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Signature/date

FMFPAC : Operations of US Marine  
Force, Vietnam Nov 1971

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# OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

## VIETNAM

### NOVEMBER 1966

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine Forces in Vietnam for the month of November 1966. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering periods from March 1965 through October 1966.

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SUMMARY

Rain and mud were the Marines' principal adversaries in Vietnam during November. The northeast monsoon, more severe than in 1965, had delivered more rain on the III MAF area than normally falls on Washington, D. C. during a two year period.

The enemy, perhaps also affected by the weather, showed a lesser disposition to fight than in any of the twelve preceding months.

Despite the sodden circumstances, slow progress was registered in all of the Marines' convergent efforts. They continued to cover the countryside with small unit, counter guerrilla-oriented operations. During the month, there were 11,256 patrols and ambushes, mainly of squad size, and 185 company size search and destroy operations. In 937 contacts, 240 guerrillas were killed.

There were six operations of battalion size or larger, each characterized by light contact. The number of enemy killed in large unit operations declined to 203, 71% below the average for the prior six month period.

Marine fixed wing aircraft, although severely hampered by rain, clouds, and fog, flew 5,558 combat and combat support sorties - an 11% increase over October's total. Over 4,300 of these were in support of III MAF, with 871 sorties flown over North Vietnam and Laos. The balance supported ARVN, ROK Marines, or U. S. Army units in-country. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing pilots accounted for 93 enemy confirmed killed, 21% of the 443 enemy killed by Marines in November.

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The 1,693 square miles under Marine influence showed a slight rise in pacification levels. The number of villagers living in areas at least 60% pacified increased to 589,000, a 26,000 gain over October's total, and a rise of 371,000 since February, when Marines began a statistical appraisal of pacification progress. Twenty villages advanced, in some degree, in their pacification level.

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



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The prime goal of the Marines in Vietnam, since their arrival, has been to establish firm GVN/US control in the coastal lowlands of the I Corps Tactical Zone. Attainment of this goal comes about through the progressive expansion of friendly influence throughout this critical area. Since March of 1965, when Marines first landed in force in Vietnam and occupied an 8 square mile area around the air base at Danang, the areas of Marine influence have expanded continually, as shown here.

**GROWTH OF MARINE AREAS**

Goal: I CTZ Littoral - 3340 Sq. Miles; 2,400,000 Population; 372 Villages



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
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Within these areas of influence, progress can be measured more specifically in terms of the III MAF Revolutionary Development Indices, where a broad spectrum of indicators is assessed monthly. Expressed as a function of Revolutionary Development growth, progress is depicted on the chart below.

### REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT GROWTH IN III MAF TACTICAL AREAS



The 60% level, shown on the chart above in blue, has been taken to describe a condition of firm GVN/US influence. In order to qualify for the 60% level, villages and hamlets must have reached a relatively advanced state in elimination of enemy units and enemy infrastructure, in establishment of local security and local government and in development of local education facilities, public health and transportation facilities and agricultural and economic development.

The graphs on the following page show the growth of the 60% and higher level in Marine areas expressed in terms of area, population and villages.

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


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
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**GROWTH OF FIRM GVN/US INFLUENCE**  
(60% OR HIGHER ON III MAF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SCALE)


**BY AREA**



**BY POPULATION**



**BY VILLAGES**



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Progress toward any long-term goal is usually not dramatically perceptible in terms of short range measurement. Several indicators of modest progress were nevertheless apparent in November. 443 of the enemy were killed by Marines and 88 were captured; the population living under firm GVN/US influence in the Marine areas increased by 26,000; and 20 villages in those areas made gains in fields ranging from functioning village councils to the establishment of village defense forces. Throughout all of I CTZ, a total of 978 enemy were killed, 150 were captured, and 74 others came over to the GVN side.

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COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

The goal of the counterguerrilla campaign is to root out the guerrillas from the countryside and to isolate them from the people, from whom they must draw their support and sustenance. This frees the people from Viet Cong terror and oppression, and permits nation building programs to go ahead. But another important bonus accompanies success in destruction of the guerrilla infrastructure. This is the damaging effect on the Main Force units, as their guerrilla link with the rich and densely populated countryside is cut.

Gains which accrue from this aspect of the counter-guerrilla campaign are difficult to measure, since account must also be taken of the constant pounding given the enemy Main Force units in large unit operations, where Marines have killed 3,700 enemy troops between 1 July and 1 November of this year. However, between the actions against the Main Force and the actions against the guerrillas a clear pattern has been emerging recently. It goes far to validate the efforts of the Marines over the past 21 months, in terms of visible degradation in the will of the enemy to fight - be they regular or guerrilla forces. Interrogations of defectors - Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, as well as captives taken during October and November, portray a picture of low morale, deprivation and dissatisfaction among enemy troops. They give evidence that the constant pressure is having its effect, as the following remarks illustrate.

- A sergeant, and political cadreman, from the 806th Battalion who rallied to the GVN, said that he abandoned the North Vietnamese forces because of extreme hardship. He said that the morale of his battalion was good for the first three months it was in South Vietnam (April to June 1965) but that it deteriorated because of air strikes. He said

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that there is a "constant fear in the battalion of engaging either the U. S. Marines or the ARVN Rangers.... There is a constant food shortage causing rations to fluctuate between one and two and a half cans of rice a day (500 to 1250 grams) .... A total lack of medical supplies necessitates only the basic medicines being used on badly wounded soldiers, many of whom die for lack of better supplies."

- A soldier from the 17th Company, 1st VC Regiment, who rallied on 30 November stated that "the morale of the 17th Company is very low due to lack of equipment, poor living conditions, disease and no medicines for malaria." He said that he could not live in misery any longer and felt that "the allies are growing too strong for the VC."

- A supply officer of the 60th VC Battalion said, "Morale of the battalion is low because of constant bombings and insufficient food.... The allies will win.... 98% of the battalion have contracted malaria.... They have no medicine for treatment."

- A 1st VC Regiment soldier taken on 16 November said that although he planted some potatoes, he had made it known to his superiors that he missed his family and wanted to go home.

- A NVA captive stated that morale in his unit was low. He said that during infiltration to SVN, there were four deserters from his unit and that "the NVA soldiers do not want to fight in SVN. Food is another reason morale is low."

- Another NVA soldier who surrendered willingly stated that 28 men had deserted his company since it arrived in RVN in June, and that morale is low because the majority of the members of his unit feel they were forced to come to SVN. "Food is poor."

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A captive from the 48th VC battalion said, "...men of the 48th are becoming demoralized. Many have disease and malaria and could not be treated."

- The Executive Officer of a guerrilla unit, who defected on 11 November, stated that he rallied to the GVN side because the "VC are not getting sufficient food."

- A captive taken on 13 November said, "Many soldiers have malaria....Morale is low."

- A captive from the Viet Cong Song Hong Battalion said, "Morale among the men was very low because of fear of getting killed and a desire to return home."

