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FMF Rec : Operations of U.S. Marine
Forces, Vietnam

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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

VIETNAM

SEPTEMBER 1966

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of September 1966. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering periods from March 1965 through August 1966.

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SUMMARY

Thirteen large unit operations by Marine forces during September accounted for 1,551 enemy killed, half of them in Operation Prairie, where between four and six Marine battalions continued to blunt attempts of North Vietnamese formations to enter northern I Corps in force.

During these major operations, the Marine logistic system in Vietnam demonstrated its capability to provide continuing support for an extended campaign in an undeveloped region, remote from the sea. Beginning in July with Operation Hastings, and continuing through August and September with Operation Prairie, that logistic system provided Marine forces engaged near the Demilitarized Zone with 5,800 tons of ammunition, 1,600 tons of food, 248,000 gallons of fuel, and 1,000 tons of miscellaneous supplies. And by the end of the month, a rapidly-developed advance logistic base to support Operation Prairie forces was near completion in northern Quang Tri Province, stocked with sufficient food, ammunition, and other basic supplies to sustain six battalions and their supporting forces for 30 days of continuous combat deep in the hinterland.

This commitment of as many as six battalions from the central pacification areas for the conduct of large unit operations in Quang Tri Province, although productive in thwarting enemy offensive efforts, paid a price in the pace of pacification and counter guerrilla activity. The northward shift of a substantial part of the Marines' ground strength - many elements of which had been deeply involved in pacification - caused small-unit operations to decline from 11,004 in August to 10,372, a 6% drop, and the lowest level of intensity since February. As a related consequence, the number of guerrillas killed in this critical campaign (238) was the lowest total in four months,

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well below the monthly average of 438 for this period.

Despite the substantial northward shift of Marine forces, the pacification program exhibited that it had generated much momentum. When forces introduced from other Corps Tactical Zones (3 Republic of Korea Marine battalions thus far) become familiar with the people and the countryside, there is reason to conclude that the momentum will be continued. At the end of September, the number of villagers living in areas considered to be at least 60% pacified exceeded 562,000, which compares with 521,000 in August, 478,000 in July and 217,000 in February, the beginning month for this statistical evaluation. Key indicators of improved security and improved conditions of government control are portrayed in the pacification section of this report.

A milestone was achieved in late September when the Commanding General of the ARVN I Corps stated that he intended to move actively into the Revolutionary Development (pacification) Program with the Marines, employing 25 of his 31 ARVN infantry battalions in the endeavor. By month's end, there was little evidence of ARVN activity yet visible in this area.

There were 14 County Fairs conducted during the month, raising to 74 the number carried out since these operations were begun in February. To date, over 31,000 villagers have been screened, issued identity cards, given food, medical treatment, agricultural instruction, made acquainted with local officials, and indoctrinated with the goals of the GVN. At the same time, 141 confirmed guerrillas have been killed and 206 others captured.

Those Marines not otherwise employed in September achieved emphatic results in protecting three widely separated rice harvests. In the largest of the three, 10,000

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workers under Marine protection harvested and retained over 8,400 tons of rice, an amount sufficient to support 31,000 Vietnamese civilians for a year. Whereas, in previous years, the Viet Cong had managed to obtain 90% of the crop in the areas concerned, their spoil this year was less than 30%. In one 10-day harvest period, Marines killed 244 Viet Cong who risked open encounters in desperate attempts to replenish their rice stores.

The threatened Viet Cong disruption of the Vietnamese national elections on 11 September failed in the I Corps Tactical Zone, as elsewhere. Of the 814,000 eligible Vietnamese voters in that area, over 87% went to the polls, undeterred by Viet Cong propaganda and threats of guerrilla violence. This underscored the progress that has been made in the pacification program and in the corresponding degradation of the guerrilla threat.

During September, Marine attack aircraft flew 5,826 sorties, a new high. Over 75% (4,400) supported Marine ground operations, accounting for 343 enemy killed. Of the remainder, 1,013 were flown over North Vietnam, 14 over Laos, and 382 were in support of ARVN and other Free World Forces in I and II Corps. Helicopter sorties declined slightly, to 35,527, from the August total of 36,216. Approximately 82% were in support of Marine operations.

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
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LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

In September, Marines participated in thirteen large unit operations, accounting for 1,551 confirmed enemy killed - the highest monthly total since the Marines' commitment in Vietnam. These included Operation Prairie, the most successful endeavor thus far in terms of enemy killed; Deckhouse IV, an amphibious landing by the Special Landing Force of the Seventh Fleet just south of the Demilitarized Zone; Operation Macon, continuing in its third month to consolidate the region southwest of Danang; and three Golden Fleece operations which protected the critical rice harvest in I Corps. The map below shows the location of all thirteen of these large scale operations.

III MAF LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS-SEPTEMBER 1966

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The largest of these, from the standpoint of enemy killed, was Prairie. After Operation Hastings (7 July - 3 August) had turned back the advance of the 324B North Vietnamese Division into northern Quang Tri Province, three Marine battalions remained near the Demilitarized Zone to search for NVA personnel who might be hiding there and to detect any reinfiltration that might be undertaken. By the 1st of September, the operation, called Prairie, had accounted for 219 NVA killed, largely as a result of small unit encounters with determined and well-armed enemy groups.

As Prairie continued into early September, contacts became more frequent, and indications grew that the enemy might again attempt to enter northern I Corps in force. Offered this opportunity to inflict further damage on the North Vietnamese, at mid-month CG III MAF added a fourth battalion to his Prairie forces and intensified reconnaissance efforts in the DMZ area. At the same time, the Special Landing Force of the Seventh Fleet (BLT 1/26 and HMM-363) landed in a rapidly executed amphibious assault. The target was enemy units which had been detected attempting to infiltrate from the DMZ southward along the coast in eastern Quang Tri.

The situation in Quang Tri Province on 14 September, and locations of the Marine attacks on 15 and 17 September are shown on the maps on the following page.


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
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OPERATION PRAIRIE SITUATION TO 14 SEPTEMBER



MID-SEPTEMBER ACTIONS



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
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Almost immediately after the amphibious attack began the Special Landing Force became heavily engaged. The majority of the subsequent action, spanning seven days, occurred in a valley just 3,000 meters south of the DMZ. In a series of sharp encounters, NVA fortifications consisting of covered trenches, bunkers and tunnels were reduced by ground assault, air, artillery, naval gunfire, and direct fire from tanks. On one occasion, three Marine companies launched a coordinated attack under a rolling barrage of supporting arms fire to envelop an estimated NVA company.

