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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

VIETNAM

OCTOBER 1966



FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of October 1966. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering periods from March 1965 through September 1966.

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SUMMARY

The commitment of almost 10,000 Marines to the Demilitarized Zone area continued for the fourth consecutive month. Aggressive patrol and reconnaissance operations resulted in infrequent and small contact, indicating that the enemy forces which had earlier attempted to move south in mass had elected - at least for the time being - to withdraw north of the DMZ. All told, in October, Marines killed 259 of the enemy in Quang Tri, raising to 2,085 the number confirmed killed since the battle for the DMZ area began in July.

While productive in terms of enemy killed, and in the security brought to far northern RVN, the continued commitment of the large number of Marines to the DMZ region has had reflections elsewhere. Particularly evident was the reduced pace of Marine activities in the coastal lowlands, chiefly in Revolutionary Development and in the related combatant efforts.

In October, there were 10,713 counterguerrilla operations. This was a slight increase over the 10,372 conducted in September, but below the average of 12,258 for the three month period prior to the northward migration of Marine forces. The number of guerrillas killed was 275, compared with 238 in September and an April - June average of 359.

Civic action activity showed a decline. Compared with September, medical treatment decreased 21% (89,332 persons treated versus 113,542); construction projects dropped 91%, from 485 to 45; and soap and food distribution were down 45% and 64%, respectively.

The decline in counterguerrilla operations and civic action activity was mirrored also in the level of

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Revolutionary Development progress. At the end of October, the number of persons living in areas at least 60% pacified remained the same as in September, whereas the average monthly gain from February to September was approximately 45,000.

Modest gains were made in other areas of the RD program. At the end of the month, 82 villages had either undertaken or completed a village census, an increase of 7 over September's total; the number of villages with functioning chiefs and councils was raised to 101, a gain of 3; and village markets under development were up to 92, from 88 in September.

Despite the shift of Marine effort away from the major Revolutionary Development areas, analysis of progress for 1966 to date discloses that III MAF has met or exceeded all of the six Honolulu Conference RD goals except in the areas of railroad rehabilitation and, perhaps, enemy attrition.

Although logistic operations were impeded by the violent arrival of the monsoon, support of Marine forces remained satisfactory throughout the month. The monsoonal effects have been tempered by measures taken during the dry season, such as construction of covered storage and maintenance facilities, rehabilitation and construction of roads and bridges, and prepositioning of supplies in areas likely to be isolated by flooding.

Marine fixed wing aircraft flew 4,987 combat or combat support sorties in October, lower than September's record high of 5,826. This is attributable to the poor flying weather which accompanied the arrival of the monsoon. Of the October total, 78% (3,893) were in support of III MAF; they accounted for 148 enemy KIA, or 20% of the total casualties inflicted by III MAF during the month (777).

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GOALSAnd Progress Toward Achieving Them

The broad goal of the Marines in Vietnam is, in company with the RVNAF, to expel, destroy or neutralize the enemy in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Through this, it is their object to bring about a condition wherein local government can function, farmers can harvest and market their crops, and the people can live with reasonable freedom from terrorism, extortion and oppression. A close companion to this goal is the mission of defending a number of large and valuable military installations.

The key to achieving both of these goals is establishment of firm GVN/US influence throughout the coastal plain of the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.

The total area of I CTZ is 10,440 square miles. The coastal plain covers only 3,340 square miles of this, about 31%. Yet, it is the coastal plain which is the source of all the salt, all of the fish and virtually all of the 470,000 ton annual rice production of the I CTZ. Also, living in the coastal plain are about 2,400,000 of the 2,700,000 people of I CTZ. The remainder of the zone is mountainous, has almost no food production and contains only about 10% of the I CTZ population.


The strategic area of I CTZ is shown graphically on the following page.

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
THE STRATEGIC AREA OF I CTZ: THE COASTAL LOWLANDS



REGION	POPULATION	AREA IN SQ. MILES	NO. OF VILLAGES	REMARKS
NORTHERN STRIP	247,000	527	72	
HUE VICINITY	170,000	77	9	Cky of Hue and outlying region north of Phu Bai Marine area.
PHU BAI MARINE AREA	68,000	162	22	
VINH LOC STRIP	94,000	247	10	Includes mountain region which abuts coast and affects security of LOC.
DANANG MARINE AREA	741,000	999	104	Includes foothill region to west.
TAM KY STRIP	414,000	501	53	
CHU LAI MARINE AREA	278,000	532	57	Includes foothill region to west.
QUANG NGAI VICINITY	124,000	138	18	Cky of Quang Ngai and outlying region.
MO DUC STRIP	301,000	157	27	
TOTAL COASTAL LOWLANDS	2,437,000	3,340	372	
ICTZ HIGHLANDS	300,000	7,100	207	Estimates of population and villages based on best available information.
TOTAL ICTZ	2,737,000	10,440	579	

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The scarcity of food in the highlands causes enemy troops there to be heavily reliant upon the guerrillas in the coastal lowlands, since the guerrilla is the vital link between the people, the food supply and the large organized units. Much of the effort of the Marines in Vietnam is directed toward breaking this link, destroying the guerrilla infrastructure and preventing the rice, information and other essentials from reaching the main force units.

Besides tending to isolate the enemy in the highlands, the counterguerrilla campaign performs another essential function, wherein it helps to break the stranglehold the Viet Cong have held on the Vietnamese peasant.

To the peasant, it is the Viet Cong guerrilla who marks the difference between peace and war, and it is the guerrilla who must be eliminated in order to give permanence to programs aimed at establishing firm GVN/US control of the lowland area.

Thus the coastal plain is not only a strategic terrain compartment that contains the majority of the people. It is also the essential target area for destruction of the guerrilla, and a key to isolation of the main force units in the highlands.

Since establishment of firm GVN/US influence in the coastal plain represents a basic goal, it is necessary to define clearly the meaning of "firm GVN/US influence" in order to discuss progress toward this goal in precise terms.

Firm friendly influence entails successful measures to eliminate the armed enemy, to enable villagers to defend themselves, rebuild their agriculture and economy, and establish functioning local government, comprised of individuals who live in the villages or hamlets they govern and who are responsive to governmental control. The degree in which "firm GVN/US influence" is established can be quantified in terms of the III MAF Revolutionary Development indices which assess these and other key factors on a monthly, village-by-village basis in the Marine areas. The III MAF Revolutionary Development indices are portrayed on the following page.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT INDICES
FOR COMPUTATION OF PROGRESS TOWARD GOALS

1. DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY UNITS	POINTS
a. VC units destroyed or expelled	15
b. Local defensive force established	5
TOTAL	20
2. DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY INFRASTRUCTURE	
a. Village census completed	2
b. VC infrastructure destroyed	8
c. Local intelligence net established	5
d. Census, grievance interviews completed	2
e. Action completed on grievances	3
TOTAL	20
3. VIETNAMESE ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY	
a. Defensive plan completed	2
b. Defensive installations completed	3
c. Security forces trained and in place	12
d. Communications net established	3
TOTAL	20
4. ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT	
a. Village chief and council in office	4
b. Village chief residing in village	3
c. Hamlet chiefs and councils in office	4
d. Hamlet chiefs residing in hamlet	4
e. Psy-ops and information program established	3
f. Minimum social and administrative organization	2
TOTAL	20
5. DEGREE OF NEW LIFE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT	
a. Adequate public health program	4
b. Adequate education facilities	4
c. Adequate agricultural development	4
d. Adequate transportation facilities	4
e. Necessary markets established	4
TOTAL	20

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The III MAF technique for assessing Revolutionary Development brings with it an important counter-balance between its major elements. For example, great gains cannot be made in "Establishment of Local Government" unless substantial gains have already been made in "Destruction of Enemy Units." Or a high mark in "Establishment of New Life Program Development" will be possible only if accompanied by gains in security and establishment of local government. Achievement of 60 out of the 100 total points on the comprehensive RD scale thus represents a substantial level of GVN/US influence and control, and the 60% pacification level is considered to describe a condition where "firm GVN/US influence" has been established. The charts on the following page show progress in the Marine areas toward attaining the 60% level, expressed in terms of area, villages and population.

