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15. SUMMARY:
(C) This report concerns a full translation of a J2, Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam study of various resolutions, directives, and circulars issued by the Communist Party Central Headquarters and COSVN from 1930 to 1970. Interpretation of the documents by J2, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, has not yet been fully correlated with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam interpretation as set forth in this study and may differ in some specific areas.

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----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

((Page 1 of O.T.))

LIST AND SUMMARY ((OF CONTENTS)) OF THE VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED
BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AND COSVN

This document consists of three parts:

- I. RESOLUTIONS EMANATING FROM THE NVN COMMUNIST CENTRAL PARTY HEADQUARTERS.
- II. RESOLUTIONS EMANATING FROM R ((COSVN))
- III. DIRECTIVES AND CIRCULARS ISSUED BY R AND CONCERNING IMPORTANT SUBJECTS SUCH AS:
 1. The Provisional Revolutionary Government
 2. The Coalition ((Government))
 3. The Formation of the Revolutionary Government
 4. Countering the 'Pacification and Vietnamization Programs.'
 5. Attaining the decisive victory.
 6. Advocating a fight to the end.

PART I

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE VN COMMUNIST
PARTY FROM 1930 TO 1945.

Since the founding of the Party on 3 Feb 30 the following resolutions have been adopted by it:

A. Resolutions issued by the Party Headquarters during its primary developmental stage.

Resolution 1:

The Party Central Executive Committee held its first meeting in Hong Kong during Oct 30 with Mr Nguyễn Ái Quốc, ((HỒ Chí Minh)), as Chairman and Mr Trần Phú as Secretary General. The conference discussed the elaboration of Party policy and Party struggle theory. Mr Trần Phú was assigned to work on a document titled "General Thesis on the Bourgeoisie and Civil Rights Revolution," usually called the "General Political Thesis," laying the groundwork for the Revolution in Indochina.

Resolution 2:

Resolution 2, adopted during Mar 31, concerns a plan for organizing and consolidating the Party and conducting propaganda and indoctrination on Marxism-Leninism.

Remarks:

From the end of 1931 to 1935, the ((Vietnamese Communist)) Party was suppressed and severely terrorized. This forced all Party Chapters to withdraw to secret areas and operate sporadically. Therefore, no resolutions were adopted by the Central Executive Committee.

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B. Resolutions issued by the Party Headquarters during its formulative stage.

Resolution 1:

The Party Central Executive Committee held its first extended meeting (since the founding of the Party) during May 36, to pass and disseminate a resolution concerning the establishment of the "Indochina Democratic United Front."

((Page 2 of O.T.))

Resolution 2:

The Party Central Executive Committee held its second extended meeting on 20 Mar 37 to pass a resolution concerning attacks to be conducted against the French. It advocated "taking advantage of the legal status ((of underground agents)) to motivate the people to participate in political struggles and rise up against the French."

Resolution 3:

This resolution was issued at the end of 1937, and aimed at intensifying the people's struggle movement and the uprising of trade union workers; establishing ((popular)) organizations and associations; and taking advantage of every opportunity and means, overt and semi-overt, to conduct struggles demanding the improvement of living conditions and the institution of democratic reforms.

Resolution 4:

The Party Central Executive Committee held an extended meeting on 30 Mar 38 to pass a resolution concerning the strengthening of ((Communist)) organizations and the formulation of activity plans to be implemented during the time the "Democratic Front" (1936-1939) was in existence.

Resolution 5:

The Party Central Executive Committee held a meeting at the beginning of 1939 to adopt a resolution concerning shifting major efforts from the cities to rural areas, winning the support of the masses, and transforming the countryside into a broad base area.

Resolution 6:

The Party Central Executive Committee held its sixth extended meeting in Vinh Long Province of Nam Bô during Nov 39. The ((resolution adopted during)) that meeting emphasized that the mission of the "Indochinese Revolution" was to overthrow the French imperialists, counter any attempt by "white" or "yellow" aggressors at putting their ((colonial)) yokes on the Vietnamese people, establish "the Indochinese Anti-Imperialist Front," and expropriate the lands of large landlords in order to allocate them to the poor farmers.

