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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, 96602

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IN REPLY REFER TO:

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27 JUN 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03H)

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report
(Report Symbol, MC 3100-4) for the First Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1967 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A

- Encl:
- (1) CG, First Marine Division (Rein) ltr, 3:Ops: hca over 3480, Serial 00128-66 of 23May66
 - (2) CG, Third Marine Division (Rein) ltr, 3B/jfc over 3060, Serial 0061766 of 27May66
 - (3) CG, First Marine Aircraft Wing ltr 3:RGH:rwk over 3000, Serial 03A14266 of 22May66
 - (4) CG, Third Marine Aircraft Wing ltr 3:WBH:rjj over 3000, Serial 003A13666 of 21May66
 - (5) CG, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ltr 3/DJV/waw over 3000 serial 0041/66 of 26May66
 - (6) CG, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ltr 3:ALE:mpc over 3000 Serial 0046-66 of 29May66
 - (7) CO, First Marine Brigade ltr 3/wam, serial 0020-66 of 31May66
 - (8) CO, First Radio Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ltr 3:RMS:jsr over 3001 Serial 0062-66 of 26May66
 - (9) CO, First ANGLICO, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ltr BGS:cjl over 5213/3500 Serial 034-66 of 27May66
 - (10) CO, Headquarters and Service Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ltr, 3/jhp over 5213, Serial 09-66 of 18May66
 - (11) CO, First Force Service Regiment, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ltr 8/BGM/elg Serial 07-66 of 24May66
 - (12) CO, Third Force Service Regiment, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, ltr 3/KLA/hgl over 3500/1, Serial 041-66 of 8 June 1966

1. (U) The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the First Quarter, Fiscal Year 1967 is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

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2. (S) Summary Statement.

Page 1 of 5 Pages

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*For File
1st Quarter 1967*

(31 June 1966)

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a. FMFPac units committed in WestPac are fully capable of accomplishing assigned missions. However, there are some areas where a reduction in combat readiness has occurred as a result of personnel shortage and a lack of certain repair parts.

b. Non committed FMFPac units in MidPac and EastPac are continuing to experience a reduced combat readiness resulting from deployment to WestPac of combat ready units, the rotation and rehabilitation of units from Vietnam, and the formation of newly activated units.

3. (U) The combat readiness, as reported by individual FMFPac units, is described in detail in enclosures (1) through (10).

4. (S) WestPac Forces

a. III MAF

(1) WestPac Forces actively engaged in combat in Vietnam are combat ready, finding some continuing problems in the personnel and material fields. Improvement in these areas is dependent to a marked degree on arrival of personnel already requested or programmed and the timely receipt of supply items.

(a) Both the First Marine Division and the Third Marine Division are fully combat ready and capable of sustained combat operations.

(b) The First Marine Aircraft Wing, supporting combat operations in Vietnam is combat ready and is capable of maintaining a high degree of combat readiness. However, the 1st and 2d LAAM Battalion and Marine Air Control Squadron Seven are only marginally combat ready.

1. The major areas of concern in these marginal units are generators and communications-electronics equipment. Inadequate supply support and an inadequate number of technicians being trained on new equipment are the primary causes of the deficiencies. Local action has been taken to alleviate the generator problem. Priority 02 and Redball are being used for critically needed repair parts. Additional PU-608 generators are anticipated in July.

b. Ninth MAB

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(1) The major combat elements of the Brigade will be rotated into the Brigade during the reporting period. It is expected that the Brigade will be combat ready as a unit by the end of the 1st Qtr FY67.

c. Third Force Service Regiment

(1) Operating under the Provisional T/O established in March 66, the 3d Force Service Regiment is capable of providing sustained logistic support to all FMFPac WestPac Forces from Okinawa.

5. (S) MidPac Forces

a. First Marine Brigade

(1) The Brigade, as an entity, will not be combat ready during the reporting period.

(a) VMF(AW)-212 is still in the rebuilding stage but should attain a minimum combat capability, assuming a continued build-up in personnel strength.

(b) VMF(AW)-232 will improve its overall combat readiness with the qualification of all pilots in the air-ground phase of training, and should reach a fully combat ready posture prior to the end of the quarter.

(c) Although MACS-2 is reporting a C-1 personnel readiness status, there is an acute shortage in air defense control officers. This shortage should be alleviated with the programmed input of officers into the Brigade during the reporting period.

(d) A shortage of repair parts for the AN/TSQ-18 system, and a unit personnel strength of 73.6 percent of T/O derogate the capability of MATCU-62 to perform its mission on a sustained 24 hour basis. The shortages of repair parts for the AN/TSQ-18 system was previously reported in the last two quarterly reports.

(e) Newly activated units, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, and H&MS, are not combat ready. They will both progress rapidly in readiness, as personnel and equipment are assigned.

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b. First ANGLICO and Headquarters and Service Battalion are combat ready and prepared to provide the combat and combat service support required in their basic mission.

c. The First Radio Battalion, although C-1 for Personnel, Supply and Training, continues to be in a marginal combat readiness status based on the deficiency of the generator, PU-535A/G. This deficiency has been previously reported and action is being taken to resolve the problem.

6. (S) EastPac Forces

a. Force Troops, FMFPac

(1) Although Force Troops reports that the 5th Dental Company (-) will not be able to perform its assigned combat service support mission, the Company will be able to perform its garrison mission of providing dental support to the tenant units at MCB, 29 Palms. The nature of the deployment of Force Troops units has precluded the assignment of the 5th Dental Company (-) to any of the units currently reinforcing FMFPac WestPac units.

(2) The combat readiness of RLT-26 continues to improve and the first deployment increment is on schedule and will be in excellent condition to be deployed. In terms of material the second and third increments are on schedule but the personnel schedule for the second increment is two weeks behind. The third increment is on schedule and if personnel continue to arrive as programmed the readiness requirements will be fulfilled.

b. Third Marine Aircraft Wing

(1) During this period VMA-121 should be combat ready and with H&MS-15 and MABS-15 deploy with MAG-15. The deployment of these major elements of the Wing will reduce the overall combat readiness of the Wing to an estimated 50 percent. As a result of the continual drain of individual and unit replacements, no significant change in readiness can be expected prior to the 3d Quarter, FY67.

c. First Force Service Regiment

(1) Personnel and equipment of the Force Service Regiment have been deployed in support of FMFPac Forces committed to combat operations in RVN. A new mission was given to the First Service Regiment to provide garrison support to Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton and the FMFPac units remaining at Camp Pendleton. The regiment can support the garrison type missions assigned.

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7. (S) During the forthcoming quarter, particular command emphasis will be directed towards:

a. Solutions of the supply support problem for FMFPac WestPac commands and the newly activated units assigned to FMFPac.

b. Providing close and continuous supervision of newly activated units to insure that these units attain a fully combat ready posture prior to deployment to WestPac.

c. Concentrating training efforts to insure that all commands and all Marines:

(1) Have the requisite, detailed knowledge of basic military subjects to stress marksmanship, small unit leadership, scouting and patrolling, map reading, first aid, and mines and booby traps.

(2) Understand the importance of civic action in the successful conduct of operations in Vietnam.

(3) Realize the necessity for supply and maintenance discipline.

(4) Are physically and mentally prepared to conduct arduous combat operations in the counterinsurgency environment of Vietnam.

d. Re-establishing the intra-theater unit rotation system between units in RVN and Okinawa.

e. Monitoring the personnel status of FMFPac WestPac commands and the newly activated units, and insuring appropriate action to maintain and increase the personnel readiness of all units.



V. H. KRULAK

Group 4

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3480

Ser: 0062566

30 MAY 1966

SECRET--Unclassified when basic material is removedFIRST ENDORSEMENT on OG 1st MarDiv ltr JtOps:hea over 3480 Ser 00128-66
of 23 May 1966From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, PacificSubj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year
1967 (U)

1. Forwarded.

J. M. PLATT
CHIEF OF STAFF

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Encl (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FME
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

3:Ops:hca
3480
Ser: C0128-66
23 May 1966

SECRET--Unclassified on 1 Oct 1966

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 1967 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPAC O 3000.4A

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted:

PART I - Evaluation of the Command.

The 1st Marine Division (Rein) is fully prepared to accomplish its assigned mission.

PART II - Evaluation of Units.

None.


LEWIS J. FIELDS

S & C FILES
HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FME

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3060
Ser: 0061766

27 MAY 1966


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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 3d MarDiv ltr 3/DVM/pnc over 3060.2 Ser 00127-66
of 23May66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 1st QTR, FY 67

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CHIEF OF STAFF

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/DVM/pnc
3060.2
Ser. 00147-66
23 May 1966

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From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 1st QTR, FY 67

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

a. Title - The Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 1st Qtr, FY 67 is a report prepared in the last month of the 4th Qtr, FY 66. The 1st Qtr, FY 67 is the reporting period covered in this report.

b. Part I - This Division is combat ready. The Division's combat effectiveness is demonstrated daily in operations against Viet Cong forces.

c. Part II - It is considered that no subordinate unit of this Division will become incapable of accomplishing its combat mission during the reporting period.


