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FMFPAC: Operations of US Marine
Forces, Vietnam

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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

VIETNAM

JUNE 1966

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of June 1966. Its purpose is to update similar reports covering periods from March 1965 through May 1966.

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
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Progress in the I Corps Tactical Zone was more clearly evident during June than at any time since the arrival of the Marines in Vietnam. The populous part of the I Corps area is slowly being freed of Viet Cong domination. Government administration of hamlets and villages is expanding, freedom of travel is improving, and intelligence deriving from the populace is growing. Despite the political unrest of the past three months, with its inhibiting effect on operations, there is greater momentum in the Marine effort in I Corps today than ever before.

For the fourth consecutive month, there were over 10,000 small unit, counterguerrilla operations. Of the 1,201 enemy killed by Marines during the month, 384 were killed in these small-unit engagements. Companion with this gradual destruction of the guerrilla force there were 11 large-scale Marine offensive operations - 9 by III MAF, extending into four of the five provinces of I Corps, and 2 by Marines of the Special Landing Force of the 7th Fleet, in the II Corps area south of Qui Nhon. During the month, 348 Viet Cong or North Vietnamese regulars were killed in large-unit encounters and another 86 were captured. In all, Marines registered about 6 battalion days of offensive military operations per battalion per week, throughout the month.

Marine fixed wing aircraft flew 4,096 combat or combat support sorties in June, approximately the same number flown in May. There were 38,279 helicopter sorties, an increase of 1,500 over the total for May.

The effective County Fair type operations continued during June, when there were 7 of these, compared with 6 in May. In addition to the beneficial health, information



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and population control measures - which resulted in some 2,600 villagers screened, fingerprinted, and interviewed - the careful search of these hitherto cleared villages still netted 2 VC killed, 16 captured (including one guerrilla platoon leader), and 15 suspects apprehended.


At the end of June, there was manifest progress in the pacification of the 1,185 square mile area under Marine influence. In February, when a statistical assessment of progress was initiated (see February report), only one village was considered to be 80% pacified. By the end of June, 22 additional villages, encompassing 182,335 people, had progressed to the 80% category. In February, 14 villages qualified for the 40%-80% group. By 30 June, the number had more than doubled, to 31. At the end of the month 49 villages were organizing local defense forces, compared with 39 in May, and a census was being taken in 46 villages, an increase of 12 during the month. The number of village markets under development showed an 83% gain during June - from 36 to a new total of 66 - and public information programs were introduced to 14 new villages, a 43% growth over similar programs in May.

Perhaps as significant as any other program aimed at bringing stability to the countryside was the road building effort. In the past three months, Marines have opened up 46 kilometers of road in areas where surface travel had previously been impracticable.

The Combined Action Company program - integrating US Marines with Vietnamese Popular Forces - had begun to regain its thrust in June after being brought to a virtual standstill during the previous three months of political turmoil. At the end of the month there were 37 Combined Action Platoons throughout the Marine areas, compared with 20 in May. Additionally, 5 Regional Force companies had been integrated into the program at Danang,

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in the same manner as Popular Force units. The goal, throughout the MAF area, is now ten companies with a total of 74 platoons.

The logistic situation showed general improvement throughout the III MAF area. Construction work, for the first time in three months, was unimpeded by the adverse effects of civil strife and there was good progress on all projects; surface travel between the tactical areas was accomplished with regularity; and supplies were available in adequate quantity.



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COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

In June, over 10,000 small unit offensive actions - the fourth consecutive month for this saturation level activity - blunted the VC effort to take advantage of the political unrest and to harass the people of the countryside.

A record number of company-size operations (227, compared with 127 in May) reduced somewhat the number of platoon and squad size patrols and ambushes and resulted in a slight decline in the monthly aggregate of counter-guerrilla operations, from a high in May of 13,201 to 10,534 for June. Contacts, nevertheless, continued to increase and reached a record level - 1,468. One out of seven small unit actions found the enemy, a 14% rate of contact which compares with the previous high of 8% in May.

It is useful to review briefly the area of focus of these operations and their relation to the total campaign. Marine counterguerrilla operations are concentrated in 7,000 square kilometers (2,600 square miles) of the coastal plain - about one fourth of the total I Corps area. This plain is the source of all the salt, all the fish, and almost all of the 470,000 tons of rice annually produced in I CTZ. Also in the coastal plain are about 1.7 million of the 2.6 million people of I CTZ. The other three-fourths of the Corps zone is very sparsely inhabited and capable of producing barely sufficient food for the scattered tribal people who live there. Enemy military units which infiltrate or are driven into the mountains from the lowlands are obliged to obtain elsewhere foodstuffs which they require. Only a small fraction of the 40,000 pounds of rice estimated as the enemy's daily requirement in I Corps can be imported from Laos or Cambodia. The bulk, by far, must be obtained from the rice-rich coastal plains.