Resolution 7:

The Party Central Executive Committee held a meeting in Bac Ninh ((Province)) during Nov 40 to analyze the international and domestic situations, begin the mission of liberating Indochina from Japanese and French domination, establish a united front against the Japanese and French fascists, and temporarily rescind the land reform policy prescribed in Resolution 6.

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Resolution 8:

The Party Central Executive Committee held a meeting at Bắc Bộ (Cao Bằng) on 19 May 41 to pass a resolution concerning the establishment of the Vietnamese Independence League and adoption of the slogan "Oppose the fascist aggressors to emancipate our people." It continued to postpone the implementation of the policy of confiscating lands of wealthy landlords to distribute to the poor farmers, and established the Việt Minh Front (19 May 41).

Supplementary Resolution 8:

On 27 Feb 43, the Current Affairs Section of the Party Central Executive Committee held a meeting to make plans to strengthen the Việt Minh Front and establish the Indochinese Democratic Front, and to reaffirm its determination to make preparations and seize all opportunities to rise up. On 9 Mar 45, the Current Affairs Section of the Party Central Executive Committee held a meeting at Đình Bảng, Từ Sơn, Bắc Ninh, ((NVN)) to prepare to issue the general uprising order and establish the National Liberation Committee for VN.

Resolution (?) ((sic)).

A National Congress was held by the Party on 13 Aug 45 in the liberated area of (Tân Trào, Sơn Dương, Tuyên Quang) to proclaim the decision to conduct the general uprising and establish the Provisional Government and a Democratic Republic Regime in Vietnam. Hồ Chí Minh ((he adopted this name during 1944)) was elected chairman of the National Liberation Committee for ((VN)).

Remarks: For information concerning the two other National Congresses held by the Party, (see the annex).

((Page 3 of O.T.))

C. Resolutions adopted by the Central Party Headquarters from 1954 to date:

(From 1945 to 1954: No documents were available which made mention of any resolutions passed during this period.)

Resolution 15 (Sep 59):

This resolution established the strategy for taking over SVN. The motto "Consolidate NVN, and pay concern to SVN" was adopted. The meeting established the National Front for the liberation of SVN ((NLF SVN)) and COSVN to provide leadership for the war of liberation in SVN. The Third National Congress was held by the Party to ratify this resolution.

Resolution 9 (Dec 63):

A meeting was held ((Dec 63)) to study the report made by the Politburo on "the world situation and the international mission of the Vietnamese Communist Party" (that is to liberate ((SVN)), help liberate all of Indochina and move toward liberating all of Southeast Asia). The original text of this resolution is 53 typewritten pages and is divided into five parts.

Resolution 10:

No document making mention of this resolution was available. It was possibly disseminated in 1964 to prepare to cope with the US limited war which was then feared would spread to NVN.

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Resolution 11 (1964):

This resolution reaffirmed the determination to defend NVN, liberate, SVN, and fight against the US aggressors for national salvation.

Resolution 12 (Mar 65):

Resolution 12 assessed the situation of the limited war then in progress as a result of the US sending many troops to SVN and bombing NVN. The Party advocated waging a protracted war while preparing for a General Offensive and Uprising. While discussing this resolution, Lê Duân had touched on the "fighting while negotiating" strategy.

Supplementary Resolution 12 (Oct 65):

It reaffirmed the determination to fight to the end.

Resolution 13 (Jul 67) from the Politburo:

This so called "Attack and Assault Resolution" stated that if the Republic of VN ((RVN)) and the US were defeated during the two successive dry seasons of '1965-66' and '1966-67', they could not avoid an eventual and complete failure. This meant that the time had come for the General Offensive and Uprising phase to be initiated in SVN. This resolution served as a basis for Resolution 5/COSVN concerning the General Uprising and Offensive phase launched during Tết Mậu Thân ((1968 Lunar New Year Celebration)).

Resolution 14 (Apr 68):

It reaffirmed the determination to fight during the General Offensive and Uprising phase to attain a decisive victory in a relatively short period of time. This resolution contained nothing new and important, merely reaffirming Resolution 13 mentioned above.

