



POW-MIA FACT BOOK



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JULY 1987

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INTRODUCTION

This Fact Book has been prepared in support of the U.S. Government's effort to ensure that public awareness on the POW/MIA issue is based on current, factual information. It outlines the extent of the problem and summarizes U.S. Government efforts to resolve the matter.

President Reagan, his entire Administration, and a strong bipartisan consensus in the Congress are deeply committed to obtaining the fullest possible accounting for our POWs/MIAs. The question of resolving the fate of these Americans is a matter of the highest national priority. During his weekly radio address to the nation on July 19, 1986, the President said:

This is, of course, a difficult and emotional issue -- it's no secret there are those who want to promise easy solutions or even exploit this issue for selfish reasons. But we have made progress and the truth is we will continue to make progress as long as we stick with the facts and keep faith with each other and demonstrate the unity of purpose so fundamental to our cause. All Americans, after all, have a common goal in this endeavor: freedom for any prisoner who may still be held in Southeast Asia and justice for all of the families who have worked so long to resolve the fate of our POWs and MIAs in Vietnam. They were our loved ones and our fellow Americans, and they were, I'm certain time will tell, part of a noble cause and history's heroes.

All involved government agencies are fully dedicated to resolving the fate of Americans still missing in Indochina as a result of the Vietnam War. The Department of Defense feels a very special commitment and a deep debt of gratitude to these Americans for serving our country in difficult times. But, just as importantly, those currently serving and those who will do so in the future must know they will never be abandoned, regardless of trying and difficult circumstances. Our efforts will continue until we have reached this goal.

John A. Keating Jr.

GENERAL SUMMARY

During the six years of this Administration, the United States Government has accelerated negotiations with the communist governments of Indochina in an effort to obtain the fullest possible accounting for Americans lost during the military conflict there. Although there has been an increase in cooperation, the Indochinese governments' response to us has been minimal in comparison to what they are capable of doing

There is a great deal of evidence that the governments of Vietnam and Laos hold information which could resolve the status of many unaccounted for Americans.

Despite the difficulties involved, the United States Government is deeply committed to resolving the POW/MIA issue. This issue is a humanitarian matter of such importance that it is pursued without linkage to other issues which separate the U.S. and the Indochinese governments, an agreement reached through policy-level negotiations.

In an address before the National League of POW/MIA Families on July 19, 1985, Vice President George Bush stated:

'The return of all POWs, the fullest possible accounting for those still missing and repatriation of the remains of those who died serving our nation -- these goals are the highest national priority

'In the area of diplomacy, it means that all parties understand the importance of the POW and MIA issue to the American people. Every government involved understands that, as a practical matter, the American people would not allow normalized relations with the United States until we have the fullest possible accounting for our men.

'And, finally, top priority means that we do not rule out the possibility that Americans are still alive and held captive in Indochina.

'Well, if we can get hard evidence that Americans are still held in Vietnamese prisons, we're pledged to do whatever's necessary to get them out.'

U.S. UNACCOUNTED FOR PERSONNEL

Army	702
Air Force	899
Navy	480
Marines	289
Coast Guard	1
Civilians	42
Total	2,413

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U.S. SERVICEMEN UNACCOUNTED FOR BY STATE

Alabama - 42	Nebraska - 25
Alaska - 3	Nevada - 9
Arizona - 24	New Hampshire - 10
Arkansas - 27	New Jersey - 63
California - 243	New Mexico - 17
Colorado - 41	New York - 153
Connecticut - 39	North Carolina - 61
Delaware - 5	North Dakota - 16
District of Columbia - 9	Ohio - 126
Florida - 80	Oklahoma - 49
Georgia - 46	Oregon - 46
Hawaii - 11	Pennsylvania - 117
Idaho - 12	Rhode Island - 10
Illinois - 100	South Carolina - 30
Indiana - 69	South Dakota - 9
Iowa - 39	Tennessee - 44
Kansas - 37	Texas - 156
Kentucky - 22	Utah - 23
Louisiana - 34	Vermont - 4
Maine - 17	Virginia - 59
Maryland - 37	Washington - 61
Massachusetts - 60	West Virginia - 25
Michigan - 75	Wisconsin - 37
Minnesota - 43	Wyoming - 6
Mississippi - 18	Puerto Rico - 2
Missouri - 51	Virgin Islands - 1
Montana - 21	Other - 7

Note: Does not include 42 civilians

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U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO OBTAIN
THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING

United States Government policy regarding the POW/MIA problem is coordinated through the POW/MIA Interagency Group. Membership in this group includes the State and Defense Departments, the White House National Security Council (NSC) staff, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National League of POW/MIA Families, and House and Senate staff members from the respective Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees. The Group addresses policy concerning the POW/MIA issue and assesses current efforts, while evaluating new initiatives and approaches to enhance resolution of the issue

Most Americans felt that with the signing of the agreements ending the war in Indochina, accounting for our missing countrymen would finally occur. In 1973 the then Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) --North Vietnam-- was expected to honor Article 8 of the Paris Peace Agreement dealing with those missing and killed in action. This article specifically provided for repatriating POWs from both sides as well as exchanging information about the missing and return of remains of those who died. These points were conditional only on the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from Vietnam. The agreement ending the war in Laos had less specific articles pertaining to POWs and MIAs of all nations. However, because of the intransigence of the Indochinese governments, the POW/MIA issue has yet to be resolved

Prior to the fall of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975, teams from the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), augmented by members of the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Thailand (CIL-Thai) and other units, searched the jungles and mountains of South Vietnam for remains of U.S. personnel, under the auspices of the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) established by the Paris Peace Agreement. Despite a lack of cooperation from the Vietnamese communists and at times at great personal risk, the JCRC recovery teams achieved noteworthy success in their efforts.

U.S. efforts in North Vietnam were limited to negotiations with the Vietnamese concerning the fate of our servicemen and the repatriation of remains. Between April 1973 and April 1975, North Vietnam returned the remains of 23 U.S. personnel

In the first six years after the fall of the Republic of Vietnam, several U.S. Congressional Delegations, as well as missions from the State and Defense Departments, met with the Vietnamese regarding this specific issue. In addition, JCRC representatives met in Hawaii with Vietnamese officials in July 1978 and traveled to Hanoi in October 1980 and May 1981. These

three meetings dealt with technical aspects of the accounting process.

