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IGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>C</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u>	13. PREPARED BY: <i>Santiago Acosta</i> SANTIAGO ACOSTA, LTC, USA Dir, US Elm, CMIC
7. SOURCE: Captive VU TAN CHAU (VUX, THANH CHAAU), CMIC No 2417	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>For Charles H. Davidson</i> PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JR. Major General, USA Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

15. SUMMARY: (C) EVALUATION OF THIS REPORT IS REQUESTED. The information contained herein was obtained by M.J. Brennan, CPT, US Army. This report contains information concerning the organization and method of operation of the Military Intelligence Organizations of COSVN, Subregion 5, and district MI sections in Subregion 5.

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1. (C) Background Information.

- a. Name: VU TAN CHAU (VUX, THANH CHAAU), aka VU CAO SON (VUX, CAO SOWN), aka TU SON (TUW, SOWN)
- b. Rank: CPT
- c. Position and Unit of Assignment: Asst Sect Ldr, MI Sect, Military Staff, Subregion 5; concurrently Chief Forward MI Cell #2
- d. DPOB: 1931, DE NHAT Vil, HUONG TRA Dist, THUA THIEN Prov, RVN

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

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18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

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REPLACES DA FORM 1048, 1 AUG 60.  
OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61).  
AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE  
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

DD FORM 1396  
1 SEP 62

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In early May 61, he began infiltration of the RVN. Source's infiltration group traveled through LAOS and arrived in TAY NINH Prov, RVN, at the end of Aug 61. The infiltration group's designation was the Western Gp. The group was divided into five sections. The ranks of the members of the infiltration group ranged from MAJ GEN to SR SGT. The members of this group were to staff COSVN HQ and its subordinate elements throughout RVN. The group had been organized for this mission in NVN. The leader of the Western Gp was MAJ GEN BAY QUANG (BAY, QANG). In Aug 61, source was assigned as the Asst Sect Ldr, Recon Sect, COSVN. Source's mission was to train battalion level personnel in recon. Between Dec 61 and Jan 62, he conducted interrogations of US PWs at COSVN. In Jan 62, the Recon Sect, COSVN, was transferred to BA DEN Mt, TAY NINH Prov RVN to construct an OP for COSVN. From Sep 63 until Sep 65, he was assigned as the Asst CofS, TAY NINH Prov Unit. In Sep 65, he returned to COSVN, as the Asst CofS, DI AN Dist Element, Subregion 4, subordinate to MR-4. In May 67, he was promoted to CofS of this organization. At the end of 1967, when the re-organization into subregions took place, source received the mission of Asst Sec Ldr, MI Sec, Subregion 5. In this position, he was in charge of the Forward MI Cell #2 and had the mission of collecting information concerning Allied activities. Source held this position until date of capture.

g. Additional References: MACV ICP and LRs 6028-5803-68, 6028-5805-68, 6028-5802-68, 6028 5535-68.

2. (C) Military Intelligence Section of Subregion 5 (see page 7).

a. Organization. The Military Intelligence Sect of Subregion 5, which was subordinate to Military Staff Sect of Subregion 5, consisted of the following:

(1) The Research Subsection. This subsection was responsible for receiving information from all the collection assets within the MI Sect, checking the information against files, records and other sources, and analyzing the information before sending it to the Military Staff as evaluated intelligence.

(2) The Reconnaissance Subsection. This subsection was responsible for the control, plans and training of recon missions for Subregion 5. Subordinate to this subsection was a recon company. This subsection also supplied the cadre for the two forward MI areas.

(3) The Signal Subsection. This subsection monitored Allied radio traffic by means of two Japanese radios. They provided early warning of Allied operations in and around Subregion 5. The subsection had one AP-BAC, and one CINEB radio. The subsection employed several personnel knowledgeable in English. These personnel transcribed messages, either plain text or CW, and submitted their reports to the Research Subsection for processing.

(4) The Reconnaissance Company. The Reconnaissance Company was under the control of the Recon Subsection and conducted the reconnaissance missions for Subregion 5.

