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In spite of this, [our] Vietnamese comrades, as before, are allowing for two possible developments:

- If the United States really wants peace and a peaceful settlement, then the accord will be signed at the end of this month.

- If the United States engages in treachery and breaks the accord that was reached, then the war will continue.

On 15 January of this year, the United States ceased bombing, artillery strikes and [coastal] mining on all territories of North Vietnam. This is a great victory for the Vietnamese people. However, after the cessation of military activity on the territory of North Vietnam, the United States heightened its military activity in South Vietnam, concentrated their military air forces to support the operations of puppet troops in the capture of liberated regions of South Vietnam, increased combat actions against liberated zones in Laos and Cambodia, and did not give up its intentions to renew bombing of North Vietnam. In recent days, American reconnaissance aircraft have continued flights over North Vietnam.

Under these conditions, [our] Vietnamese comrades will be making active efforts to use the possibility of a signing a peaceful accord. In addition, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will be vigilant for any treacherous actions by the United States, as they [the United States] have already done earlier.

With reference to this, [our] Vietnamese comrades are asking the Soviet Union to continue to coordinate their actions in the Vietnamese people's struggle to mobilize world and American opinion to fight for the quickest possible establishment of an understanding on the remaining questions and the quickest possible signing of an accord. It is necessary that the world community also be vigilant in the face of the American imperialist's crafty schemes.

The Deputy Minister asked that the information provided by him above be forwarded for the information of the Soviet leadership. He said that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States have agreed on the undisclosed contents of the accord that was reached. He also said that the information on the timetable for formalizing the accord was only for the USSR and PRK ambassadors. The representatives of the other socialist countries will not be told about it.

In connection with this, he remarked that the ambassadors of the socialist countries are waiting for information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. "Some are saying that the Swedish ambassador is better informed on this matter than they are."

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Khoang Van Tien answered that obviously the Swedish ambassador has a source of information in the United States. [Our] Vietnamese comrades do not yet plan to inform the representatives of the socialist countries on this matter.

The Deputy Minister said that, as before, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's delegation is informing the Soviet ambassador in Paris on the course of the negotiations.

Thanking him for the information, I promised to immediately bring it to Moscow's attention.

In the course of a subsequent meeting, in connection with the aforementioned, I asked about the situation with the accord that was reached concerning the other Indo-China countries.

Khoang Van Tien answered that it is indicated in the accord that both sides will respect the basic national rights of the Cambodian and Laotian people stipulated by the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

Khoang Van Tien said further that he is maintaining a tie with the Soviet ambassador in Laos and with PFL representatives in Hanoi on the Laotian matter. As concerns a settlement in Cambodia - we are receiving little information from the Cambodian ambassador in Hanoi. We are under the impression that the Cambodian liberation is lacking the proper unity and [our] Cambodian friends are "falling away" from the general direction of a settlement. In specific, they are not showing a determination to follow the general formula to find a means of negotiations and the creation of a trilateral coalition state.

Khoang Van Tien hurriedly told us that there was "nothing new" on the Cambodian matter, that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam "completely supports the Cambodian people's struggle and all of the plans of their Cambodian friends." He said further, that obviously the Cambodian leadership, inside and outside the country, must meet and discuss all of the questions. As is already known, Sianuk announced in Peking that the Vietnam problem will be resolved earlier than the Cambodian [problem]. The Cambodian leadership, inside and outside of the country, is maintaining contacts on these matters, although they are "greatly divided."

I remarked that, according to some reports, Sianuk is preparing to go to Hanoi to celebrate the Tet-Vietnamese New Year.

Khoang Van Tien answered that every year Sianuk goes to the Tet in Hanoi and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will again welcome his arrival this year.

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Further answering our question, Khoang Van Tien confirmed that the October draft of 1972, with several additions and changes, was taken as the basis of the accord for the settlement in Vietnam. There are no new articles in the accord.

I asked Khoang Van Tien about the International Conference on Vietnam and the International Control Commission. The Deputy Minister answered that, as was agreed upon earlier, the International Conference will be convened thirty days after a cease-fire. The conference's date and location are being determined and our Soviet comrades already know who the participants will be. There will be no changes of the personnel compliment to the International Control Commission. [Our] Vietnamese comrade's announcement that was made earlier against Indonesia's taking part in the International Control Commission was a tactical move that was intended to make Indonesia change its position that was somewhat unfavorable to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The International Control Commission will set to work immediately after the signing of the accord.

I referred to the fact that the Soviet Union is ready to begin the mine sweeping operations of South Vietnam's ports, which was already communicated to the Vietnamese through military channels, and asked if this matter had already been settled bilaterally between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States. I also remarked that, based on reports from our sailors, [our] Vietnamese comrades were using Chinese mine-sweepers for mine sweeping operations.

Khoang Van Tien answered that at present the mine sweeping matter is being discussed from the American side. [Our] Vietnamese comrades consider that the United States should carry full responsibility for the mine sweeping operations. Washington has agreed to this and the specific questions are at present being decided.

While answering our question, Khoang Van Tien elucidated that the accord was not subject to ratification and would go into effect immediately after the signing.

In conclusion, I asked how, after the signing, [our] Vietnamese comrades intended to observe their great victory. I mentioned that it would be desirable to know beforehand what possible plans the DVH has concerning this, as well as the necessity to demonstrate the Vietnamese people's victory to the entire world and, along with them, the victory of the entire socialist camp.

Khoang Van Tien added that it will be a victory for all of the peace loving forces who have supported the Vietnamese people the entire time. The Deputy Minister said further that, at the present,

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more than anything else, [our] Vietnamese comrades are busy, with the help of the Soviet Union, China and other socialist nations, mobilizing the world community to force the Americans to strictly carry out the accord that was reached. Foreign aid must be attracted for North Vietnam's recovery and the renewal and development of South Vietnam's liberated regions. The most important thing at the present is to defend the conquests of the South Vietnamese revolution and more than anything else - the liberation of regions and of the patriotic administration. Khoang Van Tien did not name any specific measures [to be taken] in connection with the signing of the accord.

I.A. Novikov, the attache of the USSR Embassy, was present at the meeting. Dank Dyk Kkhoj, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam interpreted at the meeting.

the receipt of information and for moral support.

Our friends strove to limit the KPSS's and the Soviet Government's ideological and political influence and ascendancy on the PTV and the masses within the borders of "what is permissible". This was seen clearly and regularly in their public speeches and in the Vietnamese press. As regards V.I. Lenin's 100th birthday and the portentous events in the lives of Soviet people, there has been a significant amount said about the decisive importance of Lenin's teachings and the October Revolution in the formation of a worldwide socialist system and of the victory of the August Revolution in the DRV. The significant economic and military aid from socialist countries to the Vietnamese people in their battle against US aggression and the building of socialism in the DRV was recognized. The important significance of the comprehensive aid from the Soviet Union was spoken about only in regards to the allocation of Soviet economic and military aid either at diplomatic receptions in the Embassy of the USSR, at meetings with Soviet delegations and in conversations with Soviet representatives in small [restricted?] circles.

The solidarity of the Soviet people with the heroic battle of the peoples of Vietnam and Indochina as a whole has been recognized. Declarations on Vietnam and Indochina have been noted in the speeches of Soviet leaders and from official Soviet documents, and it has been emphasized that the Soviet Union will henceforth render comprehensive aid to the Vietnamese people. In other words, our friends have given primary consideration to the fact that in any case it is connected with the support of their position on the Vietnam issue. At the same time, in the Vietnamese leaders' public speeches and in the press, they were silent on all the issues concerning the life and activities of the KPSS, on its battle for unity and cohesion in the collaboration of socialist countries and in the international communist movement. There was little reflection on how the Soviet Union is rendering aid and support to developing countries and the national liberation movement, on the battle for peace and peaceful coexistence, on European security, etc.

Newspapers reported belatedly and very briefly on the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Plenum decisions of the TsK KPSS were not dealt with in the press.

The decision of the December Plenum of the TsK KPSS to convene the 24th Congress of the KPSS in March 1971 was not opportunely reported on. The press ignored this significant event. Incidentally, during discussion of the plan for cooperation between the Friendship societies of our countries for 1971, our Vietnamese comrades persistently objected to including in the plan the position that the Society of Vietnamese-Soviet friendship would promote the Vietnamese society becoming acquainted with materials from the 24th Congress of the KPSS. Periodic reports of the TsSU of the SM USSR on the fulfillment of plans on the development of the national economy of the USSR were mentioned in the press in a condensed form. Our Vietnamese friends pay more attention to our country's past experience in political and economic development. Obviously, it is no accident that a concise course on the history of the VKP(b) based on a 1950 USSR edition was published in commemoration of the 53rd Anniversary of the October Revolution. Moreover, the publisher did not mention a single word about the six-volume History of the KPSS which is published in the USSR.