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
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GROWTH OF FIRM GVN/US INFLUENCE* IN COASTAL REGION OF I CTZ

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
BY AREA

Goal: 3,340 square miles




BY POPULATION

Goal: 2,400,000 people



BY VILLAGES

Goal: 372 villages



* 60% OR HIGHER ON THE III MAF 100 POINT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SCALE

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The Marine objective of establishing firm GVN/US control in the coastal lowlands responds to the six goals for end-1966 set at the Honolulu Conference in February.

In brief terms, the six Honolulu goals for end-1966 are:


1. Attrit, by year's end, VC/NVA forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field.
2. Increase the percentage of VC/NVA base areas denied the VC from 10-20% to 40-50%.
3. Increase the critical roads and railroads open for use from 30% to 50%.
4. Increase the population in secure areas from 50% to 60%.
5. Pacify the four selected high priority areas, increasing the pacified population in those areas by 235,000.
6. Ensure the defense of all military bases, political and population centers, and food producing areas now under government control.

Attainment of the first of these goals - to attrit VC/NVA as fast as they can put men in the field in South Vietnam - depends upon several factors: the North Vietnamese ability to conscript, the extent to which the North Vietnamese elect and are able to move troops southward, the effectiveness of the U.S. out-of-country interdiction program and, finally, the number of enemy troops we are able to kill, capture or cause to defect.

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The first three of these factors are not directly affected by our operations in I CTZ. The last, however, is a function of our tactical achievements there.

The first chart on the following page shows the number of enemy troops killed in I CTZ by both GVN and USMC forces, since January 1966. The second chart displays the estimated enemy strength in I CTZ by month since January 1966, based upon CG III MAF calculations. A leveling may be detected beginning in April.

The sharp rise in enemy strength in August and September relates to the entry of the 324th B Division, when it made its bid to establish a base area inside Quang Tri province. The estimate of the number of NVA troops in Quang Tri reached a peak of 10,000 at one point in September. If that unit actually remains in Quang Tri, then it is plain that the goal of attritting the enemy to a degree which equals his replacement effort has not been attained.

However, during the same period, more than 2,500 enemy troops are known to have been killed by U.S. and GVN forces in that area. Now, as captured documents are processed and prisoner interrogations assessed, the official intelligence estimate of enemy troop strength has begun to decrease, as shown on the second chart. This chart is still probably behind the actual situation since, in October, the more than 14,000 U.S. and Vietnamese troops operating in Quang Tri were finding little evidence of the presence of large enemy units, despite aggressive efforts to do so. Therefore, it seems likely that the 324th B Division has, at least for the time being, withdrawn into, or across the DMZ.

If the 324th B Division is, in fact, now largely withdrawn north of the DMZ, the graphic portrayal exhibits a level strength picture. Under this circumstance it follows that the enemy's deployments and infiltration into I CTZ have, at least temporarily, been matched by the number of his troops killed.


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
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CONFIRMED ENEMY KILLED IN I CTZ 1 JAN - 31 OCT 1966



ESTIMATED ENEMY TROOP STRENGTH IN I CTZ



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The second goal set at the Honolulu Conference related to increasing the percentage of VC/NVA base areas denied the enemy, from 10-20% to 40-50%.

COMUSMACV has recently produced a study which delineates 86 "base areas", and a new system for evaluating progress in this effort is being developed. In general, an enemy "base area" is a region which serves for training and logistic support of enemy forces, as well as for rest and rehabilitation. The region in western Quang Ngai known as the "Do Xa" is regarded as the largest enemy base area in I CTZ, and is selected by the Marines as a target for the second Honolulu goal.


Steps taken to deny use of the "Do Xa" to the enemy have been substantial. There are two principal approaches to the area from the coastal plain. These are the Tra Bong and the Tra Khuc river valleys. Through October 1966, 15 large unit operations have been held in that region, between the sea and the foothills leading into the Do Xa. In those operations, Marines killed 1,792 enemy troops and nearby ARVN units accounted for an additional 268. A few miles farther north, in the hills between the Do Xa and the coastal plain, Marines have conducted in 1966 another 12 large unit operations, killing 380 more of the enemy. And, in mid-summer an entire Marine Reconnaissance Battalion conducted a detailed search of the Do Xa region. Marines swept the area thoroughly for 8 days beginning on 6 July with only minor results (15 enemy killed and 4 captured).

Although it is not possible to extract a precise mathematical assessment of the degree to which the Do Xa has been denied the enemy, it is a fair conclusion that the loss of over 2,400 troops killed on the approaches to the Do Xa has had an unfavorable effect on his use of that area, and that the Marines have advanced substantially toward the

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second Honolulu goal.

The third Honolulu goal for end-1966 is to increase the critical roads and railroads open for use from 30% to 50%.

When the Marines landed in I CTZ in the spring of 1965, the entire coastal railway was either closed or only marginally open. At end-October 1966, the same general condition prevailed. In fact, the number of miles considered marginally open had decreased from 42% to 24%. Where the railroad is concerned, then, the goal has not been attained. This is shown on the top chart on the next page.


In the case of major roads, the story is quite different. Only 39% of the mileage of routes 1, 14 and 9 were open in the second quarter of 1965. By October 1966 63% of the road mileage was open. This is well over the Honolulu goal of 50%. Progress in this area is shown on the bottom chart on the next page.

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
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STATUS OF COASTAL RAILROAD IN I CTZ DMZ TO SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI: 236 MILES

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STATUS OF MAJOR ROADS IN I CTZ ROUTES 1, 14 AND 9; TOTAL 373 MILES



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The fourth goal stemming from the Honolulu Conference refers to increasing the population in secure areas from 50 percent to 60 percent. There is no sharply drawn definition of "Secure Area" in the present system of assessing Revolutionary Development progress. As a reasonable basis for evaluation, "Secure" is taken to represent areas where the Viet Cong local and main forces have largely been destroyed or eliminated, where the area is actively being consolidated, where security forces are present, where village councils have been elected, and where the village administrative structure is substantially complete.

The III MAF technique for assessing Revolutionary Development has already been described in some detail on page 9. There, it was pointed out that achievement of 60 out of 100 total points on the Revolutionary Development scale represents a substantial level of GVN/US influence and security from the Viet Cong. This is basically the condition that the term "Secure" aims to describe. Therefore, "Secure", as related to the six Honolulu goals is interpreted here as being roughly equivalent to 60% on the III MAF Revolutionary Development scale.

Using this interpretation, it may be seen from the chart on page 10 that the growth of population in secure areas has more than doubled since February, having grown from 217,522 people to the present 562,817, exceeding the 10% increase stipulated in the end-1966 Honolulu Conference goal.

The fifth Honolulu goal addresses the four selected national high priority areas, and aims at increasing the "pacified" population in those areas by 235,000 throughout the nation. The area in I CTZ designated as a National Priority Area is comprised of five villages ten miles south-southwest of the city of Danang. Those villages (Hoa Da, Hoa Chau, Hoa Phuoc, Hoa Thai and Hoa Loi) have a total

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
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population of 23,971. This, then, represents the share of the fifth Honolulu goal to lie within the Marines' present sphere of responsibility.

"Pacified", like "secure" discussed earlier, is an imprecise term. However, taking the 60% level on the 100 point scale as descriptive of "pacified", an assessment of pacification levels in the I CTZ National Priority Area can be made.

