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FMFPAAC: Operations of the III MAF,
Vietnam

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OPERATIONS OF THE III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

VIETNAM

JANUARY 1966

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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This is a summary of activities of the III Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam for the month of January 1966. Its purpose is to update similar reports which covered periods I through VIII, from March through December 1965. The period covered by this report is designated as Period IX.

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SUMMARY

As the northeast monsoon rains decreased during January, Marine operations in the field showed a marked increase over those in December, while the logistic effort to support these operations reached an all time high in tonnage delivered. As before, III MAF continued to approach the offensive problem on a balanced basis, applying its efforts all the way from large operations of combined arms to widespread small operations aimed at the heart of the counter-insurgency problem--assisting the Vietnamese in pacification of the countryside.

Specific efforts in civic action, an essential element of the pacification program, were diminished during the month because of the celebrations surrounding the Lunar New Year, which was celebrated officially from 21 to 23 January, but actually covered a period of about twelve days. During this time the Vietnamese custom dictated the general cessation of all business activity and even raised taboos against receiving medical attention. In spite of this enforced stand-down, there continued to be positive signs that progress was being made by III MAF in its support of the GVN pacification effort. The month of January saw the highest total number of incidents, forty, in which Vietnamese nationals supplied hard information about the Viet Cong to Marines. It was also encouraging to note that this information increased in quality as well as in quantity.

Psychological warfare operations, closely related to pacification, included a major campaign during the TET period. Emphasis was concentrated in two efforts: the populace were made aware of the burden placed upon them by Viet Cong, and the VC themselves were reminded of their own hardships, with particular emphasis on family ties from which they were separated. Results of this program

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are not yet apparent.

In combat activity, Marines initiated the largest amphibious operation since Inchon in the southern part of the I Corps area. On 28 January Marine assault units of Operation Double Eagle came ashore about twenty miles south of Quang Ngai city in an area long controlled by the Viet Cong. As the month ended, Marine forces had moved well inland in efforts to destroy enemy equipment, supplies and personnel. The operation, in conjunction with a major US Army/ARVN operation to the south, is aimed at disrupting VC control over the rice producing lowlands of southern Quang Ngai and northern Binh Dinh provinces. Small unit operations, designed to comb the guerrillas out of the fabric of the populated regions in our tactical areas, continued to increase in tempo. The Viet Cong counter tactic was to emphasize their propaganda and terrorist efforts.

The Marine logistic situation improved during January. A decrease in rainfall during the month allowed a record 127,547 measurement tons of cargo to be unloaded at Danang compared with 77,661 measurement tons in the preceding month. Port development, particularly pier construction and dredging, remains a critical need.

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SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Small Unit Actions.* The prime Marine combatant contribution to the Vietnamese pacification effort is in the steadily growing wave of small unit operations with which new tactical areas are now being saturated. In January, despite the Christmas stand-down, there were more patrols and ambushes than in December. Of the over nine thousand of these efforts launched during the month, two noteworthy examples are described here.

On the morning of 5 January, an artillery survey section from the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines at Chu Lai was engaged in surveying defensive concentrations for Popular Force units nine miles north of the airfield. Villagers in the neighborhood told the survey party that the VC were in the area collecting taxes. A UH-1E helicopter was called in, spotted the VC entrenched in two hamlets and took the enemy under fire. Fifteen Marines of the survey party assaulted the VC positions, killing three Viet Cong and capturing one known VC, one suspect, a Chicom sub-machine gun, and a MAS-36 French rifle. There were no friendly casualties.

During the night of 13 January, during operation MALLARD (see below for details on Operation MALLARD), a four man fire team from Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines surprised a group of thirty to forty VC in the act of setting up four 60 mm mortars. The fire team attacked, driving the VC from the mortar position, and then held the position against a strong VC counterattack until reinforcements arrived and the enemy fled. Results of this action were four VC killed and four mortars, forty-one rounds of mortar ammunition and two carbines captured. One Marine received a slight wound.

* (figures 1, 2, and 3)

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OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DA NANG AREA




Figure -1-

OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHU LAI AREA




Figure -2-

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OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PHU BAI AREA

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


Figure -3-

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Larger Actions - Operations of greater scope were undertaken, where the prospects of exacting a heavy penalty from the VC were good. -- (figures 4 and 5)

War Bonnet (3-4 Jan) was a two-day, three company search and destroy operation conducted by the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines in a coastal area ten miles southeast of Danang (figure 4). The operation began with a two and one half hour mechanized/motorized march (LVT, tanks, Ontos) by 2/9 from the Danang TAOR, south to the southern tip of the objective area. Concurrently, two additional Marine companies (L/3/9 and B/1/9) moved into blocking positions to the north and northwest, while the 927th and 706th Regional Force Companies occupied blocking positions to the south and southwest. On reaching the southern boundary, 2/9 turned about and made a systematic northward sweep of the countryside. Only light contacts resulted. One VC was killed and thirty suspects were detained for questioning. War Bonnet marked the initial combat in RVN of the Landing Vehicle Tracked Howitzer (LVTH-6), which moved through inundated areas to place 105 mm howitzer fires on suspected VC positions.