As before, the Soviet side continued to confidentially inform the Vietnamese leadership on individual matters concerning internal and external policies of the KPSS and the Soviet Government. The Soviet-Vietnamese political consultation that was conducted along party and state lines and through diplomatic channels in Moscow, Hanoi and Paris played an important role in the exchange of opinions and the mutual elucidation of viewpoints relating mostly to Indochina. Our information undoubtedly gave our Vietnamese friends the possibility to gain a proper understanding of the social-economic processes going on in the USSR, or more correctly to use the international arena as an example. The Vietnamese side however, did not answer with full reciprocity. They only reciprocated when they themselves were interested in some matter. Political consultations between the USSR and the DRV led, in large part, to discussions of the Vietnamese side's desire for support of separate foreign policy or internal actions of the DRV. Expressing agreement with the Soviet position on one issue or another, the Vietnamese side, nevertheless, avoided openly speaking in support of the issue. They did not move for the establishment of actual confidential contacts. In addition, while the USSR Ministry of Foreign Relations delegation was in the DRV, our friends, referring to the wartime situation, let us know that henceforth, they do not intend to tell us in advance about

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tactical aspects of specific foreign policy moves that they are undertaking and consequently also do not intend to consult with us on specific issues. In spite of this, we ought to continue, as far as is prudent, the practice of transferring information to our Vietnamese friends, bearing in mind that the Chinese are also informing the Vietnamese side on internal and foreign policy matters, giving their own evaluation of current events.

One of the main reasons for the PTV's highly restrained approach to consultations with the Soviet Union and a number of other socialist countries is the unwillingness of our friends to overstep our confidence, especially in international issues, which are limited by the particulars of the PTV leadership's current foreign policy.

Thus, our Vietnamese friends have maintained their previous positions of partial confidence towards the Soviet Union, originating from the earlier formulated position: not to spoil or aggravate relations with the Soviet Union, but at the same time not to approach a level of confidence and utmost sincerity.*

Even the approach remains principally different from the USSR's position to a number of important international problems of contemporary life. The PTV leadership's dissent from the views of the KPSS and the Moscow Conference of the Communist and Workers Party of 1969 on a number of important issues involving the struggle against imperialism and international issues, their attempts to avoid taking part in the preparation for the World Anti-imperialist Congress, the differing evaluation of the KPSS and the PTV of the dissenting activity of the Chinese leadership, negative ideas toward the USSR on the creation of collective security in Asia, the holding back of our party propaganda on Vietnam and other incidents, testify to the fact that a significant portion of the Vietnamese leadership has strong nationalistic tendencies. In recent times, as a result of these tendencies and the Vietnamese leadership's maneuvering between the USSR and China, the political development of Soviet-Vietnamese relations

*For the Embassy's assessment of the possibilities and features of a coordination of DRV foreign policy with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, see policy letter issue No. 398 dated 25 June 70.

have been all but halted and still much more time and effort is required to extricate them from such a state.

China continues to exert its influence on the Vietnamese in defining their positions in relations with the USSR. The PTV well understands that China is nearby and that the USSR is far away. It would be difficult for the Vietnamese to do without help from the Chinese in the struggle and in future peaceful construction. Therefore, it would obviously be premature to ask the Vietnamese for a clear-cut determination on their positions in relation to the USSR and China. In addition, it may be assumed that the Vietnamese leadership will not likely enter into a full union with the Chinese. Obviously, it ought to be expected that henceforth, or at least in the coming years, the DRV leadership, by pursuing a "special policy", will be striving for an intermediate "unaffiliated" position while continuing their distinctive maneuvering between the USSR and China.

Economic and trade relations between the USSR and the DRV continued to expand. In 1970, as in past years, these relations can be characterized as unilateral economic help from the USSR to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for the development of all the fundamental branches of the national economy - the energy and coal industry, engineering and transport, the food industry and agriculture, geological research and in the preparation of national cadres.

In 1970, all of the Soviet Union's aid to Vietnam, excluding military aid, amounted to approximately 316 million rubles or 45% of the overall aid from all socialist countries. Not included in the sum total are the costs of transportation, the training of many thousands of Vietnamese citizens in the USSR, the salaries of our specialists in the DRV, various gifts from Soviet social organizations, etc.

The proliferation of US aggression in Indochina has created new difficulties for the DRV, which necessitated that military and material aid be rendered to the liberation forces of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. A united front formed to provide the most minimum of needs, which required a considerable

effort of the population and all of the material resources of the DRV. Under these conditions, the basic aid to Vietnam, as before, went along departmental lines: to the military (about 120 million rubles), to the MVT (about 152 million rubles) and to the GKEhS (more than 34 million rubles).

Soviet military-economic aid was one of the decisive factors in the attainment of definite work successes and also in the Vietnamese people's struggle against American aggression. Approximately 60% of all Soviet aid is economic, the remainder is military. Up to 40% of the aid was transferred without compensation.

During the past year the Soviet Union's economic aid, as in past years, was in the form of deliveries of finished equipment and in temporary trips of Soviet specialists to the DRV and Vietnamese specialists in the USSR. Technical and practical aid continued to be rendered in the restoration and development of energy, transport, agriculture, the coal and food industry, radio communications, etc. Agriculture equipment, repair parts, mineral and chemical fertilizer, petroleum products, food-stuffs, and various materials and equipment were supplied.

In the year under review, about 600 Soviet civilian specialists worked in the DRV. They conducted the enormous task of renewing the buildings of industrial enterprises that were temporarily closed due to American bombing in 1966 and in the restoration of new projects which were damaged or destroyed. With the help of Soviet specialists, the DRV was conducting an upgrade and refurbishment of equipment that had earlier been delivered; control was exercised and practical aid was rendered directly in the course of project construction; groups worked on the collection of initial data for the restoration of the TEhD. Our specialists continued to render technical cooperation to the DRV with the reconstruction of the port at Haiphong where two moorings were put into operation, and with the construction of two power plants - a GEhS at Tkxakba, a TEhS at Uongbi and a number of power transmission lines. The construction of the second phase of the Hanoi machine factory and the first phase of the Bajtyan-Hanoi oil pipeline are continuing. Work was conducted on the drilling of a deep well for oil and gas in the area of

the Tkhajbin structure. A bread factory that can produce 50 tons a day was put into operation, and work is being completed by the Hanoi machine factory cutting instrument shop. As of 1 January 1971 there are 294 civilian specialists in the country, including: 64 geologists, 65 oil pipeline workers, 65 power specialists, 29 coal industry specialists, and others.

Progressive work methods and modern technology were introduced and are taking root in several areas of production in the DRV thanks to the persistent work of Soviet specialists. Work productivity increased significantly and the quality of repair went up after the specialization of the Hanoi ZIL repair factory. There is a lot of work being conducted to introduce systems of developmental and preventive maintenance repairs at the enterprises of several DRV ministries to ensure reliability and increase the operating time of Soviet machine tools and forging-pressing equipment. During 1970, 33 Soviet specialists worked in the DRV rendering technical assistance to Vietnamese organizations to help them master Soviet machines and equipment, the organization of technical service and repair and also the training of Vietnamese specialists.

During the years of cooperation (from 1955 to 1970), the Soviet Union rendered economic and technical aid to the DRV to the sum of 354 million rubles. During this time, with the help of the USSR, about 400 industrial, agricultural and other projects were constructed, important national economy work (geological, exploration, scientific, etc.) was conducted, and several thousand Vietnamese specialists were trained in various skills. Economic cooperation between our countries has a special significance for the national economy of the DRV. By attending training in the Soviet Union's academic institutions, enterprises and construction sites, and also at units in the DRV created with the USSR's technical cooperation, the Vietnamese are acquiring not only production skills, but they are also becoming the vehicles of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship, the vehicles of an advanced, progressive technological culture and the vehicles of modern production organization methods. It is precisely the influence of the Soviet Unions' knowledge that can explain

the following Vietnamese Government measures directed at the introduction of piece work in industry, the material stimulation of agricultural production, the reorganization of the management of the national economy, the reduction of the administrative apparatus and the increase in the specific share of the industrial group. The Soviet Union's knowledge is also transferred through Soviet specialists assigned to the DRV.

All of these factors do not easily yield to accounting and expression in specific numerical data. At this time, the Embassy does not have a summary which would fully characterize the Soviet Union's investment in the country's national product. But if we were to talk of the basic types of industrial production, then project construction with our technical cooperation continues to play a leading role in the national economy of the country. The GEhS at Tkhakba and the TEhS at Uongbi, erected with the aid of the Soviet Union, alone generate 46.5% of all electrical power produced in the country. In the agricultural sphere, the 40 State farms built with the technical cooperation of the Soviet Union include 100% of the hevea plantations [rubber trees], 98% of the land planted with coffee and 70% of all land planted with tea. The crop capacity and quality of production on the State farms remain higher than on other farms in the DRV.

