

FMFPAC: Operations of U.S. Marine
Forces, Vietnam

April

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Signature/date

OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

VIETNAM

APRIL 1966



FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of April 1966. Its purpose is to update similar reports covering periods from March 1965 through March 1966.

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SUMMARY

The political agitation which had begun in mid-March continued into early April, intensified, and then subsided, without having an appreciable effect on Marine tactical operations, although the unfavorable effect on logistic operations was considerable, and the adverse impact on pacification and Popular Force developments was serious and is still visible. Despite all of this, April was a month of record highs, with progress in many areas more clearly evident than in any other month to date.

There was a record number of small unit operations aimed at destroying the guerrilla infrastructure - 13,038 - which, in turn, made more contacts with the guerrilla enemy (795) and killed more of them (183) than in any single month before. At the same time, 14 air/ground operations of multi-battalion size were devoted to the important task of grinding down the enemy's Main Force strength, accounting, in the process, for another 320 Viet Cong or North Vietnamese killed, while diminishing substantially the hazard of attack on district towns and ARVN units.

Marine aviation units were equally active. There were 39,441 helicopter sorties, 6,000 more than the previous high set in March. Fixed wing squadrons flew 5,107 combat sorties. Again, over half were in support of units other than III MAF - 27% were flown in Laos or North Vietnam, and 27% were turned over to 7th Air Force and were flown in support of Vietnamese Army operations in both I and II Corps.

In April, Marine tactical areas again expanded farther into the rich and important countryside - the sixteenth increase since operations began fourteen months ago. The Phu Bai tactical area doubled in size; the Chu Lai and

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Danang areas were increased by 27% and 14% respectively, and some 190,000 additional villagers were brought under some measure of Marine influence. At the end of the month, the total III MAF area embraced more than 1,000 square miles, encompassing 144 villages and a population of 694,000. Fourteen months ago, the total area consisted of 8 square miles and 1 village with a population of 1,930. The Civic Action section (page 18) of this report summarizes pictorially these successive expansions and provides a graphic and statistical assessment of the level of pacification within the Marine dominated areas. Development of a stronger Popular Force base was practically halted during the month because of the political unrest.


The virtual suspension of activity in the port of Danang for nine days during the height of the unrest reduced supply levels, but accelerated operations for the remainder of the period made April the second highest cargo handling month to date, exceeded only by March. On 27 April, 9,795 M/T - a record throughput for a single day - was achieved at Danang, surpassing by 500 M/T the previous daily record. There was a slowdown in construction work because of the significant absence of civilian workers, but overall the logistic situation remained satisfactory throughout the month.

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COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

During April, there were 13,038 small unit operations, 202 of company size, devoted to the vital task of destroying the guerrilla infrastructure - isolating the guerrillas from the people upon whom they prey, separating the guerrillas from the rice which they seek for sustenance, and denying them the taxes, the information, and the recruits which they must have if they are to survive. The April total was an increase of 16% over the 11,245 counter guerrilla actions conducted in March.

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Despite the impediment of the uncertain political situation which necessitated placing a number of units on alert for airbase security, riot control, and evacuation of US civilians, Marines conducted 7,183 patrols and laid 5,653 ambushes, the latter an increase of 1,292 over the previous month. Their success was reflected in a record number of contacts - 795, resulting in 183 VC killed (almost double the number of guerrillas killed by small unit patrols and ambushes in March), 27 captured, and 311 suspected VC detained for searching and questioning.

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A large number of these small unit operations were aimed at preventing the Viet Cong seizure of significant amounts of the spring rice harvest. This is an I Corps - wide effort, called Golden Fleece II after a similar operation during the fall of 1965, which denied the guerrillas over half a million pounds of rice - an estimated 90% of their take from previous harvests.

Harvesting had barely begun by the end of March, but by the latter part of April the crop encompassed such an extended area that a considerable portion of III MAF was involved in Golden Fleece in one form or another - patrolling around the crop areas, convoying workers to and from the fields, or transporting the harvested rice to protected storage sites. As an indication of the success of the operation, during a sixteen day period in mid-April, the 3d Bn, 4th Marines made possible the harvesting and storage of 93 tons of rice in the Phu Bai area, without any reported loss. This amount is enough to feed more than nine VC battalions for one month.

As the Marine areas have expanded, it has been necessary to devote special attention to villages where the guerrilla infrastructure is especially troublesome or has a particularly strong hold over the population. One of the more effective techniques for doing this has been the "County Fair" operation.

County Fair is basically a military search operation, although it stresses the role of the local civic and police authorities in asserting government control. At the same time, steps are taken to gain the voluntary support of the people. Here is how County Fair works:

First, a cordon force of Marines, of about company strength, encircles the hamlet in the early morning hours, prior to the lifting of curfew, to prevent escape of guerrillas

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from the hamlet. Shortly after first light, GVN police and ARVN units enter the hamlet and move the villagers into an assembly area, where GVN administrators take a census, identify families with dwellings, issue identity cards, and determine the whereabouts of absent family members. VC suspects are segregated for additional questioning. While they are waiting to be processed, the villagers are given medical and dental treatment by combined GVN/III MAF teams and are presented psychological warfare films as well as entertainment in the form of movies and band concerts.

Concurrent with the processing of the villagers, ARVN units scour the hamlet, searching for hidden VC, VC supplies, hiding places and secret egress routes.


Developed by III MAF and first employed by the 9th Marines in the heavily populated area around Danang, County Fair has proved successful in weeding out guerrillas. One operation, on 26 April, resulted in 45 VC killed, 17 confirmed VC captured, and 14 weapons discovered. During the same operation two other VC turned themselves over to GVN authorities. At another County Fair earlier in the month, the VC leader for that particular hamlet and his entire cadre were killed or captured when they attempted to slip through the line of encirclement. To date, and in addition to the useful population control measures accomplished, County Fair operations have accounted for 61 VC guerrillas killed, 35 captured, and 25 weapons seized. There have been no friendly casualties.

Throughout the month, the intensity of counter guerrilla activity was evident in all three Marine areas. The rates of activity in each area are shown on the following pages.

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COUNTERGUERRILLA ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA



The seven infantry battalions at Danang conducted an average of 125 patrols and 102 ambushes each day during April. As in past months the majority of enemy contacts, 112 out of 163, were reported in the heavily populated areas south of the air base.

