

## Aggression From the North

1034

*The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign  
To Conquer South Viet-Nam*

# Aggression From the North

*The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign  
To Conquer South Viet-Nam*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7839

Far Eastern Series 130

Released February 1965

Office of Media Services

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

---

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C., 20402 -


PAUL GAUDETTE : BOOKS
2050 E. 17th St.
TUCSON, AZ. 85719
1-602-791-3868

**“[ Our purpose in Viet-Nam ] is to join  
in the defense and protection of freedom  
of a brave people who are under attack  
that is controlled and that is directed  
from outside their country.”**

**PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON**  
***February 17, 1965***

# Contents

	Page
Introduction . . . . .	1
I. HANOI SUPPLIES THE KEY PERSONNEL FOR THE ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM . . . . .	3
A. The Infiltration Process . . . . .	5
B. Military Personnel . . . . .	6
C. Infiltration of Native North Vietnamese . . . . .	11
D. Infiltration of Viet Cong Agents . . . . .	12
II. HANOI SUPPLIES WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL TO ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH. . . . .	14
III. NORTH VIET-NAM: BASE FOR CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH . . . . .	20
IV. ORGANIZATION, DIRECTION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL OF THE ATTACK ON SOUTH VIET-NAM ARE CENTERED IN HANOI . . . . .	22
A. Political Organization . . . . .	22
1. The "Liberation Front" . . . . .	22
B. Military Organization . . . . .	23
C. Intelligence Organization . . . . .	25
V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HANOI'S CAMPAIGN OF AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM . . . .	26
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . .	29
APPENDIXES	
A. Findings of the International Control Commission . . . . .	30
B. Maps of Infiltration Routes . . . . .	31
C. Detail on Military Infiltration With Case Studies . . . . .	33
D. List of Communist Weapons Captured in South Viet-Nam . . . . .	38
E. Photos of Captured Viet Cong Weapons and Ammunition From External Communist Sources .	43
F. North Vietnamese Passports and Travel Documents Used by Liberation Front Officials . .	54
G. The People's Revolutionary Party (South) and the Lao Dong Party (North) Are One Communist Party . . . . .	57
H. Charts of the Viet Cong Organization, North and South . . . . .	59
I. Detail on Viet Cong Terrorism . . . . .	62



## Introduction

South Viet-Nam is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been going on for years, but recently the pace has quickened and the threat has now become acute.

The war in Viet-Nam is a new kind of war, a fact as yet poorly understood in most parts of the world. Much of the confusion that prevails in the thinking of many people, and even many governments, stems from this basic misunderstanding. For in Viet-Nam a totally new brand of aggression has been loosed against an independent people who want to make their own way in peace and freedom.

Viet-Nam is *not* another Greece, where indigenous guerrilla forces used friendly neighboring territory as a sanctuary.

Viet-Nam is *not* another Malaya, where Communist guerrillas were, for the most part, physically distinguishable from the peaceful majority they sought to control.

Viet-Nam is *not* another Philippines, where Communist guerrillas were physically separated from the source of their moral and physical support.

Above all, the war in Viet-Nam is *not* a spontaneous and local rebellion against the established government.

There are elements in the Communist program of conquest directed against South Viet-Nam common to each of the previous areas of aggression and subversion. But there is one fundamental difference. In Viet-Nam a Communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state. And to achieve its end, it has used every resource of its own government to carry out its carefully planned program of concealed aggression. North Viet-Nam's commitment to seize control of the South is no less total than was the commitment of the regime in North Korea in 1950. But knowing the consequences of the

latter's undisguised attack, the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They have failed and their aggression is as real as that of an invading army.

This report is a summary of the massive evidence of North Vietnamese aggression obtained by the Government of South Viet-Nam. This evidence has been jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam were trained in the North and ordered into the South by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Viet Cong (VC), the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers, and propagandists have come from the North and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the South is directed by the Military High Command in Hanoi. (See section I.)

The evidence shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet Cong have been sent into South Viet-Nam from Hanoi. In recent months new types of weapons have been introduced in the VC army, for which all ammunition must come from outside sources. Communist China and other Communist states have been the prime suppliers of these weapons and ammunition, and they have been channeled primarily through North Viet-Nam. (See section II.)

The directing force behind the effort to conquer South Viet-Nam is the Communist Party in the North, the Lao Dong (Workers) Party. As in every Communist state, the party is an integral part of the regime itself. North Vietnamese officials have expressed their firm determination to absorb South Viet-Nam into the Communist world. (See section III.)

Through its Central Committee, which controls the government of the North, the Lao Dong Party directs the total political and military effort of the

Viet Cong. The Military High Command in the North trains the military men and sends them into South Viet-Nam. The Central Research Agency, North Viet-Nam's central intelligence organization, directs the elaborate espionage and subversion effort. The extensive political-military organization in the North which directs the Viet Cong war effort is described in section IV.

Under Hanoi's overall direction the Communists have established an extensive machine for carrying on the war within South Viet-Nam. The focal point is the Central Office for South Viet-Nam with its political and military subsections and other specialized agencies. A subordinate part of this Central Office is the Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam. The front was formed at Hanoi's order in 1960. Its principal function is to influence opinion abroad and to create the false impression that the aggression in South Viet-Nam is an indigenous rebellion against the established government. (See section IV.)

For more than 10 years the people and the Government of South Viet-Nam, exercising the inherent right of self-defense, have fought back against these efforts to extend Communist power south across the 17th parallel. The United States has responded to the appeals of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam for help in this de-

fense of the freedom and independence of its land and its people.

In 1961 the Department of State issued a report called *A Threat to the Peace*. It described North Viet-Nam's program to seize South Viet-Nam. The evidence in that report had been presented by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the International Control Commission (I.C.C.). A special report by the I.C.C. in June 1962 upheld the validity of that evidence. The Commission held that there was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam had sent arms and men into South Viet-Nam to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the legal Government there. The I.C.C. found the authorities in Hanoi in specific violation of four provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954.<sup>1</sup>

Since then, new and even more impressive evidence of Hanoi's aggression has accumulated. The Government of the United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citizens and to the world. It is important for free men to know what has been happening in Viet-Nam, and how, and why. That is the purpose of this report.

<sup>1</sup> For the text of pertinent sections of the I.C.C. report, see appendix A.



# *I. Hanoi Supplies the Key Personnel for the Armed Aggression Against South Viet-Nam*

The hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam are men trained in North Viet-Nam. They are ordered into the South and remain under the military discipline of the Military High Command in Hanoi. Special training camps operated by the North Vietnamese army give political and military training to the infiltrators. Increasingly the forces sent into the South are native North Vietnamese who have never seen South Viet-Nam. A special infiltration unit, the 70th Transportation Group, is responsible for moving men from North Viet-Nam into the South via infiltration trails through Laos. Another special unit, the maritime infiltration group, sends weapons and supplies and agents by sea into the South.

The infiltration rate has been increasing. From 1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establishing its infiltration pipeline, at least 1,800 men, and possibly 2,700 more, moved into South Viet-Nam from the North. The flow increased to a minimum of 3,700 in 1961 and at least 5,400 in 1962. There was a modest decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed infiltrators, though later evidence is likely to raise this figure.

For 1964 the evidence is still incomplete. However, it already shows that a minimum of 4,400 infiltrators entered the South, and it is estimated more than 3,000 others were sent in.

There is usually a time lag between the entry of infiltrating troops and the discovery of clear evidence they have entered. This fact, plus collateral evidence of increased use of the infiltration routes, suggests strongly that 1964 was probably the year of greatest infiltration so far.

Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 VC officers, soldiers, and technicians are known to have entered South Viet-Nam under orders from Hanoi. Additional information indicates that an estimated 17,000 more infiltrators were dispatched to the South by the regime in Hanoi during the past 6


years. It can reasonably be assumed that still other infiltration groups have entered the South for which there is no evidence yet available.

To some the level of infiltration from the North may seem modest in comparison with the total size of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam. But one-for-one calculations are totally misleading in the kind of warfare going on in Viet-Nam. First, a high proportion of infiltrators from the North are well-trained officers, cadres, and specialists. Second, it has long been realized that in guerrilla combat the burdens of defense are vastly heavier than those of attack. In Malaya, the Philippines, and elsewhere a ratio of at least 10-to-1 in favor of the forces of order was required to meet successfully the threat of the guerrillas' hit-and-run tactics.

In the calculus of guerrilla warfare the scale of North Vietnamese infiltration into the South takes on a very different meaning. For the infiltration of 5,000 guerrilla fighters in a given year is the equivalent of marching perhaps 50,000 regular troops across the border, in terms of the burden placed on the defenders.

Above all, the number of proved and probable infiltrators from the North should be seen in relation to the size of the VC forces. It is now estimated that the Viet Cong number approximately 35,000 so-called hard-core forces, and another 60,000-80,000 local forces. It is thus apparent that infiltrators from the North—allowing for casualties—make up the majority of the so-called hard-core Viet Cong. Personnel from the North, in short, are now and have always been the backbone of the entire VC operation.

It is true that many of the lower level elements of the VC forces are recruited within South Viet-Nam. However, the thousands of reported cases of VC kidnappings and terrorism make it abun-



Map showing infiltration route from the North by which a group of North Vietnamese troops, including VC Sgt. Huynh Van Tay, entered South Viet-Nam in Sept. 1963.

dantly clear that threats and other pressures by the Viet Cong play a major part in such recruitment.

## A. THE INFILTRATION PROCESS

The infiltration routes supply hard-core units with most of their officers and noncommissioned personnel. This source helps fill the gaps left by battle casualties, illness, and defection and insures continued control by Hanoi. Also, as the nature of the conflict has changed, North Viet-Nam has supplied the Viet Cong with technical specialists via the infiltration routes. These have included men trained in armor and ordnance, antiaircraft, and communications as well as medical corpsmen and transport experts.

There is no single infiltration route from the North to South Viet-Nam. But by far the biggest percentage of infiltrators follow the same general course. The principal training center for North Vietnamese army men assigned to join the Viet Cong has been at Xuan Mai near Hanoi. Recently captured Viet Cong have also reported an infiltration training camp at Thanh Hoa. After completion of their training course—which involves political and propaganda work as well as military subjects—infiltrating units are moved to Vinh on the east coast. Many have made stopovers at a staging area in Dong Hoi where additional training is conducted. From there they go by truck to the Laos border.

Then, usually after several days' rest, infiltrators move southward through Laos. Generally they move along the Laos-South Viet-Nam border. Responsibility for infiltration from North Viet-Nam through Laos belongs to the 70th Transportation Group of the North Vietnamese army. After a time the infiltration groups turn eastward, entering South Viet-Nam in Quang Nam, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Kontum, or another of the border provinces.

The Communists have established regular lanes for infiltration with way-stations established about 1 day's march apart. The way-stations are equipped to quarter and feed the Viet Cong passing through. Infiltrators who suffer from malaria or other illnesses stay at the stations until they recover sufficiently to join another passing group moving south.

