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# OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

## VIETNAM

### JULY 1966

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


## FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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
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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of July 1966. Its purpose is to update similar reports covering periods from March 1965 through June 1966.

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CONTENTS

SUMMARY	3
LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS	7
COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS	13
PACIFICATION AND CIVIC ACTION	19
BASE DEFENSE	33
AIR OPERATIONS	35
LOGISTICS	38
STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS	45
CONCLUSIONS	55

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~~SECRET~~SUMMARY


In July, the largest Marine operation of the war punished a regular North Vietnamese division severely. At the same time, small unit operations killed a record number of local guerrillas, and there was firm evidence of accelerated progress in the overall Marine pacification program.

Eight operations of battalion size or larger accounted for a confirmed total of 1,039 enemy regulars killed, 22 captured, and 253 weapons seized. Field commanders estimate that an additional 1,392 VC or NVA regulars were killed, raising to over 2,400 the probable enemy dead resulting from Marine large unit operations. The bulk of the enemy killed resulted from Operation Hastings, where seven USMC battalions were involved.

There were 12,454 counterguerrilla operations during the month - the third highest total to date; but more important, there were more contacts (1,457) and more of the guerrilla enemy killed (538) than in any previous month.

Marine fixed wing aircraft flew 5,159 combat or combat support sorties, the second highest total to date. The majority of these - 3,790 - were flown in support of III MAF. Marine helicopters flew 41,957 sorties, a new record.

There were 20 County Fair operations during the month, compared with 7 in June. The 48 County Fairs to date have involved 63 villages, where 21,000 civilians were screened, fingerprinted, interviewed, photographed and given medical treatment. In the process,



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90 guerrillas were killed, 132 captured, and 268 suspects seized for questioning.

There was continued progress in the pacification level within the Marine areas. The number of villages considered to be 80% pacified or higher reached 27, an increase of 5 over the previous month. By the end of July, 39 villages encompassing some 205,000 people were classified between 40% and 80% pacified, compared with 14 villages and 58,000 people at that level in February, the first month in which a detailed statistical assessment of the pacification level was made. At the end of the month, village chiefs and councils were functioning in 74 villages, an increase of 42% over June's total, and the number of villages compiling a census increased from 46 to 58, a 28% gain. Village markets under development were up 14%, from 66 to 75.

With this progress in the overall pacification effort, in late July the tactical areas at Danang and Chu Lai again expanded farther into the populated countryside. In all, the expansion added an additional 435 square miles. Danang expanded from 676 to 999 square miles, encompassing 22 additional villages and 44,551 civilians. Chu Lai increased from 347 to 459 square miles, adding 5 new villages with a combined population of 10,641. At month's end, the total III MAF area included 1,620 square miles, 171 villages and 893,128 people.

By the end of July, 201 miles of roads were being maintained or constructed within the III MAF tactical areas. To the extent that road travel connotes a trend toward stability, the facts are favorable. I Corps roads are being utilized at an increased rate; over twice as many civilian vehicles traveled on Route #1 during July as in March 1965. Military traffic on the highways between Quang Ngai city and Hue has increased from about

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1,300 vehicles in July 1965 to over 3,400 this July. Civilian and military are also utilizing the intra-area road-net freely.

The foregoing progress is a product of three mutually supporting and simultaneous campaigns. The chart on the following page describes these major campaigns, and gives a summary of progress in each during the past 6 months.

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## MARINE PROGRAMS IN VIETNAM


1 AUGUST 1966

MAJOR FUNCTIONAL AREAS	PROGRAMS	SUBPROGRAMS AND PROGRESS IN PAST SIX MONTHS
COUNTERGUERRILLA AIM: DESTROY GUERRILLA FORCES	KILL VC GUERRILLAS DESTROY VC INFRASTRUCTURE PHASE-IN VN LOCAL SECURITY FORCES	AMBUSH 27,720 since 1 Feb SNIPE 2,879 scout sniper missions since 1 Feb PATROL 40,740 offensive patrols since 1 Feb SEARCH AND DESTROY 858 company size search and destroy ops. since 1 Feb COLLECT INTELL. FROM CIV. 147 separate voluntary reports since 1 Feb CONDUCT COUNTY FAIRS 48 County Fairs since 1 Feb; Over 21,000 VN screened Total of 2,099 VC guerrillas killed since 1 Feb.
LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS AIM: DESTROY VC AND NVA MAIN FORCES	WATCH STRIKE	Demonstrate Proper Security 37 joint: USMC/VN Pits formed and conducting regular operations. 36 more programmed TRAIN LOCAL SECURITY FORCES 1,112 VNPF serving in combined platoons
PACIFICATION AIM: ASSIST IN NATION BUILDING	ESTAB. VILLAGE SECURITY ESTAB. VILLAGE GOV TS. IMPROVE LOCAL ECONOMY IMPROVE PUBLIC HEALTH IMPROVE PUBLIC EDUCATION	MAN DEEP RECON POSTS: ATTACK 355 VC/NVA killed in STING RAY Operations since 6 May RECONNOITER BY AIR 8,073 air recon sorties since 1 Feb EXECUTE STAY BEHIND RECON Examples: Operations Utah, Washington, Kansas, Hastings CONDUCT LARGE UNIT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS 66 large unit ops, varying from 1 to 7 Marine bns. in size. 3,358 VC/NVA killed, 600 wps, 285 VC captured in large unit ops since 1 Feb TRAIN VILLAGE LOCAL DEFENSE Programs in 27 villages in Feb; 58 in July. FORCES COMPLETE VILLAGE DEFENSE PLANS 5 villages complete in Feb; 29 in July ESTAB. VILLAGE INTEL. NETS 25 in Feb; 77 in July ESTAB. VILLAGE PSYWAR-PUB INFO. 6 in Feb; 59 in July ENCOURAGE VILLAGE CENSUS Census being taken in 12 villages in Feb; 58 villages in July. 26 now complete. ASSIST IN INSTALL. GOVT. OFFICIALS 16 chiefs and councils functioning in Feb; 52 in July RESTORE SECURITY FOR VILLAGE OFFICIALS Officials of 27 villages lived in own village in Feb; 80 in July MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT W/VN OFFICIALS Regular weekly meetings of USMC, US civilian, ARVN and CVN in Joint Coordinating Council. ASSIST IN ESTAB. LOCAL MKTS. 26 being estab. in Feb; 75 in July PROTECT RICE HARVEST Estimated 12,700 tons of rice harvest protected during Golden Fleece Ops. IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS 28 village comm nets being estab. in Feb; 80 in July. 22 now complete. 201 miles of road constructed or maintained; 87 bridges built; 31 mi of road swept daily for mines. ASSIST IN LOCAL CONST. PROJ. 328 projects since 1 Feb GIVE MED. TREATMENT 477,478 VN treated since 1 Feb EVACUATE CRITICALLY ILL 623 VN since 1 Feb GIVE MEDICAL TRAINING 246 VN trained since 1 Feb FEED HUNGRY VN 409,832 pounds of food dist since 1 Feb SUPPORT STUDENTS 24,345 supported since 1 Feb TEACH ENGLISH LANGUAGE 542 classes since 1 Feb HELP BUILD SCHOOLS 78 since 1 Feb GIVE VOCATIONAL TRAINING 13,200 since 1 Feb

LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

In July Marine operations of battalion size or larger accounted for at least 1,039 enemy soldiers killed, 22 captured, and 253 weapons seized. In addition to these confirmed figures, commanders in the field have estimated that an additional 1,392 VC or NVA troops were killed, raising probable total enemy killed to more than 2,400. Eight large unit operations contributed to these figures, including an amphibious landing by the Special Landing Force. They extended over a front of 165 miles, from the DMZ to Cap Batangan near Chu Lai.

## MARINE LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS - JULY 1966



Operations identified here as "large unit" are those whose forces include at least three infantry companies and a controlling command group, and have a logical beginning and end.

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The majority of the confirmed enemy killed, 977, resulted from two operations: Hastings, near the Demilitarized Zone, which began on 7 July and was still underway at the end of the month, and Macon in Quang Nam, which began on 4 July and was also still underway at the close of the reporting period. Hastings is the largest Marine/ARVN offensive operation of the war, comprising 7 USMC and 5 ARVN battalions at its peak, and marking the first encounter between Marines and a North Vietnamese regular Army division. Because of its significance, it is useful to review the events which preceded Operation Hastings.

The two northernmost provinces of I Corps, Quang Tri and Thua Thien, have invited close attention for a year or more. Quang Tri borders the Demilitarized Zone between South and North Vietnam, and both provinces are contiguous with Laos. Known enemy infiltration routes cross both the DMZ and Laos borders into these areas.

Rumors of large enemy units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien have been commonplace for some months, but there was no real evidence to support their actual presence. The rumors did, however, serve to sharpen scrutiny of the area. Beyond the regular reconnaissance and intelligence measures, a battalion-sized reconnaissance was conducted in April. This was Operation Virginia, where Marines swept the length of Route 9, 10 miles from the Laos border eastward to Dong Ha. No significant enemy forces were encountered and no evidence was discovered to indicate that large enemy forces were in the area. Later, on 30 May the coastal region near Dong Ha was thoroughly examined during Operation

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Reno. Again, results were negative, but close surveillance of the area continued.


On 5 July hard evidence of an NVA division appeared. On that day ARVN forces captured a prisoner about 11 miles southwest of Dong Ha who claimed to be a member of the 812th Regiment, 324th "B" NVA Division. Besides his own regiment, the captive stated that two other regiments were also in northern Quang Tri. Within two days the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines and elements of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion were flown north to assess those reports. Captured documents and additional captive interrogations obtained during the next 6 days tended to verify the movement of some 5,000 regular troops of the 324th "B" NVA Division across the DMZ into RVN. The evidence further pointed toward a communist plan to establish logistic bases and conduct offensive operations in northern Quang Tri.

Before the first NVA attack of the campaign could be launched, and apparently before the entire enemy division had completed infiltration, 7 USMC and 5 ARVN infantry battalions converged on the area. One of the Marine battalions, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, was initially the ground component of the Special Landing Force of the 7th Fleet. On 16 July, two weeks after completing 14 days of combat in II CTZ (Deck House 1 - Nathan Hale) the SLF conducted an amphibious landing (Deck House II) 8 miles northeast of Dong Ha. When the landing force was established ashore, Deck House II was terminated and the SLF became part of Operation Hastings. Overall control of the operation was vested in Task Force Delta, comprised of the 3d Marine Division Assistant Commander and the 4th Marines Regimental Command Group. The maps on the following page show the estimated enemy plan and Hastings objective area.


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## ESTIMATED PLAN OF 324TH "B" NVA DIVISION



## OPERATION HASTINGS (7 JULY-CONTINUING)



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Once under way, Hastings was characterized by a number of sharp, small unit engagements with an occasional large encounter. The largest single action took place on the 18th when the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines engaged an enemy force estimated at 1,000. Artillery and air support, together with the fires of reinforcing Marine units, killed at least 138 of the enemy, with their total casualties probably exceeding 500, by the time they withdrew.

Marine reconnaissance teams were also instrumental in inflicting heavy enemy casualties. On 28 July, for example, one team detected 200 NVA troops attempting to flee the battle area. Artillery and air strikes called on the enemy killed at least 65.