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3D BN 1ST MAR
 589 PATROLS
 143 AMBUSHES
 16 VC CONTACTS
 6 VCKIA
 1 VCCAPTURED

2D BN 5TH MAR
 197 PATROLS
 131 AMBUSHES
 7 VCCONTACTS
 0 VCKIA
 0 VCCAPTURED

2D BN 7TH MAR
 108 PATROLS
 96 AMBUSHES
 3 VCCONTACTS
 0 VCKIA
 0 VCCAPTURED

3D BN 7TH MAR
 476 PATROLS
 126 AMBUSHES
 24 VCCONTACTS
 1 VCKIA
 5 VCCAPTURED

1ST BN 7TH MAR
 267 PATROLS
 152 AMBUSHES
 23 VCCONTACTS
 4 VCKIA
 0 VCCAPTURED

SOUTH CHINA SEA

0 5 KILOMETERS

R1 BS **BT BS**

QUANG TRI
QUANG NGAI

Ky Ha
Chu Lai

1


The five infantry battalions at Chu Lai conducted a daily average of 55 patrols and 21 ambushes during April. As with previous months, the majority of enemy contacts occurred in the southern portion of the tactical area.

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COUNTERGUERRILLA ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PHU BAI TACTICAL AREA



At Phu Bai the four infantry battalions conducted a daily average of 52 patrols and 42 ambushes. Enemy contacts were light, being equally spaced throughout the tactical area.

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LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

During April, Marine forces in Vietnam conducted a total of 14 air/ground operations of battalion size or larger, accounting for 320 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers killed, another 17 captured, and 85 weapons seized.

Large unit activity was little affected by the unrest among the Vietnamese. To the contrary, during April operations were carried out by Marines in all five provinces of the I Corps Tactical Zone, the first month in which this level of activity has been achieved. Operations were carried out in the interior of Quang Tri province, seven miles from the Laos border (Operation Virginia); in the river valleys of Quang Nam province (Operations Orange and Georgia); in the coastal areas north of Chu Lai (Operations Iowa and Wyoming) and in the northern portion of Quang Ngai province (Operations Nevada and Hot Springs).

As the month began, Marines of the 7th Fleet Special Landing Force on Operation Jack Stay (27Mar-7Apr) were pushing deeper into the mangrove swamps of the Rung Sat, following a successful three company attack on a VC village and factory complex twenty miles southwest of Saigon. Four arms caches, two arms factories and a hospital were found during the subsequent search. Resistance in the form of ambushes increased somewhat after the attack, but there were no major confrontations. Final casualties among the VC were 63 KIA, 84 KIA (possible) and 5 WIA. Marines lost 5 KIA and 24 WIA.

On 27 April the SLF was committed in another amphibious landing some 400 miles to the north, near Danang. At month's end this operation, Osage, was continuing with light opposition.

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Of the large unit operations conducted by III MAF, Iowa and Wyoming encountered no significant enemy resistance, while Virginia and Georgia were still continuing at the end of the month. Although Orange, Nevada, and Hot Springs were each of short duration, some 377 enemy troops were killed in the three, with a loss of 23 Marines and 10 ARVN troops. These are described and displayed pictorially below.

Orange (1-11 April) was a search and destroy operation conducted by the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (reinforced) near the junction of the Vu Gia and Con Rivers about 24 miles southwest of Danang. Its purpose was to clear the area of Viet Cong while a Special Forces outpost was being constructed near the village of Thuong Duc. Enemy resistance was heavy on 2 and 3 April as the Marines drove through a series of fortified hamlets along the south bank of the Song Vu Gia. Search and destroy operations continued for the remainder of Orange against light resistance. By the 11th the Special Forces camp had been constructed and the Marines were withdrawn. Final VC casualties were 57 KIA, 89 WIA (possible), 7 captured, 53 suspects apprehended and 3 weapons seized. Marines suffered 18 killed and 92 wounded.

Nevada (12-17 April) was a combined USMC/ARVN search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Cap Batangan about 13 miles southeast of Chu Lai, an area in which 2 VC battalions (total strength-700) were reportedly operating. Participating units included the 7th Marines Headquarters with its 1st and 2nd Battalions, the 1st Vietnamese Marine Battalion, 5th Airborne Battalion and the 37th Ranger Battalion (last two both ARVN).

Although determined enemy resistance was not encountered, numerous small scale attacks supported by artillery, naval gunfire and air strikes inflicted significant losses on the enemy. Final results were 50 VC killed, 6 captured,

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and 81 suspects apprehended by Marine forces. Marine losses were 18 wounded. ARVN forces accounted for another 18 enemy killed, 18 captured, and 115 suspects apprehended. They in turn suffered 3 killed and 25 wounded.

Hot Springs (21-23 April) underscored the success that can be derived from acting rapidly and decisively to exploit good intelligence. On 20 April a VC defector pointed out the locations of major elements of the 1st VC Regiment in northern Quang Ngai province about 10 miles south of Chu Lai, in the same locale where Operations Utah, Texas and Indiana were run successfully in March. In less than twenty-four hours Marines and ARVN commanders had conferred, laid plans, and landed troops by helicopter within one thousand meters of the reported enemy concentration.

Once on the ground, Marine infantrymen, under artillery and close air support, quickly assaulted and overran the fortified enemy positions which were centered in the Dai Loc village complex. During the night the remnants of the enemy broke contact and fled, but not before 83 had been killed by Marines.

The 7th Marines was the control headquarters, with the 2nd and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines and two companies of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines as maneuver elements. Vietnamese units in the operation included the 1st Marine Battalion and 5th Airborne Battalion.

Enemy contact was sporadic after 21 April with the exception of an unsuccessful VC ambush on the final day of a Marine convoy traveling along Route One about seven miles south of Chu Lai, enroute to the Logistic Support Area. Marine small arms fire and air strikes routed the ambush, killing 32 VC. There were no Marine casualties.

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Damage to the enemy during Hot Springs was substantial. Marines killed 142 VC, captured 1 and seized 23 weapons, including four .50 caliber machine guns, four 75mm recoilless rifles and one 82mm mortar. ARVN forces were credited with killing another 110 VC, capturing 17 and taking 90 weapons. Friendly losses were light: 5 USMC KIA and 33 WIA; 7 ARVN KIA and 44 WIA.

These operations are shown graphically on the pages that follow.


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OPERATION ORANGE 1-11 APRIL

**1 April**

0700-Operation initiated to clear area for the establishment of a Special Forces camp at Thuan Duc. First elements of 1stBn 3dMar land by helo and secure Thuan Duc village and airfield. No VC contact. Note (1)

2 April

0712-Co B 3dMar lands by helo and advances to southwest.

1212- VC deliver heavy fire on Co B 3dMar from positions in a fortified hamlet. Artillery and air strikes called; Marines continue to advance against moderate resistance. Note (2)

2048-VC break contact. Note (3)

3 April

0700-Co I 3dMar moves out northeast along the south bank of the Song Vu Gia.