The map on page 4 shows the infiltration route from North Viet-Nam to the South followed by VC Sgt. Huynh Van Tay and a group of North Vietnamese army officers and men in September 1963. Tay was captured during an engagement in Chuong Thien Province in April 1964.

Local guides lead the infiltration groups along the secret trails. Generally they direct the infiltrators from halfway between two stations, through their own base station, and on halfway to the next supply base. Thus the guides are kept in ignorance of all but their own way-stations. Only group leaders are permitted to talk with the guides in order to preserve maximum security. The men are discouraged from asking where they are or where they are going.<sup>1</sup>

The same system of trails and guides used along the Lao infiltration routes is used within South Viet-Nam itself. Viet Cong infiltrators may report directly to a reassignment center in the highlands as soon as they enter South Viet-Nam. But in the past year or more some groups have moved down trails in South Viet-Nam to provinces along the Cambodian border and near Saigon before receiving their unit assignment. Within South Viet-Nam infiltration and supplies are handled by VC units such as the Nam Son Transportation Group.

At the Laos border crossing point infiltrators are reequipped. Their North Vietnamese army uniforms must be turned in. They must give up all personal papers, letters, notebooks, and photographs that might be incriminating. Document control over the infiltrators has been tightened considerably over the past 2 years. A number of Vietnamese infiltrators have told of being fitted out with Lao "neutralist" uniforms for their passage through Laos.

Infiltration groups are usually issued a set of black civilian pajama-like clothes, two unmarked uniforms, rubber sandals, a sweater, a hammock, mosquito netting, and waterproof sheeting. They carry a 3-5 day supply of food. A packet of medicines and bandages is usually provided.

The size of infiltration groups varies widely. Prisoners have mentioned units as small as 5 men and as large as 500. Generally the groups number 40-50. When they arrive in South Viet-Nam these

<sup>1</sup> For additional maps of the routes taken by VC infiltrators into South Viet-Nam, see appendix B.

groups are usually split up and assigned to various VC units as replacements, although some have remained intact.

## B. MILITARY PERSONNEL

The following are individual case histories of North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the Hanoi regime into South Viet-Nam. They are only an illustrative group. They show that the leadership and specialized personnel for the guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam consists in large part of members of the North Viet-Nam armed forces, trained in the North and subject to the command and discipline of Hanoi.

### 1. Tran Quoc Dan

Dan was a VC major, commander of the 60th Battalion (sometimes known as the 34th Group of the Thon-Kim Battalion). Disillusioned with fighting his own countrymen and with communism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he surrendered to the authorities in South Viet-Nam on February 11, 1963.

At the age of 15 he joined the revolutionary army (Viet Minh) and fought against the French forces until 1954 when the Geneva accords ended



*Maj. Tran Quoc Dan.*

the Indochina War. As a regular in the Viet Minh forces, he was moved to North Viet-Nam. He became an officer in the so-called People's Army.

In March 1962 Major Dan received orders to prepare to move to South Viet-Nam. He had been exposed to massive propaganda in the North which told of the destitution of the peasants in the South and said that the Americans had taken over the French role of colonialists. He said later that an important reason for his decision to surrender was that he discovered these propaganda themes were lies. He found the peasants more prosperous than the people in the North. And he recognized quickly that he was not fighting the Americans but his own people.


With the 600 men of his unit, Major Dan left Hanoi on March 23, 1962. They traveled through the Laos corridor. His group joined up with the Viet Cong First Regiment in central Viet-Nam.

The 35-year-old major took part in 45 actions and was wounded once in an unsuccessful VC attack on an outpost. As time passed he became increasingly discouraged by his experience as a VC troop commander. Most of all, he said, he was tired of killing other Vietnamese. After several months of soul-searching he decided to surrender to the authorities of the Republic of Viet-Nam. He has volunteered to do "anything to serve the national cause" of South Viet-Nam.

### 2. Vo Thoi

Sergeant Vo Thoi (Communist Party alias *Vo Bien*) was an assistant squad leader in the VC Tay Son 22d Battalion. On the night of October 7, 1963, his unit attacked An Tuong village in Binh Dinh Province. After overrunning the village, Vo's company was assigned to set up an ambush against Republic of Viet-Nam troops rushing to defend the village. In the ensuing fight Vo was seriously wounded. He was picked up by local farmers and turned over to the authorities.

Vo's life and experiences were similar to those of thousands of Viet Cong. Born in Quang Ngai Province in 1932, he went through 5 years of school and then worked on his parents' small farm. During the war against the French he joined the Viet Minh forces. When the fighting ended, he was transferred to North Viet-Nam with his unit, the 210th Regiment. He remained in the North Viet-



*VC Sgt. Vo Thoi.*

nameese army until 1960 when he was sent to work on a state farm in Nghe An Province. Vo said 3,000 men and women worked on the farm, of whom 400 were soldiers. In September 1962 Vo was told he must join the newly activated 22d Battalion. All the members of the battalion came from provinces in South Viet-Nam, from Quang Tri to Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary battalion; two-thirds of its members were cadre with ranks up to senior captain.

The group was put through an advanced training course that lasted 6 months. The training program included combat tactics for units from squad to company and the techniques of guerrilla and counter guerrilla fighting. There were heavy doses of political indoctrination.

On March 5, 1963, the 22d Battalion received orders to move south. They were transported in trucks from Nghe An Province to Dong Hoi in Quang Binh, just north of the 17th parallel. From there the unit was moved westward to the Lao border. Then the more than 300 men began walking to the south following mountain trails in Laos and the Viet-Nam border area. They marched by day, rested at night. Every fifth day

they stopped at a way-station for a full day's rest. One company dropped off at Thua Thien Province. Vo and the remainder of the group marched on to Pleiku Province. Two fully armed companies from a neighboring province were assigned to the battalion. The assignment given to the battalion was to harass strategic hamlets in the Hoai An district of Binh Dinh, to round up cattle and rice, to kill or kidnap cadre of the Government forces, and to recruit local youth for service with the Viet Cong.

### 3. Nguyen Thao

Nguyen Thao was a VC weapons technician. A native of Khanh Hoa province in South Viet-Nam, he joined the Viet Minh in 1950. He worked at a secret arsenal manufacturing weapons for use by the guerrilla forces. He went to North



**NGUYEN THAO**

*Nguyen Thao, VC weapons technician.*

Viet-Nam after the Geneva accords were signed in 1954. In North Viet-Nam he attended a technical school specializing in arms manufacture. He received special training in foreign small arms and artillery.

At the end of 1962 he was ordered to Ha Dong to attend a special course of political training in preparation for infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. On completion of the training course he was assigned to a group of 14 men who would move to the south together. Nguyen Thao said the group was composed of 4 armament specialists, 2 chemical engineers, and 8 middle-level technical cadre.

They left Ha Dong in March 1963, crossed into Laos, and reached their destination in the northern part of South Viet-Nam in May. Nguyen Thao went to work at a secret VC arsenal near the Quang Ngai border. Fifty men, some local workers, manned the arsenal weapons section. The group manufactured mines and grenades for the VC units in the area and repaired weapons.

Nguyen Thao said he soon realized from talking with the local workers at the arsenal that most of what he had heard in the North about conditions in South Viet-Nam was wrong. He said the Communists had deceived him. Two months after his

arrival at the arsenal he decided to defect. He asked permission to rejoin his family and to work in a national defense factory and continue his studies.

#### 4. Nguyen Viet Le

This VC soldier was born in Quang Nam Province in South Viet-Nam. He served with the 305th Division of the Viet Minh and moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. In April 1961 Nguyen Viet Le and his unit, the 50th Battalion, moved into Laos. He said the unit remained in Laos for 2 months, during which it fought in four battles alongside the Pathet Lao. During these engagements one of the battalion's four companies was badly mauled and had to be returned to North Viet-Nam.

The other three companies were assigned to South Viet-Nam. They arrived in Quang Ngai Province in the summer of 1961. For a month they rested and waited for orders. They took part in a major action against an outpost of the Government of South Viet-Nam in September. Nguyen Viet Le was captured during a battle in Quang Ngai Province in April 1962.

#### 5. Nguyen Truc

Corp. Nguyen Truc was born in 1933, the son of a farmer in Phu Yen Province in South Viet-Nam. From 1949 to 1954 he served as a courier and then as a guerrilla fighter with the Viet Minh. In early 1955 he boarded a Soviet ship and moved with his unit, the 40th Battalion, to North Viet-Nam. He remained in the army, but in 1959, bothered by illness, he went to work on a state farm.

In August 1962 Nguyen Truc was notified that he was back in the army and that he was being sent to South Viet-Nam. He reported to the Xuan Mai training center and underwent 6 months of military and political reeducation. His unit was the newly activated 22d Battalion. The training course was completed in February 1963, but departure for South Viet-Nam was delayed until April.

For infiltration purposes the battalion was divided into two groups. On April 27, Nguyen Truc and his group boarded trucks at Xuan Mai. They went first to Vinh, then on to Dong Hoi, and



Nguyen Viet Le.

finally to the Laos-North Viet-Nam border. There they doffed their North Vietnamese army uniforms and put on black peasants clothing. The march to the south began, sometimes in Lao territory, sometimes in Viet-Nam. They passed through Thua Thien Province, then Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai, and finally to their destination, Pleiku. Each day they had a new guide, generally one of the mountain people of the area.

Nguyen said that he and most of the troops who were sent north after the Indochina War wanted to return to their homes and rejoin their families. In August 1963 Nguyen Truc was sent out on a foraging expedition to find food for his unit. He took the opportunity to defect to Government forces at An Tuc in Binh Dinh Province.

#### 6. Nguyen Cam

Cam is the son of a farmer in Quang Tin Province. Born in 1929, he joined the Viet Minh youth group in his home village in 1946. In one year he became a guerrilla fighter. In 1954, as the Indochina War was drawing to a close, he was serving with the Viet Minh 20th Battalion. In May 1955 he went to North Viet-Nam with his unit.

Ill health caused his transfer to an agricultural camp in 1958. By 1960 he was back in uniform, serving in the 210th Regiment. In May of that year he was assigned to a small group that was to set up a metallurgical workshop. Early in 1961 he was sent to a metallurgical class in Nghe An Province. They were taught a simple form of cast-iron production, simple blast furnace construction, and similar skills. Their instructor was an engineer from the Hanoi Industrial Department.

Their special course completed, Cam and his group of 35 men prepared to go to South Viet-Nam. They went by truck from their training center at Nghe An to the Lao border. After 19 days marching through Laos, they arrived in the vicinity of Tchepone. There they waited for 3 days until food supplies could be airdropped by a North Vietnamese plane. Nineteen days of walking took them to the Laos-South Viet-Nam border.