In the month the Honolulu goals were set, the five villages in that area stood at 40% or less on the scale, which is to say that none of them were in the "pacified" category. By end-October, the total population of the five had been brought up at least to the 60% level, with a good share having attained 80%, which is to say within the definition of "pacified". Rates of advance in that area are shown on the chart below.

RD GROWTH* IN I CTZ NATIONAL PRIORITY AREA



MONTHLY POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

UNDER	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
20%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
40%	9,714	9,714	9,714	10,810	5,619	—	—	—	—
60%	14,257	3,795	3,795	4,095	4,095	4,095	—	—	—
80%	—	10,462	10,462	9,057	10,462	16,081	20,176	20,176	20,176
80%	—	—	—	—	3,795	3,795	3,795	3,795	3,795

* Measured against III MAF 100 point scale.

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The sixth Honolulu goal deals with ensuring the defense of all military bases, political and population centers, and food producing areas now under government control.

Apart from those characterized as harassment, there have been no successful attacks on either military bases or population centers in the Marine areas. Population centers outside the Marine areas, while threatened, were not successfully attacked. Documents captured from the NVA during Operation Hastings suggested that an attack on Quang Tri town was intended, but it never materialized.

A commentary on the security in I CTZ was the national election which was held on 11 September. On that date, 87% of the eligible voters in I CTZ went to the polls in spite of terrorist and guerrilla threats.

In connection with protection of food producing areas as prescribed in the sixth Honolulu goal, the Marines have registered progress in the series of Golden Fleece operations aimed at denying the rice harvest to the enemy, and keeping it in the hands of its rightful owners. In September, for example, a harvest of over 8,000 tons of rice was protected, and the Viet Cong take of about 90% in previous years was reduced to about 30%. This 30% was taken by the Viet Cong from fields Marines were unable to guard, simply by the limitations on the numbers available for Revolutionary Development operations.

Overall, it is concluded that achievement of the sixth Honolulu goal in the Marine areas is proceeding at the scheduled rate.

In summary, with the exception of railroad mileages, and possibly the attrition of enemy forces, the Marine areas show improvement which meets or exceeds the level established in the goals of the Honolulu conference.


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There were ten Marine large unit operations during October, extending into all five provinces of I CTZ. These accounted for 502 enemy confirmed killed. The locations of these operations are shown on the map below.

MARINE LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS-OCTOBER 1966

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Operation Prairie, the largest sustained Marine operation to date, continued through its third month. Six infantry battalions were engaged in intensive patrolling, seeking to uncover enemy forces or resources in the area immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone. In contrast to preceding periods, October was characterized by brief and small scale contacts and, at month's end, it appeared that the Marine effort had caused the enemy largely to withdraw from northern Quang Tri Province.

During the month 259 of the enemy were killed, raising to 1,202 the cumulative toll for Prairie. These losses, combined with the 883 enemy killed when Operations Hastings and Deckhouse thwarted the southward advance of the 324B NVA Division, brings to 2,085 the number of enemy confirmed killed by Marines thus far in this contested area.

The largest single encounter in Operation Prairie during October occurred in the first seven days of the month, when the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines attacked and seized the critical Nui Cay Tri ridge complex, ten miles west of Cam Lo. This ridge, which commands the surrounding terrain in all directions, borders on a major enemy infiltration route from the west, the Song Cam valley. Its importance was evidenced by determined, but unsuccessful, attempts by NVA forces to repulse the Marine attackers. In addition to killing 102 NVA, the Marines found and destroyed extensive enemy fortifications and a recently evacuated enemy command post containing 24 huts and numerous bunkers.

Other engagements, all of them small and scattered, accounted for 137 additional NVA killed - the bulk (85) by 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines north of Cam Lo. The map on the following page portrays the principal activity in Prairie during the month.


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OPERATION PRAIRIE-OCTOBER



Air support played an important part in Prairie, despite the arrival of the monsoon. Although rain at Dong Ha exceeded 20 inches, and adverse flying conditions prevailed during much of the month, the number of fixed wing combat sorties flown in support of the operation increased for the second consecutive month (1,487 versus 1,272 in September). 971 of these were controlled by the Air Support Radar Team positioned at Dong Ha (see Air Operations section).

Anticipating a possible reduction in the overall close air support capability normally associated with the rainy season, ground fire support was reinforced during the month by the arrival of three U.S. Army artillery units in the Prairie area. On 2 October, C Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, with four self-propelled 175mm guns, moved to Quang Tri from the III Corps Tactical Zone. On 23 - 25 October, 2nd Battalion, 94th Field Artillery (8 self-propelled 175mm guns) and 1st Battalion, 40th Field Artillery (eighteen 105mm self-propelled howitzers) arrived from the United States.

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
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In addition to Marine and U. S. Army artillery units situated within the Prairie area, long range naval gunfire support was provided, for varying periods throughout the month, by the heavy cruiser USS SAINT PAUL, the guided missile cruiser USS OKLAHOMA CITY and the destroyers USS HULL and USS MULLINIX. Besides these four ships, eleven other fire support ships operated off the coast of I CTZ at various times during October.

All told, the fire support array in the area is formidable, and represents a major deterrent to enemy activity throughout the DMZ region. Artillery and naval gunfire coverage near the DMZ is shown on the map below.

FIRE SUPPORT COVERAGE NEAR DMZ



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
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The overall distribution of artillery and naval gun-fire power in I CTZ is shown below.

FIRE SUPPORT COVERAGE - I CTZ



The prolonged commitment of substantial Marine forces to the Prairie area has necessitated a realignment of operational command within III MAF. On 1 October, Task Force Delta, a headquarters headed by the Assistant Divi-

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sion Commander, 3rd Marine Division, assumed control of Operation Prairie, relieving the Commanding Officer, 4th Marines. Then, on 10 October, Task Force Delta was deactivated when the CG, 3rd Marine Division assumed control of all forces committed to the provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. A division forward command post was established at Dong Ha, while the main command post was located at Phu Bai.

On the 30th, forces committed to Operation Prairie were increased to seven infantry battalions, when BLT 3/3 landed at Dong Ha from the Contingency Afloat Amphibious Ready Group, positioned offshore since 6 October. At the same time, HMM-163, the air component of the Contingency Afloat Amphibious Ready Group, joined Marine aviation units at Phu Bai.

This contingency group, in effect a second Special Landing Force, was constituted and deployed from Okinawa to meet COMUSMACV's request late in September for positioning of an amphibious landing force off northern I CTZ during the time the regular SLF was participating in a training operation in the Philippines.

The regular SLF (BLT 3/26 and HMM-362), after a period of amphibious and riverine training in the Philippines, relieved the contingency group on the 30th and, at month's end, was stationed off northern I CTZ.

While Marines were conducting Operation Prairie, five ARVN battalions commenced Operation Lam Son 318 on 3 October in an area just east of Prairie and south of the DMZ. After three days of infrequent contacts, the ARVN force became heavily engaged on 6 October with an estimated three enemy battalions, only 400 meters south of the DMZ. ARVN reinforcements were quickly moved into the area, and by 8 October, the equivalent of ten ARVN battalions had been

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committed. However, heavy fighting quickly subsided, and the remainder of the month was characterized by sporadic contacts only. By month's end, 161 enemy had been confirmed killed and 5 captured by the ARVN forces.

Meanwhile, in Quang Nam province to the south, Operation Macon continued in support of the Revolutionary Development program along the Thu Bon River southwest of Danang. In the early days of the month, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines killed 62 Viet Cong, but, by end-October, it became apparent that the bulk of the enemy had been driven from the Macon area. Consequently, the operation was terminated on 28 October. Total confirmed enemy casualties for this four month old operation were 507 killed and 7 captured.