Significant operations of BLT 1/26 during the period are illustrated below.

AMPHIBIOUS ATTACK DECKHOUSE IV, 15-16 SEPTEMBER




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
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AMPHIBIOUS ATTACK-DECKHOUSE IV 17-19 SEPTEMBER



AMPHIBIOUS ATTACK-DECKHOUSE IV, 20-23 SEPTEMBER



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
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In its ten days ashore, prior to reembarking on 25 September, the Special Landing Force killed 254 or more of the enemy, over 35% of the total casualty toll for Operation Prairie during the month.

For the other battalions involved in Operation Prairie, the latter half of the month was characterized by sharp clashes ranging far into the mountains of central and western Quang Tri. Maneuvering by helicopter and on foot, the Marines systematically isolated enemy groups in well-prepared strong points, some made of concrete. The largest single encounter in Prairie occurred on 16-18 September, when the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines attacked elements of an NVA battalion, killing 171, with another 210 listed as probably killed. The more significant events of Operation Prairie are portrayed below.

ACTION IN OPERATION PRAIRIE 16-30 SEPTEMBER



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By 30 September, the operation had accounted for 943 enemy killed (724 in September; 219 in August).

At the end of the month, two additional Marine battalions were committed to Prairie, one to the main battle area and the other to operations in the region of the Khe Sanh Special Forces camp, some fifteen miles to the southwest. The purpose of the Khe Sanh operation is to maintain surveillance of Route 9 and other principal approach routes into northern I Corps from Laos.

One hundred and fifty miles to the south, Operation Macon, initiated on 4 July to consolidate Marine influence along the Thu Bon River, encountered continuous but generally moderate contact. During the month, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines killed 163 of the enemy and captured 5 others, raising the three month total to 442 killed and 7 captured.

Macon, Prairie, and the other offensive large unit operations of September drew down heavily on the number of Marine battalions available for pacification operations, as did the continuing requirement for defense of the major U. S. installations in I CTZ. Even so, three other battalions provided rice harvest protection during Golden Fleece operations in the southern provinces.

The most successful results were obtained in the Mo Duc region south of Quang Ngai City, where guerrillas in previous years had obtained as much as 90% of the harvest. This year, while 10,000 daily harvesters at Mo Duc were protected by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 7,620 tons of rice were harvested and retained by the villagers, and 727 additional tons were confiscated from VC sources uncovered during the operation - an amount

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sufficient to feed some 31,000 Vietnamese civilians for a year. Even so, something approaching 30% of the crop is estimated to have gone to the VC. This quantity was either harvested prior to the arrival of the Marines or was obtained by the VC from fields Marines were unable to guard, simply by the limitation on the numbers available for pacification operations.

The enemy reacted strongly to Golden Fleece, daily accepting the great risk of open encounters with Marine forces in attempts to capture the harvest. As a consequence, in the ten days of this operation, a single battalion of the 7th Marines killed 244 Viet Cong. This exceeded the combined September daily kill average of the four battalions engaged in Operation Prairie (724 enemy KIA in 30 days). The high enemy casualty toll in Golden Fleece underscored the value of extensive earlier pacification operations which denied the enemy the food he requires. His desperate need for rice drove him to the coastal lowlands, where he was obliged to fight on our terms, rather than in the mountains and jungle, where circumstances are in his favor.

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COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

The commitment of substantial forces to Prairie and twelve other large unit operations diminished considerably the forces available for counter guerrilla activity during the month. The effect was understandably unfavorable. In September, there were fewer small-unit actions (10,372) than in any corresponding period since February (8,946) of this year. Of September's total, 6,317 were patrols, 3,929 were ambushes, and 126 were company-size operations.

As a consequence of this reduced activity, there were fewer encounters with the enemy than in any month since April, 1966 - 859 contacts in September versus 1,213 in August and 1,457 in July. But most important, the 238 guerrillas killed during the month was the lowest total in four months, and 54% below the average of 438 for this period.

Patrol and ambush activity by the battalions of III MAF is shown on the following pages.


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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA



Marine battalions in the Danang area conducted 3,041 patrols and 2,343 ambushes in September. Five of the infantry battalions also participated in large scale operations during the month. On 26 September, BLT 1/26 relieved BLT 1/9 which departed for Okinawa three days later.


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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHU LAI TACTICAL AREA



Infantry and reconnaissance battalions of the 1st Marine Division at Chu Lai conducted 2,454 patrols and 1,257 ambushes during September. The majority of the 170 enemy contacts made during the month occurred in daylight - 123 versus 47 at night.


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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PHU BAI TACTICAL AREA



Three of the four infantry battalions at Phu Bai were involved for the greater part of the month in Operation Prairie. Thus, the entire counter guerrilla effort in and around the 122 square mile Marine area was borne by 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, assisted by Reconnaissance Group "B". This is the fourth consecutive month in which the bulk of the Phu Bai battalions have conducted large unit operations external to the Marine area.

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PACIFICATION AND CIVIC ACTION

In the months of July and August the Viet Cong made clear their determination to prevent the Vietnamese national elections, or at least disrupt them and terrorize the voters. However, 11 September proved to be much like any other day in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Throughout the five provinces, there were only 34 Viet Cong incidents recorded. These, and earlier Viet Cong threats had little effect, as over 710,000 of the 814,000 eligible voters (87%) in I CTZ went to the polls.

On election day, virtually all III MAF civic action work halted, as Marines remained away from the population centers and polling places. This was done to ensure against any incident that could be taken as politically controversial and therefore exploited by the Viet Cong. As a precautionary measure, however, both the Marines and ARVN carried out aggressive patrol activity along the roads and around the villages and hamlets.

This surely had some damping effect on Viet Cong activity, but it is plain that other, broader considerations were present. An 87% voter turnout, in the face of violent terrorist and guerrilla threats, suggests a weakening of Viet Cong control in I CTZ and a corresponding growth of government influence. The degradation of the guerrilla power and progress in other aspects of pacification must be accorded some credit for this success.

As in months past, pacification progress in September continued to be limited by erratic GVN participation. This still is confined generally to Regional Force and Popular Force units which vary widely in motivation and performance and are inadequate in numbers for the task.