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
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
As more of the rich lowlands come under direct Marine influence, and the guerrilla infrastructure is systematically destroyed, less food becomes available to the enemy's main force units bivouacked in the mountains, because it is mainly the guerrillas who provide the link between the Main Force and the rice and fish from the coastal lowlands. As this occurs, Main Force elements are forced to move down out of the mountains in order to procure their own food. Thus, much pivots on the coastal plain and elimination of the guerrillas there.

Destruction of the local guerrilla forces is a gradual process. But the monthly totals give evidence of the serious hurt they are suffering. In June, 384 of the enemy were killed, raising to 893 the total for the previous two months; in the past four months, over 1,200 guerrillas have been killed in small-unit engagements with Marines.

A significant number of guerrilla casualties have also resulted from a hunter-killer tactic employed by III MAF. Reconnaissance teams varying in size from 4 to 25 men infiltrate deep into suspected enemy areas, and then call in artillery missions and air strikes on targets they observe. Artillery and air support plans are developed and helicopter-borne infantry units are predesignated and alerted for the exploitation of significant sightings. Enemy casualties from this operational technique to date exceed 200 - the bulk killed by artillery.

Not included in this total are 43 of the enemy who were killed during a VC battalion size attack on an 18-man reconnaissance platoon manning a deep observation post 28 miles northwest of Chu Lai. The night attack lasted for about eight hours, but every effort to breach the Marine position was repulsed. Reinforcement or extraction of the platoon by helicopter was impossible because of the heavy volume of enemy fire, but at daybreak, an overland relief



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force arrived at the scene and relieved the reconnaissance platoon which still was holding its position despite having 17 of its 18 members either killed or wounded. At the time they were relieved, only seven of the 18 Marines were able to fight, and some of them had been propped up into positions from which they could fire point-blank at the assaulting VC. Forty-three enemy bodies were found, with considerably more doubtless killed and carried away during the night - as evidenced by the number of weapons recovered: 14 assault rifles, 10 carbines, and 5 light machine guns.

A program of the scope of III MAF's counterguerrilla campaign involves thousands of Marines on the move, day and night, patrolling over hundreds of square kilometers, setting ambushes and conducting offensive operations. This in turn exposes large numbers to Viet Cong mines. These have had their effect: in May, 73 Marines were killed and 518 were wounded by these devices; in June, 60 were killed and 427 were wounded.

As a result, every unit of III MAF is aggressively engaged in searching for solutions to the mine warfare problem. In January, the 3d Marine Division destroyed 99 Viet Cong mines. In May the number had risen to 252. The June figures, not yet calculated, will be even larger. Approximately 800 Marines a month now receive formal schooling in mine counter- measures. Over 7,000 have attended these schools to date. Units have had symposiums to exchange command experiences and ideas and III MAF has convened a Mine Warfare Board which seeks to bring together ideas. Good results have been obtained by firing artillery against areas suspected of being mined (in one field 40 meters by 125 meters, artillery fires were employed at 50 meter intervals and sixteen secondary explosions occurred), by using tracked vehicles to precede the infantry, and by offering cash rewards to civilians who report the locations of mines.

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
Patrol and ambush activity by the infantry battalions of III MAF is shown on the three pages that follow. Battalions are shown in the tactical area in which they were located on 30 June.

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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA




The eight infantry battalions at Danang conducted an average of 64 patrols and 72 ambushes each day during June. As has been the case in previous months, the majority of enemy contacts, 176 out of 204, were reported in the southern area. Additionally, the newly-arrived 1st MP Battalion, which relieved the 3d Bn, 3d Marines as the Base Defense Security Battalion on 16 June, conducted 576 small unit operations in the vicinity of Danang Air Base and Marble Mountain Air Facility.




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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHU LAI TACTICAL AREA



The five Chu Lai battalions conducted a daily average of 65 patrols and 31 ambushes during June. Following the trend established in May, enemy contacts were almost equally divided between the southeast and northwest portions of the tactical area.

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Three of the four battalions at Phu Bai were involved for varying lengths throughout the month in large scale operations external to the hard Marine base. For the entire month, for example, the 3d Bn, 4th Marines was committed to Operation Athens, a battalion size operation southeast of the tactical area.

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
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LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS


Large-scale offensive operations were conducted in four provinces of I Corps, while two hundred miles to the south, in II Corps, the battalion-size Marine Special Landing Force of the 7th Fleet participated in two offensive operations in the coastal plains of Phu Yen province.

In June, there were 11 of these large operations, in which 348 VC or North Vietnamese regulars were killed, 86 captured, and 261 suspects apprehended. Locations of the nine operations carried out by III MAF forces are shown below; the two conducted by the SLF are shown on page 19.

MARINE LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS - JUNE 1966



Operations identified here as "large unit" are those whose forces include at least three infantry companies and a controlling command group, and have a logical beginning and end. Their effectiveness is measured normally in terms of damage to the enemy, rather than "battalion days", for example, which actually serves only to describe the period that a unit is absent from its base.



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
As in May, the enemy generally declined to risk engagement of his main forces, relying on guerrillas and local forces to screen his movement away from contact with the Marines. There were two noteworthy exceptions to this pattern - and both ended unfavorably for the enemy.