In addition, it is noteworthy that the basic difficulties in developing economic cooperation between the USSR and the DRV and in raising its effectiveness is the weakness of the leadership and economic organization, insufficient agricultural cadres and experience, and the continuation of military action in Indochina in which the DRV is taking an active part. Given this, the inevitable shortage of skilled working cadres and production resources, insufficient transportation resources and limitations on capital investments in the national economy negatively influence the course of construction on new and already operating enterprises, lowering their profitability and economic effectiveness. As before, much industrial equipment, machine tools, machines, and mechanisms are sitting idle. As concerns the management of the national economy,

GDR specialists who have familiarized themselves with the situation came to some highly unfavorable conclusions. The planning and accounting are in a neglected state and incompetent people are often placed in key economic leadership posts. A serious question stands before us - how to give further economic aid to the DRV and how to increase its effectiveness. There is no doubt that Soviet economic aid must henceforth be rendered to Vietnam. That is one of the organic parts of our general policy here. But we have to consider how to perfect the ways and means of economic aid to the DRV. The Embassy has already expressed its considerations on this issue.

It should be said about trade between our countries, that the MVT of the USSR, in essence, did not so much trade with the DRV in 1970 as provided aid. In 1970, the Vietnamese side provided goods to the USSR to the sum of 11 million rubles, i.e. at the 1969 level. This is approximately 13 times lower than the MVT of the USSR supplied to Vietnam. Thus, progress towards increasing Soviet-Vietnamese trade has not been observed.

As a positive development, the widening of transportation ties with the DRV should be noted. As before, maritime connections are the predominant form. About 1237.3 thousand tons of cargo, more than 270 shiploads, were delivered to the DRV during 1970. Direct air contact between the USSR and the DRV was officially established for the first time.

Matters of military cooperation. In 1970 the Soviet Union continued to render military aid without compensation to the DRV through deliveries of military equipment and arms, the rendering of technical cooperation on the use and repair of Soviet military equipment and arms, and the rendering of technical cooperation in the creation of military and special units in the DRV, etc. As designated above, Soviet military aid consisted of 120 million rubles for the year in review. At the present time the Vietnamese armed forces are to a significant degree rearmed and equipped basically on account of the Soviet Union's aid.

During the year in review, the rendering of technical cooperation on the use and repair of delivered Soviet military

equipment and armaments, and also the creation of various military and special units was done through transfer to the Vietnamese side of technical documentation, deliveries of equipment and material, visits by Soviet specialists to the DRV, and by training Vietnamese specialists in the USSR. At any one time there are 250-300 Soviet military specialists in the DRV. They are there to render assistance to the Vietnamese Peoples Army to maintain military equipment and armaments sent from the USSR in the proper working order, its combat preparedness, its maintenance and repair, and also in the training of VNA military specialists in academic institutions as well as directly in military units. The bulk of Soviet military specialists rendered aid to the antiaircraft defense forces and the military air forces of the DRV. In the military-technical academies a group of Soviet military instructors trained anti-air defense specialists of all skills, conducted pedagogical training of the instructors of these academies, and organized programs and training supplies. The DRV's antiaircraft forces have modern combat equipment (antiaircraft missile units, jet aircraft, radar units, etc.) mostly of Soviet manufacture.

Placing a great importance on the military aid received from the USSR, the VNA command at the same time saw it only as the Soviet Union fulfilling its international obligation. While highly assessing the work of the Soviet military specialists in words, the VNA command tried to limit in every possible way their sphere of activity to technical aid only and thus zealously guarded decisions on the combat use of military equipment and tactics of combat actions from the influence of our specialists. In addition, the threat of a massed air raid on the DRV forced the VNA command to more realistically assess the combat preparedness of their antiaircraft forces and to take a number of measures to heighten it, counting on, chiefly, the indirect aid of Soviet military specialists. They repeatedly voiced a desire to receive newer types of weapons and combat equipment from the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that in spite of some expansion of contact at work, we have not yet been able to achieve more idealistic military

cooperation, trust, and frankness from our friends. As a rule, the military information they have for us is of a general character. As before, the level of cooperation regarding the study of captured equipment and enemy tactics leaves much to be desired.

Although with much difficulty, we are succeeding in supporting a definite level of military cooperation in the DRV and it is, however, necessary to develop and continue this cooperation. This is one of the integral parts of our overall policy in Vietnam.

Cultural, scientific and social ties between the USSR and the DRV continued to widen, although in many respects they were characterized by our aid to the DRV in the areas of education, science, public health and culture. During the year in review, as in past years, our friends sought to elicit more aid and support in these areas of our relations. However, in spite of such a DRV position, further strengthening of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation is obviously politically and ideologically expedient for us.

In the plans of cooperation during the last year, many mass measures were foreseen with the basic goal of demonstrating the life and activities of V.I. Lenin and the triumph of Lenin's ideas in the Soviet Union, in Vietnam and all over the world. Exhibitions of Lenin's work, photos, placards, films, and other devices conducted during the Lenin anniversary in Vietnam had a positive effect. They allowed the Vietnamese to get more closely acquainted and deeply feel the immortal ideas of Lenin, to widen ideas about V.I. Lenin's life and activities, permitted the further broadening of the Vietnamese peoples' knowledge of Soviet life, of the Soviet peoples' successes in the building of Communism, and raised the interest of Vietnamese readers for Soviet literature.

From their side, our friends are striving to use channels of cultural, scientific and social ties to more deeply familiarize themselves with our experience in education, trade unions, public health, information, print, radio, etc. Our friends have shown much less interest in cultural

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[continuation of sentence] friends, judging by everything, are inclined such that in Sianuk's present situation may more actively exploit the Cambodian national liberation. It cannot be ruled out that such a change represents a definite concession to the Chinese, who are making efforts, through Sianuk in particular, to strengthen their influence in the United Front of the struggle of the Indochinese people and to increase their influence on the course of all events in Indochina.

The PTV leadership strove to play a leading roll and, in fact, did achieve that in the Indochinese peoples' fight for liberation. In practice, Hanoi became the center for exchanges of opinions, the coordination of action and cooperation of the liberation forces of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In addition, a highly nationalistic approach to a settlement of the Vietnamese issue, the preference given by our Vietnamese comrades to a settlement in Vietnam, and their submission to this resolution of the Laos and Cambodia problems provokes the hidden dissatisfaction of our Cambodian and Laotian friends, although they too recognize the Vietnamese's leadership position in the national liberation movement in Indochina. As a whole, however, the ties that are binding the patriotic forces of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are now quite solid and obviously will continue on in the future.

In the foreign policy plan our Vietnamese comrades led an active effort to create a United Front in the fight against American aggression in Vietnam, for an end of the war on the Indochina peninsula, and also to secure favorable international conditions for a solution to the Vietnamese and Indochinese issue. Having striven to realize their mission, the DRV-RYuV expected and was guided by; more than anything else, the material and moral aid of the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union and China. In 1970, the relations between the DRV-RYuV and these countries continued to develop, in general, favorably.

Nonetheless, the Vietnamese all the same tried to develop relations with socialist countries to a large degree with utilitarian, highly nationalistic and regional positions, basing their relations with this or that socialist country primarily depending on the size of the material aid received and the effectiveness of its moral support, taking it for granted that the rendering to the DRV-RYuV military, political and other

aid is the socialist countries' obligation. Proceeding from an exaggerated notion of their contribution to the anti-American struggle and their role in this struggle, our Vietnamese Comrades are inclined to subordinate the foreign policy activity of the socialist countries to the needs of the liberation movement in Vietnam and Indochina, at times placing the interests of such a movement higher than the general international interests of the socialist camp; the DRV-RYuV continued to follow a policy of balancing "between Moscow and Peking."

The Vietnamese leadership is striving to preserve its sovereignty and independence and, in essence, the exclusive right of a resolution of the Vietnamese and Indochinese issue, to hinder drawing socialist countries in, at least, at the current level in a settlement in Vietnam and Indochina. In connection with this, the DRV-RYuV does not desire to establish a confidence in the exchange of opinions and information with the socialist countries concerning a settlement or organize a full coordination of actions in the foreign policy arena with the socialist countries.

Our Vietnamese comrades attach special significance to the development of normal, friendly, wide-reaching relations with the Soviet Union. As before, they highly value Soviet material aid to the people's struggle in Vietnam, that the USSR has come forward in the international arena in support of the liberation movement in Vietnam and Indochina, considering this aid and support one of the deciding factors guaranteeing the successful repulse of the American aggressors. Our Vietnamese friends also relate in a very positive way to the support of the Warsaw Pact countries to Vietnam and Indochina.

Our Vietnamese comrades also highly value the Soviet Government's consistent and firm position on Indochinese affairs, its broad and varied aid and support to the struggle of the Vietnamese people and people of other countries in Indochina against the American aggressors and reactionary regimes in the Indochinese countries. The DRV leadership considers the Soviet Government's documents on Indochina as an important contribution of the Soviet people in the struggle of the peoples of Indochina which has a sobering effect on the American aggressors, forcing them to ponder what type of punishment awaits them for the

commission of crimes against the peoples of Indochina.