Long Lance (3-8 Jan) was a four day search and destroy operation in the extreme southwestern corner of the Danang TAOR (figure 4). This area had long been under VC domination. Units participating were the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, less one company, but reinforced by Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion and the 4.2 inch Mortar Battery of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. A combined heliborne movement/cross country march and subsequent detailed search of the objective area were conducted against moderate resistance during the first two days. Hot meals found in abandoned huts attested to the tactical surprise which was gained. VC resistance dwindled to occasional harassing fire after heavy close air support strikes on their positions by Marine attack aircraft. After sweeping

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LARGE UNIT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY AT DA NANG

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


Figure -4-

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


Figure -5-

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the objective area, the battalion advanced to the northeast to the main Marine positions. VC casualties for the operation were seven killed by ground action, ten killed by air attacks, ten VC captured, and ten VC suspects apprehended. One weapon and approximately four tons of rice were confiscated. A large number of caves and fortified positions were destroyed. One cave contained many blasting caps, fuse strikers, and other demolition items.

Mallard (10-17 Jan) was a coordinated regimental size USMC/ARVN operation twenty miles southwest of Danang (figure 4) to search out and destroy major Viet Cong units in the area and to disrupt local VC infiltration and supply routes. Marine units participating were the 3d Marines Regimental Headquarters; the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, less one company; 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, and company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. The 12th Marines provided supporting artillery fires with elements of two battalions which were air lifted to An Hoa at the southern end of the objective area. ARVN units were the 39th Ranger Battalion, the 3d Battalion of the 1st ARVN Regiment, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 51st Regiment and the 514th Armored Personnel Carrier Troop.

The ARVN portion of the operation commenced on 10 January with two battalions and the armored personnel carrier troop sweeping west from the railroad against negligible resistance. The 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment blocked on the west. On 11 January the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines crossed the Vu Gia River in LVT's supported by howitzers of LVTH-6's which silenced enemy small arms fire. The battalion advanced to the southwest quickly against light resistance. On 12 January, after a B-52 strike on a suspected VC supply area, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines was helilifted in to exploit the air strike. A search of the target area revealed one dead VC, but no indications of a supply base. In the meantime, the Marines learned from

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villagers in the objective area that the Viet Cong had informed the villagers on 9 January that the Marines were coming. The VC reportedly had fled to the mountains west of the objective area. Villagers, even though they knew the Marines would not be staying in the objective area, voluntarily offered their services to locate hidden VC rice caches that had been overlooked in the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines' rapid sweep. Both Marine battalions made a systematic and detailed search toward the northeast guided by villagers who not only pointed out hidden rice caches, but also helped to bag and evacuate 72 1/2 tons of rice and six VC owned rice milling machines. VC resistance was limited to scattered mortar fire. On 17 January the operation was terminated. Final results were thirty VC KIA, four killed by air strikes, twenty one VC captured, six of whom were wounded, and 237 VC suspects apprehended. Two Viet Cong gave themselves up to Marines. The sixteen VC weapons captured included four 60 mm mortar and a Chinese light machine gun in addition to individual weapons. Marine casualties were two KIA, two died of wounds, and fifty-one wounded. The noteworthy aspect of this effort was the willingness of villagers to point out VC rice caches and milling machines even though they knew the Marines were not remaining in the area.

Big Lodge (15-17 Jan) was a battalion (reinforced) search and destroy operation which covered a thirty-six square kilometer area centered eight miles south of Da-nang. The area had been generally fortified by the enemy during the summer of 1965. Contact was negligible as the battalion swept south on the west side of the area, then east along Route 14, then north astride the national railway. Residents of one village offered information about Viet Cong activity in the area. Results of the operations were two VC KIA and sixteen VC suspects apprehended. Numerous caves and fortifications were destroyed, and three thousand pounds of Viet Cong rice were confiscated.

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Marine casualties were five WIA.

A VC Mortar Attack at Danang (25 Jan) commenced at 250023H when the Viet Cong brought inaccurate 120 mm and 81 mm mortar fire on several areas near the Danang and Marble Mountain facilities. About ten rounds of 120 mm mortar fire landed in the vicinity of the USAF barracks flight line and ground control approach site at Danang Air Base. The 81 mm mortar rounds fell in a dependent's housing area, south of the I Corps Headquarters compound in Danang City, and the MCB-9 and 1st Battalion, 9th Marines CP areas. Counter-battery artillery and mortar fire was brought to bear on suspected VC positions. Fixed wing aircraft and armed helicopters were launched to search for the VC positions. The 9th Marines moved units into blocking positions to prevent egress from the general area of the suspected mortar positions. LVT's were used to block waterways. Friendly casualties were one US Marine and one US Air Force policeman killed, and six Marines, one airman, one VNAF and five Vietnamese military dependents wounded. Material damage was minor in the MCB-9 equipment park. There was no damage to aircraft, runways or other critical facilities.