A promising development emerged in late September, however, when CG I Corps (ARVN) advised CG III MAF

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
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that he intends to move aggressively into Revolutionary Development (pacification) with a large proportion of his thirty-one ARVN infantry battalions. Although the rate at which these battalions will be brought into the pacification program has not been announced, and while their effectiveness in this new role has yet to be measured, this step - if actually executed - can represent a major milestone of progress.

Although the number of Marines available for pacification activity in September was diminished, there was still evidence that the program has momentum, since overall pacification levels improved slowly. The number of villagers living in regions classified as 60% or higher on the III MAF pacification scale exceeded 562,000, compared with 521,000 in August and 478,000 in July. Only 217,000 villagers were in this same category in February, when this statistical evaluation commenced. The graph below shows the pacification growth of the three Marine areas since February 1966.

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As the VC have increased their demands for food, manpower and taxes, a rising tide of refugees has moved behind the shield of security provided by III MAF, ARVN and Free World Forces in I CTZ. In September, 238,000 refugees resided in the five provinces.

The relief, resettlement and rehabilitation of this influx of refugees from less secure areas in I CTZ has over-extended GVN refugee assistance resources. III MAF, operating in conjunction with the GVN, USAID and voluntary agencies, has undertaken to assist refugee relief programs in III MAF tactical areas as well as in areas secured by ARVN and provincial forces.

The III MAF contribution to refugee assistance has taken many forms. During September alone, 132 tons of foodstuffs, representing about 500,000 meals, were delivered by III MAF to refugee camps. At least 16,000 medical treatments were administered, and 2,500 sheets of roofing material, 22,500 board feet of lumber, 69,000 pounds of cement, 2,500 blankets and 500 garden tools were given to refugees. The construction material was used primarily in the self-help construction of more than 300 individual dwellings. In addition, III MAF has provided security for the establishment of resettlement camps and for the harvest of rice by refugees, mainly in the Mo Duc area south of Quang Ngai (see Large Unit Operations section).

Overall pacification progress in the Marine areas is portrayed on the next three pages, followed by a graphic representation of progress in certain key indicators related to improved village security and growth in government control.


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PACIFICATION STATUS-DANANG AREA



| PERCENT PACIFIED | SQUARE MILES | | | CIVILIAN POPULATION | | | VILLAGES | | |
|------------------|--------------|-----|----------------|---------------------|---------|----------------|----------|-----|----------------|
| | FEB | SEP | CHANGE FEB-SEP | FEB | SEP | CHANGE FEB-SEP | FEB | SEP | CHANGE FEB-SEP |
| Under 20% | 457 | 667 | +210 | 94,491 | 144,747 | +50,256 | 53 | 34 | -19 |
| 20% | 57 | 52 | -5 | 36,258 | 86,425 | +50,167 | 9 | 19 | +10 |
| 40% | 18 | 84 | +66 | 16,100 | 84,892 | +68,792 | 4 | 16 | +12 |
| 60% | 26 | 102 | +76 | 19,038 | 85,718 | +66,682 | 5 | 17 | +12 |
| 80% | 31 | 94 | +63 | 175,000 | 339,243 | +164,243 | 1 | 18 | +17 |
| 100% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 589 | 999 | | 340,885 | 741,025 | | 72 | 104 | |


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PACIFICATION STATUS-CHU LAI AREA



| PERCENT PACIFIED | SQUARE MILES | | | CIVILIAN POPULATION | | | VILLAGES | | |
|------------------|--------------|-----|----------------|---------------------|---------|----------------|----------|-----|----------------|
| | FEB | SEP | CHANGE FEB-SEP | FEB | SEP | CHANGE FEB-SEP | FEB | SEP | CHANGE FEB-SEP |
| Under 20% | 244 | 207 | -37 | 91,145 | 100,272 | +9,127 | 21 | 25 | +4 |
| 20% | 30 | 68 | +38 | 21,624 | 32,168 | +10,544 | 5 | 6 | +1 |
| 40% | — | 89 | +89 | — | 46,365 | +46,365 | — | 8 | +8 |
| 60% | — | 87 | +87 | — | 36,316 | +36,316 | — | 7 | +7 |
| 80% | — | 81 | +81 | — | +62,457 | +62,457 | — | 11 | +11 |
| 100% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total | 274 | 532 | | 112,769 | 277,578 | | 26 | 57 | |


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PACIFICATION STATUS-PHU BAI AREA



| PERCENT PACIFIED | SQUARE MILES | | | CIVILIAN POPULATION | | | VILLAGES | | |
|------------------|--------------|-----|----------------|---------------------|--------|----------------|----------|-----|----------------|
| | FEB | SEP | CHANGE FEB-SEP | FEB | SEP | CHANGE FEB-SEP | FEB | SEP | CHANGE FEB-SEP |
| Under 20% | 22 | 40 | +18 | 17,740 | 10,381 | -7,359 | 4 | 11 | +7 |
| 20% | 25 | 41 | +16 | 11,852 | 9,524 | -2,328 | 2 | 2 | — |
| 40% | — | 17 | +17 | — | 9,049 | +9,049 | — | 1 | +1 |
| 60% | 38 | 8 | -30 | 23,486 | 5,269 | -18,190 | 5 | 1 | -4 |
| 80% | — | 56 | +56 | — | 33,787 | +33,787 | — | 7 | +7 |
| 100% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total | 85 | 162 | | 53,078 | 68,037 | | 11 | 22 | |

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
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
FEBRUARY-SEPTEMBER PACIFICATION PROGRESS
IN MARINE TACTICAL AREAS

■ COMPLETE
 ▨ PARTIALLY COMPLETE








VILLAGE CENSUS



VILLAGE GVN INTELLIGENCE NETS



VILLAGE DEFENSE PLANS

DEFENSE FORCE
TRAINED AND IN PLACEVILLAGE CHIEFS AND
COUNCILS FUNCTIONINGCOMMUNICATION
NETS ESTABLISHEDVILLAGE CHIEFS
LIVING IN VILLAGESPSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PUBLIC INFORMATIONVILLAGE MARKETS
ESTABLISHED

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Modest growth continued to be registered in the Combined Action Company program, where US Marines are united with Popular Force troops down as far as the squad level. At end-September, 48 platoons had been organized (24 at Danang, 14 at Chu Lai and 10 at Phu Bai), compared with 37 in early July. Of some 1,600 personnel in these platoons, 517 are Marines. More rapid rate of growth toward the year-end goal of 73 platoons is impeded by the limited number of Popular Forces personnel available for the program.