Resolution 15 (Sep 59):

Resolution 15 dealt with the formation of the NFLSVN and COSVN.

Resolution 16:

This resolution mentioned the mission of the Party to fulfill its international obligation towards Laos (by assisting the Pathet Lao forces in liberating Laos).

Resolution 17: (Unknown)

Resolution 181 ((sic)):

Issued during Apr 69, this resolution contained only ((unit)) designations.

The resolution issued during Apr 69 served as a basis for COSVN Resolution 9 (Jul 69). (Possibly this resolution was the same as Resolution 181 mentioned above.) The contents of Resolution 9 reflected this by em-

((Page 4 of O.T.))

phasizing frustrating the rural pacification program and the Vietnamization plan, and formulating the mission to gain a gradual, partial victory before advancing toward a decisive and final victory.

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Resolution 18 (possibly issued at the beginning of 1970):

This resolution reviewed the results of the two years of General Offensive and Uprising conducted in SVN, set forth missions for the entire year of 1970, and prescribed activities to gain achievements to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party in Indochina.

((Page 5 of O.T.))

ANNEX

THE VARIOUS NATIONAL CONGRESSES OF THE INDOCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
 HELD FROM 1930 TO THE PRESENT

The First National Congress.

The congress was convened in Hông Kông during 1939, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Sixth Central Party Committee Meeting held during Nov 39 at Vinh Long, Nam B6. The congress assessed the world situation and took advantage of the outbreak of World War II to initiate the resistance against the French and Japanese to gain independence for the fatherland and liberation of the Indochina peninsula.

The Second National Congress.

The congress was convened in the Viet Bac Liberated Area on 13 Aug 45. Taking advantage of the end of World War II and Japan's unconditional surrender, the Party decided to give the general uprising order, establish the Provisional Government under the so-called name "VN National Liberation Committee" headed by Ho Chi Minh, and set up a "Democratic Republic Regime" in VN.

The Third National Congress.

This congress was convened at Hanoi on 3 Sep 59 to declare the beginning of the liberation of South Vietnam under the guide "consolidate the North, give concern to the South;" to establish the NFLSVN; and immediately form COSVN, the chief agency in the war of liberation in South Vietnam.

((Page 6 of O.T.))

PART II

THE RESOLUTIONS OF R ((COSVN)) SINCE THE DATE OF ITS FORMATION (1960).

Resolution 1 ((adopted in Oct 61)):

Resolution 1 reviewed results of the formation of COSVN and the NFLSVN and declared the mission of liberating South Vietnam.

Resolution 2 ((adopted)) (at the end of Nov 63):

Resolution 2 reviewed the situation during the two years following the establishment of COSVN and the NFLSVN; commented on "the unconventional war" recently initiated by the US in Vietnam and the coup d'etat that deposed the Ngo Dinh Diem regime; and set forth new missions, which were to attack strategic hamlets and counter the Stanley-Taylor Program (of pacifying South Vietnam within 18 months).

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Resolution 3 ((adopted on)) (15 Jan 65):

Resolution 3 reviewed the situation during 1964 and commented on the US shift to a "limited war" and its implementation throughout the country (and the bombing of North Vietnam since 6 Aug 64). It formulated missions to counter the air war and changed the phase of resistance into one of a limited counteroffensive.

Resolution 4 ((adopted on)) (25 Jun 66):

Resolution 4 reviewed the results of more than a year of resistance against the limited war and implemented Resolution 12 adopted by the Central Party Committee in which the tactic of "fighting while negotiating" was also mentioned.

Resolution 5 ((adopted)) (at the end of 1967):

Resolution 5 implemented and studied Resolution 13 of the Politburo. It also commented on the failures of the Republic of Vietnam and the US during the two dry seasons of 1965-66 and 1966-67. Convinced that the enemy was not able to conduct counteroffensives against the Communists, the Central Party Committee advocated initiating the General Offensive and Uprising phase to gain a quick and decisive victory.

Resolution 6 ((adopted)) (during Mar 68):

Resolution 6 reviewed the results of the First General Offensive and Uprising phase and advocated the tactic of continuing to attack cities to prepare for the Second General Offensive and Uprising phase (on 5 May 68).