Double Eagle (28 January-continuing) the Marine portion of the largest coordinated offensive operation of the Vietnamese war, is currently underway in the south-eastern portion of Quang Ngai Province (figure 5).

The Marine task force is built around four battalion landing teams with balanced air and logistic support. The operation was initiated by a major amphibious landing by two battalion landing teams. It will be summarized in the next monthly report.

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PACIFICATION AND CIVIC ACTION

The Marine participation in pacification and civic action declined during the month, in deference to the Vietnamese beliefs associated with TET, the Lunar New Year. For many Vietnamese in the Marines' area this was the first such holiday that had been celebrated in many years. Typical was the attitude expressed by villagers in Hai Ninh and Vinh An, in the Chu Lai enclave, who told Marines that the Viet Cong had prevented them from celebrating the holiday.

Efforts to advance the GVN pacification program by eliminating guerrillas and terrorists and providing security to the village and hamlets led III MAF to conduct 5,726 patrols, 3,578 ambushes and to employ 231 scout sniper teams. These offensive measures generated 474 contacts with the Viet Cong, sixty per cent of them in daylight. The numbers and results of patrols and ambushes conducted by III MAF figures may be found in paragraphs 6 and 8 of the STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS.

The efforts of Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines illustrate what can be accomplished by small Marine units in close conjunction with GVN pacification efforts. On 29 December Company A moved into the Vinh An-Hai Ninh complex, a series of three hamlets in the Chu Lai TAOR which had been under VC domination for over two years. A permanent patrol base was established and Marines, working in close conjunction with a twenty-five man Vietnamese Peoples Action Team, immediately undertook civic action measures. First priority was given to medical assistance and improvement of hygiene. In rapid succession, a school was opened, English language classes were conducted by a Marine NCO, a local government was established and preparation for a Popular Force unit was begun. As a result of this program, the people of

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Vinh An-Hai Ninh now enjoy greatly improved sanitation and are moving steadily toward being able to stand on their own. The keys to success in this operation appear to have been the hatred of the people for the VC, the efficiency of the GVN pacification cadre, the aggressiveness of the village chief in developing a Popular Force unit and the military/civil coordination between the Marines and the GVN. On the Marines side, it further validated the soundness of basic USMC principles of civic action, and underscored the importance of every Marine involved believing that he is a civic action officer whose task it is to convince the villagers that Marine - GVN forces intend to stay as long as necessary to protect the villagers from the Viet Cong. (figure 6)

Despite the temporary curtailment of activities during TET, more than 114,000 Vietnamese civilians received civic action assistance and support from III MAF on 929 different occasions. As in past months, medical treatment accounted for a large part of the effort, with 51,000 people receiving treatment. III MAF medical assistance was not limited to treating the sick. A considerable effort was made to instruct the Vietnamese in the fundamentals of medicine and dentistry. At the Hue Medical School twenty-eight students received formal training in dental emergencies from III MAF dental officers and thirty medical students received formal instructions from III MAF medical officers. On lower, but equally important levels, Medcap teams trained sixteen rural health workers, two volunteer nurses, and gave on-the-job training to four volunteer trainees. The III MAF aid-to-education program was equally successful as 2,900 students received educational support in the form of textbooks and school supplies. This number does not reflect the hundreds of school age children who were permitted to resume their education through the efforts of Marines directed at providing security, arranging for teachers, and building, repairing or reno-

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vating local schools.

The same interest and enthusiasm was displayed in the essential self-help projects undertaken by the Vietnamese people. With technical assistance and advice provided by MAF units, villagers in My Thi hamlet, on their own, constructed a new school and the people in Da Song hamlet, with materials obtained through GVN channels, built a dispensary that will serve the entire population of Hoa Khanh village.

The Viet Cong did not fail to recognize the threat posed by the active civic action program of III MAF and its effective coordination with the GVN pacification effort as evidenced by the explosion of a device in Gia Le hamlet at the site where medical treatment had been provided regularly by III MAF medical personnel. It was apparent that the Viet Cong had used this method to intimidate villagers and to discourage further contacts with Marines. This terroristic tactic, while engendering hatred, was successful for a short time. However, at the urging of the people, expressed to the Marines through the village chief, the site was shifted to the market place and the treatments resumed.

Pacification -which includes the clearing, securing and developing of an area to restore the public security -- continued to build on the foundation created by the III MAF offensive military efforts and civic action programs. Local government officials, who are grateful for our help, demonstrated initiative at an increasing rate. Positive evidence of this attitude was found in the rehabilitation program in Cam Ne and Yen Ne, which has been identified as a program sponsored and executed by the Government of Vietnam. Equally impressive were the efforts of the Hoa Long village chief in es-

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establishing an effective hamlet government in My Thi. These actions are having the effect of significantly strengthening the infrastructure of the local government.

