

**CONFIDENTIAL**AC3H12-dnw  
03C28864

1 6 OCT 1964

**From:** Commandant of the Marine Corps  
**To:** Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

**Subj:** Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 2d Qtr FY65

**Ref:** (a) CG FMFPAC Ltr ser 00633-64 of 25 Sep 1964

1. Reference (a), the subject report, has been reviewed. It is noted that Fleet Marine Force, Pacific is considered to be combat ready. Comments relevant to the report are provided in subsequent paragraphs.

2. Liaison with the Bureau of Naval Weapons revealed that the AN/TSQ-18s for MATCU 60 and MATCU 66 have been shipped from Naval Supply Center, Oakland.

3. The AN/TRN-14 TACAN reported as affecting MATCU 68 readiness was delayed beyond the normal delivery date by a strike at the plant of the manufacturer. At the request of this headquarters, the Bureau of Naval Weapons has arranged to obtain release of the TACAN from the manufacturer with the concurrence of the union and the company.

4. The personnel shortages stated in reference (a) will be the subject of separate correspondence.

L. F. CHAPMAN, JR.  
 Chief of Staff

*John M. ...*  
 15 OCT 1964

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**CONFIDENTIAL***FMFPAC**Also Contact Readiness Report, 2d Quarter, FY 65**267 057  
PL to Miel**(25 Sep 64)*

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT*Memorandum*AO3H12-dnw  
03D28864

TO : Chief of Staff

DATE: 15 OCT 1964

FROM : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

SUBJECT: FMFPAC Commander's Combat Readiness Report,  
2d Qtr FY65

Ref: (a) HQO 3000.1

1. In accordance with reference (a), the subject report (TAB A) has been staffed. A proposed CMC reply is attached.
2. This proposed reply is based on comments from interested staff agencies. The comments are found at the following TABS:

TAB B - DC/S (Air)  
TAB C - AC/S, G-4  
TAB D - AC/S, G-1  
TAB E - DirPers

3. CG, FMFPAC reported that "Fleet Marine Force, Pacific is considered to be combat ready, although its efficiency and competence in almost every area are susceptible of improvement".
4. The proposed CMC reply addresses the following problems:  
  
1st MAW - delivery of AN/TSQ-18's for MATCU 60 and MATCU 66  
3d MAW - delay in delivery of the AN/TRN-14 for MATCU 68
5. The personnel problem will be the subject of separate correspondence initiated by AC/S, G-1 (See TAB D).



R. G. WEEDE

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**SECRET**HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS ROUTING SHEET  
NAVMC HQ 935H-CMC (REV. 11-63)

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## G-3 DIVISION

					ACofS, G-3 (A03)
					Asst G-3
					Admin & Finc Br (A03A)
					Service Plans Br (A03B)
1	X	9/30	9/30	2	Operations Br (A03H)
					Operations Sect
					Combat Rmns Sect
					Prog & Org Sect
					Training Branch (A03C)
					General Trng Sect
					Schools Trng Sect
					Planning & Prog Sect
					Marksmanship Br (A03M)
					Historical Br (A03D)
					Admin Sect
					Writing Sect
					Archives/Library Sect

REMARKS (Entries to be dated and signed)

## ACTION:

**G-3 DIVISION**

30 SEP 1964

1. Routed simultaneously for bucktag comment by DC/STAF, AC/E, G-1, AC/S, G-4 and DirPers.

2. Bucktag comments are requested prior to 10 October. These comments along with AC/E, G-3 comments will be used as a basis for a reply to CG FMFPAC. The entire package, including the comments, and the original of the attached report will be forwarded to the Chief of Staff prior to 15 October in accordance with HQO 9000.1.

W. D. Sawyer  
W. D. SAWYER

(For additional remarks attach plain paper)

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AAP-3-jaj

9 OCT 1964

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (AIR) COMMENT on CG FMFPac Combat  
Readiness Report for 2d Quarter FY 65

1. Problem. Excessive time required between arrival of flight echelons in a theater and the arrival of aviation fuel and replenishment ordnance required for continued offensive operations.

Summary of Comments. CG FMFPac stated that the rapidity of deployment in an area where no prepositioning of units or logistical support was permitted was limited by (a) the shortage of amphibious shipping and (b) the excessive time to acquire fuel and ordnance.

CG FMFPac indicates the following specific areas are being studied by FMFPac and PacFlt to decrease the supply follow-up time.

(a) Preposition Class V and V (A) from Sasebo to the Subic area.

(b) Determine the feasibility of loading selected amounts of Class V (A) in the amphibious shipping of each SLF.

Discussion of Problem. The problem is currently an operational matter to determine appropriate actions to reduce reaction time and improve follow-up support. A liaison visit to FMFPac Headquarters this month indicates the study is in progress at the FMFPac/CincPac level. It is expected that the study will first determine operational requirements and then the means for implementing any decisions. It is anticipated that support from this Headquarters may be necessary to assist in obtaining facilities when the requirements are known.

Action Required by DCofS(Air). None.

2. Problem. Equipment for Marine Air Tactical Control Units 60 and 66 of the 1st MAW and 64 of the 3d MAW is required.

Summary of Comments.

a. CG 1st MAW indicated that the readiness posture of all units except MATCU 60 and MATCU 66 would permit deployment with necessary equipment and supplies for sustained operations. The age of the MATCU equipment and extensive maintenance required results in marginal readiness.

b. CG 3d MAW reports that readiness is affected by non-receipt of the MRN 14 tacan sets and the limited training possible as the result of the

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lack of the equipment.

CG FMFPac did not comment on this subject.

Discussion of Problem and Past Action. Much of the MATCU equipment is old and difficult to maintain. New equipment is in the process of being delivered to the units. Liaison with the Bureau of Naval Weapons revealed that the AN/TSQ-18, which CG 1st MAW indicates is enroute and will reduce equipment and maintenance problems, has been shipped from NSC Oakland along with other items of new equipment.

The AN/TRN-14 tacan reported by CG 3d MAW as affecting MATCU 68 readiness was delayed beyond the normal delivery date by a strike at the plant of the manufacture. At the request of this Headquarters, the Bureau of Naval Weapons has arranged to obtain release of the tacan from the manufacturer with the concurrence of the Union and the Company.

Action by DCoS(Air). None. Action has been initiated to expedite delivery of the equipment.



FRANK G. THOMAS  
By direction

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**SECRET**HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS ROUTING SHEET  
NAVMC HQ 335h-CMC (REV. 11-63)

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					G-2		
					G-3	✓	
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					STAFF CHAPLAIN		
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REMARKS (Entries to be dated and signed)

ACTION:

**G-3 DIVISION**

30 SEP 1964

1. Routed simultaneously for bucket comment by DC/SAItr, AC/S, G-1, AC/S, G-4 and DirPers.

2. Bucket comments are requested prior to 10 October. These comments along with AC/S, G-3 comments will be used as a basis for a reply to CG FMFPAC. The entire package, including the comments, and the original of the attached report will be forwarded to the Chief of Staff prior to 15 October in accordance with HQO 3000.1.

W. D. Sawyer  
W. D. SAWYER

(For additional remarks attach plain paper)

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AO4J-gmm-8

12 OCT 1964

G-4 Bucktag comments on G-3 routing sheet AO3H of 30 Sep 1964 (S&C # 267 057, Copy #4)

Subj: CG FMFPac's Combat Readiness Report for 2d Quarter FY-65 (U)

Ref: (a) CMC ltr O4B24164 over AO4J-pbw-4 to CNO of 2 Oct 1964

1. Subject report has been reviewed within this Division and the following relate to comments made in CG FMFPac's summary statement which has logistic implications:

a. Actions to eliminate the problem of over-all shortage in amphibious shipping to support Marine Corps Landing Force requirements have been vigorously pursued within this Headquarters. Reference (a) represents the latest concept and landing force requirements. The FMF Commanders were included in the wide distribution given this document which relates to the currently approved Navy and SecDef Amphibious Assault Force Construction and Force Level Programs.

b. Relative to aviation fuel and aviation ordnance to support MAW operations in WESTPAC, the ~~provision~~ <sup>authorization</sup> for a 15-day mount-out augmentation has made provision for adequate stocks and the positioning of these supplies is generally within the prerogative of the FMF Commander, which actions are being initiated.

2. The only materiel deficiencies appearing in the enclosures to subject report were in enclosures (4) and (5) (1st and 3d MAWs) and were related to MATCU Navy-furnished equipment. The Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) has already commented on the status of this equipment.

*Melvin D. Henderson*

MELVIN D. HENDERSON

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

AOIC-tsg-23

DATE: 13 OCT 1964

FROM : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

SUBJECT: Combat Readiness Reports

Ref: (a) HQO 3000.1

1. In accordance with reference (a), G-1 will advise the Commanding General, FMFPac and Commanding General, FMFLant, of action taken or being taken concerning critical personnel shortages reported in the Combat Readiness Reports, Personnel Status Reports and Logistic Status Reports submitted during the preceding quarter.

2. These reports are now being prepared and will be submitted for the Chief of Staff's signature by 15 October 1964.



H. C. PARKS  
Acting

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DFA3-egl

3500

12 OCT 1964

DF COMMENT

Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for 2d Quarter FY65  
(CG FMFPac)

1. The following comments refer to paragraph 1a of enclosure (9) to the subject report:


a. This Headquarters does not monitor the 1st Force Service Regiment as a separate unit. Personnel are assigned to the 1st Marine Division and internal distribution is a prerogative of the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.

b. It is expected that upon completion of the FY65 major selection board this month the 1st Marine Division will be up to strength in field grade officers.

c. The captain shortage reflects a Marine Corps-wide availability of less than 70% in that grade. It is noted, however, that the 1st Marine Division is above manning level in total company grade officers.

d. The Enlisted Assignment Section makes extensive Comments on deficiencies as reported on Personnel Status Reports. These comments can and should suffice for all other reports. Since 1st FSR is not monitored by HQMC and 1st MARDiv has not reported personnel shortages that would arise from those mentioned indirectly by 1st FSR, the assumption must be that no critical shortage exists.

12 OCT 1964



Robert M. Richards, Jr.  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director of Personnel



ROBERT M. RICHARDS

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC  
c/o FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96601

IN REPLY REFER TO:

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SEP 25 1964

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From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3H)  
Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report ( Report Symbol  
MC 3100-4) for 2d Quarter FY 65 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A

Encl: (1) CG, AirFMFPac ltr FF13-5, 3/BAM/jes, 3500, Ser:  
003A24464 of 31 Aug 1964  
(2) CG, 1stMarDiv ltr 3:OP:dwm, 3480, Ser: 00228-64  
of 28 Aug 1964  
(3) CG, 3d MarDiv ltr 3C:ADA:rlt, 3480, Ser: 0026564A  
of 3 Sep 1964  
(4) CG, 1st MAW ltr 3:PLC:dc, 5213, Ser: 0052364  
of 28 Aug 1964  
(5) CG, 3d MAW ltr 3:RAG:krm, 3500, 003B 24464 of  
1 Sep 1964  
(6) CG, ForTrs, FMFPac ltr 3/OLB/kln, 3100, Ser:  
0024-64 of 28 Aug 1964  
(7) CG, 1st MarBrig ltr 3/jab, 5213, Ser: 0142-64  
of 3 Sep 1964  
(8) CG, 1st MarBrig ltr 3/jab, 5213, Ser: 0143-64  
of 3 Sep 1964  
(9) CO, 1st FSR ltr 8/PJD:elg, Ser: 009-64 of  
26 Aug 1964

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1965 is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. Summary Statement

a. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific is considered to be combat ready, although its efficiency and competence in almost every area are susceptible of further improvement. Deficiencies noted in the enclosures are not of sufficient magnitude to degrade materially the overall capability of this command to execute all assigned missions.

