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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
c/o FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96601

IN REPLY REFER TO:

30p/akbl

00510 65

29 JUN 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03H)

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol
MC 3100-4) for 1st Quarter FY66 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A

- Encl: (1) CG 1st MarDiv ltr 3:OP:smr over 3480 Ser: 00175-
65 of 7 Jun 1965
(2) CG 3d MAW ltr 3:DLM:lad over 3500 Ser: 03A14865
of 28 May 1965
(3) CG 3d MarDiv ltr 3C:RKJ:ajz over 3480 Ser: 0037-
65 of 6 Jun 1965
(4) CG 1st MAW ltr 3:WCP:hha over 3000 Ser: 0035765
of 27 May 1965
(5) CG ForTrs FMFPac ltr 3/VWS/jbc over 3100 Ser:
0019/65 of 27 May 1965
(6) CO 1st MarBrig ltr 3/wlr over 5213 Ser: 0018-65
of 7 Jun 1965
(7) CO 1st FSR ltr 3/FRW/pv Ser: 0092-65 of 27 May
1965

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1966 is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. Summary Statement

a. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific is combat ready. There are some areas where local deficiencies degrade the readiness of an individual unit in EastPac.

b. EastPac units can commit a MEB to support current contingency plans. Such a commitment would, in the case of aviation, require a Wing-wide shifting of 3d MAW personnel in order to provide qualified crews and technicians for deployed squadrons. Upon the deployment of units now alerted in WestPac to SVN, the essential elements of a MEB remain in Force reserve to support both SVN operations and other contingency plans.

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INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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c. The BLT assigned to the 1st Marine Brigade will be in place at MCAS Kaneohe by 1 August 1965.

d. The shortages of Class VA continue to restrict the operational capability of aviation squadrons in SVN. Action has been initiated at Departmental level to alleviate this problem.

3. Detailed evaluations of the combat readiness of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific reporting units are described in enclosures (1) through (7). Comments on the salient points described in the enclosures are as follows:

a. 1st Marine Division

(1) A shortage of personnel in OF 35 and in all ranks reduces the state of combat readiness of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion (-). The EastPac Motor Transport School will help alleviate the situation but will not completely overcome the problems.

(2) The personnel shortages of the 1st Medical Battalion described in the last quarterly report, continue to exist. This unit is only able to field one collecting and clearing company.

(3) The deployment of RLIT-7 to WestPac on 21 May degraded the ability of the division to meet contingency requirements for areas other than WestPac.

b. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(1) The accelerated deployment of squadrons to WestPac and the number of squadrons transitioning to new aircraft, have reduced the combat readiness of the Wing below the desired level. This readiness posture will improve during the ensuing quarter.

c. 3d Marine Division

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29 JUN 1965

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(1) The Division is in an excellent state of readiness as manifested by its current operations in SVN.

d. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

(1) The Wing is combat ready. It is making an excellent contribution to the activities of the III MAF.

e. Force Troops, FMFPac

(1) All Force units are combat ready except the 3d 8" Howitzer Battery (SP) which is ineffective due to personnel shortages.

f. 1st Marine Brigade

(1) The Brigade is in the process of reforming. BLT 1/5 was reformed from a transplacement BLT which arrived CONUS during June and is due to arrive in MidPac by 1 August 1965.

g. 1st Force Service Regiment

(1) This unit can now support the remaining 1st Marine Division/3d Marine Aircraft Wing forces in garrison on a reduced scale, or at reduced effectiveness a deploying MEB. This reduction in readiness is due to the deployment of 24 officers and 618 enlisted with RLIT-7. Personnel shortages exist in certain areas which are discussed in detail in enclosure (7).

4. During the forthcoming quarter, particular command attention will be addressed to:

a. Logistic support of units committed in SVN to insure combat readiness is not impaired by this function.

b. Bringing the individual units within the 1st Marine Brigade up to a combat deployable status.

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29 JUN 1965

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c. Emphazing the need for accelerated training in 3d MAW squadrons to insure the maximum attainable combat readiness is achieved.

d. Evaluating the training of all Force units in light of experience of units committed in RVN.


V. H. KRULAK

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Camp Pendleton, California, 92055

310P:smr
3480
Ser: 00175-65
7 JUN 1965

AIR MAIL

SECRET

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report for 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. The quarterly combat readiness report, 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966, is a report prepared and submitted in the second month of the 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965. The 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 is the reporting period covered in this report.

2. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is hereby submitted:

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

The 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein) will be capable of mounting out five infantry battalions during July; four during August; and five during September. The deployment of Regimental Landing Team-7 created further shortages of technically qualified personnel and some unbalanced grade distribution within Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. This deployment coupled with planned continuation of the transplacement program reduces our ability to fully support operational commitments. The Division is capable of supporting any combat mission which is commensurate with available forces.

PART II - EVALUATION OF UNITS

The following units are considered to be ineffective or marginally combat ready, during the forthcoming quarter or a portion thereof:

- a. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines - Ineffective to 13 July due to personnel input. Below optimum efficiency for the remainder of July due to initial period of "Lock-on" training.
- b. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines - Ineffective in July, August, and portion of September due to transit period and personnel input. Below optimum efficiency for the remainder of September due to initial period of "Lock-on" training.
- c. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines - Below optimum efficiency until 24 July due to initial period of "Lock-on" training. Ineffective in September due to transit period.
- d. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines - Ineffective during September due to personnel input.
- e. 1st Motor Transport Battalion (-) - Below optimum efficiency due to shortage of officers, staff non-commissioned officers and drivers.
- f. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) - Ineffective due to the fact that remaining personnel (two platoons) are not fully qualified.
- g. 1st Medical Battalion (-) - Ineffective due to critical shortage of technically qualified hospital corpsmen and capability to field only one collecting and clearing company.

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

a. General. The departure of RLT-7 for WESTPAC on 21 May 1965 has had an obvious effect on the ability of this Command to provide forces of reinforced division size as required in support of many of the contingency plans listed below:

(1) Insofar as these plans relate to WESTPAC and more specifically Southeast Asia contingencies, the RLT-7 movement into a more forward area eases transportation problems and shortens the reaction time of this Division to provide required forces. The foregoing is based on the assumption that, in the execution of these contingency plans, RLT-7 will revert to the operational control of Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein).

(2) With regard to commitments in other areas (i.e., in support of General War Plans (EUCOM) or in support of CINCLANT operations as described below), the departure of RLT-7 has reduced the ability of this Command to provide required forces.

S & C FILES

HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 8300.10

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Enclosure (1)

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b. The 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein) is committed to provide forces in support of the following contingency plans:

- (1) Commanding General, FMFPac General War Plan 1-64. Forces to be provided in support of this plan will be contingent on the units available at the time of execution.
- (2) CINCPACFLT OPlans 25, 38 and 39; SFF OPlan 6-64; CRSFF OPlan 4-64; and CG, FMFPac OPlan 32-62. Subject to the assumption made in subparagraph a. (1) above, this Command is able to provide the required forces in support of these plans.
- (3) Commanding General, FMFPac OPlan 27-63. Subject to the assumption made in subparagraph a. (1) above, this Command is able to provide the forces specified but with the following condition: Providing the Counterintelligence and Photo Interpreter personnel from the 1st Marine Division to augment V MEF staff as set forth in Appendix 1 to Annex B of that plan would reduce the remaining assets of the Division in these areas to an ineffective status.
- (4) CINCPACFLT OPlan 81-64. Since the OPlan supports CINCLANT 312/313/315/316 series of OPlans, the ability of this Command to support the series will be predicated on the interaction of 312/313/315, whichever one is selected for execution, and 316. On the assumption that the transplacement program will continue, this Division will have five infantry battalions available during July and September and four during August, 1965. The capability of this Command to support this series of OPlans under the various situations is as follows:
 - (a) Execution of OPlans 312, 313 or 315 only. This Command has the ability to deploy the required force (Ground Defense Force) within the time frame specified.
 - (b) Execution of OPlans 312 and 316 concurrently. CINCLANT 312-64 requires four BLT's and two regimental headquarters for the Ground Defense Force (GDF). CINCLANT 316-64 requires a regiment of three infantry battalions and one additional battalion for the 5th MEB. With the five/four infantry battalion availability described above and with only two regimental headquarters available, this Command could not fully commit required forces to each plan concurrently. After commitment of the GDF, there would be no regimental headquarters available for the 5th MEB and only one infantry battalion during July and September and none in August.
 - (c) Execution of OPlans 313 and 316 or 315 and 316 concurrently. The same general comments contained in subparagraph (4) (b) above apply.
- (5) Commanding General, FMFPac OPlan 82-62. This Command is able to provide the required forces to support this plan.

W. T. FAIRBOURN

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, AirFMFPac
MCAS, El Toro, Santa Ana, Calif. 92709

3:DLM:lad

3500

Ser: 003A14865

28 May 1965

Copy No. 10 of 13 Copies

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for First Quarter FY 66;
(U) (RS MC 3100-4)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPAC O 3000.4

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), subject report is submitted:

a. PART I

(1) The 3d MAF has an estimated combat readiness of 70%. The recent deployment of a VMA, VMFA and HMM to WestPac in addition to forming and training squadrons, cadres, and detachments for future deployments reflects adverse on overall Wing readiness.

b. PART II

(1) VMA-121: Phase I training until approximately 1 August 1965.

(2) VMF(AW)-122: Transitioning from F-8E to F-4B aircraft. Phase I training until approximately 1 November 1965.

(3) VMCJ-3: Transitioning from RF-8A to RF-4B aircraft. Phase I training until approximately 1 December 1965. November Cadre will be RF-8A/EF-10B trained.

(4) HMM-164: Low availability of assigned CH-46A resulted in Phase training slippage. Phase I training until approximately 1 August 1965.

(5) HMM-165: Commissioning date 1 July 1965. Phase I training until approximately 1 January 1966.

c. PART III

(1) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 71-YR. Capability to support this plan is reduced because of KC-130F augmentation of 1st MAF directed by FMFPAC 250245Z May 65.

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(Enclosure 2)

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Ser: 003A14865
28 May 1965

(2) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25-YR

FMFPAC OPLAN 27-YR

FMFPAC OPLAN 32-YR

SFF OPLAN 6-YR

CRSFF OPLAN 4-YR


Capability is limited by deployment of three (3) additional 3d MAW squadrons to 1st MAW.

(3) FMFPAC OPLAN 82-YR

LFA (TG 125.3) OPLAN 316-YR

Capability to provide VMA support limited to one marginally combat ready squadron, because of recent deployment of additional VMA to WESTPAC.

(4) 5th MEB OPLAN 316-YR. Can provide.



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CG FMFPAC (Orig + 9)
CG AIRFMFPAC

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Forward)
C/O FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

3C:RKJ:ajz
3480
Ser: 0037-65
6 June 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Commander's Combat Readiness Report for 1st
Quarter, FY 66 (Report Symbol 3100-4) (U)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPACO 3000.4
Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the first quarter of fiscal year 1966 is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).
2. Upon removal of enclosure (1) this letter may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.


L. W. WALT

Copy to:
CG III MAF
AdminO 3d MarDiv

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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3C:RKJ:ajz
3480
Ser: 0037-6573D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF
QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 1ST QUARTER FY 66**PART I: EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND**

A. The Combat Readiness Report for third quarter FY 65 contained the statement, "This Division currently enjoys a state of readiness for combat that could possibly be improved only by the assignment of additional personnel and combat equipment." These personnel and equipment were subsequently provided, the Division (-) embarked and sailed to RVN and is currently **proving** its combat readiness each day.

B. Surface and air-lift mount out plans which have been tested and refined many times were executed repeatedly and effectively, often under the pressure of minimum time being available for the last-minute detailed coordination that is essential to their execution. As is nearly always the case, large-scale execution of prepared plans revealed areas in which improvements could still be made. This experience and the knowledge gained from it will certainly enhance the Division's combat readiness in the future.

C. Current operations against the Viet Cong are providing severe, but excellent, tests of our past training methods, our logistical plans and machinery, our personnel management procedures, the suitability of new weapons and equipment which have been introduced during the past few years, the validity of current concepts for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations and, most important, the ability of individuals and organizations of all types to adapt and respond to "unorthodox" and constantly changing situations. The organizational, as opposed to individual, experience and data that is being accumulated during these operations will not only contribute to a more advanced state of combat readiness within this Division, but will also be applicable to the other Fleet Marine Force organizations and will, therefore, contribute materially to the overall combat readiness of the Marine Corps. One significant area in which this experience and data are **proving** invaluable is in the accumulation of valid usage data pertaining to literally thousands of material items that have been introduced into our inventory during the past few years and/or are never fully exercised except during extended periods of 24 hours-a-day operations. On one hand this usage data will be utilized to insure that an organization is truly combat ready by indicating that greater quantities of certain items are required to be on hand, stocked or procured than are currently authorized in order for that organization to operate around the clock in a combat environment. On the other hand this same

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Ser: 0031-655

data will indicate that we are carrying an excessive amount of certain items in our inventory, thereby wasting precious shipping and storage space as well as manpower required for storing, handling, distributing and maintaining these items.

D. Two environmental factors within the current area of operations have already emerged as being constant threats to material and combat readiness. The first of these is the intense heat which significantly reduces the life of batteries. The immediate problem is being combatted by providing ventilated storage areas for these batteries i.e., open tents, and making provisions for refrigerated storage facilities at the earliest possible date. The second factor is the harshly abrasive, sandy soil and dust that is in the air almost constantly in this area. The effects of these on the many items of mechanical and vehicular equipment within a division could be extremely serious if constant command attention is not given to basic preventive maintenance procedures such as regular and frequent cleaning of brakes, oil and fuel filters. These procedures can sharply retard the destructive effects of the fine sand but a higher dead-line rate for mechanical equipment and a significant increase in the requirement for replenishment parts must certainly be anticipated. In problem areas such as those just discussed a gradual diminution of combat readiness can be prevented by early recognition of their existence coupled with a system of logistical resources that is responsive to rapidly changing requirements.

E. In summary, the planning, training and exercises that this Division has accomplished in the past are all considered to have contributed directly to a valid and demonstrated combat readiness. However, it is considered just as certain that the Division's combat readiness will continue to improve each day that we remain involved in current and anticipated future expanded operations. New lessons will always be learned and new and more efficient ways of accomplishing our mission will continue to be discovered.

II EVALUATION OF UNITS

A. During the first quarter, fiscal year 1966, all units of this Division will be effective and capable of accomplishing their combat missions.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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III EVALUATION OF CONTINGENCY COMMITMENTS

A. Current and anticipated commitments of the 3d Marine Division during the first quarter, fiscal year 1966, will negate its supporting any contingency plans executed outside of the Republic of Viet Nam.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96601

3:WCP:shha

3000

Ser: 0035765

27 MAY 1965

1stMAW SEC NO.	COPY NO.
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From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, First Quarter,
Fiscal Year 66 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) CG, 1stMAW ltr ser 0078/65 of 1Feb65

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), the following comments pertaining to the combat readiness of this Command are submitted:

Part I: The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is combat ready and capable of carrying out its mission and all contingencies which may be assigned.

Part II:

(a) "C" Btry, 1st LAMN Bn is considered ineffective for the following reasons:

(1) Of the five PU 296/G generators authorized, only one is operational. (A minimum of three is required to provide necessary power for the Battery's operational equipment.) Three of the inoperable generators are at 3d FSR for repair, and the fourth was coded condition "x" on 30 April 1965.

(2) Pulse acquisition radar (AN/MPQ 35) is down awaiting one part. Requisition has been up-graded to priority 02.

Part III:

(a) Current 1st Marine Aircraft Wing contingency plan commitments call for, and 1st MAW is capable of providing, requisite forces to execute the following plans:

1-(YR)	32-(YR)II(T)	37-(YR)	104-(YR)
23-(YR)	32-(YR)II(RVN)	33-(YR)	SFF 4 (YR)
25-(YR)	32-(YR)III/IV	60-(YR)	SFF 5 (YR)
27-(YR)	33-(YR)	80-(YR)	SFF 6 (YR)
32-(YR)II(L)	35-(YR)	99-(YR)	SFF 7 (YR)

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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Enclosure(4)

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(b) With the deployment of MAC-12 to RVN during May 1965, the 1st MAW will have all the components of a composite MAG (+) in RVN. The capability of the 1st MAW to furnish a second composite MAG for deployment elsewhere would require utilization of at least one VMA squadron of the present 1st MAW squadrons located in RVN or the use of the additional VMA squadron scheduled to arrive 1st MAW during the middle of June. In addition, the augmentation as contained in reference (b) would be required.


P. J. FONTANA

Copy to:
CG, AirFMA Pac
CG, 1st MAW (Adv)
CTF 79

65 382

HEADQUARTERS
Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Twentynine Palms, California, 92278

SECRET

3/VWS/jbc

3100

Ser: 0 0 19 / 65

27 MAY 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, First Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 (Report Symbol MC 31004) (U)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) CG ForTrps msg 220023Z May 1965

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted.

a. PART I. This command is considered capable of providing combat support and combat service support units in the support of Fleet Marine Forces as directed.

b. PART II. All units of this command will be effective during the reporting period except 3rd 8" Howitzer Battery (SP). This battery will not be fully effective until receipt of automatic recruit input as set forth in reference (c).

c. PART III. This command is capable of executing all assigned missions in current contingency plans on a reduced basis. The capabilities of this command have been reduced to the extent that operational control has been relinquished for those elements recently deployed or in the process of deploying to WESTPAC.

WILLIAM K. JONES

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(Encl 15)

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco 96601

65 3938

3/wlr
5213
Ser: 0018-65
7 June 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness,
1st Quarter, FY-66 (U)
Ref: (a) FMFPacO 3000.4
(b) CG, FMFPac ltr ser 000783-64 dtd Nov 16, 1964 (PS)

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted:


Part I - Evaluation of the Command. Since deployment of MAG-13, the First Marine Brigade is not organized with an aviation entity. There are separate tactical aviation units currently assigned to the Brigade as noted in Part II. No over all command evaluation is therefore submitted for Brigade Aviation. The First Marine Brigade does not currently have a Tactical Ground Component.

Part II - Evaluation of Units.

a. VNF(AW)-212 will be deployed to WestPac under operational control of CAG-16 during this entire period and is unable to support any operations of the First Marine Brigade.

b. VNF(AW)-232 personnel attrition has depleted the limited intermediate aircraft maintenance capability provided this squadron by augmentation from MAG-13 prior to the current deployment. The maintenance section is presently below 70 and without a significant increase of maintenance personnel, or the arrival of an Air Group level maintenance section early in this reporting period, the squadron will be unable to accomplish its combat mission.

Group-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.



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5213
Ser: 0018-65


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c. MACS-2 combat readiness will be reduced due to the introduction of the new primary search radar (TPS-34) on 1 August 1965. The training required during the previous Quarter was not accomplished due to lack of spare parts, which are now becoming available. If personnel required to maintain T/O are available the decrease in readiness will not be significant. However, unless the input to the unit is increased, MACS-2 will not be capable of deploying by the end of this period.

d. MATCU-62 is scheduled to introduce new equipment during the period. Spare parts for this equipment have not been received. If these parts and the personnel to reach T/O are not made available during the Quarter, the Unit cannot maintain combat readiness to deploy.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. Since deployment of units from the First Marine Brigade, mission assignments set forth in reference (b) are not considered compatible with the current Brigade organization.


