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By TJ NARA Date 5/4/99

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7. SOURCE: Captive VU TAN CHAU (VUX, TAANS CHAAU), CMIC No 2417	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Charles H. Davidson</i> PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JR. Major General, USA Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

15. SUMMARY: (C) The information contained herein was obtained by T.S. Coleman, 1LT, US Army. This report contains information on The VC Military Intelligence Sect of SR-5 and its use of falsified documentation, source's personal interrogation of one US Prisoner of WAR, and on the monitoring of US/ARVN radio nets by the MI Sect of SR-5 and the HQ of R. (Leave Blank)

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1. (C) Background Information:
- a. Name: VU TAN CHAU (VUX, TAANS CHAAU), aka TU SON (TUV, SOWN)
 - b. Rank: Sr CPT
 - c. Position and Unit of Assignment: Asst Sect Ldr, MI Sect, SR-5
 - d. DPOB: 1931; DE NHAT Vil, HUONG TRA Dist, THUA THIEN Prov, RVN

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DD FORM 1396
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REPLACES DA FORM 1048, 1 AUG 60, OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61), AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

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e. Parents' Names: Father: VU VAN CU (VUX, VEAN CU), deceased; Mother: NGUYEN THI LE (NGUYEENX, THIV LES), deceased.

f. Circumstances of Capture. Source was captured by ARVN Forces on 15 Oct 68 in the HANG SANH Area, GO VAP Dist, GIA DINH Prov, RVN. He had in his possession one Colt .45 pistol, one military ID card, one civilian ID card, an order permitting source to live off post, one drivers license, and one check-point pass. All documents were forged.

g. Significant Activities. From 1931 to 1943, source lived at his POB and attended a French school. He did not work because his parents were wealthy. In 1943, source left school and moved to HUE City, RVN, where he lived with his uncle. At the end of 1943, source and his brother moved to SANA BAN City, LAOS, where they lived for five months. They then moved to BASKE City, LAOS, where source was trained how to repair bicycles. From early 1944 to Aug 45, source worked for the Japanese as an interpreter. In Sep 45, the Japanese unit that had employed source moved to SAIGON City, RVN. On 15 Sep 45, source was captured by the VIET MINH and was taken to DONG AN Vil, THU DUC Dist, GIA DINH Prov. At the end of Sep 45, he was released by the VIET MINH and returned to work for the Japanese. In Oct 45, source was again captured by the VIET MINH. After capture, he went to work for the VIET MINH as an interpreter. In late 1945, source joined the Communist Youth Assault Gp. In Jan 46, source was assigned to B Plat, 1st Co, 1st Regt, THU DAU MOT Prov MF Unit, as an infantry liaison runner. He remained with this unit until 1950. In 1949, source's unit was redesignated the 301st Regt. In 1950, source's unit was combined with the 310th MF Regt and was designated the 301st, 310th Inter Regt. In mid-1951, source was chosen to attend an eight month combination military political training course which was held in CA CAI Vil, LONG-CHAU-SA Prov, RVN (sic). In Aug 52, source was assigned as a Plat Ldr in the 304th Gp, subordinate to HQ, East Inter-Subregions of SVN. He remained with this unit until Jul 53, when he was assigned as a training cadre of the 937th Co, 309th MF Bn, which was located in MY THO Prov, RVN. In Jul 54, source was assigned as XO, 939th Combat Spt Co, 309th MF Bn, which operated in CAO LANH Prov, RVN. This unit regrouped to NVN by means of a French ship, arriving at SAN SON Port, THANH HOA Prov, NVN, in Aug 54. Source was assigned to the 3d Co, 330th Div in late 1954, after the 309th Bn was disbanded. In May 55, he was promoted to Company CO of the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 4th Regt, 330th Div, while concurrently serving as PO. In early 1955, source was transferred to the 78th Med Gp and received four months treatment for malaria. In Feb 56, source took Course No 10 for Infantry Company and Battalion Level Cadre which was administered at BACH MAI Airfield near HANOI, NVN. He was at BACH MAI Airfield for training until he was assigned as Company Co, 4th Co, 3d Bn, 88th Regt, 308th Div. He remained with this unit until Jan 61. While assigned to this unit, source was promoted to the rank of CPT. In Jan 61, source was ordered to infiltrate into the RVN. Prior to infiltration, source underwent three months infiltration training at a recon school located near LONG SIEN Bridge, HANOI, NVN. In early May 61, source departed NVN with an infiltration group designated the Western Gp which was commanded by MG BAY QUANG (BAYR, QANG). The unit crossed LAOS and entered TAY NINH Prov, RVN, at the end of Aug 61. The personnel of this infiltration group were to form the nucleus of COSVN units throughout the RVN. Upon arrival in the RVN, source was assigned as Asst Sect Ldr, Recon Sect, COSVN. This unit's mission was to train battalion level cadre in recon tactics. In Jan 62, source interrogated a US prisoner for COSVN. In Jan 62, the Recon Sect moved to the BA DEN Mt area, TAY NINH Prov, to establish an OP. From Sep 62 to Sep 65, source was assigned as ACofS, TAY NINH Prov Unit. In Sep 65, he returned to COSVN as ACofS, DI AN Element, SR-4, MR-4. In May 67, source was promoted

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to CofS of that element. At the end of 1967, source was assigned as Asst Sect Ldr, MI Sect, SR-5. He was in charge of Forward CP No 2, with the mission of collecting information pertaining to Allied activity. He held this position until he was captured on 15 Oct 68.