Our Vietnamese comrades treat with understanding the position taken by the Soviet Government in acknowledging the royal government of Pen Nut, and properly assess the actions of those who would speculate on the damage to relations between the Soviet Union and the patriotic forces of the Indochinese countries. Our Vietnamese friends take into consideration that this position of the Soviet Union is echoed by the Warsaw Pact countries and that the Soviet Union supports, in full, the struggle of the Cambodian patriots for their liberation and independence and approve of the Cambodian National United Front's political agenda.

The DRV-RYuV has always carefully taken the Chinese factor into account, in particular, the KNR's intensified attempts to raise their prestige and influence in the Indochinese countries and to tie in their policy with a resolution of the Indochinese issue. Our Vietnamese comrades have quite consistently followed a policy with regard to China to defend their independence, avoid compromising to the Chinese in matters principle to them, and more than anything else, and avoid compromising on a settlement in Vietnam and Indochina. Proceeding from this point, and also keeping in mind a possible negative reaction from the USSR, in the middle of 1970 our friends declined the support of the Chinese to create a so called "United Front of the struggle" with five Asiatic nations - China, Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Our Vietnamese friends, who had gained an understanding of the situation that took form after the revolution in Cambodia, rejected China's solicitations to combine their policies, resolve the Indochinese issue and send their volunteers to the Indochina countries. They took into account that the participation of Chinese forces in the Indochinese conflict would delay a resolution to the Indochina issue and would not address the interests of the people of these countries.

In addition, the Vietnamese's interest in receipt of more active support from the KNR in connection with the proliferation and exacerbation of the Indochina conflict, several changes (in form) towards a high flexibility in KNR policy on Indochina and in particular, China's recent official recognition of the DRV-RYuV's 8 points on Vietnam as a just basis of a Vietnamese settlement and, thus, an

indirect "rehabilitation" of the Paris negotiations, by the end of 1970 led to a noticeable warming in Vietnam-China relations, to a specific strengthening of cooperation in Vietnamese and Indochinese affairs. It can be supposed that this will give our friends the opportunity to turn to Peking less frequently when searching for political solutions to Vietnamese and Indochinese problems.

The DRV-RYuV leadership is endeavoring to win the sympathy of world public opinion over to the side of the Indochinese peoples' war of liberation and to incline a number of capitalist countries and developing countries to support their settlement program, or at least to condemn American aggression in Indochina. The leadership has displayed an interest in using UN tribunals to unmask the US policy of aggression. With these aims in mind, it has expanded its activities in international public organizations and has devoted much attention to developing contacts with national public organizations advocating an end to the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese have attached great significance to this influence, in their favor, on US public opinion and to the assistance in consolidating forces opposed to Nixon's policy in Indochina.

However, it must be noted that the Vietnamese comrades' highly national, regionalist approach has left a fairly serious imprint on all DRV-RYuV foreign policy activities. While creating maximum foreign policy difficulties for the United States, our friends have treated with restraint the solution of pressing international problems, the relaxation of world tensions and the settling of international conflicts involving the US. The Vietnamese have yet to completely discontinue their use of the slogan "more Cubas and Vietnams".

As a whole, in 1970 the situation in the countries of Indochina has become significantly more complicated. Political and military tensions have seriously risen; in particular, armed conflict has sharply intensified, the outcome of which is still uncertain. One can see that prospects of a political solution to the Vietnam and Indochina problem are becoming distant. The opposing sides' plans and intentions, which have manifested themselves in the conflict, testify that not one of them

has yet prepared to begin "productive" negotiations on the peaceful solution of the Vietnam and Indochina issues, nor to find constructive ways and approaches to it. The Paris negotiations are in a virtual deadlock.

The United States, by all appearances, will continue to exert military pressure on the liberation movement in Indochina, resorting to extreme measures such as routine bombing of the entire territory of the DRV, and others. At the same time, the US, apparently, has miscalculated in thinking that the DRV-RYuV forces are exhausted; that they are nearing the end; that under the present conditions, by way of successive military thrusts, the US can place the Vietnamese on the edge of destruction or, in any case, coerce them into making principal concessions.

The escalation of American aggression, the intensification of hostilities in Laos and Cambodia and the threat of a renewal of bombing the DRV have truly created an extremely difficult position in Vietnam and Indochina. However, despite the large losses, our friends have succeeded in basically preserving their forces and in retaining many of their positions. They are still capable of conducting active combat using not only military, but also political and diplomatic means. An extremely important detail for our Vietnamese comrades is that on a parallel course the Soviet Union and KNR speak out in support of them. So it was, in particular, with their decisive condemnation of the aggressive actions taken by the US against the DRV in November 1970.

In light of the increased significance that events taking place today in Vietnam and Indochina have in shaping the entire international situation and, in particular, in view of the acutely enhanced military peril to the Indochina peninsula and the heightened threat to the national liberation of Indochinese peoples, the main task now is to continue to render the necessary material and moral support to the liberating forces of Indochina and, above all, to our Vietnamese friends for repulsing American aggression. At the same time, the task is also to build up a stabilizing influence in order to constrain the dangerous evolution of events in Indochina, to not allow military action to break out of Indochina, to carry this to an easing of tensions and to a reestablishment of peace in Indochina by means of a political

solution to the Vietnamese and Indochinese problems.

Under the conditions which have developed, our Vietnamese comrades need not only military, economic and moral support, but they also need practical advice on forming a broad program of action in the sphere of political settlement. The program should be based on two principle conditions: the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam and the creation of a coalition government capable of representing the various strata of Vietnamese people. Such a program would undoubtedly find broad support amongst socialist countries, world public opinion and the peoples of Indochina.

Reality suggests that our Vietnamese comrades should be less fearful of appearing in the international arena. Through means of a broad-based plan, they should use progressive international organizations and forums for the purposes of advancing their program on settlement, exerting active influence on US policy and impairing the reactionary regimes in Indochina. For this our Vietnamese comrades need our help.

Just as before, the problems of Vietnam and Indochina in 1970 on the whole took a leading place in the policies and actions of the PTV. The escalation of American aggression and the accompanying sharp strain on the military-political situation in Indochina in the past year has created for the DRV grave difficulties in conducting a national liberation struggle and in solving the Vietnam problem. As the war in Indochina has taken on a protracted character, and a political settlement in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia appears to have been put aside with more distant prospects - under these conditions the PTV leadership has to orient the country and its people for a longer struggle by combining military, political and diplomatic means via mobilization of all forces and resources of the country. At the same time, our Vietnamese comrades, upon whose shoulders lie virtually the entire weight of the war, to a considerable extent are counting on an increase in foreign aid, on the receipt of "ever growing" material and moral support, above all else from countries of the socialist camp.

The intensification of the Indochina conflict, the rise of its negative influence on the development of the contemporary international situation,...

[no continuation provided]

...various strata of the population of Nixon's Vietnam policy. However visits to the DRV by various youth, women's and other delegations happened to increase in 1970.

In 1970 the DRV also deepened relations with a number of capitalist countries. There was a noticeable warming of relations with France. The Swiss charge d'affaires was accredited in Hanoi. The DRV received part of a sum granted by Switzerland as non-repayable aid (7 million dollars).

Concurrently, narrow-mindedness, idealistic pragmatism and an exaggeration of the DRV's real possibilities continue to remain a part of DRV foreign policy. This has led them to not being able to take into account all international factors nor to properly assess the various aspects of US policy. In the past year our Vietnamese comrades have permitted a number of miscalculations concerning Nixon's plans in relation to Indochina. In particular, these miscalculations reared themselves in their assessments of the "Vietnamization" policy, the possibility of introducing American troops into Cambodia and the bombing of DRV territory. Underestimating the recognized successes of "Vietnamization", denying the possibility of US intervention in Cambodia and the American air raids on DRV territory in Nov 70 - all of this cost the DRV dearly.

The DRV continues as before to orient itself simultaneously to the KNR and USSR. This has both good and bad sides. As before, complete confidence is lacking in relations with socialist countries, and above all with the Soviet Union, and this lowers the effectiveness of separate DRV foreign policy actions. In 1970 there were new attempts on our part to attain more confidence. This was done during the visit of Comrades Le Zuan [Russian transliteration of name "Zuan"] and Pham Van Dong in Moscow and during the two short visits of USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Comrade Firyubin in the DRV. Our Vietnamese friends made several positive statements, however it did not lead to substantial progress. It is true that in a number of instances the Vietnamese have begun to better inform us about some of the measures they are taking (for example, about the transfer of lists of American POWs, etc.), however it is usually done days if not hours before the preliminary measure is taken, and sometimes even after its execution, as if they are only pursuing the goal of securing more support from...