J. E. HANTHORN

Copy to:

CG, AirFMFPac

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65 3791

3/PM/PM

10092-65
27 MAY 1966

SECRET

FMST RECOMMENDATION on CO, 1st FMB, FMB 1tr 8/JUL: sig Ser: 004-65 of 25 May 1965

From: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 1st Quarter, FY 1966

1. Forwarded.

R. E. CUSHMAN, JR.

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IS REMOVED

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Encl (7)

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Headquarters
1ST FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, FMF
Camp Pendleton, California 92055

8/JCH:elg
Ser: 004-65
25 May 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 1st Quarter, FY 1966

SEC FI ES - 1ST FSH

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) CG FMFPac 012321Z May 65
(d) 1st MarDiv msg 182308Z May 65
(e) CMC 1tr A04J/mcd/6 over 5320 of 24 Aug 62
(f) FMFPacO 008073.1
(g) CO 1st FSR 1tr 8/DLG:elg Ser 007-64 of 2 Jun 64
(h) CG FMFPac GWP 1-64
(i) CG FMFPac OpPlan 27-63
(j) CG FMFPac OpPlan 32-62
(k) 1st MarDiv OpPlan 302-65
(l) 1st MarDiv OpPlan 32-60
(m) CINC PAC FLT OpPlan 82-62
(n) 1st MarDiv OpPlan 312/316-64

Control No.	65-1609
Copy No.	9
of	17 Copies

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted.

a. Part I. Evaluation of the Command

In accordance with references (c) and (d) this organization is providing a detachment of 24 officers, 609 enlisted, and 6 corpsmen with the necessary equipment capable of providing the required supply, maintenance and service support to RLT Seven. After deployment of this MEB size Detachment, FSR can on a reduced scale continue to support in garrison the remaining 1st Marine Division/3d Marine Air Wing and reinforcing units, as well as fulfill the majority of the augmentation requirements to the Marine Corps Base. The FSR is capable of supporting a second MEB if required; however, the support of this second MEB will be at a reduced effectiveness due to shortages of key officers and skilled technicians in certain technical areas. After deployment of a second MEB, the overall effectiveness of FSR would be reduced to about 10% effectiveness.

The deployment of a MEB size detachment to West PAC will require approximately a 1/3 slice of FSR's organic equipment. Sufficient equipment will remain to support a second MEB and to carry out the assigned garrison mission.

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8/JCH:elg
Ser: 004-65

After the deployment of one MEB Detachment, and if presently scheduled transfers, retirements, and releases from active duty materialize, it is emphasized that officer and staff NCO replacements would be required to support garrison operations at an acceptable level, and to support further deployments.

First FSR (-) is in a readiness posture to deploy as part of the I MEF if directed. A recent study by CG, MCB, CamPen has highlighted those Base functions currently performed by FSR, and CMC has been advised of additional Base personnel requirements to assume these functions.

b. Part II. Evaluation of Units

(1) Headquarters and Service Battalion

(a) The following units, which are authorized under a Reduced Strength T/O, are normally not utilized during garrison operations.

1 Headquarters and Service Company

a Longshoreman Platoon

(b) The following units are not activated under the Reduced Strength T/O.

1 Headquarters and Service Company

a Disbursing Section

b Firefighting Section

2 Support Company

a Aviation Supply Forwarding Platoon

Reference (e) sets forth the policy for the peacetime utilization of the Navy Supply Clerks, MOS 3071, which comprise the nucleus of this platoon.

(c) Detachments of the following units have been deployed with RLT Seven, thus reducing their equipment and operational capability by approximately one-half.

1 Headquarters and Service Company

a Engineer Platoon

2 Support Company

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- a Salvage Section
- b Materiels Handling Section
- c Graves Registration Section
- d Laundry Section

- 3 Truck Company
- 4 Communications Company

(2) Supply Battalion

(a) Headquarters and Service Company

1 The Fleet Stock Account has, at present, only a limited capability to carry out its field mission. There is a shortage of personnel familiar with and experienced in mechanized accounting. This is an inactive account which is not fully exercised during garrison operations. In addition, a small stock control detachment has been deployed with RLT Seven.

(b) Ammunition Company

1 One Ammunition Section, two EOD teams and a detachment of the Nuclear Ordnance Platoon has been deployed with RLT Seven. Considering current personnel shortages this amounts to approximately one-half of Ammunition Company's operational capability.

2 Ammunition Company cannot support the mission outlined in reference (f) because of the lack of trained personnel and equipment. Action has been initiated to obtain the required equipment and to train personnel in order to comply with reference (d). T/O and T/E changes were requested by reference (g).

(c) Bulk Fuel Company

1 Three AABFS systems, with personnel for two systems, have been deployed with RLT Seven. Action has been initiated to procure two additional systems held at MCSC, Barstow. This will give Bulk Fuel Company the personnel and equipment to operate four systems.

(d) Supply Company

1 A Supply Company detachment has been deployed with RLT Seven. This leaves the company as a marginally effective unit;

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however, it is still able to warehouse the FSA A1 Mount-Out and manage the 1st Marine Division Class IV Training Allowance and Encampment/Garrison Pool.

2 The Medical/Dental Section is not currently activated. The garrison mission of this section is currently performed by Base Materiel Battalion and the Mount-Out supplies are held by the 1st Service Battalion.

(e) Ration Company

1 One ration section and 11 bakers have been deployed with RLT Seven. This leaves Ration Company at best only a marginally effective unit.

(f) Data Processing Platoon (Mobile)

1 The entire platoon (less six personnel) and all equipment has been deployed to 3d Mar Div. It is anticipated that replacement personnel and equipment to reconstitute a new platoon will arrive during July 1965.

(3) Maintenance Battalion

(a) A detachment of each maintenance company has been deployed with RLT Seven. Considering personnel shortages in critical MOS fields, this amounts to approximately one-half of the battalion's operational capability in men and equipment.

(b) The battalion can continue to give reduced support to the 1st Marine Division (Rein)/Third Marine Air Wing and reinforcing units in garrison.

c. Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments

(1) This organization is required to support contingencies outlined in references (h), (i) and (j). As mentioned above, with the deployment of Detachment 1st FSR with RLT Seven, 1st FSR (-) is left with a reduced capability to support an additional MEB size unit. This includes all of the five plans listed below. 1st FSR cannot support 1st Mar Div Op Plan 312/316-64 which calls for deployment of the 5th MEB and the Ground Defense Force simultaneously.

(2) The five 1st Mar Div contingency plans requiring support by this organization are as follows:

(a) Ready BLT (Air), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 302-65

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In support of this plan, this organization is prepared to assemble, segregate, mark, load and deliver Class V to the staging areas. This requirement can readily be performed. No personnel are assigned to deploy in support of this plan.

(b) RLT (A), CG 1st MarDiv Op Plan 32-60, TIM-10 of 041700Z of November 1960 and CG, 1st MarDiv msg 00301624Z of January 1963.

In support of this plan, this organization is prepared to furnish the required officers and men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III and V support to the RLT; 3rd echelon maintenance for Force units; and overflow 3rd echelon maintenance to all other units. A prescribed amount of Class II and IV support is furnished the RLT. If committed in support of this plan, FSR's effectiveness would be reduced to about 10%.

(c) 7th MEB - CINC PAC FLT Op Plan 82-62

In support of this plan, this organization is prepared to furnish the required officers and men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III, and V support to the 7th MEB, 3rd echelon maintenance to all other units. A prescribed amount of Class II and IV support is provided to the MEB. If committed in support of this plan, FSR's effectiveness would be reduced to about 10%.

(d) 5th MEB - 5th MEB Op Plan 312/316-64

In support of this plan, this organization is prepared to furnish the required officers and men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III and V support to the 5th MEB, 3rd echelon maintenance to Force units, and overflow 3rd echelon maintenance to all other units. If committed in support of this plan, FSR's effectiveness would be reduced below 10%; and, therefore, makes it impossible to support 5th MEB and the Ground Defense Force simultaneously.

(e) Ground Defense Force (Ready Forces), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 312/316-64.

In support of this plan, this organization is required to furnish detachments with sufficient personnel and equipment to perform a service and maintenance mission as well as Class I, III and V support for the Logistic Support Group. If committed to the 5th MEB, 1st FSR (-) cannot support this plan.


H. G. LAWRENCE, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION: CG FMFPAC (9)
CG MCB (1)
CG 1stMarDiv (1)
CO 1st FSR (3)
CO H&S Bn (1)
CO Sup Bn (1)
CO MaintBn (1)

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
c/o FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96601

IN REPLY REFER TO:

30p/lwp
002 66 65
MAR 24 1965

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03H)

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol
MC 3100-4) for 4th Quarter FY65 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) CG FMFPac ltr 16/tcm, Ser: 0653-64 of 1 Oct 1964
(c) CMC ltr AOIC-tsg 001E 1465 of 22 Jan 1965
(d) CMC msg 032308Z/Mar65
(e) CG FMFPac msg 152140Z/Mar65

Encl: (1) CG AirFMFPac ltr FF13.5, 3/JHL/dec, 3500 Ser:
003A05765 of 26 Feb 1965
(2) CG 1st MarDiv ltr 3:OP:rel, 3480, Ser: 0076-65
of 22 Feb 1965
(3) CG 3d MarDiv ltr 3C:RKJ:rrm, 3480, Ser: 003465 of
24 Feb 1965
(4) CG 1st MAW ltr 3:PLC, 3000, Ser: 0012865 of
25 Feb 1965
(5) CG 3d MAW ltr 3:CEW:lad, 3500, Ser: 003A6465 of
5 Mar 1965
(6) CG ForTrps FMFPac ltr 3/WMH/scl, 3100, Ser:
005/65 of 26 Feb 1965
(7) CG 1st MarBrig ltr 3/Job, 5213, Ser: 05265 of
11 Feb 1965
(8) CG 1st MarBrig ltr 3/sbl, 5213, Ser: 050-65 of
11 Feb 1965
(9) CO 1st FSR ltr 8/CRP:gmh, Ser: 001-65 of
23 Feb 1965

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1965 is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. Summary Statement

a. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific is combat ready. Realizing that readiness is always subject to improvement, this Force will continue its efforts to this end during the forthcoming quarter. Deficiencies noted in the enclosures are not of sufficient magnitude to degrade materially the overall capability of this command to execute all of its assigned missions.

b. In terms of total capabilities for meeting contingencies within the Force, EastPac FMFPac units are prepared to commit a

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12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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FMFPac also submit Readiness Rpt
4th Quarter FY 65
(24 Mar 1965)

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MAR 24 1965

MEF consisting of a Division/Wing Team. In view of the recent deployment of the 1st Marine Brigade, the WestPac FMFPac forces are prepared to commit a MEF consisting of a Division/Wing Team.

c. Reference (e) forwarded a proposed plan for the reconstitution of the 1st Marine Brigade at MCAS, Kaneohe in order to provide an air/ground team capability in the MidPac area.

d. As stated in the last report, the location of Class V and V(A) Storm assets require repositioning to improve contingency readiness. In furtherance of this requirement, COMSERVPAC has been provided the overall FMFPac Class V and V(A) Storm repositioning objectives. With this information, a COMSERVPAC Team is now performing a site survey of WestPac storage locations. This survey includes facilities, both actual and potential, in the Philippines, Japan and Okinawa. Upon completion of the survey, the team should provide information which will be utilized for repositioning of current assets within current storage capabilities at locations which will improve reaction readiness of the FMFPac forces. The site survey team should also provide information from which COMSERVPAC can program construction of facilities or enter interservice support agreements to store all FMFPac, CL V and V(A), storm requirements.

e. The deficiencies which exist in amphibious shipping, including the unfilled requirement for a second LPH in WestPac on a continuing basis, have not been corrected. Para 2.c. of our last report referred to the amphibious shipping shortage and the requirement for a second LPH.

3. Detailed evaluations of the combat readiness of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific reporting units are described in enclosures (1) through (9). Comments on the salient points described in the enclosures are as follows:

a. 1st Marine Division

(1) Two infantry battalions will be in a reduced state of readiness during April and June and one infantry battalion will be in a reduced state of readiness during May due to personnel input/output in support of the transplacement program. Should contingency plan commitments require more infantry battalions than are available, reconstitution of those battalions in a reduced state of readiness could be accomplished by selective recall of personnel transferred to accommodate the new input.

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MAR 24 1965

(2) The shortages of technically trained corpsmen in the 1st Medical Battalion continues to exist. This deficiency will continue until approval of reference (b) is obtained. Reference (c) stated that action was forthcoming on this matter in the near future.

b. 3d Marine Division

(1) The high state of readiness of this Division will continue during the reporting period. The day-to-day demands for rapid reaction in the Western Pacific will provide this Division with the experience which will enhance its capability to meet any contingency.

(2) The deployment of the 9th MEB to DaNang has furthered the readiness posture of the Division for other SEASIA deployments. By rotating units in the 9th MEB, valuable experience will be gained relative to operations in SEASIA. It will provide all units of the Division an on the scene appreciation of the terrain and a familiarity with the conduct of operations in that area.

(3) The deployment of the 1st Marine Brigade to WestPac will bring the 3d Marine Division to full strength. By virtue of this, the readiness of the Division to exert its full combat power will be improved accordingly.

c. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

(1) The enlisted personnel deficiencies in the 1st Wing have been addressed and by separate correspondence this headquarters has recommended that sufficient personnel be ordered to duty with the Wing to eliminate critical personnel shortages in MOS 6641, 6713/15 and 6761. Further, the Wing should be brought to table of organization strength in all MOS's and retained at that strength.

(2) Reference (d) approved a request for an increase of one SSgt MOS 2863 (RadTech) and five Cpls MOS 2823 (Electronic Repairman) to the 1st Wing's manning level. The addition of these personnel will contribute toward improving the personnel situation.

(3) The deployment of elements of MAG-13 and VMFA-542 to WestPac will further enhance the combat power of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The additional units will further improve the flexibility and capability to respond to contingency situations.

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MAR 24 1965

d. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. The readiness of this Command continues as reported in previous reports. The squadrons listed as less than ready due to pilot training are considered deployable under emergency conditions. These squadrons could be expeditiously brought up to their full combat potential by a combination of accelerated training and selective personnel input. Efforts will continue to be made to improve systems of reforming squadrons by the combination of selected personnel assignment and careful formulation of training schedules.

e. Force Troops, FMFPac. The elements of this command are considered combat ready and capable of providing combat support and combat service support units for any contingency.

f. 1st Marine Brigade.

(1) Except for the units listed in paragraph (2) below, the 1st Marine Brigade will be operating as part of the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. These units were combat ready at the time of deployment and will further enhance the readiness posture of our WestPac forces.

(2) At this time, MidPac FMFPac forces consist of:

1st Marine Brigade (Rear)
HqCo (-), 1st Marine Brigade
Service Bn (-), 1st Marine Brigade
Detachment #1, 5th Dental Company
MAG-13 (Rear)
Detachment H&MS-13
VMF-232
MACS-2
MATCU-62
VMF(AW)-212 (Deployed in Oriskany until
November 1965)

g. 1st Force Service Regiment. Personnel deficiencies continue to degrade the effectiveness of this unit. Reference (c) provided comments and anticipated assistance in improving critical shortages in MOS's 1141, 1341, 1391, 2311 and 3516. Relief in these areas will definitely improve the effectiveness of this unit.

h. General. During the forthcoming quarter, particular command attention will be addressed to:

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(1) Reconstitution of an air/ground team capability in MidPac.

(2) Utilization of the Danang deployment to familiarize as many Marines as possible with operations in SEASIA.

(3) Utilization of the Contact Instruction Teams to improve materiel readiness.

(4) Enhancement of readiness and capabilities for rapid reaction of all FMFPac forces.

4. Exercise SILVER LANCE provided invaluable training in all phases of an amphibious operation for those units that participated. Of particular benefit, were the many last minute changes in plans necessitated by the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Brigade. These changes proved the ability of FMFPac forces to respond to circumstances in a rapid, proficient and professional manner.



S. S. WADE
Acting

Copy to:
CINCPACFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
CG AirFMFPac
CG MEB CamPen
CG 3d MAW
CG 1st MarDiv
CG 3d MarDiv
CG 1st MAW
CG ForTrs FMFPac
CG 1st MarBrig
1st ForSvcRegt

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HEADQUARTERS
Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro
Santa Ana, California 92709

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FEB 26 1965

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: THE QUARTERLY COMMANDERS COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 4th Qtr, FY 65 is a Report prepared and submitted in the last month of the 3rd Qtr, FY65. The 4th Qtr, FY65 is the Reporting Period covered in this Report. (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A

1. Part I - Evaluation of the Command. The Second LAAM Battalion is fully combat ready and capable of performing its assigned combat mission.
2. Part II - Evaluation of Units. There are no ineffective combat units within this command.
3. Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments. The below listed current contingency plans can be provided for with forces required during this reported period.

CINCPACFLT	1-1-64
CINCPACFLT	23-63
CINCPACFLT	27-64
CINCPACFLT	32-64
SEATO Field Force	4-64
SEATO Field Force	6-64
COMPHIBLANT	209-63
FMFPAC	201-64

E. F. PRICE
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Camp Pendleton, California, 92055

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Ser: 0076-65
22 FEB 1965

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ATR MAIL

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report for 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) CG, FMFPac ltr 16/trm Ser: 0653-64 of 1 Oct 1964 to Chief NAVIERS 64-7379
(d) CG, 1stMarDiv ltr 3:PL:fph Ser: 0007-64 of 18 Mar 1964 64-2060

1. The quarterly combat readiness report, 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965, is a report prepared and submitted in the second month of the 3d Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965. The 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965 is the reporting period covered in this report.

2. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

The 1st Marine Division is capable of mounting out all units except two infantry battalions during April; one during May; and two during June 1965.

PART II - EVALUATION OF THE UNITS

The following units are considered to be ineffective, or at less than optimum efficiency, during the 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965, or a portion thereof:

- a. 3d Battalion, 1st Marines - Ineffective in April due to incoming personnel input.
- b. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines - Ineffective in May and June due to transit period and incoming personnel input.
- c. 2d Battalion, 5th Marines - Ineffective in April due to outgoing personnel input.
- d. 3d Battalion, 5th Marines - Ineffective in June due to outgoing personnel input.
- e. 1st Medical Battalion - Critical shortages of technically qualified Hospital Corpsman continue to exist. Commitment of one Collecting and Clearing Company will deplete the Battalion of over 50% of the technical personnel now on hand. Approval of reference (c) will permit the fielding of a second Collecting and Clearing Company. The continuing requirement of in garrison assignment of all medical officers, except the Battalion Commander and Executive Officer, to Division units continues in effect.

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

The 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF is committed to provide forces in support of the following contingency plans.

- a. CG, FMFPac General War Plan 1-64 (CATF 61 OPlans 205, 207 and 209). Forces to be provided in support of this plan will be contingent upon the units available at the time of execution.
- b. CG, FMFPac OPlan 27-63. This Command is able to provide the specified forces with the following exceptions: Line numbers 36b, c; 37a,b; 38a,b; of Appendix 1 to Annex B. The only source of these personnel is the 1st Counterintelligence Team, FMF, which is shown in the Task Organization. To provide the personnel to fill the cited line numbers would reduce the Counterintelligence Team to two, vice four sub-teams.

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c. CINCPACFLT OPlans 25, 38 and 39. This Command is able to provide the required forces in support of these plans.

d. CG, FMFPac OPlan 32-62. This Command is able to provide the required forces in support of this plan within the indicated time frame.

e. CINCPACFLT OPlan 81. Since the OPlan supports CINCLANT 312/313/315/316 series of OPlans, the ability of this Command to support the series will be predicated on the interaction of 312/313/315, whichever one is selected for execution, and 316. In the light of personnel and equipment reports previously submitted, the capability of this Command to support this series of OPlans under the various situations is as follows:

(1) Execution of OPlans 312, 313 or 315 only. This Command has the ability to deploy the specified force (Ground Defense Force) within the time frame specified.