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SEP 25 1964

b. In terms of total capabilities for meeting contingencies within the Force, WestPac FMFPac forces are prepared to commit a Marine Expeditionary Force (-), consisting of a 2/3 Division/Wing Team, while EastPac FMF forces can commit a MEF, consisting of a complete Division/Wing Team. The RLT/MAG of the 1st Marine Brigade, plus assigned supporting elements, can be deployed as a MEB size force for the conduct of operations in either EastPac or WestPac.

c. Two factors limit the rapidity of deployment of this Force in an environment where no prepositioning of units or logistical support is permitted. The first of these is the overall shortage of amphibious shipping, particularly in the Western Pacific, where there is now only enough shipping available to embark an MEB. The second is found in the excessive time required between arrival of flight echelons in a theater and the arrival of aviation fuel and replenishment ordnance required for continued offensive operations.

d. These two problem areas are being studied by both Pacific Fleet and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific in an effort to reduce the margin of deficiencies, specifically:

(1) CINCPACFLT has been made aware of our concern regarding overall amphibious shipping deficiencies and, particularly, has been requested to assign an additional LPH to WestPac in order that two SLFs may be maintained; one on station and one on a standby or training status.

(2) Actions are being initiated to migrate both Class V and V (A) from Sasebo to the Subic area to place more replenishment ordnance in a position proximate to Southeast Asia.

(3) The feasibility of loading selected amounts of Class V (A) in the amphibious shipping of each SLF is being studied.

3. Detailed evaluation of the combat readiness of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific reporting units are contained in enclosures (1) through (9). Comments on salient points described in the enclosures are as follows:

a. 1st Marine Division

(1) Two infantry battalions will be in a reduced state of readiness during October and December and one infantry battalion will be in a reduced state of readiness during November:

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SEP 25 1964

(2) The reduced state of readiness described is due to personnel input/output in support of the transplacement program. As noted in the last report this Headquarters was conducting a study covering all aspects of the transplacement program. This study was mailed to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on 3 September 1964. Should contingency plan commitments require more infantry battalions than are available and ready in the 1st Marine Division, one or both of the following actions would improve this situation:

(a) Reconstitution of the battalion by selective recall of personnel transferred to accommodate the new input of personnel.

(b) Utilization of forces from the 1st Marine Brigade.

(3) Current allowance of corpsmen is 67% of T/O while actual strength of 15 September 1964 was 53% of T/O. The 1st Medical Battalion is short of technically trained hospital corpsmen and augmentation by new personnel just prior to embarkation is not an adequate solution. The subject is now being pursued via CINCPACFLT. A letter recommending an increase in allowance of hospital corps personnel in FMFPac is being submitted.

b. 3d Marine Division

(1) Recent deployments by the 3d Marine Division in response to contingency requirements in SEAsia have tested the Division's readiness. It was called upon to execute an embarkation of combat alerted surface forces and to marshall alerted airlift BLTs for air movement. These actions culminated in the actual deployment of the ground elements of the 9th MEB to the South China Sea. In all cases units of the Division were prepared for embarkation before the arrival of the amphibious shipping and the potential rate of embarkation far exceeded the actual rate. The latter is limited by the lack of proper loading facilities available on Okinawa.

(2) In an attempt to reduce the time required to embark elements of the Division, this Headquarters is pursuing various

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actions contemplated to improve the embarkation facilities on Okinawa. The following is a summary of progress made to date:

(a) LST Ramps, Kin Red Beach: The preliminary engineering report for the construction of a deep water LST ramp, capable of accommodating two 1156 or 1173 class LSTs simultaneously has been concurred in by CINCPACFLT. It is estimated that the project will require 16 months to complete after funding.

(b) LST Ramps, Ora Wan: DIRPACDOCKS is preparing recommendations to CINCPACFLT for correction of deficiencies. Total cost is estimated to exceed \$200,000 thus requiring military construction funding. At the present time there are no firm dates on the correction of Ora Wan ramp deficiencies.

(c) Tengan Pier: The project is scheduled for completion in February 1966. It is 35% complete and will be usable, if required, as early as September 1965.

(d) Replacement of Pier Bravo, White Beach: Due to the excessively high cost for replacement of Pier Bravo (over \$6,000,000), a study is being conducted to determine if the new pier could be located elsewhere to provide better operational capabilities. No firm target date for this facility has been established.

c. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing has the capability of providing two tailored composite aircraft groups in support of contingency commitments. These specialized groups are based on the command and support elements of MAG-12 (104 Force IIB). These groups are task organized to deploy as cross-sections of the Wing's combat potential.

d. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. The mission of training squadrons for deployment to WestPac continues to affect readiness adversely. Acknowledging that it is necessary to maintain the required high state of readiness in the Far East, every effort is being made to improve the systems of reforming and training of squadrons in an effort to diminish its impact on the Wing. Recent rescheduling of two FMFLant Marine Air Control Squadrons for Far East deployment in

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SEP 25 1984

e. 1st Marine Brigade. VMF (AW) 212 will be in a reduced state of readiness for the first two months of the reporting period due to the requirement to qualify pilots for missile intercept in the newly acquired F-8D aircraft. VMF (AW) 212 will be fully combat ready by 1 December 1964.

f. 1st Force Service Regiment. There will be an exceptionally large requirement for personnel replacement during the forthcoming quarter, particularly in the ranks of Captain and Field Grade Officers, in order to maintain a full capability to support the deployment of a MEB or MEF.

g. General. During the forthcoming quarter particular command attention will be addressed to programs contemplated to:

- (1) Diminish reaction times in response to contingency plans.

- (2) Improve the transplacement program to reduce the loss of effectiveness of participating units.

- (3) Reduce shortages of critical personnel skills through refinements in assignment, and through improved training programs.

- (4) Improve the effectiveness and thoroughness of inspection programs.

4. It is noted that Part II of several subordinate unit reports exhibit inconsistencies in referring to contingency plans. A master contingency plan chart which will re-acquaint all Fleet Marine Force, Pacific commands with those contingency plans which they are required to support will be published by 15 October 1964.

**Y. H. KRULAK**

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CG ForTrs FMFPac  
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CG MCB CamPen  
1st ForSvc Regt

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HEADQUARTERS  
Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro  
Santa Ana, California 92709

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3/BAM/jes  
3500  
003A24464  
AUG 31 1964

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report for 2nd Quarter, FY 1965 (U)  
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMFPACO 3000.4

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is hereby submitted:

PART I - Evaluation of the Command. The 1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions are considered capable of performing their assigned combat missions.

PART II - Evaluation of Units. It is considered improbable that either the 1st or 2nd LAAM Battalions will become ineffective at any time during the period covered by the report.

PART III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments. Light Antiaircraft Battalions, as required by the following contingency plans, can be provided during the reported on period:

CINCPACFLT 1-64	1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions
CINCPACFLT 25-63	1st LAAM Battalion
CINCPACFLT 27-64	1st LAAM Battalion
CINCPACFLT 32-64	1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions
SEATO Field Force 4-64	1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions
SEATO Field Force 6-64	1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions
COMPHIBLANT 209-63	2nd LAAM Battalion
FMFPAC 201-64	1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions

A. R. KIR

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ENCLOSURE (1) - 3



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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Camp Pendleton, California, 92055

64 6566  
3:OP:dwm  
3480  
Ser: 00228-64  
28 Aug 1964

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AIR MAIL

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report for 2d Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4  
(c) CG 1stMarDiv ltr 3:PL:fph Ser: 0007-64 of 18 Mar 1964

Encl: (1) Availability of 1st Marine Division Infantry Units

1. The quarterly combat readiness report, 2d Quarter, FY 65 is a report prepared and submitted in the second month of the 1st Quarter, FY 65. The second Quarter, FY 65, is the reported period covered in this report.

2. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

The 1st Marine Division (Rein) is capable of mounting out seven infantry battalions during October; eight during November; and seven during December 1965.

PART II - EVALUATION OF THE UNITS

- a. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines - Ineffective in October due to outgoing personnel input
- b. 3d Battalion, 7th Marines - Ineffective in October due to incoming personnel input
- c. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines - Ineffective in November and December due to incoming transit and incoming personnel input.
- d. 3d Battalion, 1st Marines - Ineffective in December due to outgoing personnel input
- e. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) - The company is at manning level. It was organized into five operational platoons on 21 July 1964. However, only 12 fully trained reconnaissance teams (four platoons) could be employed during an emergency from 1 October to mid-November because of personnel TAD to schools and classified assignment. When the platoon now attached to the 3d Marine Division is replaced in mid-November, a shortage of fully trained personnel will exist until replacements can be brought to operational effectiveness. This will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
- f. 1st Medical Battalion - Critical shortages of technically qualified Hospital Corpsmen continues to exist. Local training programs, although helpful, do not fully satisfy these shortages. Commitment of one Collecting and Clearing Company will deplete the Battalion of over 50% of the technical personnel now on hand. The continuing requirement of in garrison assignment of all medical officers, except the Battalion Commander and Executive Officer, to Division infantry units continues in effect.

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

The 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF is committed to provide forces in support of the following contingency plans.

- a. CG, FMFPac General War Plan 1-64 (CATF 61 OPlans 205, 207 and 209). Forces to be provided in support of this plan will be contingent upon the units available at the time of execution.

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**SECRET**

3:OP:dwm

3480

Ser: 00228-64

28 Aug 1964

b. CG, FMFPac OPLAN 27-63. This Command is able to provide the specified forces with the following exceptions:

(1) Line numbers 36b, c; 37a, b; 38a, b; of Appendix 1 to Annex B. The only source of these personnel is the 1st Counterintelligence Team, FMF, which is shown in the Task Organization. To provide the personnel to fill the cited line numbers would reduce the Counterintelligence Team to two, vice four sub-teams.

(2) 1st Separate Surgical Company, FMF. Deactivated 1 September 1963

(3) 1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company (-), FMF. Deactivated 1 November 1963.

c. CG, FMFPac OPLAN 32-62. This Command is able to provide the required forces in support of this plan within the indicated time frame.

d. CG, FMFPac OPLAN 81-62. Since this OPLAN supports the CINCLANT 312/313/315/316 series of plans, the ability of this Command to support the plan will be predicated on the interaction between OPLAN 316 and any other plan in the series selected for execution. In light of personnel and equipment reports previously submitted, the supportability by this command under the various circumstances follow:

(1) Execution of OPLAN 316 only. This Command has the ability to deploy the specified force (5th MEB) within the time frame indicated.

(2) Execution of OPLANs 312 and 316. The most recent change to CINCLANT 312-64 requires the airlift of four BLT's for the Ground Defense Force (GDF) within 72 hour period. This requirement has affected Division readiness as indicated in the following paragraphs.