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...the DRV's international duty before the socialist concord. The moral and political support of these countries for the Vietnamese people's struggle and their decisive actions in unmasking the designs of American imperialism in Southeast Asia are highly valued in the DRV. This is particularly evident in the instance of the declaration taken on 2 Dec 70 at the conference of the Political Advisory Council of Warsaw Treaty participant nations. The declaration was on account of the exacerbation of the situation in Indochina, which is considered by the DRV to be a key event of year 1970. Our Vietnamese friends began to appeal to several joint conferences of Warsaw Pact participant nations along party and state lines with requests to take declarations in support of the Vietnamese people's struggle.

In addition, it must be noted that on account of the DRV's narrow national interests, which continue to exist among the Vietnamese leadership in relations with the Soviet Union and socialist countries of Eastern Europe, they are not to this day sufficiently sincere and trustworthy; they are not truly brotherly. Our friends were not adequately sincere with these countries concerning their plans for solving the Indochina problem. They have evaded agreeing and coordinating their actions with them.

The DRV approaches the development of relations with each socialist country strictly discretely. Moreover, in 1970 there were clear attempts from the DRV's side to make advances to several countries, playing on the great trust with them (this especially concerns NRB and GDR); also noted were similar appeals with analogous requests to several socialist countries (to GDR and USSR for assistance in composing prospective plans, to the ChSSR and USSR on constructing a TEhS). This was done in strict secrecy from other countries. This could be perceived as attempts to bring about an unhealthy competition of a sort between socialist countries. The DRV maintained closer relations with GDR, NRB and VNR and also, due to a number of reasons, with KNDR and Cuba. The DRV's relations with Rumania in 1970, as compared to 1969 when they had practically frozen after US President Nixon's visit to Bucharest, improved somewhat.

Several changes for the better were also observed in relations with China. The same can also be said about relations with Albania. Relations with Yugoslavia are gradually normalizing.

So far [remainder of sentence illegible]. Below is the known data on [1 illegible] and military aid from socialist countries (excluding the USSR) for the years 1970 and 1971:

	Aid received in 1970 (in millions of rubles)	Aid allocated for 1971 (in millions of rubles)
KNR	235	360 ^{x/}
PNR	20	28
GDR	42	35
ChSSR	5	20
VNR	30	30
NRB	18	18.5
SRR	8	8
KNDR	10	10 ^{x/}
MNR	2.5	1
NRA	2	1.5 ^{x/}
Cuba	1.5	1 ^{x/}
SFRYu	- a small amount of aid is rendered through Red Cross channels.	
TOTAL	374 million rubles	513 million rubles

Thus, the volume of total aid allocated to the DRV from socialist countries, including the USSR, consisted of approximately 730 million rubles for 1970 and approximately 760 million rubles for 1971. The data presented may fluctuate to one side or the other, but without any great deviation. This data is given by signed agreement; the actual fulfillment for 1970 may be lower, in particular from China and the USSR.

^{x/} Unofficial data.

...the participants gave lectures, made speeches and held discussions with Soviet people and Vietnamese audiences.

The work among the various strata of the Vietnamese population and in the diplomatic corps, as noted above, is a key channel of our information network and for the receipt of necessary information about the situation in the country. For this purpose, the Embassy has extensively used showings of Soviet films, side by side with other means (discussions, distribution of literature, organization of various exhibits, etc.). Every month, directly in the Embassy clubroom, there are two official film showings, of which one is for community representatives and the other is for the diplomatic corps. In addition, film showings have been arranged on the occasion of important holidays of the Soviet Union. In our movie propaganda amongst the Vietnamese population, we have extensively used movie projectors (more than 30), which are located at the main work places of civilian and military specialists. It must be noted that we would have achieved even better results in this, if we had received more good films (newsreels, documentaries, travel films and of course movies). The Embassy has already indicated in its documents that a number of films sent to us are of too low an ideological level and do not possess any educational significance.

While informing about the operational-official work, we would like once again to turn attention to how our Vietnamese comrades, while striving to use friendship with the Soviet Union for their own national interests above all else, have often evaded the principles of reciprocity. In this instance, we are speaking about how our diplomats are constantly running across blocking measures, across a system of various bans and restrictions. This adversely affects the quality of the Embassy's work and, to be sure, such measures cannot be conducive to a deepening of our brotherly relations. Through the fault of the Vietnamese, an unnatural, contradictory situation has developed. The Soviet Union is exerting

great efforts to support and aid Vietnam in its struggle. In the DRV hundreds of Soviet specialists are working for the Vietnamese people, yet the Soviet Embassy has been placed under unjust and severe conditions; it is under surveillance and suspicion.

Our Vietnamese comrades continued, with the exception of those instances when it is advantageous to them, to refrain from giving information to the Embassy concerning [4 illegible] of foreign policy steps. Basically all meetings between the Soviet Ambassador and the Vietnamese leadership were conducted at our initiative. At the Embassy there are normal contacts with MID, the government and social organizations. The Ambassador regularly meets with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister, etc. However, this cannot be said about our contacts with party organs, first and foremost with the TsK PTV. The First Secretary of the TsK received the Soviet Ambassador only 2-3 times in 1970. When the Ambassador requests a meeting with other secretaries, they recommend the Foreign Affairs Minister to him - he is simultaneously a TsK secretary.

While organizing operational-official work, the Embassy continually demanded from its workers a high level of work activity, organization, completion of professional and political qualifications, personal responsibility for assignments and the honorable execution of the high post of a Soviet diplomat.

Work with cadres was conducted in accordance with the decision of the TsK KPSS of 30 Dec 68 and with separate instructions from colleagues in the MID USSR. The work had as its goal to facilitate raising the ideological-theoretical growth and the professional qualification of diplomatic workers of the Embassy. Proceeding from this, the Embassy, when organizing its educational work with the diplomatic staff, rigorously took into account each diplomat's level of knowledge, length of service, work experience and his desire to study various issues. This differential approach opened up numerous opportunities to render more effective assistance to diplomats in perfecting their practical experience and necessary training.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

Proceeding from an analysis of the domestic and foreign policies of the DRV and of the situation in Indochina, and also in the interests of strengthening and activating Soviet-Vietnamese relations, the Embassy believes it necessary to express the following considerations:

In the political sphere

1. In the Embassy's opinion, in Soviet-Vietnamese relations it is necessary to further continue the established practice of high-level bilateral meetings. Our Vietnamese comrades maintain the point of view that all issues of interest to both sides must be examined during talks on rendering military and economic aid to the DRV for the forthcoming year. We have conducted such talks every year since 1965 at the level of party-government delegations in Moscow. As far as we know, in 1971 our Vietnamese comrades will continue this practice. In addition, in 1970 a party delegation visited the USSR and was present at the festivities marking the 100 year birthday of V.I. Lenin. A PTV delegation headed by Le Zuan will come to the XXIV Congress of the KPSS this year. Thus, in 1971 the USSR will be visited by two high-level delegations and matters of interest to us will be discussed with them. A number of Vietnamese delegations will make short stops in the USSR; this includes visits to the communist party congresses of socialist countries, etc. We assume that this will be sufficient to maintain direct contacts with our Vietnamese comrades on a high level. If the situation calls for a visit to the DRV from the Soviet side, then it would be possible to consider the following plan: hold the talks on aid for the year 1972 in Moscow at the level of governmental economic delegations and then carry out the signing of the agreement in Hanoi by sending to the DRV a party-governmental delegation which will also conduct talks on other issues.

2. The Chinese position represents a serious obstacle to the deepening and further development of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. We are proceeding from the fact that the Mao faction will further continue exerting efforts to undermine Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The Chinese possess serious possibilities for this - to contest them is not easy.

In 1970 the Embassy twice spoke on the issues of Vietnamese-Chinese relations in its political letters. We would like to once again draw attention to these letters which contain opinions concerning Soviet-Vietnamese relations.^X This is necessary in light of several recent changes in the relations of Chinese leaders to Vietnam and to the Vietnamese problem. The Chinese leaders are switching tactics after having become convinced that KNR's prestige in Vietnam and in other countries of Indochina is falling. The visit of Chou En-lai's delegation to the DRV in March of this year is an especially good indicator of this.

However we must not only disclose to our Vietnamese comrades the extensive implications of the switch in tactics by the Mao faction to USSR and DRV relations, we must also contrast the Chinese line with our line in DRV and KNR relations. At an appropriate time, we must address the Chinese and Vietnamese with proposals for joint or parallel actions in support of the Indochinese peoples' struggle. Our Vietnamese comrades will receive such a form of action favorably.

3. Continue to render military aid and moral-political support to Vietnam. As is known, strongly worded statements from the Soviet Union in a definite way restrain the US in its expansionary activities. They inspire confidence in the Vietnamese people in that the USSR stands firmly on the side of struggling Vietnam. Statements from the Soviet Union impel progressive-minded peoples of the world, including those in America, to more decisively speak out against US aggression in Indochina.