(2) Execution of OPlans 312 and 316. The most recent change to CINCLANT 312-64 requires the airlift of four BLT's for the Ground Defense Force (GDF) within a 72 hour period. The trans-shipment program affects this Command's readiness to support this requirement. A maximum of seven infantry battalions are available on alternate months as explained in PART II of this report. Consequently, on alternate months, deployment of four airlifted BLT's under CINCLANT OPlan 312 would leave only three battalions available for the 5th MEB instead of the four required by CINCLANT'S OPlans 312/316.

(3) Execution of OPlans 313 and 316. The same general comments contained in PART III, subparagraph e.(2) above apply. However, the possibility of limited execution of OPlan 316, wherein the 5th MEB is not required to deploy, or where there is a delay in planned deployment of the 5th MEB, would enhance the capability of this Command to execute OPlans 313 and 316.

(4) Execution of OPlans 315 and 316. Execution of OPlan 316 in conjunction with 315 is uncertain, however, such execution can reasonably be expected. In the event of concurrent or immediately subsequent execution of OPlan 316, the same conditions will prevail during alternate months as described in PART III, subparagraph e.(2) above.

f. CG, FMFPac OPlan 82-62. This Command is able to provide the required forces to support this plan within the time frame indicated.

g. SFF OPlan 6-64. This Command is able to provide the required forces in support of this plan.

h. CRSEF OPlan 4-64. This Command is able to provide the required forces in support of this plan.


W. T. FAIRBOURN

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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Ser: 003465
24 Feb 1965

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From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Commander's Combat Readiness Report for 4th
Quarter, FY 65 (Report Symbol 3100-4) (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPACO 3000.4

Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1965 is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).
2. Upon removal of enclosure (1) this letter may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

W. R. Collins
W. R. COLLINS

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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Ser: 0034653D MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN), FMF
QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 4TH QUARTER FY 65PART I: EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

A. The 3d Marine Division is combat ready.

B. Surface mount out plans and procedures have been tested time and again and have proven to be both valid and effective. As these operations are conducted by different BLT's embarking on a variety of ships from several different ports, variations and refinements in established procedures are indicated and instituted. The result of all this is a gradual, but continuing, enhancement of the Division's reaction time and combat readiness. The connotional number system has met all expectations for providing the maximum flexibility in shipping assignment/utilization consistent with minimum force reaction times. As anticipated, this has resulted from the virtual elimination of "lost motion" in ship movements and the additional planning time that is afforded embarkation units under this system.

C. Current air mount out capabilities are considered to be at an all-time high as a result of the highly successful execution of REFLEX I. This deployment of a MEU from Okinawa to Mactan, Phil. Is. clearly demonstrated the Division's ability to commit significant combat forces over long distances in an extremely short period of time. No significant flaws in our air mount out procedures were revealed by this operation and the lessons that were learned from it can only contribute to even more efficient air operations in the future.

D. The amphibious raid training program has progressed both rapidly and satisfactorily. Every possible advantage has been, and continues to be, taken of available training areas and shipping in both Okinawa and the Philippines in furtherance of this program. The primary factors limiting even greater expansion of the program are the higher priority commitments levied on suitable shipping and the continuing necessity for maintaining two BLT's afloat for extended periods of time in a posture that negates their participation in the practical aspects of amphibious raid training.

E. Another aspect of combat readiness that is less tangible than those previously mentioned, but of at least equal significance, is the continued participation of Division units and personnel in day to day operations with the 9th MEB and in scheduled MEB and MEF CPX's and field exercises. The variety of experiences that these operations provide and the wide scope of planning and coordination necessary for their execution must certainly be considered to contribute materially, if indirectly, to this Division's total combat readiness.

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3480II: EVALUATION OF UNITS

A. During the fourth quarter, fiscal year 1965, all units of the 3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF will be effective and capable of accomplishing their combat missions.

III: EVALUATION OF CONTINGENCY COMMITMENTS

A. The 3d Marine Division is committed to support the contingency plans listed below with the initial/back-up forces indicated:

<u>Plan</u>	<u>Initial Force Commitment</u>	<u>Back-up Force Commitment</u>
1. SFF-4 (year)	Division	- - - - -
2. SFF-5 (year)	Ground elements of MEB (less one inf bn)	2/3 Division
3. SFF-6 (year)	Division	- - - - -
4. SFF-7 (year)	Ground elements of MEB	2/3 Division
5. 1 (year)	Division	- - - - -
6. 23 (year)	BLT	Ground elements of MEB
7. 25 (year)	- - - - -	Division
8. 27 (year)	- - - - -	Division
9. 32 Ph II (L)(year)	Ground elements of MEB	2/3 Division
10. 32 Ph II (T)(year)	Ground elements of MEB	2/3 Division
11. 32 Ph II (V)(year)	Division	- - - - -
12. 32 Ph III/IV (year)	Division	- - - - -
13. 33 (year)	To be designated	- - - - -
14. 35 (year)	BLT	Ground elements of MEB
15. 37 (year)	Ground elements of MEB	- - - - -

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16. 38 (year)	Division	- - - - -
17. 39 (year)	Division	- - - - -
18. 60 (year)	BLT	Ground elements of MEB
19. 80 (year)	BLT	Ground elements of MEB
20. 99 (year)	To be designated	- - - - -
21. 104 (year)	BLT	Ground elements of MEB

B. The 3d Marine Division will be able to provide the forces required to support the above listed plans during the 4th quarter, fiscal year 1965.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96601

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Ser: 0012865

25 FEB 1965

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, Fourth Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1965
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) CG 1st MAW ltr, ser: 0078/65 of 1 Feb 1965

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), the following comments pertaining to the combat readiness of this Command are submitted:

Part I: The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is combat ready and capable of carrying out its mission and all contingencies which may be assigned.

Part II:

(a) As a summary evaluation of the personnel situation of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as of 1 March 1965, it is considered that the Wing and its units will be capable of carrying out their combat missions. However, enlisted shortages in numbers and skills have a continued deleterious effect on the routine operations of the Wing. If the situation is not corrected, the combat effectiveness of certain Wing units (particularly VMGR-152 and VMFA-513 in view of their present shortages in certain critical MOS's) may be downgraded.

(b) The materiel readiness posture of all units except MATCU-60 and MATCU-66 will permit their deployment with necessary equipment and supplies for sustained operations. MATCU-60 and MATCU-66 have now received all component of the AN/TSQ-18 and AN/TRN-11, except the spare parts shelter, maintenance shelter and repair parts. Therefore, the readiness postures of MATCU-60 and MATCU-66 still remains marginal for sustained operations with on hand equipment.

Part III:

(a) Current 1st Marine Aircraft Wing contingency plan commitments call for, and 1st MAW is capable of providing, requisite forces to execute the following plans:

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32-(YR)II(T)

37-(YR)

104-(YR)

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ENCLOSURE 17

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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23-(YR)	32-(YR)II(RVN)	38-(YR)	SFF 4 (YR)
25-(YR)	32-(YR)III/IV	60-(YR)	SFF 5 (YR)
27-(YR)	33-(YR)	80-(YR)	SFF 6 (YR)
32-(YR)II(L)	35-(YR)	99-(YR)	SFF 7 (YR)

(b) The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing maintains the capability to deploy either one of two tailored Composite Marine Aircraft Groups as may be required to support existing contingency commitments. As requested by Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, reference (b) outlines the augmentation necessary to allow simultaneous deployment of both these combat units to divergent locales.


R. G. FONTANA

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CG, AirFMFPac
CTF 79

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HEADQUARTERS

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, AirFMFPac
MCAS, El Toro, Santa Ana, Calif. 92709

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3:GEW:lad
3500

Ser: 003A6465
5 March 1965

Copy No. 6 of 13 Copies

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subject: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for Fourth Quarter FY 65;
Submission of (U) (RS MC 3100-4)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the below report is submitted:

a. PART I:

(1) The 3d MAW has an estimated combat readiness of 75%. The continuing requirement for reforming and training of squadrons, in addition to training cadres and detachments for future deployments reflect adversely on overall Wing readiness.

b. PART II:

(1) MACS-4: Phase I training until approximately 1 May 1965.

(2) VMFA-314: Low number of F-4B aircraft assigned resulted in Phase training slippage. Phase I training until approximately 1 June 1965.

(3) VMCJ-3: Phase I training until 1 June 1965.

(4) VMF(AW)-122: Formed 4 February 1965. Phase I training until 1 August 1965.

(5) HMM-164: Low availability of assigned CH-46A aircraft resulted in Phase training slippage. Phase I training until approximately 1 June 1965.

(6) HMM-364: Low readiness stature due to low number of assigned aircraft. Receipt of additional aircraft will enable 70% plus readiness posture by 1 June 1965.

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ENCLOSURE (5)

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Ser: 003A/65

5 March 1965

(7) MACO-68: 50% combat ready. Decline in readiness due to condition of equipment and personnel. Action being taken to solve apparent deficiencies. Training status will improve concurrent with condition of operable equipment.


(8) VIA-311: Deploys to 1st MAW by 1 April 1965.

PART III:

(1) The following contingency plans call for deployment of MACO or elements thereof:

CINCPACFLT	OPERATIONS PLAN	71-YR
CINCPACFLT	OPERATIONS PLAN	25-YR
MACPAC	OPERATIONS PLAN	27-YR
MACPAC	OPERATIONS PLAN	32-YR
MACPAC	OPERATIONS PLAN	82-YR
5th MEB	OPERATIONS PLAN	316-YR
Landing Force	OPERATIONS PLAN	316-YR
Aviation (TG 129.3)		
SET	OPERATIONS PLAN	6-YR
CRSEF	OPERATIONS PLAN	4-YR

(2) 3d MAW is capable of providing required forces except that limited KC-130F aircraft would be available in the event 71-YR and 316-YR Operations Plans were executed at the same time.



J. D. HOWARD
By direction

For
MACPAC (Orig + 9)
MACPAC

65 1631

HEADQUARTERS
Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Twentynine Palms, California, 92278

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Ser: 005/65

FEB 28 1965

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From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 1965 (Report Symbol ME 31004) (U)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFMCO 3000.4

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted.

a. PART I. This command is considered capable of providing combat support and combat service support units in the support of Fleet Marine Force in any combat situation.

b. PART II. All units of this command will be effective during the reporting period except Third 8" Howitzer Battery. It is considered that the Third 8" Howitzer Battery will not be fully effective during April 1965. The transplacement elements of the battery will depart COMUS in mid March, leaving two partially-trained platoons. Input of newly-assigned personnel is expected in early April for integration into the battery. Current training plans anticipate that the battery will reach a state of training by early May 1965 to permit accomplishment of its combat mission.

c. PART III. This command is considered to be combat ready and capable of executing all assigned missions in current contingency plans with the exception of Third 8" Howitzer Battery which will have only two platoons combat ready during the month of April 1965.

NAT M. PACE
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco 96601

1ST MARINE BRIGADE
65-008G
Copy No 10 of 14

3/jab
5213
Ser: 052-65
11 Feb 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness
(Ground), 4th Quarter, FY-65 (U)
Ref: (a) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report of combat readiness is submitted:

Part I - Evaluation of the Command. The overall combat readiness of the ground components of this command consisting of the 4th Marine Regiment (Rein), 3d Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein) and Service Battalion is considered satisfactory. All elements are considered ready for immediate deployment and are capable of accomplishing assigned missions.

Part II - Evaluation of Units. It is not anticipated that any unit will be ineffective during the reporting period. The limitations of Company B, 3d Engineer Battalion to perform its assigned mission, as contained in the last report, have been alleviated by receipt of the necessary equipment.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. The 1st Marine Brigade is supporting the following operational contingency plans:

- (1) CINCPACFLT GWP
- (2) CINCPACFLT OPlan 27
- (3) CINCPACFLT OPlan 25
- (4) CINCPACFLT OPlan 37
- (5) CINCPACFLT OPlan 38

Group-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (7)

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- (6) CINCPACFLT OPlan 39
- (7) CINCPACFLT OPlan 32
- (8) SFF OPlan 5
- (9) SFF OPlan 7
- (10) SFF OPlan 6
- (11) CRSFF OPlan 4

b. The ground components of this command are capable of accomplishing the missions assigned in the aforementioned plans.

M. E. Carr
M. E. Carr

65 1225

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco 96601

1ST MARINE BRIGADE
65-008E
Copy No 6 of 14

3/sbl
5213
Ser: 050-65
11 Feb 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness (Air),
4th Quarter, FY-65 (U)
Ref: (a) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted:

Part I - Evaluation of the Command. The overall combat readiness of Marine Aircraft Group-13 during 4th Quarter, FY-65 is projected to be excellent. All three tactical aircraft squadrons and MACS-2 are considered ready for immediate deployment and are capable of accomplishing all normally assigned tasks and combat missions.

Part II - Evaluation of Units

a. VMF(AW)-212 will be deployed to WestPac under operational control of CAW-16 during this entire period and will be unavailable for MAG-13 contingency operations. The three remaining tactical aircraft squadrons will be effective during this period, however, two squadrons will be degraded from their normally high state of readiness as shown below:

(1) VMF-232, scheduled to be designated VMF(AW)-232 on 1 March 1965, will be reduced in overall combat readiness due mainly to the increased and varying pilot training requirements.

(2) VMA-214's only problem area will be the lack of availability of an aircraft carrier deck to enable them to refresher train and qualify their presently assigned pilots. This lack of currency could effect their capability of rapidly deploying aboard an aircraft carrier and conducting further flight operations.

Group-4
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Declassified after 12 years.

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Ser: 050-65

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b. MACS-2' new primary radar, the TPS-34, is now scheduled to be operational by 1 April 1965, but this new equipment necessitates approximately two months of training for air controllers prior to attaining a combat ready status. The air controller training is presently programmed from 1 April through 1 June 1965. MACS-2 should again be at an acceptable combat ready status by 1 June 1965.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. 1st Marine Brigade Aviation can support the following Op Plans within the capability of currently assigned and available squadrons:

(1) CINCPACFLT GWP, CINCPACFLT Op Plan 25, 27, 32, 37, 38 and 39, SEFF Op Plan 5, 6, and 7, CRSEFF Op Plan 4.

M. E. Carl
M. E. CARL

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CO, MAG-13

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25 FEB 1965

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st FSR ltr 8/CRP:gmh ser: 001-65 of 23 Feb 1965

From: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter, FY 1965

1. Forwarded.

R. M. COOK
By direction

COPY NO 2

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Headquarters
1ST FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, FMF
Camp Pendleton, California 92055

8/CRP:gmh
Ser: 001-65
23 Feb 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton,
California

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter, FY 1965

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4 w/Ch 2
(c) CG MCB CampPen msg 140023Z Nov 64
(d) CG MCB CampPen msg 080115Z Jan 65
(e) FMFPacO 008073.1
(f) CO 1st FSR ltr 8/DLG:elg Ser 007-64 of 2 Jun 64
(g) CMC ltr AO4J/mcd/6 over 5320 of 24 Aug 62
(h) CG FMFPac GWP 1-64
(i) CG FMFPac OpPlan 27-63
(j) CG FMFPac OpPlan 32-62
(k) 1st MarDiv OpPlan 302-64
(l) 1st MarDiv OpPlan 32-60
(m) CMC PAC FLT OpPlan 82-62
(n) 1st MarDiv OpPlan 312/316-64

SAC FILES - 1ST FSR

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of 17	Copies

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted.

a. Part I. Evaluation of the Command

This Regiment operates on a manning level that is based on a Reduced Strength T/O which permits only a limited operational capability during the subject quarter. A high degree of personnel replacement will be required during the quarter for this Regiment to support a deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) effectively, or to provide an adequate back-up support capability after the deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). In addition to the enlisted personnel shortages listed in references (c) and (d), and the officer personnel shortages in the ranks of Captain and Major, there exists at this time only a marginal capability on the part of this Regiment to fulfill its mission as outlined in reference (e) due to the absence of trained toxic munition handlers. Reference (f) outlined the requirements in personnel and equipment needed by this Regiment to support the toxic munitions mission.

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b. Part II. Evaluation of Units

(1) Headquarters and Service Battalion

(a) The following units, which are authorized under a Reduced Strength T/O, are normally not utilized during garrison operations. These units will receive limited training and experience during "Exercise SILVER LANCE" which should prove advantageous to their operation as a unit.

1 Headquarters and Service Company

a Longshoreman Platoon

2 Support Company

a Graves Registration Platoon

(b) The following units are not activated under the Reduced Strength T/O.

1 Headquarters and Service Company

a Disbursing Section

b Fire Fighting Section

2 Support Company

a Aviation Supply Forwarding Platoon

Reference (g) sets forth the policy for the peacetime utilization of the Navy Supply Clerks, MOS 3071, which comprise the nucleus of this platoon.

(2) Supply Battalion

(a) Headquarters and Service Company

1 Over-all effective unit

2 The Fleet Stock Account has, at present, only a limited capability to carry out its field mission. There is a shortage of personnel familiar with and experienced in mechanized accounting. This is an inactive account which is not fully exercised during garrison operations, but, will receive valuable experience and training during Exercise SILVER LANCE.

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(b) Ammunition Company

1 Effective for low-level operations, considering the Reduced Strength organization level of one ammunition platoon.

2 Ammunition Company cannot support the mission outlined in reference (c) because of the lack of trained personnel and equipment. Action has been initiated to obtain the required equipment and to train personnel in order to comply with reference (c). T/O and T/E changes were requested by reference (f).

(c) Bulk Fuel Company

1 Over-all effective unit

2 One of six amphibious assault bulk fuel systems on Reduced Strength T/E remains in storage at Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, California.

(d) Supply Company

1 Marginally effective unit

2 Supply Company is presently in a semi-inactive garrison status warehousing only the FSA A1 Mount-out and managing the 1st Marine Division Class IV Training Allowance and Encampment/Garrison Pool.

3 The Medical/Dental Section is not currently activated. The garrison mission of this section is currently performed by Base Materiel Battalion and the mount-out supplies are held by the 1st Service Battalion.

(e) Ration Company

1 Marginally effective unit

2 There is a lack of experience in employing refrigeration equipment in the field.

3 A critical shortage of Bakers (50% of manning level) and a lack of experience using field equipment.

4 A lack of experience in the operation of the field Exchange facilities.

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Ser: 001-65

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(f) Data Processing Platoon (Mobile)

1 Over-all effective unit

(3) Maintenance Battalion

(a) Over-all effective unit

(b) Motor Transport Maintenance Company will be limited with respect to sustained operations as it is operating at 66% of Manning Level.

c. Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments

(1) Subject to the foregoing comments, this Regiment is prepared to execute contingencies outlined in references (h), (i), and (j).

(2) This Regiment is committed to support six separate and distinct 1st Marine Division contingency plans as follows:

(a) Ready BLT (Air), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 302-64

In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to assemble, segregate, mark, load and deliver Class V to the staging areas. This requirement can readily be performed. No personnel are assigned to deploy in support of this plan.

(b) Ready BLT (Surface), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 302-64

In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to provide Class II (3rd and 4th echelon repair parts for Force units), Class IV and V support, plus a Tracked Vehicle Repair Section (Reinforced).

(c) RLT (A), CG 1st MarDiv Op Plan 32-60, TIM-10 of 041700Z of November 1960 and CG, 1st MarDiv msg 00301624Z of January 1963.