W. B. KYLE

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Ser: 062466
29 MAY 1966


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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1st MAW ltr 3:RGH:rwk over 3000 Ser 03A14266
of 22 May 1966

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, First Quarter, Fiscal Year
67 (U)

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J. M. PLATT
CHIEF OF STAFF

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

3:RGH:rwk
3000
Ser: 03A114266
22 May 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, First Quarter, Fiscal Year 67 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPac O 3000.4A
(c) CG 1st MAW msg 070504Z May (Log Stat Rpt)
(d) CO, MACS-7 spdltr NWCrcs 4400 of 9 May 66 (NOTAL)
(e) CG 1st MAW msg 211423Z April (NOTAL)

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), the following comments pertaining to the combat readiness of this Command are submitted:

PART I:

a. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is engaged in combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam and is capable of continuing these operations.

b. Logistic status permits continued support of combat operations. All units are presently capable of accomplishing their assigned mission; however, the 1st and 2d LAAM Battalions and Marine Air Control Squadron 7 are only marginally capable.

c. There are several areas of marginal capability in ground support equipment, generators and communications-electronics equipment.

d. Problems encountered with the CH-46A and UH-1E helicopters have caused availability to fall below expectations. Relief of problems is dependent upon rapid design and material improvement and upon improvement of supply support availability.

e. Current logistics problem areas are reported in greater detail in reference (c).

f. The communication-electronics situation remains marginally satisfactory for the Wing. The introduction of new complex radar equipments and the new family of FM radio equipments should improve our status after the initial problems of supply support, and maintenance personnel training are solved. Prolonged round the clock operation has caused a high dead-line rate of communication-electronics equipment. Long lead times in obtaining required repair parts have compounded the maintenance problems.

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1st MAW S&C No.	Copy No.
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
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CONFIDENTIALPART II:

a. Marine Air Control Squadron 7 is marginally combat ready for equipment readiness. Lack of repair parts supply support has prevented MACS-7 from placing two new items of radar equipment, the AN/TPS-22 and the AN/TPS-34, in service. Reference (d) amplifies deficiencies.

b. MASS-2 has been tasked to operate four ASRT's and three DASC's. However, the capability of this unit to adequately perform it's mission will remain limited until their requested special allowance of radio equipment is received.

c. 1st LAAM Battalion is marginally combat ready for supply readiness and 2d LAAM Battalion for both equipment and supply readiness. Reference (e) amplifies deficiencies for both LAAM Battalions. Of those items reported in reference (e), 1st LAAM Battalion has received approximately fifty percent and 2d LAAM Battalion has received approximately twenty percent.



L. B. ROBERTSHAW

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3RD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMFPAC
MCAS, EL TORO, SANTA ANA, CALIF. 92709

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3000
Ser: 003A13666
21 MAY 1966

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From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for First Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1967 (U) (RS MC 3100-4)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

a. PART I

(1) The 3d MAW combat readiness for this period is estimated initially at 65%, dropping to an estimated 50% with the deployment of MAG-15 and HMM-165. At this time the 3d MAW will have no A-4 attack capability and a negligible tactical helicopter capability. These losses, with the continuing drain on key personnel and equipment as a result of providing both unit and individual replacements, will cause improvement in overall readiness to be small until the Third Quarter of FY 67.

b. PART II

(1) MAG-15 (H&MS-15, MABS-15 and VMA-121): Tentatively scheduled to deploy WestPac during July and August 1966. This deployment will leave the 3d MAW with no VMA training capability until after VMA-225 and VMA-332 are reconstituted at El Toro about December 1966.

(2) HMM-165: Programmed to deploy to WestPac during September 1966.

(3) HMM-364: Scheduled to chop to 3d MAW from WestPac about 2 September 1966. Unit will then form with CH-46A type aircraft.

(4) HMH-462: Personnel and UH-34 aircraft have been transferred to HMMT-301 leaving HMH-462 in cadre status with no capability of performing its assigned mission during this reporting period.

3d MAW S & C FILES

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Ser: 003A13666

21 MAY 1966

(5) HMH-463: Unit is presently in non-phase training status awaiting CH-53A aircraft. Anticipate receipt of aircraft beginning mid July 1966, at which time this unit will enter Phase I training for the remainder of reporting period. Scheduled to deploy four plane detachment to WestPac in November 1966.

(6) VMO-3: Tentatively programmed to be activated about 1 August 1966 and deployed to WestPac about 1 December 1966.

c. PART III

(1) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 71-YR. Capability to support this plan will continue to be limited due to KC-130F support to III MAF for an indefinite period.

(2).CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25-YR

FMFPAC OPLAN 27-YR

FMFPAC OPLAN 32-YR

SFF OPLAN 6-YR

CRSFF OPLAN 4-YR

Overall 3d MAF capability has been reduced by the deployment of an entire Helo MAG, 4 VF/VA and 1 VMO and will be further reduced on the deployment of MAG-15 (H&MS-15, MABS-15 and VMA-121) in July/August 1966

(3) FMFPAC OPLAN 83-YR

LFA (TG 125.3) OPLAN 136-YR

Present capability is one (1) VMA Squadron, which will terminate with the deployment of VMA-121 with MAG-15 in July/August 1966.

(4) 5th MEB OPLAN 316-YR

HMM-165' (C-3 (1Jul) and C-1 (1Aug) Readiness Category) is the only helicopter squadron available for this commitment, which will terminate about 1 September 1966 when HMM-165 deploys to WestPac. HMM-364 scheduled to chop to 3d MAF about 2 September 1966, will form with CH-46A type aircraft

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21 MAY 1966

and have negligible capability until latter part of Second Quarter.

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COMMANDING GENERAL
FORCE TROOPS, FMF, PACIFIC
TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA 92278

3/DJV/haw

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Ser 0041/66

26 MAY 1966

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From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 1967
(Report Symbol MC 3100-4) (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) CNK 121744Z

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted:

a. Part I. Evaluation of the Command. During the subject time period this command will be able to carry out its assigned mission. Although deployable units located at Twentynine Palms will be reduced in June to one unit, much work must be accomplished during this period with RLT-26 located at Camp Pendleton. RLT-26 is being reported in accordance with reference (c). The 7th Communication Battalion will not be a part of this command during the period covered. The 7th Communication Battalion will be capable of carrying out its assigned combat support mission.

b. Part II. Evaluation of Units. The 5th Dental Company (-) will not be able to perform its assigned combat service support mission due to the Navy Manpower Authorization (NavPers 576). With the present authorization the highest Personnel Readiness Category that can be attained by this unit is C-4. It will be able to perform its garrison mission of providing dental support to tenant units at Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms.

c. Part III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments. This command is unable to support the requirements of the present contingency plans due to the recent deployment of units of this command to WESTPAC and the scheduled deployments of RLT-26 elements to WESTPAC upon attaining readiness for combat. In addition, the ability to provide personnel to fill

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staff line billet requirements for the 5th MEB, 7th MEB, SFF 5/62, SFF 6/64, CRSEF 4/64, COMUSMACVTHAI AND COMUSSEASIA Operation Plans from residual personnel will be significantly hampered by the shortage of appropriate ranks, MOS's and skill levels remaining within this command.

V. W. BANNING

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HEADQUARTERS
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

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29 May 1966
SKR 0046-66

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From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 1st Qtr FY 67

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPACO 3000.4A

Encl: (1) PART I - Evaluation of the Command
(2) PART II - Evaluation of Units
(3) PART III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

1. References (a) and (b) require the submission of Commander's Combat Readiness Reports.

2. Enclosures (1) through (3) are submitted as required by the references.

M. P. RYAN

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SECRETPART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

1. During the early part of the first quarter, FY 67, (Jul-Sep 1966), the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, as a whole, will not be combat ready, primarily due to lack of forces, which are due to be activated and/or rotated to the Brigade during the quarter.
2. At the end of the quarter it is estimated that the command, as a whole, will be combat ready as an air-ground team composed of its headquarters and communications elements, a regimental landing team (less one of its three BLTs), a marine aircraft group (with two fighter squadrons, one attack squadron, two medium helicopter squadrons, and one aerial refueler/transport squadron), and the necessary combat support and combat service support elements for both ground and aviation elements of the Brigade.
3. During the entire quarter, the Special Landing Force (composed of one BLT and one HMM squadron) will be deployed in the Western Pacific, fully combat ready.

Enclosure (1)

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SECRETPART II - EVALUATION OF UNITS

1. Following is a list of units which are expected to be ineffective during portions of the reporting period, along with amplifying statements as to the reason for this judgment:

a. HqCo, 9th MAB - As of 28 May 1966, this unit is in possession of approximately 30% of its authorized T/E equipment. No definite statement can be made as to when the remainder of required items will be on hand as this information is not known by the supply source. However, it is estimated that the majority of combat essential equipment will be on hand and the necessary training can be conducted to ready the command and control element of the Brigade for combat by mid-to-end July 1966.

b. Provisional Communications Platoon - As of 28 May 1966, this unit has sufficient personnel and equipment for about 60% of its mission. Until arrival of the Communication Support Company being activated for support of this Brigade in late August, it must be considered that command and control of the Brigade could be exercised by using afloat communications or by satelliteing the Brigade command element on the major ground element it was tactically directing ashore. It is estimated that a fully combat ready communications status will be achieved during the last month of the quarter (Sep 1966).

c. Provisional Service Battalion/Logistic Support Group - Recent deployments have left the Provisional Service Battalion in a cadre status, so that it has no logistic support capability. Pending arrival of the Logistic Support Group being activated for support of this Brigade, during August 1966, supply and maintenance support is being received directly from the 3d Force Service Regiment. Indications are that there may be some personnel shortages in the Logistic Support Gp arriving in August, thus, it is probable that full combat readiness in this critical area will not be realized until September 1966.