South of the Macon region ARVN units encountered increasingly frequent contact with sizeable enemy forces, possibly those withdrawing from contact with the Marines in the Macon area. A battalion of Marines quickly joined the ARVN action, and in Operation Kern (21-25 October) killed 75 of the enemy.

Early in the month, Marines in the Danang area were informed, through local intelligence channels, that elements of the R . 20 Viet Cong Battalion were infiltrating into the area along the coast six miles southeast of Danang. According to the intelligence source, the enemy had the two-fold mission of attacking the headquarters of the 51st ARVN Regiment and the Marine air facility located north of Marble Mountain.

Consequently, early on the morning of 12 October, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines launched a search and destroy operation, called Teton, in the suspect area. While initial searches produced limited results, elements of the Marine battalion not committed to the operation reported contact

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
near the hamlet of Tra Khe (2), two miles to the northwest.

During daylight on the 15th, Teton units undertook to deceive the enemy by withdrawing from the original area as if to terminate the operation. The unit then changed direction and quickly threw a cordon around Tra Khe (2), preventing enemy in the area from escaping.

During the next five days, the VC made four desperate attempts to break out of the encirclement but in each case were forced to fall back to the cave and tunnel complexes within the hamlet. Marines finally swept the area, routing the remaining enemy from the underground hiding places and then sealing the caves with explosives or by use of bulldozers. Patrols also discovered and destroyed a total of 86 mines in a minefield adjacent to the hamlet. In all, 37 enemy were confirmed killed, 9 captured and 26 suspects apprehended.

Highlights of the operation are portrayed below.

OPERATION TETON (12-20 OCT)



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
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~~SECRET~~COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

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The pace of counter guerrilla activity remained high in October; however, it was evident that the northward polarization of III MAF power had decelerated the overall counter guerrilla campaign. During the month, there were 10,713 small unit operations, which compares with an average of 12,258 for the three month period of April through June, prior to the beginning of the northward movement of Marine forces.

In October, six of the eighteen Marine battalions in Vietnam were in the DMZ area and removed from the counter guerrilla campaign in the central pacification regions, where the units remaining were obliged to extend their own operations to fill the gaps. With one exception (the 4th Battalion, 503d Regiment, 173d Airborne Brigade of the US Army), these six battalions were not replaced by comparable units. The variations in level of counter guerrilla activity are shown on the chart below.

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS* PER WEEKUNCLASSIFIED
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The number of guerrillas killed also declined. During the month, 275 guerrillas were killed, 23% below the average of 359 for the three month period of April through June. And expansion of the tactical areas, opening the way for Revolutionary Development programs in new parts of the countryside, has decelerated correspondingly.

Figures which have now become available on Viet Cong activity in the Marine areas during the third quarter of 1966 make it possible to assess this activity against earlier periods. In general, enemy guerrilla activity continued to be an extension of the past two quarters, with the number of acts of minor harassment continuing high, while the more violent activity remained at a low level.

Although the number of attacks during the July-September period increased slightly over the past quarter (from 7 to 10), the number was still low for an area covering almost 1,700 square miles and containing over a million people.

Murders and kidnappings were down slightly from the preceding quarter, while the number of civil officials terrorized rose from 2 to 4.

The number of acts of sabotage against lines of communication remained the same as the preceding quarter, but substantially below the corresponding period a year ago. Additional information on the status of lines of communication in the Marine areas and throughout I CTZ is shown on pages 15 and 16.

Acts of minor harassment, which is to say the basic fabric of low-level insurgency, increased to 1,894.

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In sum, the overall pattern showed a substantial improvement over the situation of a year and a half ago when, in the same area, there were only 159 acts of minor harassment, but where 12 civil officials were kidnapped or murdered (4 during the last quarter) and 37 other citizens were kidnapped or murdered (10 during the last quarter).

The graphs on the following page display quarterly Viet Cong activity since 1 July 1964 in the regions which now comprise the Marine areas.

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
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
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VIET CONG ACTIVITY IN MARINE AREAS


ARMED ATTACKS




CIVIL OFFICIALS ASSASSINATED OR KIDNAPPED




MURDERS




KIDNAPPINGS



ROAD AND RAILROAD SABOTAGE



MINOR HARRASSMENT



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
In October, there were 7,428 patrols, 3,159 ambushes and 126 company-size search operations conducted in all three tactical areas; in addition to the 275 guerrilla KIA's previously mentioned, 59 of the enemy were captured. The activity within each tactical area is portrayed on the maps which follow. Battalions are shown in the area where they were located on 31 October.

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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA



In the Danang area, there were 3,737 patrols and 1,454 ambushes, approximately the same level of activity as in September. As in previous months, the majority of contacts occurred in an area about twelve miles south of the Danang airfield. For the entire month, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines was committed to Operation Prairie (Khe Sanh), and 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines was engaged in Operation Macon. 1st Battalion, 9th Marines departed on 3 October for Okinawa.


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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHU LAI TACTICAL AREA

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
Chu Lai forces conducted 3,751 patrols and ambushes in October, compared with 3,711 in September. The majority of contacts occurred in the southeast and northwest portions of the tactical area. At month's end, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines were away from the tactical area, engaged in Operation Prairie.

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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PHU BAI TACTICAL AREA



At Phu Bai, there were 1,153 patrols and 492 ambushes, the majority by 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines. The other two battalions of the 4th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, which regularly operate from the Phu Bai area, were engaged in Operation Prairie at the end of the month.

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In addition to this activity in and about the tactical areas, Sting Ray operations continued to inflict substantial casualties on the enemy, at relatively low cost. It will be recalled that the name "Sting Ray" is applied to small reconnaissance patrols or observation posts, established deep in the hinterland and assigned the mission of disrupting enemy movement through the countryside by bringing attack aircraft or artillery to bear on any enemy observed. In October, 109 Sting Ray patrols called in 37 artillery and 13 air support missions, which resulted in 45 enemy killed. In the six months of Sting Ray operations, 564 of the enemy have been killed by this technique at a cost of 4 Marine dead.

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
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During the month, continued progress in the Revolutionary Development program was visible, although there was an apparent diminution of the rate of progress, probably caused by the continued commitment of substantial forces to northern Quang Tri province.

In October, the number of persons living in villages classified as 60% or higher (on the III MAF pacification scale) remained at the same level as in September. However, some 6,500 villagers moved upward to the 40% category, and a like number progressed from the 60% to 80% category.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT GROWTH IN III MAF TACTICAL AREAS

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Civic action activity showed a decline. Compared with September, medical treatment decreased 21% (89,332 persons treated versus 113,542); construction projects dropped 91%, from 485 to 45; and soap and food distribution were down 45% and 64%, respectively.

Gains continued to be made in those key indices of improved village security and government control. At month's end, chiefs and councils were functioning in five additional villages, and a census was completed in three more; three others activated village communications systems, and two more village chiefs felt secure enough to sleep in their home villages. These and other indices are shown graphically on the next page, followed by maps depicting overall Revolutionary Development progress in the Marine areas.