In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to furnish the required officers and men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III and V support to the RLT; 3rd echelon maintenance for Force units; and overflow 3rd echelon maintenance to all other units. A prescribed amount of Class II and IV support is furnished the RLT. This Regiment has a limited

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capability of performing this mission due to a shortage of trained ammunition technicians. All other support requirements for the RLT can be provided without unduly disrupting current garrison support missions.

(d) 7th MEB - CINC PAC FLT Op Plan 82-62

In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to furnish the required officers and men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III, and V support to the 7th MEB, 3rd echelon maintenance to all other units. A prescribed amount of Class II and IV support is provided to the MEB. This Regiment has a limited capability to support this plan due to the shortage of trained ammunition technicians. All other support can be provided.

(e) 5th MEB - 5th MEB Op Plan 312/316-64

In support of this plan, this Regiment is prepared to furnish the required officers and men with sufficient organic equipment to provide Class I, III and V support to the 5th MEB, 3rd echelon maintenance to Force units, and overflow 3rd echelon maintenance to all other units. This Regiment has a limited capability to support this plan due to a shortage of ammunition technicians. Furthermore, although the Regiment is capable of providing all support requirements to the 5th MEB plan, the back-up support capability would be severely hindered unless there is a timely replacement of those shortages of personnel reported in references (c) and (d) and set in the foregoing Part I. It is noted that the mounting-out of this MEB depletes the operational capability of Bulk Fuel Company and Ammunition Company, and completely commits certain "one-of-a-kind" items, such as the Mobile Bakery Unit of Ration Company, Supply Battalion.

(f) Ground Defense Force (Ready Forces), 1st MarDiv Op Plan 312/316-64.

In support of this plan, this Regiment is required to furnish detachments with sufficient equipment and Class I, III and V support for the Logistic Support Group. This Regiment has a limited capability to fully support this plan due to a shortage of ammunition technicians.

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(3) As set forth above, this Regiment has a limited capability of supporting any of the standing contingency requirements (less the air and surface BLTs) due to a shortage of trained ammunition technicians. In regard to support, other than ammunition technicians, this Regiment is able to support any combination of two of the above plans (less the air and surface BLT). In addition, the deployment of any one of the above mentioned forces would either completely eliminate or very seriously restrict this Regiment's capability to furnish support to the Marine Corps Base in certain areas. Specific areas of concern would be: operation of the Base magazines; augmentation of the Base Bakery personnel; and augmentation of Base Exchange personnel. It should also be noted that, if Division Operation Plan 312/316-64 is executed, 1st Force Service Regiment would provide support to the 5th MEB, Ground Defense Force (Initial Reinforcements) and to the Ground Defense Force (Follow-On Reinforcements).


H. G. LAWRENCE, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION: CG FMFPAC (9)
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CO 1st FSR (3)
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CO SupBn (1)
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, 96601

IN REPLY REFER TO:

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28 SEP 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03H)

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol
MC 3100-4) for 2d Quarter Fiscal Year 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A

- Encl: (1) CG, 1stMarDiv ltr 3:OP:smr over 3480 ser: 00246-65
dtd 14Aug65
(2) CG, 3dMarDiv ltr 3:RJJ:jrl over 1546 ser: 0086-65
dtd 16Sep65
(3) CG, 1st MAW msg 190610Z Sep65 (S)
(4) CG, 3d MAW ltr 3:KBN:jes over 3500 ser: 003B24465
dtd 1Sep65
(5) CG, ForTrps, FMFPac ltr 3/HBC/cmf over 3100 ser:
002765 dtd 30Aug65
(6) CO, 1st FSR ltr 8/BGM/elg ser: 0014-65 dtd 18Aug65
(7) CO, 1st MarBrig, FMFPac ltr 3/FEW/eph over 3000
Ser: 0023-65 dtd 31Aug65
(8) CO, H&SBn, FMFPac ltr 3/LMW over 5213 ser: 015-65
dtd 20Aug65
(9) CO, 1st ANGLICO, FMFPac ltr OJM/weh over 5212/3500
ser: 072-65 dtd 1Sep65
(10) CO, First RadBn, FMFPac ltr 3:RWR:jsn over 3001
ser: 00115-65 dtd 1Sep65

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. Summary Statement

a. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific continues to be combat ready. There are certain specific areas where readiness of the individual unit is adversely affected by shortages of personnel, equipment and training. However, all WestPac units are capable of executing their primary mission.

b. Shortages of technical personnel within tactical and support aviation units continue to reduce their efficiency.

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28 SEP 1965

In addition, shortages of spare parts and equipment limit their operating efficiency and capabilities. A basic problem is the lack of operating generators and their associated spare parts. The next reporting period should see a general improvement in operating efficiency and capability for aviation units.

3. The self-evaluation of FMFPac units reporting combat readiness is described in detail in enclosures (1) through (10). Comments on significant items reported are as follows:

a. 1st Marine Division

(1) The deployment of 1st Marine Division forces has enhanced the ability of this division to support the varied requirements in WestPac. With a short period of additional training in Okinawa, all deployed units will be able to accomplish any assigned mission. On the other hand, elements of the division located in EastPac can not provide the necessary forces to meet all contingency requirements in South America or the Caribbean. RLT-5 (-) has only one battalion in CONUS at this time, with the 3d Battalion enroute from Okinawa. A delay in bringing deployable personnel into the RLT for training would retard its combat readiness during the next quarter.

(2) Combat support and combat service elements remaining in EastPac are experiencing shortages of personnel. Steps have been taken to alleviate this problem.

b. 3d Marine Division

(1) The Division is in an excellent state of readiness. Operation Starlite and Piranha were a challenging test and left little to be desired in their professional execution. The nature of these operations brought into sharp focus the constant requirement for all elements of this division to be maintained in a high category of readiness.

c. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

(1) The lack of essential spare parts and shortages of operative generators hampers the Wing, but it continues to meet its assigned combat missions. Every effort is being made to provide the necessary spare parts and equipment for this unit. Barring any unforeseen delays in delivery, the next reporting period should show a decided improvement in this area.

(2) The interchanging of experienced and newly joined squadron pilots will enhance the combat readiness of the recently deployed squadrons. Continued, hard, intensive training should place all units in an improved state of readiness during the next reporting period.

d. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing

(1) The deployment of 4 VMF/VMA, 4 HMM, 1 VMO, 1 H&MS and 1 MABS to WestPac severely limits the Wing in its ability to support current EastPac contingency plans. The shortage of personnel in the squadrons currently assigned averages 50% of their current manning level in selected MOS allowance and has prevented the squadrons from attaining a high degree of readiness during this reporting period. A continued shortage of this nature will adversely effect their readiness in the 3rd Quarter. In addition, some equipment and spare parts are in short supply due in part to the recent deployment of MAG-36. Action has been initiated to remedy personnel and equipment shortages.

e. Force Troops, FMFPac

(1) All Force Troops are combat ready with the exception of the 7th Communication Battalion. A degree of border-line readiness is being experienced by the 7th Communication Battalion due to the loss of experienced personnel through normal rotation. The projected input will meet the T/O requirement but will not compensate initially for the loss of operational and team experience.

f. 1st Marine Brigade

(1) Operational readiness of the Brigade is adversely affected by the personnel deficiency in Marine Control Squadron Two. With the number of personnel presently available, the squadron could not support flight operations on a continuing basis.

g. 1st Force Service Regiment, FMFPac

(1) The ability of this unit during the forthcoming quarter is limited to support of elements of the 1st Marine Division and Force units currently located at Camp Pendleton. Critical shortages exist in T/E items as a result of this unit providing essential equipment to deploying units. Steps have been taken to staff this organization with adequate personnel; a recommended manning level has been forwarded to Headquarters Marine Corps. The necessary T/E items, based on mission and the proposed manning

level, are being requisitioned.

4. During the forthcoming quarter, particular command emphasis will be directed towards:

a. Continued effective logistic support of units in SVN in order to assist them in maintaining their combat readiness posture.

b. Attainment of a combat deployable status by individual units in EastPac.

c. Continued evaluation of the training conducted by Force units to ensure that it reflects experience gained in South Vietnam.


V. H. KRULAK

C6, FMFPac

65 6552

 3:OP:amr
 3480
 Ser: 00246-65
 14 Aug 1965

#1

HEADQUARTERS

 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF
 Camp Pendleton, California, 92055

SECRET

 From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF
 To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 (U)

 Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
 (b) FMFPacO 3000.4
 (c) 1st MarDiv (-) Rein 132331Z Aug 65

1. The Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966, is a report prepared and submitted in the second month of the 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 covering the forthcoming quarter. In projecting the operational readiness of the Division the following assumptions have been made:

That the EASTPAC MAB will deploy to WESTPAC and remain under operational control of this Headquarters and will be redesignated as 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein) upon arrival.

That two BLT's of the 1st Marines will be released from operational control of that unit to CG, III MAF and CONSEVENTHFLEET.

That the 5th Marines will follow an input of personnel and retraining cycle similar to that previously afforded transplacement units.

That combat support and combat service support units remaining in EASTPAC will be brought to manning level strength during the reporting period.

2. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is hereby submitted:

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND.

This Division cannot be evaluated as a single entity due to previous, present and anticipated deployments. During the forthcoming quarter, the Division will be capable of mounting out one combat ready BLT from WESTPAC in October and a combat ready RLt consisting of two BLT's from EASTPAC in mid - December. Movement of forces to WESTPAC is considered to have enhanced the ability of this Headquarters to support contingency plans related to that area and conversely, have seriously reduced ability to support those in South and Central America and the Caribbean area. Elements of the Division located in WESTPAC stand ready to accomplish any mission assigned. Elements of the Division located in EASTPAC will not be combat ready until mid - December.

PART II - EVALUATION OF UNITS.

The following units are considered to be ineffective or marginally combat ready during the forthcoming quarter or a portion thereof:

a. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. This unit presently has approximately 300 personnel on board. It will be brought to manning level by 23 August and deployed to WESTPAC as part of EASTPAC MAB. Upon arrival intense training will be necessary to prepare unit for combat. Unit considered marginally combat ready until October.

b. 5th Marine Regiment(-). On 7 September, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines is scheduled to deploy as a transplacement battalion. The new 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines will reform in early November. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines is presently in leave/input status and will commence training about 7 September. Therefore, the regiment will be combat ineffective until November, marginally combat ready until mid - December and fully combat ready by January 1966.

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c. Combat Support and Combat Service Support Elements (EASTPAC) - All units experience critical shortages of personnel with acute shortages in 1st Medical Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines and 1st Engineer Battalion. Battalions/Companies remaining EASTPAC are considered to be marginally combat ready for the forthcoming quarter.

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

a. General.

(1) The release of RLT-7, RLT 1/5, and 7th Engineer Bn (-) Reinforced from operational control of this Command when deployed to WESTPAC, MIDPAC and RVN respectively, prohibit this Headquarters from providing a force of division size as required in support of certain contingency plans.

(2) The above, when coupled with the imminent deployment of the EASTPAC MAB to WESTPAC also significantly reduces this Command's ability to respond to contingency commitments in Central and South America and in the Caribbean area. Division elements remaining in EASTPAC, as shown in Part II above, subsequent to the deployment of the EASTPAC MAB will not be fully capable of fulfilling commitments to any one plan for these areas. Obviously, there will be no capability to support any two of these plans concurrently.

b. The 1st Marine Division (-) Rein is committed to providing forces in support of the below listed contingency plans:

(1) Commanding General, FMFPac General War Plan 1-64. Forces to be provided in support of this plan will be contingent on units available at the time of execution.

(2) CINCPACFLT OPlans 25, 38 and 39; SFF OPlan 6-64; CRSFF OPlan 4-64 and CG, FMFPac OPlan 27-65 and 32-62. These plans call for the commitment of the entire division as the ground element of I MEF. The release from 1st Marine Division operational control of elements shown in paragraph 2 a. (1) above and the anticipated release of elements of RLT-1 reduce this Command's capability to fulfill these commitments. Further with respect to CG, FMFPac OPlan 27-63, providing the counterintelligence and photo interpreter personnel to augment V MEC staff required by Appendix 1 to Annex B of that plan would deplete the remaining assets of the Division in these areas to an ineffective status.

(3) CINCPACFLT OPlan 81-64. Since the OPlan supports CINCLANT 303/313/315/304 series of OPlans, the ability of this Command to support the series will be predicated upon the interaction of 303/313/315, whichever one is selected for execution, and 304. The capability of this Command to support this series of OPlans under various situations is as follows:

(a) Execution of OPlan 303, 313 or 315 only. When RLT-5 becomes combat ready in mid - December this Command will have the ability to deploy approximately 50 per cent of the Ground Defense Force (GDF) requirements. Although interim changes 2 and 19 to CINCLANT OPlans 315 and 303 respectively (CINCLANT 142044Z Jul) add an alternate task organization for the GDF with source shown as LANTCOM, CONUS-PACOM Forces (GDF Hqs, 2 Regt Hqs, and 4 Inf Bns with supporting elements) are still committed to these plans.

(b) Execution of OPlan 303 and 304 concurrently. CINCLANT 303-64 requires four BLT's and two regimental headquarters for the GDF. CINCLANT 304-64 requires a regiment of three infantry battalions and one additional battalion for the 5th MEB. With the two infantry battalion availability described above and with only one regimental headquarters available, this Command could not fully commit required forces to these plans. Relief from 5th MEB commitments (OPlan 304) has been requested by reference (c).

(c) Execution of OPlan 313 and 304 or 315 and 304 concurrently. The same general comments contained in subparagraph (3) (b) above, apply.

(4) Commanding General, FMFPac OPlan 82-62. When RLT-5 is combat ready in mid - December, this Command will be able to provide a two BLT regiment in support of this plan.



LEWIS J. FIELDS

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96601

65 7652

#2

Copy 2 of 12 Copies
3:RJJ:jrl
1546
Ser. No. 0086-65
16 September 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Commander's Combat Readiness Report for 2d Quarter, FY 66
(Report Symbol 3100-4) (U)

Ref: (a) MCQ 3000.2A
(b) FMFPACO 3000.4

Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the second quarter of fiscal year 1966 is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

2. Upon removal of enclosure (1) this letter may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.


L. W. WALT

Copy to:
CG III MAF

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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DECLASSIFIED

6-20121

3:RJJ;jrl
3480
Ser: 0086-65

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3D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF
QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 2D QUARTER FY 66

PART I: EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

A. The 3d Marine Division continues to maintain the capability of accomplishing its mission. Division units in RVN have given evidence of a high state of readiness as indicated in Operations, STARLITE and PIRANHA. Daily contacts with enemy elements are met with strength and decisiveness.

B. Contingency Plans originally tested and refined many times have been executed with competence and rapidity; this has further been enhanced by excellent support from Commander 7th Fleet and Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Continued support coupled with gained experience and knowledge will increase the Division's Combat Readiness and improve the over-all effectiveness of the Navy-Marine Corps Team.

C. Operations against Viet Cong elements provide a continuous evaluation of our capabilities. Personnel management procedures, the accumulation and assimilation of intelligence data, current concepts in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, individual and unit training methods, new weapons and equipment and logistical plans and operations all receive steady testing under the most extreme conditions. This constant evaluation can only result in improved procedures increasing the state of combat readiness in this Division.

D. The Division's high state of combat readiness could be effected by a gradual diminution of material readiness. Environmental factors as outlined in the Combat Readiness Report for first quarter FY 66 continue to plague certain equipment areas. Constant vigilance of organizational maintenance procedures coupled with a stable flow of spare parts will largely prevent a deterioration of material readiness.

E. In summary, the continual evaluation of training and planning methods, commensurate with knowledge gained from current operations can only improve the Division's present state of high combat readiness.

II EVALUATION OF UNITS

A. During the second quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 all units of the 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF will be effective and capable of accomplishing their combat missions.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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COMMUNICATION CENTER
 HPB 324 EMD 324 HEADQUARTERS
 FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

PP RUHPG
 DE RUMFUAQ 015D 2620610
 ZNY SSSSS

P 190610Z
 FM CG FMAW
 TO RUHPG/CG FMFPAC

19SEP65 1225Z

19SEP65 1225Z

BT
 SECRET
 COMMANDER'S QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS RPT, 2ND QUARTER,
 FY66 (U)

A. MCO 3000.2A

B. FMFPAC 0 3000.4

C. CMC MSG 022052Z - (U)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF REF A, B AND C, THE
 FOLLOWING COMMENTS PERTAINING TO THE COMBAT READINESS OF THIS
 COMMAND ARE SUBMITTED:

PART I: MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST MAW ARE ENGAGED IN

PAGE TWO RUMFUAQ 015D SECRET
 COMBAT OPERATIONS IN RVN AND ARE CAPABLE OF CONTINUING THESE
 OPERATIONS. THE ABILITY OF THE WING TO SUSTAIN COMBAT OPERA-
 TIONS IN RVN OR REDEPLOY TO MEET OTHER CONTINGENCIES WOULD BE
 GREATLY ENHANCED IF THE COMMAND WERE AT T/O PERSONNEL
 STRENGTH.

PART II:

A. RECENTLY JOINED SQUADRONS ARE NOT CONSIDERED FULLY COMBAT
 READY DUE PRIMARILY TO TRAINING DEFICIENCIES. THIS SITUATION IS
 BEING REMEDIED FOR HELICOPTER SQUADRONS BY INTERCHANGING PER-
 SONNEL BETWEEN FULLY COMBAT READY SQUADRONS AND NEWLY JOINED
 HMM'S. NEW FIXED WING JET SQUADRONS WILL BE BROUGHT TO A
 FULLY COMBAT READY STATUS AS RAPIDLY AS LIMITED TRAINING
 FACILITIES IN WESTPAC PERMIT.

B. VMF(A) 115 - THE IWAKUNI BASED F-4 SQUADRON WILL CONTINUE
 TO BE MARGINALLY CAPABLE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS AN ADEQUATE DEPTH
 OF F4 GSE, SSE AND SPARE PARTS IS AVAILABLE WESTPAC TO SUPPORT
 TWO F4 SQUADRONS IN COMBAT WITH THE TWO F4 SQUADRONS AT
 IWAKUNI.

C. MACS-9- THE OKINAWA BASED AIR CONTROL SQUADRON HAS 23 OF
 ITS AUTHORIZED GENERATORS DEADLINED. ALTHOUGH THIS SITUATION

PAGE THREE RUMFUAQ 015D SECRET
 IS EXPECTED TO IMPROVE DURING THE NEXT QUARTER, EFFECTIVE
 COMBAT EMPLOYMENT DURING THE PERIOD WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL
 GENERATOR SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES.

D. MWSG-17- THE REQUIREMENT TO MANAGE AND OPERATE IWAKUNI
 AND MCAF FUTEMA WITH FMAW RESOURCES PRESENTS AN ONEROUS PROBLEM
 IN THAT THESE UNITS ARE NOT FREE FOR DEPLOYMENT TO RVN.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MAW

P 190610Z/SEP 65

ACTN: G-3

25

SECRET

65 7079

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac
MCAS, El Toro, Santa Ana, Calif. 92709

3:KBN:jcs
3500
Ser: 003824465
1 September 1965

SECRET
SECRET

Copy 1 of 3 Copies

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for Second Quarter
Fiscal Year 1966 (U) (RS MC 3100-4)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), subject report is submitted:

a. Part I

(1) The 3d MAW has an estimated combat readiness of 60%. The recent deployment of MAG-36 (-) with H&MS, MABS, 3 HMM, VMO MATCU and the 2nd LAAM Bn to WESTPAC in addition to training squadrons, cadres, and detachments for future deployments reflects adversely on overall Wing readiness.

b. Part II

(1) VMFA-122: Transitioning from F-8E to F-4B type aircraft. Phase I training until approximately 1 November 1965.