4. Taking into consideration that it has become less complicated for our Vietnamese comrades to participate

^X See [1 illegible] issue No. 34 of 21 Jan 70 and issue No. 069?/??? of 16 Dec 70.

in international forums, including those of Socialist countries where Chinese representatives do not participate, it would be expedient to encourage these activities on the part of our Vietnamese friends and to coordinate this with other socialist countries. For example, it would be expedient to renew the DRV representatives' invitation to separate meetings of the SEhV [Council for Mutual Economic Aid] and to continue to invite them to socialist country conferences on health issues, on culture and education, conferences of writers, journalists, filmmakers and other organizations.

5. The Embassy considers it expedient to examine anew our proposal (political letter No. 649 of 30 Oct 70) in regards to the way the statement on coordination of actions of socialist countries in relations with the DRV is put before the foreign ministers of Warsaw Pact countries. Under the present conditions, when tendencies have been observed in which the DRV has a differential approach to cooperation with socialist countries and is developing an unhealthy competition of a sort amongst them in the areas of support and aid to Vietnam, we believe that the statement on coordination should be stated more broadly, to include the statements on aid and support to the DRV.

6. Continue the course of broadening cooperation and attaining greater confidence amongst the MIDs of the USSR and the DRV. Despite the obvious reluctance on the part of the Vietnamese to broaden and deepen these ties, remind them of the invitation for a trip with a return visit of the MID delegation of the DRV to the USSR in 1971.

7. Taking into consideration the particular personal interest of the Vietnamese in investigating US crimes concerning the application of chemical weapons in South Vietnam, negotiate via foreign affairs ministries of socialist countries on sending representatives from these countries to the DRV for a thorough and unilateral study of the matter and for the preparation of a special document exposing the US. Provide that this material will be directed to the UN in the capacity of an official document. This could be begun trilaterally - the USSR, the DRV and the RYuV.

8. Jointly with the Vietnamese, study the issue of broader use of the UN in the interests of the struggle against American

aggression in Vietnam and in other countries of Indochina. If the situation in Indochina becomes further involved, then place the matter of US aggression in these countries and the American use of chemical weapons before the Security Council.

9. We believe that it would be possible to send the TsK PTV a letter in the name of the TsK KPSS or some other fraternal party. The letter would express concern over the dangerous situation which has developed on the Indochina peninsula and would propose that the TsK PTV make a speech initiating the calling of a meeting of fraternal parties of socialist countries. The situation in Indochina and measures for a collective repulsion of American aggression would be discussed during the meeting.

10. Make use of the PTV representatives and representatives of other fraternal parties of Indochina during the XXIV Congress of the KPSS. Propose a joint meeting to them aimed at discussing the situation in Indochina and at coordinating actions in the international arena. For this we must prepare a line of reasoning, what measures to take with the UN, with international democratic organizations, etc.

11. Referring to the necessity under the current situation to facilitate heightening unity of action among socialist countries, and also keeping in mind the expressed willingness of our Vietnamese friends "to think about ways to promote the amelioration of Soviet-Chinese relations," in a suitable manner propose to our Vietnamese comrades that they appeal to the Chinese leadership about joint Soviet-Chinese steps in support of the national liberation struggle of the peoples' of Indochina. It would also be expedient to make similar proposals to our [illegible], Laotian and Cambodian friends.

12. At the next session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Organization of Warsaw Pact Countries, invite DRV and KNR representatives for a discussion of the situation in Indochina and for deciding on a joint meeting.

13. Keeping in mind the further continuance of our proposal on the creation of a system for collective security in Asia, the urgency of which is growing significantly under the present conditions, we believe it would be expedient to

revive this proposal in a speech by a Soviet leader, or in some other suitable manner, taking into account the current situation and also the position of our Vietnamese friends on this matter. Conduct a symposium dedicated to this theme and with the participation of the leading social activists of the countries of Southeast Asia.

14. The proposals for discussions with the PTV delegation at the XXIV Congress of the KPSS, in particular on the current situation in Indochina, are being sent separately by telegraph.

IN THE SPHERE OF ECONOMIC TIES

1. The DRV's demands for economic aid at the present time have significantly increased, as compared to aid to the Laotian and Cambodian liberation movement. Our Vietnamese friends are endeavoring to obtain aid from all possible channels; however, accounting and planning for the national economy is at an extremely low level in the country. The result is that our friends are frequently not capable of putting the solicited aid into use. When examining Vietnamese appeals for the granting of various forms of aid - deliveries and so forth - we should take this situation into consideration and send our aid for essential needs, now and in the future. Satisfy first current needs for foodstuffs, cloth, oil products, chemical fertilizers, transportation vehicles, spare parts and repair and restoration equipment.

2. Taking into consideration that a significant quantity of equipment provided by the USSR has collected in the DRV and is not being used at all, the Embassy believes it expedient to propose to the Vietnamese the formation of a joint Soviet-Vietnamese commission for completely clearing up the situation with the equipment, for inventorying the equipment, and for working out a recommendation on making the equipment operational.

3. There continues to exist a duplication of aid from our organizations. For example, GKEhS and MVT deliver chemical fertilizers, MVT and the Ministry of Defense deliver automobiles, etc.

This brings confusion into our delivery system. Taking advantage of this situation, the Vietnamese deliberately insert many consumer goods into orders for military deliveries so as to obtain these goods gratis. During the next talks on economic aid to the DRV, we must implement measures to remove these shortcomings.

4. As is known, our aid to Laos is funneled through the DRV. For this, exchange letters are drawn up each year. Moreover, the Vietnamese charge us for transportation, estimated at several million rubles a year. The Embassy believes that it would be correct to sign a corresponding document with the DRV which would provide for mutual conditions of such deliveries.

5. We still know very little about how our equipment is performing. This equipment is delivered to the DRV and is being used under tropical conditions. The Vietnamese have received a laboratory for this purpose through military aid channels; however, they have not shared with us the data that they have obtained. We believe it would be expedient, through scientific-technical channels, to raise the issue before the DRV on correcting the joint research work in this field.

6. The Embassy considers it necessary to note that the Vietnamese sometimes incorrectly use Soviet credits and our organizations do not take measures with regards to this. For example, the DRV has passenger aircraft IL-18 and AN-24 in the salon version. These aircraft are essentially not used. However, in 1970 the Vietnamese made another order for an additional delivery of these aircraft. We should halt deliveries to the DRV of "DS" brand diesel fuel, which is meant for northern climates. In 1970 the Vietnamese used credits to order quite a lot of superior grade cognac, champagne and wristwatches.

7. Assign the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR, the All-Union Trade Chamber and other interested organizations to study the issue on organizing a small Soviet commercial exhibit in Hanoi. It would be good to organize this exhibit on a special ship which could visit not only the DRV, but also other countries of the world.

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on American - Vietnamese Contacts

In one form or another, contacts between the US and the DRV have been maintained throughout the entire Vietnam conflict. Moreover, the initiative in these contacts, as a rule, comes from the American side, although each side attempts to use them for their own political and diplomatic aims. The former US Secretary of State D. Rusk once commented (press conference of 19 Jul 67) that the problem is not in the absence of diplomatic channels, but is in the US's and DRV's deep contrasting principal viewpoints on possible ways to settle the conflict.

In the period starting at the beginning of the Vietnam conflict to the announcement by the Johnson Government to cease bombing DRV territory north of the 20th parallel (30 Mar 68), practically all contacts between the US and the DRV took place through representatives from third countries. With this, there were a number of more important US appeals from the Johnson Government which were passed on to the DRV Government by the Soviet Government. These appeals had a direct relationship to the bombing halts on the DRV and to the start up of negotiations in Paris on the Vietnam issue.

Since the beginning of the preliminary American-Vietnamese meetings in Paris (13 May 68), followed by the official multilateral [four party] Paris conferences on Vietnam (18 Jan 69), the US and DRV have had the opportunity to maintain permanent direct contacts with each other in both official and unofficial closed sessions. Nevertheless, since the moment the Nixon Government came to power in the US, the Paris negotiations have yielded no progress in the direction of settling the Vietnam conflict.

While attempting to find a way out of the Vietnam War under acceptable conditions, the Nixon Government, soon after coming to power, began attempts at organizing confidential discussions with DRV representatives on the principal issues concerning settlement of the Vietnam conflict directly with the White House.

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Thus, in the first half of Jan 69, the US President's assistant on matters of national security, H. Kissinger, attempted to get the North Vietnamese to agree to a personal unpublicized meeting in Paris, or someplace else, in order to discuss the situation that has developed, and to discuss the search for possible solutions. However, he received a sharp negative reply from the Vietnamese. In this connection, the Americans also made overtures to the Soviet Government, but they were told that we will not conduct any negotiations on behalf of the DRV or NFO.

In Mar - Jun 69, the US attempted to organize unpublicized closed meetings in Paris, on one side - between the heads of US and DRV delegations to discuss military issues; and on the other side - to hold parallel meetings between NFO representatives with representatives of the Saigon regime to discuss a political resolution in South Vietnam. However, after several meetings, the North Vietnamese side declined such meetings, having seen in them US attempts to solve military issues of interest to the US, and attempts to back away from a serious discussion of the political problems.