2. (C) VC Military Intelligence and Use of False Identification. The purpose of source's false documentation was to provide him free and easy access throughout III CTZ as civilian or as a member of the military. At time of capture, source had the following false documents in his possession:

- a. One civilian ID card.
- b. One military ID card. Source's rank was listed as Sr SGT
- c. One check point pass. Pass was issued by the 2d Precinct.
- d. One drivers license. The license authorized the source to drive either a car or a Vespa.
- f. One military III CTZ permission paper. This paper authorized source free travel throughout III CTZ as a part of his military duties.

g. One military permit authorizing source to live off-post. All documents were made by the Military Intelligence (MI) Sect of SR-5. Source would request a specific amount of documents for the MI Sect from the MI Documents Subject. These documents would be received complete from the Documents Subject except for the bearer's name. At the time a document was issued to an individual his name was placed it. All false documents were never carried together for fear of being discovered. They were placed in a specified box within source's old home on 45/5 TAY HOA Ham, PHUOC LONG Vil, THU DUC Dist, GIA DINH Prov. They were carried only when necessary, and only one at a time.

3. (C) Interrogation of US PW:

a. Source interrogated only one US PW. In Jan 1962, source was sent to interrogate an American soldier which R believed to be an Army officer. The US PW had been in the RVN about three weeks and was captured by Dist guerillas while swimming in NGOC THUY Lake, THU DUC Dist, GIA DINH Prov. When the Dist guerillas captured the US PW, they believed him to have valuable information and to hold officer's rank. Source used an interpreter to conduct background interrogation of the US PW. The interpreter, CPT HAI BE (HAI, BEE), had been a LLT for the ARVN and worked at JGS prior to 1960. However, he fled to R in 1960 after it was discovered that he was a VC agent, but before he could be apprehended. Source remembered that the prisoner's name was George and that he was a Catholic, that he was about 25 years old, had greyish hair and hazel eyes, weighed approx 185 lbs, was six feet one inch tall, had no exterior markings did not wear glasses, and was very handsome. Source heard the US PW was released in CAMBODIA by HQ of R in 1963 and returned to the US.

b. Source interrogated the US PW but found him to have little information which was of value to R. The US PW was found to be a Supply SGT working at an unk warehouse in SAIGON. Because of the US PW's low level of knowledgeability, source conducted only a background interrogation,

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c. When the interrogation initially commenced, the US PW refused to answer any questions. He stated he would not answer any questions unless he was unbound. The guerillas had bound his hands with wire, tied them behind his back and wrapped the wire around his neck to prevent his escape. Source stated the US PW was a large man and it would have taken several men to subdue him if he had attempted an escape on the way to the interrogation location. Once source learned of the US PW's refusal to cooperate unless he was unbound, source ordered the removal of the wire. After this, the man was never again bound. Source believed there was no need to bind the PW because if he attempted an escape he would only become lost in the surrounding jungle. Once the man was unbound, he was very cooperative with source. Throughout the remainder of the time source was with the PW (10 days), they lived and ate together. The US PW was treated very well. He ate a chicken a day, drank milk, and insisted upon bread with his meals. The PW refused to eat rice which forced the VC to travel many kilometers to obtain the PW's supplies. Source stated the VC guerillas often carried the US PW because he was unable to endure the jungle hardships and the long travel.

d. When asked to identify the US PW by means of photographs source was unable to recognize him. However, source stated that the US PW's photograph was not included in those provided. He believed he could have identified the PW if his photograph had been in the album.

4. (C) Monitoring of Allied Communications. VC/NVA efforts to monitor Allied communications were very successful. Source provided the following information on the two monitoring sections subordinate to SR-5 and to the HQ of R.

a. SR-5 Monitoring Section. The Sig Subsect of the MI Sect of SR-5 consisted of 12 to 13 men. Eight or nine of these men were used for intelligence information communications between R and SR-5. Two men monitored US radio communication nets and two men monitored ARVN communication nets. The personnel monitoring US frequencies used the PRC-25 radio, and monitored on a 24-hour basis and understood English very well; even slang. The Sig Subsect had two PRC-25 radios. Source could provide no further information concerning the Sig Subsect except that they could monitor FACs but didn't have the capability to jam them at the subregion level.

b. Monitoring at R. The Tech Recon Sect of the MI Det provided R with the bulk of its information. This section was composed of approx 400 men who monitored all Allied radio nets on a 24-hour basis. As a radio message was intercepted, it was written down and immediately passed to a decoder. Decoders were constantly guarded by a three to four man group which always moved with the decoder. Code books used by the decoders were basic code tables obtained from NVN, the USSR, and Communist CHINA. They also obtained code information through paid informers within the Allied community. Once the decoder received the message from the interceptor personnel, it was immediately decoded, rewritten, and sent to the MI Det Commander. After reading the message, the Commander immediately destroyed the information and whatever necessary action was taken as the information warranted.

COMMENTS: (C) This report partially fulfills the requirements of SICR U-GPA-G0986. Collection action continues on those sections of the SICR not covered herein.

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