(5) MI Forward Areas. The forward areas were established to facilitate the collection of intelligence information. They were similar in nature to the forward areas and CP's established by military units in

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the subregions prior to an offensive. The MI forward areas were permanent in nature and were not established solely for offensives. There were two forward areas in Subregion 5 and they were divided along geographical lines as follows:

(a) MI Forward Area 1. The area of operations of MI Forward Area 1 included CHAU THANH Dist, and CHANH PHU HOA Vil, in BEN CAT Dist, BINH DUONG Prov; TAN UYEN Dist, BIEN HOA Prov; and DI AN Dist, BIEN HOA Prov. The Forward area personnel consisted of two cadre personnel, a commo-liaison squad, and five cadre who operated as agent handlers and observation agents. The Forward Area also had one radio by which they communicated with the MI Sect.

(b) MI Forward Area 2. This area of operations consisted of THU DUC Dist, GIA DINH Prov; the THI NGHE Area which extended from the BIEN HOA Highway Bridge along the SAIGON River and THI NGHE Canal to the Steel Bridge; from the Steel Bridge to the SA CHIEU Market and from PHAN VAN TRI Street to the CAI THI Market through the HACH CAC Canal back to the BIEN HOA Highway Bridge (areas covered included parts of THI NGHE, BINH HOA, HANG SANH, DUNG ONG CO Areas and part of GIA DINH Prov); also included was one third of the First Precinct of SAIGON. The personnel of Forward Area 2 included three cadre, four liaison men, a recon squad of 10 men, a false ID card Sect of five men, an ADJ, and two medics. This Forward Area also had a radio for communication with the MI Sect. Forward Area 2 had more personnel than Forward Area 1 because its area of operation was considered more important because it extended into SAIGON. It was also further from Subregion HQ and needed more commo-liaison runners.

b. Method of Operation. The MI Sect of Subregion 5 collected intelligence information from both its organic assets and from the MI sections at the districts. The MI Sect was targeted against all Allied activity and installations in Subregion 5's Area of Operations. Information was collected from reconnaissance performed by the Recon Co as well as from Allied messages intercepted by the Signal Subsection. The forward Areas performed both Recon and agent work. Cadre were sent to reside near the location of Allied base camps or installations. These cadre would function as observation agents and they also recruited Vietnamese working on Allied installations to report information of an intelligence nature to them. These agent handlers had little difficulty in recruiting people for this type of work. Little if any money was needed to motivate the penetration agents. The Forward Area Chiefs also maintained liaison contact with the MI Section Chiefs at district level. In this way all intelligence information collected at the district was forwarded to the Research Subsection of the MI Sect at Subregion. The Research Subsection processed this information into intelligence by analyzing it before it was sent forward to the Military Staff Sect of Subregion 5.

3. (C) The Military Intelligence Staff of COSVN (see page 8). (The following information is based on source's experience with the Recon Sect of COSVN from 1961 to 1963 and his MI experience in Subregion 5.)

a. Organization. The following sections were subordinate to the MI Staff of the Military Staff Sect of COSVN.

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(1) The Espionage Section. This section was responsible for operating agents responsible directly to COSVN throughout the RVN. The Section established elements called MI Strategy Elements in each MR, VC province and VC special region of the RVN. Subordinate to the Espionage Sect was a Code and Secret Writing Subsection, a Photography Subsection, and a False Documents Subsection. Originally, the Code Subsection used code books provided by HANOI but as of early 1968, the Code Subsection manufactured its own codes. Source had no knowledge of specific inks, developers or techniques used in secret writing. The False ID Card Subsection had the capability of supplying forgeries of all documents in common use in the RVN. These documents were printed in HANOI. COSVN was supplied with blank copies and the information was to be filled in at the echelon where the document was to be used.