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

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






FEBRUARY-OCTOBER REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN MARINE TACTICAL AREAS

 COMPLETE
 PARTIALLY COMPLETE

VILLAGE CENSUS

VILLAGE GVN
INTELLIGENCE NETS

VILLAGE DEFENSE PLANS

DEFENSE FORCE TRAINED
AND IN PLACEVILLAGE CHIEFS AND
COUNCILS FUNCTIONINGCOMMUNICATION NETS
ESTABLISHEDVILLAGE CHIEFS LIVING
IN VILLAGESPSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PUBLIC INFORMATIONVILLAGE MARKETS
ESTABLISHED


Note: There are 579 villages in I CTZ, 372 in the I CTZ coastal lowlands and 183 in the Marine tactical areas.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS-DANANG AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	OCT	CHANGE FEB-OCT	FEB	OCT	CHANGE FEB-OCT	FEB	OCT	CHANGE FEB-OCT
Under 20%	457	644	+187	94,491	138,960	+44,469	53	33	-20
20%	57	56	-1	36,258	86,425	+50,167	9	19	+10
40%	18	102	+84	16,100	80,679	+74,579	4	17	+13
60%	26	91	+65	19,036	79,321	+60,285	5	16	+11
80%	31	106	+75	175,000	345,640	+170,640	1	19	+18
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	589	999		340,885	741,025		72	104	

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
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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS-CHU LAI AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	OCT	CHANGE FEB-OCT	FEB	OCT	CHANGE FEB-OCT	FEB	OCT	CHANGE FEB-OCT
Under 20%	244	207	-37	91,145	100,272	+9,127	21	25	+4
20%	30	68	+38	21,624	32,168	+10,544	5	6	+1
40%	-	89	+89	-	46,365	+46,365	-	8	+8
60%	-	87	+87	-	36,316	+36,316	-	7	+7
80%	-	81	+81	-	62,457	+62,457	-	11	+11
100%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	274	532		112,769	277,578		26	57	

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
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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS-PHU BAI AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	OCT	CHANGE FEB-OCT	FEB	OCT	CHANGE FEB-OCT	FEB	OCT	CHANGE FEB-OCT
Under 20%	22	40	+18	17,740	10,381	-7,359	4	11	+7
20%	26	41	+15	11,852	9,524	-2,328	2	2	-
40%	-	17	+17	-	9,049	+9,049	-	1	+1
60%	38	8	-30	23,486	5,296	-18,190	5	1	-4
80%	-	56	+56	-	33,787	+33,787	-	7	+7
100%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	85	162		53,078	68,037		11	22	

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Although the Marines in northern Quang Tri have been concerned mainly with offensive operations against the enemy, they nevertheless have undertaken basic Revolutionary Development tasks in the eight villages around the forward logistic base at Dong Ha.

Emphasis, thus far, has been placed on providing an improved level of security to the villagers, along with medical assistance, food and clothing. At the same time, a number of construction projects have been initiated, the most noteworthy being the Cam Lo bridge which was rebuilt for the first time since it was originally destroyed by the VC in January 1965. Until this bridge was repaired, the only means of crossing the river was by ferry, a difficult undertaking during the monsoon season. At the opening of the bridge, the villagers showed their feeling for the Marines by voluntarily clearing fields of fire around the bridge so it could be defended more easily.

The map on the following page illustrates the Revolutionary Development status of the eight villages around Dong Ha, assessed by the same criteria applied to other Marine areas. Although Marines have contributed substantially to the security of these villages, the relatively high pacification status of the villages reflects, in the main, long-term GVN efforts in the Dong Ha region.


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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY - DONG HA REGION



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES	CIVILIAN POPULATION	VILLAGES
	OCTOBER	OCTOBER	OCTOBER
60%	102	18,014	6
80%	10	10,799	2
TOTAL	112	28,813	8

NOTE: Advanced RD status is largely a result of long term GVN efforts in this region. However Marines have participated actively since July.

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The number of County Fair operations conducted during October declined to five. Although individually effective in strengthening GVN control in areas previously cleared of major Viet Cong activity, this number is considerably lower than the 14 held in September or the 13 in August, and far short of the level desired.

Noteworthy in the County Fair operations conducted during October was the improved use of psychological operations. Vietnamese government officials, supported by JUSPAO personnel and by ARVN and US Army psychological operations teams, presented pro-government, anti-Viet Cong speeches, lectures and demonstrations. In addition, Vietnamese entertainers provided by the Vietnamese USO performed pro-government dramas and folk and national music. By the final days of several of the County Fairs, the villagers' initial apathy had turned to interest and genuine cooperation.

During the five County Fairs in October, some 3,700 civilians were screened, raising to almost 35,000 the total number processed since these operations commenced early in 1966. Over 2,100 villagers received medical treatment, and 6,600 pounds of food were distributed during the month. At the same time, 34 Viet Cong were killed and 55 were captured (38 in one operation) - bringing to 175 and 261, respectively, the total number of enemy killed or captured during County Fairs. Included among the VC captives were a local guerrilla chief, a finance official and part of a local VC security cadre.

Gains were made in the Combined Action Company program during October as two more Combined Action Platoons were activated in the III MAF area. Apart from the growth in strength is the growth in quality of the Combined Action units.

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The integration of the Marines and Popular Forces is becoming progressively more complete. The Marines live, sleep and eat with their Popular Forces counterparts and the status of the Marine squad leader as advisor to the PF platoon leader is accepted and effective. Members of the platoon - of both races - learn the other's language and customs, and the Marines provide sorely-needed on-the-job training in basic military skills for the PF members, most of whom have had no earlier training of consequence. All of this relates directly to the long-term US goal of helping to form a professional local security force throughout the countryside, not only to free Marines for offensive operations elsewhere, but to maintain security, perhaps as a form of constabulary, after our forces have left Vietnam.

A measure of the effectiveness of the Combined Action Company program is the record of platoon activities for the month of October. Platoons averaged two patrols a day sweeping their local areas for Viet Cong guerrillas. The platoons made contact with the enemy on 40 occasions, killing or wounding 23 guerrillas, capturing 6 and apprehending 20 Viet Cong suspects.


From a modest beginning at Hue Phu Bai when two Combined Action Platoons were formed in December 1965, the program has now expanded to a strength of 50 platoons and 6 company headquarters in the three tactical areas on 31 October. The growth of these units to an end-1966 goal of 74 platoons has been limited by the lack of sufficient Popular Force personnel. Past growth and the end-1966 goal are shown on the following page.

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GROWTH OF COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS-1966



Combined Action Companies and Platoons are distributed in key regions throughout the Marine areas, such as near lines of communication, critical hamlets, and sites of likely VC activity. Their locations are shown on the following maps, which also contain the location of other Popular Force and Regional Force units in the Marine areas.


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COMBINED ACTION UNITS AND REGIONAL/POPULAR FORCES - DANANG AREA



★ = COMBINED ACTION COMPANY
● = COMBINED ACTION PLATOON

★ = POPULAR FORCES/REGIONAL FORCES COMPANY
● = POPULAR FORCES/REGIONAL FORCES PLATOON
▲ = POPULAR FORCES/REGIONAL FORCES SQUAD

COMBINED ACTION UNITS				POPULAR/REGIONAL FORCES		
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH		UNIT	NUMBER	*STRENGTH
		USMC	VIETNAMESE			
COMPANY HQ	5	17	—	COMPANIES	18	1080
PLATOONS	29	270	623	PLATOONS	39	975
SEPARATE SQUADS	—	—	—	SEPARATE SQUADS	29	290
TOTAL STRENGTHS		287	623	TOTAL STRENGTHS		2345

* PF/RF STRENGTH BASED ON BEST III MAF ESTIMATE


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COMBINED ACTION UNITS AND REGIONAL/POPULAR FORCES - CHU LAI AREA



★ = COMBINED ACTION COMPANY
● = COMBINED ACTION PLATOON

★ = POPULAR FORCES/REGIONAL FORCES COMPANY
● = POPULAR FORCES/REGIONAL FORCES PLATOON
▲ = POPULAR FORCES/REGIONAL FORCES SQUAD

COMBINED ACTION UNITS				POPULAR/REGIONAL FORCES		
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH		UNIT	NUMBER	*STRENGTH
		USMC	VIETNAMESE			
COMPANY HQ	2	6	—	COMPANIES	2	120
PLATOONS	11	91	332	PLATOONS	13	325
SEPARATE SQUADS	—	—	—	SEPARATE SQUADS	5	50
TOTAL STRENGTHS		97	332	TOTAL STRENGTHS		495