In February 1982, a policy-level delegation led by then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard L. Armitage traveled to Hanoi to impress upon the Vietnamese the high priority the United States Government attaches to resolution of the POW/MIA question. During the discussions, Mr. Armitage emphasized the President's commitment to resolving this issue as well as the deep concern of the American people regarding our missing personnel. As a result of this visit, the Vietnamese accepted a U.S. Government invitation to visit the U.S. POW/MIA facilities in Hawaii. These facilities include the JCRC and the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory (CIL). The visit took place in August 1982 and continued the dialogue between the two countries.

Following a visit to Hanoi by the National League of Families, on September 30, 1982, the Vietnamese agreed to a longstanding U.S. proposal that technical experts from both sides meet on a regularly scheduled basis to discuss the POW/MIA question. The Vietnamese agreed to four technical meetings per year. The first meeting was held in December 1982, the second in March 1983, and the third in June 1983, at which time the remains of nine individuals were returned, eight of which were later identified as Americans. The Vietnamese then interrupted the schedule.

In October 1983, Mr. Richard Childress, Director of Asian Affairs, National Security Council, and Mrs. Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director of the National League of Families, met in New York with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. Discussions focused on overcoming obstacles to advance serious, high-level negotiations between the two governments and lay the groundwork for future discussions.

In February 1984, a U.S. delegation visited Hanoi in an attempt to increase the pace of cooperation. Led again by Richard Armitage, the delegation included Mrs. Griffiths, Mr. Childress and Mr. Lyall Breckon, State Department's Director of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This meeting resulted in a Vietnamese offer to accelerate cooperation (concentrating initially on the most accessible cases in the Hanoi/Haiphong area and those listed as having died in captivity in the south) and to resume the quarterly technical meetings as well as a pledge by the Vietnamese to turn over the remains of eight missing servicemen. These remains were repatriated on July 17, 1984. Six of the eight remains were identified as missing American servicemen and returned to their next of kin. A technical level meeting was again held in mid-August.

In October 1984, Mr. Childress and Mrs. Griffiths met with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. During

discussions in New York, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister renewed and strengthened the February 1984 commitments and agreed to set an early date for the next technical meeting (held later that month). The October technical meeting was reported as the most cooperative and positive to date and general agreement was reached to hold the next regular meeting in early 1985.

The next meeting took place February 6-9, 1985. At that meeting, the Vietnamese announced they would soon return five remains and took the American team to visit a U.S. aircraft crash site in Vietnam.

Mr. Childress and Mrs. Griffiths met with Foreign Minister Thach and other high-level Vietnamese officials in Hanoi, March 3-5. All aspects of critical importance to the POW/MIA issues were raised, and the U.S. and Vietnamese sides agreed to several specific points to further accelerate cooperation:

-Meetings between technical personnel will increase from four to a minimum of six per year, depending on the need and information available.

-Remains mentioned during the February technical meeting were to be returned in March. (Six remains were turned over to the U.S. on March 20, identified, and returned to their next-of-kin. Of note was the fact that the names of two of these Americans appeared on the Provisional Revolutionary Government's - Viet Cong - "died-in-captivity" list. This represents the first time efforts were made by the Vietnamese to account for Americans on this list, the initial step in fulfilling a specific pledge of the Vietnamese Foreign Minister.)

-There was an exchange of views on other methods to accelerate progress on the POW/MIA issue, to include joint efforts to excavate crash site locations.

At the technical meeting held April 17-20, 1985, the Vietnamese agreed in principle to conduct a preliminary survey of a U.S. crash site in Vietnam. The U.S. Government discussed with the Vietnamese the details of such a survey, proposing a crash site to be visited.

On July 1, 1985, the Vietnamese announced their intention to resolve the POW/MIA issue within a two-year timeframe. This decision, conveyed through Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumahatmaja, was welcomed by the U.S. government as a serious policy commitment by the Government of Vietnam.

The technical meeting held July 2-6, 1985, in Hanoi resulted in the Vietnamese announcing information regarding 32 Americans (26 remains and information/material evidence on six

others). On August 14, 1985, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) returned 26 sets of remains, 24 of which were identified as American. The U.S. team also conducted a preliminary site survey of a U.S. crash site near Hanoi proposed by the Vietnamese.

The U.S. developed and provided to SRV officials in August 1985 a full bilateral plan to resolve the issue within the pledged two-year time frame. Later that month, Mr. Childress, Mrs. Griffiths, Mr. Breckon and JCRC representative LTC Paul Mather met in Hanoi with Vietnamese Acting Foreign Minister Vo Dong Giang and Deputy Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son for the most substantive and constructive meeting yet held on the issue. Without responding specifically to the U.S. workplan proposal, Vietnam presented a unilateral plan to resolve the issue within the two-year time frame committed to in early July. No preconditions were stated as both sides agreed that resolution of the issue is humanitarian and separate from political matters which divide the two countries. Although the Vietnamese again denied any knowledge of Americans held in captivity, they stated willingness to continue investigating sighting reports which come to their attention.

In mid-September 1985, meetings were held in New York with Vietnamese Minister Vo Dang Giang and Assistant Minister Le Mai. Mr. Childress, Mrs. Griffiths and Mr. Breckon again comprised the U.S. delegation and provided the Vietnamese with U.S. input on Vietnam's two-year work plan. This included detailed U.S. cooperative actions that would be undertaken in support of the Vietnamese plan. Minister Giang reiterated recent pledges, committed to a joint excavation near Hanoi and stated he expected additional American remains to be turned over very soon. Again there was no linkage to other issues.

The September 25-28, 1985 technical meeting continued discussions on logistics regarding joint excavations. Agreement led to the first joint excavation of a crash site conducted with the SRV. The U.S.-SRV excavated what was reported to be a B-52 crash site near Hanoi. The team excavated an area approximately 40 feet by 80 feet to an average depth of 25 feet. While the results of the effort were disappointing in terms of the limited remains recovered, the willingness of the SRV to permit a joint effort and their excellent cooperation were viewed as hopeful signs for the future. The U.S. team also visited a B-52 crash site in Ngoc Ha.

