release of the secret Russian document on American prisoners of war in Vietnam, past and present members of the Defense Intelligence Agency's "intelligence division" have attempted to debunk the document by challenging its "accuracy." In the past, political activists identified the cause of accelerated normalization and peace have joined them. Even Sen. John McCain who prefers to draw the distinction between the document's authenticity and its accuracy, has given some credence to the DIA officials' arguments that some of the document's content is inaccurate.

The document's authenticity is connected with accuracy in this instance. Consider the corroborating evidence. The former head of the Soviet military intelligence, Pyotr Ivashin, signed an "Executive Summary" of the document for the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee in November 1972. A report for the Soviet Politburo, based on this document, was also ordered by the then head of the relevant Central Committee department, Konstantin Katushin. These prominent Soviet officials were making their careers on the line in authenticating the content of such a document. And he knew more about the Vietnamese and his claims than anybody in the world today. This is background for evaluating the document's accuracy.

The first issue cited by skeptics is the lack of correlation between the names of prisoners cited in the documents and names on the Pentagon's list of MIAs. This is irrelevant, because sometimes American prisoners gave false names. More often than not, the Vietnamese had enormous difficulty pronouncing and transcribing the real names of Americans accurately. One of the names in the document—Jim Intish—was so obviously garbled as to make the general point clear.

The second alleged factual inaccuracy is the lack of correlation between the number of colonels listed by the North Vietnamese and the number of this rank believed to have been missing. This too is irrelevant, because some American prisoners were actually promoted while in the camp, while others deliberately inflated their rank in response to their interrogators in the hope that they might obtain better treatment. These same factors may explain Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang's questionable assertion that three prisoners had already passed the basic training to become cosmonauts.

This document would not be the first time that the Vietnamese communists had problems identifying the name and official rank of prisoners of war. One of Hanoi's most distinguished former POWs, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), has a monument erected to capture in the middle of Hanoi. It stands complete with the inaccurate description of him as Air Force Major (he was, of course, a Navy lieutenant commander) with



no's inability to accurately describe one of its most famous prisoners—McCain's father was then commander of the Pacific fleet—mean that such a person did not exist?

The next challenge has been to ask how there could have been hundreds of Americans left behind when none of the prisoners who returned knew about them. Yet the answer is clearly provided in the document itself. Some prisoners were completely segregated from the others. How could returnees have known about non-returnees if the latter were completely segregated?

Quang's assertion that there were 11 prisons with approximately 100 prisoners in each has been challenged with the claim that one prison, Hoa Lo, had 250 inmates. But this fact is not decisive. Note that Quang is speaking only of approximations. After all, if each prison had exactly 100 prisoners, then on the basis of the document's figure of 1,205, Hanoi would have had no prison for 105 people. But Quang himself in his details suggests the looseness

group of separated senior officers, he speaks of one prison set aside for only 16 colonels. His statement about overall numbers is not discredited by showing that one prison held 250 inmates.

But the most basic argument presented against the "accuracy" of the document is the claim that the author is referring to both American and allied prisoners when it speaks only of "American prisoners of war." This assertion is utterly unfounded.

Serious scholars and professional analysts of Vietnamese communist documents from the Vietnam War would know that in both published literature and secret official documents, South Vietnamese and other allied troops were always distinguished from American troops. The South Vietnamese were most commonly referred to by the adjective "puppet." Who better to confirm this fact than Quang himself? I have in my possession extensive notes taken from another document authored by the same Quang. In an earlier report to the Hanoi Polit-

buro, presented on June 26, 1972, Quang spoke frequently of "amerikantsi i ik marionetki" (Americans and their puppets) and "gruppovki amerikanskikh i marionetchnikh voisk" (groups of American and puppet forces). The notion that Quang, in discussing Hanoi's prisoners of war less than three months later, would have abandoned the analytical and linguistic habits of a lifetime, is a hypothesis based on no evidence and devoid of any logic.

Many of the criticisms of the document are irrelevant. For while the Vietnamese might make mistakes in their information when that information—such as name, rank and training—emanated from the results of an interrogation, the question of numbers is of a completely different order. For the figure of 1,205 could quite literally be derived from counting heads. And it is that head count, and that head count alone, that is the issue at stake in relations between the United States and Vietnam.

The writer, an Australian, is a visiting scholar at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

From the diary of I.S. SHCHERBAKOV [Stamp "TsK KPSS 2 Feb 73 03522 SUBJECT TO RETURN TO GENERAL DEPARTMENT TsK KPSS"] [TFR 136-51] [handwritten "25"] [handwritten "75-2/15"] Top secret. Copy No. 3 25 Jan 73 Issue No. 31

A RECORD OF THE MEETING
with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Relations of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam
Khoang Van Tien

17 Jan 73

I was invited to an informational meeting at the government's Reception House by Khoang Van Tien.

Having made reference to his mission, the Deputy Minister reported the following:

After having suffered heavy losses in their extremely barbarous operations to escalate the war, and having undergone severe censure from the world community, and also because of the serious attitude and the good will displayed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the United States was compelled to cease bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam north of the 20th parallel and to resume the Le Duc Tho-Kissinger meetings on 8 Jan 73. All the same, the American side took an obstinate position at the start of the negotiations. While discussing the remaining points of the accord and its protocols, the American side, using its favorite tactics, tried to deviate from recognizing that, in reality, two administrations, two armies and two zones of control exist in South Vietnam. During the discussion of the protocols, the Americans tried to introduce corrections to the articles of accord which had been already agreed upon.