(a) As shown in enclosure (1) due to the transplacement program this Command has a maximum of eight infantry battalions available at any given time and on alternate months a maximum of seven. Consequently, on alternate months deployment of four airlifted BLT's under CINCLANT's 312 plan would leave only three battalions available for the 5th MEB instead of the four required under CINCLANT 312 and 216 plans. A more detailed discussion of this situation was provided by reference (c).

(b) CINCLANT's 312 plan, while reducing the overall strength of airlifted GDF reinforcements to 6670 personnel, has compressed the time frame within which closure of the total force is required. The Division position on this ceiling and on the time limitation was provided by reference (c). A MATS study is currently being conducted to determine MATS airlift capability to meet this requirement under both 312 and 315 plans within the prescribed time limitations. Final determination of optimum airlifted GDF strength and ability to meet CINCLANT 312 plan requirements will depend on the results of MATS' survey.

(3) Execution of OPLANs 313 and 316. CINCLANT 313-64 divides airlifted GDF reinforcements into initial and follow-on reinforcements. The planned deployment of follow-on forces follows that of initial reinforcements, the same general comments contained in paragraph (2) apply. However, the possibility of delayed deployment of follow-on reinforcements and/or possibility of limited execution of OPLAN 316, wherein the 5th MEB is not required to deploy, or any delay in planned deployment of the 5th MEB would enhance the readiness of the Division for execution of 313 and 316 plans.

(4) Execution of OPLANs 315 and 316. Execution of OPLAN 316 in relation to 315 is uncertain. However such execution can reasonably be expected. This Command has the ability to provide GDF reinforcements for execution of OPLAN 315 alone, dependent on verification of MATS airlift capability described in paragraph (2) (b). In the event of concurrent or immediately subsequent execution of 316 OPLAN the same conditions will prevail during alternate months as described in paragraph (2) (a) above.

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Ser: 00228-64  
28 Aug 1964

e. CG, FMFPac OPlan 82-62. This Command is able to provide the required forces to support this plan within the time frame indicated by the modes of transportation.

W. T. FAIRBOURN

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# AVAILABILITY OF 1ST MARINE DIVISION INFANTRY UNITS

	* MEB	READY FORCES (ADC GROUP)		** FOLLOW-ON / REAR ECHELON	
		REGT	HQ - ALPHA-BRAVO		
1-31 DEC 63	7th MAR (3/1)	HQ 1st MAR	2/1, 1/1	HQ 5th MAR (2/5)	1/5 3/5
1-31 JAN 64	1st MAR (1/5)	HQ 7th MAR	2/7, 3/7	HQ 5th MAR (3/5) 1/7	2/5 1/7
1-29 FEB 64	1st MAR (2/5)	HQ 7th MAR	2/7, 3/7	HQ 5th MAR (3/5)	2/5 1/7
1-31 MAR 64	1st MAR (2/5)	HQ 5th MAR	1/5, 3/7	HQ 7th MAR (1/7) 2/7	3/5 2/7
1-30 APR 64	1st MAR (2/5)	HQ 5th MAR	1/5, 3/7	HQ 7th MAR (1/7)	3/5 2/7
1-31 MAY 64	1st MAR (3/5)	HQ 5th MAR	1/5, 2/5	HQ 7th MAR (2/7) 3/7	1/7 3/7
1-30 JUN 64	1st MAR (3/5)	HQ 5th MAR	1/5, 2/5	HQ 7th MAR (2/7)	1/7 3/7
1-31 JULY 64	5th MAR (1/7)	HQ 1st MAR	2/1, 3/1	HQ 7th MAR (3/7) 1/1	2/7 1/1
1-31 AUG 64	5th MAR (2/7)	HQ 1st MAR	2/1, 3/1	HQ 7th MAR (3/7)	3/7 2/1
1-30 SEP 64	5th MAR (2/7)	HQ 7th MAR	1/7, 3/1	HQ 1st MAR (1/1) 2/1	3/7 2/1
1-31 OCT 64	5th MAR (2/7)	HQ 7th MAR	1/7, 3/1	HQ 1st MAR (1/1)	1/1 3/1
1-30 NOV 64	5th MAR (3/7)	HQ 7th MAR	1/7, 2/7	HQ 1st MAR (2/1) 3/1	1/1 3/1
1-31 DEC 64	5th MAR (3/7)	HQ 7th MAR	1/7, 2/7	HQ 1st MAR (2/1)	2/1 1/5
1-31 JAN 65	7th MAR (1/1)	HQ 5th MAR	2/5, 3/5	HQ 1st MAR (3/1) 1/5	2/1 1/5
1-28 FEB 65	7th MAR (2/1)	HQ 5th MAR	2/5, 3/5	HQ 1st MAR (3/1)	3/1 2/5
1-31 MAR 65	7th MAR (2/1)	HQ 1st MAR	1/1, 3/5	HQ 5th MAR (1/5) 2/5	3/1 2/5
1-30 APR 65	7th MAR (2/1)	HQ 1st MAR	1/1, 3/5	HQ 5th MAR (2/5) 3/5	1/5 3/5
1-31 MAY 65	7th MAR (3/1)	HQ 1st MAR	1/1, 2/1	HQ 5th MAR (2/5) 3/5	1/5 3/5
1-30 JUN 65	7th MAR (3/1)	HQ 1st MAR	1/1, 2/1	HQ 5th MAR (2/5)	1/5 3/5

INFANTRY UNITS AVAILABLE  
FOR DEPLOYMENT DURING  
PERIOD INDICATED.



FIRST MONTH LOCK-ON TRAINING



SECOND MONTH LOCK-ON TRAINING



LEAVE / INPUT



IN TRANSIT

\*\* UNITS IN THIS COLUMN ARE  
UTILIZES TRANSCACEMENT LOCK-ON BN.  
\* UTILIZES CONUS LOCK-ON BN.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

3C:ADA:gsW  
3480  
Ser: 0026564A  
3 Sep 1964

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From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Quarterly Commander's Combat Readiness Report 2nd Quarter  
FY 65, Report Symbol (MC 3100-4); submission of

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMFPACO 3000.4

Encl: (1) Subject report

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in compliance with instructions contained in references (a) and (b).

2. Upon removal of enclosure (1), this letter may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

*W. R. Collins*  
W. R. COLLINS

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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3C:ADA:rlt  
3480  
Ser: 0026564  
3 Sep 1964

3D MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN), FMF  
QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 2ND QUARTER, FY 65

PART I: EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

A. This Division is now combat ready in the fullest sense. At the writing of this report Regimental Landing Team 9 with Battalion Landing Team 1/3 and 3/9, is a part of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade afloat in the ships of Task Force 76 thirty miles off the shores of Danang, RVN prepared to land and carry out the provisions of either the 37 or 60 series plans. Battalion Landing Team 2/3, as the SLF, is thirty miles off the shore of Cap Saint Jacques ready to execute the 60 plan in Saigon.

B. On the island of Okinawa, Regimental Landing Team 3 is in an alert status prepared to embark in aircraft ready to execute any plan ordered. Battalion Landing Team 1/9 and 2/9 are on twelve hour alert with the Regimental headquarters on twenty four hour alert status. Battalion Landing Team 3/3, though not committed to a contingency responsibility, is organized and preparing to go afloat to relieve the First Battalion, Third Marines for transplacement and eventually to relieve BLT 2/3 as the SLF probably during October 1964.

C. The foregoing situation has been tentatively projected into October at the Seventh Fleet scheduling conference held at Subic Bay 31 August through 2 September 1964. This Division is prepared to maintain this posture throughout the Second Quarter FY 65.

D. Embarkation of the units set forth in paragraph A above was conducted during the period 5 through 13 August 1964. In all cases the troops of this Division were prepared for embarkation before the arrival of their ships and the units' potential rate of embarkation far exceeded the actual rate which was limited by the facilities made available on the island.

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PART II: EVALUATION OF UNITS

A. All units of the 3d Marine Division (-)(Rein) will be effective and capable of accomplishing missions during the forthcoming quarter.

PART III: EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

A. Contingency plans supported by this Division are as follows:

<u>Plan</u>	<u>Force</u>
1. SFF-4 (year)	3d MarDiv
2. SFF-5 (year)	Ground elms of MEB
3. SFF-6 (year)	3d MarDiv
4. SFF-7 (year)	Ground elms of MEB
5. 1 (year)	3d MarDiv
6. 23 (year)	To be designated
7. 25 (year)	MAG
8. 27 (year)	3d MarDiv
9. 32 Ph II (L)(year)	Ground elms of MEB
10. 32 Ph II (T)(year)	Ground elms of MEB
11. 32 Ph II (V)(year)	3d MarDiv (-)
12. 32 Ph III and IV(year)	3d MarDiv
13. 33 (year)	To be designated
14. 35 (year)	To be designated
15. 37 (year)	Ground elms of MEB

Enclosure (1)

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<u>Plan</u>	<u>Force</u>
16. 38 (year)	To be designated
17. 60 (year)	To be designated
18. 80 (year)	BLT or ground elms of MEB
19. 99 (year)	To be designated
20. 104 (year)	BLT or ground elms of MEB

B. The 3d Marine Division will be able to provide the forces required to support the above listed plans during 2d Quarter, FY 65.

Enclosure (1)

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64-6511

## HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific  
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California 96601

3:PLC:de

5213

Ser: 0052064

28 AUG 1964

SECRET

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965  
Ref (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMFPAC O 3000.4  
(c) AirFMFPac O 3000.1

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), the following comments pertaining to the combat readiness of this Command are submitted:

Part I: The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is combat ready and capable of carrying out its mission and all contingencies which may be assigned. The personnel situation within the Wing is adequate to accomplish missions assigned. The logistic posture of the Wing is considered to be satisfactory.


Part II: All units of the Wing will be effective in the forthcoming quarter. The readiness posture of all units except MATCU 60 and MATCU 66 will permit their deployment with necessary equipment and supplies for sustained operations. The age of equipment and extensive maintenance requirements still result in marginal readiness for MATCU 60 and 66 to meet contingency requirements. AN/TSQ-18's presently enroute to both MATCU-60 and 66 will reduce the equipment and maintenance problems which presently exist.

## Part III

a. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is currently committed to the following contingency plans, and incapable of providing aviation forces as required, to include: Force I(SLF HDM), Force II(Composite MAG) or 1st MAW in its entirety:

1-(YR)	32-(YR)II(L)	37-(YR)	SFF 4 (YR)
23-(YR)	32-(YR)II(T)	60-(YR)	SFF 5 (YR)
25-(YR)	32-(YR)II(RVN)	80-(YR)	SFF 6 (YR)
27-(YR)	32-(YR)III/IV	104-(YR)	SFF 7 (YR)

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ENCLOSURE (4)

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b. The following plans are presently under preparation by higher Headquarters and stipulate requirements for 1st MAW forces:

33-(YR)  
35-(YR)

38-(YR)  
99-(YR)

c. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing possesses the capability to provide either of two tailored Composite Marine Aircraft Groups as may be required for support of existing contingency commitments. These specialized forces are based on the command/support elements of MAC-12(104 Force IIA) or MAC-11(104 Force IIB). They are task organized to deploy as cross-sections of the Wing's combat potential. Provision of two such identical forces contributes added flexibility to envisioned operations and permits anticipated in-country positioning of aviation elements as may be required.