Evidence was found of confusion and material damage suffered by the enemy. In one instance villagers reported being forced by the North Vietnamese to dig many graves after a nearby area had been struck by air. At other times, Marine units searching the battle area found caches of weapons and supplies, as well as hastily abandoned camp sites which contained additional equipment. A few examples include 201 individual weapons, 25 crew served weapons, 355 packs, over 10,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 40 pounds of documents.

Although Operation Hastings was still continuing at the end of July, there were no significant contacts after the 28th. It appeared almost certain that the remnants of the 324th "B" Division had fled north across the DMZ, or west into the Laos panhandle. Enemy losses were substantial. Through 31 July 769 of his dead had been counted by Marine forces, with another 929 estimated killed.

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Although less dramatic in results than Operation Hastings, Operation Macon also inflicted substantial damage on the enemy.

The Macon objective area is located about 16 miles south of Danang - along the banks of the Thu Bon River. Five battalions were taking part in this operation designed to consolidate Marine influence in this densely populated area. Action in Operation Macon was characterized by continuous but light contact with VC in groups of less than 100. Artillery and air strikes were used effectively throughout the operation, accounting for a large number of the enemy dead. By the end of the month 208 VC had been killed, another 423 probably killed, and 26 suspects apprehended. While inflicting these substantial casualties, Marines suffered 9 killed and 51 wounded.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

In July there were 12,454 Marine counterguerrilla operations. This total, the third highest to date, was achieved despite the fact that eight of III MAF's infantry battalions were involved continuously in large unit operations for the last two weeks of the month.

In all, there were 7,770 patrols, 4,440 ambushes and 244 company-size offensive operations which resulted in 1,457 contacts and 538 of the enemy killed. The latter two are new records. The total number of local guerrillas known killed to date in small unit engagements with Marines is 3,589.

During the month, there were 20 County Fair operations, an increase of 13 over June, raising the total number of County Fairs conducted by Marines to 48. Consistent with other operational commitments, Marines will increase the number of County Fair operations during the next two months to an average of 10 a week. These are described in more detail in the chapter that follows.

Of increasing significance in the field of small unit tactics are the "Sting Ray" operations. This technique encompasses insertion of small reconnaissance detachments at remote locations, carefully selected to permit observation of areas of probable enemy activity. Artillery and air are prepositioned and employed in direct support of these small outposts with the objective of causing heavy losses to the enemy at little cost to ourselves.

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A noteworthy Sting Ray operation is the Nui Tron outpost, which was established 30 kilometers southwest of Chu Lai on 3 May, for the purpose of supporting Operation Montgomery (see May report). Upon termination of Montgomery on 14 May, the reconnaissance team remained in position to determine if VC units would return to the area after the Marine forces had departed.

A battery of 155mm howitzers was positioned at Quang Ngai airfield to provide fires in support of the team at Nui Tron, and a ground-mounted 106mm recoilless rifle and one .50 caliber ground mounted machine gun were emplaced on the OP for long range sniping and destructive fires. The outpost is manned by a squad of Marines and approximately 100 Montagnards. Results to date have been good. Through the end of July, cumulative enemy casualties were 130 confirmed killed, with another 167 probable. There were no Marine casualties.

With Nui Tron as an example, the Sting Ray technique was developed further during Operations Kansas (see June report) and Washington, when 105mm and 155mm howitzer units were positioned in forward areas to fire deep into enemy territory, under the control of forward observation posts. When those operations were terminated, four 105mm howitzers remained in position. To date, 47 enemy casualties have resulted from the fires of these units.

Another Marine reconnaissance team was recently inserted at the An Hoa outpost, southwest of Chu Lai, which is manned by about 40 Regional Force troops. Well-covered by artillery, it is anticipated that this OP will significantly reduce VC traffic in the vital Song Tra Bong Valley.

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
A permanent observation post has also been established in the Operation Hastings area. In the eighteen days it has been operating, 100 of the enemy have been killed by artillery and air strikes called in from this Sting Ray site.

Patrol and ambush activity by the infantry battalions of III MAF is shown on the three pages that follow. Battalions are shown in the tactical area in which they were located on 31 July.




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## PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA



The eight infantry battalions at Danang conducted an average of 48 patrols and 66 ambushes each day during July. As in previous months, the majority of enemy contacts, 195 out of 218, occurred in the southern area. Additionally, the 1st MP Bn and 3d Reconnaissance Bn added over 1,800 patrols and 180 ambushes to the overall counterguerrilla effort. From about mid-July on, three Danang-based battalions - 1st Bn, 3d Marines; 1st Bn, 1st Marines and 2nd Bn, 9th Marines - participated in Operation Hastings in the northern portion of I CTZ.


## PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHU LAI TACTICAL AREA



The five Chu Lai battalions conducted a daily average of 76 patrols and 40 ambushes during July. As in previous months, enemy contacts were almost equally divided between the southeast and northwest portions of the tactical area. The total Marine in-country strength rose to eighteen infantry battalions as BLT 3/5 landed at Chu Lai on 31 July following nearly three months as the SLF BLT.

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## PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PHU BAI TACTICAL AREA



Three of the four infantry battalions at Phu Bai were involved once again, for varying periods throughout the month, in large scale operations external to the tactical area. From about mid-July on, all the Phu Bai battalions except 1st Bn, 4th Marines were committed to Operation Hastings.

~~SECRET~~PACIFICATION AND CIVIC ACTION

In July, slowly accelerated progress was evident throughout the Marine pacification program, making possible, by month's end, a substantial expansion of the tactical areas at both Danang and Chu Lai.