Despite its present small size, the program is growing steadily in effectiveness. During the month, Combined Action Platoons conducted 1,593 patrols and ambushes, which resulted in 13 VC killed, 22 captured, and 178 suspects apprehended. In a noteworthy action on 11 September near Danang, one platoon assisted by National Police captured 12 confirmed VC and detained 60 suspects who were moving to interfere with the elections.

During the month, 14 County Fair operations were conducted in 21 hamlets. County Fair, it will be recalled, is basically a combined military/political effort to reestablish GVN authority in the populated countryside. GVN officials take a census, fingerprint and photograph the villagers, issue identity cards, and indoctrinate the people with pro-government lectures and films. At the same time, ARVN units assisted by the Marines conduct a detailed search of the hamlet for caves, tunnels, VC supplies, and guerrillas who might be in hiding.

The 14 operations during September screened 5,368 villagers, raising to 31,259 the cumulative number processed in the 74 operations since County Fair began in February. Fifteen guerrillas were killed and 34 others were captured during the month. In the 99

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hamlets searched to date, 141 VC have been killed, 206 captured, and 59 weapons seized. Noting that there are 2,400,000 people in the key coastal area of I CTZ, it is evident that this program is a slow-moving one, however important it may be. Nor is there prospect of acceleration from the current rate of four per week to the desired rate of ten per week until the GVN participation grows substantially.

The I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, which was formed in September 1965 to improve the overall pacification effort throughout I Corps, made significant progress during its first year of operation.

At its beginning, Council membership was limited to U.S. agencies. Now the Council includes, as well, key military and civilian officials of all the Vietnamese agencies involved in the I Corps pacification program.

In September 1965, Council meetings were held exclusively in the city of Danang. Today, the entire Council journeys each month to a different province headquarters, where the programs of that province are highlighted.

The primary contributions of the Council are its assessment of the competing Revolutionary Development requirements, and its coordination of the civilian and military resources available to satisfy these requirements. At a recent meeting of the Council, for example, the Quang Tri province chief reported that sections for two critical bridges in his province were lost in Saigon. Through subsequent Council action, the bridge sections were located, transportation arranged, and the sections shipped to I Corps.

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Council success in its first year of operation prompted the establishment of Provincial Joint Coordinating Councils in all five I CTZ provinces, patterned after the I Corps Council. This should improve further the coordination of the overall I Corps pacification program.

By the end of September, the 2d Brigade, Republic of Korea Marine Corps, with 3 battalions, had completed its move into the southern portion of the Chu Lai tactical area (see page 16). Their activity during the month was highlighted by a Golden Fleece operation which protected the harvesting of 68 tons of rice; two clearing operations of battalion size or larger in northern Quang Tri Province; and active participation in the pacification effort. At month's end, 6 villages in the ROK area were classified as 60% or higher on the III MAF pacification scale, with 5 additional villages in the 40% to 60% category (see page 22).

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BASE DEFENSE

During September, defense of the air bases continued in the same pattern as in previous months, with coordinated small unit patrols and ambushes and large unit operations providing both close-in and far-reaching protection.

At Phu Bai, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was tasked with the mission of air base security, as three of the four infantry battalions normally assigned to the Phu Bai area were committed to the DMZ area. At both Danang Air Base and Marble Mountain Air Facility, primary close-in protection was provided by the 1st Military Police Battalion in its role as the Air Base Defense Battalion. To the south, the Chu Lai Defense Command, task organized on a rotational basis from units within that tactical area, provided security for the helicopter facility at Ky Ha and the jet base at Chu Lai.

The fact that at any given time the enemy is capable of harassing these installations, despite the substantial defensive effort, was borne out early on the morning of the 21st when an estimated twenty rounds of 82mm mortar fire fell in the Chu Lai airfield area. The mortar rounds, all apparently fired in rapid succession from one tube located approximately two kilometers west-northwest of the airfield, inflicted only minor damage.

The map on the following page shows the location of the 562 U. S. and Vietnamese combat aircraft at the five key bases under Marine protection. In addition to 365 Marine aircraft actually in-country at the close of the month, 35 Marine fixed wing aircraft and 13 helicopters were undergoing progressive aircraft rework or battle damage repair in the Philippines or Japan.


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AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT THE FIVE MAJOR AIRFIELDS IN ICTZ AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1966



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AIR OPERATIONS

During September, flight operations reached a new peak as Marine fixed wing jet aircraft flew a record 5,826 combat or combat support sorties, exceeding the previous high of 5,637 sorties established in March. III MAF received the majority of the fixed wing air support as over 4,400 sorties (75 percent of the total) were flown in support of Marine ground operations. Of the remaining sorties, 1,013 were flown over North Vietnam, 14 over Laos, and 382 in support of ARVN and US Army units in I and II Corps Tactical Zones. Over 5,000 tons of bombs and napalm were dropped on enemy targets, killing 343 VC/NVA and destroying 1,436 structures and 17 sampans.

A large portion of the Marine fixed wing combat effort in South Vietnam during the month was allocated to Operation Prairie, with 1,272 sorties expending over 1,670 tons of ordnance. This total, which accounted for roughly 27 percent of all Marine fixed wing sorties flown in-country during September, surpassed the previous single operation record set during July, when 1,107 sorties were flown in support of Hastings.

While supporting Operation Prairie, Marine fighter and attack aircraft flew an average of 11 fixed wing combat sorties per engaged battalion per day throughout the month. This was culminated by a surge effort on the 28th, when 84 sorties supported the ground units, an average of 21 sorties for each of the four participating battalions. On that day, most of the missions were flown in support of the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, which was heavily engaged with an NVA unit in the mountainous area eight miles west of Cam Lo (see Large Unit Operations section).

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Air operations during the month were influenced to a limited extent by lowering ceilings and visibility in advance of the monsoon. A prevailing light northeasterly wind flow caused early morning low ceilings and reduced visibility along the coastal areas of I Corps, while operations in the mountainous regions to the west were hampered by early morning patchy fog and afternoon buildups with scattered rain showers. The total of 79 sorties cancelled because of poor weather would have been larger had it not been for the support rendered by the Air Support Radar Teams at Danang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai and Dong Ha. These conducted 1,587 radar-controlled combat sorties - 733 of them in support of Operation Prairie.