Delayed en route by illness, Cam finally reached his destination in November 1961. It was a secret VC iron foundry in Kontum Province. Several

iron ore deposits were nearby, and the hill people had long used the iron to make knives and simple tools. Cam's job was building kilns to smelt the ore. The Viet Cong hoped to use the iron for mines and grenades.

On August 4, 1963, Sergeant Cam went to a nearby village to buy salt for his group. On his return he found his comrades had gone to one of their cultivated fields to gather corn, and he joined them. The group was interrupted at their work by a Vietnamese Ranger company. After a brief fight Cam was taken prisoner.

#### 7. Nguyen Hong Thai

Thai, 32 years old, was born and grew up in Quang Ngai Province in South Viet-Nam. After service with the Viet Minh he was moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. After 3 years of military service he was assigned to a military farm. In December 1961 he was recalled to his former unit, the 305th Division, and went to the special training camp at Xuan Mai in preparation for fighting with the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam.

Training began in January 1962 and lasted for 4 months. The training group, designated the 32d Battalion, was composed of 650 men who came from various branches of the North Vietnamese



*Nguyen Hong Thai.*

army—engineers, artillery, airborne, transport, marines, and some factory workers and students. Three-fourths of the training was military (guerrilla tactics, ambushes, sabotage, etc.) and one-fourth was political. In the latter, heavy emphasis was laid on the necessity for armed seizure of power in the South.

Group 32 was divided into sections and began infiltrating to the south on July 14, 1962. It moved in three groups. Thai said it took his group more than 55 days to travel from North Viet-Nam through Laos to Quang Ngai Province in the south. He reported that all the communications and liaison stations on the route to South Viet-Nam are now operated by the army of North Viet-Nam. Soon after his arrival in South Viet-Nam, Thai was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. He was made a platoon leader in the 20th Viet Cong Highland Battalion. In February 1963 the unit moved from Quang Nam to Kontum Province.

Combat conditions and the rigors of guerrilla life began to depress Thai. He said he wanted only to rejoin his family and live in peace. In September he asked and received permission to visit his family in Quang Ngai. When he got home, he surrendered to a South Vietnamese Army post.

#### 8. Dao Kien Lap

Lap is a civilian radio technician. He has been a member of the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam since 1955. In February 1963 he was selected for assignment to South Viet-Nam where he was to work with the Liberation Front. He infiltrated into South Viet-Nam with a group of about 70 civilian specialists. They included doctors, pharmacists, union organizers, radio specialists, propagandists, and youth organizers. One of the infiltrators in Dao's group was a man named Binh, publisher of the newspaper *Labor* of the Lao Dong Party. Another was a member of the city soviet of Hanoi.

The specialists in Dao's group received 3 months of basic military training at Son Tay, and then departed for the South in mid-June. Their orders were to report to the Central Office of the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam where they would be assigned according to their individual specialties. Dao and Binh were to help run a radio station of the Liberation Front.



*Dao Kien Lap.*

They traveled through Laos and along the Viet-Nam border. They had to stop for several weeks in Quang Nam Province to recuperate from their travels. On October 1 they were directed by guides to a VC station in Ban Me Thuot.

Dao said he had by then decided to defect to the Government authorities in the South. He set off with one companion, but they were separated as they crossed a swiftly flowing river. Dao gave himself up at a Government post in Ban Me Thuot on October 13, 1963.

#### 9. Tran Ngoc Linh

Linh was a Viet Cong senior sergeant, leader of a reconnaissance platoon. He is the son of a middle-class farm family in Tay Ninh Province. He served with the Viet Minh against the French and moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. He spent the next 7 years in the North Vietnamese army. In September 1962 Linh was assigned to the Xuan Mai training center at Ha Dong to prepare for duty in South Viet-Nam. His group was given a 4-month refresher course in infantry tactics with emphasis on guerrilla fighting. Then he received 6 months of special training in the use of machine-guns against aircraft. Antiaircraft training has become an increasingly important part of the preparation of North Vietnamese troops assigned to the Viet Cong.



Linh and about 120 others made up the 406th Infiltration Group commander by Senior Captain Nguyen Van Do. They were divided into four platoons. During the final 2 weeks of preparation each member of the group was issued new equipment—black, pajama-like uniforms, a khaki uniform, a hammock, mosquito netting, rubber sandals, and other supplies, including two packets of medicine.

In the early morning hours of July 4, 1963, his group started its journey from the Xuan Mai training center outside Hanoi. The convoy of six Molotov trucks moved south along Highway 21 to Nghe An Province and then on to Quang Binh. On July 7 they arrived at the final processing station near the Laos-North Viet-Nam border. There they turned in their North Vietnamese Army uniforms as well as all personal papers and anything else that might identify them as coming from the North. But their departure for the South was delayed for several weeks. In August they set off through Laos.

Twice along the way Linh had to stop at liaison stations because of illness. When the infiltrators recovered from their illnesses, they were formed into special groups to continue their penetration into South Viet-Nam. Linh reported being delayed once for 8 days, and the second time for 10 days.

Finally, in the first week of November 1963, Linh was sufficiently recovered to begin the final leg of his journey to a VC center where he was to be assigned to a combat unit. He and three others who had been similarly delayed by attacks of malaria and other sickness made up a group. They moved through the jungles of Quang Duc Province near the Cambodian border. On the morning of November 9 they crossed the Srepok River. There they ran into a unit of the South Vietnamese Army. One of the infiltrators was killed, Linh was taken prisoner, and the other two Viet Cong escaped.

These are typical Viet Cong. There are many other officers like Tran Quoc Dan, technicians like Nguyen Thao, and simple soldiers like Nguyen Truc. They were born in South Viet-Nam, fought against the French, and then went north and served in the army of North Viet-Nam. They were ordered by the Communist rulers in Hanoi

to reenter South Viet-Nam. Violating the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, they used the territory of neighboring Laos to infiltrate into the South. They are the means by which Communist North Viet-Nam is carrying out its program of conquest in South Viet-Nam.<sup>1</sup>

### C. INFILTRATION OF NATIVE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The Communist authorities in Hanoi are now assigning native North Vietnamese in increasing numbers to join the VC forces in South Viet-Nam. Heretofore, those in charge of the infiltration effort have sought to fill their quotas with soldiers and others born in the South. The 90,000 troops that moved from South Viet-Nam to the North when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina War have provided an invaluable reservoir for this purpose. Now, apparently, that source is running dry. The casualty rate has been high, and obviously many of those who were in fighting trim 10 years ago are no longer up to the rigors of guerrilla war.

In any case, reports of infiltration by native North Vietnamese in significant numbers have been received in Saigon for several months. It is estimated that as many as 75 percent of the more than 4,400 Viet Cong who are known to have entered the South in the first 8 months of 1964 were natives of North Viet-Nam.

Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Province in North Viet-Nam in 1936. He was captured by South Vietnamese forces on May 5, 1964. He described himself as a military security officer. He infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in April 1964 with a group of 34 police and security officers from the North.

Another native North Vietnamese captured in the South was VC Private First Class Vo Quyen. His home was in Nam Dinh Province. He was a member of the 2d Battalion of the North Vietnamese army's 9th Regiment. He said the entire battalion had infiltrated into South Viet-Nam between February and May last year. He was captured in an action in Quang Tri Province on July 4. He told interrogators that the bulk of

<sup>1</sup> See appendix C for additional details on military infiltrators.

his unit was composed of young draftees from North Viet-Nam.

Le Pham Hung, also a private first class, was captured on July 7 in Thua Thien Province. He is a native of Nam Dinh in North Viet-Nam. Drafted for military service in May 1963, he was in the 324th Division. His group, consisting solely of 90 North Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in May 1964. He reported that another company of North Vietnamese entered the South at the same time as his unit.

A former member of the 90th VC Battalion reported that his unit had been reinforced by native North Vietnamese troops earlier this year. Le Thua Phuong, an information cadre and a native of Quang Ngai Province in the South, surrendered to Government forces on April 23, 1964. He said that the 90th Battalion had received 80 North Vietnamese replacements in February.

A medical technician named Hoang Thung was captured in Thua Thien Province on July 4, 1964. He said he had infiltrated into the South in late 1963 with a group of 200 Viet Cong, the majority of whom were ethnic northerners, 120 of them draftees.

These reports destroy one more fiction which the authorities in Hanoi have sought so long to promote—that the fighting in the South was a matter for the South Vietnamese. They underline Hanoi's determination to press its campaign of conquest with every available resource.

#### D. INFILTRATION OF VIET CONG AGENTS

No effort to subvert another nation as elaborate as that being conducted by the Ho Chi Minh regime against South Viet-Nam can succeed without an intelligence-gathering organization. Recognizing this, the authorities in Hanoi have developed an extensive espionage effort. An essential part of that effort is the regular assignment of secret agents from the North to South Viet-Nam.

The heart of the VC intelligence organization is the Central Research Agency in Hanoi (see section IV, C). Communist agents are regularly dispatched from North Viet-Nam, sometimes for brief assignments but often for long periods. Many of these agents move into South Viet-Nam

along the infiltration trails through Laos; others are carried by boats along the coasts and landed at prearranged sites. A special maritime infiltration group has been developed in North Viet-Nam, with its operations centered in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces just north of the 17th parallel.

#### 1. Maritime Infiltration

The following case illustrates the methods of maritime infiltration of secret agents used by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam:

In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelligence agent named Nguyen Viet Duong began training to infiltrate South Viet-Nam. A native southerner, he had fought against the French and had gone to North Viet-Nam after the war ended. Selected for intelligence work, he was assigned to the Central Research Agency in 1959.

After a period of intensive instruction in radio transmission, coding and decoding, and other skills of the intelligence trade, he was given false identity papers and other supplies and was transported to the South. His principal task was to set up a cell of agents to collect military information. He flew from Hanoi to Dong Hoi, and from there the maritime infiltration group took him by boat to South Viet-Nam. That was in August 1962.

In January 1963 Duong reported to Hanoi that he had run into difficulties. His money and papers had been lost, and he had been forced to take refuge with VC contacts in another province. Another agent was selected to go to South Viet-Nam. One of his assignments was to contact Duong, find out details of what happened to him, and help Duong reestablish himself as a VC agent. The man selected for the task was Senior Captain Tran Van Tan of the Central Research Agency.

Tan had already been picked to go to the South to establish a clandestine VC communications center. Making contact with Duong was one of his secondary assignments. After intensive preparations Tan was ready to move to South Viet-Nam in March. He was transferred to an embarkation base of the maritime infiltration group just north of the 17th parallel.

He was joined by three other VC agents and the captain and three crewmen of the boat that would take them south. All were given false identity papers to conform to their false names. They

also were provided with fishermen's permits, South Vietnamese voting cards, and draft cards or military discharge papers. The boat captain received a boat registration book, crew lists, and several South Vietnamese permits to conduct business.

The agents and boatmen were given cover stories to tell if captured. Each man had to memorize not only the details of his own story but the names and some details about each of the others. The agents had to become familiar with simple boat procedures so they could pass as legitimate fishermen.