During the November 13-16, 1985 technical meeting, the SRV agreed to turn over seven sets of remains, which subsequently turned out to be remains of eight individuals. Actual return date was December 4, 1985. Seven were identified by the CIL as Americans and returned to their next of kin. One set is still undergoing analysis. The Vietnamese also provided information

on seven sets of unrecoverable remains as well as personal data/effects on three other service members.

The highest level U.S. Government delegation to visit Vietnam since the end of the war met with the Vietnamese in January 1986. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage led the U.S. contingent which included Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz, Mr. Richard Childress, and Mrs. Ann Mills Griffiths. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach agreed the POW/MIA issue is a humanitarian one and reiterated the Vietnamese pledge to resolve the issue within two years. The Vietnamese also agreed to investigate any POW live-sighting information that the U.S. might present.

During the technical talks held February 27-28, 1986 in Hanoi, the SRV presented a list of 49 cases on which the populace had reported information to Vietnamese government officials. Of the 49 cases, 21 resulted in remains being recovered and subsequently repatriated on April 10, 1986. The SRV accepted in principle the U.S. invitation to send a delegation to Hawaii for a "technical exchange" with the CIL and JCRC.

In April 1986, at the request of the Vietnamese, Mrs. Griffiths met with the Vietnamese Ambassador at their mission in New York and was informed that statements by various U.S. Government officials were not helpful in setting the right atmosphere to resolve the issue and that the U.S. had not demonstrated a commitment to the Vietnamese two-year plan.

The April 11-14, 1986, technical meeting in Hanoi was postponed by Vietnam, to be rescheduled at a mutually agreeable date. Postponement was linked to the U.S. Government's retaliatory actions against Libya to counter international terrorism. The delayed technical talks were subsequently held in Hanoi June 11-14. The Vietnamese presentation was generally critical of U.S. actions since the January 1986 high level meeting and again criticized the U.S. for failing to respond formally to their two year plan. The SRV also gave a brief update on the cases under investigation. It is anticipated that future technical meetings will be more productive with less rhetoric, thus allowing increased progress on the issue.

In May 1986, Mr. Childress, Mrs. Griffiths and Mr. Breckon met in New York with Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son to clarify U.S. commitments to Vietnam's two-year plan.

On July 1-2, 1986, a U.S. delegation consisting of Mr. Childress, Mrs. Griffiths, Mr. Breckon and Colonel Howard Hill, USAF, Principal Advisor to the Secretary of Defense on POW/MIA Affairs, met in Hanoi with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, Deputy Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son and other

officials for very productive discussions. Responding to media reports of Vietnam's perception that the U.S. lacked commitment to the two-year Vietnamese plan, Mr. Childress delivered an official letter with attachment from Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage which outlined specific oral and written agreements previously reached. Agreement was reached with the Vietnamese on the following:

a. We and the Vietnamese will meet at the technical level in August and October, confirming the agreed pattern of at least six such meetings per year. Vietnamese officials said these meetings would be especially productive.

b. Vietnamese and American forensic specialists will meet in Vietnam for consultations

c. Vietnam will provide us with the results in writing of its investigation of reports of live prisoner sightings.

d. Vietnam will permit American experts to accompany Vietnamese officials on investigations in accessible areas.

e. Vietnamese officials agreed to discuss specific crash sites for further excavation in the next technical meeting.

f. The Vietnamese accepted our invitation for another visit, with the date to be determined, to U.S. technical facilities (JCRC and CIL) in Hawaii.

Soon thereafter, however, the Vietnamese began to publicly backaway from some of these commitments.

Technical talks were held with the Vietnamese in Hanoi August 13-16, 1986. During this meeting the U.S. technical team visited areas where the Vietnamese had accumulated B-52 aircraft wreckage (Ngoc Ha pond, the botanical gardens, and the military museum). The U.S. teams' B-52 technician fully analyzed the information he was able to acquire from the wreckage.

On September 17, 1986, the SRV turned over one set of remains that were subsequently identified as a U.S. Serviceman and returned to his next of kin.

Mr. Childress led a delegation consisting of Mrs. Griffiths, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (DAS) John Monjo, Mr. Shepard Lowman (State Department's Director for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), and Colonel Hill to New York to meet with Vietnamese Minister of State Vo Dang Giang to address the POW/MIA issue and other humanitarian interest topics. The U.S. delegation also met with Lao Vice Foreign Minister Soubanh to discuss accelerated Lao cooperation on the POW/MIA issue.

The October 1986 technical meeting was postponed three weeks by Vietnam and rescheduled for October 30 - November 1, 1986. During that meeting in Hanoi, the Vietnamese announced the recovery of three sets of remains (subsequently turned over to U.S. officials on November 26, 1986). The U.S. team also visited a crash site near Haiphong.

On November 26, 1986 the Vietnamese turned over three sets of remains believed to be American. Two have been identified as U.S. Servicemen and returned to their families. The other set of remains is still in the identification process. The November 26 turn over ceremony in Hanoi included informal discussions during which the SRV representatives stated they were investigating 19 new cases on which they would have information at the next technical meeting, which they suggested holding in January 1987.

In January 1987, U.S. proposals for technical discussions in Hanoi were rejected by the Vietnamese. The U.S. proposals were in line with the Vietnamese agreement for a minimum of six technical level discussions per year. In fact, several U.S. proposals for specific dates since the first of the year have been rejected by Vietnam.

A second U.S. proposal for technical talks in Hanoi was rejected by the SRV in February 1987. The Vietnamese cited timing and other matters which required their attention.

On April 17, 1987 Mr. Childress, Mr. Lowman and Mrs. Griffiths met with Vietnam's Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Nhat, and other officials in New York and explained the President's new initiative of appointing a special Presidential Emissary (General Vessey, USA, ret) to Hanoi on the POW/MIA issue. This meeting followed up several exchanges with the Vietnamese to accept a delegation to discuss General Vessey's visit.