Three aircraft were lost during the month. One A-4 Skyhawk was reported missing and presumed down shortly after midnight on the 9th, following an Air Support Radar Team controlled bombing mission in the Chu Lai area. Search and rescue operations failed to produce any trace of the missing aircraft and pilot.

Seven days later, another A-4 crashed while on a close air support mission in support of the US Army Operation Seward in east-central II Corps. The pilot ejected successfully, but during the rescue attempt, the sling on the rescuing US Army helicopter broke and the pilot fell from approximately 800 feet and was killed.

Then, on 20 September, a third A-4 conducting a direct air support mission 15 miles southwest of Danang caught fire and crashed following a dive bombing run, fatally injuring the pilot. In addition to these losses, 19 other fixed wing combat aircraft received varying

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
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degrees of battle damage during the month, 3 of them while conducting strikes in North Vietnam.

The graph below depicts the fixed wing sortie allocation since February.

**FIXED WING SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF III MAF
AND UNITS OTHER THAN III MAF**



Marine helicopters flew a total of 35,527 sorties during September, a slight decrease from the previous month. Almost 50% of the sorties were involved directly with troop and cargo carrying operations, while the balance was composed of armed helicopter, search and rescue, casualty evacuation, and reconnaissance missions. Approximately 82% of the total helicopter effort supported III MAF operations. Over 3,100 wounded Marine and ARVN troops were evacuated from the battlefield by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters.

Contributing to the overall effort was HMM-363, the helicopter squadron with the Special Landing Force,

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
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which lifted 4,931 passengers and 993 tons of cargo while flying 1,751 sorties in support of Deckhouse IV and Operation Prairie during the period 15 to 25 September.

Five helicopters were lost during the month and an additional 112 were damaged in combat operations. Four passengers or crew members were killed, and 37 were wounded.

The graph below shows the number of helicopter sorties and passengers lifted since October 1965.

HELICOPTER SORTIES AND PASSENGERS LIFTED



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LOGISTICS

During the month of September, the Marine logistic system demonstrated its capability to provide continuing, high intensity logistic support for a major campaign, remote from the sea, deep in the undeveloped mountain region of northwestern Quang Tri Province.

Beginning on 7 July 1966 with Operation Hastings, and phasing into Operation Prairie, Marine forces up to 7 battalions in size have operated continuously in that isolated region, inflicting upon the enemy the heaviest losses he has suffered in I CTZ to date. During this very demanding period, the Marine logistic system provided 5,800 tons of ammunition, 1,600 tons of food, 248,000 gallons of fuel, and almost 1,000 tons of other supplies. Over 4,000 tons of supplies and 167,000 gallons of fuel were laid down in September alone.

Besides providing for the combat logistic support of the Marine forces engaged during Hastings and Prairie, an important logistic base was developed near the town of Dong Ha. Largely complete by the end of the reporting period, stockage objectives for the Dong Ha base were set at 30 days of food, ammunition, and other basic supplies for six battalions plus supporting forces.

Bulk fuel buildup at the Dong Ha airfield commenced on 7 September with deliveries ranging between 40,000 and

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
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60,000 gallons daily. The fuel is stored and dispensed from the Marines' Amphibious Assault Bulk Fuel System. This portable complex of equipment has a total capacity of 440,000 gallons comprised of 160,000 gallons each of aviation gasoline and JP-4, and 60,000 gallons each of motor gasoline and diesel fuel.

The map below displays the major components of the Logistic Support Area at Dong Ha.

DONG HA LOGISTIC SUPPORT AREA-30 SEPT.



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Fulfillment of the logistical demands of prolonged large unit operations in the inaccessible highland area, accompanied by the buildup at Dong Ha, validated the Marine logistic structure which has evolved with the growing Marine commitment in Vietnam. The evolution was a natural one.

When the Marines landed at Danang, Phu Bai and Chu Lai in the spring of 1965, their logistic system was tailored to fit the initial amphibious requirement; streamlined and, by design, suited to amphibious warfare. As the size of the Marine forces in Vietnam grew (57,596 troops by the end of September 1966) and the nature of the campaign changed from an amphibious operation to a prolonged inland campaign, the logistic structure was progressively redesigned to meet the need.

The organization which now supports the III MAF is the Force Logistic Command. It is built around a central headquarters which employs advanced accounting techniques and mechanization to control the commitment of materials and services to meet CG, III MAF requirements. It embraces three main subordinate logistic organizations. Two of these, Force Logistic Support Groups Alfa and Bravo, are located at Danang and Chu Lai, while a Force Logistic Support Unit is located at Phu Bai.

Access to the sea - direct or by river - is at Dong Ha, Hue, Danang, An Hoa, and Chu Lai. There are a total of eight C-130 capable airfields in I CTZ. The location of these facilities and others are displayed on the logistic system facility map on the following page.


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
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FMFPAC WESTPAC BASIC LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION

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III MAF LOGISTIC FACILITIES



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Supplies located in major supply points from Dong Ha to Chu Lai are controlled as a single inventory. Continuous, around the clock, electronic exchange of supply accounting data goes on between subordinate outlying groups, Force Logistic Command headquarters and the Third Force Service Regiment located in Okinawa. By this means supplies can be shifted as the changing tactical situation demands, with minimum likelihood of excesses in one area while there are shortages in another.

Gross supply fill rate is one indication of the effectiveness of the system. Of the 513,036 supply demands placed on the 3d Force Service Regiment in Okinawa between 1 January 1966 and 30 September 1966, 84% had been fulfilled by the end of the reporting period. The Force Logistic Command in Vietnam satisfied 75% of the 434,128 demands placed on it during the same period.

Monthly supply performance in-country during that time, expressed in terms of transactions, is shown on the page following.

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
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The "Demands" trace on the chart below represents the total number of demands placed on the Force Logistic Command during the month indicated. These totals are shown in black.

"Requisitions Fulfilled" represents the number of requisitions satisfied during the calendar month in which the demand was received. The numbers of prior month obligation releases, plus the total number of requisitions fulfilled during the month, are shown in the blue portion, to give a practical portrayal of the level and growth in supply effectiveness.

MAJOR SUPPLY TRANSACTIONS



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An important indicator of overall logistic performance is the equipment deadline rate, that share of the combat essential equipment which is out of commission, in need of repairs or spare parts. There is implicit in the deadline rate not only a measure of maintenance effectiveness but also a reflection of the quality of the supply system performance, the level of logistic personnel training, and the effectiveness of management of key logistic assets. Deadline rate expresses logistic performance from the standpoint of the customer.