- A member of the V 51 Local Force Company, captured on 2 November, said that they were given only "two small cans of rice (1000 grams) and some water every day ....morale seems to be low.... Villagers do not mix with the soldiers."

- A Senior Captain from Viet Cong Military Region V Headquarters, said, in process of interrogation, "... malaria is a great problem afflicting 95 percent of the personnel.... Food is in short supply. There simply is not enough to feed all the troops and cadre....Morale is low even among the cadre, who are all afraid."

#### NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

The repeated reference to food in the above prisoner statements underscores the importance of the counterguerrilla effort, which serves to deny the Main Force elements their food supply. This food denial is a product of constant pressure on the guerrilla enemy. A total of 143,820 counterguerrilla operations have been conducted by Marines since March 1965, 122,079 of them in 1966, and fully 50

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percent at night. This pace has continued through November despite the impeding effects of the monsoon and the continuing commitment of six infantry battalions to Operation Prairie.

In fact, there were more counter guerrilla operations in November (11,256) than in any month since July (12,454). Throughout the heavily populated countryside in the three principal pacification areas (pop 1.1 million), Marine counter guerrilla operations included 8,094 patrols, 2,977 ambushes, and 185 company-size searches. During the month, 240 guerrillas were killed, raising to 4,666 the number of guerrillas confirmed killed to date in small engagements with Marines.


Counter guerrilla activity by the battalions of III MAF is shown in detail on the pages which follow.

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## PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA




Marines in the Danang area conducted 5,478 small unit operations, including 4,039 patrols, 1,367 ambushes, and 31 company size search and destroy operations, compared with 2,709 in November, 1965. Eleven battalions (10 Marine and 1 US Army) were assigned to the Danang area at various times throughout the month. At any one time, however, the number seldom exceeded 9, which included one reconnaissance and one military police battalion. During the month, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines and 2d Battalion, 5th Marines arrived at Danang after participating in Operation Prairie. On 17 November, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines moved to northern Quang Tri.

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## PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHU LAI TACTICAL AREA



At Chu Lai, Marine battalions conducted 4,711 small unit actions - including 3,402 patrols, 1,201 ambushes and 108 search and destroy operations of company size. This compares with 1,597 small unit actions in November 1965. There were no changes to units assigned to the tactical area.


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## PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PHU BAI TACTICAL AREA




At Phu Bai, there were 1,067 small unit actions - 653 patrols, 409 ambushes and 5 search and destroy operations, as compared to 373 in November, 1965. 1stBn, 4th Marines arrived from the Operation Prairie area on 2 November, relieving 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, which departed for Okinawa on 7 November. For the entire month, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines participated in Operation Pawnee III, fifteen miles southeast of the tactical area.

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Sting Ray operations - advanced outposts capable of directing artillery, air and naval gunfire on enemy targets - continued to be a productive means of killing the enemy at little cost to ourselves. In November, 34 Viet Cong were killed by this method - raising to 588 the total number of enemy killed in seven months of Sting Ray operations. This compares with 9 Sting Ray outpost Marines killed over the same period.

**CASUALTIES IN STING RAY OPERATIONS**

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
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LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

The northeast monsoon with up to 21 inches of rain affected every large unit operation conducted in November, from the Demilitarized Zone in the north to the approaches of the enemy's Do Xa secret base, 180 miles to the south. There were six major operations in all, each beset by heavy and continuing rains, and each characterized by light and infrequent contact with an enemy who showed little disposition to fight. The six operations accounted for 203 enemy killed, the lowest total in six months, and 71% below the average for the same period. The locations of these operations are shown on the map below.

**MARINE LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS - NOVEMBER 1966**

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There was little evidence of enemy presence and little enemy activity in Quang Tri province during November despite aggressive reconnaissance efforts by the Marines. Events there were generally an extension of those in late September and October, with only minor enemy reaction to our overall surveillance of the DMZ region. Beyond this, there continued the development and consolidation of the northern logistic base complex at Dong Ha and other points in Quang Tri province.

It appears that the majority of the NVA forces which entered Quang Tri during the summer have been killed or driven back across the DMZ, but it is possible that they may, at any time, repeat their earlier efforts. It is this prospect that presently fixes 6 Marine battalions and substantial supporting forces - 10,000 Marines in all - in northern Quang Tri. As will be exhibited later, this deployment has had a direct adverse effect on the Revolutionary Development effort in the central pacification regions to the south.

Operation Prairie, the DMZ surveillance effort, continued through November. Although over 21 inches of rain fell there during the month, the 6 Marine battalions committed to Prairie maintained a constant and aggressive, but generally unproductive, search for the enemy.

The only significant encounter in Prairie came in mid-month when a Marine patrol engaged a North Vietnamese company five miles south of Cam Lo. The patrol was quickly reinforced by three rifle companies, which routed the enemy, killing 28 of them and capturing another. Except for this engagement, the enemy avoided substantial contact. During the month, only 74 of the enemy were killed in northern Quang Tri, which compares with 2,085 killed in the four preceding months, when the Marines turned back the southward movement of NVA forces.

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The enemy's reluctance to engage in large scale encounters was evident elsewhere in I Corps. Pawnee III, a search and destroy operation, commenced on 29 October, 15 miles southeast of Phu Bai. It resulted in only light contact as 2d Battalion, 26th Marines swept the rice-rich area between Danang and Phu Bai in quest of a guerrilla force reportedly concentrating in that area. At month's end, with the operation entering its second month, only 25 guerrillas had been killed and 2 captured.

Sixteen miles south of Danang, near the junction of Routes 1 and 14, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, with seven rifle companies, conducted an intensive search for guerrillas who were reported to have reinfested this region after having previously been driven out in August. This was Operation Shasta. In fifteen days of small scale skirmishes (5-19 November), Shasta resulted in 25 VC KIA and 3 captured.

Farther to the south, in Quang Ngai Province, U.S. Marines joined Republic of Korea Marines and ARVN forces in a coordinated action to intercept a VC force withdrawing to the westward after an unsuccessful attack on the ROK Marines. The operations were Rio Blanco (USMC), Dragon Eye (ROKMC), and Lien Ket 70 (ARVN). This tri-national operation forced the VC to stand and fight in the only such occurrence in I CTZ during the month.

The overall operation commenced on 9 November, when the 2d ROK Marine Brigade initiated Dragon Eye, a search and destroy operation centered ten miles west of Quang Ngai City. After twelve days of only scattered contact, a ROKMC company was attacked on 20 November by an enemy battalion. In the intense two hour battle which followed, the ROKs held their ground and killed 91 VC, causing the enemy to break contact and retreat westward toward the mountainous Do Xa secret base area.

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
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U. S. Marines and ARVN forces moved rapidly to exploit this contact. In pre-planned Operation Rio Blanco/Lien Ket 70, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines landed by helicopter to the west, ahead of the VC, and then attacked eastward toward the ROK Marines. At the same time, five ARVN battalions moved to block the enemy's escape to the south.