(2) The Research Section. The Research Sect at COSVN performed the same research and analysis function as the Research Subsection at the Subregion 5 MI Sect. Research sections were located at all MRs, VC provinces, and VC special regions. The Research Sect of COSVN had information reported to it from all over the RVN. Subordinate to the Research Sect was a Translation Subsection. This subsection translated captured Allied documents and monitored commercial Allied radio broadcasts and newspapers. The Translation Subsection had linguists capable of translating from English, French Korean.

(3) The Reconnaissance Section. The Reconnaissance Sect of the MI Staff of COSVN was responsible for conducting recon missions in support of COSVN plans for offensive operations. Subordinate to the Recon Sect was a Reconnaissance Battalion, a Training Subsection, a Battle Cadre Subsection, and an Interrogation Element. The Battle Cadre Subsection provided cadre support to lower echelons for the planning and conduct of recon operations prior to large scale offensives. The Interrogation Element conducted interrogations of Allied PWs of the rank of LT or higher. These PWs were evacuated to COSVN from lower echelons throughout the RVN.

(4) The Signal Section. The Signal Sect provided organic signal support to the MI Staff. The section was equipped with one X AP BaC and one X CANEL Japanese radio (not further identified). The section maintained communications with HANOI and subordinate elements in the RVN. Subordinate to the Signal Sect was a Crypto Subsection and a Radio Repair Subsection.

(5) The Finance Section. The Finance Sect was responsible for the budget and fiscal aspects of the operation of the MI Staff. Subordinate to this section was an ADJ Subsection, an Office Subsection, and a Security Platoon. The Security Platoon was responsible for providing security for the location of the MI Staff.

(6) The Political Section. The Political Sect was responsible for the conduct of political monitoring, propaganda and training for the MI Staff. Subordinate to the Political Sect was a Party Subsection, a Cadre Subsection, and a Propaganda and Training Subsection. The Cadre Subsection was responsible for maintaining background files of all of the MI Staff.

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4. (C) Military Intelligence Organization at District Level (see page 9). In Subregion 5, the Asst District Unit Ldr was usually the chief of the district MI Sect. The district MI organization controlled agents who in turn operated within the village population to collect information concerning Allied activity and installations. These agent handlers or agents reported directly to the district MI Sect. If a village had a MI Sect, the Asst Vil Unit Ldr would be chief of the Sect. The Vil MI Sect had two sources of intelligence information. They operated their own observation and penetration agents in and around Allied installations. They also depended upon the village guerrillas to provide them with recon information. In the case of Subregion 5 information was reported from the village to the district MI Sect and from there to either Forward 1 or 2 MI cells. From there the information was processed through the Research Subsection of the MI Sect of Subregion 5 and forwarded to the Military Staff Sect.

5. (C) Miscellaneous. The Military Intelligence Department in HANOI received intelligence information from other Communist Intelligence Agencies throughout the world and from its own agents located in Free World Countries. COSVN HQ had access to this information. Source believed that this was how COSVN was able to receive prior warning of B-52 strikes. Source revealed the names of all personalities he was knowledgeable of to the MSS of the GVN who had apprehended many of these individuals. Only one individual, DA LAM (aka, LAMM) Chief of the MI Sect, Subregion 5 received intelligence training. He had received his training in HANOI. Source had no knowledge concerning a MI Training School at COSVN or any other location in the RVN. The Recon Subsection of Subregion 5 performed general recon missions except prior to a general offensive at which time specific targets were assigned to the Subsection by the Military Staff Sect. Source stated that agent recruitment was relatively easy in Subregion 5 because the people wanted to report information to the VC. Potential agents were also assessed thoroughly before they were approached for recruitment. Source knew of no other intelligence or security organizations operating in Subregion 5.

COMMENTS: (C) Source was highly intelligent and was very cooperative throughout the interrogation. This report partially satisfies the requirements of SICR: U-GPA-G0986 and the MACV ICP concerning enemy intelligence operations.

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
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Organization of the MI staff of COSVN, as provided by  
captive VU TAN CHAU (VUX, TAAN CHAU), CMIC No 2417  
(DOI: Oct 68)

Mil Staff Sect R



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