The number of villages considered to be 80% pacified reached 27, as compared with 22 in June and only one in February, when the statistical evaluation of progress was begun. At the end of the month, 39 villages were classified in the 40%-80% group, compared with 31 in June and 14 in February. Some 97,000 villagers resided in areas 20%-40% pacified, an increase of 27,000 over the previous month.

Throughout the III MAF area, village chiefs and councils were functioning in 74 villages, a 42% increase during the month, and the number of village markets under development - an index to economic progress - increased from 66 to 75. Village intelligence nets established or in the process of being organized also increased substantially - from 52 in June to 77 in July.

In view of this quickened rate of progress, in late July the tactical areas at Danang and Chu Lai again expanded farther into the populated countryside. In all, the expansion added 435 square miles; Danang increased in size from 676 to 999 square miles, and Chu Lai from 347 to 459 square miles. The Danang increase encompassed 22 additional villages, with a combined population of 44,551; at Chu Lai, 5 new villages with a total population of 10,641 were brought under Marine influence. With this latest expansion, the total III MAF area included 1,620 square miles, 171 villages, and 893,128 people.

Graphs portraying progress in certain key areas of the pacification program are shown on the next page. Following these are maps showing the overall pacification growth in each tactical area.


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**FEBRUARY-JULY PACIFICATION PROGRESS  
IN MARINE TACTICAL AREAS**


COMPLETE

PARTIALLY COMPLETE


**VILLAGE CENSUS**




**VILLAGE GVN  
INTELLIGENCE NETS**




**VILLAGE DEFENSE  
PLANS**




**DEFENSE FORCE  
TRAINED AND IN PLACE**




**VILLAGE CHIEFS AND  
COUNCILS FUNCTIONING**




**COMMUNICATION  
NETS ESTABLISHED**




**VILLAGE CHIEFS  
LIVING IN VILLAGES**







**PSYCHOLOGICAL AND  
PUBLIC INFORMATION**





**VILLAGE MARKETS  
ESTABLISHED**



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UNCLASSIFIEDPACIFICATION GROWTH IN DANANG AREA  
FEBRUARY - JULY 1966

PACIFICATION LEVELS


■ 80%
■ 60%
■ 40%
■ 20%
□ UNDER ACTIVE PACIFICATION, LESS THAN 20%.



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Detailed chart on following page shows 31 July pacification status in Danang area.

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
## PACIFICATION STATUS-DANANG AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	JUL	CHANGE FEB-JUL	FEB	JUL	CHANGE FEB-JUL	FEB	JUL	CHANGE FEB-JUL
Under 20%	457	650	+193	94,491	94,735	+244	53	40	-13
20%	57	93	+36	36,258	62,386	+26,128	9	20	+11
40%	18	114	+96	16,100	100,182	+84,082	4	19	+15
60%	26	52	+26	19,036	54,988	+35,952	5	11	+6
80%	31	90	+59	175,000	336,785	+163,785	1	14	+13
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	569	999	—	340,885	651,076	—	72	104	—

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
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PACIFICATION GROWTH IN CHU LAI AREA  
FEBRUARY - JULY 1966


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
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
MAY

PACIFICATION LEVELS

■ 80%
■ 60%
■ 40%
■ 20%
□ UNDER ACTIVE PACIFICATION, LESS THAN 20%.



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
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Detailed chart on following page shows 31 July pacification status in Chu Lai area.

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






## PACIFICATION STATUS-CHU LAI AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	JUL	CHANGE FEB-JUL	FEB	JUL	CHANGE FEB-JUL	FEB	JUL	CHANGE FEB-JUL
Under 20%	244	341	+97	91,145	88,125	-3,020	21	28	+7
20%	30	20	-10	21,624	16,508	-5,116	5	3	-2
40%	—	28	+28	—	23,683	+23,683	—	4	+4
60%	—	37	+37	—	20,773	+20,773	—	4	+4
80%	—	33	+33	—	24,926	+24,926	—	6	+6
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	274	459		112,769	174,015		26	45	

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PACIFICATION GROWTH IN PHU BAI AREA  
FEBRUARY - JULY 1966


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Detailed chart on following page shows 31 July pacification status in Phu Bai area.

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## PACIFICATION STATUS-PHU BAI AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	JUL	CHANGE FEB-JUL	FEB	JUL	CHANGE FEB-JUL	FEB	JUL	CHANGE FEB-JUL
Under 20%	22	49	+27	17,740	10,381	-7,359	4	11	+7
20%	25	49	+24	11,852	18,573	+6,721	2	3	+1
40%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
60%	38	8	-30	23,486	6,296	-18,190	5	1	-4
80%	—	56	+56	—	33,787	+33,787	—	7	+7
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	85	162		53,078	68,037		11	22	

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Twenty County Fair operations were conducted in July, bringing the cumulative total to 48. The County Fair technique, it will be recalled, was developed early in 1966 by III MAF to clean out the residue of guerrillas which often remains after purely military operations have driven the organized guerrilla units out of a region. Although the number of guerrillas who remain is usually small, they can still exert a substantial influence over the people and must, therefore, be eliminated.

The County Fair process begins when a cordon force of Marines encircles a selected village or hamlet in the early morning hours, prior to the lifting of curfew, to prevent escape of guerrillas. Shortly after first light, GVN police and ARVN units enter the area and move the villagers into an assembly area. Here GVN administrators take a census, fingerprint and photograph the villagers, identify families with dwellings, issue identity cards and determine the whereabouts of absent family members. VC suspects are segregated for additional questioning, as are their families.

While they are waiting to be processed, the villagers are given clothing, soap, medical and dental treatment by combined GVN/Marine/Navy teams. Also, since they are temporarily separated from their homes, families are given meals prepared in Marine field kitchens. Psychological warfare films, movies and band concerts provide a measure of education and entertainment during the operation.