### OPERATIONS DRAGON EYE - RIO BLANCO - LIEN KET 70 - 20 NOVEMBER



Initially, U. S. Marines had only minor contact but, on the 25th, one hundred of the enemy were entrapped between the advancing 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and the ROKs. Of those who attempted to escape, 23 were killed and five were captured.

The five ARVN battalions operating to the south also fought with considerable success, killing 123 VC and capturing 30 more.

Thereafter, contact was scattered, and the three operations were terminated on the 27th. Cumulative casualties were 338 VC confirmed killed and 42 captured; in addition, 30 tons of rice and 67 weapons were seized.

The map which follows shows the principal activity in Rio Blanco/Lien Ket 70/Dragon Eye.


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## OPERATIONS DRAGON EYE - RIO BLANCO - LIEN KET 70 - 25 NOVEMBER

Naval Gunfire Support

Throughout the month, fire support ships, ranging in size from rocket-firing landing ships to destroyers and light cruisers, provided naval gunfire coverage of the I CTZ littoral. These ships, which included, at various times, one light cruiser, ten destroyers, and one Landing Ship Medium, Rocket, mounted a total of 6 8-inch guns, 48 5-inch guns, 24 3-inch guns, 2 40mm guns and 8 5-inch rocket launchers. During the month, they destroyed or damaged more than 935 structures and provided ground forces with illumination, fire support and helicopter landing zone preparation fires.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Pacification levels throughout the 1,693 square miles of primary Marine influence showed modest gains in November.

The number of villagers living in areas classified as 60% or higher on the III MAF scale rose to 589,000, a 26,000 increase over October's total, and a gain of 371,000 since February of this year. The number of villages in the 60% and higher category is now 65, compared with 61 a month ago, and 11 in February.

Progress at Danang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai is portrayed on the next three pages, followed by a graphic representation of progress in village security and growth of government control in the Marine areas. A map showing RD progress at Dong Ha is also included. While the commitment of Marines in the Dong Ha area has been primarily for offensive purposes, the effect of the civic action orientation of all of the Marine forces is becoming progressively more evident.

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
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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - DANANG AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	NOV	CHANGE FEB-NOV	FEB	NOV	CHANGE FEB-NOV	FEB	NOV	CHANGE FEB-NOV
Under 20%	457	648	+191	94,491	138,869	+44,378	53	33	-20
20%	57	54	-3	36,258	79,887	+43,629	9	18	+9
40%	18	95	+78	16,100	67,919	+71,819	4	17	+13
60%	25	93	+67	19,036	77,727	+58,691	5	16	+11
80%	31	108	+77	175,000	355,035	+180,035	1	20	+19
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	589	999		340,885	739,437*		72	104	

\*Revised estimate


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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - CHU LAI AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	NOV	CHANGE FEB-NOV	FEB	NOV	CHANGE FEB-NOV	FEB	NOV	CHANGE FEB-NOV
 Under 20%	244	195	-49	91,145	88,483	-2,662	21	24	+3
 20%	30	80	+50	21,624	36,097	+14,473	5	7	+2
 40%	—	39	+39	—	27,560	+27,560	—	5	+5
 60%	—	85	+85	—	41,705	+41,705	—	7	+7
 80%	—	133	+133	—	75,736	+75,736	—	14	+14
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	274	532		112,769	269,581*		26	57	

\*Revised estimate


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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - PHU BAI AREA






PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	FEB	NOV	CHANGE FEB-NOV	FEB	NOV	CHANGE FEB-NOV	FEB	NOV	CHANGE FEB-NOV
Under 20%	22	40	+18	17,740	10,381	-7,359	4	11	+7
20%	26	41	+16	11,852	9,524	-2,328	2	2	-
40%	-	17	+17	-	9,049	+9,049	-	1	+1
60%	38	8	-30	23,486	5,296	-18,190	5	1	-4
80%	-	56	+56	-	33,787	+33,787	-	7	+7
100%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	86	162		53,078	68,037		11	22	

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
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
# FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN MARINE TACTICAL AREAS




## DEFENSE FORCE TRAINED AND IN PLACE




## VILLAGE CHIEFS AND COUNCILS FUNCTIONING




## COMMUNICATION NETS ESTABLISHED




## VILLAGE CHIEFS LIVING IN VILLAGES



## PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PUBLIC INFORMATION



## VILLAGE MARKETS ESTABLISHED




Note: There are 579 villages in I CTZ, 372 in the I CTZ coastal lowlands and 183 in the Marine tactical areas.

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY - DONG HA REGION



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES		CIVILIAN POPULATION		VILLAGES	
	OCT	NOV	OCT	NOV	OCT	NOV
40%	—	38	—	3,663	—	2
60%	102	102	18,014	18,014	6	6
80%	10	10	10,799	10,799	2	2
TOTAL	112	150	28,813	32,476	8	10

NOTE: Advanced RD status is largely a result of long term GVN efforts in this region. However, Marines have participated actively since July.

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County Fair

There were four County Fairs during November, which compares with 5 in October and 14 in September. The four conducted were large. 5,224 persons were screened and processed by ARVN or GVN authorities; 1,234 of these received medical or dental treatment by US Navy or Vietnamese personnel. Twenty-one guerrillas were killed and 14 others captured, raising to 471 the number of enemy killed or captured in County Fairs to date.

The Marines are capable of supporting a much broader County Fair effort - as many as ten per week. However, a single deficiency continues to impede growth of the program. This is the limited amount of actual GVN support from National Police, local forces and, mainly, the ARVN. As of the end of the reporting period, only four ARVN battalions were participating actively in the Revolutionary Development program, although the I Corps Commander has stated that 25 of his 32 battalions will ultimately be so dedicated.

As one matter of perspective, however, it is significant to compare the growing effectiveness of the small number of County Fairs conducted in November with those of earlier months. When County Fairs began in early spring of this year, the number of villagers screened in a single operation seldom exceeded 500. In one of the County Fairs held in November, 3,000 people were screened; in another, 2,000 were screened. And, although there was one fewer County Fair in November than in October, 1,522 more people were processed. The number of guerrillas killed during November's 4 operations (21) exceeds, for example, the 13 VC killed during 20 County Fairs in July.





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## COUNTY FAIR RESULTS

Combined Action Company Program

The Combined Action Company program has also suffered from lack of GVN support - in this case, the number of Popular Forces troops made available. To a considerable extent, however, this shortage originates not in a lack of willingness, but from an overall shortage of Popular Forces in I CTZ. It is hoped that PF recruiting will benefit somewhat from a recent pay raise for privates - from 1,400 piasters per month to 1,820 piasters (about \$15.00 U.S.). As a practical thing, however, the PF recruiting potential, in the Danang area particularly, is limited due to the opportunities available for local men to make more money working in civilian occupations.

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Two additional Combined Action Company platoons were activated during November, bringing to 52 the number of platoons now under the control of the 8 CAC headquarters in the three Marine areas. This is six less than the number scheduled for activation in November, making most doubtful attainment of the end-December goal of 74 platoons.