The deadline rates displayed in the charts on the following page show an overall rate for combat essential Marine Corps equipment of less than 9%.

Of particular interest are the three key equipment categories: ordnance, motor transport and communication-electronics. The ordnance category encompasses all weapons and weapon systems larger than machine guns, including artillery pieces, tanks and Ontos. Motor transport includes all prime movers and motor vehicles used for transporting men and cargo, from the 1/4 ton "Mighty Mite" up to the 5 ton M-54 cargo truck. Communication - electronics includes all of the electronics equipment and all of the radios of III MAF. These three equipment categories encompass, to a large extent, the means which enables the combat unit to travel, to communicate and to shoot. The composite deadline of the 16,513 separate items of equipment in those three categories was less than 7% in September, a low figure even by peacetime standards.

These and related figures are shown on the charts on the following page.







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MATERIAL DEADLINE COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT



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
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
Related directly to deadline rates are work order and repair activity of the major supporting units.

The charts below display activity in third, fourth and fifth echelon repair by Force Logistic Command and Third Force Service Regiment.

FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT WORK ORDERS -3RD&4TH ECHELON REPAIR



THIRD FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT 4TH&5TH ECHELON REPAIR



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Detailed supply, resupply, maintenance and cargo movement activity during September continued at the same high tempo as in the past few months. Specifics in these areas are presented in the paragraphs which follow.

Supply:

Class I - Ration support of all III MAF forces remained adequate during the period. Increased refrigerated storage space at the logistic support areas expanded the availability of fresh provisions. To ensure uninterrupted support of tactical operations in the northern portion of the I CTZ after the monsoon arrives, the stock levels of rations were increased at Dong Ha and Phu Bai.

Class II - The move of all Class II supplies from the old site of FLSG-A (vicinity of the Danang Air Base) to the recently completed site at Red Beach will provide for more efficient service, additional covered storage, and better conditions for outside storage.

To improve the Red Ball program, more stringent criteria for designating Red Ball items were established, resulting in over 200 items being removed from the Red Ball listing.

And to improve the repair parts support for LAAM battalions, authorization has been given for these units to requisition HAWK peculiar repair parts direct from Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, California.

Class III/IIIA - No problems have been encountered in providing for the support of tactical operations.

Class IV - Stock levels remain sufficient to satisfy the daily demands of tactical operations.

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Class V/VA - A Class V stockage objective of 45 days of ammunition is being maintained. Aviation ordnance (Class VA) assets presently on hand are adequate to meet authorized expenditure allowances.

General - Emphasis has been placed on direct shipment of bulk items from CONUS and Japan to Danang and Chu Lai to reduce shipping time and the problems encountered in double handling. Examples of major direct shipments during September are culverts from Japan, a \$5,000,000.00 supply of spare parts for FLSC B in support of the First Marine Division, and a \$500,000.00 lumber procurement from Oregon. Third Force Service Regiment continues to ship direct to Chu Lai to eliminate double handling at Danang.

Since the supply effectiveness of the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa to a great extent determines the effectiveness of the FLC in Vietnam, it is important to note that the backlog of issue documents at 3d FSR has been reduced by 50,000 in the last 3 months. The backlog on 30 September was 15,000 documents.

Maintenance: A communication-electronics contact instruction team completed instruction of the new FM family of radios, single-sideband radio equipment and on-line cryptographic equipment for all III MAF units. Another contact instruction team provided instruction to supervisory personnel on procedures required for 2d through 4th echelon maintenance on multi-fuel vehicles.

To improve forklift and generator availability, a special team was formed to instruct all WestPac units on maintenance procedures and operational techniques of these important items of equipment. Also, a one time special Critipac of forklift repair parts was provided.

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Engineer Operations

Road Building - Extensive road construction and maintenance work continued throughout the month. Approximately 30 miles of new roads were constructed, the bulk in the Logistic Support Areas. Maintenance of some 220 miles of major roads was oriented to grading, shaping, and drainage work in preparation for the coming monsoon season.

Port Facilities: Seven of thirteen templates have been placed for the new Tourane River bridge at Danang. Three spans were fabricated and set in place on the existing bridge. The 1600 foot, 60-ton floating bridge across the Tourane River there continues to be operational with only minor maintenance required.

The first of the Observation Point deep water piers at Danang became operational on 9 September, with the USS ALUDRA (AF-55) becoming the first deep draft ship to moor at this new complex. The second pier should be completed in early October. All templates are in place and all deck sections have been installed. The completion date for the De Long pier number three, including dredging, is late October. Both sections of the De Long pier are in place and span sections are being installed.

Progress continues on the port facilities in the Hue Phu Bai area. A four inch bottom laid POL line has been installed which permits transfer of bulk fuel products to expeditionary storage facilities ashore. This line ensures continuity of refueling operations during rough seas, when surface methods become inoperative. Road work and dredging of the channel and outer harbor is underway.

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Aviation Facilities. Work commenced on the Chu Lai crosswind runway on 18 July 1966 (see August report), with the overall project now approximately 68% complete.

Upgrading on the Dong Ha airfield continued with the construction of parking and cargo areas for C-123 and C-130 aircraft. The treatment of shoulders, overruns, and refueling pads with penepime (asphalt emulsion material used to stabilize soil) continues. Except for matting, both turn-around areas are complete. The aircraft parking area is 90% complete, the area near the runway cleared for use as a drop zone is 30% complete, and the perimeter road is 5% complete.

Movement and Resupply. On the first of September, the advance echelon of HMM-165, with 115 personnel and 14,791 pounds of cargo, arrived aboard 2 MAC C-130 aircraft. On the same day, elements of Marine Wing Service Group-17 arrived at Danang aboard 1 LST. During the period 2-6 September, a 74 man detachment of 1st ANGLICO deployed from Kaneohe to Chu Lai in 7 MAC C-130's. On the 7th of the month, elements of Marine Air Base Squadron-13 arrived at Chu Lai and debarked from 2 LSTs. A third LST loaded with MABS-13 personnel and material arrived on 10 September, and a fourth LST on 13 September. One LST arrived at Danang on 19 September with additional elements of MWSG-17, and three organic USMC KC-130 aircraft lifted the headquarters element of H&MS-13 from Iwakuni to Chu Lai.