In an effort to advance the possible mission by special Presidential Emissary General John Vessey, a U.S. delegation, led by National Security Council Director for Asian Affairs Richard Childress and including Mrs. Griffiths and Mr. Lowman, met in Hanoi in late May 1987 with First Deputy Minister Dinh Ngo Liem and other Vietnamese officials. While the separate, humanitarian nature of cooperation to resolve the POW/MIA issue was reaffirmed during the talks, subsequent statements by Vietnamese officials dealt largely with political matters, and failed to reveal the details of SRV concerns in the humanitarian area, leaving much work to be done in preparing a realistic framework for the possible Vessey mission.

Regarding Laos, our sustained effort to obtain the cooperation of the Lao Government has met with some success. A visit by the National League of Families in September 1982, was followed by several high level U.S./Lao meetings in 1983/84.

These discussions resulted in two visits by a U.S. team to Laos, the first since 1975. During the second visit, JCRC and CILHI representatives surveyed the requirements to excavate a crash site in southern Laos. This eventually led to the most encouraging development yet - an unprecedented joint crash site excavation which took place February 10-22, 1985. A U.S./Lao team conducted a full-scale excavation of a U.S. Air Force AC-130 aircraft shot down near Pakse, Laos. The team recovered some personal effects and partial human remains which were determined to be those of the 13 men lost aboard the aircraft.

This excavation was a major step in efforts to develop a sustained pattern of cooperation with the Lao government on the POW/MIA issue. The first of what is hoped will be many such excavations to resolve the fates of the over 550 Americans still missing in Laos was conducted with excellent cooperation by Lao officials.

Additional high-level meetings on the POW/MIA issue with the Lao have occurred, including discussions in New York between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz and Lao Foreign Minister Phoun Sipaseut. During March 1985 meetings in Vientiane, Laos, between Mr. Childress, Mrs. Griffiths and Lao Vice Foreign Minister Soubanh, the Lao government agreed to continue and increase cooperation with the U.S., to pursue accountability on a unilateral basis and to meet with U.S. officials as frequently as necessary to enhance the process. They also agreed in principle to visiting the JCRC and CIL facilities in Hawaii.

In July 1985, Laos agreed in principle to a second excavation during the 1985-86 dry season and accepted a U.S. Government invitation to send a delegation to visit JCRC and the CIL, both located in Hawaii. In September 1985, Lao experts traveled to Hawaii for consultations with DOD, JCRC and CIL personnel. Assistant Secretary of State Wolfowitz and Mr. Childress also visited Vientiane in December 1985, to discuss the issue.

A joint U.S.-Lao crash site survey was conducted in January 1986, followed by the second joint U.S.-Lao excavation in February 1986 of an AC-130 aircraft which crashed in March 1972 in Savannakhet Province in southern Laos. The aircraft had a crew of 14 on board. Although this crash site had obviously been disturbed by private groups seeking remains and material evidence from the site, a significant quantity of remains and personal effects were recovered. Thus far, eight of the 14 have been identified. The other remains are still undergoing examination at the CIL for possible identification and subsequent return to next of kin.

The July 4, 1986, policy-level discussions in Vientiane, Laos, resulted in Lao government agreements to provide written

reports on discrepancy cases of missing Americans and to consider a unilateral crash site survey, possibly accompanied by an American official, plus added unilateral efforts by the Lao government. The delegation which was led by Mr. Childress and included Mrs. Griffiths, Mr. Beckon and Defense Department representative Colonel Howard Hill, emphasized the need to accelerate cooperation and to resume the joint excavation process as quickly as weather permitted before the end of 1986.

In January 1987, a U.S. proposal for policy level meetings with the Lao was accepted "in principle", but no date has been agreed upon.

In summary, significant strides have been made over the past two years in our negotiations. More remains were returned in this time frame than during any similar time frame since the end of the war. Though all involved are frustrated with the pace, we are pursuing every available avenue to resolve this issue in the shortest time frame possible and are determined to achieve success.

EVIDENCE OF CAPTURE OF U.S. PERSONNEL

The following list provides examples of U.S. personnel about whom the Indochinese governments should have information. The individuals mentioned herein are those about whom there is "hard evidence" (e.g. post-capture photography, U.S. or indigenous eyewitnesses to capture or detention, intelligence reports) that they were captured and detained by communist forces. These cases represent only a sampling of those individuals for which the Indochinese should be able to provide an accounting.

ROBERT ANDERSON
USAF
NORTH VIETNAM



EUGENE H. DEBRUIN
CIVILIAN
LAOS



COL Anderson went down over North Vietnam on October 6, 1972. He and his back seater both parachuted and talked with rescue planes. Anderson said, "I have a good parachute, am in good shape and can see no enemy forces on the ground." His back seater was immediately captured. Radio Hanoi reported that a number of U.S. pilots were captured the same day, however, Anderson's plane was the only one lost that day. The back seater was repatriated in 1973.

A photo of Eugene DeBruin and his surviving crewmembers in captivity was obtained from a Pathet Lao publication. LTJG Dieter Dengler, USN and one of the Thai nationals who was a member of the DeBruin crew and held with DeBruin successfully escaped from the Pathet Lao and provided information on DeBruin. In 1986, the Lao Government pledged to provide a written report regarding information they might have regarding the DeBruin case. They have yet to provide that report.

DAVID HRDLICKA
USAF
LAOS



COL Hrdlicka's chute was observed opening and he was seen on the ground. One flight member believed he saw Hrdlicka being supported or led away by natives. A helicopter pilot landed at a nearby village and was told Hrdlicka had been picked up by the Pathet Lao. Rallier reports indicated he was a prisoner. A post capture photo of Hrdlicka was obtained from several sources. A recording allegedly made by him was broadcast in May 1966 and the text appeared in Foreign Broadcast Information Service documents. In 1986, the Lao Government pledged to provide a written report regarding information they might have regarding Hrdlicka. They have yet to do so.

CHARLES SHELTON
USAF
LAOS



Voice contact was made with COL Shelton on the ground and he indicated he was in good condition. A villager witnessed the crash and observed the capture and arrest of Shelton by Pathet Lao forces. Rallier reports indicated he was a prisoner. Like DeBruin and Hrdlicka, in 1986 the Lao Government pledged to provide a written report regarding information they might have regarding Shelton. To date, no report has been received.