Though impeded by a scarcity of personnel, the accomplishments of these composite US Marine/Popular Forces units were considerable in November. In 2,622 patrols and ambushes conducted by CAC units, 15 guerrillas were confirmed killed and 29 were captured. But the physical results of CAC operations are less important than the fact that their operations represent growing VN assumption of tasks hitherto undertaken entirely by Marines.

#### Revolutionary Development Communications

The maintenance of security throughout the countryside is largely dependent on the rapid interchange of information between villages and hamlets, and between villages and military forces nearby, to ensure that aid can be marshalled quickly when a village or hamlet is in need.

Development of rural communication facilities thus is a basic indicator of progress in Revolutionary Development. As noted previously, for example, 38 villages were credited in November with having reliable communications between the village headquarters, each hamlet in the village, and the district headquarters. Another 50 villages have a partially completed communications network.

In November, 6 rural communications channels were in existence in the Marine areas, employing both telephone and radio. These channels include:

-A telephone net connecting district and province headquarters.

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-A Command and Operations Radio Net, connecting district and province headquarters, as well as CAC's and RF/PF units operating in the field.

-A Province Security Net, with stations at province and district headquarters, connecting with radios at village level which in turn link up all hamlets in the village. The radios in this net are manned 24 hours a day, and some 88 villages are now operating in the system. Thirty-eight of these have all hamlets also operating in the net.

-A Police Net has radio terminal stations at each province, each district headquarters, and at selected villages to pass police traffic.

-A Revolutionary Development Net, established between the Revolutionary Development cadre stationed in villages throughout the Marine areas undergoing reconstruction, and the district headquarters to which assigned. Each RD team has three radios to use on this net.

-A Supplementary Voice/CW Net using AN/GRC-9 radios, manned as a backup net to link the districts and province headquarters together.

Marine units can enter the Vietnamese radio nets at all times, and battalions and regiments are in firm communications with neighboring district headquarters, using both telephone and radio.

The maps which follow show the Revolutionary Development communication systems in operation today within the three Marine areas.


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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATIONS - DANANG AREA



- Stations in Province Security Net. Includes Province and District Hqtrs, plus Hqtrs of villages which have radios in all hamlets.
- Villages in which village chief has a Province Security Net radio, but hamlet net is only partially complete.
- ▲ Stations on the Police Net. This net connects Province and District Hqtrs.
- ★ Stations on the Revolutionary Development Net. The RD net is used by Province and District Hqtrs to communicate with RD cadre teams in the field.
- Telephone communications. Districts net through switchboards at Province Hqtrs.


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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATIONS - CHU LAI AREA



- Stations in Province Security Net. Includes Province and District Hqtrs, plus Hqtrs of villages which have radios in all hamlets.
- Villages in which village chief has a Province Security Net radio, but hamlet net is only partially complete.
- ▲ Stations on the Police Net. This net connects Province and District Hqtrs.
- ★ Stations on the Revolutionary Development Net. The RD net is used by Province and District Hqtrs to communicate with RD cadre teams in the field.
- Telephone communications. Districts net through switchboards at Province Hqtrs.


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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATIONS - PHU BAI AREA



- Stations in Province Security Net. Includes Province and District Hqtrs, plus Hqtrs of villages which have radios in all hamlets.
- Villages in which village chief has a Province Security Net radio, but hamlet net is only partially complete.
- ▲ Stations on the Police Net. This net connects Province and District Hqtrs.
- ★ Stations on the Revolutionary Development Net. The RD net is used by Province and District Hqtrs to communicate with RD cadre teams in the field.
- Telephone communications. Districts net through switchboards at Province Hqtrs.

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Amnesty

Closely related to Revolutionary Development and establishment of firm government control is the nationwide Chieu Hoi amnesty program. Any enemy who voluntarily gives himself up, other than in battle, can qualify as a Chieu Hoi, and thus far this year 1,386 of the enemy in I Corps have availed themselves of the opportunity.

The Chieu Hoi program consists of a 45 day curriculum of reeducation and motivational lectures and limited training in a skill, if desired. Following this, the Chieu Hoi is resettled on a piece of farm land, or the GVN will help him to find a job in his trade.

Marine assistance to a Chieu Hoi hamlet near Phuoc An, north of Phu Bai, is worthy of detailing. With priority going to provision of an adequate water supply and hygienic improvements, construction of a dispensary, a school, and an animal husbandry cooperative, Marines have provided tools, technical assistance and donated scrap lumber while the villagers have done the work. To date a dispensary is in being, four new wells have been dug, two 160 gallon showers installed, and a temporary school is in service until enough bricks have been made for a permanent structure. In addition, a fish pond and pig farm have been built and stocked, and some 80 acres of farm land are undergoing development for truck farming.

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III MAF and Psychological Warfare

Contributing to the Chieu Hoi amnesty program is III MAF's psychological warfare program. This effort consists of two elements. One is designed to alienate the villagers from the Viet Cong, the other is aimed at the guerrilla himself - to encourage him to defect by pointing out the futility of his cause and the advantages of life under the government.

During November, III MAF distributed over 11 million leaflets, stressing these themes throughout the Marine areas (compared with 400,000 in November last year). In addition, audio/visual teams traveled throughout the countryside, broadcasting over 230 hours of messages.

Great emphasis is placed on responding rapidly to VC incidents of terrorism, harnessing all media available to tell the story to the people who live in the area where the unfavorable incident occurred.

During November, for example, Viet Cong terrorists threw two hand grenades into a bus filled with Vietnamese civilians, resulting in one killed and seven wounded. Within two days, 150,000 leaflets describing this act had been produced and air-dropped over the area in which the victims lived, and 300 posters had been conspicuously placed. In another instance in which a 9 year old girl was killed by the VC, 50,000 leaflets and a taped message had been disseminated within two days. And in yet another, 250,000 leaflets told the story of how a VC mine had been detonated by a civilian bus, seriously wounding three civilians.

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The psywar effort is directed by a Marine staff. However, the problems of language and the differences in culture and customs of Americans and Vietnamese have demonstrated the wisdom of utilizing ARVN psywar units and personnel for the actual preparation of psywar material and conduct of the operations. A year ago, only one ARVN psywar detachment was committed in support of III MAF. Today, an ARVN Psyops Company, an ARVN Political Warfare Battalion, and a flight of specially configured U. S. Air Force psywar aircraft are all part of the III MAF effort.

#### Revolutionary Development Reorganization

In November, there was a major reorganization in the overall U. S. support for the GVN RD effort. Within the U. S. Embassy, a separate office of civil operations was established under the control of the Deputy U. S. Ambassador. Headed by the Deputy USAID Director for Vietnam, the Civil Operations Office is charged with providing closer cooperation and support for the Vietnamese government's vital program for Revolutionary Development.

In essence, this is a move toward unification of responsibility. USAID and JUSPAO field representatives will continue to be supported administratively by their parent headquarters, but the operational direction will now emanate from the office of Civil Operations.