P. J. FONTANA

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CG, AirFPPac  
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64 6577

HEADQUARTERS  
3D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, AIRFMFPAC  
MCAS, EL TORO, SANTA ANA, CALIF. 92709

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3:RAG:krm

3500

Ser: 003B24464

1 Sept 1964

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From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for Second Quarter FY 65;  
submission of (U) (RS MC 3100-4)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the below report is submitted:

a. Part I.

(1) The 3d MAW has an estimated combat readiness of 75%. The continuing requirement for reforming and training of squadrons in addition to training cadres and detachments for future deployment reflects adversely on overall Wing readiness.

b. Part II.

(1) MACS-9: Deploys to 1st MAW by 1 October 1964.

(2) MACS-4: Forms 2 October 1964.

(3) VMFA-513: Deploys to 1st MAW by 1 November 1964.

(4) VMFA-314: Forms 2 November 1964 and will be in Phase I until 1 May 1965.

(5) VMCJ-3: Cadre deploys to 1st MAW by 1 November 1964. Unit then in Phase I until approximately 1 June 1965.

(6) HMM-361: Phase I until 1 June 1965.

(7) HMM-163: Deploys to 1st MAW by 1 December 1964.

(8) HMM-364: Forms 2 December 1964 and will be in Phase I until 1 April 1965.

(9) HMM-164: Phase I until 1 January 1965.

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Ref: 003B24464

1 Sept 1964

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(1) MATCH-68: 35% Combat Ready. The MRN-14 tacan sets have not been received to date. In addition limited training of personnel until are furnished by the FAA.

c. Part III.

(1) The following contingency plans call for deployment of 3d MAF or elements thereof:

CINCPACFLT	OPERATIONS PLAN	71-YR
CINCPACFLT	OPERATIONS PLAN	25-YR
FMFPAC	OPERATIONS PLAN	27-YR
FMFPAC	OPERATIONS PLAN	32-YR
FMFPAC	OPERATIONS PLAN	82-YR
5th MEB	OPERATIONS PLAN	316-YR
LANDING FORCE AVIATION (TG 129.3)	OPERATIONS PLAN	316-YR

(2) 3d MAF is capable of providing required forces except that limited KC-130 aircraft would be available in the event 7-YR and 316-YR Operations Plans were executed at the same time.

F. E. 1234

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CG AIRFMFPAC

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**SECRET**

64 6415

HEADQUARTERS  
Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Twentynine Palms, California, 92278

3/OIB/kln  
3100  
Ser: 0024-64

**SECRET**

28 AUG 1964

**SECRET**

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965 (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) (U)  
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4  
(c) FMFPac msg 292313Z Aug 1963

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted. As directed by reference (c), Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalions are not included in this report.

a. PART I. This Command is considered capable of providing combat support and combat service support units in the support of the Fleet Marine Force in any combat situation.

b. PART II. This Command will have no ineffective units during the Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965.

c. PART III

(1) FMFIANT Operation Plan 205-59. Assigned forces can be provided in combat ready condition.

(2) FMFPAC Operation Plan 32-62 - I MEF. Assigned forces can be provided in combat ready condition with the exception of the Heavy Artillery Rocket Battery, deactivated.

(3) FMFPAC Operation Plan 27-63 - I MEF. Assigned units can be provided in combat ready condition with the exception of the Heavy

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ENCLOSURE (6)

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3100  
Ser:

Artillery Rocket Battery, deactivated.

(4) 5TH MEB Operation Plan 316-62. Assigned forces can be provided in a combat ready condition.

(5) FMFPAC Operation Plan 82-62 - 7th MEB. Assigned forces can be provided in combat ready condition.

(6) FMFLANT Operation Plan 209-63 - II MEC. Assignment of Force Troops, FMFPac units not definite. However, all units stationed at Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms can be provided in combat ready condition.

(7) CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plan 312-64. Assigned forces can be provided in combat ready condition.

(8) Ground Defense Force Operation Plan 312/316-64. Assigned forces can be provided in combat ready condition.

(9) 1ST MAR DIV Operation Plan 312/316-64. Assigned forces can be provided in a combat ready condition.

(10) FMFPAC Operation Plan 81-64. Assigned forces can be provided in a combat ready condition.

(11) FMFPAC Operation Plan 81-62. Assigned forces can be provided in a combat ready condition.

64-8597

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

3/jab  
5213  
Ser: 0142-64  
3 Sep 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Commanders Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness (Ground)  
2d Quarter, FY-65 (U)  
Ref: (a) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report of combat readiness is submitted:

Part I - Evaluation of Command

a. The overall combat readiness of the ground components of this command consisting of the 4th Marine Regiment (Rein), 3d Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein), and Service Battalion is considered satisfactory. Elements are considered ready for immediate deployment and are capable of accomplishing assigned missions.

Part II - Evaluation of Units

a. It is anticipated that no ground units of this command will be ineffective during the reporting period.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. The 1st Marine Brigade is supporting the following operational contingency plans and orders:

- (1) CG, FMFPac GWP 1-64
- (2) CG, FMFPac COOPlan 1-64
- (3) CG, FMFPac OPlan 27-63
- (4) CG, FMFPac OPlan 32-62
- (5) CINCPACFLT OPlan 37-64

1ST MARINE BRIGADE
64-013R
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Group-4  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years.

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ENCLOSURE (7)

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5213  
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CONFIDENTIAL

b. The ground components of this command are capable of accomplishing the missions assigned in the aforementioned plans and orders.

  
REGAN FULLER  
Chief of Staff

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64-5596

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

3/1ab  
5213  
Ser: 0143-64  
3 Sep 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Commanders Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness (Air),  
2d Quarter, FY-65 (U)  
Ref: (a) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted:

Part I - Evaluation of the Command

a. The overall combat readiness of Marine Aircraft Group-13 is considered excellent. Three of the four tactical aircraft squadrons and MACS-2 are considered ready for immediate deployment and are capable of accomplishing any assigned combat mission. The fourth squadron, VMF(AW)-212, should be capable of accomplishing any assigned combat mission by 1 December 1964.

Part II - Evaluation of Units

a. During this period all units under this command, except VMF(AW)-212, will be effective as far as readiness for combat is concerned. VMF(AW)-212, should be ready by 1 December. The primary reasons for VMF(AW)-212's state of readiness is due to the following:

(1) Receipt of F8D as replacement for F8B's during July 1964.

(2) Requirement for retraining of all pilots in the newer model F8 particularly in the missile intercept category.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. The 1st Marine Brigade is supporting the following operational contingency plans and orders:

(1) CG, FMFPac GWP 1-64

Group-4  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years.

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
ENCLOSURE (8)

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5213  
Ser: 0143-64

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- (2) CG, FMFPac COOPlan 1-64
- (3) CG, FMFPac OPlan 27-63
- (4) CG, FMFPac OPlan 32-62
- (5) CINCPACFLT OPlan 37-64
- (6) CINCPACFLT OPlan 25-63

b. The air component of this command is capable of accomplishing the missions assigned in the aforementioned plans and orders.

  
REGAN FULLER  
Chief of Staff

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Headquarters  
1ST FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, FMF  
Camp Pendleton, California, 92055

8/PJD:elg  
Ser: 009-64  
26 August 1964

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Via: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, FY 1965

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMF PacO 3000.4 w/Ch 2  
(c) CG MCB CampPen msg 071611Z Jul 64  
(d) FMF PacO 008073.1  
(e) CO 1st FSR ltr 8/DLG:elg Ser 007-64 of 2 Jun 64  
(f) CG FMF Pac G/P 1-64  
(g) CG FMF Pac Op Plan 27-63  
(h) CG FMF Pac Op Plan 32-62  
(i) 1st MarDiv Op Plan 302-64  
(j) 1st MarDiv Op Plan 32-60  
(k) CINC PAC FLT Op Plan 82-62  
(l) 5th MEB Op Plan 312/316-64

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1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted.

a. Part I. Evaluation of the Command.

An exceptionally high degree of personnel replacement will be required during the quarter in order for this Regiment to support a deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) effectively, or to provide adequate back-up support capability after the deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The existing enlisted personnel shortages are reflected in reference (c). In addition, the officer personnel shortage is critical in the ranks of captain and field grade officers. The basis for this Regiment's personnel shortage rests on the fact that it is operating on a manning level based on a Reduced Strength Table of Organization. At present, the Regiment is operating at approximately 80% of manning level. As set forth in reference (c), the Regiment could adequately support any foreseeable contingency requirement with the Class II T/E and Class II Mount-out stocks now on hand. The Regiment had between 98 and 100 per cent of the required items on hand prior to the receipt of T/E No. 3449, Revision No. 1, which is currently being reviewed by this headquarters to determine any equipment overage or shortages and possible funding deficiencies.

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**SECRET**

ENCLOSURE (9)

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8/PJD:elg  
 Ser: 009-64  
 26 August 1964

b. Part II. Evaluation of Units - T/O No. M-3449, Revision No. 1 applies.

(1) Headquarters and Service Battalion

(a) The following unit will remain authorized, but not activated, under the Reduced Strength T/O.

1 Headquarters and Service Company

a Disbursing Section

(b) The unit listed below possesses a moderate capability to perform full strength T/O functions through a nucleus of trained personnel who are available in the event of full strength activation.

1 Headquarters and Service Company

a Longshoreman Platoon - Activated at Reduced Strength. (Becomes Longshoreman Company at Full Strength.) A period of shipboard (AKA) training and the loading of transplacement and replacement drafts aboard LSTS shipping from the Port of San Diego was conducted for the platoon during the current period.

(2) Supply Battalion

(a) Headquarters and Service Company. Fleet Stock Account is considered capable of supporting a MEF with marginal effectiveness and with a resultant inability to continue its garrison mission. This is the result of inadequate experience in the full-scale operation of a Fleet Stock Account due to the restricted garrison mission assigned. Fleet Stock Account is capable of fully supporting all contingency plans up to and including a MEB while still continuing its garrison mission.

(b) Ammunition Company. This company requires the four (4) Ammunition Platoons authorized by the Full Strength T/O in order to adequately perform its combat ammunition supply mission. The company could support a MEF ammunition supply operation with three (3) Ammunition Platoons, but the company would be extremely limited in its capability of furnishing reinforcing detachments to division and wing elements. The company is now operating at approximately 71% of its manning level for the one (1) platoon authorized in the Reduced Strength T/O. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support mission can be accomplished for a MEB. The EOD capability to support a normal MEF does not exist due to a shortage of formal school trained enlisted personnel. Ammunition Company cannot support the mission outlined

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 Ser: 009-64  
 26 August 1964

in reference (d) because of a lack of trained personnel and equipment. Action has been initiated to obtain the required equipment and to train personnel in order to comply with reference (d). Related T/O and T/E changes were requested in reference (e).

(c) Bulk Fuel Company. This company now operates at approximately 45% of its manning level. The company maintains five (5) Amphibious Assault Bulk Fuel Systems, but only two (2) of these systems can be employed effectively. Continuing loss of personnel without replacement seriously affects the capabilities of the company to carry out its mission. Bulk Fuel Company is considered capable of supporting contingency requirements up to and including a MEB.

(d) Supply Company. This company is considered capable of supporting units up to and including a MEB. This support will have only marginal effectiveness due to inadequate training of personnel to perform all functions of the company mission due to the restricted garrison mission assigned and the inactive status of certain T/O functions. In addition, insufficient personnel are available to receive, store, and issue the first resupply and subsequent materiel which would be received in an objective area. This company is presently at approximately 52% of its manning level but is considered susceptible to rapid manpower build-up in the event of deployment.