PHILIP TERRILL & JAMES SALLEY, JR.
USA
SOUTH VIETNAM



There is a high degree of correlation between VC and Hanoi radio broadcasts describing the capture of two Americans and the circumstances surrounding the loss of SPC Terrill and MSGT J. Salley. Several sighting reports correlated well to the two men. Capture status was confirmed by U.S. returnees who said both men died after capture. Salley was on the PRG died in captivity list, but Terrill was not.

LAWRENCE T. HOLLAND
USAF



On 12 June 1965, Major Lawrence T. Holland, U.S. Air Force, was the pilot of an F100D jet aircraft that was shot down by ground fire. Major Holland was forced to eject and was observed to land near Don Luan Village, South Vietnam. A rescue helicopter was sent to the location but the rescue party was unable to get to Major Holland due to gunfire. However, the rescue party did get close enough to see Major Holland's body being dragged in a limp condition by men on the ground. Subsequent information states that Major Holland was shot and killed by Viet Cong soldiers after he opened fire on them. Major Holland was reportedly buried in the immediate vicinity of the incident; however, no information has been furnished by the Vietnamese on Holland.

DONALD SPARKS
USA
SOUTH VIETNAM



On 17 June 1969, PFC Donald L. Sparks was captured when his patrol became engaged in a firefight in Tien Phuoc District, South Vietnam. PFC Sparks and CPL Lay A. Graham, another member of the patrol, were wounded and fell to the ground. As the remaining members of the patrol withdrew, they observed North Vietnamese Army personnel stripping PFC Sparks of his clothing and weapon. The following day a U.S. patrol returned to the site of the ambush and recovered the remains of CPL Graham. There was no sign of PFC Sparks. In May 1970, two letters that PFC Sparks had written on 11 April 1970 were found on a Viet Cong soldier. Qualified handwriting analysts have proven conclusively that PFC Sparks had written the letters. In one of the letters Sparks mentioned having received a wound to his foot. Three Americans released in 1973 reported that in the spring of 1970, while enroute to a new detention camp in the same province in which Sparks was lost, their Vietnamese interpreter/guard said that a U.S. prisoner named "Don" was moving slowly due to his wounded foot but would join them. "Don" never arrived in the camp. No information has been provided on Sparks.

DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE POSSESSED BY
THE INDOCHINESE GOVERNMENTS REGARDING
U.S. UNACCOUNTED FOR PERSONNEL

The U.S. Government has repeatedly urged the Indochinese governments to meet their humanitarian obligation to provide the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing in their countries. These governments assert that they know of no Americans held captive, but they have done little to substantiate the assertion. It is clear that the governments of Indochina have considerably more information on missing Americans than they have given to the United States. The United States is fully committed to repatriating any Americans who may still be held captive, to obtaining the fullest possible accounting for Americans still missing in Southeast Asia, and the return of all recoverable remains.

Cambodia

The communists in Cambodia recently claimed that they have some knowledge of U.S. personnel missing in that country. It is known that during the War, some U.S. personnel now listed as missing were captured in Cambodia, mostly in areas under Vietnamese control. Appeals through the Vietnamese government and other channels have not produced information for U.S. authorities.

Lao People's Democratic Republic

A peace agreement was signed between the Royal Lao Government and the Pathet Lao forces in early 1973. While the United States is not a signator to that agreement, similar to the Vietnam Agreement, the Laos Agreement specified conditions and provisions for the exchange of prisoners of war regardless of nationality, and information on the missing. The Lao have provided little information on unaccounted for U.S. personnel. The nine American prisoners released by the Vietnamese in early 1973 during Operation Homecoming were not, as was claimed at the time, captured by the Pathet Lao. They were captured by North Vietnamese forces operating in Laos and moved as expeditiously as possible to North Vietnam for detention. After signing the peace agreement ending the war in Laos, the Pathet Lao claimed to hold only one prisoner, Mr. Emmet Kay, a U.S. civilian, captured on May 7, 1973. He was subsequently released on September 18, 1974. This statement was in contradiction to earlier public statements by high ranking Lao officials that many prisoners were being held. A Pathet Lao official commented that the Pathet Lao Central Committee had been gathering information on U.S. personnel missing in action, but he warned that they could probably provide information on



Gravesite photo presented to Vietnamese at Technical Talks
(Remains of Lt Dickson have never been returned)
NOTE: Date on gravesite is Feb 7, 1965

only a "feeble percentage." On August 24, 1978, the Lao government provided the remains of four persons to a U.S. Congressional Delegation. Two of the remains were determined to be those of indigenous Southeast Asian personnel. One of the remaining two sets was identified as a USAF pilot shot down on the Lao/Vietnam border. The other set of remains is still undergoing analysis. As the cases presented in this Fact Book demonstrate, the Lao should have considerably more knowledge of missing U.S. personnel than they have thus far provided.

Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)

There is much evidence to indicate that the Vietnamese have knowledge concerning the fate of many U.S. personnel lost over North Vietnam. A wealth of information on specific aircraft downings was published throughout the war in the North Vietnamese press. A communist source interrogated during the War stated that the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, Enemy Proselyting Department, maintained central listings of all U.S. POWs detained in North Vietnam. This source also reported that in North Vietnam, all data pertaining to the death and/or burial of an American prisoner, whether in the North or South, was to be forwarded to Hanoi as quickly as possible together with sketches of the burial site. In 1980, a Vietnamese mortician told U.S. officials that the remains of approximately 400 Americans were warehoused in Hanoi. He also said he had seen three Caucasians whom he believed to be Americans. U.S. intelligence personnel conducted intensive interviews with the sources, and the U.S. Government judged the information they provided to be credible.

In the South, representatives of the former Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) should have information on many unaccounted for U.S. personnel. For example, after signing the Paris Peace Agreement, the PRG provided the U.S. a list of 37 missing Americans who died in captivity. Prior to the March 20, 1985 repatriation of remains, the Vietnamese had taken no action to return the remains of anyone on this list or to otherwise account for them. In addition, it is known that the South Vietnamese communists captured a number of U.S. personnel whose names have not appeared on any lists provided to the U.S. by either the former PRG or present Vietnamese Government.