The first of these occurred on 25 June in Operation Jay, when two battalions of Marines engaged elements of the 6th NVA Regiment operating in the coastal plains of Thua Thien Province, 19 kilometers northwest of Hue (see next page). At 0800, the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines landed by helicopter just north of the enemy's reported positions and attacked towards the southeast. An hour later the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines landed by helicopter to the southeast of the enemy and moved towards the northwest - in the direction of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. Intelligence estimates proved to be accurate. Trapped between the advancing Marine battalions was the 812th Battalion of the 6th NVA Regiment, which resisted stubbornly. Throughout the afternoon and night, Marine close support aircraft, artillery, and naval gunfire supported the converging Marine ground units as they compressed the enemy from two positions. During the night, the surviving North Vietnamese troops broke up into groups of twos and threes and fled the area, leaving behind 54 of their dead. There were indications that total casualties exceeded 200. In a search of the enemy positions, some 130 tons of rice were seized and later given to Vietnamese officials for redistribution. Marine casualties were 23 killed and 58 wounded; most of these were incurred in the initial contacts. Total enemy casualties for the 8 day operation were 82 KIA.

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OPERATION JAY



25 June

- (1) Reports received of 6th NVA Regt operating in coastal plain northwest of Hue.
- (2) 0800-2d Bn 4th Mar lands by helo and attacks southeast.
- (3) 0900-2d Bn 1st Mar lands by helo and attacks northwest.
- (4) 1300-Contact gained with VC Bn; heavy contact through the night. VC flee. Marine Bns continue search and destroy operations through 2 July and find 82 VC KIA.

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On 29 June, while Operation Jay was still in progress, a Vietnamese Marine convoy traveling along Route 1, only 8 kilometers from the Jay area, was ambushed by another battalion of the same 6th NVA Regiment (see next page).


After enemy mortars and recoilless rifles had stopped the convoy, debarking Vietnamese troops found themselves in a dense, enemy-laid minefield which was covered by heavy fire. Casualties in the first few minutes were heavy:

54 Vietnamese killed and 84 wounded. The enemy had made one error which ultimately turned his victory into a defeat - a failure to reconnoiter the area thoroughly. There were the greater portions of a Marine regiment within 5 miles of the ambush scene. Marine artillery, supporting the final stages of Operation Jay, monitored a radio message from the ambushed troops and immediately offered support. Within minutes, the Marines were firing at the enemy, trapping them in their ambush position. At the same time, Marine air attacks were called in, and the 2d Battalion, 1st U. S. Marines and a separate company were quickly lifted by helicopter to engage the ambushing NVA battalion. Five ARVN battalions also moved rapidly to exploit the contact, one of them helilifted by Marine helicopters. Before he was able to break contact, the enemy had lost 202 counted killed. There were no USMC casualties.

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
VC AMBUSH OF VIETNAMESE COLUMN



29June


- ① 0825-VC Bn ambushes 2d VNMC Bn in convoy on Route 1.
- ② 0840-USMC artillery supporting Op Jay shifts fire against VC ambush. Air strikes called on enemy.
- ③ 1030-Marine helos lift Co I 3dBn 4thMar, 2dBn 1stMar, and 5th ARVN Abn Bn into ambush area. 4 ARVN Bns arrive overland. VC routed; 202 KIA.


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While III MAF was applying continuous pressure to the enemy in the northern part of the country, Marines of the Special Landing Force (BLT 3/5 and HMM 364) were engaged in a major action in central Vietnam - the eleventh amphibious operation for the SLF in as many months (see map on following page).

Deckhouse One (18-27 June) was the first of a new series of amphibious attacks on VC coastal strongholds along the littoral of RVN. The landing force encountered only moderate opposition (51 VC KIA in 9 days) as the VC withdrew southward. Shortly after the Marine landing these enemy forces were struck by elements of the U. S. Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division 7 miles to the south, and heavy contact followed. Its escape northward blocked by the Marines, the enemy made a determined defense against aggressive Army attacks and the operation, called Nathan Hale, quickly grew to nine-battalion size. On 27 June, control of the SLF was passed to the 1st Air Cavalry Division, for participation in Nathan Hale. For the next four days, the Marine and Army units operated against the remnants of the VC force, but contact was light. During their 14 days ashore, Marines of the SLF killed 65 VC, captured 72 others, apprehended 180 suspects, and captured 211 tons of enemy rice.




CIVIC ACTION AND PACIFICATION

Despite the political unrest of the past three months, and the consequent inhibiting effect on all activities, steady and reassuring progress was evident throughout the Marine pacification program. In February, when a statistical evaluation of progress was initiated (see February report), only one village was considered to be 80% pacified. At the end of June, 21 additional villages, encompassing 182,335 people, had progressed into this category. In February, 14 villages qualified for the 40% - 80% group. By 30 June, the number had more than doubled, to 31.