(e) Ration Company. Personnel availability limits this company's ability to conduct sustained operations in support of any organization larger than a MEB. After being deployed to support a MEB, Ration Company would lose its capability to perform the presently assigned garrison mission of supporting the Marine Corps Base Bakery and Exchanges.

(3) Maintenance Battalion. No units will be ineffective during the reporting period. However, in Ordnance Maintenance Company there will be a 70% shortage of Ordnance officers. No relief is anticipated. A critical shortage also exists in MOS 3516. On-board strength is 44% of the manning level. In 90 days, 28 Basic 3500 will be qualified 3516, which will increase the percentage of on-board strength to 57% of the manning level.

c. Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments

(1) Subject to the comments above, this Regiment is prepared to execute contingencies outlined in references (f), (g) and (h).

(2) This Regiment is committed to support six separate and distinct 1st Marine Division contingency plans as follows:

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Ser: 009-64

(a) Ready BLT (Air), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 302-64 26 August 1964  
In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to assemble, segregate, mark, load and deliver Class V to the staging areas. This requirement can readily be performed. No personnel participation is involved in support of this plan.

(b) Ready BLT (Surface), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 302-64.  
In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to provide Class II (3rd and 4th echelon repair parts for Force units), Class IV and V support, plus a Tracked Vehicle Repair Section (Reinforced), totaling one officer and 20 men. This requirement can readily be performed.

(c) RLT (A), CG 1st MarDiv Op Plan 32-60, TIM-10 of 041700Z Nov 60 and CG 1st MarDiv msg 00301624Z Jan 63. In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to furnish a detachment of seven officers and 267 men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III, and V support to the RLT, 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance to Force Units and overflow 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance for all other units. A prescribed amount of Class II and IV support is furnished to the RLT. This Regiment has a limited capability of performing this mission due to a shortage of trained ammunition technicians. All other support requirements for the RLT can be provided without unduly disrupting current garrison support missions.

(d) 7th MEB - CINC PAC FLT Op Plan 82-62. In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to furnish a detachment of 12 officers and 329 men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III, and V support to the 7th MEB; 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance to Force units; and overflow 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance to all other units. A prescribed amount of Class II and IV support is provided to the MEB. This Regiment has a limited capability to support this plan due only to a shortage of trained ammunition technicians (see paragraph 1.b.(2)(b) above). All other support can readily be provided.

(e) 5th MEB - 5th MEB Op Plan 312/316-64. In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to furnish 23 officers and 605 men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III and V support to the MEB, 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance to Force units; and overflow 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance to all other units. This Regiment has a limited capability to support this plan due to a shortage of ammunition technicians. Furthermore, although the Regiment is capable of providing all support requirements to the 5th MEB plan, the back-up support capability would be severely hindered unless there is a timely replacement of those shortages of personnel reported in reference (c) and set forth in Part I above. It is noted that the mounting-out of this MEB depletes the operational capability of Bulk Fuel and Ammunition Company and fully commits certain "one-of-a-kind" items, such as the Mobile Bakery Unit of the Ration Company, Supply Battalion.

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Ser: 009-64  
26 August 1964

(f) Ground Defense Force (Ready Forces), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 312/316-64. In support of this plan, this Regiment is required to furnish two officers and 92 men with sufficient equipment and Class I, III and V support for a task organized detachment for the Logistic Support Group. This Regiment has a limited capability to fully support this plan due to a shortage of ammunition technicians.

(3) As set forth above, this Regiment has a limited capability of supporting any of the standing contingency requirements (less the air and surface BLTs) due to a shortage of ammunition technicians. In regard to support other than ammunition technicians, this Regiment is able to support any combination of two or more of the above plans (less the air and surface BLT) only on a marginal basis. In addition, the deployment of any one of the above mentioned forces would either completely eliminate or very seriously restrict this Regiment's capability to furnish support to the Marine Corps Base in certain areas. Specific areas of concern would be: operation of the Base magazines; augmentation of the Base Bakery personnel; and augmentation of Base Exchange personnel. It should also be noted that, if Division Operation Plan 312/316-64 is employed, 1st Force Service Regiment would provide support to the 5th MEB, Ground Defense Force (Initial Reinforcements) and to the Ground Defense Force (Follow-On Reinforcements). In view of the present personnel shortages, 1st FSR would require a significant personnel build-up to Reduced Strength T/O strength to accomplish its mission fully under the cited plans.

  
H. G. LAWRENCE, Jr.

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC  
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
30p/lwp  
26 December 1964  
Ser: 00919-64

**SECRET**

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03H)

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for 3d Quarter FY 65 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) CG FMFPac ltr 6/ehw, Ser: 0551-64 of 26 August 1964 (NOTAL)  
(c) ADMINO FMFPac 172255Z/OCT64  
(d) CG FMFPac ltr 16/tcm Ser: 0653-65 of 1 Oct 1964  
(e) First MarDiv 191944Z Dec64

Encl: (1) CG AirFMFPac ltr FF 13-5, 3/WHS/lrm, 3500 Ser: 003A33864 of 3 Dec 1964.  
(2) CG 1st MarDiv ltr 3:OP:dbr, 3480, Ser: 00332-64, of 27 Nov 1964.  
(3) CG 3d MarDiv ltr 3C:RKJ:gsu, 3480, Ser: 0035164 of 3 Dec 1964.  
(4) CG 1st MAW ltr 3:WCP:wfd, 3000, Ser: 0074964 of 27 Nov 64.  
(5) CG 3d MAW ltr 3:WDW:lad, 3500, Ser: 003A33564 of 30 Nov 1964.  
(6) CG ForTrps ltr 3/WMH/ara, 3100, Ser: 0035-64 of 24 Nov 64.  
(7) CG 1st MarBrig ltr 3/rek, Ser: 0193-64 of 24 Nov 1964.  
(8) CG 1st MarBrig ltr 3/jab, 5213, Ser: 0192-64 of 18 Nov 1964.  
(9) CO, 1st FSR ltr 8/PJD:elg, Ser: 0011-64 of 23 Nov 1964.

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1965 is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. Summary Statement

a. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific is combat ready. However, much can and is being done to enhance this readiness. Deficiencies noted in the enclosures are not of sufficient magnitude to degrade materially the overall capability of this command to execute all of its assigned missions.

b. In terms of total capabilities for meeting contingencies within the Force, WestPac FMFPac units are prepared to commit

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INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER  
12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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**SECRET**26 December 1964  
Ser: 00919-64

a. MEF(-) consisting of a 2/3 Division/Wing Team while EastPac FMFPac forces can commit a MEF consisting of a complete Division/Wing Team. The RLT/MAG of the 1st Marine Brigade, plus assigned supporting elements, can be deployed as a MEB size force for the conduct of operations in either EastPac or WestPac.

c. As stated in the last report, the rapidity of deployment of this force is limited by the overall shortage of amphibious shipping and particularly in WestPac where, at present, there is only sufficient shipping available to embark a MEB. CINCPAC FLT has been made aware of our concern regarding overall amphibious shipping deficiencies. Reference (b) requested CINCPAC FLT to maintain an additional LPH in WestPac in order that two BLTs, each with a helicopter capability, may be maintained afloat. The recent assignment of the LPD VANCOUVER to the 7th Fleet will further enhance our WestPac forces' reaction time by providing an additional platform to facilitate movement of troops and supplies by helicopter lift and to provide a refueling and service facility to supplement the LPH. This addition, however, is not regarded as a substitute for an LPH.

d. Reference (c) furnished CINCPACFLT a statement of Class V and VA storage requirements in the Subic and Okinawa areas as part of a program to relocate a portion of ordnance mount out and resupply stocks from Sasebo to the Subic area, in order to improve logistic support to the two BLTs afloat and to reduce reaction time for a MEB in the SEASIA area. This data will be further refined in a study currently underway at this Headquarters.

3. Detailed evaluations of the combat readiness of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific reporting units are contained in enclosures (1) through (9). Comments on the salient points described in the enclosures are as follows:

a. 1st Marine Division

(1) Two infantry battalions will be in a reduced state of readiness during February, and one infantry battalion will be in a reduced state of readiness during January and March, due to personnel input/output in support of the transplacement program. Should contingency plan commitments require more infantry battalions than are available, one or both of the following actions would improve the situation:

(a) Reconstitution of the battalion by selective recall of personnel transferred to accommodate the new input.

(b) Utilization of units from the 1st Marine Brigade.

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**SECRET**26 December 1964  
Ser: 00919-64

(2) 1st Medical Battalion reported critical shortages of technically trained corpsman. On 1 October this Headquarters forwarded a letter, reference (d), to CNO via CMC requesting that allowance of Hospital Corps personnel be increased to 85% of T/O and that this strength be maintained for FMFPac. Until there is favorable action on this request, the medical support capability in the 1st Marine Division must be regarded as seriously deficient.

(3) The readiness of the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion has improved as a result of a program to restore the maximum number of vehicles to a combat serviceable condition. Further action to improve the situation is now being pursued at this headquarters, and a letter specifying assistance desired from CMC will be forwarded in early January.

b. 3d Marine Division

(1) The readiness of this division has continued to improve since the last report. The increased frequency of alerts and deployments since the last report has provided all Division units with valuable experience.

(2) With the advent of the requirement for deployment of two BLTs afloat in the SEASIA area, the reaction time of the Division has been enhanced without sacrificing essential training and conditioning. The BLTs alternate in on-station assignments; while one BLT remains within 24 hours of the areas probable employment, the other BLT conducts conditioning and field training ashore at Subic Bay area while maintaining a 96 hour reaction time.

(3) Air mount out reaction time has been, and will continue to be, improved through close liaison with airlift forces, tailored palletization of cargo compatible with the 463-L loading system, precise detailed planning and scheduling of airlifts and realistic, complete air mount-out exercise, one of which is presently scheduled to MACTAN Air Base, Philippine Islands in early January.

c. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

(1) The readiness of MATCUs 60 and 66 will improve during the period as the AN/TSQ radars and components are received. MATCU 66 is now in receipt of the new radar and the majority of its components.

(2) The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing maintains the capability of deploying two composite MAGs activated around the command and support elements of either MAG-12 or MAG-11. The inherent flexibility of the composite MAG permits selection of the appropriate MAG for air defense or close support operations as the situation warrants.

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26 December 1964

Ser: 00919-64

d. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(1) The mission of reforming and training squadrons and the effect on combat readiness has been mentioned in previous reports. The squadrons listed as less than ready due to pilot training are considered deployable only under emergency conditions. These squadrons could be expeditiously brought up to their full combat potential by a combination of accelerated training and selective personnel input. Notwithstanding this, every effort will continue to be made to improve systems of reforming and training squadrons by selected personnel assignment and careful formulation of training schedules.

e. Force Troops, FMFPac. The elements of this command are considered combat ready and capable of providing combat support and combat service support units for any contingency.

f. 1st Marine Brigade

(1) The reported less than fully ready status of Company B, 3d Engineer Bn is based upon non-receipt of equipment recently reallocated to Company B by this Headquarters. The receipt of this equipment will enhance the combat capabilities of the company, but the lack of it does not present a severe limitation.