2. This evaluation of units is necessarily incomplete. The following units are scheduled to join the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade during the first quarter, FY 1967, and their state of combat readiness cannot be accurately forecast at this time:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>JOIN FROM</u>	<u>APPROXIMATE DATE</u>
BLT 1/26	CONUS	31 July 1966
BLT 3/3	VIETNAM	27 August 1966
BLT 3/26	CONUS	September 1966
Hq RLt 26	CONUS	August 1966
VI FA 542	VIETNAM	July 1966
VI F (AW) 232	HAWAII	September 1966
VI A 211	VIETNAM	July 1966
VI A 121	CONUS	September 1966
H&HS MAG 15	CONUS	August-September 1966
MAES 15	CONUS	August-September 1966
MAMS 15	CONUS	August-September 1966

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SECRETPART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

1. The following is a list of current contingency plans for which the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade provides forces, along with a narrative statement on each plan, evaluating ability to provide the required forces:

PLANFORCE REQUIREMENT AND NARRATIVE STATEMENT

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 23-63

Force requirement: Special Landing Force plus 2 Tactical Air Control Parties and 1 Major (Asst Air Ops O).

Narrative Statement: Special Landing Force will be available unless previously committed to other contingencies. Assistant Air Operations Officer available. Pending arrival of elements of RLT 26 from CONUS in Aug-Sep, it would be necessary to specially organize 2 TACPs from available personnel; this is feasible.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 25-65

Force Requirement: Initial requirement is for a Marine Fighter Group and supporting elements, including a Marine Air Control Squadron, with the remainder of the FMF SEVENTHFLT held in reserve.

Narrative Statement: A combat ready MAG Hq and supporting elements will be immediately available, however only one fighter squadron will be available in July and August, with a probability that 2 fighter squadrons will be available in September (the latter is undetermined pending promulgation of squadron rotation program for September 1966 and later months). Reserve forces would be the Special Landing Force initially, with the remainder of 9th MAB when units arrive in Aug-Sep.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 27-64

Force Requirement: Immediate deployment of up to one MAG (3 fighter squadrons), with MEF (2/3 MARDIV -2/3 MAW) held in general reserve initially. First elements of MEF (an RLT) arrive in combat area with prior alert in 7 days, and the remainder of the MEF arriving in 17-19 days.

Narrative Statement: Ability to provide a fighter MAG is as described under OPLAN 26-65 above. One BLT (the SLF BLT) will be available in July, with other elements of the RLT in Aug-Sep. Other force requirements cannot be met within 9th MAB resources due to deployments to RVN since the plan was prepared.

Enclosure (3)

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SECRETPLANFORCE REQUIREMENT AND NARRATIVE STATEMENTCOMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 27A-64Force Requirement: VMGR aircraft (number not specified) and VMA and VMF aircraft (numbers not specified). Operate from IW KUNI or KOREAN airfields.Narrative Statement: A minimum of one VMGR, 1 VMA and 1 VMF squadrons will be in combat ready status during the period.COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 32-65
(Phase II)Force Requirement: Initial requirement is for MEB (MAB), composed of a Hq, and RLT, a Composite MAG, a Logistical Support Group, and an Engineer Group, with the remainder of a MEF afloat.Narrative Statement: Ready posture for the initial requirement will be achieved in Aug-Sep as units are joined, except for the Engineer Group (the source of which is not determined). Source of the remaining ground and aviation elements of the MEF is undetermined due to deployments to RVN since the plan was prepared.COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 32-65
(Phase III/IV)Force Requirement: MEF/MEC, plus NCC and staff and personnel for COC.Narrative Statement: Narrative statement under Oplan 32-65 (Phase II) above applies. Source of NCC staff and COC personnel not determined and are beyond the resources of 9th MAB.COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 37-65Force Requirement: Div/Wg Team to DANANG. MEB (MAB) initial increment of this Team. Reconstitute SLF (for amphibious raids) and provide unspecified amounts of airlift for personnel, equipment and ordnance in WestPac.Narrative Statement: That portion of the plan dealing with deployments and reconstitution of the SLF has been accomplished. SLF will have capability to execute amphibious raids during this period. VMGR aircraft are continuously providing lift in support of this plan, as required.COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 39-66Force Requirement: 2 Div (6 RLT), 2 LAAN Bn, 5 VMF Sq, 4 VMFA Sq, 6 VMA Sq, 2 VMGR Sq, 2 VMCJ Sq, 10 HMM/HMH Sq.Narrative Statement: Bulk of deployments accomplished by deployments to RVN. Capability remains to make partial deployments to meet requirements this plan as described under OPLANS 25 and 27, except there is a deficiency of one VMCJ Sq, in addition to the deficiencies described

Enclosure (3)

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SECRETPLANFORCE REQUIREMENT AND NARRATIVE STATEMENT

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 39-66
(CONTINUED)

for execution of OPLANS 25 and 27. As to amphibious operations in areas other than those to which deployments have been made, the SLF will be combat ready during the entire period. Operations up to MAB scale will be feasible after additional units are joined in Aug-Sep.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 60-64

Force Requirement: SLF (BLT/HMM size) up to MEB (MAB) of RLT/MAG size.
Narrative Statement: SLF combat ready during period. Buildup to combat ready MAB (RLT/MAG) occurs in Aug-Sep 1966, when additional forces are available.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 80-61

Force Requirement: Same as OPLAN 60-64.
Narrative Statement: Same as OPLAN 60-64.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 121-66

Force Requirement: MAB (less fixed wing aircraft).
Narrative Statement: MAB will achieve capability to execute this plan with 2 BLT in late August or with 3 BLT if additional forces provided from III MAF assets. Prior to that time only SLF is available and combat ready.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 122-66

Force Requirement: MAF (1 Div - 1 Wg), with Reinforced MarDiv (Follow up).
Narrative Statement: Source of forces beyond capabilities 9th MAB not determined.

Enclosure (3)

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/wam
Ser: 0020-66
31 May 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness,
1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 1967 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A
(c) CMC msg 212230Z Mar 1966
(d) CG, FMFPac ltr Ser: 0113 of 29 Feb 1964

1. (U) In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted for first quarter, Fiscal Year 1967.

(S) Part I - Evaluation of Command. Due to the nature of the contingency plans which the First Marine Brigade would be called upon to support, individual unit combat readiness should be examined rather than the Brigade as an entity.

Part II - Evaluation of Units

a. (C) VMF(AW)-212. During the next quarter this squadron should achieve a minimum combat capability. This estimate based on a continued buildup in enlisted strength during the quarter and normal progression of pilots through phase training.

b. (C) VMF(AW)-232. This Squadron will be a fully combat ready squadron prior to the end of the quarter. Readiness in all weather fighter mission stands at 90 percent, however, equipment shortages for external ordnance delivery reduces overall readiness to 75 percent until pilots are qualified in air-ground phase of training.

c. (C) MACS-2. This unit is currently, "Fully Combat Ready, C-1 Personnel", however, some acute shortages exist by MOS. For example officer strength in MOS 6709 is only 55 percent. A number of officers are in receipt of orders to this Command and this percentage should improve as these officers become schooled and trained in the field. The squadron is maintaining a high degree of training and proficiency. ECCM training continues to improve rapidly and more exercises are planned. Lack of replacement parts and

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Ser: 0020-66

maintenance difficulties continue to derogate the squadron's capability to maintain a high degree of proficiency.

d. (C) MATCU-62. This unit is currently "Marginally Combat Ready" due to a unit strength of 73.5 percent T/O. All personnel are highly trained and the unit is capable of performing it's mission, but not sustained 24 hour operations. It is not anticipated that the AN/TSQ-16 system will become operational during the quarter unless the shortage of repair parts is rectified.

e. (C) 1stBn, 27th Mar. This Battalion will be activated by cadre on 1 June 1966 and will not be combat ready during the quarter. Personnel and training will increase throughout the quarter. Anticipated problem areas are being resolved early and this Command foresees a smooth buildup to a combat ready unit.

f. (C) H&MS. This Squadron, while not assigned training or deployment readiness dates in accordance with reference (c), is progressing rapidly towards personnel and equipment readiness. The unit should be fully operational by the end of the quarter.

g. (C) Service Company. No change from previous report.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. (C) The forces required by reference (d) can be provided in so far as they do not exceed two (2) VMF(AW) squadrons and one (1) MACS squadron, subject to the limitations described in Part II.

b. (S) JTF-119 OPLAN 1-61

(1) Description. This CINCPAC (JTF) plan provides for all Navy/Marine Units with an air defense capability to assist in the air defense of Hawaii. This assistance would include fighter aircraft from the two VMF(AW) squadrons and radar surveillance and weapons control by the MACS squadron.