On 26 September, three ships of the Amphibious Ready Group debarked BLT 1/26 at Danang from its previous duties with the SLF. On 27 September, BLT 1/9 commenced embarkation at Danang aboard 4 Amphibious Force ships, departing 29 September for

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Okinawa, to undergo rehabilitation.

Cargo operations at the Port of Danang were reduced somewhat by a scarcity of shipping. Total throughput was 152,306 M/T, compared with 236,046 in August. The daily average unload rate was 3,193 M/T, with 126,721 M/T of cargo unloaded during the month.

On 30 September, there were 5 cargo ships in the port of Danang with 5,127 M/T of backlogged cargo; on 31 August there were 7 ships, with 21,261 M/T. The average backlog for September was 16,031 M/T.

Typhoon weather conditions impeded logistic support by aircraft during September. The MAC channel from Kadena to Danang airlifted 259 S/T, 315th Air Division airlifted 428 S/T, and VMGR-152, with VMGR-352 Det "A", airlifted 400 S/T.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS1. PHU BAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

None

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

| <u>Confirmed</u> | <u>Sep</u> | <u>Aug</u> | <u>Probable</u> | <u>Sep</u> | <u>Aug</u> |
|------------------------|------------|------------|------------------------|------------|------------|
| <u>Within 25 miles</u> | | | <u>Within 25 miles</u> | | |
| Regt Hq | 0 | 0 | Regt Hq | 0 | 0 |
| Battalions | 4 | 4 | Battalions | 0 | 0 |
| Companies | 3 | 2 | Companies | 2 | 2 |
| Total Strength | 1,785 | 1,695 | Total Strength | 150 | 150 |

A comparison of the September 1966 and the August 1966 Confirmed Order of Battle shows an increase of 90 enemy personnel within 25 miles of the Phu Bai airfield. The increase was caused by the shift of a local force company to within 25 miles of the Phu Bai airfield.

2. DONG HAENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

| <u>Confirmed</u> | <u>Sep</u> | <u>Probable</u> | <u>Sep</u> |
|------------------------|------------|------------------------|------------|
| <u>Within 25 Miles</u> | | <u>Within 25 Miles</u> | |
| Northern Sub-Region Hq | 1 | | |
| Division Hq | 2 | | |
| Regimental Hq | 7 | | |
| Battalions | 28 | | |
| Companies | 3 | Companies | 1 |
| Total Strength | 19,376 | Total Strength | 120 |

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The total strength shown above has been adjusted for recent confirmed enemy losses. Due to the proximity of Dong Ha to the DMZ and NVN, the majority of these units, with a strength of approximately 16,500, are considered to be in North Vietnam and the DMZ.

2. DANANGMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

| <u>Unit</u> | <u>Date</u> | <u>Change</u> | <u>From/To</u> | <u>Remarks</u> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| MWSG-17 | 22Sep | Arrive | Iwakuni | OPCON 1stMAW |
| WERS-17 | 22Sep | Arrive | Iwakuni | OPCON MWSG-17 |
| BLT 1/26 | 26Sep | Arrive | SLF | Rotation with BLT 1/9 |
| BLT 1/9 | 29Sep | Depart | Okinawa | Rotation with BLT 1/26 |
| H&MS-17 | 30Sep | Arrive | Iwakuni | OPCON MWSG-17 |

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

| <u>Confirmed</u> | <u>Sep</u> | <u>Aug</u> | <u>Probable</u> | <u>Sep</u> | <u>Aug</u> |
|------------------------|------------|------------|------------------------|------------|------------|
| <u>Within 25 miles</u> | | | <u>Within 25 miles</u> | | |
| Regt Hq | 0 | 0 | Regt Hq | 0 | 0 |
| Battalions | 4 | 2 | Battalions | 2 | 3 |
| Companies | 4 | 4 | Companies | 2 | 2 |
| Total Strength | 2,130 | 1,340 | Total Strength | 1,025 | 1,325 |

A comparison of the September 1966 and the August 1966 confirmed Order of Battle shows an increase of 790 enemy personnel within 25 miles of the Danang airfield. The increase was caused by the northern shift

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of the 70th VC Main Force Battalion within a 25 mile radius of the airfield, plus the confirmation of the V.25 Local Force VC Battalion and the 409th Sapper Battalion.

3. CHU LAI

MAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

| <u>Unit</u> | <u>Date</u> | <u>Change</u> | <u>From/To</u> | <u>Remarks</u> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|--------------------------|
| MABS-13 | 7Sep | Arrive | Iwakuni | OPCON 1stMAW |
| MAG-13 | 25Sep | Arrive | Iwakuni | OPCON 1stMAW |
| HMM-363 | 27Sep | Arrive | SLF | Rotation with HMM-362 |
| HMM-362 | 28Sep | Depart | SLF | Rotation with HMM-363 |

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

| <u>Confirmed</u> | <u>Sep</u> | <u>Aug</u> | <u>Probable</u> | <u>Sep</u> | <u>Aug</u> |
|------------------------|------------|------------|------------------------|------------|------------|
| <u>Within 25 miles</u> | | | <u>Within 25 miles</u> | | |
| Regt Hq | 1 | 1 | Regt Hq | 0 | 0 |
| Battalions | 7 | 7 | Battalions | 1 | 1 |
| Companies | 12 | 11 | Companies | 0 | 0 |
| Total Strength | 4,580 | 4,600 | Total Strength | 300 | 300 |

A comparison of the September 1966 and the August 1966 confirmed Order of Battle shows a decrease of 20 enemy personnel within 25 miles of the Chu Lai

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airfield. The decrease was caused by normal order of battle adjustments.