The expedition left the embarkation port on April 4. In addition to the four agents the boat carried six carefully sealed boxes containing a generator, several radios, some weapons, and a large supply of South Vietnamese currency. They also carried some chemicals and materials for making false identification papers. Their destination was a landing site on the coast of Phuoc Tuy Province.

Soon after leaving North Viet-Nam the VC boat encountered high winds and rough seas. On April 7 the storm became violent. The boat tossed and threatened to capsize. Strong northeasterly winds forced it ever closer to shore. Finally the boat captain, Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be thrown overboard. This was done, and the boat then was beached. The eight men decided to split up into pairs and try to make contact with VC forces. They buried their false papers and set out. Six of the eight were captured almost immediately by authorities in Thua Thien Province, and the other two were taken several days later.

## 2. Student Propaganda Agents

The student population of South Viet-Nam is an important target group for VC propagandists. These agents seek to win adherents for the Communist cause among young workers, students in high schools and universities, and the younger officers and enlisted men in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Typical of the agents sent into South Viet-Nam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy, a 19-year-old VC propagandist. He is a native of the Vinh Linh District in North Viet-Nam, just north of the Demilitarized Zone. He was a member of a Communist Party youth group in his native

village. He was recruited for propaganda work in the South in the fall of 1962. He was one of 40 young persons enrolled in a special political training course given by the Communist Party in his district.

The first phase of the training consisted of political indoctrination covering such subjects as the advance of communism, the North Vietnamese plan for winning control of the country, the responsibility of youth in furthering this plan, the war in the South, and the need for propaganda supporting the Liberation Front.

Those who successfully completed the first phase were selected for the second level of training, the so-called technical training phase. In this the trainees were given their mission in the South. Vy was told he should infiltrate into South Viet-Nam and there surrender to the authorities, describing himself as a defector who was "tired of the miserable life in the North." He was to say he wanted to complete his schooling, which was impossible in the North. He was told to ask to live with relatives in the South so he could go to school. Once his story was accepted and he was enrolled in a school, he was to begin his work of propagandizing other students. He was to wait for 3 or 4 months, however, until he was no longer the subject of local suspicion. He was assigned to work under an older agent to whom he had to report regularly.

A third member of the team was a younger man who was to assist Vy. The three were to infiltrate into South Viet-Nam separately and to meet there at a rendezvous point.

At first Vy was to do no more than to observe his fellow students carefully, collecting biographical data on them and studying their personalities, capabilities, and aspirations. He was then to select those he thought might be most influenced by Communist propaganda and try to make friends with them.

Once he had selected targets, he was to begin to influence them favorably toward the North and to implant Communist propaganda. He was responsible then for bringing into his organization those he had influenced effectively. These individuals were to be given their own propaganda assignments to work on other students.

Students who wanted to evade military service in the Government forces were considered prime

targets. Where possible, Vy was to help them get to North Viet-Nam. He was also told to make contact with any students who had been picked up by the authorities for suspected Communist activities. These, too, were to be helped to escape to North Viet-Nam. Any useful information concerning developments in the South or military activities were to be reported through his superior, Nguyen Van Phong.

In case he became suspect, he was either to make his own way back to North Viet-Nam or to go into the jungle and try to contact a VC unit.

Vy entered South Viet-Nam on January 2, 1963, by swimming across the Ben Hai River. He encountered an elderly farmer who led him to the local authorities in Hai Gu. There he told his story but it was not believed. He then admitted his true mission.

### 3. Other Agents

The Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam send their agents into South Viet-Nam by a wide variety of means. A few like Nguyen Van Vy cross the demilitarized zone, more infiltrate by sea, and still more along the infiltration routes through Laos. But there are other methods for entering South Viet-Nam. VC espionage agent Tran Van Bui attempted one such method.

Bui was a graduate of the espionage training school in Haiphong, North Viet-Nam. He com-

pleted a special 6-month course in July 1962. The training included political indoctrination, but most of the time was spent on such things as use of weapons, preparing booby traps, and methods of sabotage. He was also given instruction in methods for enlisting help from hoodlums, draft dodgers, and VC sympathizers. Once in South Viet-Nam, he was to organize a small unit for sabotage and the collection of information. On specific assignment by his superiors he was to be ready to sabotage ships in Saigon harbor and to blow up gasoline and oil storage points and Vietnamese Army installations. He was told to be prepared to assassinate Vietnamese officials and American personnel.

In September 1962 Bui was given his mission assignment. He was to hide aboard a foreign ship. When discovered, he was to claim to be a refugee who wanted to "escape" to South Viet-Nam. He was given an automatic pistol with silencer, some explosive devices, and a small knife that could inject poison into the body of a victim.

Bui stole aboard a foreign ship in Haiphong harbor. After 3 days at sea—when he was sure the ship would not turn around—Bui surrendered to the ship's captain. When the ship arrived in Bangkok, Bui was turned over to the Thai authorities. They in turn released him to the South Vietnamese as he had requested. But in Saigon his true mission was disclosed and he made a full confession.

## II. *Hanoi Supplies Weapons, Ammunition, and Other War Materiel to Its Forces in the South*

When Hanoi launched the VC campaign of terror, violence, and subversion in earnest in 1959, the Communist forces relied mainly on stocks of weapons and ammunition left over from the war against the French. Supplies sent in from North Viet-Nam came largely from the same source. As the military campaign progressed, the Viet Cong depended heavily on weapons captured from the Armed Forces in South Viet-Nam. This remains an important source of weapons and ammunition

for the Viet Cong. But as the pace of the war has quickened, requirements for up-to-date arms and special types of weapons have risen to a point where the Viet Cong cannot rely on captured stocks. Hanoi has undertaken a program to re-equip its forces in the South with Communist-produced weapons.

Large and increasing quantities of military supplies are entering South Viet-Nam from outside the country. The principal supply point is

North Viet-Nam, which provides a convenient channel for materiel that originates in Communist China and other Communist countries.


An increasing number of weapons from external Communist sources have been seized in the South. These include such weapons as 57mm. and 75mm. recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket launchers, large mortars, and antitank mines.

A new group of Chinese Communist-manufactured weapons has recently appeared in VC hands. These include the 7.62 semiautomatic carbine, 7.62 light machinegun, and the 7.62 assault rifle. These weapons and ammunition for them, manufactured in Communist China in 1962, were first captured in December 1964 in Chuong Thien Province. Similar weapons have since been seized in each of the four Corps areas of South Viet-Nam. Also captured have been Chinese Communist antitank grenade launchers and ammunition made in China in 1963.

One captured Viet Cong told his captors that his entire company had been supplied recently with modern Chinese weapons. The reequipping of VC units with a type of weapons that require ammunition and parts from outside South Viet-Nam indicates the growing confidence of the authorities in Hanoi in the effectiveness of their supply lines into the South.

Incontrovertible evidence of Hanoi's elaborate program to supply its forces in the South with weapons, ammunition, and other supplies has accumulated over the years. Dramatic new proof was exposed just as this report was being completed.

On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter pilot flying along the South Vietnamese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully camouflaged and moored just offshore along the coast of Phu Yen Province. Fighter planes that ap-



*Chinese Communist 75 mm. recoilless rifle captured in An Xuyen Province in Sept. 1963.*



*Part of the hull (left) of a North Vietnamese cargo ship which delivered a huge supply of arms and ammunition to the Viet Cong. It was sunk along the coast of Phu Yen Province by South Vietnamese aircraft. More than 100 tons of military supplies were seized.*

proached the vessel met machinegun fire from guns on the deck of the ship and from the shore as well. A Vietnamese Air Force strike was launched against the vessel, and Vietnamese Government troops moved into the area. They seized the ship after a bitter fight with the Viet Cong.

The ship, which had been sunk in shallow water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms, ammunition, and other supplies. Documents found on the ship and on the bodies of several Viet Cong

aboard identified the vessel as having come from North Viet-Nam. A newspaper in the cabin was from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965. The supplies delivered by the ship—thousands of weapons and more than a million rounds of ammunition—were almost all of Communist origin, largely from Communist China and Czechoslovakia, as well as North Viet-Nam. At least 100 tons of military supplies were discovered near the ship.



*Part of the huge stock of Chinese and other Communist weapons and ammunition seized from the Viet Cong in Phu Yen Province in Feb. 1965. A North Vietnamese military cargo vessel which delivered the arms was sunk. More than 100 tons of weapons and ammunition were captured. (For other pictures of this incident, see appendix E.)*

A preliminary survey of the cache near the sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the following supplies and weapons:

- approximately 1 million rounds of small-arms ammunition;
- more than 1,000 stick grenades;
- 500 pounds of TNT in prepared charges;
- 2,000 rounds of 82 mm. mortar ammunition;
- 500 antitank grenades;
- 500 rounds of 57 mm. recoilless rifle ammunition;
- more than 1,000 rounds of 75 mm. recoilless rifle ammunition;
- one 57 mm. recoilless rifle;
- 2 heavy machineguns;
- 2,000, 7.95 Mauser rifles;
- more than 100, 7.62 carbines;
- 1,000 submachineguns;
- 15 light machineguns;
- 500 rifles;
- 500 pounds of medical supplies (with labels from North Viet-Nam, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, and other sources).

QUÂN ĐỘI NHÂN DÂN VIỆT NAM

## SỔ SỨC KHỎE

Họ và tên Nguyễn Hoàng Long  
 Chức vụ giáo viên  
 Cấp bậc TRUNG SỸ  
 Đơn vị TRƯỜNG ĐOÀN VĂN HÓA

CỤC QUẢN LÝ  
 1960

(Translation)

THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM

## PERSONAL HEALTH RECORD

FULL NAME	NGUYEN HOANG LONG
POSITION	TEACHER
RANK	SERGEANT
UNIT	CULTURE BATTALION

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

1960

The document reproduced above is a personal health record issued by the army of North Viet-Nam to its personnel. It bears the name Nguyen Hoang Long. It was found on the body of a Viet Cong killed when a North Vietnamese military cargo ship was sunk along the coast of South Viet-Nam's Phu Yen Province in Feb. 1965. Another document in the same name was a permit from the North Vietnamese army for Sgt. Long to have leave in Haiphong in Sept. 1964.



The ship was fairly new and had been made in Communist China. Documents aboard the ship included three North Vietnamese nautical charts (one of the Haiphong area and one of Hong Gay, both in North Viet-Nam, and one of the Tra Vinh area of South Viet-Nam). The military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found. One man had a political history sheet showing he was a member of the 338th Division of the North Vietnamese army. (See Appendix E.)

Also aboard the North Vietnamese ship were: an instruction book for a Chinese Communist navigational device; postcards and letters to addresses in North Viet-Nam; snapshots, including one of a group of men in North Vietnamese army uniforms under a flag of the Hanoi government.