(2) Capability. MACS-2 and VMF(AW)-232 are capable of carrying out their combat assignments in support of this OPLAN except MACS-2 would not be able to maintain sustained 24 hour operations. VMF(AW)-212 could give limited support compatible with training level of pilots.

c. (S) 326th Air Division OPLAN 1-66


(1) Description. This OPLAN supports PACAF OPLAN 1-65

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Ser: 0020-66

and covers the air defense of Hawaii. When requested by the Commander, 326th Air Division, the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier will coordinate with the appropriate Naval and Marine Commanders and provide available Naval and Marine ASW and interceptor aircraft.

(2) Capability. (Same as c. (2) above).


R. H. SPANJER

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56 4997

1ST RADIO BATTALION
Fleet Marine Force, FPO
San Francisco 96602

3:JMS:jar
3001
Ser: 0062-66
26 May 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for First Quarter, Fiscal Year 1967
Ref: (a) FMFPAC 3000.4A
(b) My ltr report 3:JBP:jar over 3001 Ser: 0024-66 of 1 March 1966

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a). The First Quarter, Fiscal Year 1967 is the period covered by this report.

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

A. This command continues to be marginally combat ready to fully execute its assigned mission. This marginal qualification is based solely on equipment deficiencies (generator PU-535A/G). This deficiency has been reported previously, and most recently by reference (b) and my OPSTAT 072248Z May.

B. The following actions have taken place since reference (b) was submitted:

(1) ADHINO FMFPAC's message 160606Z Mar to CMC requested advice as to the status of replacement for detector and gating modules of Generator Set PU-535A/G. This message also stated that if the module problem had not been resolved, it was requested that authority be granted to requisition three PU-239 and three PU-565 generators for 1st Radio Battalion.

(2) CMC message 250023Z Mar to CG FMFPAC stated that generators PU-565 and PU-239 were not suitable substitutes for the generator PU-535A/G; and that generator problem was being resolved with priority of delivery of modifications to FMFPAC.

(3) As of this date, the generator deficiency remains unresolved, and this command remains marginally combat ready.

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3001
 Ser: 0062-66
 26 May 1966

PART II - EVALUATION OF UNIT

Without non-organic generator power, the ELINT Platoon of Operations Company and the Special Security Communications Platoon of Headquarters and Service Company are considered incapable of fully accomplishing their missions in the event of total Radio Battalion commitment to combat support operations (see PART I).

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTSPlan

CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32
 CINCPACFLT OPLAN 37
 SFF OPLAN 5
 SFF OPLAN 6
 SFF OPLAN 7
 CRSSFF OPLAN 4

CINCPACFLT GWP
 CINCPACFLT OPLAN 27
 CINCPACFLT OPLAN 38
 CINCPACFLT OPLAN 39

Readiness

The command is now supporting the requirements of these plans, except Phase III/IV of CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32, which the command is not considered prepared to support at this time.
 (See PART I)

The command is not prepared to support the maximum requirements of these plans, due to already being committed in support of plans above and deficiencies stated in PART I.

R. H. STEWART

SECRET

66 504

1ST AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY
 Fleet Marine Force
 FPO San Francisco 96602

CONFIDENTIAL

Ser: 034-66
 BOS:ejl
 5213/3500
 27 May 1966

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 1st Quarter, FY67

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
 (b) FMFPAC 3000.4A
 (c) T/O M-4892 of 21 June 1963 w/Pas 543-64 and 307-65
 (d) FY66 Manning Level, CG, FMFPac Ltr 1/gff over 5321/4 dtd 4 Feb 1966

Encl: (1) Current Contingency Plan Commitments

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following Quarterly Combat Readiness Report is submitted.

2. PART I - Evaluation of the Command

- a. This section of the report reflects the personnel strength of 1st ANGLICO, Sub Unit #1 - 1st ANGLICO and personnel who have assumed PCS orders to 3rd MARDIV. Percentages were derived by comparing on-board strength to T/O strength as shown in reference (c).

Naval Aviators - 22 of 23 for 95%

Five (5) Naval Aviators are on PCS orders to RVN - one to Sub Unit One, 1st ANGLICO and four (4) to 3rd MARDIV.

Marine Ground CG 0840 - 7 of 7 for 100%

Three (3) Marine 0840's are deployed PCS to Sub Unit #1, 1st ANGLICO.

Marine Officers other MA's - 5 of 4 for 125%

All of these Officers are with 1st ANGLICO at NAS, Kaneohe, Hawaii.

Navy Line Officers - 10 of 10 for 100%

Six (6) Navy Line Officers are on PCS orders to Sub Unit #1, 1st ANGLICO in RVN.

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(Enc 1 (12))

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 BOS:ajl
 5213/3500
 27 May 1966

Marine Enlisted - 268 of 313 for 925

Forty-three (43) enlisted Marines are on PCS orders to Sub Unit #1, 1st ANCHICO and twenty-four (24) enlisted Marines are on PCS orders to 3rd MARDIV.

- b. This section of the report reflects the personnel strength of 1st ANCHICO, FOF at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station as compared to the Manning Level, reference (d).

Naval Aviators - 17 of 16 for 100%

Marine Ground MOS O&A - 4 of 2 for 200%

Marine Officers other MOS's - 4 of 4 for 100%

*Navy Line Officers - 4 of 10 for 40%

Marine Enlisted - 221 of 234 for 94%

- c. There are currently sufficient officers and enlisted personnel assigned to provide the necessary control and liaison agencies for an Army Division Headquarters, two Infantry Brigade Headquarters, five Battalion TACP's and two Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties, one Division and one Brigade ECHO Staff.

* No Manning Level published for Navy Officers.

- d. There are sufficient personnel qualified personnel to provide two Battalion TACP's and one Battalion SHCP.

3. PART II - Evaluation of Units

- a. All personnel currently assigned are sufficiently trained for immediate Combat Operations.

4. PART III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

- a. Enclosure (1) lists those operational plans currently showing this Command as a participating Unit.
- b. This Command is capable of supporting the required Contingency Plans listed in Enclosure (1) based on the assumption that we will be reconstructed to T/O strength for personnel and T/E for equipment.

O. J. MERRILL

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Ser: 034-66
 BGS:ajl
 5213/3900
 27 May 1966

Listing of those operational plans currently held or known to indicate let
 ANGLICO, FMF participation:

CINCPACFLT General War Plan 1-64
 CG, FMFPac General War Plan 1-64
 CINCPAC OPLAN 23-65 and Supporting Plans thereto
 CINCPAC OPLAN 27-65 and Supporting Plans thereto
 CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase II and Supporting Plans thereto (LAOS)
 CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase II and Supporting Plans thereto (THAI)
 CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase II and Supporting Plans thereto (RVN)
 CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase III and IV and Supporting Plans thereto (SEASIA)
 CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 and Supporting Plans thereto
 CINCPAC OPLAN 39-65 and Supporting Plans thereto
 TF 79 OPLAN 104-64
 TF ALFA 5-61
 SEATO FF 4/64 and Supporting Plans thereto
 SEATO FF 5/62 and Supporting Plans thereto
 SEATO FF 6/64 and Supporting Plans thereto
 SEATO FF 7/64 and Supporting Plans thereto

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ENCLOSURE (1)

66 4613

HEADQUARTERS
Camp M. M. Smith, U. S. Marine Corps
FTO San Francisco 96610

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FTO SAN FRANCISCO 96602

3/jhp
3213
Ser: 09-66
18 MAY 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacD 3000.4A

- 1. In compliance with instructions contained in references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted:**

PART I

This Headquarters has sufficient personnel who are adequately trained to support either a MAF or MAC Headquarters if deployed by Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

In addition, this Headquarters is prepared to provide basic logistic support for a MAF/MAC Headquarters to accomplish the logistic missions currently assigned.

A. D. CEREHINO

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Encl (10)

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66-5492

Headquarters
1ST FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, FMF
Camp Pendleton, California 92055

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Ser: 07-66
24 May 1966

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 1st Quarter, FY 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) CG FMFPac ltr 1/gff Ser 0092965 of 24 Nov 1965
(d) CG FMFPac msg 260127Z Feb

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted.

a. PART I. Evaluation of Command

First Force Service Regiment is severely limited in support that can be provided with less than Reduced Strength T/O personnel and T/E equipment available. Personnel and equipment were deployed to WestPac in 1965 in support of units. FSR is currently operating on an austere manning level with the mission to support only garrison type operations.

b. PART II. Evaluation of Units

The units of First Force Service Regiment are limited within the present manning level to the accomplishment of the mission assigned by references (c) and (d). Shortages in the on board strength in OF 01, 04, 13 and 20 for officers and in OF 04, 13, 28, 30, 33 and 35 for enlisted further complicate FSR's ability to provide support beyond presently assigned missions.

c. PART III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments

Operational commitments assigned by references (c) and (d) are being fulfilled.

J. E. Garner
J. E. GARNER

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Force Service Regiment
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/KLA/hgl
3500/1
Ser: 041-66
8 June 1966

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report; 1st Qtr FY 1967 (Report Symbol MC 3100-04)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A


1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted.

Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 1st Quarter FY 1967

Part I - Evaluation of the Command. A Provisional T/O was established for 3d Force Service Regiment on 15 March 1966. The mission, as extracted from the T/O, is to provide sustained logistic support to all FMF WestPac Forces from Okinawa. The logistic posture and readiness of this command is good. Third Force Service Regiment is capable of providing the support necessary to meet the requirements of WestPac Forces in accordance with the stated mission.

Part II - Evaluation of the Units. There are no ineffective units.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments. This command can logistically support current contingency plans as required.


JAMES H. REEDER
Acting

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, 96602

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3/jrs
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28 SEP 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03H)
Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report (Report
Symbol, MC 3100-4) for the Second Quarter, Fiscal Year
1967 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A

- Encl: (1) CG 1st MarDiv (Rein) ltr 3:Op:emk over 3000 of
23 August 1966
(2) CG 3rd MarDiv (Rein) ltr 3/LGA/pnc over 3000
Ser: 00288-66 of 31 August 1966
(3) CG 1st MAW ltr 3:RGH:cpc over 3000 Ser: 03B24066
of 28 August 1966
(4) CG 3rd MAW ltr 3:REH:rjs over 3100 Ser: 003B2256
of 16 August 1966
(5) CO Hq ForTrps FMFPac ltr 3/WOS/waw over 3500/1
Ser: 0047/66 of 25 August 1966
(6) CG 9th MAB ltr 3:ABC:jta Ser: 00116-66 of
24 August 1966
(7) CO 1st MarBrig ltr 3/rer Ser: 0022-66 of 30
August 1966
(8) CO 1st RadBn ltr 3:LMB:jhg over 3100 Ser: 0094-66
of 31 August 1966
(9) CO 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Co ltr
OJM:rhv over 5213/3500 Ser: 0068-66 of 31 August
1966
(10) CO H&S Bn FMFPac ltr 3/lnw over 5213 Ser: 017-66
of 16 August 1966
(11) CO 1st ForServRegt ltr 8/BGM/eig Ser: 09-66
of 22 August 1966
(12) CO 3d ForServRegt ltr 3/KLA/mpf over 3500/2
Ser: 068-66 of 6 September 1966

1. (U) The Commander's Combat Readiness Report for the Second
Quarter, Fiscal Year 1967 is submitted in accordance with
reference (a).

2. (S) Summary Statement

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a. The successful combat operations of FMFPAC, WESTPAC units in Vietnam and continuing provisions of combat support from Okinawa and Japan based elements is solid evidence of the readiness of these FMFPAC commands. On an individual basis, some of these units are experiencing a reduction in combat readiness as a result of personnel and equipment shortages. These fluctuations are proportional to combat operational losses and the in and out of country flow in the personnel and logistics pipelines.

b. FMFPAC units in MidPac and EastPac, not scheduled for immediate deployment, continue to experience a reduced combat readiness as combat ready elements in these commands are deployed to Vietnam, combat units are rotated from Vietnam for rehabilitation and newly activated units are assigned for training.

3. (U) The combat readiness, as reported by individual FMFPAC units, is described in detail in enclosures (1) through (12).

4. (S) WestPac Forces

a. III MAF

(1) WestPac Forces are fully operational and capable of executing their assigned combat missions. Several infantry battalions of the 1st Division and 3rd Division are still reporting personnel deficiencies. This condition has been brought to the attention of CMC, and if recommendations to bring WestPac Ground Forces up to Manning Level are approved, this situation will be alleviated.

(2) 1st MAW

(a) The Wing has continued to provide highly effective combat support during this reporting period. Because of the heavy commitments, some difficulties have been encountered in equipment shortages and within certain specialist occupational fields.

(b) The round-the-clock operations of communication-electronics equipment has contributed to a high deadline rate, but because of the efficient "Red Ball" system, a steady decrease in this rate has been noted.

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(c) Generator deadlines are the source of a major problem; however, improvement in this situation will appear as new types of generators are phased in and military construction (MCON) power systems come on line.

(d) One of the more serious personnel shortages is in the aviation ordnance field. This situation will be somewhat relieved by the transfer of aviation ordnance personnel from MAG-15. In addition, a proposed change to the WestPac M/L, if approved, will resolve the problem.

(e) The personnel shortages reported by the LAAM Battalions are temporary in nature and will be alleviated by the transfer to Wing of the required personnel with LAAM occupational specialties during the month of September.

(f) MASS-2 has been heavily committed, and has had a considerable strain placed on their assets. The planned deployment of MASS-3 (-) in-country will aid in alleviating some of the operational requirements. Additionally, MASS-2 was provided a spare AN/TPQ-10 for back-up service.

(g) MACS-7 has experienced some difficulty maintaining their two new radars in service. Presently, both are in operation.

(h) Although there is still a shortage of spare parts for the new and complex radars in the Wing, an easing of this situation is anticipated through the process of direct requisitioning of spare parts from Barstow and the diversion of parts from MACS-6 to MACS-7.

b. Ninth MAB

(1) The Brigade will be able to function as an air ground team fully combat ready with the capability to perform its mission in any environment. The combat potential of the Brigade will be increased by the rotation of combat experienced battalions from Vietnam to Okinawa.

c. Third Force Service Regiment

(1) The Third Force Service Regiment will continue to provide sustained logistic support from Okinawa to all FMFPac WestPac Forces. Some recognized shortages in the MOS of 3050 (Warehouse Officer) and E-5 and above 3051's (Warehouseman) exist.

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5. (S) MidPac Forcesa. First Marine Brigade

(1) The First Marine Brigade could conduct limited operations as an integrated air-ground task force with currently assigned units during this reporting period.

(a) VMF(AW) 212, the only remaining tactical squadron in the 1st Brigade, is marginally combat ready due to shortages of enlisted personnel in the occupational field 6400. Enlisted strength is presently 79% of manning level and there is a continuing loss of combat ready pilots. These personnel deficiencies have also created an extremely limited intermediate level of maintenance support, a situation which is not expected to show marked improvement during the next quarter.

(b) MACS-2 and MATCU-62 are both in a reduced readiness category due to personnel shortages in critical MOS's and an influx of untrained personnel into the squadrons.

(c) The 1st Battalion, 27th Marines is programed to attain personnel and material readiness by 1 November 1966 and training readiness by 15 December 1966.

(d) H&MS is still in the process of receiving its initial outfitting of material. In view of the fact that this squadron does not have a requirement to deploy, it will continue to perform its mission as assigned in T/O M-8810.

b. First Anglico

(1) The deployment of Sub-Unit one, First Anglico to RVN leaves the remaining elements of the company at Kaneohe with a capability of providing the control and liaison agencies to support one Brigade.

c. First Radio Battalion

(1) The generator deficiency of the PU-535A/G, previously reported, continues to plague the battalion and keeps it in a marginally combat ready status. However, recent correspondence with CMC reveals that resolution of the reliability

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problem with this generator is to be demonstrated by the contractor during the week of 12 September 1966. The contractor estimated delivery schedule to commence 30 November 1966 and to be completed by 30 December 1966. This problem should be resolved during the next reporting period.

d. Headquarters and Service Battalion

(1) This battalion has sufficient personnel and is prepared to provide the basic combat service support to either a MAF or MAC Headquarters as directed.

6. (S) EastPac Forces

a. Third Marine Aircraft Wing

(1) The loss of all VMA training capability, the negligible tactical helicopter capability, the constant drain of key personnel and equipment from this unit, and individual replacements to WestPac will keep the Wing in a reduced state of combat readiness until the latter part of the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 67.

b. Force Troops, FMFPac

(1) Force Troops will be capable of performing its assigned mission during the reporting period. Emphasis will be placed on preparing for deployment the newly activated units of the Fifth Marine Division assigned to Force Troops.

c. First Force Service Regiment

(1) Although operating on an austere manning level, the regiment maintains its capability of providing garrison type support to the FMFPac units at Camp Pendleton.

7. (S) During the forthcoming quarter, particular command emphasis will be directed towards:

a. Maintaining a high degree of combat readiness for all FMFPac WestPac units by close and continuous supervision of supply, personnel, and training problems affecting these units.

b. Providing close and continuous supervision of newly activated units to insure that these units attain a fully combat ready posture prior to deployment to WestPac.

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c. Insuring that training efforts in all commands are directed toward preparing all Marines mentally and physically for arduous combat operations in RVN.

d. Refurbishing and re-training the combat units rotated from Vietnam to Okinawa in a minimum of time.

e. The development of a proficient capability to conduct riverine operations.



A. R. KIER
Acting

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FIRST ENDOGRAPHY on CG 1st Marine Div ltr 3:00pm 8/26/66 over 3000 of 23Aug66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, First Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commanding General's Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, Fiscal Year 1967 (U)

1. Forwarded.

J. H. CHALSON
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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

3:Op:emk
3000
23 August 1966

SECRET--Unclassified on 1 January 1967

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, Fiscal Year
1967 (U)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A
(c) CMC msg 022052Z Sep65

1. In accordance with references (a), (b) and (c), the subject report is submitted:

PART I - Evaluation of the Command.

The 1st Marine Division (Rein) is fully prepared to accomplish its assigned mission.

PART II - Evaluation of Units

None.