Signs of slow progress being made by III MAF in gaining the support of the people for the Government's pacification plan are becoming more common. The elders of Yen Ne (1), who had initially resisted pacification efforts, visited local Marine units and government officials during TET to express their appreciation for the assistance and security being provided. Other indications of the increasing effectiveness of pacification efforts can be seen in the fields of agriculture and economic activity. Local agriculture has increased significantly since the arrival of Marine forces. This may be observed in four areas. First, as village governments are reestablished, the village chiefs, through village agriculture meetings, have taken an increased interest in the needs of their villagers. This trend has been especially noticeable at Chu Lai, but is spreading to Danang. Second, the use of fertilizer has increased from practically none used on the crop harvested in October 1965 to more than ten thousand tons used on the crop which will be harvested this April. It is calculated that this will result in an additional 45,450 tons of rice. Plans are already being made for even more fertilizer for the next crop to be planted. Third, there has been a twelve-fold increase in the number of home gardens. Whereas in 1964 less than one thousand gardens were planted in the entire I Corps Tactical Zone, over twelve thousand were planted behind Marine forward positions alone during 1965. Last, the Vietnamese Government has regained its aggressive attitude toward agriculture, which it lost after the 1964 floods and an accompanying Viet Cong offensive. Optimistic evaluations now indicate that if this attitude continues, I Corps will begin to approach self sufficiency in food production by the end of 1966.

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AREA OF ACCELERATED CIVIC ACTION
PROGRAM BY COMPANY A, 7TH MARINES

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


Figure -6-

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Encouraging signs of economic growth are appearing in Marine controlled areas. This progress is best illustrated by the increased number of village and hamlet markets in the III MAF enclaves. By thirty-one January there were forty-three market places in the enclaves which were either new or had been reactivated since the arrival of III MAF. By a conservative estimate, this is a one hundred percent increase in the number of market places which existed prior to Marine influence. These market places serve the Vietnamese people almost exclusively and provide an outlet for the exchange or sale of excess products. This growth has been fostered by the offensive military efforts of GVN and III MAF to provide the populace with security from VC guerrillas, terrorists, agitators and tax collectors. An ancillary reflection of economic activity is found in the number of small shops and stalls, many only one room shacks, that have grown with the increasing Marine strength. There are approximately 1,690 such shops selling curios to Marines. While this trend is a common one around any encampment area, these shops have resulted in economic benefits to the local populace.

By the end of the month it appeared that III MAF participation in the overall pacification program would increase. A new pacification cadre concept, which will require approximately one year to implement, is being prepared under the guidance of the U. S. Ambassador. The Ambassador desires to have III MAF assist in training the new cadre and expand its active support for the Government of Vietnam Rural Construction Program. Under this new plan the present Peoples Action Teams will be combined with Census Grievance, Civil Affairs and New Life Development Teams to form a fifty-nine man organization called the Rural Reconstruction Group. The Peoples Action element will be primarily responsible for meeting the needs of the villagers in the areas of social welfare, health, and education. The Census Grievance

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element will be responsible for surveying and classifying the people in the pacification area and for determining and reporting the attitudes of the rural populace. The task of rebuilding local governments will be undertaken by the Civil Affairs element, while the New Life Development element will assist the villagers in participating in government self-help projects and economic developments such as road improvements and aids to agriculture. The concept for employment of the Rural Construction Cadre Groups is that one such group will be able to pacify a hamlet in three months. Commanding General, III MAF estimates that 250 Rural Construction Cadre Groups would be required to pacify all of the remaining hamlets in I Corps in approximately two years. This estimate is based on the fact that there are 2368 hamlets in I Corps, of which 545 are considered pacified.

Coordinated Pacification Operation in Quang Nam Province: Progress in the Ngu Hanh Son Pacification Campaign during January centered in the Cam Ne - Yen Ne complex of Hoa Thai village in the southern portion of the Danang TAOR. Intensive joint III MAF/I CORPS (ARVN) offensive operations in December resulted in restoring a substantial degree of security to the hamlets, while civic action elements provided medical assistance, helped construct an access road into the area thereby aiding economic development, and provided engineer assistance desired by the residents in preparing the site for the New Life hamlet where the villagers will be resettled.

By the end of the month the assigned pacification force consisted of the 59th Regional Force Battalion (424 men), four Popular Force Platoons (approximately 80 men), six Peoples Action Teams (153 men), a rifle company and a service company of the 51st ARVN Regiment, and the Pacification Cadre (approximately 280 men). In addition, III MAF is providing two rifle com-

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panies to pursue the local anti-guerilla effort and to support the inadequate Vietnamese security forces.

I Corps Joint Coordinating Council for Civic Action:

Early in January it was announced that a shipment of America's Christmas Trains and Trucks (ACTT) commodities totalling 300 tons was being sent to III MAF for distribution throughout I Corps Tactical Zone. Recognizing the scope of the problem, the Commanding General, III MAF referred the matter to the Joint Council. As a result, Vietnamese and U. S. civilian and military agencies are combining their efforts to ensure an equitable distribution of the commodities to the Vietnamese people.