Concurrent with the processing of the villagers, ARVN units make a detailed search of the area, seeking to discover caves, tunnels, VC supplies, and secret escape routes, as well as any guerrillas who might be in hiding.

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Principal criteria used in selecting villages for  
County Fair operations:

- The village should be in a cleared, or semi-cleared area, from which the major guerrilla power has already been eliminated.
- The village should, if possible, be near to other settlements which are under substantial government control, in order to avoid creating islands in a VC-dominated area. Put otherwise, the County Fair process should contribute directly to the orderly pursuit of pacification.
- The village should show need of the County Fair process, in terms of suspected residual VC activity.

The County Fair operation itself is short, ranging from one to three days in length. However, after it is completed, and the Marines and ARVN units that have conducted the operation move elsewhere, continuing security must be provided for the village or hamlet. Only by maintaining this security in the area until the VC infrastructure is completely eradicated can the village or hamlet be protected from reinfection. Usually, a Popular Forces squad or platoon will be lodged in the vicinity. If the area is particularly troublesome, a Combined Action Company or an ARVN or a U. S. Marine force may be positioned nearby. This security effort, which is an essential ingredient of success, is a direct function of the availability of forces (GVN or U.S.) to do the job. As time goes on this may well turn out to be the controlling factor in the County Fair effort.

A key role in County Fair planning is played by the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council. This council was formed in the summer of 1965, when it became apparent that there was an urgent need for improved coordination

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of the overall pacification effort throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone. The Council's scope has since broadened to the point that it now includes key military and civilian officials from all U. S. and Vietnamese agencies involved in the I Corps pacification effort.


Meeting weekly, the council has provided the vital link needed for coordination between these agencies. In addition to its role in County Fair planning, an important contribution of the Council is its assessment of the competing Revolutionary Development requirements, and its allocation of the civilian and military resources available to satisfy these requirements. The chart on the following page displays the role of the Council and the overall GVN/US pacification management structure of I CTZ, within which County Fair planning is conducted.

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
## ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION IN I CTZ



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In the 48 County Fairs thus far, 63 villages and hamlets have been subjected to the County Fair treatment. Besides the important population control measures which accrued in the process (for example, over 21,000 civilians have been screened, fingerprinted, etc.), 90 Viet Cong have been killed, 132 VC captured, 268 suspects taken for further questioning, and 45 weapons seized. Plans envision expansion of the County Fair program to a rate of about 10 per week, reaching all Marine areas. The Danang area, where the technique was developed and refined has, thus far, been the scene of the majority of these operations. Forty-two of the total of 48 were held in the Danang area; locations of those operations are shown on the chart below.

## COUNTY FAIR OPERATIONS IN DANANG MARINE AREA



★ COUNTY FAIRS HELD DURING JULY 1966  
\* COUNTY FAIRS HELD BEFORE JULY 1966

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County Fair has been successful thus far and is certainly a cardinal step in the pacification process. In reality, however, it has no more than gotten started. So far, a total of 48 County Fairs have been completed. To cover 80% of the villages in the I Corps area will require about five hundred similar efforts. At the projected rate of 10 County Fairs per week, it promises to be a job of a year or more, even accepting the hopeful assumption that adequate Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces will be provided to give continuing security to the cleared areas.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**BASE DEFENSE

For the first month since March 1966, I Corps was free from political disturbance. With the government in firm control and most Buddhist leaders at least temporarily placated by promises of national elections, the countryside was politically stable and no Marine bases were threatened by civil unrest.

On 23 July the Marble Mountain Air Facility was hit by communist 81mm mortar fire. Coming from positions about 2,000 meters southwest of the field, rounds began falling at 2005. The shelling caused minor wounds to 25 III MAF and 2 U.S. Army personnel. Major equipment damage was to 1 Marine UH-34 and 4 U.S. Army 0-1's. Another 16 U.S. Army aircraft received minor damage.

Marine artillery and infantry units responded quickly to the VC attack. Elements of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines were immediately dispatched to the area, blocking exits to the south and west of the suspected enemy mortar positions. Marine artillery and mortars provided illumination and counter-mortar fire. During subsequent sweeps of the area, Marines located three VC mortar positions. Craters of friendly counter-mortar fire indicated that three 155mm rounds hit within 10 meters of the positions, two 105mm rounds hit within 8 feet, and two 81mm rounds hit within 20 meters. There were, however, no firm indications of enemy casualties.

At month's end, intensified ground operations were continuing in order to locate the enemy mortars and their crews which possibly were still in the area. Elements of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines and 1st Military Police Battalion were conducting extensive patrols and interrogation

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
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of local villagers. The numerous waterways were being searched for hidden equipment with the aid of grappling hooks and scuba gear. In addition, a battalion sized search and destroy operation was planned for early August to ferret out any remaining guerrillas.

Aside from this incident, base defense of the five major installations in I Corps - Danang Air Base, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Marble Mountain, and Ky Ha - was uneventful. These bases, as before, continued to house about 600 U.S. and Vietnamese aircraft. The disposition of these aircraft is shown below.

### AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT THE FIVE MARINE AIRFIELDS IN ICTZ AS OF 31 JULY 1966.



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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**AIR OPERATIONS


Marine fixed wing aircraft flew 5,159 combat or combat support sorties during July, the second highest total for a one month period since the Marines' arrival in Vietnam. A significant factor in this activity was the presence of large enemy units which were either willing or forced to stand and fight, thus providing lucrative air targets. Taking advantage of this, Marine aircraft flew 1,107 tactical fixed wing sorties in support of Operation Hastings alone, an all-time high for any single operation.

Marine aircraft continued to strike communist supply lines leading into RVN; however, there was a noticeable change in the areas which they hit. In June some 80% of the out-of-country sorties struck targets in Laos, with the remainder flying over North Vietnam. In July emphasis was shifted to the lines of communication in North Vietnam, resulting in 573, or 65% of the out-of-country sorties, being flown there.