-321st VC Bn engaged.

Marines continue the attack toward the northeast with 3 companies abreast. VC routed. Note (4)

4-10 April

-Search and destroy operations continue along the banks of the Song Vu Gia and Song Con. Light enemy contact. Note (5)

11 April


1855-All Marine units return to Danang. Operation terminated.

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OPERATION NEVADA 12-17 APRIL

**12 April**

0700-1stBn and 2dBn 7thMar move by helo into objective area and attack toward east. Light VC contact. Notes ② and ③.

13 April

1115-1stBn 7thMar lands by helo on Cap Batangan. Note ④.

14 April

-1stBn 7thMar conducts search and destroy operations on Cap Batangan. 2dBn 7thMar continues search on mainland near the coast. Light VC contact.

15 April

1630-2dBn 7thMar retracts to Chu Lai via helos.

16 April

-1stBn 7thMar continues search of Cap Batangan. Numerous large caves discovered and destroyed including one with sleeping quarters for several hundred men. Light sporadic contact.


17 April

1130-All Marines return to Chu Lai. Operation terminated.

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OPERATION HOT SPRINGS 21-23 APRIL

**20 April**

- 1900-CG 2d ARVN Div notifies CG 1st MARDIV that VC defector has pinpointed a VC regimental Hq and 2 Bns. Note ①
- 2000-CG 1st MARDIV confers with ARVN commander. Hot Springs planned.

21 April

- 0940-2dBn 7th Mar moves by helo into objective area and conducts search and destroy operations to the east. Heavy contact on right flank.
- Air strikes called; Marines assault through VC positions. Note ②
- 1300-3dBn 7th Mar lands by helo in objective area and sweeps eastward. Note ② Heavy enemy contact.
- 1700-3dBn 1st Mar lands by helo in objective area and conducts search and destroy operations to the east. Note ③ No enemy contact.
- 1800-VC break contact. 84 VC killed and 20 weapons captured. Note ④

22 April

- Search and destroy operations continue. Light contact.
- 1445-3dBn 1stMar returns to Chu Lai by helicopter.
- 1900-2dBn 7thMar returns to Chu Lai by motor march.

23 April

- 1025-VC ambush Marine convoy 7 miles south of Chu Lai. Marine air strikes and small arms fire kill 32 VC. No friendly casualties. Note ⑤
- 1945-3dBn 7thMar returns to Chu Lai. Operation terminated.

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
CIVIC ACTION AND PACIFICATION

The unfavorable political events during the month had a stultifying effect on pacification programs. Time and ground were lost; however, by the end of the month much momentum had been regained. The extent to which Marine presence (see page 30) tended to dampen the explosive political conditions cannot be assessed; however, the situation around Danang and Hue in April 1966 had many characteristics in common with events there in 1961, which spread ultimately to overthrow of the government and assassination of the Vietnamese head of state. The situation in April 1966 in I CTZ, unlike that of November 1961, receded until, by the end of the month, conditions had begun to return to normal and the Marines continued their slow but steady progress in the field of pacification.

In an earlier section there were described the 14 large scale offensive operations aimed at destroying the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Main Force units. The section devoted to the counter guerrilla program mentions the 202 company size operations, the more than 7,100 patrols and 5,600 ambushes, all aimed at weeding the guerrillas out of the countryside. But to appear in context, those steps must be viewed as companions to the vigorous civic action program. For example, during the time that 593 enemy soldiers were killed in military action and another 698 suspects were captured, medical treatment was also being given to 62,482 civilians, 42 construction projects were initiated, 162 critically ill civilians were evacuated to hospitals and 156,813 hungry Vietnamese were fed.

It has been through this balance of large scale operations, counter guerrilla actions and civic action campaigns that Marine Tactical Areas have been expanded steadily. This expansion has brought with it a population growth in

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
Marine dominated areas from 2,000 to 700,000 in fourteen months, approximately doubling in the past six months, as have the number of villages and the size of the geographic area.

During April, 237 square miles were added to the Marine Tactical Areas, bringing 35 additional villages and almost 118,000 additional Vietnamese people under some measure of Marine influence. With the April growth Marine areas now embrace more than 1,000 square miles of rich and important Vietnamese countryside, and a new level of pacification and stability is being brought to the thousands who live there. The overall growth of the total Marine areas since the initial landings at Danang, Phu Bai and Chu Lai in the spring of 1965 is shown below.

GROWTH OF MARINE TACTICAL AREAS

DATE	SQ MILES	POPULATION	VILLAGES
8 MAR 65	8	1,930	1
14 MAR 65	10	4,339	2
7 MAY 65	11	4,339	2
25 MAY 65	101	32,932	11
15 JUN 65	335	124,876	30
6 JUL 65	417	188,840	44
21 SEP 65	608	350,083	72
31 JAN 66	948	506,712	109
30 APR 66	1,185	694,489	144


The individual growth of the three Marine areas which comprise the totals above is displayed pictorially on the pages that follow.



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GROWTH OF THE DANANG MARINE TACTICAL AREA



DATE	SQUARE MILES	CIVILIAN POPULATION	VILLAGES
8 MARCH 1965	8	1,930	1
JUNE 1965	172	51,608	13
JULY 1965	254	125,570	27
SEPT 1965	344	221,263	42
JAN 1966	589	340,865	72
APRIL 1966	676	482,360 *	82


* Includes revised MACV population estimate for city of Danang, and refugee movement into total tactical area.

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GROWTH OF THE CHU LAI MARINE TACTICAL AREA




DATE	SQUARE MILES	CIVILIAN POPULATION	VILLAGES
7 MAY 1965	1	0	0
END MAY 1965	55	22,798	6
JUNE 1965	102	55,669	11
SEPT 1965	201	111,219	24
JAN 1966	274	112,769	26
APRIL 1966	347	157,962	40

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GROWTH OF THE PHU BAI MARINE TACTICAL AREA



DATE	SQUARE MILES	CIVILIAN POPULATION	VILLAGES
14 APRIL 1965	2	2,406	1
MAY 1965	38	8,204	4
JUNE 1965	61	17,601	6
JAN 1966	85	53,078	11
APRIL 1966	162	54,167	22

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
But size and population of the military areas do not tell the whole story by themselves. Hunting down enemy soldiers and expanding areas of offensive military operations are meaningful only if they bring with them an improved level of security to the people living in those areas.