(2) The two fighter squadrons in MAG-13 have recently acquired new type aircraft, however, no difficulties are foreseen in the rapid attainment of full proficiency by the squadrons with the new type aircraft.

g. 1st Force Service Regiment

(1) The shortages reported in enclosure (9) pertain to the non availability of personnel qualified in MOSs 1141, 1341, 1391, 2311 and 3516 as reported in reference (e), the personnel status report of 15 December submitted by the First Marine Division. The graduates from the FMFPAC Automotive Mechanics' School and the activation of a FMFPAC Bulk Fuel Operation school during January 1965 will assist in providing qualified personnel for the MOSs 1391 and 3516.

h. General. During the forthcoming quarter, particular command attention will be addressed to programs contemplated to:

(1) Diminish reaction times in response to contingency deployments through training and application.

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6 December 1964

Ser: 00919-64

(2) Improve material readiness through the use of specialized contact instruction teams.

(3) Improve stability of critical officer and enlisted personnel in WestPac by developing programs to foster continuity.

(4) Enhance the effectiveness of inspection programs by improving inspection techniques and follow up programs.

4. The forthcoming MECLEX, SILVER LANCE, scheduled during the reporting period will be an excellent vehicle for improving the readiness of MidPac and EastPac Forces.

5. A Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Contingency Plan Support Chart has been published since the last report. The purpose of this chart was to re-acquaint all subordinate commands with those contingency plans which they are required to support. The value of this chart is evidenced by the uniformity of Part III of the reports submitted by subordinate commands. Five copies of this chart were forwarded to CMC (Code A03B) on 17 November 1964.

Copy to:  
CINCPACFLT  
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CG MCB CAMPEN  
CG 3D MAW  
CG 1ST MARDIV  
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CG FOR TRS FMFPAC  
CG 1ST MAR BRIG  
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V. H. KRULAK**SECRET**

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HEADQUARTERS  
Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro  
Santa Ana, California 92709

FF13-5  
3/WHS/1rm  
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DEC 3 1964

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From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: THE QUARTERLY COMMANDERS COMBAT READINESS REPORT,  
3rd Qtr, FY 65 is a Report Prepared and Submitted  
in the Last Month of 2nd Qtr, FY 65. The 3rd Qtr,  
FY 65 is the Reporting Period Covered in this Report (u)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A

1. Part I - Evaluation of the Command. The combat readiness of the 2nd LAAM Battalion is considered to be at an acceptable level to accomplish the assigned mission.
2. Part II - Evaluation of Units. There are no ineffective units within this command.
3. Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments. Below listed are current contingency plans for which this command provides forces. It is anticipated that the forces required can be provided during the reported period.

CINCPACFLT	1-64
CINCPACFLT	25-63
CINCPACFLT	27-64
CINCPACFLT	32-64
SEATO Field Force	4-64
SEATO Field Force	6-64
COMPHIBLANT	209-63
FMFPAC	201-64

4515-64

C. M. KUNZ

By direction

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Enclosure (1)

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Camp Pendleton, California, 92055

3:OP:dbf  
3480  
Ser: 00332-64  
27 NOV 1964

**SECRET**

AIR MAIL

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report for 3d Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4  
(c) CG, FMFPac ltr 16/trm Ser: 0653-64 of 1 Oct 1964 to Chief NAVPERS  
(d) CG, 1stMarDiv ltr 3:PL:fph Ser: 0007-64 of 18 Mar 1964  
(e) CG 1stMarDiv msg 270016Z

1. The quarterly combat readiness report, 3d Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965, is a report prepared and submitted in the second month of the 2d Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965. The 3d Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965 is the reporting period covered in this report.

2. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

The 1st Marine Division (Rein) is capable of mounting out all units except one infantry battalion during January; two during February; and one during March 1965.

PART II - EVALUATION OF THE UNITS

The following units are considered to be ineffective, or at less than optimum efficiency, during the 3d Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965, or a portion thereof:

- a. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines - Ineffective in January and February due to transit period and incoming personnel input.
- b. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines - Ineffective in February due to outgoing personnel input.
- c. 3d Battalion, 1st Marines - Ineffective in March due to transit period.
- d. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) - One reconnaissance platoon was deployed to the 3d Marine Division in November. Additionally, other trained personnel have been transferred. Nine fully trained reconnaissance teams will, however, be available for employment during the 3d Quarter. The replacement personnel will be brought to operational effectiveness as rapidly as possible.
- e. 1st Medical Battalion - Critical shortages of technically qualified Hospital Corpsman continue to exist. Commitment of one Collecting and Clearing Company will deplete the Battalion of over 50% of the technical personnel now on hand. Approval of reference (c) will permit the fielding of a second Collecting and Clearing Company. The continuing requirement of in garrison assignment of all medical officers, except the Battalion Commander and Executive Officer, to Division units continues in effect.
- f. 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion - This unit was reported in reference (e), the REDOPS report of 26 October 1964, as being marginally combat ready by virtue of equipment deadline. However, in view of the major effort being made to restore the maximum number of Amphibian Tractors, LVT(P)5A1, to a combat serviceable condition it is estimated that the combat readiness of this battalion should improve during the 3d Quarter of FY 1965. This unit is capable of supporting current contingency plans.

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

The 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF is committed to provide forces in support of the following contingency plans.

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COMMANDING GENERAL, 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF  
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Amphibious (2)

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Ser: 00332-64

a. CG, FMFPac General War Plan 1-64 (CATF 61 OPlans 205, 207 and 209). Forces to be provided in support of this plan will be contingent upon the units available at the time of execution.

b. CG, FMFPac Oplan 27-63. This Command is able to provide the specified forces with the following exceptions: Line numbers 36b, c; 37a, b; 38a, b; of Appendix 1 to Annex B. The only source of these personnel is the 1st Counterintelligence Team, FMF, which is shown in the Task Organization. To provide the personnel to fill the cited line numbers would reduce the Counterintelligence Team to two, vice four sub-teams.

c. CG, FMFPac Oplan 32-62. This Command is able to provide the required forces in support of this plan within the indicated time frame.

d. CG, FMFPac Oplan 81-62. Since this Oplan supports the CINCLANT 312/313/315/316 series of plans, the ability of this Command to support the plan will be predicated on the interaction between Oplan 316 and any other plan in the series selected for execution. In light of personnel and equipment reports previously submitted, the supportability by this Command under the various circumstances follow:

(1) Execution of Oplan 316 only. This Command has the ability to deploy the specified force (5th MEB) within the time frame indicated.

(2) Execution of OPlans 312 and 316. The most recent change to CINCLANT 312-64 requires the airlift of four BLT's for the Ground Defense Force (GDF) within 72 hour period. This requirement has affected Division readiness as indicated in the following paragraphs.

(a) Due to the transplacement program this Command has a maximum of eight infantry battalions available at any given time and on alternate months a maximum of seven. Consequently, on alternate months deployment of four airlifted BLT's under CINCLANT's 312 plan would leave only three battalions available for the 5th MEB instead of the four required under CINCLANT 312 and 316 plans. A more detailed discussion of this situation was provided by reference (d).

(b) CINCLANT's 312 plan, while reducing the overall strength of airlifted GDF reinforcements to 6670 personnel, has compressed the time frame within which closure of the total force is required. The Division position on this ceiling and on the time limitation was provided by reference (d). A MATS study is currently being conducted to determine MATS airlift capability to meet this requirement under both 312 and 315 plans within the prescribed time limitations. Final determination of optimum airlifted GDF strength and ability to meet CINCLANT 312 plan requirements will depend on the results of MATS' survey.

(3) Execution of OPlans 313 and 316. CINCLANT 313-64 divides airlifted GDF reinforcements into initial and follow-on reinforcements. The planned deployment of follow-on forces follows that of initial reinforcements, the same general comments contained in paragraph (2) apply. However, the possibility of limited execution of Oplan 316, wherein the 5th MEB is not required to deploy, or any delay in planned deployment of the 5th MEB would enhance the readiness of the Division for execution of 313 and 316 plans.

(4) Execution of OPlans 315 and 316. Execution of Oplan 316 in relation to 315 is uncertain. However such execution can reasonably be expected. This Command has the ability to provide GDF reinforcements for execution of Oplan 315 alone, dependent on verification of MATS airlift capability described in paragraph (2) (b). In the event of concurrent or immediately subsequent execution of 316 Oplan the same conditions will prevail during alternate months as described in paragraph (2) (a) above.

e. CG, FMFPac Oplan 82-62. This Command is able to provide the required forces to support this plan within the time frame indicated by the modes of transportation.

*W. T. Fairbourn*  
W. T. FAIRBOURN

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
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San Francisco, California

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**64 9306**

3C:RKJ:gsW  
3480  
Ser: 0035164  
3 December 1964

**SECRET**

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Commander's Combat Readiness Report for 3rd  
Quarter, FY 65 (Report Symbol 3100-4) (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMFPACO 3000.4

Encl: (1) Subject report

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1965 is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

2. Upon removal of enclosure (1) this letter may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

*W. R. Collins*  
W. R. COLLINS

1  
DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

**SECRET**

*Enclosure (3)*  
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3C:RKJ:gsW  
3480  
Ser: 00351643D MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN), FMF  
QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 3RD QUARTER FY 65PART I: EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

A. This Division currently enjoys a state of readiness for combat that could possibly be improved only by the assignment of additional personnel and combat equipment. Both the training and "experience" levels of individual marines, as well as units, have been markedly improved during recent months by stepped-up deployment schedules, lengthened afloat periods, an accelerated training tempo, participation of more units/personnel in actual operations in the Republic of Viet Nam and numerous alert exercises.

B. Complementing the Division's readiness posture are refinements which have been introduced into the vital transportation means for deploying our combat forces. In conjunction with Amphibious Force, SEVENTH Fleet, a system of assignment of contingency notional (connotional) numbers to amphibious shipping has been instituted which promises reduced embarkation times for surface deployments and, consequently, overall reaction times that more closely approach the potential capability of the embarking units. Air mount-out reaction capability is continuously being improved through closer liaison with the airlift organization, tailored palletization of cargo compatible with the 463-L loading system, precisely detailed planning and scheduling of airlifts, and realistic, complete air mount-out exercises.

C. Current and future employment schedules for the Division are designed to provide for an optimum balance between prepositioning combat-ready forces and maintaining essential training and conditioning standards. The constant deployment of two afloat BLT's, alternating on-station assignments, permits one BLT to be within four hours reaction time of the current area of most likely employment at all times, while the other BLT is conducting essential troop conditioning and field training within a 96-hour reaction time area. A third BLT will constantly be deployed, either conducting intensive field exercises and tactical testing at Fuji, participating in MEB/MEF exercises or carrying out cold weather landing exercises. Two more BLT's will continuously be committed to airlift contingency assignments on-island while going through a thorough basic training cycle. The sixth battalion will necessarily be involved in the transplacement rotation cycle, either having just arrived on-island or preparing to transplace to CONUS. An airlift exercise is planned for one of the contingency airlift BLT's in order to test our plans and enhance the capabilities of the BLT by actual deployment to another area in accordance with current plans.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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II. EVALUATION OF UNITS

A. During the third quarter, Fiscal Year 1965, all units of the 3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF will be effective and capable of accomplishing their combat missions.