During July the majority of fixed wing combat sorties, 3790, were flown in support of III MAF. Of the others, 878 were flown on out-of-country missions and 491 were in support of ARVN units in I and II Corps Tactical Zones.


The graph on the following page depicts the fixed wing sortie rate since December 1965.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**FIXED WING COMBAT SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF III MAF  
AND UNITS OTHER THAN III MAF

Marine helicopters flew a greater number of sorties, 41,957, and lifted more passengers, 58,231, than in any other month. As with fixed wing aircraft, protracted engagements with sizeable enemy forces contributed to the record totals. Some 27% of the helicopter sorties and 29% of the total passengers lifted were accomplished during Operation Hastings. The graph below shows the number of helicopter sorties and passengers lifted since August 1965.

## HELICOPTER SORTIES AND PASSENGERS LIFTED

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As in previous months, Marine helicopters accomplished a variety of tasks. Besides troop carrying missions, some 3,682 casualty evacuation sorties were flown. Another 261 search and rescue missions were flown to find downed allied aviators. In addition, armed UH-1E helicopters flew over 3,300 fire support missions, delivering some 2,600 rockets and 355,000 machine gun rounds on enemy positions.

The intense operational pace in July exposed Marine helicopters to heavy enemy ground fire in a number of areas. Ten helicopters were downed by enemy action during the month. This compares with 5 lost in June and 1 in May.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**LOGISTICS

Continued improvement was evident in all aspects of the Marine logistic operations in the Far East during July. This can be attributed to good weather, an improved and expanded road network which facilitated the flow of resupply convoys, an increased availability of covered storage, and continued aggressive action by all concerned. Improved supply techniques resulted in better logistic support to the many tactical operations conducted. Unrestricted logistic support during Operation Hastings was provided by the use of aircraft, landing craft, military convoys, and commercial trucks. Additionally, a logistic support area established at Dong Ha provided more responsive logistic support in the objective area.

Supply: For the first month since March there were no disruptions in the distribution of supplies in the Danang and Phu Bai areas due to political disturbances. A general buildup of supplies resulted which was adequate to support the increased tempo of combat operations.

Class I - Supply levels of all types of rations were maintained at approximately the established stockage objectives throughout the period. Chill and freeze products, however, continued to remain below the desired level due to an insufficient quantity of refrigerated storage to satisfy all requirements.

Class II - A new program was initiated whereby supply support for low density engineer equipment can be expedited by direct message requisition from the user to the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa. The two special supply programs - CRITIPAC (which provides supply support for continually required items direct to the using unit) and Red Ball (which expedites supply action

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on critical items) continue to prove their merit in sustaining logistic support to the III MAF.

Class III/III A - Construction of four 10,000 barrel bolted steel tanks at Danang was completed. This brings the number of these upright tanks now available for POL storage at Danang to seven. In order to increase the refill rate ashore, and also to provide back-up facilities, a second 4-inch, bottom layed fuel line was established from Red Beach Number One to the AOG mooring site in Danang harbor. At Chu Lai, three upright 10,000 barrel bolted steel tanks have been completed as the first increment of the Chu Lai POL tank farm.

Class IV - Stock levels remain sufficient to satisfy the daily demands of tactical operations.

Class V/VA - Ground ammunition stocks were maintained at approximately the established stockage objectives of 45 days of ammunition. CINCPAC allocations of preferred Class VA munitions from new production sources were made available in-country in sufficient quantities to permit optimum weapon loading of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing aircraft within the prescribed limits of these allocations. Sufficient Class VA is now on hand in III MAF, or in the pipeline (within 10 days from in-country), to satisfy Class VA requirements for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing through August 1966.

Maintenance: Deadline rates for combat essential equipment continued to show a downward trend during July. The overall motor transport deadline rate remains at less than ten percent.

The program to modify the T-58 engine on the CH-46

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helicopter with a one hundred percent barrier air filter has been accelerated. This filter will reduce sand erosion in the T-58 engine.

The Force Logistic Command has been authorized to perform fourth echelon maintenance where practical and where such effort does not interfere with their performance of third echelon maintenance. Additional funds have been provided for the procurement of fourth echelon repair parts and the necessary tools.

The Public Works Center, Yokosuka, rebuild program is proceeding satisfactorily. Negotiations have been completed and contracts have been signed with two Japanese civilian contractors and the first increment of 5-ton trucks and generators has been delivered to them. It is estimated that the first ten 5-ton trucks and twenty-two generators undergoing rebuild will be completed by 15 August and returned to the III MAF.

Port Facilities: A 1600 foot, 60 ton floating bridge across the Tourane River at Danang was completed on 21 July and is open to traffic. This bridge improves the flow of traffic between the logistic complexes on the east side of the Tourane River and the principal users on the west side of the river. The Danang East pier and the LST ramps on the east side of the river are 75 percent complete, with an in-use date of 15 August.

On 12 July the Mayor of Danang directed the relocation of civilian housing which has been blocking road construction on the Observation Point pier project. The Delong pier is now scheduled for completion by 1 September. Completion date for a second

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Delong pier is October.

Tan My, near the mouth of the Hue River, has been selected as the site for port facilities in the Hue/Phu Bai area.

Engineer Operations:


Road Building. Contemplating the coming monsoon season, III MAF engineers expended maximum effort on roads in the I CTZ. Road improvement is a continuous project which includes installing culverts, filling pot holes, grading and shaping road beds, surfacing with asphalt and erecting or repairing bridges. There are, in all, 201 miles of major roads being maintained or constructed within the III MAF tactical areas. Of these, 88 miles have been constructed where no roads previously existed, in order to provide an all weather capability for heavy traffic. There are 140 miles of additional roads currently programmed for construction.