The enemy troops must not only be destroyed or expelled, but their infrastructure must also be destroyed. Villagers must come to develop their own local governments, without Viet Cong coercion. Minimum social and administrative organization must be established and commence to function. Villagers must prepare their own defensive programs, build their own defenses and then assemble and train the troops to man them. They must develop their own intelligence networks, and their own psychological and information programs. They must develop their own health programs, educational facilities, agricultural programs, transportation systems and facilities for marketing their goods.

In short, they must come to do what they have never been able to do before: build their own government and develop the strength to defend it. Obviously, they cannot do these things themselves. They need our help, and are getting it. The extent to which these things are done is the real key to the success of the pacification program. Therefore, it is essential to assess progress in those terms. The following figures, based on these and similar factors, constitute an analysis of the pacification progress which has followed the military progress in the Marine Tactical Areas over the past three months.

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CHANGE IN PACIFICATION STATUS * IN TOTAL MARINE TACTICAL AREAS SINCE FEBRUARY 1966

PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	APR	CHANGE	FEB	APR	CHANGE	FEB	APR	CHANGE
0%	723	874	+151	203,376	283,658	+80,282	78	101	+23
20%	112	135	+23	69,734	71,147	+1,413	16	15	-1
40%	18	43	+25	16,100	44,652	+28,552	4	9	+5
60%	64	52	-12	42,522	45,631	+3,109	10	11	+1
80%	31	81	+50	175,000	249,401	+74,401	1	8	+7
100%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	948	1,185	+237	506,732	694,489	+187,757	109	144	+35

* Criteria for assessment of pacification status are displayed on the following page.

In order to permit an orderly assessment of pacification progress, the Marines have developed an index system of measuring and recording a broad range of essential indicators such as those mentioned above. Individual indicators are weighted according to their relative importance, and a number of points are assigned to each. The factors which make up the system are shown on the following page. Then, on the three subsequent pages, assessments are made of individual Marine areas, showing progressive changes in pacification status through February, March and April.

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
INDICATORS USED IN ASSESSMENT OF PACIFICATION STATUS

1. DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY UNITS		POINTS
a. VC units destroyed or expelled		15
b. Local defensive force established		5
	TOTAL	20
2. DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY INFRASTRUCTURE		
a. Village census completed		2
b. VC infrastructure destroyed		8
c. Local intelligence net established		5
d. Census, grievance interviews completed		2
e. Action completed on grievances		3
	TOTAL	20
3. VIETNAMESE ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY		
a. Defensive plan completed		2
b. Defensive installations completed		3
c. Security forces trained and in place		12
d. Communications net established		3
	TOTAL	20
4. ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT		
a. Village chief and council in office		4
b. Village chief residing in village		3
c. Hamlet chiefs and councils in office		4
d. Hamlet chiefs residing in hamlet		4
e. Psy-ops and information program established		3
f. Minimum social and administrative organization		2
	TOTAL	20
5. DEGREE OF NEW LIFE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT		
a. Adequate public health program		4
b. Adequate education facilities		4
c. Adequate agricultural development		4
d. Adequate transportation facilities		4
e. Necessary markets established		4
	TOTAL	20

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PACIFICATION STATUS-DANANG TACTICAL AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES				CIVILIAN POPULATION				VILLAGES			
	FEB	MAR	APR	CHANGE FEB-APR	FEB	MAR	APR	CHANGE FEB-APR	FEB	MAR	APR	CHANGE FEB-APR
* 0%	457	428	512	+55	94,491	95,489	163,432	+68,941	53	47	57	+4
20%	57	56	62	+6	36,258	35,054	33,102	-3,156	9	8	8	-1
40%	18	31	28	+10	16,100	17,483	34,862	+18,462	4	7	7	+3
60%	26	45	43	+17	19,036	53,539	32,596	+13,560	5	9	8	+3
80%	31	29	31	-	175,000	210,000	218,668	+43,668	1	1	2	+1
100%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	589	589	676	-	340,885	411,565	482,360	-	72	72	62	-

* The regions in the 0% category are those in which effort is being applied, but where no survey has been conducted yet, or where the pacification level has not yet reached 20%. Villages in those areas which have been analyzed vary from 0% to as high as 19% pacified.


** Includes revised MACV population estimate for city of Danang, and refugee movement into total tactical area.

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PACIFICATION STATUS-CHU LAI TACTICAL AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES				CIVILIAN POPULATION				VILLAGES			
	FEB	MAR	APR	CHANGE FEB-APR	FEB	MAR	APR	CHANGE FEB-APR	FEB	MAR	APR	CHANGE FEB-APR
* 0%	244	193	284	+20	91,145	58,480	103,643	12,498	21	16	30	+9
20%	30	34	73	+43	21,624	18,240	38,045	16,421	5	3	7	+2
40%	—	25	—	—	—	26,802	—	—	—	5	—	—
60%	—	22	6	+6	—	9,267	12,083	12,083	—	2	2	+2
80%	—	—	4	+4	—	—	4,191	4,191	—	—	1	+1
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	274	274	347	—	112,769	112,769	157,962	—	26	26	40	—

* The regions in the 0% category are those in which effort is being applied, but where no survey has been conducted yet, or where the pacification level has not yet reached 20%. Villages in those areas which have been analyzed vary from 0% to as high as 19% pacified.


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PACIFICATION STATUS-PHU BAI TACTICAL AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES				CIVILIAN POPULATION				VILLAGES			
	FEB	MAR	APR	CHANGE FEB-APR	FEB	MAR	APR	CHANGE FEB-APR	FEB	MAR	APR	CHANGE FEB-APR
* 0%	22	22	98	+76	17,740	17,760	16,583	-1,167	4	3	14	+10
20%	25	7	—	-25	11,852	4,055	—	-11,852	2	1	—	-2
40%	—	8	15	+15	—	7,651	10,090	+10,090	—	1	2	+2
60%	38	1	3	-35	23,486	483	952	-22,534	5	1	1	-4
80%	—	47	46	+46	—	23,229	26,542	+26,542	—	5	5	+5
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	65	65	162	—	53,078	53,078	54,167	—	11	11	22	—

* The regions in the 0% category are those in which effort is being applied, but where no survey has been conducted yet, or where the pacification level has not yet reached 20%. Villages in those areas which have been analyzed vary from 0% to as high as 19% pacified.

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The permanence of the progress shown on the previous pages, however, is going to depend on the ability of Popular Force units to move in behind III MAF and maintain an adequate level of security. At the end of April, these forces still were not adequate for the task, both in training and numbers. Personnel strength remained at approximately 23,000, still 6,000 short of the minimum requirements, while implementation of the program to bring additional PF units under MAF control, endorsed on 28 January by General Thi, was halted by the change of I Corps (ARVN) commanders and political unrest during March and April. (This program was covered in detail in the February report of this series.)