(2) VMCJ-3: Transitioning from RF-8A to RF-4B type aircraft. Phase I training until approximately 1 December 1965. Cadre scheduled to deploy to WESTPAC by 1 November 1965. (Cadre will be RF-8A/EF-10B trained.)

(3) HMM-165: Unit remains in Forming Phase until mid-October dependent upon assignment of personnel. Unit currently training limited personnel assigned with HMM-164.

(4) MATCU-70: Tentatively scheduled for activation in December 1965 in accord with CMC msg 111953Z May 1965.

c. Part III

(1) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 71-yr. Capability to support this plan will continue to be limited due to KC-130F augmentation to 1st MAW for an indefinite period.

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(Rev. 6-14)

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1 September 1965

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- (2) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25-yr
FMFPAC OPLAN 27-yr
FMFPAC OPLAN 32-yr
SFF OPLAN 6-yr
CRSFF OPLAN 4-yr

Overall 3d MAW capability has been reduced by the deployment of 4 VF/VA, 4 HMM, 1 VMO, 1 H&MS and 1 MABS squadrons to WESTPAC.

- (3) FMFPAC OPLAN 82-yr
LFA (TG 125.3) OPLAN 316-yr

Capability to provide VMA support remains limited to one marginally combat ready squadron, due to scheduled deployment of an additional VMA to WESTPAC.

- (4) 5thMEB OPLAN 316-yr

HMM-164 (C-3 Readiness Category) is the only helicopter squadron available for this commitment, in addition there is no residual VMO capability at this time.



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CG FMFPAC (Orig + 9)

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DECLASSIFIED



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FORCE TROOPS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA 92278

65 6999

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3/HBC/cmt

3100

Ser 0027 65

30 AUG 1965

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1966 (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) (U)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted.

a. Part I. This command is considered capable of providing combat support and combat service support units in the support of Fleet Marine Forces as directed.

b. Part II. The 7th Communication Battalion will be marginally combat ready during this period due to known losses in experienced and qualified personnel. The projected input to this command during the reporting period is not capable of compensating for this loss until later in the period. All other units of this command will be effective during this period.

c. Part III. This command is capable of executing all assigned missions in current contingency plans on a reduced basis. The capabilities of this command have been reduced to the extent that operational control has been relinquished for those elements recently deployed or in the process of deploying to WESTPAC. The residual ability to provide earmarked forces is hampered by shortages of deployable personnel.

Wm K Jones
WILLIAM K. JONES

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#2

4/HJF/jkc

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st FSR ltr 8/BGM/elg Ser: 0014-65 of 18 Aug 65

From: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, FY 1966

1. Forwarded.

R. E. CUSHMAN JR.

3

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(encl (6))

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Headquarters
1ST FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, FMF
Camp Pendleton, California 92055

8/BGM/elg
Ser: 0014-65
18 Aug 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, FY 1966

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) CG FMFPac GWP 1-64
(d) CG FMFPac OpPlan 27-63
(e) CG FMFPac OpPlan 32-62
(f) 1st MarDiv OpPlan 302-65
(g) 1st MarDiv OpPlan 32-60
(h) CINC PAC FLT opPlan 82-62
(i) 1st MarDiv OpPlan 312/316-64

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of	16 Copies

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

a. Part I. Evaluation of Command

Deployment of additional personnel in late August of 23 officers, 800 (est) enlisted (Marine Corps), and 1 officer, 6 enlisted (Navy) will limit this organization's capabilities in carrying out its assigned mission. Prior to being capable of providing desired logistical support, this organization will require a complete review of the manning level, reorganization and realignment of certain functions to provide each battalion a balanced composition for sustained services and support. Personnel remaining, who meet the present criteria for deployment, are 34% of the on board strength of officers and 58% of the on board strength of enlisted. Certain units are presently ineffective due to lack of personnel, and other units will be reduced to an ineffective status upon deployment of the August detachment.

Adequate Electronic, Motor Transport, Engineer, and Ordnance T/E equipment is not on hand to support this organization's primary mission. Critical shortages of major T/E items have resulted by providing a proportionate share of T/E equipment to units deploying to West Pac. Listing of these T/E items provided deploying units will be set forth in the September Logistic Status Report.

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CG, MCB, CAMPEN CONTROL NO.
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8/BGM/elg
Ser: 0014-65b. Part II. Evaluation of Units

This organization's three battalions - Maintenance, Supply and Headquarters and Service - will be virtually ineffective during this reporting period, but can provide limited support for remaining Division and Force units. These battalions cannot perform their assigned mission by deploying in support of a Division/Wing size operation primarily due to shortages of personnel and equipment.

c. Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments

Support requirements outlined in references (c) through (i) cannot be supported until receipt of sufficient replacements with required technical skills, and a review of the manning level and realignment of certain functions within the organization to provide a balanced composition. In the final analysis, support will depend upon the input of personnel and the tasks assigned.


J. E. GARNER

DISTRIBUTION: CG FMFPac (9)
CG 1st MarDiv (1)

65 6958

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96601

3/FEW/eah
3000
Ser: 0023-65
31 August 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
Subj: Commander's Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness,
2d Quarter FY 1966 (U)
Ref: (a) FMFPACO 3000.4
(b) CG, FMFPAC ltr Ser: 00783-64 of 16 Nov 64
(c) CG, FMFPAC ltr Ser: 0113-64 of 29 Feb 64

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following report is submitted for the second quarter fiscal year 1966.

PART I - Evaluation of the Command. Due to the nature of the contingency plans which the First Marine Brigade would be called upon to support, individual unit's combat readiness should be examined rather than the Brigade as a whole.

PART II - Evaluation of Units.

a. VMF(AW)-212 - This squadron is presently OPCON to CAW-16 and will not be available to support any contingency plans which the Brigade would be called upon to provide forces until third quarter fiscal year 1966.

b. VMF(AW)-232 - This squadron's overall combat readiness stands at seventy (70) per cent, with an overall pilot training readiness figure of sixty-three (63) percent. The latter figure is considerably higher when viewed from the standpoint of required training for a Vietnamese type deployment. This will be raised within the next one hundred and twenty (120) days, after which the unit will be fully combat ready with the one exception of pilot's carrier qualifications. On 1 October 1965, this unit will not possess any carrier qualified pilots. Attaining this combat readiness status will be predicated directly, however, on retention of all presently assigned personnel.

c. MACS-2 - The operational readiness of the AN/TPS-34 radar equipment has been progressing smoothly, but somewhat behind schedule due to a shortage of repair parts. Critical personnel shortages continue to exist in the enlisted fields of Personnel

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INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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Encl (7)

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Ser: 0023-65
31 August 1965

Administration, Supply Administration, Generator Maintenance, Radar and Communications Repair. The critical personnel shortages and the excessive age and wear of this Unit's generators (except the PU 608) renders the combat capability to deploy and support sustained 24 hour operations marginal.

d. MATCU-62 - The introduction of new radar equipment is progressing smoothly but somewhat behind schedule because of a shortage of repair parts. Disposition will not be requested on old radar equipment until an adequate stock of repair parts is available. Information has been received from BU-EPS that three 400 cycle generators will be shipped to MATCU-62 during September 1965. Shortages of electronic technicians and controllers give the unit a marginal capability to carry out a combat deployment. The unit will be unable to support 24 hour daily flight operations for any sustained period.

e. Service Battalion - This unit is essentially the Service Company of the Service Battalion of the First Marine Brigade. On 25 May 1965, the Service Battalion Rear was redesignated as Service Battalion. The new Service Battalion personnel strength is one (1) officer and forty-one (41) enlisted. Battalion Landing Team 1/5 has temporarily augmented the unit with one (1) officer and forty-one (41) enlisted from their detachment of First Service Battalion. The present mission of Service Battalion is two fold; to maintain Fleet Stock Account at Pearl City, Hawaii and to operate a Field Maintenance Facility with 3d and 4th echelon maintenance facility at MCAS, Kaneohe. Service Battalion is able to perform this first mission, but can perform only limited 3d and 4th echelon maintenance on all items of equipment while in garrison. This capability will not exist if Service Battalion is deployed to the field since field equipment is not available. The major reason for the ability to perform only limited support in garrison is due to the lack of an approved T/E. Upon the removal of the augmented personnel of the Battalion Landing Team, the proposed T/O of one (1) officer and eighteen (18) enlisted for the Field Maintenance Section of Service Battalion is wholly inadequate to perform maintenance support in the field. This unit is not capable nor is it intended to perform a combat mission.

PART III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. Since deployment of the original RLT/MAG units from the First Marine Brigade, mission assignments as set forth in reference (b) are not considered compatible with the current brigade organization.

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Ser: 0023-65
31 August 1965

b. The forces required by reference (c) can be provided during this period in so far as they do not exceed one (1) BLT, one VMP(AW) squadron and one MACS squadron subject to limitations described in Part II above.

R H Spanjer
R. H. SPANJER

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65 6558

HEADQUARTERS

Camp H. M. Smith U. S. Marine Corps
FPO San Francisco 96610

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

3/1nw
5213

Ser: 015-65
20 AUG 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) H&SBn, FMFPac ltr 4440/2 of 2 August 1965

1. In compliance with instructions contained in references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted:

PART I

This Headquarters has sufficient personnel who are adequately trained to support either a MAF or MAC Headquarters if deployed by Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

In addition, this Headquarters is prepared to provide basic logistic support for a MAF/MAC Headquarters. A request for a modification of allowances has been submitted to CMC by reference (c). Approval of this request will enhance this Headquarters capabilities to accomplish assigned logistic missions.


A. D. CEREGHINO

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl (2)

DECLASSIFIED

65 7135

1ST AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY
Fleet Marine Force
FPO, San Francisco, 96601

Ser: 072-65
OJM:weh
5212/3500
1 Sept 65

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966

Ref: (a) FMFPacO 3000.4
(b) MCO 3000.2A

Encl: (1) Listing of effective operation plans

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the Quarterly Combat Readiness Report is submitted.

2. PART I - Evaluation of the Command

a. Current on board personnel strength reflects the following manning level of 100% T/O strength.

Naval Aviators - 19 for 83% of 23
Marine Ground MOS 0840 - 8 for 114% of 7
Marine Ground other MOS's - 4 for 100% of 4
Navy Line Officers - 12 for 120% of 10
Marine Enlisted - 303 for 98% of 308

b. There are currently sufficient officers and enlisted personnel assigned to provide the necessary control and liaison agencies for an Army ROAD Division Headquarters, three Infantry Brigade Headquarters, seven Battalion TACP's and six Battalion SFCP's.

c. There are sufficient parachute qualified personnel to provide one Brigade Naval Gunfire Liaison Team, one Brigade Air Liaison Team, two Battalion SFCP's and two Battalion TACP's.

d. There are presently deployed to RVN two Battalion SFCP's plus four officers and one spot team, one Beacon Team and a Headquarters Element.

3. PART II - Evaluation of Units

a. It is considered that all personnel currently assigned are sufficiently trained for immediate combat operations.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

(Encl (9))

Ser: 072-65

OJM:cjl

5213/3500

1 Sept 65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

4. PART III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. Enclosure (1) lists those Operational Plans currently showing this command as a participating unit.

b. With the return of all detachments indicated in 2d above, this command will be capable of supporting all contingencies within the limits stipulated in 2d above.

O. J. Morel
O. J. MOREL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS UNLESS INDICATED
12 YEARS, AND ON 08-09-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Ser: 072-65
OJM:cjl
5213-3500
1 Sept 65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Listing of those operations plans currently held or known to indicate
1ST ANGLICO, FMF participation:

CINCPACFLT General War Plan 1-64
CG, FMFPac General War Plan 1-64
CINCPAC OPLAN 23-64 & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 27-63 & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XI L & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XI T & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XI RVN & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XII & IV & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 99-64 & Supporting Plans thereto
TF 79 OPLAN 104-64
SEATO FF 4/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
SEATO FF 5/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
SEATO FF 6/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
SEATO FF 7/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
Task Force ALFA 5/61

CONFIDENTIAL
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

65 6943
#1

FIRST RADIO BATTALION
Fleet Marine Force, FPO
San Francisco 96601

3:RWR:jsr
3001
Ser: 00115-65
1 September 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for
2nd Quarter FY66

Ref: (a) FMFPACO 3000.4
(b) CMC 182257Z Jan 65 (Confidential)
(c) CG FMFPAC 032117Z Apr 65
(d) CMC 131744Z Apr 65
(e) CMC 052200Z May 65
(f) ADMINO FMFPAC 022350Z July 65
(g) CG MCSC Barstow 280034Z Aug 65

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a). The second quarter Fiscal Year 1966 is the period covered by this report.

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

A. This command is considered to be marginally combat ready to fully execute its assigned mission. The marginal qualification is based solely on equipment deficiencies, and assumes no equipment relief from non-organic resources. This evaluation is based on the following considerations:

(1) Total unit commitment, requiring maximum organic resources.

(2) Eleven major items of communication-electronic equipment held by this command, (5 Electronic Intercept Facilities AN/TSQ-46, 4 Special Communication Central AN/MSG-43, and 2 Special Communication Central ODTT-4), are powered by the engine generator "Universal Power Supply PU-535 - PU-535A/G".

(3) Exhaustive tests conducted by this unit, and under auspices of CMC have proven the PU-535/PU-535A/G an unsatisfactory power source. First Radio Battalion UER's 2-64, 3-64, and 5-64 (forwarded to CMC via CG FMFPAC under 1st RadBn cover letter 4:LR:bm 4700 of 1 Dec 64) reported the deficiencies existing in the PU-535/PU-535A/G.

(4) The unsuitability of the PU-535/PU-535A/G has also been reported on several occasions by this command's Deadline Report of Combat Essential Equipment, and by Logistic Status Reports of 31 Oct 64, 31 Dec 64,

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copy 1 of 12

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Ser: 00115-65

28 Feb 65, 30 Apr 65 and 30 Jun 65.

(5) In January 1965, CMC indicated by reference (b) that the PU-535's would be modified within 60 days to correct reported deficiencies.

(6) In April 1965, CG FMFPAC reported to CMC that PU-535 deficiencies greatly impaired the combat efficiency of this unit, and requested status on the proposed modification. (See reference (c)). CMC answered by reference (d), and reported the modification delayed and estimated delivery date of the modified PU-535 to using units by 15 July 1965.

(7) In May 1965, CMC indicated by reference (e) that the modified generators would be available for shipment within 30 days. By reference (f), CG FMFPAC directed this unit to requisition the modified generators through normal supply channels. A quantity of nine modified generators was subsequently requisitioned on priority Ø5 by this unit to replace assets on hand. This requisition was submitted by message on 8 July 1965. The requisition was traced on 28 July 1965, and again on 26 August 1965. CG MCSC Barstow's reply to the second tracer (reference (g)) indicated the "shipment will be effected upon completion of work request; ETC 1 Oct; ETA your activity 25 Oct".

(8) On 31 August 1965, direct liaison was effected with MCSC Barstow challenging the 25 October 1965 delivery date, under the rationale that this unit could not be fully committed to combat support operations without the modified generators. Results of this direct liaison are still pending.

(9) Subsequent to receipt and successful evaluation of the modified generator, it is anticipated this command will be fully combat ready and capable of executing its assigned mission. Estimated date of complete combat readiness is 8 November 1965, based on the current ETA of 25 Oct 65 for the modified generator plus a 14 day test and evaluation period.

(10) It is emphasized that this equipment deficiency does not totally impair the combat readiness of this command. This command is capable of accomplishing a portion of its mission by utilizing generators organic to other major items to power the AN/TSQ-46's and AN/MSC-43's. The command is not however, capable of maximum combat commitment without recourse to non-organic equipment support (engine generators).

PART II - EVALUATION OF UNITS

Without non-organic generator power support, the ELINT platoon of Operations Company and the Special Security Communications platoon of Headquarters and Service Company are considered incapable of fully

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Ser: 00115-65

accomplishing their missions in the event of total Radio Battalion commitment to combat support operations. (See Part I above)

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTSPlanReadiness

CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 37
SFF OPLAN 5
SFF OPLAN 6
SFF OPLAN 7
CRSFF OPLAN 4

The command is considered prepared to support the requirements of these plans, except Phase III/IV of CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32.

CINCPACFLT GWP
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 27
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 38
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 39

The command is not considered ready to support the maximum requirements of these plans. (See Part I)

R. M. Stewart
R. M. STEWART

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DECLASSIFIED



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO 96601

IN REPLY REFER TO:

30P/nmr

0001022-65

28 Dec 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03H)

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report
(Report Symbol, MC 3100-4) for the Third Quarter
Fiscal Year 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A

- Encl: (1) CG, First Marine Division ltr 3:OP:jwd over
3480 Serial 00262-65 of 29 Nov 1965
(2) CG, Third Marine Division ltr 3:VTB:vb over
3060.2 Serial 00147-65 of 28 Nov 1965
(3) CG, First Marine Aircraft Wing Report (will
be forwarded separately) *See 286 735, add'l 12/20/65*
(4) CG, Third Marine Aircraft Wing ltr 3:KBN:lad
Serial 003A33065 of 26 Nov 1965
(5) CG Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force ltr 3/RWT/
cmt over 3500, Serial 003465 of 26 Nov 1965
(6) CO, First Marine Brigade ltr 3/wlr over 3000
Serial 0033-65 of 3 Dec 1965
(7) CO, First Force Service Regiment ltr 4/HJF/jkc
Serial 00221-65 of 23 Nov 1965
(8) CO, Headquarters and Service Battalion, Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific ltr 3/lnw over 5213, Serial
021-65 of 4 Dec 1965.
(9) CO, First ANGLICO, FMFPac ltr GMW:cjl over 5213/
3500 Serial 097-65 of 1 Dec 1965
(10) CO, First Radio Battalion, FMFPac ltr 3:RWR:jsr
over 3001, Serial 00150-65 of 29 Nov 1965

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the third quarter, fiscal year 1966 is submitted in accordance with reference (a). As a result of recently planned deployments to be effected during the 3d QTR FY66, an updating of the report as directed in paragraph 2.e of enclosure (5) to reference (a) will be submitted, if necessary, when the situation has stabilized.

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INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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2. Summary Statement.

a. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific continues to demonstrate its combat effectiveness by the daily operations of WestPac units, and its readiness by the ability of non deployed units in EastPac and MidPac to meet accelerated deployment schedules. However, there are some specific areas where readiness of individual units is adversely affected by shortages of personnel, equipment and training.

b. Shortages of technical personnel and security personnel within tactical and support aviation units continue to reduce their combat readiness. There is a shortage of personnel in units not deployed in RVN. Transition of aviation units to new aircraft impedes attainment of training readiness. Introduction of new equipment without adequate spare parts affects combat readiness adversely. Material shortages and the heavy maintenance burden generated by combat, unite to degrade combat readiness.

3. The combat readiness as reported by individual FMFPac units is described in detail in enclosures (1) through (10). Comments on significant items reported are as follows:

a. First Marine Division.

(1) The First Marine Division is obliged to have 6 BLT's in Vietnam and 3 BLT's in WestPac fully combat ready by the end of the 3d Qtr FY66. This is an attainable goal, but it will be accomplished only by timely input of personnel in BLT 2/5 and 3/5, and by an intensive effort to train individuals in these and other Division units in a compressed period of time.

b. Third Marine Division. The Division is combat ready, as it demonstrates daily in successful operations in Vietnam. However, a continuing maintenance and repair problem exists in overcoming the deleterious effects of weather and adverse terrain on all items of equipment.

c. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

(1) A shortage of personnel in critical MOS fields affects adversely the readiness of some of the Wing support squadrons. Rotation of squadrons between Japan and RVN, and the associated equipment exchange, will periodically

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cause a temporary decrease in combat readiness of the unit rotated out of RVN, but has a corresponding beneficial effect on the overall effectiveness of the Wing, by introducing a fresh unit into the combat area.