Resolution 7 (adopted on 13 May 68):

Resolution 7 reaffirmed the will to proceed with the General Offensive and Uprising. It stated that no one should have any illusions about peace because of the preliminary negotiations in Paris and ordered preparations for the Autumn 1968 ((Offensive)) Campaign.

Resolution 8 ((adopted)) (Aug 68):

Resolution 8 reviewed the achievements of the six months of the General Offensive and Uprising (through the first and second phases of 1968). It also set forth requirements for a decisive victory in the Winter-Spring 1968-69 ((Campaign)).


((Page 7 of O.T.))

Resolution 9 ((adopted)) (during Sep 69):

Resolution 9 is based mainly on the resolution adopted by the Central Party Committee during Apr 69. This resolution assessed the situation after nearly two years of General Offensive and Uprising and stated the missions for 1969-70. It reflected a change in strategy from gaining immediate victories to achieving partial successes and securing a large part of the rural areas, especially in the Mekong Delta.

This resolution is important because it influences present and future ((VC)) strategy, even though it has been supplemented many times.

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Supplementary Resolution 9:

Directive 136/CTNT of COSVN issued during Nov 69 re-emphasized the importance of frustrating the pacification and de-Americanization plans, stating that "if that task cannot be fulfilled in 1970, it must be continued into 1971."

There were no documents which mentioned Resolutions 10, 11, 12, or 13.

Resolution 14/NQNT ((adopted)) (during Oct 69):

Resolution 14 called for increasing guerrilla warfare during ((each)) General Offensive and Uprising ((phase)) as well as attacks in "three areas" ((mountain, lowland, and city)) and on three fronts ((military, political and military proselyting)), and continuation of the protracted war.

During 1970, R ((COSVN)) did not issue any resolutions.

((Page 8 of O.T.))

PART 3

SUMMARY OF COSVN DIRECTIVES AND COMMUNIQUE ((OR CIRCULARS))

Directive 4/TVNT (date? ((sic)) mentioned the important role of the security mission implemented by branches and agencies. This mission had two goals:

Motivate the people to initiate a widespread and continuous security maintenance movement.

Intensify suppressive activities according to the requirements and policies made by the Revolution.

Directive 9/CTNT (issued on 12 Jan 68), stated the principle and leadership guidelines for cadre at all echelons to develop the people's uprising movement.

Directive 11/CTNT (issued on 15 Jan 68), stated the missions, organizational principles, and methods for establishing ((local)) governments at village and hamlet levels. It also prescribed guidelines for conducting elections.

Directive 12/CTNT (issued on 3 May 68), prescribed the missions and guidelines for promotions and awards, as well as disciplinary action to be taken against cadre and soldiers of the armed security forces. (This directive was mentioned in Directive 17/CTNT dated 9 Jun 68.)

Directive 17/CTNT (issued on 9 Jun 68), reminded cadre at all echelons to establish armed security forces.

Directive 18/CTNT (issued simultaneously with Resolution 6 of COSVN during Jun 68), mentioned a plan for establishing village and hamlet administrations in local areas.

Directive 19/CTNT, issued on 13 Jun 68, ordered political reorientation courses for the entire Party to make Party members clearly see ((VC)) victories gained during the past two General Offensive and Uprising phases in order to implement the strategic plan of COSVN immediately.

Directive 22/CTNT, issued on 3 Jul 68, ordered high-ranking indoctrination cadre to provide closer leadership for the indoctrination task.

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Directive 24/CTNT, issued on 27 Sep 68, was aimed at reorganizing "the use and management of the telecommunication system," because the Communists believed that it seriously violated the principles and regulations prescribed by the Central Headquarters of the Communist Party and COSVN.

Directive 32/CTNT (date unknown) mentioned the role and missions of the security branch. (The contents of this directive were mentioned in Directive 17/CTNT.)

((Page 9 of O.T.))

Directive 36/CTNT (disseminated on 7 Nov 68) formulated a number of propaganda and proselyting tasks to be carried out when the US stopped bombing NVN.