At Danang, the number of villages with completed or partially completed markets increased by 110% during the month, from 20 to 42. By comparison, in the four month period from February to May the increase had been 33%. A census had been completed or was being undertaken in 24 villages; by comparison, last month the figure stood at 19, and in February it was 11. Gradually an increasing number of local chiefs are coming to reside in their villages - in February only 13 villages had chiefs in residence. By the end of June the total had risen to 21.


One of the most impressive signs of progress in the Danang area is the extent to which old roads have been opened or repaired and new roads built. Progress in this field is absolutely essential to the establishment of tranquility in the countryside. As the southern portion of the area has been developed, Marines have accompanied their counterguerrilla offensive with a vigorous road improvement program. Particularly noteworthy is the progress on "Liberty Road", a new north-south road, built partly on abandoned railroad right of way, aimed at reopening

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the important An Hoa industrial complex which had been almost completely isolated and accessible only by air for more than two years. The map following exhibits the progress that has been made in the field in the past three months.

DANANG-AN HOA ROAD PROGRESS APRIL-JUNE 1966



— Roads repaired and opened by Marines April-June 1966
— Roads constructed by Marines April-June 1966
=====Road construction planned or in progress.



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In the Chu Lai area, progress was similarly impressive. The number of villages having functioning chiefs and councils increased by three, to 13. Four months ago the total number was three. In June, six villages completed defensive plans and eight others were working towards that goal, a 75% increase over May, and twice as many villages were organizing local defensive forces as in May.

Progress in these and other indicators is displayed on the next three pages, followed by map and graph portrayals of total progress.




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


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CLASSIFIEDFEBRUARY-JUNE PACIFICATION PROGRESS
IN MARINE TACTICAL AREAS

█ █ COMPLETE
█ █ PARTIALLY COMPLETE
FEB JUN




VILLAGE CENSUS



VILLAGE GVN INTELLIGENCE NETS ESTABLISHED




VILLAGE DEFENSE PLANS

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
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
VILLAGE LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE TRAINED AND IN PLACE



VILLAGE CHIEFS AND COUNCILS FUNCTIONING






VILLAGE DEFENSIVE COMMUNICATION NETS ESTABLISHED






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


VILLAGE CHIEFS LIVING IN VILLAGES



VILLAGE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM ESTABLISHED




NECESSARY VILLAGE MARKETS ESTABLISHED

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PACIFICATION STATUS-DANANG TACTICAL AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	JUN	CHANGE FEB-JUN	FEB	JUN	CHANGE FEB-JUN	FEB	JUN	CHANGE FEB-JUN
Under 20%	457	401	-56	94,491	89,007	-5,484	53	34	-19
20%	57	94	+37	36,258	80,692	+44,434	9	17	+8
40%	18	75	+57	16,100	62,426	+46,326	4	12	+8
60%	26	31	+5	19,036	37,770	+18,734	6	9	+4
80%	31	76	+44	175,000	296,827	+121,827	1	10	+9
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	589	676		340,885	566,525		72	62	

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PACIFICATION STATUS-CHU LAI TACTICAL AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	JUN	CHANGE FEB-JUN	FEB	JUN	CHANGE FEB-JUN	FEB	JUN	CHANGE FEB-JUN
Under 20%	244	234	-10	91,145	73,038	-18,107	21	23	+2
20%	30	20	-10	21,824	16,506	-5,116	5	3	-2
40%	—	22	+22	—	14,260	+14,260	—	3	+3
60%	—	43	+43	—	30,196	+30,196	—	5	+5
80%	—	38	+38	—	29,372	+29,372	—	6	+6
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	274	357		112,769	163,374		26	40	

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PACIFICATION STATUS-PHU BAI TACTICAL AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	JUN	CHANGE FEB-JUN	FEB	JUN	CHANGE FEB-JUN	FEB	JUN	CHANGE FEB-JUN
Under 20%	22	49	+27	17,740	10,381	-7,359	4	11	+7
20%	25	49	+24	11,852	18,573	+6,721	2	3	+1
40%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
60%	38	11	-27	23,486	7,747	-15,739	5	2	-3
80%	—	53	+53	—	31,336	+31,336	—	6	+6
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	85	162		53,078	68,037		11	22	



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PACIFICATION GROWTH IN III MAF TACTICAL AREAS

PACIFICATION PERCENTAGES

■ 80%	■ 60%	■ 40%	■ 20%	□ UNDER ACTIVE PACIFICATION, LESS THAN 20%
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A vital contributor to this progress was the vigorous civic action effort, which complemented the simultaneous counterguerrilla and large-unit military operations. In June, a total of 270,000 Vietnamese civilians received some form of humanitarian assistance from Marines, compared with 205,000 in May. Some 80,000 were given medical treatment, including 25,000 who were inoculated against bubonic and pneumonic plague. At the same time, vocational training was provided 7,400 Vietnamese, an increase of 1600 over the number of May trainees. As a result, there is a substantial contribution to the pool of artisans so badly needed throughout the country. Marines also distributed food to over 150,000 needy families and took part in 57 local construction projects designed to improve the villagers' standard of living, e.g., 25 schools and 15 wells.