(2) This evaluation is based on current combat readiness reports. 1st MAW report was forwarded to this headquarters on 6 December but has not arrived. The report, and appropriate comments if required, will be mailed separately when received by this headquarters.

d. 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing.

(1) The accelerated rotation of units, individual replacements to WestPac, the formation of training squadrons and cadre detachments place the Wing in a reduced combat readiness posture.

(2) Newly activated units: MHTG, MATCU-70 and HMH-463 will have limited training capability until April 1966. Transition to new aircraft will keep VMF-334 and VMCJ-3 in a Phase I training status until January and February 1966, respectively.

(3) HMH-462 and HMM-165 will have limited capability as a result of a shortage of trained personnel and support equipment.

(4) FMFPac letter, Serial 0095865 of 3 Dec 1965 provides HQMC a complete analysis of the 3d MAW's present personnel status and recommends a M/L to meet anticipated training requirements.

e. Force Troops, FMFPac.

(1) The deployment of the Construction Platoon, Radio Relay and Construction Company of the Seventh Communications Battalion causes this unit to be reduced in combat readiness during the 3d Qtr FY66.

(2) Although the Communication Company was reconstituted on 12 November 1965, the shortage of personnel and equipment reduces the capability of this unit.

~~TOP SECRET~~f. First Marine Brigade.

(1) The loss of personnel from normal rotation and the replacement of the F8E aircraft with F8D's will place VMF(AW)-212 in an ineffective status during the 3d Qtr FY66. Shortages of personnel, especially in the fields: Engineer Maintenance, Radar Repair, Supply, Wireman/Telephone/Radio Repair, keeps VMF (AW)-232 and MACS-2 from being fully combat ready. MATCU-62 is not able to accomplish assigned missions due to personnel shortages and a lack of adequate spare parts for a new radar, AN/TSQ-18.

(a) This headquarters has taken action to obtain a clarification of the MATCU-62, Electronic Repair Parts Allowance List (ERPAL). This subject was addressed in the FMFPac Logistic Summary for the period ending 31 Oct 1965 and CO, MATCU-62 ltr of 1 Oct 1965 to BUWEPS via CMC. It is anticipated that the supply procedures for spare parts will be clearly defined and the reported spare parts deficiency should be overcome during the 3d Qtr FY66.

g. First Force Service Regiment.

(1) The deployment in May and August 1965 of personnel and equipment in support of an RLT and a MEB has limited the capabilities of the Regiment.

(a) The Maintenance, Supply, and Headquarters and Service Battalions will have a reduced combat readiness during the 3rd Qtr FY66. However, the Regiment can provide limited support for the Division and Force units remaining in EastPac.

(2) Remedial action is being taken by the Regiment to train personnel, reorganize and realign certain functions to improve efficiency and to provide maximum support possible.

h. First Radio Battalion.

(1) The reported marginal combat readiness of the 1st Radio Bn is based on an equipment deficiency in the generator, PU-535 A/G. This problem has been a continuing one since 1964. Although CMC has authorized requisitioning additional PU-535 A/G generators, this headquarters has held the requisition in abeyance pending results of CMC's evaluation. (CMC 022023Z Nov, CG FMFPac 132314Z Nov refers).

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(a) In view of the immediate operational necessity for improved combat readiness of this unit, it has been recommended that eleven (11) PU-239 generators and eleven (11) PU-565 converters be procured for the 1st Rad Bn as a special allowance until a suitable replacement for the PU-535 generator becomes available.

4. During the forthcoming quarter, particular command emphasis will be directed towards:

a. Improvements in the level and quality of logistic support of units in Vietnam.

b. Attainment of a fully combat deployable status by individual units in EastPac and MidPac.

c. Continued evaluation of the training conducted by Force units to ensure that it reflects experience gained in South Vietnam.


V. H. KRULAK

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, Calif., 96601

3:0P:jwd
3480
Ser: 00262-65
29 NOV 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter Fiscal Year 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) CG, 1st Marine Division (Rein) 132331Z Aug65

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter, Fiscal Year - 66 is hereby submitted:

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND.

During the forthcoming quarter the First Marine Division will be capable of mounting out ground elements of a Marine Amphibious Brigade from WESTPAC to include two fully combat ready BLT's and one combat ready BLT from EASTPAC. Additionally another BLT will become combat ready in EASTPAC during March. There are, however, no Service Battalion detachments and only one Shore Party Team available to EASTPAC BLT's. Within the framework of these limited assets, the Division stands ready to accomplish any combat mission assigned.

PART II - EVALUATION OF UNITS.

The following units are considered to be ineffective or marginally combat ready during the forthcoming quarter or a portion thereof:

a. WESTPAC BLT. Due to effects of the Rotational BLT program, at any given time during the forthcoming quarter, one BLT assigned to the Division in WESTPAC will be marginally combat ready. Upon arrival of rotational BLT's in Okinawa, it is anticipated that the status of equipment will downgrade the units' readiness and that approximately one month will be required to repair and/or replace unserviceable combat essential items. By the time this BLT's equipment is fully combat ready, the cycle will repeat itself, thereby precluding the possibility of having more than two of the three assigned BLT's fully ready for combat at any one time.

b. Third Battalion, Fifth Marines. This unit presently has approximately 150 personnel assigned. Programmed input of personnel during January and February should bring this unit to manning level strength, at which time a progressive twelve week training program will be implemented to bring this

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battalion to a full state of combat readiness. Battalion will be combat ineffective during January and February, marginally effective during March, and fully combat ready during April.

c. 1st Service Battalion. Unit presently at fifty percent strength and has only fifty percent of authorized equipment on hand due to transfer of the detachment deployed with RLT-7 to 3dFSR. This unit must be considered as marginally combat ready until required personnel and equipment are reconstituted. Service Battalion as presently constituted can, however, support current Division assets.

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS.

a. The release of RLT -7, BLT 1-5, 7th Engineer Bn (-) Reinforced and 1st Force Reconnaissance Company from the operational control of this Headquarters coupled with the geographical split of remaining assets between EASTPAC and WESTPAC, prohibit this Command from providing a force of Division size required in support of certain contingency plans.

b. Elements of the Division located in WESTPAC can provide the ground elements of a Marine Amphibious Brigade to include two BLTs in support of CTF-79 contingency plans. One of these two BLT's is constantly afloat as the Special Landing Force (SLF). In addition to the available combat ready BLT's, a third Okinawa-based BLT which is marginally ready (see part II) could be committed in support of contingencies.

c. Elements of the Division located in EASTPAC can provide one BLT in support of contingency commitments in Central and South America and in the Caribbean area. This BLT is also available for utilization in support of WESTPAC contingency plans. Relief from 5th MEB commitments (OPLAN 304) was requested by reference (c).

Lewis J. Fields
LEWIS J. FIELDS

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1st MarDiv, FMF, (Rear)

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1 Dec 1965

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 3dMarDiv ltr 3:VTB:vb over 3060.2 Ser 00147-65
of 28 November 1965

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Commander's Readiness Report for 3d Quarter, FY 66

1. Forwarded.

2. This sheet becomes unclassified upon removal of the basic letter.

E. H. Simmons
E. H. SIMMONS

By direction

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96601

Copy 1 of 12 copies
3:VTB:vb
3060.2
Ser. No. 00147-65
28 Nov 65

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Quarterly Commander's Readiness Report for 3d Quarter, FY 66

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPACO 3000.4A

Encl: (1) Subject-report

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the 3d Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

2. Upon removal of Enclosure (1), this letter may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

L. W. WALT
L. W. WALT

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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DECLASSIFIED

SECRET28 Nov 1965
Ser. No. 00147-653D MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF
QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 3D QUARTER FY 66PART I: EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

A. With the exception of the 3d 155 Gun Battery, all subordinate units of the 3d Marine Division are combat ready. The Division's combat readiness is tested daily in actions against the VC. Division units repeatedly show aggressiveness and professional competence, demonstrating their ability to locate, engage, and destroy the VC. Local weather and terrain conditions continue to have a deleterious effect on all items of equipment. Maintenance and repair of equipment has been a major problem which is being overcome through diligent and vigorous efforts at all echelons.

PART II: EVALUATION OF UNITS

A. Although the 3d 155 Gun Battery is currently in C4 (not Combat Ready), it is anticipated that it will attain C1 (fully Combat Ready) status by the end of the 3d Quarter FY 66. Excessive tube wear is the primary reason five of the Battery's six guns are deadlined. The Battery can attain C1 status within 24 hours after the arrival of new tube assemblies which have been requisitioned and for which air shipment was requested.

PART III: EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

A. There are no current contingency plans effective other than those directly related to the current combat mission of the Division.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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ENCLOSURE (3)

FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING:
COMMANDER'S QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS REPORT,
3D QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 1966 (U)

NOT ENCLOSED. WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY
WHEN RECEIVED THIS HC. *Added. 52C 286 735*

ENCLOSURE (3)

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0035 66

7 JAN 1966

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1st MAW ltr 3:JRC:dc over 3000,
Serial 00518-65 of 3Dec65

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03H)

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report
(Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for the Third Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) FMFPac's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report
for the 3d Qtr FY 66

1. Readdressed and forwarded. The basic document did not arrive at this Headquarters in time to be included in reference (a).

2. Daily combat and combat service support provided by the 1st MAW in RVN attest to the Wing's combat readiness.

3. This Headquarters is cognizant of the personnel and equipment problems causing a reduction in combat readiness of the Wing support units listed in the basic correspondence. Appropriate action has been taken to reduce these deficiencies.



V. H. KRULAK

286 706

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Enclosure (3)

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17 DEC 1965


#0048865

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1st MAW ltr 3:JRC:dc over 3000 Ser 00518-65 of
3 Dec 65

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 66 (U)

1. Forwarded, concurring with the comments and recommendations of the
CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is fully
capable of effectively continuing combat operations.


L.W. WALT

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96601

3:JRC:dc
3000
Ser: 00518-65
3 December 1965

SECRET
SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 66 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPac O 3000.4

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), the following comments pertaining to the combat readiness of this Command are submitted:

PART I: The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is engaged in combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam and is capable of continuing these operations.

PART II:

a. MACS-6 - The Okinawa based squadron is considered to be marginally combat ready. The following items are required in operable condition, to attain combat ready status: Two PU-344 generators, four PU-608 generators, one UPS-1B and one TRD-12 direction finder.

b. MACS-7 - Although combat ready, the full accomplishment of the squadron's combat mission is hampered by the continuing problems with generators (23 deadlined), and the non-operational status of the AN/TPS-34 radar. Both problem areas are primarily due to the lack of parts.

c. MABS-13 - The squadrons combat readiness is marginal due to personnel shortages in MATCU-66, TAFDS and LOX sections, a shortage of crash vehicles, and the lack of a Morest Unit.

d. MMSG-17 - The continuing requirement to manage and operate MCAS Iwakuni and MCAF Futema with 1st MAF resources precludes the deployment of MMSG-17 units to RVN.

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DOD DIR 5200.10

Keith B. McCutcheon
KEITH B. Mc CUTCHEON

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CO, 1st MAF (Rear)
CTF 79

1st MAF S&C No. Copy No.
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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac
MCAS, El Toro, Santa Ana, Calif. 92709

3:KBN:lad
Ser: 003A33065
26NOV1965
Copy 1 of 12 Copies

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for Third Quarter Fiscal Year 1966 (U) (RS-MC 3100-4)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted.

a. Part I

(1) The 3d MAW has an estimated combat readiness of 60%. The accelerated rotation of units, the increased number of individual replacements to WestPac, in addition to forming and training squadrons, cadres, detachments and individual replacements, reflects adversely on unit as well as overall Wing Readiness posture.

b. Part II

(1) MHTG: Activation target date Dec 1965. Limited training capability until approximately April 1966.

(2) MATCU-70: Activation target date Dec 1965. Limited capability until April 1966 dependent on equipment/personnel input.

(3) VMCJ-3: Phase I training until approximately February 1966, due to deployment of cadre to WestPac Nov65 and transition to the RF-4B type aircraft.

(4) VNF-334: Phase I training due to transition from F-8C to F-4B type aircraft during January 1966.

(5) HMM-165: Phase I training until approximately 1 April 1966 due mainly to limited trained personnel.

(6) HMH-463: Scheduled activation March 1966 with the CH-53A type aircraft.

ENCLOSURE 41

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(7) MAG-15 (H&MS-15, MABS-15 and VMA-121): Scheduled to deploy to WestPac during March 1966. H&MS-15 and MABS-15 in C-4 Training. C-3 January 1966. VMA-121 in C-3 Training, C-2 January 1966. MABS-15 C-4 Personnel, C-3 May 1966.

(8) HMM-462: Estimate only 30% Combat ready. This unit has 5 OH-37C and 5 UH-34 type aircraft on board with negligible support equipment/personnel available. Not expected to increase appreciably in combat readiness during this reporting period.

c. Part III

(1) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 71-Yr. Capability to support this plan will continue to be limited due to KC-130F augmentation to 1st MAF for an indefinite period.

- (2) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25-Yr
 FMFPAC OPLAN 27-Yr
 FMFPAC OPLAN 32-Yr
 SFF OPLAN 6-Yr
 CRSFF OPLAN 4-Yr

Overall 3d MAF capability has been reduced by the deployment of entire Helo MAG, 4 VF/VA, and 1 VMO to WESTPAC.

- (3) FMFPAC OPLAN 82-Yr
 LFA (TG 125.3) OPLAN 136-Yr

Capability to provide VMA support remains limited to one marginally combat ready squadron, due to scheduled deployment of an additional VMA to WESTPAC.

- (4) 5th MEB OPLAN 316-Yr

HMM-164 (C-2 Readiness Category) is the only helicopter squadron available for this commitment. The VMO capability is negligible at this time.

F. E. J. K.

F. E. J. K.

Copy to:
 CG FMFPAC (Orig + 9)

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FORCE TROOPS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA 92278

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SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3/RWT/cmt

3500

Ser: 0034 65

26 NOV 1965

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966
(Report Symbol MC 3100-4, (U))
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPACO 3000.4A

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

a. Part I. Evaluation of the Command. This command is considered capable of providing combat support and combat service support units in the support of Fleet Marine Forces as directed.

b. Part II. Evaluation of Units. The Seventh Communication Battalion will be ineffective during this period due to the reconstitution of Communication Company on 12 November 1965 without personnel or equipment and deployment of the Construction Platoon, Radio Relay and Construction Company. Due to this deployment, the wire capability of the battalion will be lost since most of the wiremen in the battalion were used to bring the Construction Platoon to deployable strength. These limitations will exist until such time as equipment is received and personnel are trained for Communication Company and Construction Platoon, Radio Relay and Construction Company. There is adequate known input within the quarter to provide for shortages of personnel in Seventh Communication Battalion. However, sufficient training cannot be completed within the quarter to reduce this deficiency. Allowance of equipment to reconstitute Communication Company has been requisitioned, however, the estimated date of receipt is unknown. All other units of this command will be effective during this period.

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c. Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments. This command is capable of executing all assigned missions in current contingency plans on a reduced basis. The capabilities of this command have been reduced to the extent that operational control has been relinquished for those elements deployed to WESTPAC. The residual ability to provide earmarked forces is hampered by shortages of deployable personnel.

William K Jones
WILLIAM K. JONES

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco 96601

3/wlr
3000
Ser: 0033-65
3 December 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
Subj: Commander's Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness,
3d Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 (U)
Ref: (a) FMFPacO 3000.4
(b) COMNAVAIRPAC msg 200035Z Nov 65
(c) CMC msg 261820Z Nov 65
(d) CG, FMFPac ltr Ser: 00783-64 of 16 Nov 64
(e) CG, FMFPac ltr Ser: 0113-64 of 29 Feb 64

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following report is submitted for the third quarter fiscal year 1966.

PART I - Evaluation of Command. Due to the nature of the contingency plans which the First Marine Brigade would be called upon to support, individual unit's combat readiness should be examined rather than the Brigade as a entity.

PART II - Evaluation of Units

a. VMF(AW)-212. This squadron is presently OPCON to CAW-16. The squadron is scheduled to return to Hawaii on 10 December 1965, after completing a nine (9) month deployment to WESTPAC. A large percentage of the personnel will be transferred upon return from WESTPAC with few replacements available. Reference (b) requested that the F8E aircraft presently assigned VMF(AW)-212 be replaced by F8D's upon return of the squadron. Reference (b) estimated that VMF(AW)-212 will receive all replacement F8D aircraft by the end of the third quarter fiscal year 1966. Reference (c) has approved the request contained in reference (b). Considering these two factors, personnel and aircraft availability, VMF(AW)-212 will not be capable of accomplishing any combat mission during the third quarter FY 1966.

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Ser: 0033-65

b. VMF(AW)-232. This squadron is marginally combat ready due to the personnel losses in November 1965 and projected personnel losses for December 1965. Overall combat readiness stands at seventy (70) percent. This figure is an accurate representation, considering current pilot and enlisted training readiness. Any further loss of personnel will derogate training capabilities and lower overall combat readiness. Given a stable manning level, this squadron will be able to become combat ready.

c. MACS-2. This squadron is also "marginally combat ready". Critical personnel shortages continue to exist in the enlisted fields of Engineer Maintenance (50% of T/O), Radar Repair (68% of T/O), Supply (47% of T/O), Wiremen/Telephone Repair (40% of T/O) and Radio Repair (0% of T/O). These shortages have resulted in excessive "down time" of equipment. Despite the aforementioned personnel shortages the squadron has been able to maintain a high level of training and proficiency. The close proximity of an All-Weather Fighter Squadron and excellent local training areas have allowed the squadron to develop intercept techniques to a high level. In addition, the squadron participates in the weekly Hawaiian Air Defense Exercise and has had an opportunity to work under the same Air Force/Marine Air Defense structure currently employed in Vietnam. This squadron is well trained and well equipped. With the addition of trained personnel to bring the unit to Manning Level, MACS-2 would be capable of accomplishing assigned missions.

d. MATCU-62. MATCU-62 is currently not combat ready due to personnel shortages. The unit strength is 54% of T/O. All of the personnel on hand are well trained. The unit currently is transitioning from the AN/CPN-4A Radar system to the AN/TSQ-18 system. The new equipment detracts from the combat readiness of MATCU-62 due to a shortage of repair parts and the lack of a clearly defined supply policy for procurement of initial stock of repair parts. MATCU-62 is not capable of supporting any assigned mission during the third quarter 1966.

e. Service Battalion. This unit is essentially the Service Company of the Service Battalion of the First Marine Brigade. On 25 May 1965, the Service Battalion Rear was redesignated as Service Battalion. The personnel

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3/wlr

Ser: 0033-65

strength is (1) officer and forty-one (41) enlisted. Battalion Landing Team 1/5 has temporarily augmented the unit with one (1) officer and forty-one (41) enlisted from their detachment of First Service Battalion. The present mission of Service Battalion is two fold; to maintain a Fleet Stock Account at Pearl City, Hawaii and to operate a Field Maintenance Facility with a 3d and 4th echelon maintenance capability at MCAS, Kaneohe. Service Battalion is able to perform this first mission, but can perform only limited 3d and 4th echelon maintenance on all items of equipment. The major reason for the ability to perform only limited support in garrison is due to the lack of an approved T/E. Upon the removal of the augmented personnel of the Battalion Landing Team, the proposed T/O of one (1) officer and eighteen (18) enlisted for the Field Maintenance Section of Service Battalion is inadequate to perform maintenance support in the field. This unit is not organized or equipped to perform a combat mission in the field.