III. EVALUATION OF CONTINGENCY COMMITMENTS

A. The 3d Marine Division is committed to support the contingency plans listed below with the initial/back-up forces indicated:

<u>Plan</u>	<u>Initial Force Commitment</u>	<u>Back-up Force Commitment</u>
1. SFF-4 (year)	Division	- - - - -
2. SFF-5 (year)	Ground elements of MEB (less one inf bn)	2/3 Division
3. SFF-6 (year)	Division	- - - - -
4. SFF-7 (year)	Ground elements of MEB	2/3 Division
5. 1 (year)	Division	- - - - -
6. 23 (year)	BLT	Ground elements of MEB
7. 25 (year)	- - - - -	Division
8. 27 (year)	- - - - -	Division
9. 32 Ph II (L)(year)	Ground elements of MEB	2/3 Division
10. 32 Ph II (T)(year)	Ground elements of MEB	2/3 Division
11. 32 Ph II (V)(year)	Division	- - - - -
12. 32 Ph III/IV (year)	Division	- - - - -
13. 33 (year)	To be designated	- - - - -
14. 35 (year)	BLT	Ground elements of MEB

ENCLOSURE (1)

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15.	37 (year)	Ground elements of MEB	- - - - -
16.	38 (year)	Division	- - - - -
17.	39 (year)	Division	- - - - -
18.	60 (year)	BLT	Ground elements of MEB
19.	80 (year)	BLT	Ground elements of MEB
20.	99 (year)	To be designated	- - - - -
21.	104 (year)	BLT	Ground elements of MEB

B. The 3d Marine Division will be able to provide the forces required to support the above listed plans during the 3d Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

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64 9065

HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific  
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California 96601

3:WCP:wfd

3000

Ser: 0074764

27 NOV 1964

SECRET

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), the following comments pertaining to the combat readiness of this Command are submitted:

Part I: The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is combat ready and capable of carrying out its mission and all contingencies which may be assigned.

Part II: All units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing will be effective in the forthcoming quarter. The readiness posture of all units except MATCU 60 and MATCU 66 will permit their deployment with necessary equipment and supplies for sustained operations. MATCU 66 has now received all components of the AN/TSQ-18 except the PU-608 generators, the spare parts shelter and the maintenance shelter. MATCU 60 has received no components of the AN/TSQ-18 as yet. Therefore, the readiness postures of MATCU 60 and MATCU 66 remain marginal for sustained operation with on hand equipment.

Part III:

a. Current 1st Marine Aircraft Wing contingency plan commitments call for, and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is capable of providing, requisite forces to execute the following plans:

1-(YR)	32-(YR)II(T)	37-(YR)	104-(YR)
23-(YR)	32-(YR)II(RVN)	38-(YR)	SFF 4 (YR)
25-(YR)	32-(YR)III/IV	60-(YR)	SFF 5 (YR)
27-(YR)	33-(YR)	80-(YR)	SFF 6 (YR)
32-(YR)PHII(L)	35-(YR)	99-(YR)	SFF 7 (YR)

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Enclosure (4)

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0074964

27 NOV 1964

b. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing possesses the capability of providing either one of two tailored Composite Marine Aircraft Group as may be required to support existing contingency commitments. The Composite MAG (1-VMK, 1-VIA, 2-HMM, 1-MACS, detachments of VMCJ and VMO, and command and support elements) provides a cross-sectional slice of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing combat potential for employment as the aviation component of a MEB or as the advanced force of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing for initial in-country positioning. The Composite MAG may be activated around the command/support elements of MAG-12 (104 Force IIA) or MAG-11 (104 Force IIB). This flexibility permits selection of the appropriate Composite MAG: (1) for subsequent air defense or close support augmentation as the situation dictates, (2) whose command/support structure is programmed to remain at the initial in-country airfield precluding repositioning upon further introduction of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing forces. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is capable of deploying either Composite MAG for sustained operations with a MEB; however, in order to deploy two Composite MAG's simultaneously, as structured herein, augmentation would be required from other resources.

  
P. J. FONTANA

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CTF 79

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64 9266

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, AirFMFPac  
MCAS, El Toro, Santa Ana, Calif. 92709

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3:WDW:lad  
3500  
Ser: 003A33564  
30 November 1964  
Copy No. 1 of 13 Copies

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for Third  
Quarter FY 65; Submission of (U) (RS MC 3100-4)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the below report is submitted:

a. Part I:

(1) The 3d MAW has an estimated combat readiness of 75%. The continuing requirement for reforming and training of squadrons in addition to training cadres and detachments for future deployment reflects adversely on overall wing readiness.

b. Part II:

(1) MACS-4: Formed 2 October 1964. Phase I training until approximately 1 May 1965.

(2) VMFA-314: Formed 2 November 1964, Phase I training until approximately 1 May 1965.

(3) VMCJ-3: Cadre deployed 1 November 1964. Remainder of unit will remain in Phase I training until 1 June 1965.

(4) VMF(AW)-312: Deploys to 1st MAW by 1 February 1965.

(5) VMF(AW)-122: Forms approximately 2 February 1965. Phase I training until 1 August 1965.

(6) HMM-164: Phase I until approximately 1 April due to transition to CH-46A aircraft.

(7) HMM-361: Phase I until 1 June 1965.

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**SECRET***Enclosure (5)*

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Ser: 003A33564

30 November 1964

(8) HMM-364: Forms 2 December 1964. Phase I training until 1 April 1965.


(9) MATCU-68: 55% Combat Ready. Minor personnel shortages exist, however appropriate action being completed as personnel report aboard. Two (2) MRN-14 tacans not received to date.

c. Part III:

(1) The following contingency plans call for deployment of 3d MAW or elements thereof:

CINCPACFLT	OPERATIONS PLAN	71-YR
CINCPACFLT	OPERATIONS PLAN	25-YR
FMFPAC	OPERATIONS PLAN	27-YR
FMFPAC	OPERATIONS PLAN	32-YR
FMFPAC	OPERATIONS PLAN	82-YR
5th MEB	OPERATIONS PLAN	316-YR
Landing Force	OPERATIONS PLAN	316-YR
Aviation (TG 129.3)		
SFF	OPERATIONS PLAN	6-YR
CRSFF	OPERATIONS PLAN	4-YR

(2) 3d MAW is capable of providing required forces except that limited KC-130F aircraft would be available in the event 71-YR and 316-YR Operations Plans were executed at the same time.

  
D. E. MARSHALL  
Chief of Staff

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CG FMFPAC (Orig + 9)  
CG AIRFMFPAC

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HEADQUARTERS  
Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Twentynine Palms, California, 92278

3/WMH/ara  
3100  
Ser:0035-64

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24 NOV 1964

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, Third Quarter, Fiscal Year  
1965 (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) (U)  
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4  
(c) FMFPac msg 292313Z Aug 1963

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted. As directed by reference (c), Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalions are not included in this report.

a. PART I. This Command is considered capable of providing combat support and combat service support units in the support of the Fleet Marine Force in any combat situation.

b. PART II. This Command will have no ineffective units during the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965.

c. PART III.

(1) FMFPAC Operation Plan 205-59. Assigned forces can be provided in combat ready condition.

(2) FMFPAC Operation Plan 32-62 - I MEF. Assigned forces can be provided in combat ready condition with the exception of the Heavy Artillery Rocket Battery, deactivated.

(3) FMFPAC Operation Plan 27-63 - I MEF. Assigned units can be provided in combat ready condition with the exception of the Heavy Artillery Rocket Battery, deactivated.

(4) 5TH MEB Operation Plan 316-62. Assigned forces can be provided in a combat ready condition.

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Enclosure (6)

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3/WME/ara

3100

Ser:

24 NOV 1964

SECRET

(5) FMFPAC Operation Plan 82-62 - 7th MEB. Assigned forces can be provided in combat ready conditions.

(6) FMFIANT Operation Plan 209-63 - II MEC. Assignment of Force Troops, FMFPac units not definite. However, all units stationed at Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms can be provided in combat ready condition.

(7) CINCIANT Contingency Operation Plan 312-64. Assigned forces can be provided in combat ready condition.

(8) Ground Defense Force Operation Plan 312/316-64. Assigned forces can be provided in combat ready condition.

(9) 1ST MAR DIV Operation Plan 312/316-64. Assigned forces can be provided in a combat ready condition.

(10) FMFPAC Operation Plan 81-64. Assigned forces can be provided in a combat ready condition.

(11) FMFPAC Operation Plan 81-62. Assigned forces can be provided in a combat ready condition.

(12) FMFPAC GWP 1-64. Assigned forces can be provided in a combat ready condition.

*Wm K Jones*

WILLIAM K. JONES

64 9050

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

3/rek  
Ser: 0193-64  
24 November 1964

1st MARINE BRIGADE
64-013AB
Copy No. 1 of 15

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Commander's Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness (Ground),  
3d Quarter, FY 65 (U)  
Ref: (a) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report of combat readiness is submitted:

Part I - Evaluation of the Command. The overall combat readiness of the ground components of this command consisting of the 4th Marine Regiment (Roin), 3d Battalion, 12th Marines (Roin), and Service Battalion is considered satisfactory, subject to the limitations described in Part II.

Part II - Evaluation of Units

a. It is not anticipated that any unit will be ineffective during the reporting period. However, Company B, 3d Engineer Battalion will be severely limited in their ability to perform their assigned mission. FMFPac letter 15/dja of 13 April 1964 to the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division directed that certain items of equipment be furnished to augment Company B, 3d Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Brigade. The following have not been received:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1. Compressor 105 CFM	(1) of (1)	3d FORSERVREGT msg 200637Z Nov stated shipped aboard LST 600, ETD 21 Nov, ETA 12 Dec.
2. Turbo Service Unit, Power Opr	(1) of (1)	CG, 3dMarDiv Spdltr 21/HLA/drb over 4500 of 13 Oct 1964 states item being prepared for shipment by, or awaiting transportation at, 3d MarDiv.

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INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER  
12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

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Enclosure (7)

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Sor: 0193-64

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
3. Tractor, Cargo 1½ Ton, M-105	(2) of (2)	CG, 3dMarDiv Spdltr 21/HLA/arb over 4500 of 13 Oct 1964 states item being prepared for shipment by, or awaiting transportation at, 3d MarDiv.
4. Truck, Dump, 5 Ton, M-51	(4) of (5)	3d FORSERVREGT msg 200637Z Nov stated shipped aboard LST 600, ETD 21 Nov, ETA 12 Dec.
5. Truck, Tractor, M-52	(1) of (1)	3d FORSERVREGT msg 200637Z Nov stated shipped aboard LST 600, ETD 21 Nov, ETA 12 Dec.
6. Scraper, Earth Moving	(1) of (1)	GMC Spdltr CSX-4-odf of 5 Nov states expected issue from Barstow is Dec 64.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. The 1st Marine Brigade is supporting the following operational contingency plans:

- (1) CINCPACFLT GWP
- (2) CINCPACFLT OPlan 27
- (3) CINCPACFLT OPlan 25
- (4) CINCPACFLT OPlan 37
- (5) CINCPACFLT OPlan 38
- (6) CINCPACFLT OPlan 39
- (7) CINCPACFLT OPlan 32
- (8) SFF OPlan 5
- (9) SFF OPlan 7

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Sor: 0193-64

(10) SFF OPlan 6

(11) CRSFF OPlan 4

b. The ground components of this command are capable of accomplishing the missions assigned in the aforementioned plans.