Carrying this concept one step further, regional and provincial representatives of the Civil Operations Office will also be appointed to coordinate the U. S. Civil Revolutionary Development support effort.

It is expected that the impact of this coordinating effort in I CTZ will be less than in other parts of the country, since the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council has


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already proven to be an effective vehicle for ensuring co-ordination between the agencies - civil and military - supporting RD.

It will be recalled from an earlier report that the successes of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council in its first year of operation prompted a move to establish Provincial Councils, patterned after the I Corps body, in each of the five provinces.

By end-November, councils had been established and were functioning in four of the five provinces, with Quang Tri - the fifth - scheduled to hold its first meeting during the first week of December. Basic organization of the Regional and Provincial Councils is shown below.

### REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IN I CTZ



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In general, the membership of the Provincial Councils follows the pattern of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council. Representatives include the Province Chief, who is chairman of the council, and his staff assistants for administration, security and RD Cadre; provincial representatives of USAID and JUSPAO; the MACV Sector Advisor, and a representative from the senior Marine headquarters in the Province. In Quang Ngai Province, the ROK Marines are also included, an important step, as the ROK's have been criticized for acting unilaterally in RD support, and not coordinating their effort with the GVN province officials. The Combined Studies Division of MACV (responsible for advising on RD Cadre matters) also sits on the councils. The total membership is rounded out by inclusion of ARVN officers.

To date, the major effort of the provincial councils has been directed to reviewing and coordinating RD plans and programs for the coming year. This is significant. In the past, little coordination has been evident within GVN ranks and between the Province and ARVN. The councils also provide a means for ensuring coordination of the U. S. RD support role, both civil and military.

In the past, annual RD plans have not been prepared but today, the five provinces are in the process of developing plans for 1967. To emphasize the importance of these plans, the GVN Minister of RD toured I CTZ during November to review the provincial plans and provide guidance for the provinces.

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
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~~SECRET~~BASE DEFENSE

Ground defense of the five major airfields under Marine protection was carried out by one infantry battalion at Phu Bai, the 1st MP Battalion with two combined Action Companies at Danang and Marble Mountain, and a four company equivalent Defense Command at Chu Lai.

All of the major bases were free of serious enemy activity during the month. During the daily patrols, ambushes and area sweeps immediately adjacent to the airfields, 1 VC was killed and 5 were captured. The one enemy killed was the VC district chief of Hoa Vang district. Aircraft population at these facilities is shown on the map below.

**AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT THE FIVE MAJOR AIRFIELDS  
IN I CTZ AS OF 30 NOVEMBER 1966 \***



\* Does not include 57 Marine aircraft undergoing repair or maintenance out-of-country.

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
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Air defense of the bases, provided by 67 Marine and 60 USAF fighter aircraft, is complemented by two Marine Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalions equipped with Hawk missiles.

Early warning radar for the Hawk missile system is located at Phu Bai to detect aircraft approaching Danang from the north. Overall air defense of I CTZ is coordinated by the USAF/VNAF combat reporting center at Monkey Mountain.

Hawk system coverage in I CTZ is shown on the following map.

### HAWK RADAR AND MISSILE COVERAGE IN I CTZ



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Air defense capabilities in I CTZ were augmented late in the month by the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery (US Army), reinforced by Battery G of the 65th Air Defense Artillery (US Army). The 1st Battalion, 44th ADA consists of four batteries, with a total of 64 tracked vehicles mounting twin 40 mm anti-aircraft guns. The battery of the 65th ADA Battalion is equipped with 24 trailer-mounted quad-50 caliber machine guns.

At the end of the month these units were deploying northward to the Phu Bai and Dong Ha areas. In addition to their air defense capabilities, the firepower of these weapons can also be employed in a ground defense role, particularly in case of a mass attack.

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AIR OPERATIONS

Flight operations during the month were hampered by rain, clouds and fog. Marine fixed wing sorties were nevertheless 11% greater than the previous month - 5,558 combat and combat support sorties in November versus 4,987 in October. Of the total fixed wing effort, 78% (4,333 sorties) supported III MAF operations in I Corps, while 354 were flown in support of ARVN, ROKMC, and U. S. Army units in-country. In addition, 808 sorties were flown over North Vietnam, and 63 over Laos.

Approximately 46% of all those fixed wing sorties flown in support of III MAF were allocated to the large operations - Prairie and Rio Blanco. Marine pilots flew nearly 2,000 combat sorties and expended over 1,640 tons of ordnance while supporting these two operations (see Large Unit Operations section).

In all, Marine fixed wing aircraft expended 6,434 tons of bombs and napalm on enemy targets in RVN, Laos and North Vietnam, destroying or damaging over 1,530 enemy structures and 62 sampans. During one particularly successful strike in NVN on the 24th, four F-4 Phantoms and two F-8 Crusaders hit two suspected SAM sites, expending 14 tons of ordnance. The targets were subsequently removed from 7th Air Force's target list. In addition, 93 enemy were confirmed killed by Marine pilots during the month, representing 21% of all enemy casualties inflicted by Marines during November.

The distribution of the Marine fixed wing effort from January 1966 is shown on the following graph.


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

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### FIXED WING SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF III MAF AND UNITS OTHER THAN III MAF



Adverse weather had a direct effect on air operations; 1,331 fixed wing sorties were cancelled during the month.

Measured rainfall within the Marine tactical areas and its effect on fixed wing combat sorties are shown on the following charts.



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Radar Bombing Operations

As a counterpoise to the unfavorable weather, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's combat effort was enhanced by Air Support Radar Teams at Chu Lai, Danang and Dong Ha (2 teams), and by the arrival of a fifth team from CONUS on 10 November. A general re-allocation of the Air Support Radar Teams in mid-month provided an all-weather close air support system that covered the entire I Corps littoral, as well as much of the mountainous region to the west.

During the month, these teams, which have a radar-to-target range of approximately 50 miles, controlled 1,834 combat sorties, 62 of them conducted against enemy targets in the DMZ and North Vietnam. Concurrently, 261 additional Marine tactical strikes were conducted in North Vietnam and Laos under the control of US Air Force ground radar equipment located at Dong Ha.

In addition to the offensive capability discussed above, ASRT's in RVN were utilized for accurate positioning of Marine helicopters delivering troops and supplies to forward areas, as well as for directing photo aircraft to assigned locations during the hours of darkness or low visibility.

The location of the Marine radar bombing installations and their effective area coverage is shown on the map on the following page.


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# MARINE AIR SUPPORT RADAR TEAM COVERAGE IN I CTZ NOVEMBER 1966



Site	Dong Ha	Phu Bai	Danang	Chu Lai	Quang Ngai	Nov. Total
Sorties Controlled	558	377	320	138	441	1,834
Tons Ordnance Expended	1,378	958	504	155	672	3,667

## Arrival of New Aircraft

On 1 November, three EA-6A aircraft, of a group of five newly arrived at Danang following a trans-pacific flight ferry from MCAS El Toro, California, flew electronic

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countermeasure sorties over North Vietnam, the first time that this type aircraft had been flown in combat. The same day, twelve A-6A's arrived at Danang, completing the trans-oceanic ferry (Operation File Cabinet), in which aerial refueling was accomplished by organic Marine aircraft.