In a move designed to clarify the role and functions of the Joint Coordinating Council, a formal statement of mission was drafted, approved, and promulgated during the month. The new mission of the Joint Coordinating Council is:

- To determine Government of Vietnam plans for Rural Construction in the I Corps Tactical Zone.
- To facilitate coordination of the rural construction effort.
- To determine requirements for cooperation and support between U. S. agencies operating within the I Corps Tactical Zone and to recommend methods to meet these requirements.
- To serve as a forum for the exchange of information between all such agencies.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

During January the I Corps psy-ops emphasis was placed on face-to-face communications with the people. Marine patrols accompanied by psy-ops teams were in direct contact with the people, bringing messages from the United States and the Republic of Vietnam to them through leaflets, posters, magazines and speeches. The salient parts of the I Corps psy-war effort are described below.

The major psy-war effort during the month took place from 9 to 20 January in conjunction with TET. This was a nationwide operation during which over 28,000,000 leaflets were dropped throughout RVN. During the first half of the campaign concentration was placed on the peasants. The hardships imposed by the VC, such as illegal taxes and forced labor, were pointed out while at the same time loyalty to the government was stressed. During the second half of the operation, beginning 15 January, the enemy soldier was the target. Message themes stressed the hopelessness of the VC cause and the unnecessarily lonely life that had to be lead. The major portion of this effort in I CTZ was centered in twenty-six villages in southern Quang Nam and eighteen villages in northern Quang Tin provinces. Remnants of enemy units which were engaged in Operation Harvest Moon were believed to be in this area. Their concentration and reported low morale made them a prime target. It is too soon to determine the effects of the TET campaign; however, during January the total psy-war program resulted in a total of 117 Chieu Hoi returnees in I Corps.

An additional psy-war effort by III MAF included the offering of a 100,000 piasters (about \$1400) reward to any villager supplying information which directly leads

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to capture or destruction of a 120 mm mortar. Beside the reward offer, the leaflet contained a message pointing out the destruction to civilian property caused by the weapon.

An example of the success of friendly psy-war efforts was demonstrated by a spontaneous effort by villagers of the Chu Lai New Life Hamlet. On 23 January hand painted color posters depicting a horse stamping on a VC were observed in the hamlet. The theme of the posters was that during the "Year of the Horse" (New Lunar Year), the Government of Vietnam will stamp out the VC. This was very encouraging in that these villagers were not receptive to either RVN or US forces when USMC elements first landed in May 1965.

In addition to the distribution of leaflets, magazines were found to be valuable to the psy-war program. Two GVN published periodicals are currently being used in I Corps: the Huong Que (Rural Spirit), which is primarily designed for rural, agrarian audiences, and the Gioi Tu-Do (Free World), which is primarily designed for a more sophisticated, educated urban populace. The stress in the rural magazine is on do-it-yourself tips and agricultural improvement advice. The urban magazine mainly contains information about current national and international affairs. Both magazines are basically free of propaganda as such, but they serve as reminders to the people that the government has an active interest in both the rural and urban population. The magazines have been very well received.

During the month the operations efficiency of the I Corps Joint Psy-War Center in Danang improved. The central government in Saigon has now taken official notice of the center and has commended the I Corps

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Commander, General THI, for its development.

Aside from its own psy-war operations, the Center is also taking a marked interest in VC efforts along this line. Most of the printed VC efforts attempt to persuade the populace that it is the VC, not the government, which can help them. Specific anti-American themes have been prevalent. Captured leaflets of this nature are carefully studied by the Center with view to developing counter-measures.

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LOGISTICS

The overall logistical situation in III MAF continued to improve during January; however, shortages of some equipment repair parts and deficiencies in storage and transportation facilities remained. Improved weather during the month and minor improvement in unloading and handling techniques resulted in a substantial improvement in movement of materiel through the port of Danang. Overall expansion of the supply pipeline was realized; however, the demand for materiel also continued to increase. Reliance on special supply programs and premium transportation was required to keep the lead time for critical items at a minimum and to maintain an acceptable state of materiel readiness.

Port Facilities: The most noticeable improvement in logistics during January is evidenced in the increase of the average daily unload at the port of Danang from 2505 M/T in December to 4114 M/T in January. This increase was realized without the benefit of additional unload facilities; however, the tapering off of the north-east monsoon rains permitted more productive employment of the available assets. The port construction projects to provide improved unloading conditions are continuing with the LST/LCU ramps at the west of the Tourane River Bridge being approximately twenty-five percent complete. Dredging of the approaches to these ramps is progressing very slowly. The LST ramp at Chu Lai was improved by the placing of crushed rock on the ramp and staging area. Dredging also continues on the approaches to this facility; however, lack of suitable equipment and adverse weather conditions resulted in little significant progress. Until the dredging is completed, LSTs unloading at Chu Lai will be required to carry reduced loads in order to enter the area. In light of these problems, the improvement in port

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throughput capacity in January was greater than expected.