Members of the I.C.C. and representatives of the free press visited the sunken North Vietnamese ship and viewed its cargo. The incident itself underlined in the most dramatic form that Hanoi is behind the continuing campaign of aggression aimed at conquering South Viet-Nam. It made

unmistakably clear that what is happening in South Viet-Nam is not an internal affair but part of a large-scale carefully directed and supported program of armed attack on a sovereign state and a free people.

There have been previous seizures of large stocks of ammunition and weapons and other military supplies that could only have come from Communist sources outside South Viet-Nam. In December 1963 a Republic of Viet-Nam force attacked a VC stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province southwest of Saigon. A large cache of VC equipment was seized. Included in the captured stocks were the following weapons and ammunition, all of Chinese Communist manufacture:

- One 90 mm. rocket launcher;
- 2 carbines (type 53);
- 120 rounds of 75 mm. recoilless rifle ammunition;
- 120 detonating fuzes for recoilless rifle ammunition;
- 14,000 rounds of 7.62 (type P) ammunition;
- 160,000 rounds of 7.62 carbine ammunition;
- 150 fuzes for mortar shells;
- 100,000 rounds of 7.92 Mauser-type ammunition;
- 110 lbs. (approximate) of TNT;
- Two 60 mm. mortars.

These weapons and ammunition are the same as those used in the North Vietnamese army. Some of the 7.62 mm. ammunition was manufactured as recently as 1962.<sup>1</sup>

Materiel is sent into South Viet-Nam from the North by a variety of methods—overland, by river and canal, and by sea. In one instance Vietnamese troops discovered a cache in which the 75 mm. ammunition alone weighed approximately 11½ tons. It has been estimated that it would require more than 150 porters to carry this quantity of ammunition over rough terrain. However, a few sampans, each manned by a few men, could transport it with little difficulty. It is worth noting, in this connection, that the delta where the cache of materiel was seized has 460 miles of seacoast as well as



*120 rounds of Chinese Communist 75 mm. ammunition for recoilless rifle—part of the huge cache of VC weapons and supplies captured at Dinh Tuong in Dec. 1963.*

<sup>1</sup> On Jan. 29, 1964, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam supplied the International Control Commission with a list of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment of Communist origin captured in South Viet-Nam since June 1962. The list is summarized in appendix D.

2,500 miles of canals navigable by large water craft and another 2,200 miles of canals over which sampans can move easily. Much of the transport of large stocks of ammunition is undoubtedly waterborne for at least much of its travel into South Viet-Nam.<sup>2</sup>

Large quantities of chemical components for explosives have been sent into South Viet-Nam for the Viet Cong. During 1963 there were at least 15 incidents in which boats, junks, or sampans were seized with explosives aboard. More than 20 tons of potassium chlorate or nitrate were captured. All these cases were in the delta area, and the majority were on or near the Mekong River. Red

<sup>2</sup> Photographs of additional Viet Cong weapons and ammunition of Communist origin are contained in appendix E.

phosphorus made in Communist China has been among the chemicals captured from the Viet Cong.

The Communists have shown extreme sensitivity to exposure of the fact that war materiel is going to the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam, Communist China, and other Communist countries. A secret document captured from a VC agent last year reflected this sensitivity. The document was sent from VC military headquarters in Bien Hoa Province to subordinate units. It ordered them to "pay special attention to the removal of all the markings and letters on weapons of all types currently employed by units and agencies and manufactured by friendly East European democratic countries or by China." It said incriminating marking should be chiseled off "so that the enemy cannot use it as a propaganda theme every time he captures these weapons."

### III. *North Viet-Nam: Base for Conquest of the South*

The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960 set forth two tasks for its members: "to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam" and "to liberate South Viet-Nam."

The resolutions of the congress described the effort to destroy the legal Government in South Viet-Nam as follows: "The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses."

At the September meeting the Communist leaders in the North called for formation of "a broad national united front." Three months later Hanoi announced creation of the "Front for Liberation of the South." This is the organization that Communist propaganda now credits with guiding the forces of subversion in the South; it is pic-

tured as an organization established and run by the people in the South themselves. At the 1960 Lao Dong Party Congress the tone was different. Then, even before the front existed, the Communist leaders were issuing orders for the group that was being organized behind the scenes in Hanoi. "This front must rally . . ."; "The aims of its struggle are . . ."; "The front must carry out . . ."—this is the way Hanoi and the Communist Party addressed the "Liberation Front" even before its founding.

The Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation; it is neither independent nor southern, and what it seeks is not liberation but subjugation of the South.

In his address to the Third Lao Dong Party Congress, party and government leader Ho Chi Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up the socialist revolution in the North and, at the same time, to step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South."

The year before, writing for *Red Flag*, the Communist Party newspaper of Belgium, Ho had said much the same thing:

We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to *direct and bring to a close* the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution.

In the same vein, the commander-in-chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, spoke at the 1960 party congress of the need to "*step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South.*" Earlier in the year, writing for the Communist Party journal *Hoc Tap* in Hanoi, General Giap described the North as "*the revolutionary base for the whole country.*"

Le Duan, a member of the Politburo and first secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even more explicit when he talked at the party congress about the struggle in the South and the party's role. After noting the difficulties involved in overthrowing the existing order in South Viet-Nam, Le Duan said:

Hence the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, *legal and illegal*—and based on the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, *we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the South.* . . .

Another high official of the Hanoi regime, Truong Chinh, writing in the party organ *Hoc Tap* in April 1961, expressed confidence in the success of the struggle to remove the legal Government in South Viet-Nam because: "North Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, *is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong base for the struggle for national reunification.*"

He outlined the steps by which the Communists expect to achieve control over all Viet-Nam as follows: The "Liberation Front" would destroy the present Government in the South; a "Coali-

tion Government" would be established; this government would agree with the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi regarding national reunification "under one form or another." It takes little imagination to understand the form that is intended.

"Thus," wrote Truong Chinh, "though *South Viet-Nam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means*, the party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct."

The official government radio in Hanoi is used both overtly and covertly to support the Viet Cong effort in South Viet-Nam. Captured agents have testified that the broadcasts are used sometimes to send instructions in veiled code to Viet Cong representatives in the South.

*Hoc Tap* stated frankly in March 1963: "They [the authorities in South Viet-Nam] are well aware that *North Viet-Nam is the firm base for the southern revolution* and the point on which it leans, and that *our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution.*"

In April 1964 the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party issued a directive to all party echelons. It stated: "When the forces of the enemy and the plots of the enemy are considered, it is realized that *the cadres, party members, and people in North Viet-Nam must . . . increase their sense of responsibility in regard to the South Viet-Nam revolution by giving positive and practical support to South Viet-Nam in every field.*"

Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in a Hanoi newspaper in May 1963, underlined the importance of the role of the North Vietnamese army in Hanoi's plans to unify Viet-Nam under Communist rule:

"Our party set forth two strategic tasks to be carried out at the same time: to transform and build socialism in the North and to struggle to unify the country. *Our army is an instrument of the class struggle in carrying out these two strategic tasks.*"

## IV. Organization, Direction, Command, and Control of the Attack on South Viet-Nam Are Centered in Hanoi

The VC military and political apparatus in South Viet-Nam is an extension of an elaborate military and political structure in North Viet-Nam which directs and supplies it with the tools for conquest. The Ho Chi Minh regime has shown that it is ready to allocate every resource that can be spared—whether it be personnel, funds, or equipment—to the cause of overthrowing the legitimate Government in South Viet-Nam and of bringing all Viet-Nam under Communist rule.

### A. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Political direction and control of the Viet Cong is supplied by the Lao Dong Party, i.e. the Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Party agents are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, propaganda, anti-Government demonstrations, and other activities of a political nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering facilities of the party are also at the disposal of the Viet Cong.

Overall direction of the VC movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. Within the Central Committee a special Reunification Department has been established. This has replaced the "Committee for Supervision of the South" mentioned in intelligence reports 2 years ago. It lays down broad strategy for the movement to conquer South Viet-Nam.

Until March 1962 there were two principal administrative divisions in the VC structure in the South. One was the Interzone of South-Central Viet-Nam (sometimes called Interzone 5); the other was the Nambo Region. In a 1962 reorganization these were merged into one, called the Central Office for South Viet-Nam. The Central Committee, through its Reunification Department, issues directives to the Central Office, which translates them into specific orders for the appropriate subordinate command.

Under the Central Office are six regional units (V through IX) plus the special zone of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh. A regional committee responsible to the Central Office directs VC activities in each region. Each regional committee has specialized units responsible for liaison, propaganda, training, personnel, subversive activities, espionage, military bases, and the like.

Below each regional committee are similarly structured units at the province and district levels. At the base of the Communist pyramid are the individual party cells, which may be organized on a geographic base or within social or occupational groups. The elaborateness of the party unit and the extent to which it operates openly or underground is determined mainly by the extent of VC control over the area concerned.

### 1. The "Liberation Front"

The National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam is the screen behind which the Communists carry out their program of conquest. It is the creature of the Communist Government in Hanoi. As noted above the Communist Party in the North demanded establishment of such a "front" three months before its formation was actually announced in December 1960. It was designed to create the illusion that the Viet Cong campaign of subversion was truly indigenous to South Viet-Nam rather than an externally directed Communist plan.

The front has won support primarily from the Communist world. Its radio faithfully repeats the propaganda themes of Hanoi and Peiping. When its representatives travel abroad, they do so with North Vietnamese passports and sponsorship.<sup>1</sup> The front's program copies that of the Lao Dong Party in North Viet-Nam.

<sup>1</sup> Pictures of North Vietnamese passports and travel documents used by front officials are in appendix F.

In late 1961, in still another effort to conceal the extent of Communist domination of the front, the Communists announced formation of a new Marxist political unit, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). This mechanism provided a way to explain the Communist presence in the front while at the same time making it appear that the Communist voice was only one of several affiliated organizations in the front. The PRP itself claimed direct descent from the original Indo-Chinese Communist Party and from the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi.<sup>2</sup>

## B. MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Military affairs of the Viet Cong are the responsibility of High Command of the People's Army of North Viet-Nam and the Ministry of Defense, under close supervision from the Lao Dong Party. These responsibilities include operational plans, assignments of individuals and regular units, training programs, infiltration of military personnel and supplies, military communications, tactical intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six military regions are the same as those of the VC political organization.

The military structure of the Viet Cong is an integral part of the political machinery that controls every facet of VC activity in South Viet-Nam under Hanoi's overall direction. Each political headquarters from the Central Office down to the village has a military component which controls day-to-day military operations. Similarly, each military headquarters has a political element, an individual or a small staff. This meshing of political and military activity is designed to insure the closest cooperation in support of the total Communist mission. It also gives assurance of political control over the military.

Associated with the Central Office, believed to be located in Tay Ninh Province, is a military headquarters. Through this headquarters, as well as through other channels, Hanoi maintains direct contact with its principal military units in the South.

<sup>2</sup> For evidence that the People's Revolutionary Party in the South and the Communist Lao Dong Party in the North are one Party, see appendix G.