*M. E. Carl*  
M. E. CARL

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force  
o/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

1ST MARINE BRIGADE
64-0132
Copy No. 7 of 14

3/jab  
5213  
Ser: 0192-64  
18 Nov 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Commanders Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness (Air),  
3d Quarter, FY-65 (U)  
Ref: (a) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted:

#### Part I - Evaluation of the Command

a. The overall combat readiness of Brigade aviation (Marine Aircraft Group-13) during 3d Quarter, FY-65 is projected to be excellent. All four tactical aircraft squadrons and MACS-2 are considered ready for immediate deployment and are capable of accomplishing any assigned combat mission.

#### Part II - Evaluation of Units

a. All units under this command will be effective as far as readiness for combat is concerned. VMF(AW)-212 will achieve a maximum combat readiness prior to reporting OpCon to CAW 16 aboard the USS Oriskany in early February 1965. A changeover from F8D to F8E type aircraft is occurring during November and December 1964, but should not present any significant problems in their deployment. VMF-232, converting from F8B to F8D aircraft during November and December 1964 is expected to have better than an acceptable degree of combat readiness prior to deployment for Operation SILVER LANCE. A redesignation of VMF-232 to VMF(AW)-232 is expected to be made in the latter part of 2d Quarter FY-65. MACS-2 has recently received the AN/TPS-34 radar. Installation and operational checks are progressing at the present time and the new radar should be operational by 1 January 1965.

#### Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. The 1st Marine Brigade aviation is supporting the following operational contingency plans and orders:

Group-4  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years.

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
Enclosure (2)

3/jab  
5213  
Ser: 0192-64

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- (1) CG, FMFPac GWP 1-64
- (2) CG, FMFPac COOPlan 1-64
- (3) CG, FMFPac OPlan 27-63
- (4) CG, FMFPac OPlan 32-62
- (5) CINCPACFLT OPlan 37-64
- (6) CINCPACFLT OPlan 25-63

b. This command is capable of providing the required forces, but will have a reduced capability due to VMF(AW)-212's deployment aboard the USS Oriskany from early February 1965 to December 1965. VMF-214 will have a detachment supporting project "SHADY GROVE" from 4 January to 31 March 1965. This detachment can be recalled, as required, to support contingency plans.

  
REGAN FULLER  
Chief of Staff

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CG, AirFMFPac  
CO, MAG-13

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3/LLG/pv  
0206 -b4

1 DEC 1964

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st FSR ltr 8/PJD:elg Ser: 0011-64 of  
23 Nov 1964

From: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter, FY 1965

1. Forwarded.

*R. E. Cushman, Jr.*  
R. E. CUSHMAN, JR.

COPY NO 1 of 2

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Headquarters  
1ST FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, FMF  
Camp Pendleton, California 92055

8/PJD:elg  
Ser: 0011-64  
23 Nov 1964

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Via: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter, FY 1965

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A  
(b) FMF PacO 3000.4 w/Ch 2  
(c) CG MCB CamPen msg 070031Z Nov 64  
(d) CG MCB CamPen msg 140023Z Nov 64  
(e) FMF PacO 008073.1  
(f) CO 1st FSR ltr 8/DLG:elg Ser 007-64 of 2 Jun 64  
(g) CG FMF Pac GWP 1-64  
(h) CG FMF Pac Op Plan 27-63  
(i) CG FMF Pac Op Plan 32-62  
(j) 1st MarDiv Op Plan 302-64  
(k) 1st MarDiv Op Plan 32-60  
(l) CINC PAC FLT Op Plan 82-62  
(m) 5th MEB Op Plan 312/316-64

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of	16 Copies

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted.

a. Part I. Evaluation of the Command.

An exceptionally high degree of personnel replacement will be required during the quarter in order for this Regiment to support a deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) effectively, or to provide adequate back-up support capability after the deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). In addition to the critical enlisted personnel shortages reflected in references (c) and (d), and the officer personnel shortage in the ranks of captain and field grade officers, there exists at this time only a marginal capability on the part of this Regiment to fulfill its mission outlined in reference (e) due to the absence of trained toxic munition handlers. Reference (f) outlined the requirements in personnel and equipment needed by this Regiment to support the toxic munitions mission. As set forth in reference (c), Revision No. 1 to T/E M-3449 has generated considerable shortages in equipment; however, it is considered that these shortages do not significantly impair the ability of this Regiment to carry out its assigned mission.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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8/PJD:elg  
 Ser: 0011-64  
 23 Nov 1964

b. Part II. Evaluation of Units - T/O No. M-3449, Revision No. 1

(1) Headquarters and Service Battalion

(a) The following units are not activated under the Reduced Strength T/O.

1 Headquarters and Service Company

a Disbursing Section

2 Support Company

a Aviation Supply Forwarding Platoon

(b) The units listed below possess a moderate capability to perform full strength T/O functions through a nucleus of trained personnel who are available in the event of full strength activation.

1 Headquarters and Service Company

a Longshoreman Platoon

2 Support Company

a Graves Registration Platoon

b Salvage Section

(2) Supply Battalion

(a) Headquarters and Service Company. Fleet Stock Account is considered capable of supporting a MEF with marginal effectiveness and with a resultant inability to continue its garrison mission. This is the result of inadequate experience in the full-scale operation of a Fleet Stock Account due to the restricted garrison mission assigned. Fleet Stock Account is capable of fully supporting all contingency plans up to and including a MEB while still continuing its garrison mission. — OK

(b) Ammunition Company. This company requires the four (4) Ammunition Platoons authorized by the Full Strength T/O in order to adequately perform its combat ammunition supply mission. The company could support a MEF ammunition supply operation with three (3) Ammunition Platoons, but the company would be extremely limited in its capability of furnishing reinforcing detachments to division and wing elements. The company is now operating at approximately 53% of its manning level for the one (1) platoon T/O 108 75 O/H

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 Ser: 0011-64  
 23 Nov 1964

authorized in the Reduced Strength T/O. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support mission can be accomplished either for a MEB or a MEF.

(c) Bulk Fuel Company. At present the company has 96 basic and 78 primary MOS 1300 placing it at approximately 75% of its manning level. Upon completion of a period of intensive training to be completed by approximately 10 January 1965, Bulk Fuel Company will be able to effectively employ four (4) of the five (5) bulk fuel systems that it maintains.

(d) Supply Company. This company is considered capable of supporting units up to and including a MEB. This support will have only marginal effectiveness due to inadequate training of personnel to perform all functions of the company mission due to the restricted garrison mission assigned and the inactive status of certain T/O functions, primarily the FSA. In addition, insufficient personnel are available to receive, store, and issue the first resupply and subsequent materiel which would be received in an objective area. This company is presently at approximately 70% of its manning level but is considered susceptible to rapid manpower build-up in the event of deployment.

(e) Ration Company. Personnel availability limits this company's ability to conduct sustained operations in support of any organization larger than a MEB. After being deployed to support a MEB, Ration Company would be severely hampered in its capability to perform the presently assigned garrison mission of supporting the Marine Corps Base Bakery and Exchanges.

(3) Maintenance Battalion. No unit will be ineffective during the reporting period. However, the effectiveness of Motor Transport Maintenance Company will be limited with respect to sustained operations. The company is currently operating at approximately 55% of its reduced strength T/O.

### c. Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments

(1) Subject to the comments above, this Regiment is prepared to execute contingencies outlined in references (g), (h), and (i).

(2) This Regiment is committed to support six separate and distinct 1st Marine Division contingency plans as follows:

(a) Ready BLT (Air), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 302-64.

In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to assemble, segregate, mark, load and deliver Class V to the staging areas. This requirement can readily be performed. No personnel are assigned to deploy in support of this plan.

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 Ser: 0011-64  
 23 Nov 1964

(b) Ready BLT (Surface), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 302-64.

In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to provide Class II (3rd and 4th echelon repair parts for Force units), Class IV and V support, plus a Tracked Vehicle Repair Section (Reinforced), totaling one officer and 25 men. This requirement can readily be performed.

(c) RLT (A), CG 1st MarDiv Op Plan 32-60, TIM-10 of 041700Z of November 1960 and CG 1st MarDiv msg 00301624Z of January 1963. In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to furnish a detachment of seven officers and 267 men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III, and V support to the RLT, 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance to Force Units and overflow 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance for all other units. A prescribed amount of Class II and IV support is furnished to the RLT. This Regiment has a limited capability of performing this mission due to a shortage of trained ammunition technicians. All other support requirements for the RLT can be provided without unduly disrupting current garrison support missions.

(d) 7th MEB - CINC PAC FLT Op Plan 82-62. In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to furnish a detachment of 12 officers and 329 men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III, and V support to the 7th MEB; 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance to Force units; and overflow 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance to all other units. A prescribed amount of Class II and IV support is provided to the MEB. This Regiment has a limited capability to support this plan due only to a shortage of trained ammunition technicians. All other support can readily be provided.

(e) 5th MEB - 5th MEB Op Plan 312/316-64. In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to furnish 23 officers and 605 men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III and V support to the MEB, 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance to Force units; and overflow 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance to all other units. This Regiment has a limited capability to support this plan due to a shortage of ammunition technicians. Furthermore, although the Regiment is capable of providing all support requirements to the 5th MEB plan, the back-up support capability would be severely hindered unless there is a timely replacement of those shortages of personnel reported in references (c) and (d) and set forth in Part I above. It is noted that the mounting-out of this MEB depletes the operational capability of Bulk Fuel and Ammunition Company and full commits certain "one-of-a-kind" items, such as the Mobile Bakery Unit of the Ration Company, Supply Battalion.

(f) Ground Defense Force (Ready Forces), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 312/316-64. In support of this plan, this Regiment is required to furnish two officers and 92 men with sufficient equipment and Class I, III and V support for a task organized detachment for the Logistic Support Group.

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Ser: 0011-64  
23 Nov 1964

This Regiment has a limited capability to fully support this plan due to a shortage of ammunition technicians.

(3) As set forth above, this Regiment has a limited capability of supporting any of the standing contingency requirements (less the air and surface BLTs) due to a shortage of ammunition technicians. In regard to support other than ammunition technicians, this Regiment is able to support any combination of two of the above plans (less the air and surface BLT). In addition, the deployment of any one of the above mentioned forces would either completely eliminate or very seriously restrict this Regiment's capability to furnish support to the Marine Corps Base in certain areas. Specific areas of concern would be: operation of the Base magazines; augmentation of the Base Bakery personnel; and augmentation of Base Exchange personnel. It should also be noted that, if Division Operation Plan 312/316-64 is executed, 1st Force Service Regiment would provide support to the 5th MEB, Ground Defense Force (Initial Reinforcements) and to the Ground Defense Force (Follow-On Reinforcements). In view of the present personnel shortages, 1st FSR would require a significant personnel build-up to Reduced Strength T/O strength to accomplish its mission fully under the cited plans. ✓

  
H. G. LAWRENCE, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION: CG FMFPAC (9)  
CG MCB (1)  
CG 1stMarDiv (1)  
CO 1st FSR (3)  
CO H&S Bn (1)  
CO SupBn (1)  
CO MaintBn (1)