The Americans and their puppets have concurrently intensified military operations in South Vietnam to seize liberated territory. In turn, the puppets in Saigon have advanced the demand that South Vietnam be recognized as a separate state, and that the puppet administration is the only government in South Vietnam. The Saigon administration has also advanced the demand that the so-called "North Vietnamese forces" be withdrawn from South Vietnam.

From their side, our Vietnamese comrades, using their success in repulsing American aviation's strategic strikes and the favorable conditions

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22 Dec 73]

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[TFR 136-52]

2.

in the international arena, have exposed the United States' treachery and its actions to escalate the war to severe criticism. They have demanded from the United States a serious attitude in the negotiations, a renunciation of their absurd demands, a solution of the remaining issues and an agreement on the protocols with the aim of signing an accord.

The Le Duc Tho-Kissinger talks which took place 8 to 13 Jan 73 yielded the following results:

Relative to the remaining unsolved issues. In the beginning, the United States demanded a repeat discussion of the articles in which it is stated that "the United States and other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of South Vietnam." The United States demanded the exclusion from the text of the article of the word "United States" so that the article would read "countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of South Vietnam." After firm protest from the Vietnamese side, the United States agreed to maintain the previous wording. Khoang Van Tien explained that the United States protested against the wording "the United States respects the independence..." stating that in such a form, the article could lead to censure of the United States. For this reason they refused the wording "the United States and other countries respect the independence..." However, in the end our Vietnamese comrades succeeded in pressing for this very wording.

The order for signing the accord. Originally, the United States insisted that the text of the accord make no mention of the name VRP RYUV, and they used all means possible to allow the Saigon administration to avoid fulfilling the accord. Consequently, the American side gave agreement to only the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and United States signing the accord and refused a multilateral [four-party] signing. In the event of a four-party signing, the United States demanded that the accord made no mention of the name VRP RYUV or the Saigon administration, to include [no mention] in the signatures. The United States proposed that all four sides would separately sign a clean sheet of paper, which would then be filed with the text of the accord.

The Vietnamese side came out firmly opposed to this and in the end, the parties came to a relative agreement on the order of signing the accord:

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3.

Two texts of the accord will be signed. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States will sign the text with a preamble and a closing article, in which mention will be made of the names of the governments of the four parties. This text will be signed by the foreign ministers of both sides.

The four sides will sign the text of the accord with the preamble and the closing article, in which mention will be made of the participants of the Paris conference, without mention of the names of the governments of the four sides. This text will be signed by the foreign ministers of the four sides.

Both signing ceremonies will take place on the same day. During the first half of the day, the four party signing will take place; and during the second half, the bilateral signing will take place.

The issue of a demilitarized zone. The United States, as before, attempted to turn the provisional demarcation line, from under the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords, into a political and territorial border separating both divisions of Vietnam. The goal was to split the country for a protracted period. Originally, the United States agreed to the wording "both divisions of Vietnam will observe the demilitarized zone." Simultaneously, the Americans demanded the exclusion from the text of a sentence, which was previously agreed to, that there will also be the issue of how to transport civilians across the demilitarized zone, among those issues about which both divisions of Vietnam will conduct negotiations.

Thus, at the latest meeting, the Vietnamese side upheld the principal positions of the text of the accord reached 20 Oct 72, which resulted in the United States and Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on 13 Jan 73, certifying to the completion of the drawing up of the text of the accord.

Concerning protocols to the accord. During the discussion of protocols appended to the accord, it has become clear that the United States attempted to change previously agreed upon paragraphs and to remove itself from responsibility for solving internal issues of South Vietnam. Above all, the United States strove to decline from discussing the issue of defining the zones of control of each of the sides, and concealed its intentions to isolate liberated areas in South Vietnam.

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4.

In the protocol on the issue of releasing incarcerated civilians and service members, the United States demanded the immediate release of all American POWs simultaneously with the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. They tried to back away from a discussion of the order for releasing incarcerated South Vietnamese patriots. The experts are continuing negotiations on this matter.

In the protocol on the issue of an International Control Commission, the United States had insisted that the International Control Commission hold wide powers, have at its disposal numerous advisory groups and a large number of personnel having the right to freely move throughout South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese side firmly opposed these absurd United States demands. Now, all the major issues of the protocols have been resolved.

Experts from both sides are presently continuing work. Both sides have agreed to spare no effort to complete the drawing up of the protocols this week.

Concerning the timetable for formalizing the accord. The sides have agreed to the following:

On 15 January of this year, the United States will announce the cessation of bombing, artillery strikes and [coastal] mining on all territories of North Vietnam;

On 23 January, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho will initial the text of the accord and the protocols;

On 27 January, there will be an official document signing ceremony in Paris. The first half of the day there will be an official signing ceremony of the four sides. The second half of the day will be the official signing ceremony between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States;

At 2400 hrs on 27 January, Greenwich time, that is 7:00 AM on 28 January, Hanoi time, a cease fire on all territories of South Vietnam will be implemented.

On 13 January, after the conclusion of the meeting between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, both sides confirmed that the text of the accord was completed and that all of the major points in the protocols have been decided. The United States pledged not to introduce any changes to the text of the documents that was agreed upon and to exactly execute the accord after its signing.