Based on the above information, and the communist proclivity for detailed reporting, it is believed that Vietnam and Laos hold a significant amount of specific information on missing American servicemen and civilians.

U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION ON AMERICANS STILL BEING HELD CAPTIVE IN INDOCHINA

Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, the United States Government has acquired more than 6,000 reports bearing on the POW/MIA problem. Of the total reported, 965 are firsthand live-sighting reports with 624 resolved through a determination that they correlate with individuals since accounted for. Additionally, 205 of the reports are known or suspected to be fabrications by the source, while 136 are as yet unverified and under continuing investigation in an attempt to confirm the information. The remaining reports pertain to hearsay sightings and to crash site and grave site information.*

Given the above circumstances, it would be irresponsible to rule out the possibility that live Americans are being held. Thus, the U.S. Government's position since 1982 is:

ALTHOUGH WE HAVE THUS FAR BEEN UNABLE TO PROVE THAT AMERICANS ARE STILL DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL, THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US PRECLUDES RULING OUT THAT POSSIBILITY. ACTIONS TO INVESTIGATE LIVE-SIGHTING REPORTS RECEIVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE NECESSARY PRIORITY AND RESOURCES BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AT LEAST SOME AMERICANS ARE STILL HELD CAPTIVE. SHOULD ANY REPORT PROVE TRUE, WE WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO ENSURE THE RETURN OF THOSE INVOLVED.

*Statistics as of 1 July 87.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE

Background

With the buildup of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia during 1964, intelligence acquisition capabilities concerning POW/MIAs were enhanced. A regular flow of captured documents as well as enemy POWs, ralliers, and refugee interrogation reports developed.

In April 1966, the intelligence community increased the emphasis on collecting information on POWs and MIAs. DoD's highest priority was assigned and CIA and DoD collectors were immediately notified of this increased emphasis. Additionally, expanded formal collection requirements were published and disseminated. U.S. Government installations and organizations worldwide were involved in obtaining information about POWs and those listed as missing.

Past Efforts

Following Hanoi's announcement in June 1966 that captured airmen would be tried for war crimes, the entire system of collecting, disseminating and processing information on missing personnel was reviewed and intensified. A network of debriefing and interrogation centers was developed in liaison with local government intelligence agencies in Vietnam and Laos. Sources were debriefed or interrogated in depth on the information they possessed. Indigenous teams checked out, where possible, crash sites, detention sites, and reported sightings of Americans. The scope of the worldwide collection effort was expanded to include all overt media coverage and photography of POWs. Communist radio broadcasts were carefully monitored for information about POW/MIAs. The major elements of the Executive Department focusing on POW/MIA problems were DoD (Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence branches of the Military Services), the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), established in late 1961, was assigned a limited responsibility for POW/MIA analysis until mid-1966. After that time, DIA's role expanded. During 1967, DIA assumed chairmanship of the Interagency POW Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee. In December 1971, DIA chaired the DoD Intelligence Task Force established to supervise the intelligence aspects of the POW/MIA problem and to provide more rapid and effective communication between policymakers and intelligence officials.

Following the repatriation of the POWs in 1973, the intelligence community's efforts focused on the more than 2,500

Americans still listed as missing. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973 and the fall of Saigon in April 1975 resulted in a mammoth reduction in the level of field assets and the opportunity to access geographic locations as well as indigenous sources.

Current Efforts

Increased policy level emphasis on the POW/MIA issue in 1981 resulted in the raising of intelligence priorities. The entire intelligence community now affords top priority to collecting and analyzing information which would lead to an accounting for Americans missing in Indochina. Strong command attention is being placed on this issue. DIA's Special Office For POW/MIA affairs was increased in authorized strength from 12 personnel in 1981 to 39 today.

Presently, the principal source of POW/MIA information available to the U.S. Government is Indochinese refugees. The continued absence of political stability and dismal economic conditions in Indochina have resulted in an unabating flow of refugees from one or more of the three countries of primary concern. Interviews have been conducted with many of these refugees by both government and private individuals. Reported sightings of Americans by these sources continue to reach the U.S. Government from any number of different channels. The U.S. Government has an established program for follow-up action which is taken on each such report received.

Active collection efforts are conducted by the entire intelligence community using a wide variety of disciplines. As stated by the President, "intelligence assets of the United States are fully focused on this issue." DIA has primary responsibility for evaluating reported POW/MIA related sightings. Necessary follow-up action is conducted through the Defense Attaché System, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center Liaison Office in Bangkok, the Department of State through U.S. Embassies, and by DIA or other military assets within the United States. Due to numerous refugee movements between camps, onward settlement in other countries, and temporary accommodations provided by sponsor organizations, follow-up action for clarification or amplification of reported information consumes many manhours and at times can require months to complete. However, the time required is reduced to the minimum amount possible.

POW/MIA intelligence information, regardless of the source, is channeled into DIA for analysis. Through close coordination with the military services, all correlated information which relates or may relate to missing Americans is provided to the Services; the POW/MIA's parent service Casualty Branch then transmits the information to the POW/MIA's next of kin.

Additionally, DIA keeps U.S. Government decisionmakers apprised of POW/MIA intelligence information.

Future Efforts

When evidence becomes convincing that one or more Americans are still detained in Indochina, officials at the highest levels of the U.S. Government will be notified immediately in order to determine appropriate action to gain their release.

An obvious question arising is - what amount of evidence is required to be "convincing?" First, the evidence will have to satisfy certain criteria such as currency and specificity. It is unrealistic to assume that a single refugee report without additional verification will justify decisive action. One hope is that a report can be strengthened and supported through technical means. Another is that more than one report will be specific and similar as to time, place and circumstance. Despite the many reports we have received and the technical means available to us, no single report or combination of reports and technical sensors has thus far been specific enough to be "convincing." What continues to condition our thinking and motivate our efforts is the "weight of evidence" theory: The many reports, the limited information provided by the governments in Indochina, and the fact that some of the missing initially survived the incident in which they were lost, preclude ruling out the possibility that Americans may be alive in communist controlled Indochina.