*PF/RF STRENGTH BASED ON BEST III MAF ESTIMATE

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COMBINED ACTION UNITS AND REGIONAL/POPULAR FORCES - PHU BAI AREA



★ = COMBINED ACTION COMPANY
● = COMBINED ACTION PLATOON

● = POPULAR FORCES/REGIONAL FORCES PLATOON

COMBINED ACTION UNITS				POPULAR/REGIONAL FORCES		
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH		UNIT	NUMBER	*STRENGTH
		USMC	VIETNAMESE			
COMPANY HQ	1	4	—	COMPANIES	—	—
PLATOONS	10	112	194	PLATOONS	17	425
SEPARATE SQUADS	—	—	—	SEPARATE SQUADS	—	—
TOTAL STRENGTHS		116	194	TOTAL STRENGTHS		425

*PF/RF STRENGTH BASED ON BEST III MAF ESTIMATE

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BASE DEFENSE

There were no attempts by the VC to attack the hard Marine bases during October, although numerous reports continued to be received of impending enemy attacks. As in previous months, III MAF's defense of the five major installations was comprised of a balanced combination of close-in internal security, intermediate ranging small unit counter guerrilla actions, and the far reaching large offensive operations aimed at destroying major enemy formations in the hinterland.

At Phu Bai, security of the airfield and other critical installations was provided primarily by one infantry battalion. At Danang, the 1st Military Police Battalion remained as the Air Base Defense Battalion, conducting nearly 50 patrols or ambushes each day in the area surrounding the Danang and Marble Mountain air bases.

Fifty-three miles to the south, close-in protection of the Chu Lai and Ky Ha fields continued to be the responsibility of the Chu Lai Base Defense Command. This task-organized unit, composed of one platoon of a Combined Action Company, two Marine tank platoons, and three Marine rifle companies assigned on a rotational basis from units within the tactical area, operates under the control of a small permanent headquarters of six officers and fourteen men. This command is responsible for the coastal area east of Highway 1 containing the airfield installations.

The disposition of the 467 Marine, 116 US Air Force, 54 US Army, 47 Vietnamese Air Force,

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* Does not include 67 Marine aircraft undergoing repair or maintenance out-of-country.

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AIR OPERATIONS

Flight operations during the month were down slightly from September's high of 5,826 fixed wing jet sorties. Heavy rains and low ceilings curtailed air activity in many parts of I CTZ, North Vietnam and Laos, causing cancellation of 1,326 fixed wing sorties. During October, Marine jet aircraft flew 4,987 combat or combat support sorties, over 78% (3,893 sorties) supporting III MAF operations in I Corps. Of the remaining sorties, 685 were flown over North Vietnam, 64 over Laos, and 345 in support of ARVN, ROKMC and US Army units. While fixed wing sorties for the month were down, total ordnance expended equalled that of September, with over 5,000 tons of bombs and napalm dropped on enemy targets.

Despite the fact that in many cases poor weather conditions prevented bomb damage assessment, 148 enemy were confirmed killed by Marine air attacks, representing nearly 20% of all enemy casualties inflicted by Marines during the month. In addition, 541 enemy structures and 39 sampans were destroyed. No fixed wing aircraft were lost to enemy fire.

As in September, Operation Prairie received a significant portion of 1st MAF's fixed wing combat effort. Marine Phantoms, Skyhawks and Crusaders flew a total of 1,487 sorties and expended over 2,100 tons of ordnance in the Prairie area, accounting for roughly 35% of all Marine fixed wing sorties flown in-country during October.

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
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The graph below depicts 1st MAW's fixed wing sortie allocation since March.

FIXED WING SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF III MAF AND UNITS OTHER THAN III MAF



Marine helicopters flew a total of 32,867 sorties during October, also a slight decrease from September's mark. As in previous months, helicopters accomplished a variety of tasks, with roughly one half of all sorties committed to troop and cargo carrying operations, lifting nearly 41,000 troops and 3,445 tons of cargo. In addition, 3,416 casualty evacuation sorties, 1,324 reconnaissance and 317 search and rescue sorties were flown. Armed UH-1E helicopters flew 3,434 fire support missions, delivering 720 rockets and over 224,000 machine gun rounds on enemy targets.

Three helicopters were lost during the month, compared to five in September, while 91 were damaged.

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
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

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The graph below exhibits the number of helicopter sorties and passengers lifted since November 1965.

HELICOPTER SORTIES AND PASSENGERS LIFTED



Measured rainfall within the Marine tactical areas, and the associated effect on fixed wing combat sorties are shown on the following charts.



While the number of fixed wing sorties cancelled due to adverse local, enroute, or target weather during October was high, many more aircraft would undoubtedly

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have been forced to abandon their missions had it not been for the Air Support Radar Teams at Danang, Chu Lai and Dong Ha. During the month, these teams conducted 1,692 radar-controlled combat sorties, 46% of the 3,652 combat sorties flown during the month.

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LOGISTICS

Logistic support of Marine forces remained satisfactory throughout the month, although operations were noticeably affected by the northeast monsoon. Over 36 inches of rain fell at Danang and Chu Lai, 20 inches at Dong Ha, and about 15 inches at Phu Bai, slowing construction and washing out roads and bridges. Heavy seas accompanying the monsoon intermittently interrupted resupply shipping to Hue and Dong Ha. At Danang, although lighterage operations were curtailed in the port, the recently completed Observation Point piers remained in operation and ship unloading continued without interruption throughout the month.

While the worst of the weather still lies ahead, it is apparent that measures taken during the dry season, such as construction of covered storage and maintenance facilities; the rehabilitation of old roads and bridges and the construction of new ones; and the prepositioning of supplies and equipment have reduced considerably the effects of the monsoon as compared with last year.

Supply:

Class I - - The stockage objective for rations was reduced from 52 days of supply to 38 days of supply during October. This decrease was made in order to make optimum use of covered storage facilities during the monsoon.

Class II - - A direct delivery system was initiated as a means of improving the supply posture of RVN-based units by reducing the lead time and work load. Under this program, 124 line items are requisitioned for direct delivery from CONUS to Force Logistic Command agencies.

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There are 500 XM16E1 lightweight rifles in III MAF at present and 480,000 rounds of 5.56 ammunition have been transferred from U.S. Army sources for familiarization firing. The weapons will be issued to the bulk of III MAF ground forces during the period December 1966 through March 1967.

Class III/IIIA - - The POL storage facility at Cua Viet on the coast east of Dong Ha was inundated during the month and partially evacuated. Fuel supply at this site was maintained through the use of off-shore sources. No other problems were encountered in providing Class III/IIIA support for tactical operations.

Construction of the Danang northwest tank farm has been completed. This brings the number of 10,000-barrel bolted steel tanks now available for POL storage at Danang to fifteen.

Class IV - - Stock levels remain sufficient to satisfy the daily demands of tactical operations.

Class V/VA - - Ground stocks were maintained at approximately the established stockage objective of 45 days of ammunition. Sufficient Class VA is now on hand in III MAF, in the pipeline, callout from production, and programmed from new production to satisfy Class VA requirements for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing through CY-67.

Research and Development:

A total of twenty-five R&D projects have been completed recently, 21 are currently under test and 22 projects are scheduled and awaiting arrival of the test items.

Projects completed recently include the Helicopter Illumination System; Field Pack, Combat M1961; and the Lightweight Battlefield Surveillance Radar, AN/PPS-6 (XE6).

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Projects currently underway include Helicopter Landing Site Materials, Beehive Shotgun Ammunition and Pattern Camouflaged Lightweight Utilities.