By the end of the month, however, there were signs of progress. General Ton That Dinh, new CG of I Corps, concurred in III MAF control of additional PF units, and steps were being taken for the immediate formation of seven additional Combined Action Companies, raising to nine the number of these integrated Marine/Popular Force units throughout the Marine areas.

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BASE SECURITY

While III MAF's military offensive efforts continued virtually uninterrupted in the countryside, the explosive Vietnamese political situation in the urban areas of Danang posed a potential threat to the key air installations there, and thus affected to some extent Marine activities at those bases. Although the threat never materialized, all the ingredients were present for violence between opposing factions of the Vietnamese armed forces. The Commanding General, 1st ARVN Division, had announced himself in sympathy with the anti-government "Struggle Forces". Units in his command and forces identified as loyal to the government were both converging on Danang, while other anti-government elements had set up roadblocks in and around the city. Some 2,000 Vietnamese Marines, the bulk of the pro-government forces, were standing by at Danang Air Base, and 24 A-1 aircraft of the Vietnamese Air Force, potentially a key weapon in suppressing an armed revolt, were located there. Obviously the airfield would become a focal point of any open clash between armed Vietnamese.

Fortunately, the month long period of unrest and demonstrations failed to erupt into armed conflict. The first of the demonstrations had occurred in Danang on 11 March, when an orderly crowd of about two thousand I Corps soldiers and government workers protested Premier Ky's dismissal on 10 March of General Nguyen Chanh Thi as I Corps Commander. The following day, pro-Thi rallies spread to Hue and Hoi An, and then to Quang Ngai, with demonstrators calling not only for Thi's return but also for a cleanup in the Saigon government.

In Hue on 14 March, Buddhists fanned the unrest by calling for the removal of all military men from the government in Saigon.

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Intermittent strikes and other displays of protest continued for the remainder of the month without serious incident. By then, the Danang dissidents had abandoned their pro-Thi movement in favor of the anti-government demands of the Hue Buddhists: a democratically based civilian council as the national assembly, return of the military to the battlefield, and economic and social reforms. On 22 March, anti-American themes were noted for the first time in rallies at Hue and Danang. In Danang on the following day a strike was held by a large segment of the Vietnamese employed by the US military and civilian agencies and the RMK construction company.

Anti-government rallies continued through 1 April, particularly in Danang. On 2 April, Premier Ky described Danang as being in the hands of communists and promised military action to free the city. Three days later, three Vietnamese Marine battalions were lifted to the air base at Danang, where they awaited commitment against the insurgents. At the same time, armed civilians and ARVN soldiers supporting the "Struggle Forces" set up roadblocks around Danang and Hue to prevent movement into or out of the two cities. The situation remained tense but quiet from 6 through 8 April as additional troop moves were made or threatened by both sides.

As a precautionary measure, on the morning of 9 April American civilians were evacuated, under Marine supervision, from Hue and Danang. At about this time pro-US demonstrations began to appear, in some cases with loudspeakers enjoining all to realize that the US is Vietnam's great friend and ally. In wake of the evacuations, anti-government factions began to address the Americans through Radio Danang and loudspeaker trucks conveying the message that the "Struggle Forces" appreciate American assistance and would ensure that the Americans would not be harmed.

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Tension reached a peak on 9 April when III MAF received reports that an ARVN Armored Personnel Carrier troop, some infantry and howitzers were moving from Hoi An to Danang, apparently to join the "Struggle Forces." When the group was attacked briefly by VNAF aircraft operating from Danang, III MAF promptly asked that such offensive activity from the base be discontinued. VNAF complied. The commander of the Vietnamese troops was told that movement of 155mm howitzers to positions within range of the air base was unacceptable. At the same time a Marine truck was parked to block a bridge, halting movement of the column nearer the airfield. Shortly thereafter, Vietnamese gunners with the 155mm howitzers broke out ammunition, and started fuzing rounds. The Vietnamese commander was informed that if he fired on the air base he would endanger US lives and installations and that Marine artillery would fire on his howitzers. At that time Marines actually had pieces laid, but intended to fire 400 meters away from the Vietnamese, at least initially. After about an hour the Vietnamese directed two howitzers at the truck blocking the bridge. The Marines then aimed two Ontos at the howitzers. After a brief but tense period the ARVN gunners elevated their tubes and the episode was over. Subsequent events transpired at a progressively more relaxed level.

Also on the 9th, General Nguyen Van Chuan, who had replaced General Thi as CG I Corps, resigned his post and was succeeded by General Ton That Dinh. Upon assuming command, Dinh ordered ARVN troops to return to their units and, in an apparent effort to restore an air of normalcy, moved one of the three Vietnamese Marine battalions at Danang Air Base to Quang Ngai. Danang and Hue remained calm on 10 and 11 April and with the marked easing of tensions, the remaining two Vietnamese Marine battalions departed Danang for Saigon on 12 April. Although demonstrations, pro-Ky and pro-opposition, continued sporadically through the 20th, for all practical purposes the crisis was over.

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No extraordinary defensive measures were taken during the trouble, since the regular III MAF perimeter defensive system was considered adequate for protection against possible anti-government activity. However, some precautionary steps were taken. Continuous air surveillance of routes around Danang and Hue was maintained, for example. Aircraft capable of dispensing riot control agents were readied, and additional ground units were alerted for possible defense of the bases.

Normal defense of the air bases against Viet Cong action continued in the same pattern as in previous months.

At the northernmost base, Phu Bai, the responsibility for base defense was again shared by the three battalions which operated within the tactical area, even though the field itself lies within the area assigned to the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. The fourth battalion at Phu Bai, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, operated to the north of the tactical area for most of the month.

At Danang the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines remained as the Air Base Defense Battalion for the majority of the month. Patrols outside the air base perimeter were curtailed briefly because of the political situation, resulting in a decrease of 27% in counter guerrilla actions by that unit. On 30 April the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines was assigned as the Air Base Defense Battalion. The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines returned to the operational control of the 9th Marines and assumed responsibility for the area vacated by its relief.

Fifty-three miles to the south, the close-in defense of the Chu Lai and Ky Ha fields continued to be the responsibility of the Chu Lai Defense Command which was established at the end of March. On 9 April two rifle companies and Command Group Bravo of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines

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
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relieved elements of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines as the infantry element of this organization. Additional support continued to be provided by one platoon each from the 1st Tank and 1st Anti-Tank Battalions.

Marine aircraft, as in previous months, constituted the majority of aircraft in I Corps Tactical Zone. On 30 April, 64% of the total inventory, or 367 aircraft, were from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. In addition there were 105 U. S. Air Force, 45 U. S. Army, 3 U. S. Navy and 50 Vietnamese Air Force aircraft stationed at Danang and Hue Phu Bai.

AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT THE FIVE MARINE AIRFIELDS

IN I CTZ AS OF 30 APRIL 1966




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The political unrest had no perceptible effect on First Marine Aircraft Wing operations, which continued at approximately the same level as in March. Some 5,100 fixed wing sorties were flown, with the majority carried out in support of units other than III MAF. Of the total, some 1400, or 27% were turned over to 7th Air Force, and flown in support of Vietnamese troops in I or II Corps, while another 1,400 were flown in Laos and North Vietnam against targets designated by the 7th Air Force and U. S. Navy. The remaining 2,300 sorties were flown in support of Marines operating in I Corps.

FIXED WING COMBAT SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF III MAF AND UNITS OTHER THAN III MAF




The seven Marine helicopter squadrons in RVN flew a record number of sorties, 39,441, for the month of April. Over 5,000 of these were in support of ARVN forces and

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139 air rescue missions were flown to pick up downed pilots of all services in RVN, Laos and North Vietnam.

HELICOPTER SORTIES AND PASSENGERS LIFTED



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LOGISTICS

Although logistic progress was at a slower pace during April as a result of the political and civil disturbances in the I CTZ, available material and services were adequate to support III MAF operations, and some improvement was noted in the overall logistic situation. The closing of the cities of Danang and Hue to military traffic, the loss of commercial assistance in cargo handling and movement, and the slowdown or stoppage of construction tasks utilizing civilian labor all contributed to the reduction in logistic tasks accomplished. Even so, essential services and resupply were conducted, alternate routes and methods of effecting logistic support were developed, and the logistic situation at the end of the period of unrest was satisfactory.

Supply: The general status was adequate; however, the distribution of supplies was curtailed at times during the period of tension. Items previously reported as being in short supply, such as rough terrain forklift repair parts, were isolated and subjected to expedited supply actions. The use of CRITIPAC, RED BALL, and parcel post shipments of high priority items filled most requirements.

Class I -- Stock levels remained adequate during the period even though there were temporary drawdowns of all types of rations without replacements at the height of the unrest. There was some disruption in the feeding of "A" rations (fresh provisions) since organic and other storage capacity is limited to less than seven days supply; however, an adequate stock of other rations was available.

Class II -- The fifth monthly shipment of CRITIPACS (high usage routinely required items) was shipped on 15 April and delivered to the using units of III MAF within ten

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days. Revised packing procedures on these packages eliminated approximately 100 pounds of tare weight; each CRITIPAC box is now limited to 400 pounds. Also, revised procedures will now permit the contents of the CRITIPACS to be changed each month to meet the needs of using units. As a measure of effectiveness of the RED BALL system for special supply action, there were initially 280 requisition documents for 128 different items to support the 6,000 pound rough terrain forklift on RED BALL. There are currently only 28 documents for 14 items required for the rough terrain forklift on RED BALL.

Class III and IIIA -- The supply of POL products from the commercial facilities in Danang and the use of civilian trucks for delivery were halted during the first half of the month when the political turmoil was most active. This necessitated the installation of a second expeditionary fuel line from the fuel farm at the Danang Air Base to Red Beach One, directly north of the base, and the installation of a buoyant ship-to-shore fuel line from the South China Sea to the vicinity of Marble Mountain Air Facility. Commercial POL deliveries to Phu Bai were virtually stopped for the first three weeks of April. Because of the uncertain flow of commercially delivered POL, a bulk fuel farm was established near the mouth of the Hue River to provide a reliable source of fuel in that area and a ship-to-shore buoyant fuel line was installed to the farm. This farm has a capacity of 110,000 gallons of aviation gasoline and 80,000 gallons of JP-4 jet fuel.

Class IV -- Supply was adequate, materials were stockpiled at each FLSG and routine supply to supported units was accomplished.

Class V and VA -- Stocks of ground ammunition continued to be maintained at 45 days of supply. CINCPAC assumed logistic control of all Class VA assets in PACOM, and directed

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that a major portion of the 250 and 500 pound low drag bombs on hand in III MAF be transferred to the U. S. Air Force. The remaining assets of these preferred items of aviation ordnance were carefully rationed, supplemented by the use of less desirable high drag bombs, for which an adequate supply was available.

Maintenance: Contact instruction teams from FMFPAC for automotive test equipment and automotive maintenance procedures have been in III MAF during the period, providing instructions to mechanics and operators at all echelons.

The Force Logistic Command in III MAF has been authorized to undertake selected fourth echelon maintenance. At the same time the 3d FSR on Okinawa is conducting fifth echelon (depot) maintenance on many items normally evacuated to Barstow under the recoverable items program and on generators and motor transport equipment which has been removed from the FMFPAC Replacement and Evacuation Program. In addition, arrangements have been completed with the Public Works Center, Yokosuka, Japan to commence a program in May to rebuild 12 generators and 40 M-54 trucks per month. To provide further for an increased capability in this area, agreements also are being negotiated with the U. S. Army Depot, Sagami, Japan to rebuild motor transport and engineer equipment.

Although the flight performance of the 24 CH-46A helicopters flown by HMM-164 has been excellent, the constant sand and dirt encountered in Vietnam has caused serious maintenance problems. The T-58 engine compressor blades and stator vanes were subjected to heavy erosion, requiring frequent replacement. Sand damage necessitated the replacement of 50 engine mount bearings, the change of 15 engine condition actuators, and the change of 9 rotor blades, all during the period 30 March to 18 April. Corrective measures, such as the provision of engine air

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intake filters, improved compressor blades, increased availability of spare engines, improved rotor blades, and new fuel filters have been recommended by the CG, First Marine Aircraft Wing and CG FMFPac to Commander, Naval Aircraft Pacific and the Chief of the Bureau of Weapons (Chief of Naval Material).

Medical: During Operation Jack Stay a Surgical and Evacuation Team was transferred from USS Repose (AH-16) to USS Princeton (LPH-5). During the operation a total of 209 personnel were evacuated to the team's facilities on the Princeton. Of these evacuees, 31 were evacuated for wounds and 178 were evacuated for non-combat injuries.

To assist the Civic Action program a lieutenant commander, Medical Service Corps, has been assigned to III MAF Headquarters. His duties include supervision of supplies for MEDCAP programs, as well as the organization of programs for training rural health workers.