Chiefly as a result of the example set by Marines, an ARVN engineer battalion has begun the repair of a dam in the Ngu Hanh Son pacification area south of Danang, an ambitious project which will provide irrigation water for 18 villages and 2,500 acres of cropland. This is another indication of the influence of US forces in persuading ARVN elements to give increasing attention to civic action projects. Heretofore, their presence in villages has not greatly benefited the people.

The Combined Action Company program regained momentum in June after being disrupted during the previous three months of unrest. Each of the four successive I Corps commanders during the crisis was impressed with the value of the program, and the present commander, General Lam, as well as the essential provincial officials, has endorsed the concept. Substantial gains were made during the month in the program. There were 10 combined action

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
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platoons at Phu Bai, compared with 7 in May, and at Danang, there were 19 compared with 10 previously. Five Regional Force companies were also participating in the effort at Danang. At Chu Lai, the number of platoons increased by five, to eight. The goal throughout the MAF area is now 10 companies, with 74 platoons.

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~~SECRET~~BASE DEFENSE


At the end of May, the strong stand finally taken by the GVN and mediation efforts by III MAF had combined to eliminate the external evidences of civil discord in Danang - but at Hue, still-active dissidents posed a potential threat to Marine operations at the base at Phu Bai.

This threat reached its high-water mark during the period 6-16 June. On the 6th, after a week of what seemed to be relaxing tensions, militant Buddhist leaders prevailed upon their supporters to place altars and other religious articles in the streets of the city, with the purpose not only of preventing vehicular movement, but apparently in hopes of precipitating an incident which would rally the Buddhist faithful to the anti-government cause, should one of the articles be run over or in some way desecrated. Although routes used by Marine supply convoys travelling to and from the unloading ramp in Hue were obstructed in this manner, vehicles nevertheless were able to move about, with some rerouting and, by exercising considerable caution, and there were no incidents of consequence.

When the demonstrations showed signs of spreading beyond Hue to Quang Tri city to the north, the government turned, on 10 June, to those stronger methods which earlier had successfully stifled the opposition movement in Danang. Loyal government troops were brought in and, by the 19th, outward signs of resistance had collapsed. For the time being, at least, the threat to Phu Bai was over.

There were no attempts by the VC to attack the hard Marine bases during the month. As before, defenses of these installations were accomplished by a coordinated series of small unit patrols and ambushes and large unit operations, providing both close-in and far-reaching protection. Previous sections of this report have discussed

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this activity.


The 1st Military Police Battalion, which arrived in-country on 31 May, relieved the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines as Danang Air Base Defense Battalion on 16 June. Only recently activated (December 1965), the 1st Military Police Battalion is now responsible for the close-in protection of both the Danang and Marble Mountain facilities. The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, upon being relieved, were able to devote their full attention to offensive tactical operations.

At five separate installations - Danang Air Base, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Marble Mountain, and Ky Ha - Marines were responsible for ensuring the safety of about 600 US and Vietnamese combat and combat support aircraft from all the services. Among these are over half the total US combat aircraft capability in Vietnam. The disposition of these aircraft is shown on the following page.



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
**AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT FIVE MARINE AIRFIELDS
IN I CTZ AS OF 30 JUNE 1966**

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~~SECRET~~AIR OPERATIONS

Marine fixed wing aircraft flew 4,096 combat or combat support sorties, about the same number flown in May. For the fourth straight month, the majority were in support of other than III MAF; 1,115 were flown over Laos or North Vietnam and 1,278 in-country, supporting ARVN units.

**FIXED WING COMBAT SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF III MAF
AND UNITS OTHER THAN III MAF**




These flights accounted for 289 confirmed VC killed, or about 29% of the total enemy KIA's inflicted by Marines. One particularly effective strike took place on 9 June, when Chu Lai-based A-4 Skyhawks struck an enemy concentration about 30 miles south of their base. Pilot assessments of enemy casualties (75 VC KIA) proved to be remarkably accurate; a Special Forces patrol which arrived at the target area a short time later counted 79 enemy bodies.

~~SECRET~~REF ID: A65404
100-140

38,279 sorties were flown by Marine helicopters in June, an increase of some 1,500 over last month. As in past months, Marine helicopters flew a variety of missions. Over 50,000 passengers and some 2,500 tons of cargo were lifted. Additionally, 2,656 casualty evacuation and 317 search and rescue missions were flown. This activity was not without its cost, as five helicopters were shot down and 87 others received hits from enemy ground fire - compared with one shot down and 88 receiving hits last month.

The number of helicopter sorties and passengers carried since July 1965 are shown on the graph below.

HELICOPTER SORTIES AND PASSENGERS LIFTED

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~~SECRET~~LOGISTICS

There was general improvement during June in the logistic situation throughout the III MAF area. Logistic indicators show that progress during June exceeded that of any previous month: the cargo input to the I CTZ was a record high, construction progress was good on all projects, supply availability was increased at all levels, movement of materiel by sea and overland routes between Marine tactical areas was increased, and logistic support for tactical operations continued to improve.