Aviation Logistics:

The movement of air and ground forces into Vietnam, and the forming of the III MAF, has created the largest single air/ground combat formation in Marine Corps history. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is now composed of three tactical jet groups and two helicopter groups plus the necessary command and control units.

Providing logistic support to an aviation force of this size (231 tactical jets, 12 transports, 291 helicopters) in an expeditionary environment has not been without problems. Environmental conditions in RVN have had an adverse effect on jet engines and airframes, and the introduction of new model aircraft (EA6A-RF4B-CH46A) has required aggressive action by both Marine and Navy aviation support agencies to provide the maintenance, equipment and repair parts required to support flight operations.

The Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) is the focal point for supply operations in the Marine Aircraft Wing. All MAGs are authorized a ninety day supply of repair parts for assigned aircraft and associated support equipment, an average range of 20,000 line items stocked by each MAG. Resupply of this material is obtained by the MAGs directly from Navy sources at Subic Bay; requisitions are transmitted to Subic Bay by telecommunications and material is shipped directly from the supplier to the MAGs.

Availability of aircraft spare parts and supplies (Class IIA) was adequate during the month, with aircraft "not operationally ready due to supply" (NORS) for 15.1 percent of available flight hours.

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All of the aircraft groups are capable of performing intermediate maintenance support for their tactical aircraft, including repair to the combustion (burner) section of jet engines and component repairs. Additionally, MAGs perform structural repair to battle damaged aircraft. Intermediate avionics support is centered around van complexes. The van concept provides avionics facilities with a mobile complex of compact shops which provide the optimum environment for the repair of the delicate internal parts of avionics equipment.

To improve further in-country maintenance support, action is now being taken to establish a Complete Engine Repair (CER) capability, within the helicopter MAGs, for the jet engine of the CH-53A. Complete engine repair is an extension of the MAG's intermediate level maintenance capability. The major advantage of having this capability within the helicopter MAGs is a reduction in turn-around time for engine repairs which in turn will result in much improved aircraft availability.

Each tactical squadron within the groups has the capability of performing organizational level maintenance on its own aircraft. This involves on-aircraft repair and scheduled maintenance on engines and airframes.

Aircraft were "not operationally ready due to maintenance" (NORM) for 21 percent of available flight hours.

Following a specified number of months in service (18 months normally) all aircraft are evacuated out of country for Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) at a depot type facility. Currently, all aircraft assigned to Marine aviation in WestPac are receiving PAR at aircraft plants in Japan operated by Japanese contractors. Upon completion of the

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PAR, each aircraft is returned to RVN and placed back in a squadron in an operating (A-1) status.

Engineer Operations:

Port Facilities: The 1,600 foot, 60-ton floating bridge across the Tourane River at Danang was removed when swift currents resulting from floods threatened its destruction. The original permanent bridge is open to one-way traffic and a ferry also is in operation. Pier Number One of the Observation Point Piers was officially dedicated on 15 October. This pier, operational since 9 September, provided continuous unloading facilities throughout the month in spite of heavy seas. The second pier is 80 percent complete, but usable at the present time. The completion date for the DeLong Pier has slipped from October to November.

Road Building: Activity by eight Navy Mobile Construction Battalions and the 7th Engineer Battalion during the month resulted in extensive repair and improvement of existing roads, and construction of 11 miles of new roads.

Storage Facilities: A covered storage facility of 624,000 square feet was completed at Danang, and 248,000 square feet were completed at Chu Lai, with 21,600 square feet still under construction at the latter site. An additional 114,000 square feet of covered storage and maintenance facilities have been completed throughout the I CTZ, and an additional 168,000 square feet are under construction.

Aviation Facilities: Construction of the crosswind runway at Chu Lai, which began on 18 July (see September report) was completed during October, except for the installation of catapult and arresting equipment.

Construction at Dong Ha airfield continued with emphasis on replacing the M8A1 matting with AM-2 matting.

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The air strip is finished and the overall project, including the drop zone and perimeter road, is 73% complete.

Movement and Resupply: On 3 October, BLT 3/3 deployed from Okinawa aboard three amphibious ships for contingency force duties off the coast of I CTZ. On the same day, BLT 1/9 departed Danang for Okinawa aboard 1 APA, 1 AKA and 2 LST; and elements of MAG 13 arrived at Chu Lai and debarked from 1 LST. During the period 3 - 15 October, elements of MAG-13 headquarters and VMFA-542 and VMA-211 personnel and equipment arrived at Chu Lai in nine separate flights aboard 315th Air Division C-130/C-124 aircraft. The 3d Bridge Company, FMF debarked at Danang from the USNS SULTAN on 18 October; and on 22 October elements of H&MS-17 debarked at Danang from 1 LST. On 29 - 30 October, BLT 3/3 completed debarkation at Dong Ha and HMM-163 deployed ashore at Hue Phu Bai following duty as an afloat contingency force.

Although lighterage operations at the Port of Danang were suspended for a total of 23 hours during the period 9 - 22 October because of high seas in the harbor, cargo operations continued without interruption. A daily average unload rate of 5,594 M/T resulted in 173,439 M/T of cargo being unloaded during the month. This amount, combined with a record 66,816 M/T backloaded figure, equals a new monthly cargo throughput total of 240,255 M/T at Danang and a new monthly record of 333,156 M/T throughput for ICTZ.

On 31 October there were 11 cargo ships in the Port of Danang, with 33,471 M/T of cargo backlogged on board, as compared to 5 ships, with 5,127 M/T aboard, on 30 September. The average backlog for October was 25,658 M/T.

The airlift situation improved considerably during October. The Military Airlift Command channel from Kadena to Danang airlifted 1,356 S/T (as compared with 259

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S/T during September) and thereby equalled the stated Marine Corps monthly requirements. FMFPac KC-130 aircraft airlifted 449 S/T of critical cargo from Okinawa to Vietnam. Scheduled 315th Air Division flights were discontinued, although special airlifts by this agency moved 94 S/T from Okinawa to Danang.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS1. PHU BAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
Hqs 3rdMarDiv	10Oct	Arrive	Danang
HMM-163	30Oct	Arrive	SLF

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sept</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regt Hq	0	0	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	4	4	Battalions	0	0
Companies	3	3	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	1,785	1,785	Total Strength	150	150

A comparison of the October 1966 and the September 1966 confirmed Order of Battle shows no increase or decrease of enemy personnel within 25 miles of the Phu Bai airfield.

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~~SECRET~~2. DONG HAMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
2dBn, 7thMar	2Oct	Depart	Chu Lai	
9th MT Bn	16Oct	Arrive	Danang	
2dBn, 94thFA	23Oct	Arrive	CONUS	OpCon 3dMarDiv
1stBn, 40thFA	25Oct	Arrive	CONUS	OpCon 3dMarDiv
3dBn, 3dMar	30Oct	Arrive	LPH-2	

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sept</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Northern Sub-					
Region Hq	0	1			
Division Hq	2	2			
Regimental Hq	7	7			
Battalions	30	28			
Companies	3	3	Companies	1	1
Total			Total		
Strength	19,349	19,376	Strength	120	120

The total strength within 25 miles of Dong Ha includes the 324 "B" and 341st Divisions, which are located either in the DMZ or in North Vietnam, with the preponderance of evidence indicating them to be in or north of the DMZ. A comparison of the October 1966 and September 1966 confirmed Order of Battle shows a difference of 27 enemy personnel. This difference was caused by the confirmation of two NVA Support Battalions within 25 miles, balanced by the confirmed enemy losses in Operation Prairie and the southerly shift of the Northern Sub-Region Headquarters.