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JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) is a United States military task force designated to assist in the recovery or status resolution of U.S. personnel unaccounted for as a result of the Southeast Asian conflict. The JCRC maintains active case files on all U.S. military personnel and civilians who were captured, are missing, and who died but their remains were not recovered.

JCRC was established in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, as a joint service humanitarian organization by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1973. In February 1973, the JCRC relocated to Thailand. In May 1976, the organization was moved to the Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii, and a Liaison Office at the American Embassy, Bangkok, was opened.

Initially, the focus of JCRC activities was on a large-scale American effort to conduct field recoveries. Operations were begun in South Vietnam immediately, and negotiations for access to field sites in other countries were initiated. Information already in JCRC files was supplemented by additional data gathered from the local populace. In February and March 1973, the JCRC participated in debriefing the former prisoners of war released by North Vietnam. The information gathered increased knowledge on a number of other cases and was incorporated into JCRC master files. The JCRC continued its activities in South Vietnam until 1975, when that country, Laos, and Cambodia fell under communist control and the JCRC lost all access to field recovery sites.

JCRC efforts were then concentrated on information refinement, analysis, and contingency planning in anticipation of agreements which would reopen field operations. Over 150,000 documents were assembled, correlated, analyzed, and processed through automated data processing to develop the most accurate information possible concerning the fate of the U.S. military and civilian personnel.

Today, much of the JCRC activity is devoted to interviewing Indochinese refugees, analytical investigation, and records updating. JCRC personnel conduct an extensive program to interview Indochinese refugees in an attempt to obtain POW/MIA information. Four command interviewers, all of whom are highly fluent in one or more Asian languages, travel from the Liaison Office in Bangkok to refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Refugees in the Philippines are interviewed by a JCRC linguist from the Headquarters office. The JCRC interviewers produce approximately 900 new, initial interview reports per year. These reports are given careful and thorough evaluation by DIA and JCRC analysts, and if found to correlate or possibly

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correlate to active cases, are incorporated into the appropriate individual file and provided to the next of kin by the Service Casualty Office. Uncorrelated reports are continuously compared with each other in an effort to establish patterns and correlations which may not at first be evident.

A team from the JCRC and CILMI meets several times each year with officials of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in a technical level exchange on the POW/MIA issue. Since the first technical meeting in October 1980, the frequency of these meetings has increased, and a minimum of six technical meetings per year has been agreed upon. The technical meetings are devoted solely to discussing POW/MIA cases and closely related issues concerning accounting for missing Americans. Discussion materials are prepared by JCRC personnel for coordination and approval on an interagency basis. Individual case folders are assembled relating to personnel who became missing during ground combat or personnel who were known to have escaped their aircraft before it crashed. Each folder contains a translated narrative of the incident, a map of the loss area, a photo of the individual, and all available foreign press reports, photos and other documentation about the incident. The JCRC also uses folders relating to crash site incidents to nominate those sites for recovery operations. Crash site folders contain narratives of the incident, in English and Vietnamese, maps of the area, summary sheets of personnel and equipment, a list of serial numbers unique to the aircraft, and photographs of the aircraft.

Discussions with the government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) on POW/MIA matters are conducted through the U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Vientiane, who works to improve and increase the exchange of POW/MIA related information. The JCRC provides all required technical assistance for these efforts, such as preparing case folders, in English and Lao, on personnel still missing in Laos or detailed information concerning crash sites which may warrant recovery operations.

Efforts to increase technical level exchanges of information have become increasingly important as cooperation with the governments of Vietnam and Laos to recover U.S. personnel missing in those countries has accelerated.

The JCRC continues to serve as the primary agency for receiving and repatriating remains. JCRC personnel plan and coordinate the repatriation missions, and conduct ceremonies in Hanoi and in Hawaii according appropriate honors to the individuals repatriated. The JCRC also plans and directs joint crash site recovery operations which require coordination and implementation of special airlift support, field communications, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and medical support, ground transportation, and logistics. As with much of

the work of the two organizations, all crash site recovery operations are conducted in close support and with invaluable team work from the U.S. Army General Identification Laboratory. Efforts to secure greater and more frequent crash site access in both Vietnam and Laos are on-going, and a concept plan has been prepared for the conduct of a sustained series of recovery operations to be implemented upon approval of the government involved.

The ultimate goal of the JCRC is to account for all Americans missing in Southeast Asia. In pursuit of this goal, the JCRC will continue to play a key role in collecting POW/MIA information, analyzing its content, conducting technical level meetings, and conducting repatriation and recovery operations.

The JCRC is currently staffed by nineteen military personnel and seven civilians. Included in this staffing is a six member liaison office at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.



Posters of this sort are placed in Refugee Camps soliciting POW/MIA information.

US ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY, HAWAII (CILHI)

During the Vietnam conflict, identification of the remains of service members killed in Southeast Asia was the responsibility of the two mortuaries in Vietnam, located in Saigon and Da Nang. In March 1973, during the withdrawal of US military personnel from Vietnam, the US Army Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) was established at Camp Samae San, Thailand, to assume responsibility for search, recovery, and identification of remains of US service members killed in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. In May 1976, the CIL was relocated to its present location in Honolulu, Hawaii, and is currently a field element of the Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center of the US Army Military Personnel Center in Alexandria, Virginia. The unit has an authorized strength of 29 military and 13 Department of the Army civilians.

After relocation, the mission was expanded as follows:

- o Conducts search and recovery (S&R) operations in the Pacific area for World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam War dead.
- o Applies anthropological and other sophisticated scientific techniques in the processing of remains to establish individual identity.
- o Accumulates and catalogues information on American and allied personnel listed as missing in action (MIA) and those declared dead but body not recovered (BNR).
- o Performs humanitarian missions as directed by competent authority.
- o Provides world-wide emergency support to the Army Memorial Affairs Program and, as required, to the Departments of Navy and Air Force for the search, recovery, and identification of remains.

The process of identification begins with the recovery or return of remains. Remains have been received via three avenues: through CIL's own S&R missions with the cooperation of host countries; through official turnovers in which a foreign government provides previously recovered remains to the CIL; and through other unofficial friendly or refugee sources.