Since the Danang area is both the major III MAF logistical complex and the center of Vietnamese population and commerce in I Corps, it has received the preponderance of the road building effort. The map on the following page shows the progress that III MAF has made on the Danang road net since January 1966.

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## ROAD DEVELOPMENT IN THE DANANG MARINE AREA-PAST 6 MONTHS



- Roads constructed by III MAF
- Roads constructed by other U.S. forces
- Existing roads and bridges rehabilitated and/or currently maintained by III MAF

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Road building within the Chu Lai complex was of a different nature from that at Danang. Upon arrival of the Marines on 7 March 1965, the only existing road in the vicinity was Route 1. To date 10.5 miles of all weather roads have been constructed at Chu Lai and an additional 24.5 miles are under construction. The arrival of the 9th Engineer Battalion in June has greatly increased the road building effort and capability in this area. In addition to the above construction 25 miles of existing roads (Routes 1 and 20) are being continually improved.

The road work at Phu Bai has emphasized maintenance of existing roads and installation of pioneer roads to the tactical units.

Aviation Facilities. Progress in the construction of the permanent 10,000 foot concrete runway at Chu Lai has been good. The runway, connecting taxiways, and the 60,000 square yard northwest parking apron are planned for completion by October. The construction of MAG-13 cantonments at Chu Lai will begin in early September. Deployment of MAG-13 is scheduled for September - October 1966.

Movement and Resupply: The month commenced with the arrival of more elements of the 7th Communications Battalion (-) at Chu Lai on 1 July. The Communications Support Company of the 7th Communications Battalion arrived at Danang on 24 July. On 31 July, following their participation in Operations Deckhouse II and Hastings, BLT 3/5 joined the forces at Chu Lai to become the eighteenth infantry battalion in III MAF. During the month, a total of 2,155 personnel were added to III MAF.

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strength.

Cargo operations at the Port of Danang did not match the previous month's record breaking throughput, but the figures were still impressive. Total throughput was 195,692 M/T - 147,163 M/T of which was unloaded, for an average daily discharge rate of 4,747 M/T; as compared with the June rate of 5,920 M/T per day.

On 31 July there were 11 deep draft ships in the port of Danang. During the month 28 deep draft ships arrived and 22 were unloaded and departed. The backlog of cargo in the port on 31 July was 73,206 M/T compared with 22,197 M/T reported on 30 June. The average backlog for July was 32,094 M/T.

A total of 573 S/T of critical combat cargo was moved on FMFPac KC-130 aircraft from Okinawa to Vietnam, compared to 804 S/T during the previous month. The cargo lifted from Kadena to Danang by the Military Airlift Command increased slightly over that carried in June. A total of 459 S/T was lifted, but this still did not meet the established requirements, or allocation, for movement over the Military Airlift Command channel from Kadena to Danang. The 315th Air Division lifted 702 S/T of Marine Corps cargo from Okinawa to Vietnam. In July a total of 1,734 S/T of cargo was airlifted to III MAF from Okinawa; the total airlift for June over these same routes was 1,471 S/T.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS1. PHU BAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

None

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>June</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regt Hq	1	1	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	7	7	Battalions	0	0
Companies	2	2	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	3,695	3,595	Total Strength	150	150

Confirmed enemy strength within a twenty-five mile radius of the Phu Bai Tactical Area is 3,695; the adjusted figure based on assessed casualties is now 3,493. The principal enemy unit which suffered KIA's was the 802d VC Battalion (202 KIA).

The 324th "B" NVA Division encountered during Operation Hastings is now considered to have relocated into NVN or the DMZ leaving behind only small liaison, reconnaissance and surveillance units and personnel in Quang Tri province.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**2. DANANGMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
VMFA-323	5Jul	Arrive	Iwakuni	Opcn MAG-11

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

	<u>Increase on 20 July</u>	<u>Total as of 31 July</u>
Square Miles	323	999
Civilians	84,551	651,076
Villages	22	104

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>June</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regt Hq	0	0	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	4	4	Battalions	3	3
Companies	4	4	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	2,140	2,140	Total Strength	1,325	1,325

Confirmed enemy strength within a twenty-five mile radius of the Danang Tactical Area is 2,140; the adjusted figure based on assessed casualties is now 1,919. The principal enemy unit which suffered KIA's is considered to be the R-20 VC Battalion (221 KIA).

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**3. CHU LAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
HMM-364	4Jul	Arrive	SLF	Replaced by HMM-363
HMM-363	4Jul	Depart	SLF	Replaced by HMM-364
VMA-224	14Jul	Arrive	Iwakuni	Rotation with VMA-211
VMA-211	14Jul	Depart	Iwakuni	Rotation with VMA-224
BLT 3/5	31Jul	Arrive	SLF	Replaced by BLT 1/26


CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

	<u>Increase on 20 July</u>	<u>Total as of 31 July</u>
Square Miles	112	459
Civilians	10,641	174,015
Villages	5	45

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>June</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>				<u>Within 25 miles</u>	
Div Hq	0	1	Regt Hq	0	0
Regt Hq	2	0	Battalions	1	1
Battalions	7	1	Companies	0	0
Companies	11	11			
Total Strength	5,400	1,600	Total Strength	300	300

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~~SECRET~~4. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

During the month of July, major Marine operations conducted within twenty-five miles of the Marine Tactical Areas killed 438 VC. Consequently, contacted enemy Main Force and Local Force units have been reduced in combat effectiveness and strength. In addition to the confirmed enemy strength figures shown for Phu Bai, Danang, and Chu Lai, a reduced enemy unit strength adjustment figure is shown to compensate for personnel losses inflicted by Marines.