Supply: Availability of all classes of supplies improved. Support of combat operations continued to improve with the ready availability of supplies and by continuous improvement in the techniques of providing supply, maintenance, and service support to forces in combat.

Class I--Supply levels of all types of rations except refrigerated products were maintained at approximately the established stockage objectives throughout the period. Lack of refrigerated space continues to limit storage capacity and availability of chill and freeze products.

Class II--Special programs continued to be used to augment routine supply action. These included the use of CRITIPAK to provide direct supply support for routinely required items from the Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, California to the using units, and the use of RED BALL to expedite supply action on critical items. In addition, a program was initiated to identify other problem items and provide direct "push" supply of these items from the Supply Center to the Force Logistic Command, III MAF.

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The general status of aviation supply was good; however, problems were encountered in supporting the UH-1E and CH-46 helicopters. Support of the 540 rotor system on the UH-1E aircraft has been plagued with problems associated with the teflon bearings and bushings and with an inadequate stock of repair parts. Emergency procurement to support the 540 rotor system has been initiated and a retrofit kit for improvement of the system will be available by November. In the interim, supply support is being provided on a push basis to insure maximum availability of the parts on hand. The T-58 engine and the main rotor blades of the CH-46 helicopter have incurred high usage rates due to sand erosion. To reduce erosion in the engine, one hundred per cent barrier air filter kits are being provided, commencing with six kits on 9 July and 21 each week thereafter. A main rotor blade with a nickel leading edge has been developed to reduce sand erosion, and blades from new production are being shipped direct to Vietnam to replace those blades with steel leading edges.

Class III--The civil disturbances during the month had only a limited effect on the supply and distribution of POL products. Stock levels and availability continued to improve with the completion of additional upright steel tanks at Danang and Chu Lai.

Class IV--Supply of these items remains adequate. The FLSG's are maintaining sufficient stock to support all operations.

Class V and VA--Ground ammunition stocks were maintained at approximately the established stockage objective of 45 days of supply. Aviation ordnance supply remained critical because of the limited availability of low drag bombs; however, combat air support continued with the use of the less efficient high drag bombs and the



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
discriminate use of available assets of low drag ordnance designed for high performance aircraft.

Maintenance: Fourth echelon capacity within the Force Logistic Command again expanded during the period. The fifth echelon program at the 3d Force Service Regiment is progressing satisfactorily. Twelve electrical generators per month are being rebuilt at the Public Works Center, Yokosuka; 40 five-ton trucks are now at Yokosuka for rebuild at a rate of 10 per month; and 36 two-and-a half ton trucks are undergoing rebuild at 3d FSR on Okinawa.

Communication-electronics equipment availability is expected to improve and present deadline rates decrease when the introduction of a new family of radios is completed in July. This new family replaces the AN/PRC-6, AN/PRC-9, AN/PRC-10, AN/MRC-37, and AN/MRC-38 radio sets.

Port Facilities: The Tourane River bridge cargo facility is now approximately 70 per cent complete and is in partial operation. Landing craft and barges have been using the ramps for unloading since 20 May. The south ramp at the Museum pier area and the Danang East Pier and LST ramps are planned for completion by August. Dredging operations at the site of the Observation Point piers have encountered an area of boulders extending approximately 140 feet out from the site of the Delong pier; it is probable that relocation of the Delong pier will delay its completion until August.

Engineer Operations: During June the 9th Engineer Battalion became the second Force Engineer Battalion assigned to III MAF. The battalion is currently in support of the First Marine Division in the Chu Lai area and is

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exerting primary effort to improving the roads in that area.

Marine Corps engineer units completed three Class 60 timber bridges and have two more under construction. A 270 foot floating bridge was also completed 10 miles south of Danang. Work has been initiated to emplace a Class 60 M4 floating bridge across the Danang River just south of the present fixed bridge in the city. This will be a 1600 foot span with a raised center section to allow normal river traffic to navigate. Real estate clearances have been obtained and construction of access roads has commenced.

Progress on facilities to support Marine Corps aviation units was significant. A total of 80,000 square yards of aircraft parking apron was completed at Danang and placement of concrete on the second runway at Danang is progressing. It is estimated that the runway will be ready for use by 6 August. At Chu Lai, the north warm-up pad for the permanent runway was completed and concrete is being poured for the 60,000 square yard north apron.

Due to good weather during the month and without the adverse effects of political unrest and local labor absenteeism experienced in April and May, greater progress was made in all construction projects during June than in the previous two months combined.

Movement and Resupply: The buildup of Marine Corps forces in RVN continued during June. During the month, the 1st Military Police Battalion (-) unloaded at Danang on 1 June, and a Detachment of Marine Wing Service Group-17, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, unloaded at Danang on 18 June. The 9th Engineer Battalion and elements of the 7th Communications Battalion debarked at Chu Lai during the period 1-16 June. During the month,

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a total of 1,639 personnel were introduced into RVN from 6 amphibious ships and 1 MSTS TAP.