On 14 Apr 69, Kissinger, on the instructions of President Nixon, sent a memorandum through the Soviet Ambassador in Washington to the Soviet Government. The memorandum contained considerations on the Vietnam issue, about which the American side requested that Hanoi be informed. Declaring a desire to reach a mutually acceptable settlement in Vietnam, in this memorandum Nixon expressed his readiness to enter into confidential negotiations with the DRV in Moscow or in Washington with the goal of working out the basis for a political and military settlement: the mutual withdrawal of all troops from South Vietnam and a cease-fire with the provision of the NFO's guaranteed right to participate in the political life of South Vietnam, including participation in elections, the term of which would have to be established. But he did not agree to the creation of a coalition government in South Vietnam before the elections. The American plan also stipulated that South Vietnam, for a period of time, for example five years, would remain "separate and independent," after which the US would not oppose the unification of Vietnam.

We informed the DRV Government of the contents of the memorandum mentioned. In the DRV's answer, given to us 5 May 69 by Fam Van Dong, it is pointed out that the current Paris negotiations
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may completely meet the goal of achieving an agreement. Mention was also made of the invariable position of the DRV. In our answer to the Americans concerning Nixon's appeal of 14 Apr, it was emphasized that the US refusal to create a temporary coalition government which would reflect an accurate arrangement of the political forces in South Vietnam hinders the possibility of cooperation from the Soviet side, and that this issue, together with the withdrawal of foreign troops from Vietnam, is decided.

On 4 Aug 69, the first unpublicized meeting in Paris between Kissinger and Suan Tkhyui, the head of the DRV delegation, took place. Judging from known information, at that meeting Kissinger developed the position which was laid out in the American memorandum of 14 Apr 69, and also in Nixon's speech of 14 May 69. Around the same time, in the middle of July, Nixon sent a personal letter to Ho Chi Minh through unofficial channels. The letter, in general form, calls for a joint effort in settling the conflict. The DRV's answer was given 30 Aug, three days before the death of Ho Chi Minh. The North Vietnamese side in essence confirmed its well-known official position.

During 1970, there were five confidential meetings during the Paris negotiations between Kissinger and leaders of the DRV delegation - 21 Feb, 16 Mar, 4 Apr, in the beginning and in the end of Sep. At the first three of these meetings, Le Dyk Tkho took part side-by-side with DRV delegation head Suan Tkhyui. Le Dyk Tkho is a special advisor to the delegation and a member of the PTV Politburo.

An analysis of these meetings, on the basis of known information, indicates:

1. The North Vietnamese side has steadfastly insisted on the unconditional and complete withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam within a specified time limit, on the US renouncing support of the Saigon puppet regime of Tkhieu and on the establishment of a temporary coalition government in South Vietnam, which would be entrusted with preparing for and conducting elections in South Vietnam.

2. While proposing various stages for the withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam (over the course of 16, then 12 months), the American side each time has established within its proposals the conditions of a mutual cease fire and withdrawal of DRV troops from South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, while expressing its readiness to agree to a so-called unpublicized virtual withdrawal No. 604ossha

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FROM THE DIARY OF
I.S. SHCHERBAKOV

Secret. Copy No. 1
"24" Jul 70
Entry No. 472

A RECORD OF THE MEETING

with Nguen Zuj Chin
a member of the Politburo and the Secretary of the TsK PTV

We were asked to a reception with Com. Le Zuan, but we were told that he was still ill and had charged Nguen Zuj Chin to receive us.

In accordance with the instructions from the Center, I passed the letter, regarding Soviet aid to the DRV in the construction of a mausoleum for Ho Chi Minh, from the General Secretary of the TsK KPSS, L.I. Brezhnev, to the First Secretary of the TsK PTV, Le Zuan.

I asked that our wish for a speedy recovery be sent to Com. Le Zuan.

Nguen Zuj Chin thanked me for the letter that I had passed and for the warm wishes and promised to immediately tell Com. Le Zuan about them.

I inquired if it was true that [our] comrades were preparing an exposition of the sarcophagus with Ho Chi Minh's body for the 25th anniversary of the DRV. I also asked how things were going with the adoption of the design for the mausoleum construction.

Nguen Zuj Chin answered that the mausoleum matter has not yet been finally decided. As far as the design for the construction of the mausoleum is concerned, very soon the Ministry of Construction will present the design for review by the TsK PTV. The specialists have recently come out with several new ideas. As far as Nguen Zuj Chin knew, changes and additions will be made to the design. It is foreseen, in particular, to change the profile of the roof,

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the lines of the facade, and to decrease the number of columns surrounding the building and to strengthen those that remain.

Further, in accordance with the instructions from the Center, I reported the TsK KPSS's agreement to receive Comrades Chan Kxyu Zyk and Bin Fyong for rest and recuperation. I said that [these] comrades could leave for Moscow in August, where they would be afforded all needed medical care and prescribed a course of treatment.

Nguen Zuj Chin noted that he had familiarized himself with the record of the recent meeting with Com. Khoang Van Tien, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRV. During the meeting, the Soviet Ambassador asked about the [planned] return trips of Suan Tkhyui to Paris and also asked a string of other questions. Suan Tkhyui, he said, had, as reported, arrived in Hanoi to brief the DRV Government on the activities of the delegation that is headed by him at the Paris negotiations. At present he is preparing to return to France, but the exact date of his departure has not yet been established. From an analysis of the latest steps taken by the Nixon Administration, a definite opinion is forming, he continued, that because of the election campaign in the US, several new factors in American politics in Vietnam can be expected. The pace of US troop withdrawals from South Vietnam could be better, but it is possible that Nixon could withdraw 50,000 men by October of this year. The announcement by the head of the American Administration to raise the quota of troop withdrawals is well known, but they have remained only words, as has the announcement of the intent to withdraw 150,000 American troops by spring of next year. Nguen Zuj Chin emphasized that in Vietnam they are carefully following all of the changes of the American Government's diplomatic activities. He again repeated that the DRV has not received the so called letter from 89 Senators to Fam Van Dong, but that the reports on it have attracted the attention of the Vietnamese side.

In response to our remark on the success of Nguen Tkhi Bin's, the Minister of Foreign Relations of the VRP, friendly visit to India, Nguen Zuj Chin said that [our] Vietnam Comrades are of the

same opinion. She met with the President, the Vice-president, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of India. As was noted in the newspapers, the meetings and conferences with India's statesmen were held in a friendly atmosphere. The residents of the Indian capital organized a massive rally and warmly greeted the emissaries of the heroic Vietnamese people. After Nguen Tkhi Bin's visit to India, she is setting off for Ceylon at the invitation of the government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who obviously will soon be establishing diplomatic relations with the VRP RYUV. He said that, at the same time, the Indian authorities did not refuse to give entrance visas to two traitors from Vietnam and, attempting to use the treachery of the two renegades for their own ends, even set up a press conference for them in New Delhi. This escapade, however, did not receive the support of the people. The American ruling circles and their puppets were forced to give up the intention to take the traitors to Paris to resort to a "sensational exposure" with their help. They were forced to change their plans, as tens of thousands of Vietnamese immigrants live in France, who devotedly voice their sympathy for the South Vietnamese people's justified struggle, and also because it is impossible to not consider the politics of the French Government on the Vietnam problem.

I thanked Nguen Zuj Chin for the information.

Present at the meeting -- auditors from the USSR Section and the Eastern European Countries Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRV, Igyen Tan, Dang Dyk Kkhoj and I.V. Kuz'minov, the Attache from the USSR Embassy.

The Ambassador of the USSR in the DRV [signature]
(I. SHCHERBAKOV)

One copy typed
1 - TsK KPSS Section
2 - OYUVA
3 - file
24 Jul 70
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[handwritten 1198 - es 28 Jul 70"]

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IN THE DRV
[Demokraticeskaya Respublika V'etnam,
Democratic Republic of Vietnam]

[Cut off stamp "Vietnam"]

[TFR 136-11]
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Entry No. 166

I N F O R M A T I O N

The work of the special group of Soviet specialists studying American military equipment.

In accordance with the agreement between the Ministry of Defense of the USSR and the Ministry of National Defense of the DRV, a group of our military-scientific specialists is conducting a selection and study of captured American military equipment. They are also conducting a familiarization with the combat tactics of the US armed forces. Our work in this area also has the general agreement of Fam Van Dong and Le Zyan. They have indicated their readiness to aid us in the study of American military equipment on more than one occasion.

Our specialists have selected and sent more than 700 pieces of US military equipment and weapons (417 - according to official Vietnamese data) to the Soviet Union in the period from May 1965 to 1 January, 1967. These include aircraft parts, rocket parts, and radio-electronic, photoreconnaissance and other types of equipment. In addition, Soviet specialists have prepared dozens of informational reports on the firsthand study of weapons and equipment, and also on American technical documentation. Our specialists' work has been of great use, in specific with the TsK KPSS's [Tsentral'nyy Komitet Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] decision to introduce and assimilate in industry a large number of items that we hand selected and studied. (The "Sparrow-3" guided missile, various radioelectronic equipment, aircraft assemblies, engines, etc.) Many of our informational reports are highly valued by the Soviet command. We pass along to our Vietnamese friends the information on our studies of American aviation tactics and equipment and also our recommendations on how to combat it.