In addition to its supervision of the general military effort of the VC, the military section of the Central Office is believed to have direct command of two regimental headquarters and a number of security companies.

The hard core of the VC military organization is the full-time regular unit usually based on a province or region. These are well-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. They follow a rigid training schedule that is roughly two-thirds military and one-third political in content. This compares with the 50-50 proportion for district units and the 70 percent political and 30 percent military content of the village guerrilla's training.

The size of the Viet Cong regular forces has grown steadily in recent years. For example, the Viet Cong have five regimental headquarters compared with two in 1961. And the main VC force is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies. Hard-core VC strength now is estimated at about 35,000, whereas it was less than 20,000 in 1961.

The main force battalions are well armed with a variety of effective weapons including 75-mm. recoilless rifles and 81-82-mm. mortars. The companies and smaller units are equally well equipped and have 57-mm. recoilless rifles and 60-mm. mortars in their inventory. It is estimated that the Viet Cong have at least 130 81-mm. mortars and 300 60-mm. mortars. There is no precise estimate for the number of recoilless rifles in their hands, but it is believed that most main force units are equipped with them. In at least one recent action the Viet Cong employed a 75-mm. pack howitzer. This mobile weapon, which has a range of 8,500 yards, will increase the Viet Cong capabilities to launch long-range attacks against many stationary targets in the country.

Supporting the main force units of the Viet Cong are an estimated 60,000-80,000 part-time guerrillas. They are generally organized at the district level where there are likely to be several companies of 50 or more men each. These troops receive only half pay, which means they must work at least part of the time to eke out a living.

Below the irregular guerrilla forces of the district are the part-time, village-based guerrillas.



*The smoking ruins of a Cao Dai temple in Tan Hanh village, Vinh Long Province, burned down by VC terrorists on Aug. 10, 1964. The 64-year-old caretaker died in the flames.*

They are available for assignment by higher headquarters and are used for harassment and sabotage. They are expected to warn nearby VC units of the approach of any force of the legal government. They provide a pool for recruitment into the VC district forces.

The record shows that many of the village guerrillas are dragooned into service with the Viet Cong. Some are kidnaped; others are threatened; still others join to prevent their families from being harmed. Once in the Viet Cong net, many are reluctant to leave for fear of punishment by the authorities or reprisal by the Communists.

Lam Van Chuoi is a typical example. He was a member of the Village Civil Defense force in his home village in Kien Giang province. In March 1960, he was kidnaped by the Viet Cong and kept a prisoner in the highlands for one month. There he was subjected to intense propaganda and indoctrination. He was returned to his village but kept under close observation and steady pressure. Finally, he was convinced he must join the VC.

Later, he was transferred to a Communist military unit in another province. After learning of the Government's "Open Arms" program, he decided to defect from the VC. In May 1964, he walked into a Government outpost and asked for protection.

Money to pay the regular VC units comes from a variety of sources. Funds are sent from Hanoi. "Taxes" are extorted from the local population. Landowners and plantation operators often must pay a tribute to the VC as the price for not having their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation companies have been forced to pay the VC or face the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged. Officials and wealthy people have been kidnaped for ransom. The VC have often stopped buses and taken the money and valuables of all on board.

For the most part, the VC have concentrated their attention on individuals, isolated or poorly defended outposts, and small centers of population. They have mercilessly killed or kidnaped thousands of village chiefs and other local officials.

But over the past year the VC have moved into larger unit operations. Their ability to operate on a battalion-level or larger has substantially increased.

## C. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

A key element in the Viet Cong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the Central Research Agency (C.R.A.) (Cuc Nghien-Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Viet-Nam. This agency is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities of both the Lao Dong Party and the North Vietnamese armed forces for information, personnel, and facilities.

The C.R.A. reportedly operates under the close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi government reportedly sit on its directing committee, including Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

Considerable information on the organization of the C.R.A. has become available from captured Viet Cong agents and from the work of intelligence agents of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Much of this information cannot be made public for security reasons, but it is possible to describe the C.R.A. organization and its operations in broad outline.

The headquarters of the C.R.A. in Hanoi is divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. Each section has units to handle the specialized activities of its particular area of responsibility. The research section, for example, has subsections that handle political, economic, and military affairs respectively.

C.R.A. headquarters directs a number of special centers for overseas operations. One such center maintains intelligence channels to overseas areas.

It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay.

A second special center is responsible for VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line," the border with South Viet-Nam. This unit, based in Vinh Linh in southeast North Viet-Nam, is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the South by sea. It also cooperates with the North Vietnamese army in planning and carrying out infiltration. The C.R.A. maintains intelligence bases in Laos and other countries.

Inside South Viet-Nam the Viet Cong have a large intelligence network. Some of its units are responsible for receiving and sending on agents arriving from the North. They feed and give instructions to groups infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. They take delivery of equipment and supplies received from the North and relay them to Viet Cong units in the South.

Many Viet Cong agents have been captured in Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the C.R.A. to penetrate all Republic of Viet-Nam Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations. Party and military intelligence units and agents work closely with the C.R.A.

Each of the main centers operating under C.R.A. headquarters has its own sections and units designed to carry out its main functions. The center at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main infiltration effort of the Viet Cong, has separate sections for radio communications, coding, documentation and training, and liaison. It also has specialized units for infiltration through the mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action" in the mountain area.

The C.R.A. maintains a large and expanding radio communications network. Agents also are used to carry messages, usually in secret writing or memorized.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operation in support of the Viet Cong is one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Charts of the VC organizational structure are in appendix H.



## *V. A Brief History of Hanoi's Campaign of Aggression Against South Viet-Nam*

While negotiating an end to the Indochina War at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all former French territory in Southeast Asia. When Viet-Nam was partitioned, thousands of carefully selected party members were ordered to remain in place in the South and keep their secret apparatus intact to help promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were stored away for future use. Guerrilla fighters re-joined their families to await the party's call. Others withdrew to remote jungle and mountain hideouts. The majority—an estimated 90,000—were moved to North Viet-Nam.

Hanoi's original calculation was that all of Viet-Nam would fall under its control without resort to force. For this purpose, Communist cadres were ordered to penetrate official and non-official agencies, to propagandize and sow confusion, and generally to use all means short of open violence to aggravate war-torn conditions and to weaken South Viet-Nam's Government and social fabric.

South Viet-Nam's refusal to fall in with Hanoi's scheme for peaceful takeover came as a heavy blow to the Communists. Meantime, the Government had stepped up efforts to blunt Viet Cong subversion and to expose Communist agents. Morale in the Communist organization in the South dropped sharply. Defections were numerous.

Among South Vietnamese, hope rose that their nation could have a peaceful and independent future, free of Communist domination. The country went to work. The years after 1955 were a period of steady progress and growing prosperity.

Food production levels of the prewar years were reached and surpassed. While per capita food output was dropping 10 percent in the North from 1956 to 1960, it rose 20 percent in the South. By 1963, it had risen 30 percent—despite the disruption in the countryside caused by intensified Viet Cong military attacks and terrorism. The authorities in the North admitted openly to continuing annual failures to achieve food production goals.

Production of textiles increased in the South more than 20 percent in one year (1958). In the same year, South Viet-Nam's sugar crop increased more than 100 percent. Despite North Viet-Nam's vastly larger industrial complex, South Viet-Nam's per capita gross national product in 1960 was estimated at \$110 a person while it was only \$70 in the North.


More than 900,000 refugees who had fled from Communist rule in the North were successfully settled in South Viet-Nam. An agrarian reform program was instituted. The elementary school population nearly quadrupled between 1956 and 1960. And so it went—a record of steady improvement in the lives of the people. It was intolerable for the rulers in Hanoi; under peaceful conditions, the South was outstripping the North. They were losing the battle of peaceful competition and decided to use violence and terror to gain their ends.

After 1956 Hanoi rebuilt, reorganized, and expanded its covert political and military machinery in the South. Defectors were replaced by trained personnel from party ranks in the North. Military units and political cells were enlarged and were given new leaders, equipment, and intensified training. Recruitment was pushed. In short, Hanoi and its forces in the South prepared to take by force and violence what they had failed to achieve by other means.

By 1958 the use of terror by the Viet Cong increased appreciably. It was used both to win prestige and to back up demands for support from the people, support that political and propaganda appeals had failed to produce. It was also designed to embarrass the Government in Saigon and raise doubts about its ability to maintain internal order and to assure the personal security of its people. From 1959 through 1961, the pace of Viet Cong terrorism and armed attacks accelerated substantially.

The situation at the end of 1961 was so grave that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam asked the United States for increased military assistance. That request was met. Meantime, the program of strategic hamlets, designed to improve





*The wreckage of a civilian bus destroyed by a Viet Cong mine on Mar. 22, 1964, in Long An Province; 22 civilian passengers, including 6 children, were killed in the incident.*

the peasant's livelihood and give him some protection against Viet Cong harassment and pressure, was pushed energetically.

But the Viet Cong did not stand still. To meet the changing situation, they tightened their organization and adopted new tactics, with increasing emphasis on terrorism, sabotage, and armed attacks by small groups. They also introduced from the North technicians in fields such as armor and antiaircraft. Heavier weapons were sent in to the regular guerrilla forces.

The military and insurgency situation was complicated by a quite separate internal political struggle in South Viet-Nam, which led in November 1963 to the removal of the Diem government and its replacement with a new one. Effective power was placed in the hands of a Military Revolutionary Council. There have been a number of changes in the leadership and composition of the Government in Saigon in the ensuing period.

These internal developments and distractions gave the Viet Cong an invaluable opportunity, and they took advantage of it. Viet Cong agents did what they could to encourage disaffection and to exploit demonstrations in Saigon and elsewhere. In the countryside the Communists consolidated their hold over some areas and enlarged their mili-

tary and political apparatus by increased infiltration. Increasingly they struck at remote outposts and the most vulnerable of the new strategic hamlets and expanded their campaign of aggressive attacks, sabotage, and terror.

Any official, worker, or establishment that represents a service to the people by the Government in Saigon is fair game for the Viet Cong. Schools have been among their favorite targets. Through harassment, the murder of teachers, and sabotage of buildings, the Viet Cong succeeded in closing hundreds of schools and interrupting the education of tens of thousands of youngsters.

Hospitals and medical clinics have often been attacked as part of the anti-Government campaign and also because such attacks provide the Viet Cong with needed medical supplies. The Communists have encouraged people in rural areas to oppose the Government's antimalaria teams, and some of the workers have been killed. Village and town offices, police stations, and agricultural research stations are high on the list of preferred targets for the Viet Cong.