Port Facilities: The civil disturbances and lack of all or a major part of the civilian labor force for the first half of the period resulted in delays in the construction of improved unload facilities. In addition, the loss of civilian workers on other projects required that some of the military construction force on the port facilities accomplish the high priority tasks at the airfields and other areas. Some progress was realized on all projects. At the LST/LCU unload facility by the Tourane River bridge, installation of deadmen on the quay wall was completed, and dredging of the approaches continued. By month's end, the project was 45 percent complete. Most noticeable progress was made on the Observation Point piers, where the dredging was 36 percent complete and the land fill 40 percent complete. On 31 March, the overall project was 16 percent complete. It is estimated that a Delong pier will be available for use

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in July, with the remaining two conventional piers being completed in October. Planning continued on the construction of LST unloading facilities in the vicinity of Hue to support increased tactical operations in that area. To facilitate current resupply operations with LCU's, an Underwater Demolition Team blasted a 126 feet wide opening, to a depth of six feet, through the Hue river entrance breakwater.

Engineer Operations: Until 14 April, construction projects throughout the Danang area were seriously hampered by the political unrest. Travel restrictions curtailed the flow of materials between east and west Danang, and the Vietnamese labor force employed by the RMK Construction Company was non-effective until mid-April.

Until 14 April, limited progress was made on the new III MAF CP at Marble Mountain by using military construction personnel and non-RVN contractor workers. Construction supervisors, plumbers, equipment operators and equipment were furnished to this project by the 30th NCR, while 7th Engineer personnel were assigned to other high priority work such as the Danang Air Base parking apron. By 15 April the majority of Vietnamese workers had returned, with normal operations evident by 21 April.

Operations at the air base at Chu Lai have continued the progressive validation of the short airfield concept. The short airfield, developed by Marines for use in underdeveloped countries where airfields are limited, employs mobile arresting gear, catapults, and JATO, uses interlocking aluminum mats for the runway and parking surfaces, and contains supporting equipment common to a regular field - e.g., portable control tower, liquid oxygen plants, and complete communication, radar and fueling components. Much of this same type of equipment was provided MACV to assist in the construction of jet-capable expeditionary fields

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at Phan Rang and Cam Ranh Bay in II Corps.

Through some 30,000 takeoffs and landings by all types of aircraft, from the A4 to the KC-130, and through eleven months of continuous operation under particularly adverse climatic conditions, the entire system has proved effective and durable. On 29 April for example, a 500 pound bomb from a taxiing A4 dropped onto the runway, where it was run over by a following aircraft (without exploding) and with negligible damage to the aluminum matting. The two fist-size holes which resulted were repaired within twenty minutes. By the end of April, aircraft population had risen from the first single flight of A4's which landed at the field on 1 June 1965, only 25 days after construction began, to four attack squadrons of 90 jet aircraft which daily fly some 100 sorties against targets in Laos and South Vietnam.

Movement and Resupply: The introduction of 1st Marine Division units continued during April. During the month, the 1st Motor Transport Battalion (-) (Rein), a detachment of 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, BLT 2/5, and the Construction Platoon of the Radio Relay and Construction Company, 7th Communication Battalion arrived at Chu Lai. A total of 1,806 personnel were introduced into RVN from amphibious ships. In addition, the USNS General Gordon arrived at Danang 4 April with 530 replacement personnel for III MAF.

Cargo operations at Danang were virtually suspended during the period from 4 to 12 April. Assuming that the discharge rate established in March could have been maintained uninterrupted through the first half of April, it is estimated that the demonstrations and political strife reduced the total cargo unloaded during the period 1-19 April by approximately 30,000 M/T. Nevertheless, April

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was the second highest cargo handling month to date, exceeded only by March.

During the month, the average daily cargo discharge rate at Danang was 4,855 M/T, while during March the average was 5,197 M/T per day. A total of 145,659 M/T of cargo were unloaded during April. On 27 April a record 9,795 M/T throughput for a single day was achieved at Danang. This eclipsed the previous record high of 9,265 M/T set on 28 February.

On 31 March there were 9 ships in port at Danang. During April, 21 ships arrived and 24 ships completed unloading and departed; six were in port on 30 April with 14,388 M/T of cargo backlogged. The average stay of deep-draft ships in port was 9.5 days. The backlog on 31 March was 23,785 M/T, and the average daily backlog for April was 24,432 M/T.

The Military Airlift Command cargo channel between Kadena, Okinawa and Danang was utilized to move 415 S/T of high priority cargo. The 315th Air Division and organic Marine aircraft moved an additional 906 S/T, for a total of 1,321 S/T of airlifted cargo from areas outside Vietnam to Danang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai.

Road travel, as distinguished from air and seaborne logistics, continued to be used more exclusively as the Marine influence grew. During the month at least 400 tons were moved over the road between Danang and Phu Bai and between Danang and Chu Lai. This increasing road travel is accompanied by a corresponding increase in friendly influence in the regions between the hard Marine base areas.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. PHU BAI - There were no changes in major unit dispositions in April. The Marine area of responsibility was again increased, to the south and west, during the month. The map on page 22 portrays this latest expansion, which doubled the size of the area.

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regt Hq	0	1	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	4	7	Battalions	0	0
Companies	2	2	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	1795	3695	Total Strength	150	150
<u>Within 25 to 50 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 to 50 miles</u>		
Sub Region Hq	1	1	Regt Hq	0	0
Regt Hq	2	0	Battalions	5	5
Battalions	8	4	Companies	3	3
Companies	8	12			
Total Strength	5405	2765	Total Strength	2345	2265
<u>Grand Total to 50 miles</u>	7200	6460	<u>Grand Total to 50 miles</u>	2495	2415

A comparison of the March 1966 and the April 1966 confirmed enemy order of battle indicates that there has been an increase of 740 enemy personnel within a fifty mile radius of the Phu Bai airfield. The increase was caused by the confirmation of the 6th NVA Regimental Headquarters and the 812th NVA Battalion. Both are within fifty miles of the Phu Bai airfield.

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2. DANANG - On 1 April HMM-161 arrived at Marble Mountain from Okinawa in a normal inter-theater rotation. HMM-361 completed the rotation by returning to Okinawa on the same date. In another inter-theater rotation VMFA-161 arrived at Danang from Iwakuni, Japan on 11 April. VMFA-314 returned to Iwakuni on 15 April. The number of infantry battalions at Danang was increased to seven with the arrival of BLT 2/4 from Chu Lai on 15 April. BLT 2/4 has been placed under the operational control of the 9th Marines.

Area expansion during April is shown on page 20.