W. A. Stiles
W. A. STILES
Acting

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
662236
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66 8619

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4 SEP 1966

SECRET--Unclassified when basic material is removed

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 3d MarDiv ltr 3/DCA/pno over 3000 Ser: 10208-66
of 31Aug66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2d qtr, FY 67 (U)

1. Forwarded.

J. M. PLATT
CHIEF OF STAFF

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/LGA/pnc

3000

Ser: 00288-66

31 AUG 1966

SECRET (DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.)

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2d Qtr, FY 67

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

Title - The Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2d Qtr, FY 67 is a report prepared and submitted in the last month of 1st Qtr, FY 67. The 2d Qtr, FY 67 is the reporting period covered in this report.

Part I - The 3d Marine Division is combat ready. The readiness and capability of performing the assigned combat mission is evidenced by daily operations against the enemy in Vietnam.

Part II - No unit of the 3d Marine Division is expected to be ineffective or incapable of accomplishing its combat mission during the reporting period.

W. B. KYLE

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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66 8616

CONFIDENTIAL

G-3B/rel

3489

Ser:

0121266

4 SEP 1966

CONFIDENTIAL--Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1stMAW, FMFPac ltr 3:RCH:cpo Ser: 03B24066
of 28Aug66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, Second Quarter, Fiscal
Year 67 (U)

1. Forwarded.

R. B. NEVILLE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

3:RGH:opc
3000
Ser:03B24066
28 August 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, Second Quarter, Fiscal
Year 67 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPac C 3000.4A

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), the
subject report is submitted:

PART I:

a. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is engaged in combat operations in
the Republic of Vietnam and is capable of continuing these operations.

b. The communications-electronics situation remains marginally
satisfactory for the Wing.

(1) The majority of the new family of FM radio equipments has
been received by the using organizations. After initial problems of supply
support and maintenance personnel training are solved, considerable improve-
ment is expected on circuits utilizing this equipment.

(2) Introduction of new complex radar equipments continue to be
plagued by lack of repair parts supply support.

(3) Prolonged round the clock operation is still causing a high
deadline rate of communication-electronics equipment. Long lead times in
obtaining required repair parts continue to compound the maintenance problem,
however, continued improvement of the "REDBALL" system is primarily respon-
sible for a declining deadline rate. The current deadline rate is the
lowest experienced since 15 January 1966.

(4) Deadlined generators continue to be a major problem throughout
the Wing impairing operations of all units.

NAW S&C No.	Copy No.	GROUP 4 Downgraded at 3 year intervals; Declassified after 12 years.
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3000

c. The aviation ordnance capability is marginal in relation to increasing ordnance allocation expenditure rates for the following reasons:

(1) Introduction of SATS weapons loaders has been plagued by the lack of repair parts supply support.

(2) Weapons handling and loading cradles have not been provided. Cradles are required in conjunction with the SATS weapons loader in order to expeditiously rearm tactical aircraft.

(3) The current T/O and M/L for 1st MAW ordnance personnel is completely inadequate for a continuous 24 hour, seven day week combat operation in RVN. An increase in the current M/L has been requested by separate correspondence. The shortage of ordnance personnel impacts unfavorably on the efficient utilization of aircraft and safety of flight.

(4) The shortage of MER/TIR bomb racks greatly increases the turn around time of aircraft; there is also a shortage of repair parts to maintain the racks on-hand.

d. Environmental problems encountered during the previous quarter with the OH-46A aircraft should be appreciably reduced during the next quarter with completion of AFC's on rotor blades, engine compressors and fuel controls, and the installation of barrier filters for engine intakes.

e. Improvement of UH-1E availability is contingent on improved supply support and incorporation of the 540 rotor system.

PART II:

a. 1st and 2nd LAAM BNS. The Aug/Sep 66 losses of personnel in all MOS's rotating to CONUS will exceed the anticipated incoming replacements by 295. This will reduce the 1st and 2nd LAAM Bns to C Pers Status C-3 and possibly C-4, by 3 September 1966. No information on incoming personnel beyond September 1966 is available; therefore, an estimate of the personnel situation for the entire 2d quarter FY67 cannot be made at this time. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is unable to maintain the LAAM Bns in a C-2 status by intra-group redistribution of personnel.

b. MASS-2. The heavy commitment of operating four ASRT's and three DASO's with present assets continue to limit this unit's capability to adequately perform its mission. Considerable outage has been experienced with the AN/TPQ-10 at Dong Hai. Plans are currently underway to replace this unit.

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3000

c. MACS-7. This unit is marginally combat ready for lack of repair parts supply support and this continues to prevent placing two new radars, the AN/TPS-22 and the AN/TPS-34, in service.

L. B. Robertshaw
L. B. ROBERTSHAW

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HEADQUARTERS
3RD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMFPAC
MCAS, EL TORO, SANTA ANA, CALIF. 92709

66 7771

3:REH:rjs
3100
Ser: 003B22566
16 August 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for Second Quarter
Fiscal Year 1967 (U) (RS MC 3100-4)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

a. PART I

(1) The combat readiness of this Command is estimated to be 50%. This low state of readiness is attributed to the loss of all VMA training capability; the negligible tactical helicopter capability available; a constant drain of key personnel and equipment for unit and individual replacements to WESTPAC; anticipated slippage in receiving CH-53A aircraft from July to September in addition to spreading the limited assets of this Wing into newly formed units. Anticipate no significant increase in overall Wing Combat readiness until later part of Third Quarter FY 67.

b. PART II

(1) MASS-5: Phase I training until February 1967.

(2) BTRY A (5th LAAM BN): Phase I training until about January 1967. Phase training cycle dependent on influx of personnel and equipment.

(3) HMM-364: Programmed to reform in 3d MAW during September 1966 from Wing assets. This unit will remain in Phase I training during this reporting period.

(4) BTRY B (5th LAAM BN): Forms on 1 October 1966. Phase I training remainder of the reporting period.

(5) HMM-463: The anticipated slippage in CH-53A

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3:REH:rjs
 Ser: 003B22566
 16 August 1966

aircraft program from July to September 1966 and the shortage of first tour pilots available precludes setting a definite training phase time frame at this time. In addition to slippage of aircraft programming, this unit is programmed to deploy four (4) aircraft with qualified crews to WESTPAC during November 1966.

(6) HMH-462: Due to anticipated slippage in CH-53A aircraft programming and limited personnel available, this unit will remain in a cadre status with no capability of performing its assigned mission during this reporting period.

(7) VMCJ-3: Deploys cadre to WESTPAC during October 1966 leaving remainder of unit to reform and commence phase I training.

(8) HMMT-302: Forms 1 November 1966 from within limited assets of the 3d MAW.

(9) VMO-3: Deploys detachment of twelve (12) aircraft and qualified crews to WESTPAC during December 1966.

(10) VMA-225 and VMA-332: Chops from 2d MAW to this Command in name only about 1 December 1966. These units will be formed from within Wing personnel assets and remain in a forming phase for the remainder of the reporting period.

c. PART III

(1) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 71-YR.

Capability to support this plan will continue to be limited due to KC-130F support to 9th MAB for an indefinite period.

- (2) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25-YR
 FMFPac OPLAN 27-YR
 FMFPac OPLAN 32-YR
 SFF OPLAN 6-YR
 CRSFF OPLAN 4-YR

Overall 3d MAW capability has been reduced by the deployment of an entire Helo MAG, MAG-15 (H&MS-15, MABS-15 and VMA-121), 4 VF/VA units, 1 VMO, and HMM-165, leaving this Command with no VMA capability and marginal helicopter capability until 3d Quarter FY 67.

- (3) FMFPac OPLAN 83-YR
 LFA (TG 12513) OPLAN 136-YR

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Ser: 003B22566
16 August 1966

No VMA capability until later part of Third
Quarter FY 67.

(4) 5th MEB OPLAN 316-YR

No helicopter capability to support this plan
until Third Quarter FY 67.

F. E. Leek
F. E. LEEK

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HEADQUARTERS
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

66 8025

3:ABC:jta
Ser: 00116-66
24 Aug 1966

S E C R E T

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, Second Quarter FY67
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A
Encl: (1) Part I Evaluation of the Command
(2) Part II Evaluation of Units
(3) Part III Evaluation of Operational Commitments
1. Reference (a) and (b) require the submission of Commander's Combat Readiness Reports.
2. Enclosures (1) through (3) are submitted as required by the references.

M. P. RYAN

S E C R E T

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Encl (6)

S E C R E T

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

1. During the Second Quarter, FY67 the Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade, as a whole, will be combat ready.
2. The command will be composed of the Brigade Headquarters, a Regimental Landing Team (less one Battalion Landing Team from 29 November to 10 December), a Logistic Support Group, a composite Marine Air Group (Two Medium Helicopter Squadrons, a Marine Air Control Squadron, Aerial Refueler Squadron, two Fighter Squadrons from 1 October to 15 October, reduced to one Fighter Squadron from 16 October to 31 December and two Attack Squadrons from 1 October to 1 December, reduced to one Attack Squadron from 2 December to 31 December), and necessary combat support for both ground and aviation. This will enable this command to function as an air ground team with the capability to perform its mission in any environment. The rotation of Battalion Landing Teams and Squadrons out of the Republic of Vietnam will increase the combat potential of the Brigade by adding a measure of combat experience and know how. Current plans provide that BLTs will be refurbished in personnel and equipment as required within thirty (30) days after arrival on Okinawa. While BLTs will maintain an emergency capability to mount out within a ten day period after arrival on Okinawa, such an emergency move will require mount out at reduced personnel and equipment strength with a resultant reduced combat potential.
3. During the entire quarter, the Special Landing Force, (Composed of one Battalion Landing Team and one HMM Squadron from the Regimental Landing Team and Marine Air Group) will be deployed in the Western Pacific fully combat ready.