In 1964, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs and other Government officials were killed outright by the Viet Cong and 1,131 were kidnapped. More than 1,350 civilians were killed in bombings



*The maternity hospital of My Phuoc Tay in Dinh Tuong Province, destroyed by Viet Cong terrorists on Apr. 8, 1964*

and other acts of sabotage. And at least 8,400 civilians were kidnaped by the Viet Cong.<sup>1</sup>

Today the war in Viet-Nam has reached new levels of intensity. The elaborate effort by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam to conquer the South has grown, not diminished. Military men, technicians, political organizers, propagandists, and secret agents have been infiltrating into the Republic of Viet-Nam from the North in growing numbers. The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, has increased. Communications links with Hanoi are extensive. Despite the heavy casualties of 3 years of fighting, the hard-core VC force is considerably larger now than it was at the end of 1961.

The Government in Saigon has undertaken vigorous action to meet the new threat. The United States and other free countries have increased their assistance to the Vietnamese Government and people. Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Viet-Nam in 1964, and he promised the Vietnamese: "We shall remain at your side until the aggression from the North has been defeated.

<sup>1</sup> For additional details of VC terrorism, see appendix I

until it has been completely rooted out and this land enjoys the peace which it deserves."

President Johnson has repeatedly stressed that the United States' goal is to see peace secured in Southeast Asia. But he has noted that "that will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace."

Though it has been apparent for years that the regime in Hanoi was conducting a campaign of conquest against South Viet-Nam, the Government in Saigon and the Government of the United States both hoped that the danger could be met within South Viet-Nam itself. The hope that any widening of the conflict might be avoided was stated frequently.

The leaders in Hanoi chose to respond with greater violence. They apparently interpreted restraint as indicating lack of will. Their efforts were pressed with greater vigor and armed attacks and incidents of terror multiplied.

Clearly the restraint of the past was not providing adequately for the defense of South Viet-Nam against Hanoi's open aggression. It was mutually agreed between the Governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States that further

means for providing for South Viet-Nam's defense were required. Therefore, air strikes have been made against some of the military assembly points and supply bases from which North Viet-Nam is conducting its aggression against the South. These strikes constitute a limited response fitted to the aggression that produced them.

Until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt its intervention in the South, or until effective steps are taken to maintain peace and security in the area, the Governments of South Viet-Nam and the United States will continue necessary measures of defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Viet-Nam.

## VI. *Conclusion*

The evidence presented in this report could be multiplied many times with similar examples of the drive of the Hanoi regime to extend its rule over South Viet-Nam.

The record is conclusive. It establishes beyond question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South. It shows that North Viet-Nam has intensified its efforts in the years since it was condemned by the International Control Commission. It proves that Hanoi continues to press its systematic program of armed aggression into South Viet-Nam. This aggression violates the United Nations Charter. It is directly contrary to the Geneva accords of 1954 and of 1962 to which North Viet-Nam is a party. It shatters the peace of Southeast Asia. It is a fundamental threat to

the freedom and security of South Viet-Nam.

The people of South Viet-Nam have chosen to resist this threat. At their request, the United States has taken its place beside them in their defensive struggle.

The United States seeks no territory, no military bases, no favored position. But we have learned the meaning of aggression elsewhere in the post-war world, and we have met it.

If peace can be restored in South Viet-Nam, the United States will be ready at once to reduce its military involvement. But it will not abandon friends who want to remain free. It will do what must be done to help them. The choice now between peace and continued and increasingly destructive conflict is one for the authorities in Hanoi to make.

## APPENDIX A

### Findings of the International Control Commission

(See Introduction, page 1)

On June 2, 1962, the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam (I.C.C.) sent a special report to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Soviet Union in their role as Cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. The I.C.C. is composed of delegates from India (chairman), Canada, and Poland.

In its report the I.C.C. noted the following findings of the Commission's Legal Committee:

Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

In examining the complaints and the supporting material in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the fur-

ther conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN [People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. The use of the Zone in the North for such activities is in violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

The I.C.C. report then stated:

The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 in specific instances. The Polish delegation dissents from these conclusions. On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case.


The full text of the I.C.C. report is contained in a publication, "Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China" issued by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State on July 2, 1962.

## APPENDIX B


### Infiltration of Military Personnel From North Viet-Nam Into South Viet-Nam

(See section I, B.)

1. Map showing the route over which Huynh Duc Tha, deputy commander of a Viet Cong company, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam from the North in Mar.-Apr. 1962. Tha surrendered to Government forces in July 1963.



2. Map showing the infiltration route of VC Master Sergeant Tran Huu Hung, who was taken prisoner in June 1963.



## APPENDIX C

### Detail on Military Infiltration With Case Studies

(See section I. B and C.)

The following table shows the scale of infiltration of military personnel from North Viet-Nam into the South since 1959. The confirmed list is based on information on infiltration groups from at least two independent sources.

Year	Confirmed	Estimated additional	Total
1959-60	1,800	2,700	4,500
1961	3,750	1,650	5,400
1962	5,400	7,000	12,400
1963	4,200	3,200	7,400
1964	4,400	3,000	7,400
Total	19,550	17,550	37,100

Photographs and brief case histories of typical Viet Cong who were sent into South Viet-Nam by the authorities in Hanoi follow.

**Name:** Le Van Thanh

**Alias:** Huu Tam

**Date and place of birth:** July 12, 1936. Hoa Hao hamlet, Cat Tai village, Phu Cat district (Binh Dinh)

**Rank and position in North Viet-Nam:** Lt., formerly platoon leader of signal platoon of 3d Bn., 90th Regt., 324th Div.

**VC position in South Viet-Nam:** Platoon leader of signal platoon of 95th Bn., 2d Regt., 5th Inter-Region

**Date entered South Viet-Nam:** Departed Nov. 27, 1961, arrived Do Xa station early Feb. 1962

**Date, place, and circumstance of defection:** Rallied to Government at Nhon Loc post, Nghia Hanh district (Quang Ngai) May 24, 1962



**Name:** La Thanh

**Alias:** Nguyen Ba Tong - La Giau

**Date and place of birth:** 1928, Can Tho city (Phong Dinh)

**Rank and position in North Viet-Nam:** Sr. sgt., formerly squad leader in charge of construction of barracks for 338th Div.

**VC position in South Viet-Nam:** Squad leader, 8th Squad, 3d Platoon, 3d Co., 21SB Bn. (War Zone D)

**Date entered South Viet-Nam:** Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed Apr. 4, 1962, arrived War Zone D early Aug. 1962

**Date, place, and circumstance of defection:** Rallied at Cau Song Be (bridge) post Sept. 8, 1962, with 1 MAS 36



**Name:** Le Van Quyen

**Alias:** Ho Hai, Hong Thanh

**Date and place of birth:** 1929, Tan Binh Thanh village, Cho Gao district (My Tho)

**Rank and position in North Viet-Nam:** Lt., formerly assigned to 338th Brigade as instructor on heavy weapons such as 57 mm. recoilless rifle and machinegun

**VC position in South Viet-Nam:** Platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 2d Co., Infiltration Group 15

**Date entered South Viet-Nam:** Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed Apr. 3, 1962, arrived Suoi Da (War Zone D) Sept. 10, 1962

**Date, place, and circumstance of defection:** Rallied at Hien Lien district (Phuoc Thanh) Oct. 7, 1962





**Name:** Nguyen Van Do

**Party name:** Thanh Minh

**Infiltration alias:** Nguyen Thuan

**Date and place of birth:** 1923, Thuan Giao village, Lai Thieu district (Binh Duong)

**Rank and position in North Viet-Nam:** Sr. capt. (Bn comdr.) 1st Bn., 338th Brigade

**VC position in South Viet-Nam:** Subject was to be appointed comdr. of Phuoc Tuy Province Main Force Battalion

**Date entered South Viet-Nam:** Comdr. of Infiltration Group H. 26; departed Xuan Mai, Ha Dong (North Viet-Nam) July 4, 1963; arrived Ban Me Thuot Oct. 23, 1963

**Date, place, and circumstance of defection:** Rallied at Ban Don post, Ban Me Thuot, Oct. 23, 1963, while guiding Group H.26 to Hai Yen Zone



**Name:** Nguyen Thanh Phi

**Party name:** Hung Phuong

**Infiltration alias:** Nguyen Tu

**Date and place of birth:** Nov. 16, 1926, Thanh Van village, Thanh Chuong district (Nghe An)

**Rank and position in North Viet-Nam:** Doctor, chief of internal disease section, Tiep Viet Hospital

**VC position in South Viet-Nam:** Doctor, health team leader, 5th Region base construction group (Do Xa)

**Date entered South Viet-Nam:** Mar. 1962

**Date, place, and circumstance of capture:** Captured by South Vietnamese Armed Forces May 4, 1963, with 1 12mm. Colt pistol and 5 rounds



**Name:** Le Van Net

**Party name:** Le Hung Tien

**Infiltration alias:** Le Na

**Date and place of birth:** 1924, Tan Hiep village, Go Cong Dinh Thung

**Rank and position in North Viet-Nam:** Discharged Lt. served in Co Dinh chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) with grade of sr. sgt.

**VC position in South Viet-Nam:** Sr. sgt., 6th Squad, 2d Platoon, Infiltration Group H 26

**Date entered South Viet-Nam:** Late June 1963 with Infiltration Group H 26

**Date, place, and circumstance of capture:** Captured Nov. 16, 1963, by inhabitants in strategic hamlet in Ban Me Thout (Darlact) with 1 Communist Chinese rifle and 50 rounds.



**Name:** Van Cong Khanh

**Party name:** Pham Tien

**Date and place of birth:** 1924, An Hoi village, Chau Thanh district (Kien Hoa)

**Rank and position in North Viet-Nam:** Discharged and reassigned to Co Dinh chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) as sr. sgt.

**VC position in South Viet-Nam:** Aspirant, leader of 7th Squad, 3d Platoon, 608th Engineer Co. subordinate to Hdqtrs. Region 7

**Date entered South Viet-Nam:** Accompanied Group 49 infiltrated into South Viet-Nam Mar. 18, 1962

**Date, place, and circumstance of capture:** Captured Nov. 23, 1962, in Buug Dia hamlet



**Name:** Nguyen Thanh Hoa

**Party name:** Quoc

**Infiltration alias:** Nguyen Quoc Trung

**Date and place of birth:** 1917, Phong Coc village, Ha Nam canon (Quang Yen)

**Rank and position in North Viet-Nam:** Capt., discharged and reassigned to Chu Ne agricultural camp May 1957

**VC position in South Viet-Nam:** Comdr., 4th Main Force Battalion

**Date entered South Viet-Nam:** Accompanied Infiltration Group 52 departed Xuan Mai Apr. 13, 1961, arrived about Aug. 1961

**Date, place, and circumstance of capture:** Captured by South Vietnamese Armed Forces with 1 PA 38 (pistol) in Quen Long (Dinh Tuong), Aug. 1962



**Name:** Tran van Khoa

**Alias:** Tran Hong Hai

**Date and place of birth:** 1935, Giong Gach hamlet, An Hiep village Ba Tri district, Ben Tre Province (Kien Hoa)

**Rank and position in North Viet-Nam:** Sgt., formerly driver of Transportation Group 3 of (Hanoi) Logistical Bureau

**VC position in South Viet-Nam:** Member of 46th Infiltration Co.; cover designation V 2 (infiltrated unit)

**Date entered South Viet-Nam:** Accompanied the 46th Infiltration Co. departed for South Viet-Nam Apr. 17, 1962

**Date, place, and circumstance of capture:** Captured by South Vietnamese Rangers in ambush (after being wounded) along with 1 MAS 36 July 7, 1962, in Phuoc Long Province



# APPENDIX D

## List of Communist Weapons Captured in South Viet-Nam

(See section II.)