4. ENEMY LOSSES FOR SEPTEMBER 1966

| <u>September</u> | | <u>Total to date</u> |
|------------------|----------|----------------------|
| 1,789 | Killed | 11,503 |
| 35 | Captured | 1,161 |
| 156 | Suspects | 7,471 |
| 0 | Wounded | 491 |
| 116 | Weapons | 1,750 |

5. CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS

| <u>Sep</u> | <u>Aug</u> | | <u>Total as of 30Sep66</u> |
|------------|------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 113,542 | 112,450 | Persons given medical treatment | 953,549 |
| 77 | 97 | Persons given medical training | 573 |
| 366,679 | 442,063* | Pounds of food distributed | 1,768,499 |
| 19,153 | 6,127 | Pounds of soap distributed | 132,145 |
| 6,388 | 7,029 | Pounds of clothing distributed | 207,178 |
| 220 | 205 | Critically ill civilians evacuated | 5,557 |
| 163 | 203 | English language classes conducted | 1,026 |
| \$1,368 | \$681* | Cash donations | \$31,807 |
| 733,358 | 884,126* | Persons fed | 2,241,242 |
| 2,749 | 3,386 | Students supported | 33,368 |
| 485 | 152* | Construction projects | 1,184 |

* August totals revised by III MAF

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6. MARINE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

| <u>September</u> | <u>August</u> | | <u>Total as of 30Sep66</u> |
|------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 6,317 | 6,686 | Patrols | 73,140 |
| 3,929 | 4,139 | Ambushes | 47,044 |
| 350 | 672 | Sniper posts | 4,520 |
| 2 | 4 | Regimental or larger operations | 40* |
| 11 | 10 | Battalion opns | 103* |
| 126 | 179 | Company opns | 1,667 |
| 5,826 | 5,437 | Offensive air sorties | 60,000 |
| 35,527 | 36,216 | Helo sorties | 462,673 |

* Totals do not include Operation Prairie and the battalion-sized Operations Macon and Pawnee, which were initiated in a previous month.

7. III MAF STRENGTH - ON 30 SEPTEMBER

| | |
|-------------|--------------|
| Danang | 30,203 |
| Chu Lai | 21,377 |
| Hue Phu Bai | <u>6,016</u> |
| Total | 57,596 |

8. III MAF AREA - ON 30 SEPTEMBER

| | <u>Square miles</u> | <u>Civilians</u> | <u>Villages</u> |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Danang | 999 | 741,025 | 104 |
| Chu Lai | 532 | 277,578 | 57 |
| Phu Bai | 162 | 68,037 | 22 |
| Total | 1,693 | 1,086,640 | 183 |
| Goals | 3,300* | 2,400,000 | 349 |
| Percent of goal achieved | 51% | 45% | 52% |

* Revised total - I CTZ coastal plain.

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9. LOGISTICSa. Supply Levels at End of Period:

| | <u>DANANG</u> | <u>CHU LAI</u> | <u>PHU BAI</u> |
|---|---------------|----------------|----------------|
| Class I (1000 of rations/ days of supply) | | | |
| MCI (Rations) | 256/12 | 458/21 | 348/50 |
| B Rations | 392/19 | 320/15 | 257/37 |
| A Rations | 70/2 | 88/4 | 32/5 |
| Class III & IIIA (BULK) (1000 gals/days of supply) | | | |
| JP-4 | 1814/10 | 323/3 | 49/4 |
| AVGAS | 397/36 | 107/6 | 99/25 |
| MOGAS | 404/17 | 115/5 | 63/16 |
| DIESEL | 258/12 | 124/4 | 41/7 |
| Class V and VA: | <u>DANANG</u> | <u>CHU LAI</u> | <u>PHU BAI</u> |
| Ground Ammo (days of supply) | 45 | 45 | 15 |
| 250 lb LD Bombs (number of bombs) | 8,779 | 4,174 | 0 |

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| | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|-------|---|
| 500 lb LD Bombs (number of bombs) | 2,663 | 5,870 | 0 |
| Launcher w/19 2.75 in. rockets | 800 | 2,300 | 0 |
| Launcher w/4 5 in. rockets | 827 | 369 | 0 |

b. Resupply Status:

(1) Surface Shipping Status (Danang)

| | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|
| Cargo unloaded (Sep) | 126,721 M/T |
| Average daily discharge rate | 3,193 M/T |
| Ships in port 31 August | 7 |
| Ships arriving during September | 21 |
| Ships unloaded during September | 23 |
| Ships in port 30 September | 5 |
| Cargo backlog 31 August | 21,261 M/T |
| Cargo backlog 30 September | 5,127 M/T |
| Average cargo backlog (Sep) | 16,031 M/T |

(2) Air Shipping Status

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Cargo lifted into RVN (Sep) | 1,087 S/T |
| Cargo awaiting lift on Okinawa as of 1 October | 327 S/T |

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c. RED BALL Summary (September):

| | |
|----------------------------------|-------|
| Items at beginning of period | 1,587 |
| Items added | 402 |
| Items removed | 833 |
| Items remaining at end of period | 1,156 |

d. Maintenance (September):

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-----|
| Items evacuated from RVN | 981 |
| Items repaired at 3rdFSR | 848 |
| Items returned to CONUS from 3rdFSR | 0 |
| Items disposed of on Okinawa | 0 |

e. Construction Projects

| | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Roads rehabilitated or constructed | -Construction of 30 miles of new road. Maintenance of 220 miles. |
|------------------------------------|--|

| | |
|---------|---|
| Bridges | -Constructed one 30 ft fixed span walk bridge. Installed new decking on three bridges. Removed one M4T6 60 ton floating bridge. Constructed four float ferries. |
|---------|---|

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| | |
|---|--|
| Wells drilled. | - 4 completed; 5 in progress. |
| Covered storage, NSA, Danang | - 600,960 sq ft completed and 23,040 sq ft under construction. |
| Covered storage, NSA, Chu Lai | - 248,400 sq ft completed and 21,600 sq ft under construction. |
| III MAF covered storage (includes maintenance facilities) | - 272,000 sq ft completed and 120,000 sq ft under construction. |
| Ammo storage | - ASP#1-30% complete; ASP#2-95% complete. |
| POL storage tanks 10,000 BBL | - Danang main NW tank farm, 15 - 10,000 BBL tanks are 46% complete. The east tank farm, 14 - 10,000 BBL tanks, is 5% complete. |
| 400 bed hospital | - 97% complete. |

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CONCLUSIONS

- The Marine logistic system is equal to the task of supporting large forces committed to a campaign of maneuver, deep inland.

- The major unit efforts of Marine forces in Quang Tri Province have punished the enemy severely and have exhibited that he must pay a heavy penalty if he chooses to move larger forces across the Demilitarized Zone.

- The eminent success of the Vietnamese elections, in the face of aggressive Viet Cong counter-efforts, underscores the benefits implicit in the pacification effort, however laborious and frustrating it may be.

- The diversion of sizeable Marine forces away from pacification and counter guerrilla tasks must necessarily have an adverse impact upon these endeavors.

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