#### Helicopter Operations

Helicopter operations also were conducted at a slightly higher pace than the preceding month, with Marine pilots logging 33,496 sorties in November. Approximately 81% of the total helicopter effort supported III MAF operations during the month. As has been the case in previous months, over half of all sorties flown were engaged in troop or cargo carrying missions, lifting 51,726 passengers and 3,419 tons of cargo. In addition, helicopters accomplished a variety of other missions, including 2,739 armed helicopter, 265 search and rescue, 2,178 casualty evacuation, and 1,836 reconnaissance sorties.

Four helicopters were lost during the month to enemy ground fire. The most costly of these losses occurred about mid-afternoon on the 14th, when an armed UH-1E was downed by enemy fire thirteen miles southwest of Danang. Three of the four man crew were killed. All three of the remaining combat losses resulted from enemy fire in or near landing zones. In addition, 84 helicopters received varying degrees of battle damage from enemy ground fire, and 27 passengers or crew were wounded.

The graph on the following page exhibits the number of helicopter sorties flown and passengers lifted since December 1965.


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# HELICOPTER SORTIES AND PASSENGERS LIFTED



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LOGISTICS

The logistics capability of III MAF was not appreciably degraded by the monsoon conditions which prevailed in November. Despite the heavy rains, adverse flying weather, and poor surface trafficability, all tactical operations received adequate support throughout the month.

Supply

Class I -- There was no change in the stockage objective for rations during the reporting period. Covered and refrigerated storage facilities are adequate to store the total stockage objective of 38 days of rations; however, limitations on refrigerated storage in the Dong Ha and Khe Sanh areas restrict the storage of fresh rations to approximately two days supply.

Class II -- There were no changes of special significance during the month.

Class III and IIIA -- Availability of POL continued to improve as additional bolted steel tanks were completed at Danang and Chu Lai. Utilization of the steel tanks relieves the requirement for expeditionary fuel systems at these locations, and permits the establishment of fuel farms at more remote areas. The capacity of the POL installation at the mouth of the Cua Viet river in Quang Tri Province was increased by 60,000 gallons.

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The new distribution of POL at the installation is JP-120,000 gallons; AVGAS-120,000 gallons; MOGAS-60,000 gallons; and Diesel-60,000 gallons.

Class IV-- Stock levels remained sufficient to satisfy the daily demands of tactical operations.

Class V/VA-- Ground stocks remained at the established stockage objective of 45 days of ammunition. Sufficient Class VA is available, or allocated, to III MAF to satisfy projected requirements of 1st MAW through March of 1967. A daily allowance of 81mm mortar illuminating rounds has been imposed because of stock limitations.

#### Maintenance

##### FMFPac Equipment Rebuild:

The M-36 Cargo Truck Rebuild Program being conducted at the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa continued to meet the output goal of five vehicles per month. Twenty-five vehicles have been rebuilt since the program began in July 1966, and 17 vehicles are presently in various stages of rebuild.

The M-37 Cargo Truck and the M-43 Ambulance Rebuild Program also located at the 3d Force Service Regiment, progressed satisfactorily. In November, 25 vehicles were being rebuilt at the repair facility, with the initial output of five vehicles per month scheduled to commence in December, 1966.

The M-5/M-54 5-ton Truck Rebuild Program at the Public Works Center, Yokosuka, is steadily gaining momentum. Four M-54 Cargo Trucks and two M-51

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Dump Trucks have been rebuilt since the beginning of the program in October 1966.

The Generator Rebuild Program also progressed favorably at the Public Works Center, Yokosuka. To date, 32 generators have been rebuilt, with 75 others being rebuilt under civilian contracts established by the Public Works Center, Yokosuka. The monthly goal is 20.

#### Medical

Medical operations in Vietnam did not change appreciably in November although there were some unit relocations during the month. Company A, 1st Medical Battalion moved from Chu Lai to Danang and joined the 3d Medical Battalion while the 1st Medical Battalion (-) continued operations at Chu Lai. Company D, 3d Medical Battalion moved to Dong Ha. The construction of new facilities for the 1st Hospital Company at Chu Lai is now more than 50% completed, and a milestone was passed when the company began operation by admitting its first patients. The 400 bed hospital at Danang was completed during the month.

Medical support was strengthened and refined by establishment of new stockage objectives for medical supplies by CG, FMFPac. The new stockage objectives provide for 15 days of supply at all units except collecting and clearing companies and hospital companies. These units are allowed a 30 day supply level. Force Logistic Support Group levels remain at 30 days for operations with a 15 day safety level added. The in-country supplies are supported by backup stocks at the 3d FSR on Okinawa.

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Aviation Logistics

Overall aircraft availability, effectiveness of the support system for aeronautical material, and the performance of aircraft maintenance functions are all measured, to a degree, by readiness percentages. Records are maintained on individual aircraft to relate all air-hours into one of three categories - operationally ready, not operationally ready due to supply (NORS), or not operationally ready due to maintenance (NORM). These records are then compiled for each type of aircraft, in each organization, as a means to determine system effectiveness and corrective actions required.

The method for calculating readiness percentages is prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations, along with acceptable standards for all aircraft and for each type of aircraft. An aircraft is not operationally ready (NOR) when a supply or maintenance requirement exists which would prevent it from performing its primary mission safely and completely. All other aircraft are considered operationally ready.

An aircraft is considered not operationally ready-supply (NORS) when material/component/part(s) are not available, prohibiting further maintenance work. An aircraft is considered not operationally ready-maintenance (NORM) when scheduled or unscheduled maintenance is required.

The established overall minimum readiness objective for naval aircraft is 71%, with the desired NORS rate at 7% and the desired NORM rate at 22%. The overall NORS/NORM rates for Marine aircraft in WestPac during November was 17% and 22.5%, respectively. The NORM rate for deployed Marine aircraft has remained near the desired standards. However, NORS rates have been higher than desired, with the main reason being lead time involved for new procurement of spare parts to support flying hours in excess of that originally programmed.







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# NORS/NORM - WESTPAC AIRCRAFT



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Off-Shore Support

Okinawa, the prime forward base for Marine Corps forces in the Pacific since 1955, was used as the springboard for deployment of Marines into Vietnam, and continues today to serve as the principal source of off-shore support for III MAF.

Among its other functions, the Okinawa base complex is used as an area to rehabilitate battalions arriving from Vietnam in the intra-theater unit rotation program. Arriving units, after a year's tour in Vietnam, are in need of rest, replacement of personnel and repair or replacement of equipment.

Prior to the battalion's leaving Vietnam, a team from Okinawa visits the unit to obtain detailed information on its needs. By the time the battalion arrives in Okinawa, all necessary preparations have been made to satisfy those needs.