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~~SECRET~~3. DANANGMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
1stBn, 9thMar	3Oct	Depart	Okinawa
VMFA-323	5Oct	Depart	Chu Lai
Hqs 3dMarDiv	10Oct	Depart	Phu Bai
Hqs 1stMarDiv	10Oct	Arrive	Chu Lai
11th Mar	10Oct	Arrive	Chu Lai
1stReconBn	14Oct	Arrive	Chu Lai
1st Bridge Co.	16Oct	Arrive	Chu Lai
3d Bridge Co(-)	18Oct	Arrive	CONUS
1st AT Bn	20Oct	Arrive	Chu Lai
7th MT Bn	20Oct	Arrive	Chu Lai
VMFA-314	21Oct	Depart	Chu Lai
Det VM CJ-2	28Oct	Arrive	CONUS
Det VM CJ-3	28Oct	Arrive	CONUS

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sept</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regimental Hq	0	0	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	3	4	Battalions	2	2
Companies	5	4	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	1,780	2,130	Total Strength	1,025	1,025

A comparison of the October 1966 and the September 1966 confirmed Order of Battle shows a decrease of 350

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enemy personnel within 25 miles of the Danang airfield. The decrease was caused by the southern shift of the 70th Battalion.

4. CHU LAI

MAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
2dBn, 7thMar	2Oct	Arrive	Dong Ha
VMFA-323	5Oct	Arrive	Danang
VMFA-542	10Oct	Arrive	Iwakuni
Hqs 1stMarDiv	10Oct	Depart	Danang
11th Marines	10Oct	Depart	Danang
VMA-211	10Oct	Arrive	Iwakuni
1st Recon Bn	14Oct	Depart	Danang
1st Bridge Co	16Oct	Depart	Danang
1st AT Bn	20Oct	Depart	Danang
7th MT Bn	20Oct	Depart	Danang
VMFA-314	21Oct	Arrive	Danang

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sept</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regimental Hq	1	1	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	9	7	Battalions	1	1
Companies	9	12	Companies	0	0
Total Strength	4,720	4,580	Total Strength	300	300

A comparison of the October 1966 and the

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September 1966 confirmed Order of Battle shows an increase of 140 enemy personnel within 25 miles of the Chu Lai airfield. The increase was caused by normal Order of Battle adjustments.

5. ENEMY LOSSES FOR OCTOBER 1966

<u>October</u>		<u>Total to date</u>
777	KIA	12,280
45	Captured	1,206
328	Suspects	7,799
0	Wounded	491
99	Weapons	1,849

6. CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS

<u>Oct</u>	<u>Sept</u>		<u>Total as of 31 October 1966</u>
89,332	113,542	Persons given medical treatment	1,042,881
63	77	Persons given medical training	636
135,354	366,679	Pounds of food distributed	1,903,853
10,490	19,153	Pounds of soap distributed	142,635
6,898	6,388	Pounds of clothing distributed	214,076
160	220	Critically ill civilians evacuated	5,717
201	163	English language classes conducted	1,227
\$1,741	\$1,368	Cash donations	\$33,548
271,202	733,358	Persons fed	2,512,444
3,572	2,749	Students supported	36,940
45	485	Construction projects	1,229

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~~SECRET~~7. MARINE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>October</u>	<u>September</u>		<u>Total as of 31Oct66</u>
7,428	6,317	Patrols	80,568
3,159	3,929	Ambushes	50,203
78	350	Sniper posts	4,598
1	2	Regimental or larger opns	40
9	11	Battalion opns	110
126	126	Company opns	1,793
4,987	5,826	Combat/ combat support sorties	64,987
32,867	35,527	Helo sorties	495,540

8. III MAF STRENGTH - ON 31 OCTOBER 1966

Danang	27,193
Chu Lai	20,736
Phu Bai	4,484
Dong Ha	<u>8,677</u>
Total	61,090

9. MARINE TACTICAL AREAS - ON 31 OCTOBER 1966

	<u>Square miles</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Villages</u>
Danang	999	741,025	104
Chu Lai	532	277,578	57
Phu Bai	162	68,037	22
Total	1,693	1,086,640	183
Goals	3,340	2,400,000	372*
Percent of goal achieved	51%	45%	49%

*Revised total - I CTZ coastal plain.

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10. LOGISTICSa. Supply Levels at End of Period:

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
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Class I(1000 of rations/
days of supply)

MCI rations	211/9	366/17	309/44	209/21
B rations	308/13	322/15	239/34	180/18
A rations	158/5	161/7	24/3	2/1

Class III & IIIA (BULK)

(1000 gals/days of supply)

JP-4	1448/8	672/3	36/3	117/8
AVGAS	201/20	37/3	80/20	98/8
MOGAS	198/8	172/6	58/15	52/10
DIESEL	413/18	157/5	33/6	35/9

Class V and VA

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>
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Ground ammunition
(days of supply)

45	45	45
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250 lb L. D. bombs
(number of bombs)

20,091	3,409	0
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500 lb L. D. bombs (number of bombs)	17,849	6,052	0
Launcher w/19 2.75 inch rockets	641	2,182	0
Individual 2.75 inch rockets	10,052	1,111	0
Launcher w/4 5 inch rockets	430	416	0
Individual 5 inch rockets	2,257	0	0

b. Resupply Status:

(1) Surface Shipping Status (Danang)

Cargo unloaded (October)	173,439 M/T
Average daily discharge rate	5,594 M/T
Ships in port 30 September	5
Ships arriving during October	39
Ships unloaded during October	33
Ships in port 31 October	11
Cargo backlog 30 September	5,127 M/T
Cargo backlog 31 October	33,471 M/T
Average backlog (October)	25,658 M/T

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(2) Air Shipping Status

Cargo lifted into RVN	1,899 S/T
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Cargo awaiting lift on Okinawa as of 1 November	289 S/T
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c. RED BALL Summary

Items at beginning of period	1,156
Items added	420
Items removed	375
Items remaining at end of period	1,201

d. Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN	4,044
Items repaired at 3rdFSR	2,699
Items returned to CONUS from 3rdFSR or disposed of on Okinawa	67

e. Construction Projects

Roads rehabilitated or constructed	-Construction of 11 miles of new road. Maintenance of 220 miles.
Bridges	-Constructed 3 timber bridges, 1 M4T6 400 ft floating bridge and 1 M4T6 45 ft fixed span bridge.
Wells drilled	-6 completed; 4 in progress.

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Covered Storage
NSA, Danang

-Project completed
(624,000 sq ft).

Covered Storage
NSA, Chu Lai

-248,400 sq ft completed
and 21,600 sq ft under construction.

III MAF Covered Storage
(includes maintenance facilities)

-114,000 sq ft completed
and 168,000 sq ft under construction.

Ammo Storage

-ASP #1 - 17% complete
(This decrease from 30% completed as of 30 September reflects an enlargement in the scope of the project).
ASP #2 - 98% complete.

POL Storage

-Danang main NW tank farm, 15 - 10,000 BBL tanks are complete. The Danang main east tank farm, 14-10,000 BBL tanks, is 10% complete. Marble Mountain Air Facility tank farm, 8-10,000 BBL tanks, is 88% complete.

400 Bed Hospital

-97% complete.

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CONCLUSIONS

The convergence of US power in northern Quang Tri has, at least for the time being, abated the threat of mass enemy invasion of that area. As such, the effort involved has been abundantly justified.

The cost of the northward shift of Marine effort is evident in a deceleration of Revolutionary Development in the critical Danang - Chu Lai region. Forces remaining there have not been able to maintain the growth level of the past few months.

Nevertheless, the overall Marine effort has succeeded in meeting most of the goals set at the Honolulu Conference for 1966.

The evidences of great logistic flexibility exhibited in the first months of the northward deployment were underscored in October, and under conditions of most unfavorable weather. III MAF has a wholly adequate logistic base to support all of the activities in which it is now engaged.

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