S E C R E T

PART II - EVALUATION OF UNITS

1. The following units are expected to join this organization during the period covered by this report. Whereas the combat potential and effectiveness of these units are unknown at this time, the inherent capacity for them to perform their mission is assumed. The specific degree of combat readiness of these units cannot be accurately forecast at this time.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>JOIN FROM</u>	<u>APPROXIMATE DATE</u>
3/26	CONUS	26 September 1966
BLT 1/4	III MAF	02 October 1966
2/4	III MAF	06 November 1966
1/9	III MAF	10 December 1966
*VMF(AW) 235	III MAF	15 November 1966
*VMF(AW) 223	III MAF	01 December 1966
HMM 362		26 September 1966
HMM 161		01 October 1966

* Tentative

2. The following units will be detached from this organization during the period covered by this report.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>APPROXIMATE DATE</u>
BLT 3/3	27 October 1966
BLT 3/26	07 December 1966
* VMA 211	01 November 1966
* VMF(AW) 232	15 November 1966
HMM 362	26 September 1966
HMM 161	01 December 1966

* Tentative

S E C R E T

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

1. The following is a list of current contingency plans for which the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade provides forces, along with a narrative statement on each plan, evaluating ability to provide the required forces.

PLANFORCE REQUIREMENT AND NARRATIVE STATEMENT

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 23-63

Force Requirement: Special Landing Force plus 2 tactical Air Control parties and 1 Major (Asst Air Opns O).

Narrative Statement: Special Landing Force will be available unless previously committed to other contingencies. Assistant Air Operations Officer is available.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 25-66

Force Requirement: Initial requirement is for a Marine Fighter Group and supporting elements including a Marine Air Control Squadron with the remainder of FMF SEVENTH Fleet held in reserve.

Narrative Statement: A combat ready MAG Hq and supporting elements will be immediately available, however only two fighter squadrons will be available 10Oct-15Oct and only one fighter squadron will be available during 15Oct-21Dec. Reserve forces would be the Special Landing Force initially with the remainder of the 9th MAB deploying as required.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 27-64

Force Requirement: Immediate deployment of up MAG (3 VMF(AW) with a MAB (RLT, MAG) initially held in general reserve. First elements of the MAB (BLT) to arrive in area within 7 days; the remainder of MAB (RLT(-) MAG(-)) arriving 17-19 days.

Narrative Statement: Ability to provide MAG is as described under Oplan 25-65 above. One BLT (SLF BLT) will be available unless engaged in SpecOps. Other force requirements can be met from 9th MAB resources except for period 29Nov-10Dec when only two BLTs (including SLF BLT) will be available.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 27A-64

Force Requirement: VMGR aircraft (number not specified) and VMA and VMF aircraft (numbers not specified) operate from IWAKUNI or KOREAN airfields.

S E C R E T

Narrative Statement: A minimum of one VMGR, 1 VMA and 1 VMF squadrons will be in combat ready status during the period.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 32-65
Phase II

Force Requirement: Initial requirement is for MAB, composed of a Hq, an RLT, a composite MAG, a Logistical Support Group, and Engineer Group with the remainder of a MAB afloat.

Narrative Statement: 9th MAB will possess the initial requirement except for the Engineer Group (the source of which is not determined). The source of the remaining ground and air units is undetermined.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 32-65
Phase III/IV

Force Requirement: MEF/MEC, plus NCC and staff and personnel for COC.

Narrative Statement: Narrative statement under Oplan 32-65 (Phase II) above applies. Source of NCC staff and COC personnel not determined and are beyond the resources of 9th MAB.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 37-65

Force Requirement: Div/Wg Team to DANANG. MEB (MAB) initial increment of this team. Reconstitute SLF (for amphibious raids) and provide unspecified amounts of airlift for personnel, equipment and ordnance in WestPac.

Narrative Statement: That portion of the plan dealing with deployments and reconstitution of the SLF has been accomplished. SLF will have capability to execute amphibious raids during this period. VMGR aircraft are continuously providing lift in support of this plan, as required.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 39-66

Force Requirement: 2 Div (6 RLT), 2 LAAM Bn, 5 VMF Squadrons, 4 VMFA Squadrons, 6 VMA Squadrons, 2 VMGR Squadrons, 2 VMCJ Squadrons, 10 HMM/HMH Squadrons.

Narrative Statement: Bulk of deployments accomplished by deployments to RVN.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 60-64

Force Requirement: SLF (BLT HMM size) up to MAB of RLT/MAG size.

Narrative Statement: SLF combat ready during entire period. MAB combat ready except as discussed Oplan 25 and Oplan 27.

S E C R E T

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 121-66

Force Requirement: MAB (less fixed wing aircraft).

Narrative Statement: 9th MAB has capability to execute this plan except as noted in Oplan 25 and Oplan 27.

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 122-66

Force Requirement: MAF (1 Div/1 Wg), with reinforced MarDiv (follow up).

Narrative Statement: Sources of forces beyond capabilities of 9th MAB not determined.

66 8193

HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco 96602

SECRET

3/rcr
Ser: 0022-66
30 Aug 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness, 2nd Quarter
Fiscal Year 1967 (U)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.3A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4A

1. (U) In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted for second quarter, Fiscal Year 1967.

(S) Part I - Evaluation of Command. Due to the nature of the contingency plans which the First Marine Brigade would be called upon to support, individual unit combat readiness should be examined rather than the Brigade as an entirety.

Part II - Evaluation of Units

(a) (C) VMF(AW)-212. This squadron has not yet reached marginal combat readiness due to the following: shortages of enlisted personnel in occupational fields 6400 and 6600; continuing loss of combat ready pilots being replaced by pilots not qualified in assigned aircraft; extremely limited intermediate level maintenance support, and the present enlisted strength of 79% of manning level. A build up of enlisted personnel is essential if this squadron is to increase its training capability and to achieve marginal combat readiness during this quarter.

(b) (C) MACS-2. Even though this squadron has over 90% of T/O and M/L on hand the critical shortages of MOS's 1341, 5941, and 5943 necessitates a combat readiness of C-2 personnel. It is not possible to estimate when the on hand strength in the above MOS's will permit C-1 personnel. A high degree of training has continued especially with ECCM training. It is contemplated that Squadron proficiency will continually improve due to the future scheduled ECM/ECCM exercises. Lack of adequate supply support prevents the AN/TPS-34 radar from maintaining a continuous operational status. The squadron is expected to remain "Combat Ready C-2" during this quarter.

(c) (C) MATCU-62. This unit is currently "Combat Ready C-2 Personnel." There has been an influx of untrained personnel which has kept "CRTNG at C-3" It is estimated that six months training is required to bring the training to "C-1". The unit is expected to reach "Combat Ready C-2" during the middle of this quarter.

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12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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SECRETSer: 0022-66
30 Aug 1966

(d) 1st Battalion, 27th Marines. This organization is programmed to reach personnel and material readiness from cadre status during this period. In light of recently received information, however, it is apparent that the previously established target dates will require re-evaluation. The command will not be combat ready during this quarter.

(e) H&MS. This organization was commissioned during the last quarter of FY-66 and is still in the process of receiving its initial outfitting of material and equipment. As the only H&MS in the Marine Corps that is not part of a Marine Air Group, it does not have capability or requirement for mount out or deployment. This unit is capable of and is performing the mission assigned in T/O M-8810.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments.

(a) (C) The forces required by reference (a) can be provided in so far as they do not exceed one VMF(AW) Squadron and one Marine Air Control Squadron, subject to the limitations described in Part II.

(b) (S) JTF-119 OPLAN 1-61

(1) Description. This CINCPAC (JTF) Plan provides for all Navy/Marine Units with an air defense capability to assist in the defense of Hawaii. This assistance would include fighter aircraft from one VMF(AW) Squadron and radar surveillance and weapons control by the Marine Air Control Squadron.

(2) Capability. MACS-2 and VMF(AW)-212 are capable of carrying out their combat assignments in support of this OPLAN on a limited basis. MACS-2 would not be able to maintain sustained 24 hour operations. VMF(AW)-212 could give limited support compatible with training level of pilots.

(c) (S) 326th Air Division OPLAN 1-66.

(1) Description. This OPLAN supports PACAFOPLAN 1-65 and covers the air defense of Hawaii. When requested by the Commander, 326th Air Division, the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier will coordinate with appropriate Naval and Marine ASW and interceptor aircraft.

(2) Capability. (Same as (b)(2) above).

D. H. Stapp

D. H. STAPP

GP-4

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66 8230

1ST RADIO BATTALION
Fleet Marine Force, FPO
San Francisco 96602

SECRET

JLMB:jg

3001

Ser: 0094-66

31 August 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol MC 3100.4) for
Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1967

Ref: (a) FMFPAGO 3000.4A
(b) My ltr report JLRMS:jg over 3001 Ser: 0062-66 of 26 May 1966

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a). The Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1967 is the period covered by this report.