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regt Hq	0	0	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	4	3	Battalions	3	3
Companies	5	5	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	2590	2190	Total Strength	1425	1425
<u>Within 25 to 50 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 to 50 miles</u>		
Regt Hq	1	2	Regt Hq	0	1
Battalions	4	8	Battalions	3	4
Companies	10	10	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	3165	4865	Total Strength	1350	2650
<u>Grand Total to 50 miles</u>	5755	7055	<u>Grand Total to 50 miles</u>	2775	4075

A comparison of the March 1966 and the April 1966 confirmed enemy order of battle indicates a reduction

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of 1,300 enemy personnel within a fifty mile radius of the Danang tactical area. This decrease in confirmed strength figures is due to the southern movement of the 1st VC Regiment into northern Quang Ngai province.

3. CHU LAI - The build up of the 1st Marine Division continued with the arrival of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion (-) and BLT 2/5 from Okinawa on 2 and 12 April respectively. In an inter-theater transfer on 8 April HMM-362 flew ashore from the USS Princeton (LPH-5) and was replaced by HMM-364 as the helicopter squadron of the 7th Fleet's Special Landing Force.

The Marine area of responsibility was increased during the month. The map on page 21 portrays this latest expansion, which aggregates a growth of about 27%.

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
MR V Hq	1	1	Regt Hq	0	0
Div Hq	1	0	Battalions	2	2
Regt Hq	2	2	Companies	0	0
Battalions	8	10			
Companies	11	11			
Total Strength	6500	6559	Total Strength	600	600
<u>Within 25 to 50 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 to 50 miles</u>		
Regt Hq	0	0	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	5	5	Battalions	4	3
Companies	10	9	Companies	0	0
Total Strength	3510	3400	Total Strength	1700	1300
<u>Grand Total to 50 miles</u>	10010	9959	<u>Grand Total to 50 miles</u>	2300	1900

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A comparison of the March 1966 and the April 1966 confirmed enemy order of battle indicates an increase of 51 enemy personnel within a fifty mile radius of the Chu Lai tactical area. The slight increase was caused by the confirmation of the 620th NVA Divisional Headquarters and normal order of battle adjustments.

4. III MAF TOTAL AREA


<u>Increase during April</u>		<u>Total as of 30Apr</u>
237	Square miles	1,185
187,777	Civilians	694,489
35	Villages	144

5. VIET CONG LOSSES FOR APRIL 1966

<u>As of 30 April</u>		<u>Total to Date</u>
593	KIA	5,483
71	VC (Captured)	764
698	VC (Suspects)	5,770
8	WIA	454
95	Weapons	1,015

6. CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS

<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>		<u>Total as of 30Apr</u>
84,035	62,482	Persons Given Medical Treatment	471,531
77	25	Persons Given Medical Training	259
80	42	Construction Projects	409
44,595	50,793	Pounds of Food Distributed	307,418
9,945	8,235	Pounds of Soap Distributed	80,381



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CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS (cont)

9,394	2,921	Pounds of Clothing Distributed	161,132
81	162	Critically III Civilians Evacuated	4,808
136	57	English Language Classes In Progress	366
\$1,884	\$1,713	Cash Donations	\$24,727
45,338	156,813	Persons Fed	257,054
3,120	3,510	Students Supported	16,867
		Miles of Road Reasonably Secure for Daylight Travel (cumulative through April)	270

7. III MAF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>		<u>Total as of 30Apr</u>
6,788	7,183	Patrols	39,087
4,361	5,653	Ambushes	24,435
136	451	Sniper Posts	1,460
2	4	Regimental or Larger Opns	21
13	10	Battalion Opns	71
96	202	Company Opns	764
5,637	5,107	Offensive Air Sorties	35,408
33,268	39,441	Helo Transport Sorties	273,904

8. III MAF STRENGTH - ON 30 APRIL

Danang	25,346
Chu Lai	19,268
Hue Phu Bai	<u>7,055</u>
Total	51,669

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9. LOGISTICS

a. Supply Levels at End of Period:

DANANG CHU LAI PHU BAI

Class I (1000 of
rations/
days of
supply)

MCI (Rations)	870/30	720/34	122/16
B Rations	325/12	418/20	59/8
A Rations	27/1	80/4	9/1

Class III & III A (BULK):
(1000 gallons/days of
supply)

JP-4	145/6*	549/6	39/4
AVGAS	105/8	79/5	18/4
MOGAS	230/14	102/4	42/14
DIESEL	134/3	97/3	25/10

* Includes only JP-4 stored by FLSC; does not include NAVSUPACT, Danang storage or deliveries from NAVSUPACT direct to operating squadrons.

Class V & VA:

Ground Ammo
(days of supply)

	45	45	45
250 lb bombs	3,718 (incl 28 low drag)	4,224 (incl 566 low drag)	-

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500 lb bombs (number of bombs)	201	1,014	-
Launcher W/19 2.75 in. rockets	14	36	-
Launcher W/4 5 in. rockets	957	608	-

b. Resupply Status:

(1) Surface shipping status (Danang):

Cargo unloaded (April)	- 145,659 M/T
Average daily discharge rate	- 4,855 M/T
Ships in port 31 March	- 9
Ships arriving during April	- 21
Ships unloaded during April	- 24
Ships in port 30 April	- 6
Cargo backlog 31 March	- 23,785 M/T
Cargo backlog 30 April	- 14,388 M/T
Average cargo backlog (April)	- 24,432 M/T

(2) Air shipping status:

Cargo lifted into RVN (April)	- 1,321 S/T
Cargo awaiting lift on Okinawa as of 1 May	- 271 S/T

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c. RED BALL Summary (April)

Items at beginning of period	- 315
Items added	- 313
Items removed	- 189
Items remaining at end of period	- 439

d. Maintenance (April)

Items evacuated from RVN	-1,029
Items repaired at 3d FSR	- 528
Items returned to CONUS from 3d FSR	- 175
Items disposed of on Okinawa	- 363

e. Construction Projects

Roads rehabilitated or constructed	- Maintenance and improvement to existing roads.
Bridges constructed	- 1 Class 60 completed.
Wells drilled	- 3 completed and 3 in progress.
Covered storage, NSA (Includes maint. facilities)	- 224,000 sq ft completed and 160,000 sq ft under construction.

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Covered storage, III MAF
(Includes maint. facilities)

- 48,000 sq ft
completed and
36,000 sq ft un-
der construction.

Ammo storage facilities

- ASP#1 68%
completed;
ASP#2 76%
completed.

POL storage tanks, 10,000 BBL

- Danang, 3 com-
pleted; Chu Lai,
2 completed; 2
under construction
at Danang, 1 un-
der construction
at Chu Lai, and
1 under construction
at Marble Mt.

Status Of:

400 Bed Hospital
(Marble Mt)

- 73% complete

Water supply distribution
system (Danang)

- 76% complete

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