PART III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. Since deployment of the original RLT/MAG units from the First Marine Brigade, mission assignments as set forth in reference (b) are not considered compatible with the current Brigade organization.

b. The forces required by reference (c) can be provided during this period in so far as they do not exceed one (1) BLT, one (1) VMF(AW) squadron and one (1) MACS squadron subject to the limitations described in PART II above.

c. JTF-119 OPLAN 1-61.

(1) Description. This CINCPac (JTF) plan provides for all Navy/Marine Units with an air defense capability to assist in the Air Defense of Hawaii. This plan calls for MACS-2 to augment the 326th Air Division radar surveillance and weapons control capability.

(2) Capability. MACS-2 is capable of carrying out its combat assignment in support of this OPLAN. From their site on ULUPAU CRATER they have excellent radar coverage as well as all of the necessary communications. Once a quarter, MACS-2 participates in a

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Ser: 0033-65

full JTF-119 Air Defense Exercise to test the capabilities of the system.

d. 326th Air Division OPLAN 1-66

(1) Description. This OPLAN supports PACAF OPLAN 1-65 and covers the Air Defense of Hawaii. MACS-2 is listed within the plan as an augmentation unit. The procedures used within this plan are compatible with the JTF-119 OPLAN 1-61.

(2) Capabilities. MACS-2 is capable of carrying out its assigned combat mission in support of this plan. The radio frequencies used by MACS-2 have been included in the overall air defense communications plan and the Air Force has provided the necessary wire communications to fully integrate the squadron into the 326th Air Division. Once a week the squadron participates in an Air Force Air Defense Exercise to develop the necessary coordination procedures. In addition, once a month MACS-2 participates in a full Division Air Defense Exercise.


R. H. SEANJER

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4/HJF/jkc
00221-65
23 NOV 1965

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
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st FSR, FMF, Camp Pendleton ltr 8/BGM/elg Ser:
0017-65 of 19 Nov 65

From: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton,
California

To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter, FY 1966

1. Forwarded.
2. This endorsement may be declassified upon removal of the basic correspondence.


R. E. CUSHMAN

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Headquarters
1ST FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, FMP
Camp Pendleton, California 92055

8/BGM/elg
Ser: 0017-65
19 Nov 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter, FY 1966

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) CG FMFPac GWP 1-64
(d) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 82-62
(e) FMFPac OPLAN 27-63
(f) FMFPac OPLAN 32-62
(g) 1st MarDiv OPLAN 303/304-64

84C FILES - 1ST FSR

Control No.	
65-2325	
Copy No.	1
of	16 Copies

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

a. Part I. Evaluation of Command

First Force Service Regiment is severely limited in support that can be provided with less than Reduced Strength T/O personnel and T/E equipment available. These personnel and equipment were deployed in May and August 1965 in support of an RLT and a MEB. Because of these deployments, some units are ineffective and some are marginally effective.

b. Part II. Evaluation of Units

This organization's three battalions - Maintenance, Supply and Headquarters and Service - will be virtually ineffective during this reporting period, but can provide limited support for remaining Division and Force units.

These battalions cannot perform their assigned combat missions by deploying in support of a Division/Wing size operation primarily due to shortages of personnel, shortages of personnel in critical MOS's, and lack of equipment provided to deploying units.

Remedial action wherever possible is being taken to train personnel, reorganize and realign certain functions to improve efficiency and to provide maximum support possible.

c. Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments

References (c) and (d) are not held by 1st FSR, copies that were available to Force Service Regiment through the 1st Marine Division are no longer at Camp Pendleton. The support required from 1st Force

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8/BGM/elg
Ser: 0017-65

Service Regiment by references (e), (f) and (g) cannot be met. The reasons are those mentioned in Parts I and II. Support can be provided for a BLT with limited augmentation of skilled personnel and equipment.

J. E. Garner
J. E. GARNER

DISTRIBUTION: CG FMFPac (10)
CG 1st MarDiv (1)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Camp H. M. Smith, U. S. Marine Corps
FPO San Francisco 96610

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

3/1nw
5213
Ser: 021-65
4 DEC 1965


From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness (U)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In compliance with instructions contained in references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted:

PART I

This Headquarters has sufficient personnel who are adequately trained to support either a MAF or MAC Headquarters if deployed by Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

In addition, this Headquarters is prepared to provide basic logistic support for a MAF/MAC Headquarters to accomplish the logistic missions currently assigned.


W. D. KELLY
Executive Officer

RECORDED 181

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1ST AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY
Fleet Marine Force
FPO, San Francisco, 96601

Ser: 097-65
GMW:cjl
5213/3500
1 Dec 65

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: The Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3d Qtr, FY66 is a report prepared and submitted in the last month of 2d Qtr, FY66. The 3d Qtr, FY66 is the reporting period covered in this report.

Ref: (a) FMFPacO 3000.4A
(b) MCO 3000.2A

Encl: (1) Listing of effective operation plans

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the Quarterly Combat Readiness Report is submitted.

2. PART I - Evaluation of the Command

- a. Current on board personnel strength reflects the following manning level of 100% T/O strength.

Naval Aviators - 18 for 78% of 23
Marine Ground MOS 0840 - 8 for 114% of 7
Marine Ground other MOS's - 4 for 100% of 4
Navy Line Officers - 11 for 110% of 10
Marine Enlisted - 321 for 102% of 313

b. There are currently sufficient officers and enlisted personnel assigned to provide the necessary control and liaison agencies for an Army ROAD Division Headquarters, three Infantry Brigade Headquarters, seven Battalion TACP's and six Battalion SFCP's.

c. There are sufficient parachute qualified personnel to provide one Brigade Naval Gunfire Liaison Team, one Brigade Air Liaison Team, two Battalion SFCP's and two Battalion TACP's.

d. There are presently deployed to RVN two Battalion SFCP's plus five officers and one spot team, one Beacon team and a Headquarters Element.

ENCLOSURE (9)

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Ser: 097-65

GMW:cjl

5213/3500

1 Dec 65

3. PART II - Evaluation of Units

a. It is considered that all personnel currently assigned are sufficiently trained for immediate combat operations.

4. PART III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. Enclosure (1) lists those Operational Plans currently showing this command as a participating unit.

b. With the return of all detachments indicated in 2d above, this command will be capable of supporting all contingencies within the limits stipulated in 2b above.



C. B. BURCH
Acting

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Ser: 097-65

GMW:cjl

5213/3500

1 Dec 65

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Listing of those operations plans currently held or known to indicate
1ST ANGLICO, FMF participation:

CINCPACFLT General War Plan 1-64
CG, FMFPac General War Plan 1-64
CINCPAC OPLAN 23-64 & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 27-63 & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XI L & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XI T & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XI RVN & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XII & IV & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 & Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 99-64 & Supporting Plans thereto
TF 79 OPLAN 104-64
SEATO FF 4/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
SEATO FF 5/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
SEATO FF 6/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
SEATO FF 7/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
Task Force ALFA 5/61

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (1)

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~~SECRET~~

FIRST RADIO BATTALION
Fleet Marine Force, FPO
San Francisco 96601

copy 1 of 10 copies
3:RWR:jsr
3001
Ser: 00150-65
NOV 29 1965

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for
3rd Quarter FY66
Ref: (a) FMFPACO 3000.4A
(b) My ltr report 3:RWR:jsr Ser 00150-65 of 1 September 1965 (Report
Symbol MC 3100-4)
(c) My ltr 4:LR:bm 3000 of 24 September 1965

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a). The third
quarter Fiscal Year 1966 is the period covered by this report.

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

A. This command is still considered to be marginally combat ready
to fully execute its assigned mission. The marginal qualification is based
solely on equipment deficiencies (generator PU-535A/G), and assumes no
relief from non-organic resources. This deficiency was reported earlier
by reference (b) as detracting from the combat readiness of this command.
My REDOP's 009/011/012 and 013 have also reiterated this deficiency.

B. The following actions have been taken since reference (b) was
submitted:

(1) On 9 September 1965 this command received a quantity of nine
newly modified generators PU-535A/G from MCSC Barstow. The generators
were immediately tested and evaluated for operational effectiveness. The
generators proved to be still unsatisfactory to power the equipment for
which they are intended: the Special Communications Central AN/MS-43 and
Electronic Intercept Facility AN/TSQ-46. Reference (c) reported this
fact to CMC via CG, FMFPAC.

(2) CMC's message 022023Z Nov stated that reported generator
instability may result from other than generator defects, and authorized
an increase in PU-535A/G allowance by a 2 for 1 factor as an interim
solution pending completion of evaluation.

DO NOT CLASSIFY FOR 1 YEAR
INTERVALS, PERIODICALLY AND AFTER
12 YEARS. IF NOT DECLASSIFIED

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Ser: 00150-65

(3) CG, FMFPAC's message 132314Z Nov recommended that requisitioning of increased generator allowance be held in abeyance pending a complete evaluation and resolution of the instability problem.

(4) To date the generator deficiency has not been solved, and this command remains marginally combat ready.

PART II - EVALUATION OF UNITS

Without non-organic generator power support, the ELINT platoon of Operations Company and the Special Security Communications platoon of H & S Company are considered incapable of fully accomplishing their missions in the event of total Radio Battalion commitment to combat support operations. (See Part I)

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

Plan

Readiness

CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 37
SEF OPLAN 5
SEF OPLAN 6
SEF OPLAN 7
CRSEF OPLAN 4

The command is considered prepared to support the requirements of these plans, except Phase III/IV of CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32.

CINCPACFLT GWP
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 27
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 38
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 39

The command is not considered ready to support the maximum requirements of these plans. (See Part I)

R. M. Stewart
R. M. STEWART

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, 96601

IN REPLY REFER TO:

30P/nmr

004 91 66

28 MAR 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03H)

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report
(Report Symbol, MC 3100-4) for the Fourth Quarter
Fiscal Year 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A

- Encl: (1) CG, First Marine Division (Rein) ltr 3:OP:smr
over 3480, Serial 0047-66 of 23 Feb 1966
(2) CG, Third Marine Division (Rein) ltr
(will be forwarded separately)
(3) CG, First Marine Aircraft Wing ltr 3:RGH:ceg
over 3000, Serial 003E5766 of 26 Feb 1966
(4) CG, Third Marine Aircraft Wing ltr 3:WBH:rll
over 3000, Serial 003A04666 of 24 Feb 1966
(5) CG, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
ltr 3/DCM/eef over 3500/1, Serial 0013/66 of
28 Feb 1966
(6) CO, First Marine Brigade ltr 3/eph over 3000,
Serial 0013-66 of 1 March 1966
(7) CO, First Radio Battalion, Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific ltr 3:JBP:jsr over 3001, Serial 0024-66
of 1 March 1966
(8) CO, First ANGLICO, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
ltr BGS:cjl over 5213/3500, Serial 018-66 of
7 March 1966
(9) CO, Headquarters and Service Battalion, Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific ltr 3/jhp over 5213,
Serial 04-66 of 17 Feb 1966
(10) CO, First Force Service Regiment ltr 8/BGM/dmc,
Serial 04-66 of 21 Feb 1966

1. The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the Fourth
Quarter, Fiscal year 1966 is submitted in accordance with
reference (a).

DOWNGRADED AT 8 YEAR
INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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2. Summary Statement.

a. FMFPac air and ground units committed in WestPac continue to demonstrate their combat effectiveness by their daily execution of combat, and combat support missions.

b. The combat readiness of some individual FMFPac units in MidPac and EastPac is adversely affected by shortages of personnel, equipment, and training. Units recently rotated, and those units recently activated, will continue to operate at reduced combat readiness during the Fourth Quarter.

3. The combat readiness as reported by individual FMFPac units is described in detail in enclosure (1) through (10). Comments on significant items reported are as follows:

a. First Marine Division.

(1) During the Fourth Quarter, the Division will be operating in South Vietnam with at least six of its organic battalions. Division units not in Vietnam will be deployed to Okinawa. All Division units in Vietnam and on Okinawa are considered to be combat ready, with the exception of BLT 3/5, whose training readiness will be marginal until late April.

b. Third Marine Division.

(1) The successful execution of eight combat operations of battalion size and larger, plus 23375 smaller unit operations since the first of January 1966, is evidence of the combat readiness of all Division units. The increase in large scale operations during the Third Quarter, plus an additional increase in operations during the Fourth Quarter, will require an intensive and continuous maintenance and repair program.

(2) This evaluation is based on a readiness report submitted by message. A letter reporting the Division's combat readiness was mailed to this headquarters 19 March but has not arrived. The letter report, and appropriate comments if required, will be mailed separately when received by this headquarters.

c. First Marine Aircraft Wing.

290 326

(1) The successful execution of combat air support for ARVN and other Free World Forces in Vietnam, in addition to providing close air support to III MAF units, identifies the Wing as being combat ready.

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(2) First and Second LAAM Battalions are experiencing minor reduction in combat readiness resulting from deadlined items of ground support equipment, generators and motor transport.

(a) A representative from FMFPac Supply Office made a staff visit to Barstow with a complete obligation listing of outstanding documents submitted by the LAAM Battalions. These obligations were screened against the Barstow stock balance cards to determine if any items listed were available. Out of the 415 obligations screened 343 items were found available and are being shipped directly to the LAAM Battalions. The remaining 72 items are being upgraded to an O2 priority and Barstow is taking action to follow through on procurement.

(3) Wing units providing support from Iwakuni, Japan are still experiencing a shortage of personnel in critical MOS fields. The shortage in special items of equipment, plus the requirement to manage and operate MCAS, Iwakuni and MCAS Futema reduces the deployment capability of MWSG-17. However, this condition is expected to be alleviated in the Fourth Quarter with the activation of H&HS Iwakuni and Futema.

(a) With the organization of the Ninth MAB and a reorganization of all Wing units out-of-country, the personnel situation of MABS-13 should improve materially during the Fourth Quarter.

d. Third Marine Aircraft Wing.

(1) The training and support squadrons formed during the Third Quarter will remain in a reduced readiness category until sufficient personnel and support equipment are received. Those units scheduled for activation (HMH-463, HMMT-301, MATCU-70, MATCU-75, MATCU-77) during the Fourth Quarter will have only limited combat capability during the reporting period. Movement of units and individual replacements to WestPac will further reduce the combat readiness of the Third Marine Aircraft Wing during the Fourth Quarter.

(2) The personnel situation does not reflect a serious or critical personnel situation except in isolated MOS's. Serious shortages exist in MOS's 6422, 6418 and in the area of helicopter instructor-pilots. Shortages in MATCU-65 have been reported to CMC on the monthly personnel status reports.

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(3) The supply problems for the newer MATCU equipment are well known to HQMC and have been the subject of several conferences. This problem area is not expected to be reduced significantly during the reporting period.

e. Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

(1) Deployment of major units to WestPac has significantly reduced the capability of Force Troops to provide the prescribed units in the support of current contingency plans. However, the remaining elements of Force Troops are evaluated as capable of providing the combat support and combat service support required by FMFPac units.

f. First Marine Brigade.

(1) Although VMF(AW)-212 is not combat ready at this time, the anticipated arrival of the remaining three F8-D aircraft during the Third Quarter should materially improve the training readiness of the squadron during the reporting period. Funds for the reported deficiencies in Class II, Class IIA, and Mount-Out supplies have been included in the unit's Fourth Quarter FY66 budget.

(2) Planned personnel inputs to VMF(AW)-232 should bring the squadron to deployment M/L by 1 July 1966.

(3) The operational readiness of MACS-2 and MATCU-62 continues to be affected by personnel shortages. Neither unit can perform its assigned mission on a 24 hour basis.

(a) MACS-2 is experiencing critical shortages in personnel in the hard skill MOS's such as Engineer Maintenance, Radar Maintenance, Radio Maintenance, and Wire/Telephone Maintenance. Shortages are also reflected in the basic supply MOS's of 3041, 3051 and 3071. These personnel shortages are seriously affecting the maintenance of equipment necessary for operations and training.

(b) The transition of MATCU-62 from the AN/CPN-4A radar system to the AN/TSQ-18 systems continues; but, it is not anticipated that the AN/TSQ-18 system will become operational during the Fourth Quarter. The shortages of spare parts for this radar system, a subject addressed in the last quarterly report, continues to cause delay in transitioning from the AN/CPN-4A radar.

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g. First Force Service Regiment.


(1) The task of supporting a MEB has been deleted from the mission of the FSR elements remaining in EastPac. The mission now includes providing support to the Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton as well as support for the newly activated FMFPac units.

4. During the forthcoming Quarter, particular command emphasis will be directed towards:

a. Continued improvement in the quality of logistical support for FMFPac units in WestPac.

b. Readiness for deployment of the newly activated units assigned to FMFPac.

c. Inculcating all levels of command with an awareness of the problems to be encountered in the environment of Vietnam and with the need for local resolution of these problems, wherever feasible. In this regard, language training will be stressed, with increased emphasis on developing a complete understanding of the civic action programs for units in country, as well as for those units scheduled for deployment. Supply and maintenance discipline will continue to be stressed.



V. H. KRULAK

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66 1909

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

3:OP:smr
3480
Ser: 0047-66
23 Feb 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. The Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966, is a report prepared and submitted in the second month of the 3rd Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 covering the forthcoming quarter. A projection of the operational readiness of the Division during this time frame is predicated on the following assumptions:

a. That the Division Headquarters and separate battalion headquarters currently "on-island" will deploy to the Republic of Vietnam in March 1966 as scheduled.

b. That units presently committed in-country to be assigned this Command are fully combat ready.

2. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is hereby submitted:

PART I - Evaluation of the Command

The 1st Marine Division deploys to RVN in mid-March 1966 and will assume command of units previously committed in-country. This Headquarters and the headquarters of each separate battalion scheduled for deployment are fully prepared to assume command of in-country forces and accomplish any mission assigned by higher authority.

PART II - Evaluation of Units

All subordinate units of this Command are considered to be combat ready

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(Enclosure (1))

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during the forthcoming quarter. See paragraph 1.b. above.

PART III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments.

Not applicable for in-country forces.


LEWIS J. FIELDS

62:01 MW 62 054 98.

DECLASSIFIED

THIRD MARINE DIVISION
COMMANDER'S QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS,
REPORT

4TH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 1966 (U)

NOT ENCLOSED. WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY
WHEN RECEIVED THIS HQ.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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Copy 1 of 19 Copies
3/jfc
Ser: **0024466**
7 March 1966

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1st MAW ltr 3:RGH:ceg over 3000 Ser: 003B5766
of 26Feb66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 66 (U)

1. Forwarded.

2. This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal from basic document.


KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON

SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

SECRET

1st MAW S&C No.	Copy No.
881-66	1

3:RGI:ceg
2000
Ser: 003B5766
26 February 1966

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commanding General's Combat Readiness Report, Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 66 (U)

Ref: (a) FMF 2000.2A
(b) FMF 2000.4A
(c) CG FMF 171520Z Redops NR 10 as of 162400Z FEB 66 (MCTAI)
(d) CG FMF 200301Z Redops NR 12 as of 181500Z FEB 66 (MCTAI)

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), the following comments pertaining to the combat readiness of this Command are submitted:

PART I: The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is engaged in combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam and is capable of continuing these operations.