In spite of the obvious great importance for both sides of this collaboration, our military-scientific specialists in the DRV continue to operate under difficult circumstances, which

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[Illeg.] Sector Chief TsK KPSS Department
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are often artificially complicated by our Vietnamese comrades. It is known that trips to the sites of downed aircraft is the Soviet specialists' main method of collecting pieces of equipment. This system was set up by the Vietnamese side. The Vietnamese, however, hide the aircraft crash sites from us using various pretexts. They delay our trips, even after giving us permission to go to the crash site. It is for this reason that the main source of information regarding aircraft crash sites comes from the observation of Soviet specialists.

There were many times when downed aircraft were examined by qualified specialists before the arrival of our specialists. That has now been cleared up; it turned out to be the Chinese. In January of this year a reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by a rocket. The plane was in perfect condition. Our specialists were invited to examine the aircraft, but when they arrived the Chinese were already there. They had already taken all of the valuable equipment and were rigging the remains for demolition. This was highly embarrassing for the Vietnamese. To try and smooth things over they gave us the "Shrike" rocket that our specialists had wanted for a long time.

The Vietnamese side set up a quite complicated bureaucratic procedure and made it very difficult to transfer items found or picked out by our specialists. An inventory of items taken from an aircraft has to be made, and the items themselves are transferred to the local VNA [*V'etnamskaya Narodnaya Armiya*, Vietnamese Peoples Army [North Vietnam]] command. In the course of 2-3 weeks the central military authorities allegedly conduct negotiations with the local command to decide which pieces can be sent to Hanoi for study. Yet another request document must be prepared in order to transfer these pieces to the Soviet Union. The request is reviewed and approved by the VNA command and other high level approval authorities. As a rule, an item removed from an aircraft takes 2-3 months until it is sent to the Soviet Union.

It is not an infrequent occurrence that our specialists are refused permission to examine a downed aircraft. The transfer of items already removed from aircraft are also refused on various groundless pretexts. It is simply announced that the local authorities will not allow the items to be taken or that the items are destined for museums, etc.

Our specialists often come into conflict with the guarded attitude of the Vietnamese side, which really borders on antagonism. For example, Captain Mokhov, our mine laying specialist, was asked by the Vietnamese in December 1966 to disarm a floating mine. His work was strictly controlled by several people and they even demanded that he wash his hands in their presence so that there were no pieces of explosives left on him. This was all done under the pretext that the explosives were poisonous, although our comrade knew the characteristics of various types of explosives perfectly well.

It is paradoxical that the most effective method of procuring items was to establish good relations during our trips to the downed aircraft with the local authorities and with several of the Vietnamese troops who escorted our specialists. Many of the items sent to the Soviet Union were obtained strictly as a result of taking them directly from the site and not transferring them officially. It is noteworthy that the detached representatives of the scientific department of the PVO [Protivobozdushnaya Oborona, Air Defense] and the DRV Air Force, on orders from higher up, forbid us from working directly with local authorities to procure items during our trips, strictly control the actions of our specialists, and often interfere with this important work.

An analogous situation exists with the exchange of military information. As a rule, our military people are given information of the most general type, it is oversimplified, and sometimes they simply hide the true situation. In essence, this amounts to disinformation. An agreement was reached to inform our specialists on a monthly basis of enemy activity and disposition, aerial combat, the regular transfer of the interrogations of captured American fliers, summary reports on the effects of interference on American rockets and tactical US Air Force and Navy aviation. This agreement has been very poorly supported.

Naturally, the similar situations that exist with the collection of captured American military equipment and the exchange of military information are not able to satisfy us. As the Ambassador has already been told that measures urgently need to be taken to facilitate the work of the group of Soviet military-scientific specialists in the DRV. This could be done by signing a special agreement with

the Vietnamese side that would legitimize the presence of the Soviet military-scientific specialists in the DRV and would regulate the specific obligations of both sides.

This information is based on information given by Colonel Kolotil'tsikov, the senior man of the group of our specialists that studies captured equipment.

1st Secretary
USSR Embassy in the DRV

(V. Zvesdin)
[Signature]

3 copies sent
1 - OYuVA [Otdel Yuzhno-Bostochnoj Azii?, Southeast Asia
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14 Mar 67
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Stephen Morris

The Vietnamese Know How to Count

Challenges to the accuracy of the Russian document don't hold water.

Even before my release of the secret Russian document on American prisoners of war being held in Vietnam, past and present members of the Defense Intelligence Agency's analytical division have attempted to debunk the document by challenging its "accuracy." Since its release, political activists identified with the cause of accelerated normalization with Hanoi have joined them. Even Sen. John Kerry, who prefers to draw the distinction between the document's authenticity and its accuracy, has given some credence to the DIA and activists' arguments that some of the document's content is inaccurate.

Yet authenticity is connected with accuracy in this instance. Consider the corroborating evidence. The former head of Soviet military intelligence, Pyotr Ivashutin, signed an "Executive Summary" of the document for the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee in November 1972. A special report for the Soviet Politburo, based on this document, was also ordered by the then head of the relevant Central Committee department, Konstantin Katushev. These prominent Soviet officials were putting their careers on the line in authenticating the content of such a document. And they knew more about the Vietnamese author and his claims than anybody in the West today. This is background for evaluating the document's accuracy.

The first issue cited by skeptics is the lack of correlation between the names of prisoners cited in the documents and names on the Pentagon's list of MIAs. This is irrelevant, because sometimes American prisoners gave false names. More often though, the Vietnamese had enormous difficulty pronouncing and transcribing the real names of Americans accurately. One of the names in the document—Jim Intisht Shasht—is so obviously garbled as to make this general point clear.

The second alleged factual inaccuracy is the lack of correlation between the number of colonels listed by the North Vietnamese and the number of this rank believed to have been missing. This too is irrelevant, for some American prisoners were actually promoted while in the camp, while others deliberately inflated their rank in response to their interrogators in the hope that they might obtain better treatment. These same points may explain Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang's questionable assertion that three prisoners had already passed the basic training to become cosmonauts.

This document would not be the first time that the Vietnamese communists had problems identifying the name and official rank of their prisoners of war. One of Hanoi's most distinguished former POWs, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), has a monument erected to his capture in the middle of Hanoi. It stands today, complete with the inaccurate description of him as Air Force Major (he was, of course, a Navy lieutenant commander) with the spelling of his name garbled. Does Ha-



noi's inability to accurately describe one of its most famous prisoners—McCain's father was then commander of the Pacific fleet—mean that such a person did not exist?

The next challenge has been to ask how there could have been hundreds of Americans left behind when none of the prisoners who returned knew about them. Yet the answer is clearly provided in the document itself. Some prisoners were completely segregated from the others. How could returnees have known about non-returnees if the latter were completely segregated?

Quang's assertion that there were 11 prisons with approximately 100 prisoners in each has been challenged with the claim that one prison, Hoa Lo, had 250 inmates. But this fact is not decisive. Note that Quang is speaking only of approximations. After all, if each prison had exactly 100 prisoners, then on the basis of the document's figure of 1,205, Hanoi would have had no prison for 105 people. But Quang himself in his details suggests the looseness of his approximation. In discussing a large

group of separate senior officers, he speaks of one prison set aside for only 16 colonels. His statement about overall numbers is not discredited by showing that one prison held 250 inmates.

But the most basic argument presented against the "accuracy" of the document is the claim that the author is referring to both American and allied prisoners when it speaks only of "American prisoners of war." This assertion is utterly unfounded.

Serious scholars and professional analysts of Vietnamese communist documents from the Vietnam War would know that in both published literature and secret official documents, South Vietnamese and other allied troops were always distinguished from American troops. The South Vietnamese were most commonly referred to by the adjective "puppet." Who better to confirm this fact than Quang himself? I have in my possession extensive notes taken from another document authored by the same Quang. In an earlier report to the Hanoi Polit-

buro, presented on June 26, 1972, Quang spoke frequently of "*amerikantsi i ik marionetki*" (Americans and their puppets) and "*gruppировки amerikanskikh i marionetchnikh voisk*" (groups of American and puppet forces). The notion that Quang, in discussing Hanoi's prisoners of war less than three months later, would have abandoned the analytical and linguistic habits of a lifetime, is a hypothesis based on no evidence and devoid of any logic.

Many of the criticisms of the document are irrelevant. For while the Vietnamese might make mistakes in their information when that information—such as name, rank and training—emanated from the results of an interrogation, the question of numbers is of a completely different order. For the figure of 1,205 could quite literally be derived from counting heads. And it is that head count, and that head count alone, that is the issue at stake in relations between the United States and Vietnam.

The writer, an Australian, is a visiting scholar at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.