5. VIET CONG LOSSES FOR JULY 1966

<u>July</u>		<u>Total to Date</u>
1,577	KIA	8,739
38	VC (Captured)	1,055
308	VC (Suspects)	6,995
7	WIA	477
268	Weapons	1,473

6. CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS

<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>		<u>Total as of 31Jul166</u>
78,961	110,004	Persons Given Medical Treatment	727,557
36	42	Persons Given Medical Training	399
57	35	Construction Projects	547
161,061	49,001	Pounds of Food Distributed	570,850
12,068	8,410	Pounds of Soap Distributed	106,746
17,252	9,181	Pounds of Clothing Distributed	193,466



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**UNCLASSIFIED**CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS (cont)

<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>		<u>Total as of 31Jul66</u>
110	214	Critically Ill Civilians Evacuated	5,132
80	169	English Language Classes in Progress	660
\$ 783	\$ 2,281	Cash Donations	\$ 29,758
157,811	91,583	Persons Fed	623,758
3,769	1,430	Students Supported	27,233

7. MARINE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>		<u>Total as of 31Jul66</u>
6,294	7,770	Patrols	60,137
4,013	4,440	Ambushes	38,976
661	747	Sniper Posts	3,498
4	4	Regimental or Larger Ops	36
7	4	Battalion Ops	85
227	244	Company Ops	1,362
4,096	5,159	Offensive Air Sorties	48,737
38,279	41,957	Helo Sorties	390,930

8. III MAF STRENGTH - ON 31 JULY

Danang	28,751
Chu Lai	21,332
Hue Phu Bai	7,226
Total	57,309

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**III MAF AREA - ON 31 JULY

	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Square Miles	999	459	162	1,620
Civilians	651,076	174,015	68,037	893,128
Villages	104	45	22	171

10. LOGISTICS

## a. Supply Levels at End of Period:

	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>
Class I (1000 of rations/ days of supply)			
MCI (Rations)	738/25	428/18	211/30
B Rations	364/13	403/17	84/12
A Rations	84/3	151/6	7/1
Class III & IIIA (BULK): (1000 of gals/days of supply)			
JP-4	*702/4	709/8	43/4
AVGAS	196/9	119/9	52/6
MOGAS	332/16	243/8	49/6
DIESEL	257/14	149/5	32/4

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\* Includes only the JP-4 stored by FLSG at Danang;  
 does not include NAVSUPPACT, Danang or deliveries  
 from NAVSUPPACT direct to operating squadrons.

Class V and VA: DANANG CHU LAI PHU BAI

Ground Ammo  
 (days of supply) 45 45 45

250 lb LD bombs 4,111 2,742 -  
 (number of bombs)

500 lb LD bombs 2,800 1,762 -  
 (number of bombs)

Launcher w/19 1,178 485 -  
 2.75 in. rockets

Launcher w/14 532 341 -  
 5 in. rockets

b. Resupply Status:

(1) Surface Shipping Status (Danang)

Cargo unloaded (July) 147,163 M/T

Average daily discharge rate 4,747 M/T

Ships in port 30 June 5

Ships arriving during July 28

Ships unloaded during July 22

Ships in port 31 July 11

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Cargo backlog 30 June	22,197 M/T
Cargo backlog 31 July	73,206 M/T
Average cargo backlog (July)	32,094 M/T

## (2) Air Shipping Status

Cargo lifted into RVN (July)	1,734 S/T
Cargo awaiting lift on Okinawa as of 1 August	448 S/T

c. RED BALL Summary (July):

Items at beginning of period	- 1,021
Items added	- 593
Items removed	- 336
Items remaining at end of period	- 1,278

d. Maintenance (July):

Items evacuated from RVN	- 1,386
Items repaired at 3d FSR	- 1,619
Items returned to CONUS from 3d FSR	- 197
Items disposed of on Okinawa	- 591

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e. Construction Projects:

Roads rehabilitated - 201 miles being maintained.  
or constructed. 88 miles constructed to date.

Bridges constructed.- Completed one 1600 ft span of M4 floating Class 60 bridge - Completed one 15 ft span Class 60 two lane fixed bridge. Completed one 32 ft span Class 60 timber bridge. Completed one 259 ft span floating foot bridge. Completed one 35 ft span Class 60 two lane M-6 bridge. One bridge under construction and two under repair.

Wells drilled. - 4 completed, and 3 in progress.

Covered storage - 408,960 sq ft now completed; 167,040 sq ft under construction of the 624,000 sq ft programmed.

Covered storage - 64,000 sq ft now completed and in use; 128,000 sq ft under construction of the 270,000 sq ft programmed.

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III MAF covered storage (includes maintenance facilities). - Accurate data for month of July not available.

Ammo storage. - ASP #1 28% complete; ASP #2 95% complete.

POL storage 10,000 BBL tanks. - The seventh 10,000 BBL tank was completed. Three tanks under construction.

400 Bed Hospital. - 94% complete.

Water supply - 82% complete.  
Danang/Danang East/  
Chu Lai/Phu Bai.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**CONCLUSIONS

The events of the month in the I Corps area underscored three significant truths:

- Given a reasonable opportunity, U. S. Forces are able to deliver serious punishment on organized units of the enemy, wherever and whenever encountered. It is plain that the VC and NVN forces cannot stand up to the combined air/ground power of our units.
- The growing U.S. /GVN pressure in the rural construction/civic action area is beginning to be felt in the VC dominated regions.
- Although U. S. Forces form an essential ingredient in the restoration of peace and stability to the countryside, the Vietnamese must participate actively in the rural construction task, too. There is today - as there has consistently been in the past - a substantial shortage of Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces involved in the pacification effort.

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