Supply: The third monthly CRITIPAC shipments of high usage, routinely required supplies were received during the period 22 - 25 January and distributed to the using units. The contents of these CRITIPACS were based on a revised listing submitted by CG, III MAF, after receipt of the previous packages. Material previously requested to provide increased stock availability at Chu Lai to support increased force levels is currently being received. Approximately one-third of the 17,500 line items requisitioned have been received by parcel post and are being stored temporarily under canvas. Construction of Butler buildings at Chu Lai is in progress to receive the heavier items which are being moved by surface means and to provide more adequate storage for materiel already on hand. The steadily increasing demand for material in WESTPAC is illustrated by the increases in requisitions processed by the 3rd FSR on Okinawa. During November, 46,000 requisitions were processed; this jumped to 59,000 in December and to a record total of 65,000 in January.

On 24 January the source of aeronautical support for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was shifted to NSD, Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, from NSD, Yokosuka, Japan. At that time approximately seventy-five percent of supply materials were on hand at Subic Bay with action continuing to position additional material. As an interim measure, pending full support capability at Subic Bay, aeronautical stocks at both Subic and Yokosuka will be utilized to support 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units in III MAF.

Maintenance: There was no appreciable change in the percentage of equipment deadlined during January. The

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increases in the availability of spare parts and the improved maintenance capacities were largely offset by increased usage under adverse environmental conditions.

During the month, a total of 1326 items were evacuated to 3rd FSR on Okinawa for higher echelon maintenance or for other disposition.

Movement and Resupply: Because of the requirements to deploy additional elements to RVN, the BLT rotation program was suspended during January; however, it is planned that this program will be resumed in April. HMM-261 was rotated into RVN from the Special Landing Force on 6 January and was replaced on the USS Valley Forge by HMM-361. On 17 January RLT-1 Headquarters and supporting units were landed at Chu Lai from an APA and 2 LST's. Also, BLT 3/1 was landed near THACH TRU to participate in Operation Double Eagle. This unit will remain in RVN as a portion of the force buildup in RVN--the thirteenth Marine battalion deployed in the I CTZ. Ships controlled by MSTs continue to lift the bulk of re-supply cargo for III MAF, although utilization of space aboard amphibious ships transiting between Okinawa/RVN and Philippines/RVN has made a significant contribution. During January six amphibious ships were used, in whole or in part, to transport III MAF cargo.

During January the average daily unload of cargo was 4114 M/T at Danang as contrasted with 2505 M/T in December. On 31 December there were twelve ships at Danang. An additional twenty-seven arrived during the month. Thrity ships completed their unloading, leaving nine in port on 31 January. The average cargo backlog during January was 16,901 M/T as compared to 34,844 in December. The backlogged cargo on 31 January totalled 16,111 M/T. There are currently no ships being held in ports outside RVN with Danang as the first port of call. Of

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particular significance is the record breaking 127,547 M/T of cargo unloaded at Danang during January. This marked the first time 100,000 M/T or more had been discharged in a one month period.

Medical: The Naval Support Activity Hospital at Danang was opened on 17 January. On 31 January 115 beds of the four hundred beds programmed were available. In addition the following facilities have been completed: X-Ray, pharmacy, laboratory, EENT and urology clinics, living quarters for the staff, morgue, blood processing and storage facilities, and preventative medicine. Construction continues on the remaining facilities necessary to place the hospital in full operation with four hundred beds. Since the initial opening of the hospital, the daily patient census has been thirty-five to forty-five patients.

A Medical Services Section was established as a part of the Logistic Support Unit at Chu Lai to administer more adequately the medical supplies and material received and stored in that enclave.

Engineer Operations: Although the heaviest portion of the monsoon has passed, a total of fourteen inches of rain in January resulted in the continued diversion of a major portion of the engineer effort to maintenance of roads and facilities. Demands for crushed rock for road improvement work, in addition to the other requirements, continued to exceed the combined capacity of all rock crushing equipment in the area. Sand-cement stabilization of the northern half of the Chu Lai Expeditionary Airfield runway, with concurrent installation of a catapult, was begun. Maximum use of prefabricated bridging was made to meet stream crossing requirements throughout the III MAF area of operations in support of both tactical and logistical operations. Work continued on mess halls and cantonments as materials became available. Progress on

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cantonment construction was governed by the rate of receipt of materials, primarily lumber.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS

PERIOD IX - 1 January - 31 January

1. PHU BAI-On 3 January HMM-161 at Phu Bai rotated to Futema, Okinawa and was replaced by HMM-163 which joined MAG-16 from Okinawa. (figure 7 for area increase)

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Within 25 miles			Within 25 miles		
Regt Hq	0	0	Regt	0	0
Battalions	2	2	Battalions	1	1
Companies	2	3	Companies	2	2
Total			Total		
Strength	995	1,065	Strength	550	470
Within 25 to 50 miles			Within 25 to 50 miles		
Sub Region Hq	1	1	Regt Hq	0	0
Regt Hq	0	0	Battalions	5	7
Battalions	3	3	Companies	3	4
Companies	12	12	Total		
Total			Strength	1,845	2,285
Strength	2,265	2,375			
Grand Total			Grand Total		
to 50 miles	3,260	3,440	to 50 miles	2,395	2,755

When comparing the December 1965 and the January 1966 confirmed Enemy Order of Battle, it may be seen that there has been a reduction of 180 enemy personnel within a fifty mile radius of the Phu Bai enclave. This is due to a shift of two companies to the west away from the enclave.