Directive 38/CTNT (disseminated on 7 Nov 68) made a preliminary assessment of the US presidential election of 5 Nov 68 and included a report to COSVN on the ideological progress of cadre, Party members, soldiers, and people concerning the bombing halt by the US.

Directive 39/CTNT (disseminated on 18 Nov 68) commented on the ideological development of RVNAF, US, and FWMAF troops after the US stopped bombing NVN.

Directive 41/CTNT (Nov 68) recognized that the Party Chapters were still weak in meeting operational requirements. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct a reorganization and consolidation phase so that the Party Chapters would meet "Four-Good-Quality" requirements set forth in COSVN Revolution 8.

Directive 42/CTNT (after 6 Nov 68, the date on which the Republic of Vietnam and US Government decided to stop bombing NVN) stated that the US decision to stop bombing NVN confused the RVN soldiers. Therefore, it was necessary to initiate a military proselyting activities phase in coordination with General Offensive and Uprising activities to gain a decisive victory.

(The contents of this directive are also mentioned in Directive 56/CTNT.)

Directive 49/CTNT (possibly disseminated by the end of Nov 68) assessed the situation after the US stopped bombing NVN, and stated that the situation could turn in favor of the Communists. It also ordered (that) preparations be made for the climaxing phase for the 1969 Spring ((Campaign)). Communist forces were to take advantage of all opportunities to gain the greatest victories during the climaxing phase.

(The contents of this directive are also mentioned in Directive 56/CTNT and Directive 63/CTNT.)

Directive 51/CTNT (23 Nov 68) established temporary regulations for the administration of budgets, treasuries, and money in local organizations and units.

Directive 52/CTNT (2 Dec 68) increased the women's proselyting tasks.

Directive 55/CTNT (the end of 1968) ordered the initiation of a military activity phase during May 68 ((sic)) to celebrate the two great holidays (International Labor Day on 1 May and Ho Chi Minh's birthday on 19 May).

The directive also ordered increased development of forces in all fields.

Directive 56/CTNT (21 Dec 68) stated that favorable changes in the situation could occur (such as the unconditional bombing halt over NVN). Therefore, the Party Chapters had to be ready to take advantage of opportunities to gain the final victory.

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((Page 10 of O.T.))

Directive 57/CTNT (1968) ((ordered)) an increase in military proselyting activities.

Directive 58/CTNT (1968) ((called for efforts to)) counter the pacification program.

Directive 59/CTNT (1968) ((stated that)) activities should be increased during regular phases.

Directive 60/CTNT (20 Dec 68) ((called for efforts to)) increase propaganda and to motivate youths to join youth proselyting organizations.

Directive 63/CTNT (1 Jan 69) ((ordered that)) a movement be initiated to motivate the people to rise up and participate in political struggle ((activities)), and that military and enemy proselyting activities be increased.

Directive 65/CTNT (2 Jan 69) ((called for)) an intensification of public health and production activities to support combat activities.

Directive 66/CTNT (6 Jan 69) increased the farmer proselyting task in order to use the farmers advantageously in future ((political)) struggles against the enemy.

Directive 67/CTNT (6 Jan 69) concerned the distribution, maintenance, and administration of classified Party documents, such as directives, communiques, resolutions, etc ... ((sic)).

Directive on Political Reorientation 68/CTNT (17 Jan 69) discussed the victories the Communists gained during the three phases of General Offensive and Uprising during 1968, and pointed out strengths and weaknesses in the accomplishment of missions.

Directive 71/CTNT (4 Feb 69) concerned strategic and tactical plans for the 1969 Spring Campaign and preparations to be made for the 1969 Summer Campaign.

Directive 78/CTNT (30 Mar 69) ((called for)) increased attacks in all fields to accomplish the plans prescribed for the 1969 Spring Campaign.

Directive 81/CTNT (1969) commented on the results of the 1969 Spring Campaign to gain experiences for the 1969 Summer Campaign and meet the requirements of "occupying all rural areas and a number of cities and towns."

(This directive is a supplement to Directive 71/CTNT.)

((Page 11 of O.T.))