In a recent, typical case, one battalion received 200 replacements on the day of its arrival on Okinawa. On the same day, over 6,500 separate pieces of equipment were turned in to 3d FSR for repair. Within the first 24 hours of arrival, all individual weapons, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and mortars - over 2,100 items - were inspected, repaired or replaced, and returned to the battalion. Repair of motor transport, communications, engineer, and major ordnance material was expedited to the degree that, within 30 days, the unit was classified "combat ready in equipment".

While this was being accomplished, the battalion was benefitting from rest, liberty, and a rigorous program of Vietnam - oriented training. Concurrent with the classification of the battalion as "combat ready in equipment", it was rated "combat ready in personnel and training" and prepared again for deployment. Thus far,

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5 battalions have been rehabilitated by this program.

The FMFPac Transient Facility was established in June, 1965. The Facility is responsible for the reception and onward transportation of personnel arriving and departing WestPac. Specifically, and in addition to making transportation arrangements, the Facility is responsible for receiving, billeting, messing, and administration of transient Marines.

From June 1965 to 1 December 1966, 55,085 individual replacements from CONUS have been processed through the Transient Facility. 90,452 have been processed to CONUS.

Each enlisted Marine arrives at the Transient Facility from CONUS with one seabag if traveling by air. His other seabag arrives 60-90 days later. If traveling by surface, each replacement arrives with 2 seabags. Since the inception of the Transient Facility, there has been less than 2% loss of personal effects processed by the Facility.

The 3d Force Service Regiment, the principal off-shore logistical support activity, provides resupply and maintenance support for all Marine units in WestPac. It is the hub of the FMFPac logistic system in the Western Pacific, furnishing services such as fiscal accounting, baggage handling and storage, repair/rebuild of equipment, and shipment and receipt of materiel. Close coordination between the Force Logistic Command in RVN and the 3d Force Service Regiment has resulted in a dynamic and efficient logistical system. Electronic exchange of supply accounting is conducted, and programs for maintenance of equipment and supply of critical assets have been established.

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The effectiveness of the 3d FSR effort is best illustrated by indices of activity during the past three months. Between 1 September 1966 and 30 November 1966, 3d FSR had completed 8,023 work requests on combat essential equipment; shipped 40,366 M/T of materiel to Vietnam by sea and 5,980 S/T by air; received 161,924 requisitions from the FLSC's in Vietnam; filled 88,511 requisitions or demands; obligated approximately \$242,133 per day of funds for replenishment of materiel supplies; and rebuilt 31 M-36 and M-54 trucks.

#### Engineer Operations

During November the 11th Force Engineer Battalion deployed to RVN, bringing the present total of Marine engineer battalions in III MAF to five. The arrival of this engineer battalion provides CG, III MAF a balanced engineering capability in the Marine areas of operation.

The Chu Lai expeditionary airfield, feeling the effects of the moonsoon rains, underwent extensive maintenance during the month. This consisted of picking up the matting in eroded areas, refurbishing the sub-base, and replacement of unserviceable matting. Maintenance is continuing, while the airfield continues to perform its routine functions effectively. To date there have been over 108,000 takeoffs and landings on the expeditionary air facilities.

Also during the month, a second 60-ton ferry was placed in operation across the Danang River. It will be recalled that another ferry commenced operation in October, when the floating 60-ton bridge over the Tourane was removed to prevent damage from the rising water.

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In November, eleven separate road widening projects were completed, extending over more than 30 kilometers of roadway. With the addition of 10 feet of width, the majority of the roads are now approximately 32 feet wide. Work on more than 200 kilometers of roads is continuing.

The 235 miles of major roads in I CTZ which were open in October dropped to 187 in November, because of the heavy rain and flooding of the continuing monsoon.

Pier number two of the Observation Point Piers was completed during November. The two permanent piers (600'X90') now have a capacity of 2,000 S/T each per day. In addition, the installation of the De Long pier was completed, adding a capacity of 1,440 S/T per day to the Danang total. This completes the Observation Point deep water port.

The daily cargo capacity at Danang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai is now: Danang - 9,220 S/T per day; Chu Lai - 2,590 S/T per day; and Phu Bai - 1,200 S/T per day.

#### Movement and Resupply

November began with the transfer of the Special Landing Force (BLT 3/26 and HMM-362) from the VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8), the HENRICO (APA-45) and the GUNSTON HALL (LSD-3) to the Amphibious Ready Group composed of the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-8), USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2), and USS THOMASTON (LSD-28). The transfer took place off the I CTZ coast immediately subsequent to completion of the 30 October debarkation of BLT 3/3. The transfer was completed on 2 November. On 12 November, the final elements of Marine Wing

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Service Group - 17 arrived at Danang to join the 1st MAW. BLT 2/4 and HMM-161 rotated from Vietnam to Okinawa during the period of 4-8 November. Between 15-19 November, VMF(AW) - 235 moved from Danang to Iwakuni. Marine Corps organic aircraft were used for the latter moves. The main body of the 1st Armored Amphibian Company closed Danang on 22 November and the remaining elements arrived on 28 November. On 30 November the 11th Force Engineer Battalion arrived from CONUS.

#### Port Activities

Winds and seas halted lighterage operations at the port of Danang for a total of 169 hours, and swells at the deep water piers necessitated cancellation of pier operations and shifting of ships to anchorages on four occasions.

Coastal resupply operations to Hue and Dong Ha were suspended on eleven occasions, and 98 trips were delayed for periods of from 24 to 96 hours.

Although port operations were hindered by the northeast monsoon, the I CTZ port throughput remained high. A daily average unloading rate of 6,787 M/T resulted in 203,651 M/T of cargo being unloaded at all of the I CTZ ports during the month, as compared with 67,000 tons during the month of November 1965. In addition, 90,252 M/T of cargo was backloaded during the period. This resulted in a total throughput of 293,903 M/T for the I CTZ ports. At the major port of Danang, on 30 November there were 13 cargo ships with 44,160 M/T of cargo to be unloaded. This compares with 11 ships and 33,471 M/T of cargo on 31 October. The average backlog at Danang during November was 29,220 M/T.

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Airlift of cargo continued to be adequate during the month as 2,317 S/T was lifted from Okinawa to I CTZ. Of this amount, the MAC channel from Kadena to Danang set a new record by moving 1,554 S/T; 545 S/T was lifted by organic USMC aircraft, and 218 S/T was lifted by special airlifts from the 315 Air Division.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS1. PHU BAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
1stBn, 4thMar	2Nov	Arrive	Dong Ha
BLT 2/4	7Nov	Depart	Okinawa
HMM-161	8Nov	Depart	Okinawa

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Oct</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regt Hq	0	0	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	4	4	Battalions	0	0
Companies	3	3	Companies	2	2
Total strength	1800	1785	Total strength	150	150

2. DONG HAMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1stBn, 4thMar	2Nov	Depart	Phu Bai	
2dBn, 3dMar	17Nov	Arrive	Danang	OpCon 4thMar
3dBn, 5thMar	25Nov	Depart	Danang	OpCon 9thMar
11th Engr Bn	30Nov	Arrive	CONUS	OpCon 3dMarDiv

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ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Oct</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Northern Sub-	1	1			
Region Hq					
Division Hq	2	2			
Regimental Hq	7	7			
Battalions	30	30			
Companies	3	3	Companies	1	1
Total			Total		
Strength	19,300	19,349	Strength	120	120

The total strength within 25 miles of Dong Ha includes the 324 "B" and 341st NVA Divisions, which are located either in the DMZ or in North Vietnam.

3. DANANGMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
VMA-224	1Nov	Depart	CONUS	To FMFLANT
VMA(AW)-242	1Nov	Arrive	CONUS	OpCon, MAG-11
VMF(AW)-232	15Nov	Arrive	Iwakuni	OpCon, MAG-11
1st Bn 44th ADA	13Nov	Arrive	CONUS	
(Rein)				
1st Dental Co.	16Nov	Arrive	Chu Lai	
2dBn, 3rdMar	17Nov	Depart	Dong Ha	OpCon, 4thMar
VMF(AW)-235	17Nov	Depart	Iwakuni	OpCon, MAG-15
1st Armd Amph	23Nov	Arrive	CONUS	OpCon, 11thMar
Co.				
2dBn, 5thMar	25Nov	Arrive	Dong Ha	OpCon, 9thMar
MATCU-62	28Nov	Arrive	Kaneohe	1st MAW

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CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Oct</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regimental Hq	1	0	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	6	3	Battalions	2	2
Companies	5	5	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	3,300	1,780	Total Strength	1,025	1,025

A comparison of the November 1966 and the October 1966 confirmed Order of Battle shows an increase of 1,500 enemy personnel within 25 miles of the Danang airfield. The increase was caused by the northern shift of the 3d NVA Regiment from Quang Ngai province.

4. CHU LAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
MASS-3 (-)	10Nov	Arrive	CONUS
1st Dental Co	16Nov	Depart	Danang
1st FAG (Prov)	28Nov	Arrive	Okinawa

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

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ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Oct</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regimental Hq	0	1	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	6	9	Battalions	1	1
Companies	9	9	Companies	0	0
Total Strength	2,600	4,720	Total Strength	300	300

A comparison of the November 1966 and the October 1966 confirmed Order of Battle shows a decrease of 2,120 enemy personnel. The decrease was caused by the northern shift of the 3d NVA Regiment plus recent losses suffered by the enemy during Operations Rio Blanco/Dragon Eye.

5. ENEMY LOSSES FOR NOVEMBER 1966

<u>November</u>		<u>Total to date</u>
443	Killed	12,723
88	Captured	1,294
487	Suspects	8,286
77	Weapons	1,926

6. CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS

<u>Nov</u>	<u>Oct</u>		<u>Total as of 30Nov66</u>
91,964	94,587*	Persons given medical treatment	1,140,100
55	63	Persons given medical training	691
225,538	135,354	Pounds of food distributed	2,129,391

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8,112	10,490	Pounds of soap distributed	150,747
6,696	6,898	Pounds of clothing distributed	220,772
246	160	Critically ill civilians evacuated	5,963
237	201	English language classes conducted	1,464
\$436	\$1,741	Cash donations	\$33,948
451,608	271,202	Persons fed	2,964,052
470	3,572	Students supported	37,410
36	45	Construction projects	1,265

\* Revised Oct total.

7. MARINE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>November</u>	<u>October</u>		<u>Total as of 30Nov66</u>
8,094	7,428	Patrols	88,662
2,977	3,159	Ambushes	53,180
185	126	Company opns	1,978
111	78	Sniper Posts	4,709
4	9	Battalion opns	113
2	1	Regimental or larger opns	41
5,558	4,987	Combat/combat support sorties	70,545
33,496	32,867	Helo sorties	529,036

8. III MAF STRENGTH - ON 30 NOVEMBER 1966

Danang	29,560
Chu Lai	21,195
Phu Bai	4,719
Dong Ha	<u>8,187</u>
Total	63,661

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9. MARINE TACTICAL AREAS - ON 30 NOVEMBER 1966

	<u>Square miles</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Villages</u>
Danang	999	739,437*	104
Chu Lai	532	269,581*	57
Phu Bai	162	68,037	22
Total	1,693	1,077,055	183
Goals	3,340	2,400,000	372
Percent of goal achieved	51%	45%	49%

\*Revised totals.

10. LOGISTICSa. Supply levels at end of period:

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
<u>Class I</u>				
(1000 of rations/ days of Supply)				
MCI rations	78/3	268/13	268/38	231/23
B rations	396/17	383/18	215/31	300/30
A rations	206/7	176/8	45/11	2/1

Class III and IIIA (Bulk)

(1000 gals/days of supply)

JP-4	969/8	972/4	52/5	120/11
AVGAS	230/33	80/8	86/22	120/12

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MOGAS	417/30	76/3	60/12	36/5
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DIESEL	167/10	86/3	38/10	24/6
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<u>Class V and VA</u>	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>
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Ground ammunition (days of supply)	45	45	45
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Aviation Ordnance-CINCPAC allocation of operational stock reserves are being maintained at prescribed levels.

b. Resupply Status:

(1) Surface shipping status (all ICTZ)

Cargo unloaded (November)	203,651
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Average daily discharge rate	6,787
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Port of Danang

Ships in Port 31 October	11
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Ships arriving during November	27
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Ships unloaded during November	25
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Ships in Port 30 November	13
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Cargo backlog 31 October	33,471 M/T
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Cargo unloaded November	140,777 M/T
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Cargo backlog 30 November	44,160 M/T
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Average backlog (November)	29,220 M/T
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## (2) Air Shipping Status

Cargo lifted into RVN	2,317 S/T
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Cargo awaiting lift on Okinawa as of 30 November	357 S/T
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c. RED BALL Summary

Items at beginning of period	1,201
Items added	248
Items removed	549
Items remaining at end of period	900

d. Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN to 3rd FSR	696
Items repaired at 3d FSR	342
Items returned to CONUS from 3rd FSR or disposed of on Okinawa	120

e. Construction Projects

Roads rehabilitated or constructed	-Widening of 30 miles of existing roads completed.
Bridges	-Three Class 60 timber bridges completed; one under construction. One Class 60 steel bridge (Danang River Bridge) continuing under construction; estimated com- pletion date is March, 1964.

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Bridges (continued)

One 400' reinforced concrete bridge completed.  
One single lane Bailey (85') bridge repaired.

Wells drilled

-Six completed; four in progress.

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CONCLUSIONS

- The Marine forces, air and ground, are clearly capable of meeting fully the challenge of the monsoon.

- The failure of the enemy to undertake any major offensive effort, despite weather which favors such action, suggests either a diminished capability or an alteration in tactical concept.

- The announced intensification of Revolutionary Development effort on the part of the GVN has not yet been manifested in the I CTZ. This has had a direct and adverse effect upon the prosecution of operations by Marine forces.

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