On January 29, 1964, the Government of Viet-Nam submitted to the International Control Commission a list of weapons and other military equipment which had been captured from the Viet Cong. The weapons and equipment came from Communist sources outside South Viet-Nam and obviously had been introduced clandestinely into the country in support of the Viet Cong campaign of conquest directed by Hanoi.

### I. CHINESE COMMUNIST ORIGIN

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
75-mm. recoilless rifle . . . . .	1	9/10/63 . .	An Xuyen Province
	1	12/2-6/63 .	An Xuyen Province
	1	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total . . . . .	3		
57-mm. recoilless gun . . . . .	1	11/25/62 .	Phuoc Chau in Quang Tin (1 gun and 7 gun carriages)
		12/5/62 .	Phu Bon (1 gun carriage)
	2	8/31/63 . .	Province of Quang Ngai
Total . . . . .	3 guns (8 gun carriages)		
Shells for 75-mm. gun (shells bear markings in Chinese characters. On some shells, markings were scratched out and replaced by "American" markings.)	8	11/24/63 . .	Province of An Xuyen
	120	12/22/63 . .	Operation Duc Thang at Dinh Tuong
Total . . . . .	128		
Shells for 57-mm. gun . . . . .	49	11/25/62 .	Phuoc Chau, Province of Quang Tin
	8	2/20/63 .	Viet Cong attack on the post of Ben Heo (Tay Ninh)
	33	5/24/63 .	On a Viet Cong vessel on the Bassac River
	6	8/31/63 .	Quang Ngai
	1	10/8/63 .	Province of Binh Dinh
	58	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total . . . . .	155		

I. CHINESE COMMUNIST ORIGIN—*Continued*

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
80-mm. mortar . . . . .	1	3/25/63 . .	Province of Tay Ninh
60-mm. mortar . . . . .	1	1/7/63 . . .	Phuoc Thanh
	2	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total . . . . .	3		
Shells for 60-mm. mortar . . . . .	18	9/10/63 . . .	Province of An Xuyen
	165	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total . . . . .	183		
90-mm. bazooka . . . . .	1	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong.
Caliber 27-mm. rocket launcher . . . . .	2	6/10/62 . . .	Provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Duc.
Total . . . . .	3		
Caliber 7.92-mm. model 08 Maxim machinegun . . . . .	2	9/10/63 . . .	Province of An Xuyen
	4	12/21/63 . .	Chuong Thien
Total . . . . .	6		
MP-82 rocket . . . . .	142	4/24/63 . . .	Quang Ngai
TNT explosives . . . . .	365 charges	6/13/62 . . .	Quang Duc
	43	11/25/62 . .	Phuoc Chau (Quang Tin)
	29	5/7/63 . . . .	Can Tho
	140	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total . . . . .	577 charges		
Red phosphorous . . . . .	5 kg.	4/19/63 . . .	Province of Kien Phong
Potassium chlorate . . . . .	17 tons	Sept '62 . . .	On a Viet Cong vessel at Phu Quoc
	2 tons	4/19/63 . . .	Province of Kien Phong
	150 kg.	7/10-15/63 .	Phu Quoc
Total . . . . .	19 tons 155 kg		
Cartridges for 7.92-mm. machinegun . . . . .	100,000	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Detonating fuses for 60-mm. mortar shell . . . . .	150	. . . do . . .	Do.

## II. SOVIET ORIGIN

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
MP-82 rifle . . . . .		5/10/62 . .	Binh Dinh
Launching cartridges . . . . .		. . do . .	Do.
Mossin Nagant carbine (with automatic bayonet).	1	6/13/63 . .	Kien Phong
	2	7/13/63 . .	Long An
	5	7/20/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
	7	9/8/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total . . . . .	15		
Rifles . . . . .	6	10/6/63 . .	Long An
	1	10/19/63 .	Dinh Tuong
	11	11/6/63 . .	Vinh Binh
	1	11/17/63 .	Dinh Tuong
	1	11/25/63 .	Hau Nghia
	1	12/6/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
	8	12/7/63 . .	Phong Dinh
	1	12/12/63 .	Kien Tuong
	1	12/13/63 .	An Xuyen
	1	12/16/63 .	Kien Giang
	1	. . do . .	Ba Xuyen
	3	. . do . .	An Xuyen
	1	12/17/63 .	Phong Dinh
	1	12/20/63 .	Kien Hoa
	6	12/21/63 .	Chuong Thien
	2	12/22/63 .	Dinh Tuong
Total . . . . .	46		
Automatic pistol . . . . .	1	10/19/63 .	Phan Thiet
Grenades . . . . .	5		Long An
Rifle cartridges . . . . .	160,000	12/22/63 .	Dinh Tuong
Submachinegun (machine pistol) . .	2	9/23/63 . .	Long Xuyen

### III. CZECH ORIGIN

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
7.65-mm. automatic pistol . . . . .	1	1/2/63 . . .	On person of Viet Cong leader arrested at Phu Yen
K-50 submachinegun . . . . .	2	11/25/62 . .	Quang Tin
	1	11/29/62 . .	Phuoc Long
	7	4/24/63 . .	Quang Ngai
	5	5/9/63 . . .	Quang Tin
	2	7/11/63 . .	Operation Hau Giang
	3	8/31/63 . .	Quang Ngai
	1	9/8/63 . . .	Dinh Tuong
	1	9/16/63 . .	Long An
	1	10/17/63 . .	Quang Nam
	2	11/13/63 . .	Phu Yen
	1	-----do-----	At Hué
	9	10/8/63 . .	Binh Dinh
	1		Operation Phuoc Binh Thang
	1	12/20/63 . .	Kien Hoa
	1	12/26/63 . .	Chuong Thien
	1	12/17/63 . .	Long Xuyen
Total . . . . .	40		
Rifles . . . . .	9	9/10/63 . .	An Xuyen
	1	10/19/63 . .	Chuong Thien
	1	11/6/63 . . .	Ba Xuyen
	2	11/9/63 . . .	Chuong Thien
	3	11/13/63 . .	Kien Giang
	1	11/17/63 . .	Ba Xuyen
	2	11/26/63 . .	Hau Nghia
	1	12/2/63 . . .	Phong Dinh
	6	12/21/63 . .	Chuong Thien
Total . . . . .	26		

### III. CZECH ORIGIN—Continued

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Machinegun cartridges . . . . .	14, 000	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Grenade launcher . . . . .	1	7/14/63 . .	Long An
3.5 antitank bazooka . . . . .	1	12/22/63 . .	Din Tuong

### IV. (a) WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MODIFIED BY THE REGULAR ARMY OF NORTH VIET-NAM

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Modified MAT-49. . . . .	16	11/25/62 . .	Quang Tin
	2	12/ 5/63 . .	Phu Bon
	6	11/13/63 . .	
Total . . . . .	24		
12.7-mm. machinegun . . . . .	2	11/24/63 . .	Operation at Duc Hoa

### IV. (b) MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE MANUFACTURE

Uniform . . . . .		12/21/62 . .	Phuoc Thanh
Helmets . . . . .	16	10/8-10/63 .	Kien Hoa
Socks . . . . .	(No number given). . . . .	12/21/62 . .	Phuoc Thanh
Sweaters (made in Ha Dong) . . . . .	do . . . . .		Do.
Belts (made in Hanoi) . . . . .	do . . . . .		Do.
Mess Kits (made in Haiphong) . . . . .	do . . . . .		Do.




## APPENDIX E

### Photos of Captured Viet Cong Weapons and Ammunition From External Communist Sources

(See section II.)

The following are photographs of some of the many weapons and the large stocks of ammunition supplied to the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam from external Communist sources.



4 North Vietnamese nautical chart of Haiphong harbor and channel. It was found aboard the North Vietnamese cargo vessel that delivered weapons, ammunition, and other supplies to the Viet Cong. It was sunk by the South Vietnamese Air Force along the coast of Phu Yen Province on Feb. 16, 1965. (For details, see section II, pp. 15-17.)

ĐƠN

GIẤY NGHỈ PHÉP

Họ và tên: NGUYỄN HOÀNG LONG  
Số: 114.74

Ngày 18 tháng 9 năm 1965

Đơn xin đi xe lửa

Ngày 18 tháng 9 năm 1965

Thị trấn

ĐƠN XIN ĐI XE LỬA

Chú thích:

Ngày cấp: 18/9/65  
Địa điểm: TP. Hà Nội

Leave slip of a North Vietnamese soldier, Nguyen Hoang Long, found on his body at the site of the sinking of the munitions supply ship in Phu Yen Province. The heading shows he was a member of Unit 1270 of the People's Army of North Viet-Nam. He was on leave in Haiphong (North Viet-Nam) from Sept. 19 to Sept. 25, 1965. Below, a page from the Communist Party record of Sergeant Long, also found on his body, showing he was a soldier of the North Vietnamese army's 338th Division. One notation mentions his being "on missions in distant areas," the phrase used in Hanoi to mean South Viet-Nam.

PHIẾU CHUYỂN ĐẢNG TÍCH  
CỦA ĐẢNG VIÊN

1. Họ và tên: NGUYỄN HOÀNG LONG  
2. Ngày sinh: 18/9/1935  
3. Quê quán: xã An Thái, huyện  
4. Chức vụ: Sĩ quan  
5. Chức vụ hiện tại: Sĩ quan  
6. Thành phần gia đình: Trung ương viên  
7. Thời gian làm việc: 1955 - 1965  
8. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
9. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
10. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
11. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
12. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
13. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
14. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
15. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
16. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
17. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
18. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
19. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
20. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
21. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
22. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
23. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
24. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
25. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
26. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
27. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
28. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
29. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
30. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
31. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
32. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
33. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
34. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
35. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
36. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
37. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
38. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
39. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
40. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
41. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
42. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
43. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
44. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
45. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
46. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
47. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
48. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
49. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
50. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
51. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
52. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
53. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
54. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
55. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
56. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
57. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
58. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
59. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
60. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
61. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
62. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
63. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
64. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
65. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
66. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
67. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
68. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
69. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
70. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
71. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
72. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
73. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
74. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
75. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
76. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
77. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
78. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
79. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
80. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
81. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
82. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
83. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
84. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
85. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
86. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
87. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
88. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
89. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
90. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
91. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
92. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
93. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
94. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
95. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
96. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
97. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
98. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
99. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965  
100. Thời gian chuyển đảng: 1965