The CIL can field three S&R teams capable of conducting thorough area searches and excavations at crash and burial sites to recover remains and personal effects. Crash site recoveries conducted by the S&R team often uncover significant

information that can aid in the identification process, such as where remains and personal effects were found in relation to major components of the aircraft.

In the past, the CIL has dispatched its S&R teams on missions to Laos, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, New Britain, Melanesia, the Republic of the Philippines, Canada, Korea, and Malaysia.

Receiving remains through official turnovers from other governments has been the primary means by which remains have been returned from Indochina. Eighteen such repatriations have occurred since the CIL was established. Typically, a joint repatriation team, consisting of members of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) and the CIL, travels to the foreign country returning the remains. The team conducts an appropriate honors ceremony as the remains are placed on a U.S. Air Force aircraft for return to the United States.

After remains are received at the CIL, forensic and other investigative techniques are applied in the processing of the remains to establish, when possible, individual identities. The CIL employs physical forensic anthropologists and a forensic odontologist who perform the identification examinations.

Since the remains received by the CIL are frequently commingled, the first step in the identification process is to segregate them into separate and unique individuals. After the segregation process is completed, all dental and anthropological findings are documented on a series of charts, forms, and special narrative statements. Anthropological data can be obtained from skeletal remains to determine age, race, sex, muscularity, handedness, height, and indications of injuries the individual may have received or abnormalities which might have existed. The CIL has radiographic and photographic equipment to aid in examination and documentation of the skeletal remains.

After the analysis of the dental remains is completed by the forensic odontologist, his findings are entered into the Computer Assisted Postmortem Identification (CAPMI) System. With the CAPMI system, dental information obtained from an unknown set of remains is rapidly sorted against the antemortem dental data base, which at CILHI consists of the composite antemortem dental records of those missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War. It is important to understand that the purpose of the CAPMI system is not to make identifications, but merely to increase the efficiency of the investigative team. The system is designed to provide the investigator with a list of possible matches for each set of remains. It is then up to the forensic odontologist to examine each listed record manually and make the final determination as to the degree of

positivity of any identification based on dental comparison. The CAPMI system has proven to be an invaluable management tool at the CILHI, saving the forensic odontologist countless man-hours that would have been required to make several difficult identifications to date.

Concurrent with the anthropological and dental analyses, the casualty data analysts use existing intelligence information to identify casualties which could be associated with the remains. The CIL maintains files on all individuals who are unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. Data from these files are correlated to a map search which narrows the possibilities for potential association. This "circle search" is done using maps and computerized data to identify known incident or crash sites falling within an established radius of the reported recovery site of the remains in question. The files of all individuals known to be lost in that circle are analyzed for available identifying data.

If no association is made using the CAPMI system, or no dental structures were recovered with a set of remains, the anthropologists and forensic odontologist then compare the files identified by the casualty data analysts through the "circle search" method with the information obtained from the remains. If no match results from a comparison of the circumstances of the incident or crash and the characteristics of the individuals involved in the incident with the determinations made by the forensic specialists, the radius of the circle search is expanded to include additional individuals for comparison until a match is found or all possibilities are exhausted.

After thorough documentation of the comparison is completed, the CIL makes a recommendation which is reviewed by a team of professional consultants, normally consisting of two senior Board Certified Physical Anthropologists and one senior Board Certified Forensic Odontologist. Recommendations for identification which are concurred with are provided to the next of kin through the parent service. The next of kin may exercise the option of soliciting a private opinion from an expert of their choosing. The opinion of the independent expert, if obtained by the next of kin, is returned to the Army's team of professional consultants to be considered before all information is submitted to the Armed Forces Identification Review Board (AFIRB) for the final decision to approve or disapprove the CIL's recommendation. The AFIRB consists of one primary voting member each from the Departments of the Army, Navy (or Marine Corps, if applicable) and Air Force as designated by their respective Departments. The members are in the grade of Colonel, Navy Captain, GS-15 or higher.

After the AFIRB has approved an identification, the remains depart Hickam AFB, Hawaii, with full military honors, for the

Army Mortuary in Oakland, California, where they are held pending disposition instructions from the next of kin. If the AFIRB disapproves a CIL recommendation, the case is referred back to the CIL for further review and processing.

EFFORTS REGARDING WORLD WAR II AND KOREAN WAR MISSING AND UNACCOUNTED FOR AMERICANS

Although many years have passed since the conclusion of World War II and the Korean War, it may come as a surprise that the U.S. Government is also working to resolve cases of American unaccounted for from those conflicts. Approximately 78,750 Americans were unaccounted for from World War II, and there were about 8,200 from the Korean War, however, there are many differences between those wars and the war in Vietnam. For instance, World War II ended in a clear-cut victory; the U.S. had access to the battlefields, so extensive searches could be conducted. Nevertheless, many men were lost and not recovered. The U.S. Government does, however, make an effort to recover remains from World War II whenever possible. In 1982, the remains of 22 Americans were recovered from a B-24 crash site in Papua New Guinea. We anticipate conducting additional World War II recovery operations in the future.

Korea offers a unique situation. Men from fifteen allied nations as well as South Korea fought with US servicemen on the Korean Peninsula under the United Nations Flag. Since the ceasefire ending hostilities in 1953, the United Nations Command (UNC) has continued to demand from the other side an accounting, in particular for the 2,233 UNC soldiers including 389 Americans, who were known to have been under enemy control and yet neither they nor their remains have been returned.

Since 1954 the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) has annually called for the Korean Peoples Army/Chinese Peoples Volunteers (KPA/CPV) to account for UNC POWs. Under the Reagan Administration the UNC has requested the repatriation of United Nations war dead every year beginning in 1982. In August 1986 the UNC passed new information to the North which included maps/charts of 13 POW camps and a POW hospital, 291 air crash sites (total of 301 personnel unaccounted for), and the list of 2,233 UNC POWs and 18 foreign nationals never repatriated. So far, the other side has yet to give a reasonable response to the U.N. appeal to account for the UNC POWs and return the remains of the men who fought in defense of freedom in Korea. This lack of humanitarian cooperation will not blunt our determination to pursue the issue.