PART II:

a. It is anticipated that MACS-7 will be fully capable of accomplishing its control mission by the commencement of the 4th Quarter FY 66. The problems with generators and the AN/TPS-34 radome have been alleviated considerably since the last reporting period.

b. The First and Second LAAM Battalions are considered to be marginally combat ready. Deadlined items of equipment due to lack of adequate supply system responsiveness include ground support equipment, generators and motor transport. Logistics problems are amplified in greater detail by references (c) and (d).

c. MABS-13 is considered marginally combat ready due to shortages of personnel, crash vehicles and 60 cycle generators.

d. MWSC-17 is still unable to deploy with the requirement of managing and operating MCAS Iwakuni. The program of forming MCAS Iwakuni as a separate organization from MWSC-17 will alleviate this situation.

CONTINUED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
003 BIR 020010

Keith B. McCutcheon

KEITH B. McCUTCHEON

Copy to:
CG, 1st MAW (Rear)
CTF 79

CTF 79 07 23 0173
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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Enclosure (3)

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66 1867

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac
MCAS, El Toro, Santa Ana, Calif. 92709

3:WBH:rl1
3000
Ser: 003A04666
24 FEB 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 1966 (U) (RS MC 3100-4)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A
(c) CMC ltr AAP-2C-rc Ser 00803565 of 15Jun65 (Marine Corps Aviation Program Document)

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

a. PART I

(1) The 3d MAW remains at an estimated combat readiness of 60%. The rotation of units and individual replacements to WestPac, and formation of training squadrons, cadres and detachments restricts any improvement of overall Wing readiness.

b. PART II

(1) MHTG-30 and H&MS-30: Formed on 20 January 1966. These units will have a limited training and support capability until sufficient personnel and support equipment are received.

(2) HMH-463: Scheduled to form on 1 March 1966 with CH-53A type aircraft. Phase I training until approximately September 1966.

(3) HMT-301: Tentatively scheduled to form during April 1966 with UH-34 type aircraft.

(a) Anticipate this unit will be limited in training capability by insufficient aircraft availability, ground support equipment and personnel.

(4) HMH-462: Not capable of accomplishing its assigned mission as a heavy helicopter squadron, due to limited aircraft and personnel. This unit is conducting limited UH-34 rotational pilot training in addition to providing trained personnel for the formation of MHTG-30 units and HMH-463.

3d MAF S & C FILES

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Enclosure (4)

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Ser: 003A04666

(5) HMM-165: Anticipate limited flight training time. No significant increase in combat capability during this period due to deployment of HMM-164 with critical items of ground support equipment. These shortages have been reported and are under the cognizance of higher headquarters. **24 FEB 1966**

NOTE: Anticipate this command will have no medium or heavy helicopter unit combat capable during this reporting period due to the deployment of HMM-164 and limited trained personnel, aircraft availability, and support equipment available this command.

(6) MATCU-65: Estimate only 20% combat ready. This unit has the following shortages which are resulting in low combat readiness status:

(a) Received AN/TSA-13 portable tower less spare parts. ESO to issue parts as soon as possible.

(b) Approximately 5-10% spare parts on hand for AN/TPN-8.

(c) No spare parts on hand for two (2) PU-239.

(d) Only 59% of enlisted personnel assigned, with four critical MOS's shown as follows:

	T/O	O/H	
5951	6	4	(1 SSgt on Orders April)
6713	13	5	(1 Cpl on Orders March)
6715	12	4	
3071	1	0	

(7) MATCU-70: Originally programmed to form during Dec 65, has been delayed indefinitely.

(8) MATCU-75 and MATCU-77: Reference (c) programmed these units to form during the fourth quarter. Slippage is anticipated in forming dates because of personnel and equipment shortages. In the event forming date becomes a reality these units would have no capability during this reporting period.

(9) MAG-15 (H&MS-15, MABS-15 and VMA-121): Tentatively scheduled to deploy to WestPac during June 1966. This will leave the 3d MAF with no VMA training capability.

c. PART III

(1) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 71-yr. Capability to support this plan will continue to be limited due to KC-130F support of III MAF for an indefinite period.

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24 FEB 1966

- (2) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25-yr
FMFPAC OPLAN 27-yr
FMFPAC OPLAN 32-yr
SFF OPLAN 6-yr
CRSFF OPLAN 4-yr


Overall 3d MAF capability has been reduced by the deployment of entire Helo MAG, 4 VF/VA, and 1 VMO to WestPac.

- (3) FMFPAC OPLAN 82-yr
LFA (TG 125.3) OPLAN 136-yr

Present capability is only one (1) VMA squadron, which will terminate with expected deployment of VMA-121 with MAG-15, scheduled for June 1966.

- (4) 5th MEB OPLAN 316-yr

HMM-165 (C-4 Readiness Category) is the only helicopter squadron available for this commitment. The VMO capability is negligible at this time.




F. E. IKEN

Copy to:
CG FMFPAC (Orig & 9)

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66 2028



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FORCE TROOPS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA 92278

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3/DCM/eef

3500/1

Ser: 0013/66

28Feb66

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966
(Report Symbol MC 3100-4) (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted:

a. Part I. Evaluation of the Command. The remaining elements of this command are considered capable of providing combat support and combat service support units in the support of Fleet Marine Forces as directed.

b. Part II. Evaluation of Units. Although the Seventh Communication Battalion will be at manning level and capable of performing its normal combat assignment, the MOS and rank distribution and the shortage of school trained and experienced supervisory personnel will reduce the effectiveness of its mission. All other units of this command will be effective during this period.

c. Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments. Recent deployments of units of this command to WESTPAC with relinquishment of their operational control have significantly reduced the capability to provide prescribed units in the support of current contingency plans. In addition, the ability to provide personnel to fill staff line billet requirements for 5th MEB, 7th MEB, SFF 5/62, SFF 6/64, SFF 7/64, CRSFF 4/64, COMUSMACHTAI and COMUSSEASIA Operation Plans from residual personnel will be significantly hampered by the shortage of appropriate ranks, MOS's and skill levels remaining within this command.

V. W. BANNING

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ENCLOSURE

66 1997

HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96601

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3000
Ser: 0013-66
1 Mar 1966

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness,
4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A
(c) CG, FMFPac ltr Ser: 000783-64 of 16 Nov 64 64-8806
(d) CG, FMFPac ltr Ser: 0113-64 of 29 Feb 64 64-1502

1. (U) In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted for the fourth quarter, Fiscal Year 1966.

(S) Part I - Evaluation of Command. Due to the nature of the contingency plans which the First Marine Brigade would be called upon to support, individual unit combat readiness should be examined rather than the Brigade as an entity.

Part II - Evaluation of Units

a. (S) VME(AW)-212. This squadron is not combat ready. The unit was on an extended deployment aboard the USS CRISKANY in the Western Pacific until December 1965 and is now in the process of reorganizing. The majority of pilots are in early Phase I training. Upon return from WESTPAC the squadron was assigned F8-D aircraft. Twelve of the assigned fifteen aircraft are on hand and it is anticipated that the three remaining aircraft will arrive during late third quarter Fiscal Year 1966. The unit has significant shortage in Class II and Class IIIA supplies and equipment and is 100% deficient in 30 day mount-out stocks.

b. (S) VME(AW)-232. This squadron is marginally combat ready. Personnel shortages limit the overall combat readiness to seventy (70) per cent. Critical areas are in the 6400 and 6500 field. When the necessary personnel are assigned, this squadron will be fully combat ready in F8-D aircraft. Transition to F8-E aircraft would not materially effect the advancement of the combat readiness of this squadron if the aircraft were received three months prior to any deployment.

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c. (S) MACS-2. The squadron is currently "not combat ready". The squadron cannot perform its primary mission on a 24 hour basis because of critical shortages in personnel. Even though the unit is at 68% of T/O, more critical shortages are reflected in the "hard skill" MOS's such as Engineer Maintenance at 30% of T/O; Radar Maintenance at 55% of T/O; Radio Maintenance at 50% of T/O and Wire/Telephone Maintenance at 50% of T/O. Severe shortages are also reflected in the basic supply MOS's of 3041, 3081, and 3071. Officer strength is critical in the area of MOS 6700 with 43% of T/O on hand. The squadron is maintaining a high degree of training and proficiency with the exception of Engineer Maintenance. The new PU-600 generator electrical system is too complex for the amount of training and schooling the squadron MOS 1341 personnel have received. Training in ECCM capabilities is progressing rapidly. The AN/TPS-22 early warning radar received during 2d quarter FY-66 is not yet operational but the AN/TPS-34 search radar is. In summary, personnel shortages are seriously affecting the maintenance of equipment necessary for operations and training.

d. (S) MATCU-62. This unit is currently "not combat ready" due to personnel shortages. The unit strength is 54% of T/O. All of the personnel within the unit are highly trained and the unit is capable of performing its assigned mission, but not on a 24 hour basis. The unit continues to transition from the AN/CPN-4A radar system to the AN/TSQ-18 system, but the shortages of repair parts continues to delay this transition. During the last quarter the unit received a tentative supply policy for procurement of initial stock of repair parts, however, it is not anticipated that the AN/TSQ-18 system will become operational during the 4th quarter.

e. (S) Service Company. Service Company, Service Battalion is essentially Service Company (-) of the former Service Battalion and is not considered a combat organization. Service Company is performing a primary role of maintaining a Fleet Stock Account at Pearl City, Hawaii and a secondary role of providing a limited 3d and 4th echelon Field Maintenance Facility at MCAS, Kaneohe. The equipment and personnel in this unit are not adequate to perform a combat mission in the field.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. (S) Mission assignments as set forth in reference (c) are not considered compatible with the current Brigade organization.

b. (C) The forces required by reference (d) can be provided in so far as they do not exceed one (1) VMT(AW) squadron and one (1) MACS squadron subject to the limitations described in Part II above.

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c. (S) JTF-119 OPLAN 1-61

(1) Description. This CINCPAC (JTF) plan provides for all Navy/Marine Units with an air defense capability to assist in the Air Defense of Hawaii. This assistance would include fighter aircraft from the two VMF(AW) squadrons and radar surveillance and weapons control by the MACS squadron.

(2) Capability. MACS-2 and VMF(AW)-232 are capable of carrying out their combat assignments in support of this OPLAN. Once a quarter, these units participate in a full JTF-119 Air Defense Exercise to test the capabilities of the system and individual units. VMF(AW)-212 has participated on a limited scale in these exercises. Participation will increase when the squadron completes Phase I training.

d. (S) 326th Air Division OPLAN 1-65

(1) Description. This OPLAN supports PACAF OPLAN 1-65 and covers the air defense of Hawaii. When requested by the Commander, 326th Air Division, the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier will coordinate with the appropriate Naval and Marine Commanders and provide available Naval and Marine ASW and interceptor aircraft.

(2) Capability. (Same as c. (2) above).

R. H. Spanjer
R. H. SPANJER

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66 1390

FIRST RADIO BATTALION
Fleet Marine Force, FPO
San Francisco 96601

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3:JBP:jsr
3001
Ser: 0024-66
1 March 1966

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for
Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 1966

Ref: (a) FMFPACO 3000.4A
(b) My ltr report 3:RWR:jsr over 3001 Ser: 00150-65 of 29 November
1965 (Report Symbol MC 3100-4)

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a). The fourth
quarter, Fiscal Year 1966 is the period covered by this report.

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

A. This command continues to be marginally combat ready to fully
execute its assigned mission. This marginal qualification is based solely
on equipment deficiencies (generator PU-535A/G). This deficiency was
reported earlier by reference (b) and by my REDOP's 014, 015 and 016.

B. The following actions have taken place since reference (b) was
submitted:

(1) CMC's message 271634Z Dec 65 states that extensive tests
conducted by First Radio Battalion to determine probable cause of PU-535A/G
generator problems disclosed that failures were due to faulty detector
and/or gating modules.

(2) First Radio Battalion message 302305Z Dec 65 to CG FMFPAC
requested authorization to cancel requisitions for 19 detector and gating
modules, which had already been proven to be faulty, and resubmit re-
quisitions at such time as the improved modules became available.

(3) CG FMFPAC's message 050336Z Jan granted the authorization
to cancel the requisitions stated in para (2) above.

(4). CG FMFPAC's endorsement 4C/4:JF over 4441/4 of 23 Feb 66
on CO First Radio Battalion ltr 4/DKC/ae over 4400 of 7 Feb 66 (T/E
Recommendations) recommends a special allowance of PU-239 and PU-565

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Enclosure (7)

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Ser: 0024-66

1 March 1966

be established to satisfy power requirements of the MSC-43 and TSQ-46, pending resolution of the PU-535 problem by CMC.

(5) As of this date, the generator deficiency remains unsolved, and this command remains marginally combat ready.

PART II - EVALUATION OF UNITS

Without non-organic generator power, the ELINT Platoon of Operations Company and the Special Security Communications Platoon of Headquarters and Service Company are considered incapable of fully accomplishing their missions in the event of total Radio Battalion commitment to combat support operations (see Part I).

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

Plan


CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 37
SFF OPLAN 5
SFF OPLAN 6
SFF OPLAN 7
CRSFF OPLAN 4

CINCPACFLT GWP
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 27
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 38
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 39

Readiness

The command is now supporting the requirements of these plans, except Phase III/IV of CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32, which we are not considered prepared to support at this time. (See Part I)

The command is not prepared to support the maximum requirements of these plans, due to already being committed in support of plans above and deficiencies stated in Part I.


D. H. MURCH
Acting

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66 2257

1ST AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY
Fleet Marine Force
FPO, San Francisco, 96601

Ser: 018-66
BGS:cjl
5213/3500
7 Mar. 66

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: The Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th Qtr, FY66, is a report prepared and submitted in the last month of the 3rd Qtr, FY66. The 4th Qtr, FY66 is the reporting period covered in this report.

Ref: (a) MCC 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A
(c) FY66 Manning Level, CG, FMFPAC Ltr 1/gff dtd 4 Feb 1966

Encl: (1) Listing of effective operations plans

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), and as directed by reference (b), the Quarterly Combat Readiness Report is submitted.

2. PART I - Evaluation of the Command

- a. Current on board personnel strength reflects the following manning level of 100% T/O strength.

Naval Aviators - 13 for 55% of 23
Marine Ground MOS 0840 - 3 for 43% of 7
Marine Ground other MOS's - 4 for 100% of 4
Navy Line Officers - 3 for 30% of 10
Marine Enlisted - 238 for 76% of 313

- b. Current on board personnel strength reflects the following percentage for the FY66 Manning Level, reference (c).

Naval Aviators - 13 for 81% of 16
Marine Ground MOS 0840 - 3 for 150% of 2
Marine Ground other MOS's - 4 for 100% of 4
*Navy Line Officers - 3 for 30% of 10
Marine Enlisted - 238 for 101% of 234

*No M/L has been published for Navy Line Officers

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(Enclosure (8))

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Ser: 018-66

BGS:cjl

5213/3500

7 Mar 66

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c. There are currently sufficient officers and enlisted personnel assigned to provide the necessary control and liaison agencies for an Army ROAD Division Headquarters, two Infantry Brigade Headquarters, Five Battalion TACP's and Four Battalion SFCP's.

d. There are sufficient parachute qualified personnel to provide four Battalion TACP's and two Battalion SFCP's.

3. PART II - Evaluation of Units

a. It is considered that all personnel currently assigned are sufficiently trained for immediate combat operations.

4. PART III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments


a. Enclosure (1) lists those Operational Plans currently showing this command as a participating unit.

b. This command is capable of supporting all contingencies, however, support of a contingency requiring personnel in excess of those mentioned in 2c will require an increase in the Manning Level contained in reference (c).



O. J. MOREL

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding



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5213/3500

7 Mar 66

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Listing of those operations plans currently held or known to indicate 1ST
 ANGLICO, FMF participation:

CINCPACFLT General War Plan 1-64
 CG, FMFPac General War Plan 1-64
 CINCPAC OPLAN 23-64 & Supporting Plans thereto
 CINCPAC OPLAN 27-63 & Supporting Plans thereto
 CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XI L & Supporting Plans thereto
 CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XI T & Supporting Plans thereto
 CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XI RVN & Supporting Plans thereto
 CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase XII & IV & Supporting Plans thereto
 CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 & Supporting Plans thereto
 CINCPAC OPLAN 99-64 & Supporting Plans thereto
 TF 79 OPLAN 104-64
 SEATO FF 4/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
 SEATO FF 5/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
 SEATO FF 6/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
 SEATO FF 7/64 & Supporting Plans thereto
 Task Force ALFA 5/61
 Base Development Planning, 27 Year Plan

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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66 1585

HEADQUARTERS

Camp H. M. Smith, U. S. Marine Corps
FPO San Francisco 96610

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

3/jhp
5213
Ser: 04-66

17 FEB 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness (U)


Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4

1. In compliance with instructions contained in references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted:

PART I

This Headquarters has sufficient personnel who are adequately trained to support either a MAF or MAC Headquarters if deployed by Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

In addition, this Headquarters is prepared to provide basic logistic support for a MAF/MAC Headquarters to accomplish the logistic missions currently assigned.


A. D. CEREGHINO

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Enclosure (9)

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043-66

2 MAR 1966

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
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st FSR, FMF ltr 8/BGM/dmc Ser: 04-66
of 21 Feb 1966

From: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton,
California 92055

To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, FPO
San Francisco, 96601

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th quarter, FY 1966

1. Forwarded.


W. R. EARNEY
By direction

CONFIDENTIAL

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ORIGINAL

Headquarters
1ST FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, FMF
Camp Pendleton, California, 92055

8/BGM/dmc
Ser: 04-66

21 FEB 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th quarter, FY 1966

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) CG, FMFPac GWP 1-64
(d) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 82-62
(e) FMFPac OPLAN 27-63
(f) FMFPac OPLAN 32-62
(g) 1st MarDiv OPLAN 303/304-64

SEC FILES - 1ST FSR

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1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

a. Part I. Evaluation of Command

First Force Service Regiment is severely limited in support that can be provided with less than Reduced Strength T/O personnel and T/E equipment available. These personnel and equipment were deployed in May and August 1965 in support of an RLT and a MAB. Because of these deployments, some units within 1st FSR are ineffective and some are marginally effective.

b. Part II. Evaluation of Command

This organization's three battalions - Maintenance, Supply and Headquarters and Service - will be virtually ineffective during this reporting period, but can provide limited support for FMF type units.

CG, MCB, CAMPEN
CONTROL NO.
CD 66-376

These battalions cannot perform their assigned combat missions by deploying in support of a Division/Wing size operation primarily due to shortages of personnel, shortages of personnel in critical MOS's, and lack of equipment provided to deploying units.

Remedial actions wherever possible is being taken to train personnel, reorganize and realign certain functions to improve efficiency and to provide maximum support possible. In line with this, a T/O was compiled and submitted on 30 December 1965 to CG, FMFPac containing the minimum number of personnel required in support of a MAB. On 24 January 1966, the T/E status of 1st FSR was submitted to CG, FMFPac with a listing of equipment required to provide complete 3rd and 4th echelon support for a MAB. Personnel on board at present cannot fill this T/O and authorization to requisition the T/E equipment is still pending.

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Ser: 04-66

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c. Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments

References (c) and (d) are not held by 1st FSR; copies that were available to this organization through the 1st Marine Division are no longer available. The support required from 1st FSR by references (e), (f) and (g) cannot be fulfilled. The reasons are those stated in Parts I and II. Essential logistical support for a MAB can be provided with limited input of skilled personnel and the T/E equipment requested by our 24 January letter.


J. E. GARNER

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CG, 1st MarDiv (1)

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