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PHU BAI TAOR EXPANSION

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


Figure -7-

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2. DANANG-There was no change to major USMC/USN forces. (figure 8 for area increase)

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Within 25 miles			Within 25 miles		
Regt Hq	0	0	Regt Hq	1	0
Battalions	3	3	Battalions	5	4
Companies	8	8	Companies	2	3
Total			Total		
Strength	1,840	1,800	Strength	1,525	1,365
Within 25 to 50 miles			Within 25 to 50 miles		
Regt Hq	1	1	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	5	5	Battalions	2	2
Companies	11	11	Companies	2	2
Total			Total		
Strength	3,054	2,890	Strength	1,050	970
Grand Total to 50 miles	4,894	4,690	Grand Total to 50 miles	2,575	2,335

When comparing the December 1965 and the January 1966 confirmed Enemy Order of Battle, it may be seen that there has been an increase of 204 enemy personnel within fifty miles of the Danang enclave. This is due to an increase in the strength of one local force company and the shifting of another company to within fifty miles of Danang.

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DA NANG TAOR EXPANSION

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


Figure -8-

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3. CHU LAI - On 6 January, in a normal rotation, HMM-261 joined MAG-36 from the Special Landing Force. On the same date HMM-362 went aboard the Valley Forge (LPH-8) as the helicopter component of the Special Landing Force. Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 1st Marine Regiment arrived at Chu Lai on 17 January and assumed the functions of the 4th Marines Headquarters. The 4th Marines Headquarters joined the Assistant Division Commander to plan future operations. (figure 9 for area increase)

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Within 25 Miles			Within 25 Miles		
Regt Hq	0	0	Regt Hq	0	1
Battalions	4	4	Battalions	2	2
Companies	11	11	Companies	0	0
Total			Total		
strength	2,190	2,100	strength	600	700
Within 25 to 50 Miles			Within 25 to 50 Miles		
MRV Hq	1	1	Regt Hq	1	0
Regt Hq	3	3	Battalions	6	3
Battalions	13	14	Companies	0	0
Companies	14	13	Total		
Total			Strength	1,900	1,300
strength	8,099	8,550			
Grand Total			Grand Total		
to 50 Miles	10,289	10,650	to 50 Miles	2,500	2,000

When comparing the December 1965 and the January 1966 confirmed Enemy Order of Battle, it may be seen that there has been a reduction of three hundred and seventy-one enemy

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CHU LAI TAOR EXPANSION

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


Figure -9-

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personnel within a fifty mile radius of the Chu Lai enclave. There is now some doubt as to whether the Heavy Weapons Support Battalion of the 2d VC Regiment moved north from Binh Dinh province into Quang Ngai province with its parent organization.

4. GENERAL. It is expected that at least two North Vietnamese Army regiments, which are believed by MACV to be in I Corps, will be accepted by that headquarters in the coming months. Thus the confirmed enemy strengths may soon be increased by several thousand. It is expected that some enemy unit designations will be duplicated in the future, tending to confuse the order of battle listings. North Vietnamese Army units already in Vietnam have left cadres behind to reform units which in some cases have assumed the designation of the original unit. Should these new units infiltrate, two units with the same designation may be found in the future VC/North Vietnamese Army order of battle. When identified, these units will be designated by the addition of letters along with the normal numerical designation (i. e., 18A North Vietnamese Army Regt; 18B, North Vietnamese Army Regt). Enemy strength figures shown in the three Marine enclaves should not be added together to determine the total enemy strength. The enemy strengths are expressed in terms of units within a twenty-five mile and twenty-five to fifty mile radii of enclaves. Thus, a given enemy unit may be counted as being within fifty miles of two enclaves.

5. III MAF TOTAL AREA

<u>INCREASE THIS PERIOD</u>		<u>TOTAL AREA 31JAN66</u>
144	Square miles	948
70, 335	Civilians	506, 732
16	Villages	109
74	Hamlets	543

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6. VC LOSSES FOR JANUARY 1966

<u>This Period</u>		<u>Total to 31 Jan</u>
332	KIA	2,846
59	VC (Confirmed)	561
618	VC (Suspects)	3,607
26	WIA	350

7. PACIFICATION/CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS*

<u>January</u>	<u>December**</u>		<u>Total to 31 Jan</u>
51,413	61,472	Persons Given Medical Treatment	250,079
22	38	Persons Given Medical Training	153
26	21	Construction Projects	219
14,781	13,759	Pounds of Food Distributed	161,018
6,358	5,677	Pounds of Soap Distributed	52,981
8,543	13,299	Pounds of Clothing Distributed	142,649
87	91	Critically Ill Civilians Evacuated	4,509
36	42	English Language Classes in Progress	118
\$907	\$4,516	Cash Donations	\$23,286

* Next month's summary will contain additional statistical data on such matters as growth of Popular Forces and Rural Reconstruction Cadre and the functioning of local officials. Since this information must be obtained from Vietnamese sources, there is necessarily some delay in receiving the data and reporting it.