Directive 88/CTNT (1 Jun 69) commented on the results achieved during the year of General Offensive and Uprising and stated the activity plan for the 1969 Summer Campaign.

Circular 89/CTNT (4 May 69) contained information on the NFLSVN "10-point ((peace)) solution" offered at the 16th session of the Paris Conference 8 May 68.

Circular 92/CTNT (26 May 69) commented on the eight-point peace solution offered by President Nixon on 15 May 69. It stated the measures which were to be taken against that solution.

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Circular 95/CTNT (15 Jun 69) analyzed the reactions of the free world to the Communist "10-point peace solution" at the Paris Conference on 8 May 69.

Circular 99/CTNT (26 Jun 69) concerned the significance of the establishment of the "Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of SVN."

Circular 100/CTNT (15 Jun 69) concerned comments made by the communists on the results of the talk between Presidents Nixon and Thieu at their Midway Meeting (8 Jun 69).

Directive 102/CTNT (19 Jun 69) ordered various organizations and units to practice economy in the use of provisions and funds and to increase ((agricultural)) production.

Directive 103/CTNT (20 Jul 69) reviewed the activities of the first six months of 1969 and contained the activity plan for the 1969 Autumn Campaign.

Directive 105/CTNT (Summer 1969) ordered an intensification of military proselyting activities throughout SVN from Jul 69 to the end of Sep 69.

Circular 106/CTNT (19 Jul 69) commented on the declaration made by President ((Thieu)) of RVN on 11 Jul 69, concerning the free general election in SVN.

Directive 111/CTNT (19 Aug 69) ((called for a motivation campaign to urge)) the people to rise up and conduct political struggles and the initiation of a struggle movement against the enemy.

Directive 113/CTNT (1 Oct 69) ordered the stocking of provisions because of the poor crops in rear areas of Cambodia and the ((economic)) blockade imposed by the Republic of Vietnam.

Directive 114/CTNT (4 Sep 69) ((called for a campaign to)) boost the morale of troops after Ho Chi Minh's death and to implement Ho Chi Minh's testaments.

((Page 12 of O.T.))

Directive 117/CTNT (1969) ordered continuous attacks to frustrate the de-Americanization plan of the US and RVN.

Directive 119/CTNT (19 Sep 69) commented on the withdrawal of 35,000 US troops ((from SVN)) and ordered an increase in attacks to frustrate the de-Americanization program as mentioned in Directive 117/CTNT.

Directive 124/CTNT (1969) ordered an increase in military proselyting activities. The contents of this directive are similar to that of Directive 105/CTNT (also mentioned in Directive 9/CTNT/70).


Directive 125/CTNT (10 Oct 69) ordered the improvement in the leadership of the "Forward Supply Council" in order to mobilize more manpower and materiel for the frontline.

Directive 129/CTNT (8 Nov 69) ordered an increase in political struggles in cities to demand the withdrawal of US troops and in "military and enemy proselyting tasks" to demoralize RVN troops.

Directive 130/CTNT (69) ordered Party Committees to conduct political reorientation sessions for Party Chapters.

Directive 135/CTNT (6 Dec 69) provided instructions for the execution of COSVN Resolution 13 (14 Aug 68) concerning the establishment of "investigation committees" at all levels.

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Directive 136/CTNT (Dec 69) assessed the situation after four months of implementing Resolution 9 and ordered the concentration of efforts to "gain decisive victory within a relatively short period of time."

Directive 139/CTNT (20 Dec 69) ordered an increase in ((agricultural)) production, thrift, and in economic and financial activities to support the struggle.

Directive 40/CTNT ((sic)) (10 Feb 70) ((this must be Directive 04/CTNT/70 - a mistake in the document)) gave additional instructions for improving leadership to insure successful implementation of Resolution 9 and Directive 136/CTNT.

Directive 06/CTNT/70 (Mar 70) commented on the situation after the overthrow of Sihanouk and ordered troops operating along the Vietnamese - Cambodian border to conceal their storage facilities and avoid provocative actions.

Directive 09/CTNT/70 (17 Apr 70) ordered an increase in military proselyting activities during the 1970 Spring-Summer-Autumn Campaign.

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