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

A. This command continues to be marginally combat ready to fully execute its assigned mission. This marginal qualification is based solely on equipment deficiencies (generator PU-535 A/G). This deficiency has been reported, beginning in December 1965, by my monthly REDOPS/OPSTATS and by reference (b).

B. The following actions have taken place since reference (b) was submitted:

(1) CG FMFPAC's message 131900Z Aug to CMC requested information on the status of the PU-535 A/G problem.

(2) CMC's message 251626Z Aug to CG FMFPAC stated that resolution of reliability problem of PU-535 A/G is to be demonstrated by the contractor during the week of 12 September. Contractor estimated delivery schedule commence 30 November, completed by 30 December. It also directed a continued effort to maintain the PU-535 A/G's until the modification kits become available.

(3) As of this date, because of the generator deficiency, this command remains marginally combat ready.

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(encl 8)

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3001

Ser: 0094-66

31 August 1966

PART II - EVALUATION OF UNITS

Without non-organic generator power, the ELINT Platoon of Operations Company and the Special Security Communications Platoon of Headquarters and Service Company are considered incapable of fully accomplishing their missions in the event of total Radio Battalion commitment to combat support operations (see PART I).

PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS**Plan**

CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 37

CINCPACFLT GWP
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 27
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 39
SFF OPLAN 6
CRSFF OPLAN 4

Readiness

The command is now supporting the requirements of these plans, except Phase III/IV of CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32, which at this time the command is not considered prepared to support. (see PART I).

This command is not prepared to support the maximum requirements of these plans, because of commitment in support of plans above and deficiencies stated in PART I.

R. M. STEWART

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

66 8223

1ST AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY
Fleet Marine Force
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

SECRET

OJM:rhw
5213/3500
Ser: 0068-66
31 Aug 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, FY 67
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPACO 3000.4A
(c) T/O 4852 w/PAC 543-64 and 207-65
(d) CG FMFPac msg 130516Z/Aug66 (S)

Encl: (1) Current Contingency Plan Commitments

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following Quarterly Combat Readiness Report is submitted.

2. Part I - Evaluation of the command.

a. This section of the report reflects the personnel strength of First ANGLICO and Sub-Unit One, First ANGLICO. Percentages are the results of comparing on board strengths to T/O strengths as shown in reference (c).

(1) Naval Aviators - 19 of 23 for 82.6%.

(a) Nine Naval Aviators on PCS orders to RVN; one presently as OIC SU #1, First ANGLICO, four to the Sub-Unit from 3rd Marine Division and four to the Sub-Unit from First ANGLICO in accordance with reference (d) during September 1966.

(2) Marine Ground (MOS 0840) - 6 of 7 for 85.7%.

(a) Four Marine 0840's are presently assigned to Sub-Unit One, First ANGLICO.

(b) Two Staff Sergeants, 0849's, selected for temporary officer status, are being deployed to the Sub-Unit in September 1966.

(3) Marine Officer (other MOS) - 6 of 4 for 150%.

(a) Presently assigned to First ANGLICO, MCAS, Kaneohe, Hawaii.

(b) Orders have been received to PCS one officer in September and one in November.

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INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS. DATE FOR REVIEW

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Encl (9)

SECRET

OJM:rhw
 5213/3500
 Ser: 0068-66
 31 Aug 1966

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, FY 67

(4) Navy Line Officers - 9 of 10 for 90%.

(a) Five Navy Line officers are presently in Sub-Unit One.

(b) Two are being deployed to the Sub-Unit in September.

(c) Two presently with First ANGLICO, MCAS, Kaneohe, Hawaii.

(5) Marine Enlisted - 271 of 313 for 86.5%.

(a) Forty-three enlisted presently assigned to Sub-Unit One.

(b) Twenty-four transferred from 3rd Marine Division to Sub-Unit One in September 1966.

(c) Seventy being transferred from First ANGLICO to Sub-Unit in September 1966.

b. The combined strengths of First ANGLICO and Sub-Unit One, First ANGLICO are capable of providing control and liaison agencies for an Army Division Headquarters, two Brigades, and one Battalion TACP and one Battalion Shore Fire Control Party.

(1) However, in view of the geographical separation between First ANGLICO at Kaneohe and Sub-Unit in RVN the capability is as follows:

(a) First ANGLICO at Kaneohe can provide the control and liaison agencies to support one Brigade less one Naval Gunfire Spotter (Lt 0840).

(b) Sub-Unit One in RVN will have the capability of providing the control and liaison agencies to support an Army Division Headquarters less the Division Headquarters NGFO and Assistant Air Officer, one Brigade, and one additional Battalion TACP and SFCP.

(c) There are sufficient parachute qualified personnel to provide three battalion TACP's and one Battalion SFCP.

3. Part II - Evaluation of Units.

a. Personnel currently assigned are sufficiently trained for immediate combat operations.

(1) Several officers recently assigned to this command have completed tours with III MAF units during the last six months.

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OJM:rhw
5213/3500
0068-66
31 Aug 1966

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, FY 67

4. Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments.

a. Enclosure (1) lists those operational plans currently showing this command as a participating unit.

b. This command is capable of supporting the required contingency plans listed in enclosure (1) based on the assumption that we will be reconstructed to T/O strength for personnel and T/E for equipment.

O. J. MOREL

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Ser: 0068-66
31 Aug 1966

CURRENT CONTINGENCY PLAN COMMITMENTS

CINCPACFLT General War Plan 1-64
CG FMFPAC General War Plan 1-64
CINCPAC OPLAN 23-65 and Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 27-65 and Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase II and Supporting Plans thereto (LAOS)
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase II and Supporting Plans thereto (THAI)
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase II and Supporting Plans thereto (RVN)
CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 and Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 39-65 and Supporting Plans thereto
TF 79 OPLAN 104-64
TF 79 OPLAN 39-66
TF ALFA 5-61
SEATO FF 4/66 and Supporting Plans thereto
SEATO FF 5/62 and Supporting Plans thereto
SEATO FF 6/64 and Supporting Plans thereto
SEATO FF 7/64 and Supporting Plans thereto
CINCPAC OPLAN 32 Phase III and IV and Supporting Plans thereto (SEASIA)

SECRET

66 7727

HEADQUARTERS
Camp M. M. Smith, U. S. Marine Corps
FTO San Francisco 96610

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FTO SAN FRANCISCO 96602

3/lmw
3213
Ser: 017-66
16 AUG 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Report of Combat Readiness (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacG 3000.4A

1. In compliance with instructions contained in references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted:

PART I

This Headquarters has sufficient personnel who are adequately trained to support either a MAF or MAC Headquarters if deployed by Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

In addition, this Headquarters is prepared to provide basic logistic support for a MAF/MAC Headquarters to accomplish the logistic missions currently assigned.

C. J. ROBICHAUD, JR.

DECLASSIFIED

66 8126

Headquarters
1ST FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, FMF
Camp Pendleton, California 92055

8/BGM/elg
Ser: 09-66
22 Aug 1966

1ST FSR CONTROL NO. <i>4-12</i>
<i>66-882</i>

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 2nd Quarter, FY 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2A
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
(c) CG FMFPac ltr 1/gff Ser 0092965 of 24 Nov 1965
(d) CG FMFPac msg 260127Z Feb 65
(e) My Conf ltr 8/BGM/elg Ser 07-66 of 24 May 1966

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b). References (c) and (d) established the mission for the 1st Force Service Regiment and provided a manning level for its accomplishment.

2. The condition of readiness since submission of the last report in reference (e) remains essentially unchanged.

a. PART I. Evaluation of Command

First Force Service Regiment is severely limited in support that can be provided with less than Reduced Strength T/O personnel and T/E equipment available. Personnel and equipment were deployed to WestPac in 1965 in support of units. FSR is currently operating on an austere manning level with the mission to support only garrison type operations.

b. PART II. Evaluation of Units

The units of 1st Force Service Regiment are limited within the present manning level to the accomplishment of the mission assigned by references (a) and (d).

c. PART III. Evaluation of Operational Commitments

Operational commitments assigned by references (c) and (d) are being fulfilled.

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J. E. Garner
J. E. GARNER

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Encl (11)

COPY NUMBER 10112

3d Force Service Regiment
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
APO, San Francisco, 96302

3/111/401
3500/2
Part 1088-11

6 SEP 1966

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subject: Commander's Casualty Readiness Report; End of FY 1967 (Report Symbol
3500-114)
Ref: (a) 3500-114
(b) 3500-114

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted.

Quarterly Casualty Readiness Report, End Quarter FY 1967

Part I - Evaluation of the Command. A provisional I/C was established for 3d Force Service Regiment on 15 March 1966. The mission, as extracted from the I/C, is to provide sustained logistic support to all FMF combat forces from Okinawa. The logistic posture and readiness of this command is good. Third Force Service Regiment is capable of providing the support necessary to meet the requirements of combat forces in accordance with the stated mission.

Part II - Evaluation of the Units. There are no ineffective units.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Capabilities. This command can logistically support current contingency plans as required.

A. B. 114

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