** Includes amounts not previously reported.

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8. III MAF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS*

<u>January</u>	<u>December</u>		<u>Total to 31 Jan</u>
5,726	4,218	Patrols	19,397
3,578	2,988	Ambushes	11,256
231	222	Sniper Posts	619
1	1	Regimental Opns	12
4	3	Battalion Opns	43
35	12	Company Opns	404
4,108	2,285	Offensive Air	20,402
		Sorties	
25,744	23,179	Helo Transport	167,646
		Sorties	

*Operation Double Eagle will be reported in February

9. III MAF STRENGTH BY ENCLAVE - 312400 January

Danang	28,153
Chu Lai	15,069
Hue Phu Bai	<u>2,190</u>
Total	45,190

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10. LOGISTICS

a. Supply Levels at End of Period:

	DANANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI
Class I: (1000 of rations/ days of supply)			
MCI (Rations)	700/28	915/34	79/34
B Rations	650/26	233/15	61/27
A Rations	33/2	28/2	9/4
Class III & III A (BULK): (1000 gallons/days of supply)			
JP-2	415/5	110/16	42/16
AVGAS	98/16	584/9	7/35
MOGAS	119/9	42/4	29/20
DIESEL	66/9	97/9	17/24
Class V and VA:			
Ground Ammo (days of Supply)	45	45	45
250 lb bombs (Number of bombs)	7766	6689	-

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500 lb bombs			
(number of bombs)	1025	5322	-
Launcher w/19 2.75			
in. rockets	319	492	-
Launcher w/4 5.0			
in. rockets	243	228	-

b. Resupply Status:

(1) Surface Shipping Status (Danang):

Cargo unloaded (January) - 127,547 M/T

Avg. daily cargo discharge rate- 4,114 M/T

Ships in port on 31 Dec - 12

Ships arriving during January - 27

Ships unloaded (January) - 30

Ships in port on 31 January - 9

Cargo backlog (31 Dec) - 26,650 M/T

Cargo backlog (31 Jan) - 16,111 M/T

Avg. daily cargo backlog (January)- 16,901 M/T

(2) Air Shipping Status:

Cargo lifted to RVN (Jan) - 1,210,200 lbs

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Cargo offered and awaiting
lift Okinawa - 204 S/T

c. RED BALL SUMMARY (Jan);

Items at beginning of period - 230
Items added - 180
Items removed - 95
Items remaining at end of period - 315

d. Maintenance (January)

Items evacuated from RVN - 1,326
Items repaired at 3rd FSR - 1,123
Items returned to CONUS from
3rd FSR - 178
Items disposed of on Okinawa - 678

e. Construction Projects

Roads rehabilitated or constructed - Maintenance
only.
Bridges constructed - 1 foot bridge
Wells drilled - 3 in progress
Covered storage (III MAF) - 8,000 sq ft com-
pleted, 64,000
sq ft in progress

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Covered storage (NSA) - 192,000 sq ft in progress
(35% complete)

Maintenance facilities
constructed - 32,000 sq ft in progress

Ammo storage facilities
constructed - 2 magazines (16'x32') in
progress. ASP#
1-80% completed
ASP# 2-35% completed

POL storage tanks - 1 in progress, Danang.
- 3 in progress, Chu Lai.

Status of:

400 bed hospital (Marble - 48% complete
Mt)

Cantonments - 54% complete


Water supply distri- - 56% complete
bution systems

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
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USMC Ground Operations


Patrols



Ambushes



Company and Battalion Operations




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Viet Cong Killed by USMC




* OPERATION HARVEST MOON

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
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Viet Cong Captured by USMC

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
Weapons Captured by USMC




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USMC Air Operations


Fixed Wing Sorties



Aviation Ordnance Expended in RVN (tons)



Helo Sorties




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
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Passengers Carried by Air



Cargo Delivered by Air (tons)




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
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USMC Civic Action

Persons Treated



Clothing Distributed (Lbs)




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
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Food Distributed (Lbs)



Money Donated (\$)




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Persons Fed



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CONCLUSIONS


 During the month, combined III MAF/GVN offensive operations in the I Corps area dealt damage to the VC, in terms of causing him material loss, personnel casualties and some disruption of the guerrilla-terrorist effort. If nothing else, the January operations underscored the soundness, the sureness - as well as the slowness-of our tactics.

Developments during the month gave hope that the Government of Vietnam is moving towards a sound pacification arrangement, and basis for optimism that the essential Marine Corps integration into this program is proceeding satisfactorily. There was still no reason for concluding that the Vietnamese are putting their manpower problems in order, and a major gap must therefore remain in the pacification system.

The basic logistic condition of the III MAF is sound.