Cargo operations in I Corps Tactical Zone were again slightly impeded by civil unrest at the beginning of June, but there was no significant effect on logistic support. The Naval Support Activity achieved the largest daily cargo operation in the Danang Port history on 20 June, with a total port throughput for the day of 11,433 M/T. During the month, the average daily discharge rate at Danang was 5,920 M/T, with a total of 177,659 M/T unloaded during the period. This compares with a daily average of 3,675 M/T during May and a May total unload of 113,910 M/T. At Chu Lai 43,641 M/T were unloaded during June, with a daily average discharge rate of 1,455 M/T.

On 31 May there were 11 deep draft ships in port at Danang. During June, 23 deep draft ships arrived and 29 deep draft ships completed unloading and departed. Five deep draft ships were in port on 30 June with 22,197 M/T of cargo backlogged. The backlog on 31 May was 56,930 M/T, and the average daily backlog for June was 36,684 M/T.

The Military Airlift Command cargo channel between Okinawa and Danang was not able to meet the requested allocation of 1,200 S/T in June. It actually moved 255 S/T of cargo, while 315th Air Division and organic Marine aircraft moved an additional 1,217 S/T of critical material, for a total airlift of 1,471 S/T of cargo from Okinawa to Danang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai during June.

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~~SECRET~~STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS1. PHU BAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
HMM-163	4Jun	Depart	Danang	Replaced by HMM-161

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>May</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regt Hq	1	1	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	7	7	Battalions	0	0
Companies	2	2	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	3,595	3,795	Total Strength	150	150
<u>Within 25 to 50 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 to 50 miles</u>		
Sub Region Hq	1	1	Regt Hq	0	0
Regt Hq	1	1	Battalions	5	5
Battalions	5	5	Companies	3	3
Companies	8	8	Total Strength	2,245	2,345
Total Strength	3,655	3,755			
<u>Grand Total to 50 miles</u>	7,250	7,550	<u>Grand Total to 50 miles</u>	2,395	2,495

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A comparison of the May 1966 and the June 1966 confirmed enemy order of battle shows a decrease of 300 enemy personnel within 50 miles of the Phu Bai airfield. This decrease was caused by the re-evaluation of the strength figures for the 806th and 808th Battalions, and normal order of battle adjustments.

2. DANANG

MAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
HMM-163	4Jun	Arrive	Phu Bai	Replaced HMM-161
1st Mar	8Jun	Arrive	Chu Lai	Opcon 3d MarDiv
1st Bn, 11th Mar	14Jun	Arrive	Chu Lai	Opcon 12th Mar
Mar (-)				

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>May</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regt Hq	0	0	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	4	4	Battalions	3	3
Companies	4	5	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	2,140	2,590	Total Strength	1,325	1,425

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miles

Regt Hq	3	1
Battalions	11	3
Companies	11	10
Total Strength	7,855	2,905

Within 25 to 50
miles

Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	2	2
Companies	2	2
Total Strength	1,050	1,050

Grand Total to
50 miles 9,995 5,495Grand Total to
50 miles 2,375 2,475

A comparison of the May 1966 and the June 1966 confirmed enemy order of battle shows a marked increase of 4,500 enemy personnel within a fifty mile radius of the Danang airfield. This increase in confirmed strength is due to the northern movement of the 21st NVA Regiment, 1st VC Regiment, RQ-21st AA Battalion, and the RQ-23d 120mm Mortar Battalion from Quang Ngai Province to southern Quang Tin Province.

3. CHU LAI

MAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1st Mar	8Jun	Depart	Danang	To 3d MarDiv
1st Bn, 11th Mar (-)	14Jun	Depart	Danang	To 12th Mar
9th EngrBn (-)	14Jun	Arrive	CONUS	Opcon III MAF

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

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ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>May</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
MR-V Hq	0	1	Regt Hq	0	0
Division Hq	1	1	Battalions	1	1
Regt Hq	0	2	Companies	0	0
Battalions	1	9			
Companies	11	11			
Total Strength	1,600	7,000	Total Strength	300	300
<u>Within 25 to 50 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 to 50 miles</u>		
MR-V Hq	1	0	Regt Hq	0	0
Regt Hq	2	0	Battalions	4	4
Battalions	12	4	Companies	0	0
Companies	13	10			
Total Strength	8,440	3,060	Total Strength	1,600	1,700
<u>Grand Total to 50 miles</u>	<u>10,040</u>	<u>10,060</u>	<u>Grand Total to 50 miles</u>	<u>1,900</u>	<u>2,000</u>

A comparision of the May 1966 and the June 1966 confirmed enemy order of battle shows a major decrease in forces within 25 miles and essentially no change in forces within a fifty mile radius of the Chu Lai airfield.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**4. VIET CONG LOSSES FOR JUNE 1966

<u>June</u>		<u>Total to Date</u>
1,021	KIA	7,162
158	VC (Captured)	1,017
338	VC (Suspects)	6,687
5	WIA	470
74	Weapons	1,205

5. CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS

<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Total as of 30Jun66</u>
70,050	78,961 Persons Given Medical Treatment	617,553
42	36 Persons Given Medical Training	357
46	57 Construction Projects	512
56,851	161,061 Pounds of Food Distributed	521,849
5,984	12,068 Pounds of Soap Distributed	98,336
5,930	17,252 Pounds of Clothing Distributed	184,285
176	110 Critically Ill Civilians Evacuated	4,918
46	80 English Language Classes in Progress	491
\$1,934	\$ 783 Cash Donations	\$ 27,444
124,269	157,811 Persons Fed	532,175
5,165	3,769 Students Supported	25,803

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6. MARINE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>		<u>Total as of 30Jun66</u>
6,986	6,294	Patrols	52,367
6,088	4,013	Ambushes	34,536
630	661	Sniper Posts	2,751
7	4	Regimental or Larger	32
		Opns	
5	7	Battalion Opns	81 *
127	227	Company Opns	1,118
4,074	4,096	Offensive Air Sorties	43,578
36,790	38,279	Helo Sorties	348,973

* 2 opns continued from previous month not added to total.

7. III MAF STRENGTH - ON 30 JUNE

Danang	28,375
Chu Lai	20,510
Hue Phu Bai	6,860
Total	55,745

8. III MAF AREA - ON 30 JUNE

	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Square Miles	676	347	162	1,185
Civilians	566,525	163,374	68,037	797,936
Villages	82	40	22	144

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a. Supply Levels at End of Period:

DANANG CHU LAI PHU BAI

Class I (1000 of
rations/
days of
supply)


MCI (Rations)	687/25	489/22	230/33
B Rations	329/12	468/21	141/20
A Rations	84/3	65/3	11/2

Class III & IIIA (BULK):
(1000 gals/days of supply)

JP-4	* 106/5	974/11	45/5
AVGAS	100/4	185/12	79/18
MOGAS	166/7	284/12	23/6
DIESEL	114/6	286/9	8/2

* Includes only the JP-4 stored by FLSG at Danang;
does not include NAVSUPPACT, Danang storage or
deliveries from NAVSUPPACT direct to operating
squadrons.

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~~SECRET~~Class V and VA:

Ground Ammo (days of supply)	45	45	45
250 lb LD bombs (number of bombs)	1,647	3,702	-
500 lb LD bombs (number of bombs)	83	260	-
Launcher w/19 2.75 in. rockets	9	364	-
Launcher w/4 5 in. rockets	603	416	-

b. Resupply Status:**(1) Surface Shipping Status (Danang)**

Cargo unloaded (June)	177,659 M/T
Average daily discharge rate	5,920 M/T
Ships in port 31 May	11
Ships arriving during June	23
Ships unloaded during June	29
Ships in port 30 June	5
Cargo backlog 31 May	56,930 M/T
Cargo backlog 30 June	22,197 M/T
Average cargo backlog (June)	36,684 M/T

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(2) Air Shipping Status

Cargo lifted into RVN (June) 1,471 S/T

Cargo awaiting lift on Okinawa as 391 S/T
of 1 Julyc. RED BALL Summary (June):

Items at beginning of period	-	1,035
Items added	-	574
Items removed	-	612
Items remaining at end of period	-	997


d. Maintenance (June):

Items evacuated from RVN	-	2,020
Items repaired at 3rd FSR	-	2,008
Items returned to CONUS from 3rd FSR	-	384
Items disposed of on Okinawa	-	802

e. Construction Projects:

Roads rehabilitated or con- structed	-	Maintenance and improvement to existing roads.
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Bridges constructed - Class 60 timber bridge-3 completed. Class 60 timber bridge-2, construction in progress. 270' of Class 60 M4-T6 floating bridge completed. Class 60 M4 floating 1600' span, work commenced on access road.

Wells drilled - 2 completed; 6 in progress.

Covered storage, NSA Danang - 320,000 sq ft completed and in use; 160,000 sq ft under construction of the 624,000 sq ft programmed.

Covered storage NSA Chu Lai - 144,000 sq ft under construction of the 270,000 sq ft programmed.

III MAF covered storage (includes maintenance facilities) - 120,000 sq ft completed; 124,000 sq ft under construction.

Ammo storage - ASP #1 20% complete; ASP #2 87% complete.

POL storage tanks 10,000 BBL - 4 tanks completed Danang Air Base; 1 under construction.

2 under construction Marble Mountain Air Facility.

3 completed Chu Lai.

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400 Bed hospital - 85% complete.

Water supply Danang / - 80% complete. The
Danang East change from the previous
report is attributed to the
consolidation of the in-
dividual projects into one
central project. The scope
of the project includes
seven 1,000 BBL water
tanks and 8,000 feet of
expeditionary pipeline.

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The Free World effort is winning in I Corps, not just militarily, but in all the convergent battles which go to make up the war. If illustrated in no other way, it is made clear by the enemy inability, even under the ideal conditions of political unrest during May and June, to do little more than infiltrate urban mobs and accelerate their campaign of terrorism. All of the ingredients of Viet Cong success were there. Yet nothing happened. Not because the Viet Cong would not have liked to take advantage of the situation, but because they were not able to do so.

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