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P. B. Villanueva

3/1/77

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*FMFPAE: Opns of U.S. Marine Corps,
Vietnam and 1966 Summary*

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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

VIETNAM

DECEMBER 1966

AND

1966 SUMMARY

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of December 1966, as well as a review of those activities for the whole of 1966. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through November 1966.

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
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SUMMARY

During 1966, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific put into the field the largest force since its amphibious operations at Okinawa in World War II. III MAF grew from 44,196 in January to 70,617 at year's end.

III MAF STRENGTH

Responsive to MACV directives, the overall 1966 Marine campaign was designed to maintain a balance between three simultaneous, mutually-supporting efforts. The first, a program of large unit operations, aims at attriting the enemy Main Force and regular units; the second, a counter guerrilla campaign, directed toward rooting out and destroying the guerrilla network; and the third, a system of comprehensive Revolutionary Development programs to help the Government of Vietnam consolidate local government control and help the peasant find a better and more secure life.

Progress during the year reflected the validity of this balanced campaign. By year's end, the Marine tactical areas had doubled in size, from 804 to 1,693 square

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miles, involving more than 1,077,000 people; the enemy had been largely eliminated from 66 villages (the number assessed at 60% or higher on the III MAF scale); public health, education, and transportation facilities were all growing; and the Combined Action Company program had flourished to 58 platoons.

In terms of direct enemy losses, Marines killed 10,627 during the year and captured 913 more. Based on a standard factor, 5,313 others were estimated to have died from wounds. The total loss thus inflicted on the enemy by the Marines in 1966 was calculated at 16,853.

During the first eight months of the year, the enemy attempted to escalate the conflict by a major troop build-up, both by infiltration of NVA forces from the north and by a heavy drawdown on guerrilla elements to strengthen the larger enemy units. This effort reached its climax in mid-summer when the enemy moved to establish himself in strength in Quang Tri province, near the Demilitarized Zone. The effort was unsuccessful. The enemy, met by a force which grew to some 17 Marine and Vietnamese battalions, was defeated in every major encounter, took painful losses, and withdrew a substantial number of his elements north of the DMZ. By the end of the year, his units remaining in Quang Tri were suffering from lowered morale and from logistic difficulties. Doubtless as a result of these developments, the final months of the year evidenced some shift, in this region, back down the insurgency scale, trending away from large unit combat, and toward intensified guerrilla tactics by smaller units.

Marine forces numbering some 10,000 men, which were shifted northward to meet the enemy's challenge were, for the most part, still operating near the DMZ at year's end, in a security, anti-infiltration and screening role. Their continued absence from the regions farther

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south in I CTZ had an unfavorable effect upon both Revolutionary Development progress and base defense.

A major development of the year occurred in December, with the decision to orient ARVN effort directly upon Revolutionary Development and to shift Marine forces to the I CTZ hinterland to assume the tasks hitherto pursued by the ARVN. This was a major change in thrust, and the measure of its success will go to the heart of the training and motivation of the Vietnamese soldier, who has never been conditioned to the importance of ministering to the needs of the people. There is little likelihood that the ARVN reorientation can be accomplished without much guidance and side-by-side participation by our forces. At the same time, we are also committed to relieve the ARVN of its back-country tasks. The force level implications are plain. Meanwhile, problems raised by the conversion were beginning to appear by year's end, and it is already clear that this program, and its costs, represents the great unanswered question facing Marine forces in 1967.

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GOALSAnd Progress Toward Achieving Them

In keeping with the basic MACV guidance, the prime goal of the Marines' 1966 campaign was to establish firm GVN/US influence in the critical coastal lowlands of the I Corps Tactical Zone.

There, in a 3,340 square mile coastal area, are located all of the political and population centers of I CTZ, all of its principal military bases, virtually all of its food producing land, and 90% of its people. There is where the enemy must obtain the food, recruits, and popular support he has to have to continue the battle. And there is where the Government of Vietnam must eventually establish its firm influence.

In helping to bring this condition about, Marines worked in close concert with GVN forces whenever the task could be attacked in joinder. But when GVN forces were unavailable, unsuited or unwilling to do the job, the Marines went ahead unilaterally, keeping in mind that all programs should be targeted on an eventual condition where the GVN will carry out all the essential functions alone, and the presence of our forces will no longer be necessary.

Although Marine presence is felt throughout the I Corps coastal plain, the Marine effort is largely concentrated in the designated Marine tactical areas. These are arbitrarily defined geographic regions where frequent military operations are conducted, and where intensive counter guerrilla programs and civic action programs are under way. Thus, the Marine areas describe the focus of the Revolutionary Development effort in the I Corps region. Specific progress within those areas has been measured monthly during the year, on a village-by-village basis, against the







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
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formal III MAF Revolutionary Development indices. The charts below depict the overall growth of the Marine areas during 1966, as well as pacification progress among the villages within those areas.

GROWTH OF MARINE AREAS - 1966



PACIFICATION LEVELS



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
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Firm GVN/US influence is defined, for purposes of measurement, as a condition where the armed enemy has been largely eliminated, and where local government control is developing at a favorable rate. The 60% pacification level on the III MAF scale generally fulfills those conditions. Thus, on the charts on the preceding page, the blue and dark green areas together exhibit the geographic regions where firm GVN/US influence prevailed. The charts below show the growth in friendly influence during 1966 in the coastal plain, in terms of population.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT GROWTH IN I CTZ COASTAL PLAIN

1 JAN 66 Population 2,400,000 31 DEC 66



The Marine objective of establishing firm GVN/US influence in the coastal lowlands responds to the six goals for end-1966 set at the Honolulu Conference in February. These goals were:

- Attrit, by year's end, VC/NVA forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field.

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- Increase the percentage of VC/NVA base areas denied the enemy from 10-20% to 40-50%.
- Increase the critical roads and railroads open for use from 30% to 50%.
- Increase the population in secure areas from 50% to 60%.
- Pacify the four selected high priority areas, increasing the pacified population in those areas by 235,000.
- Ensure the defense of all military bases, political and population centers, and food producing areas now under government control.

The first Honolulu goal relates to attrition of enemy forces. In 1966 Marines killed or captured 11,540 of the enemy in I CTZ. ARVN forces, meanwhile, accounted for an additional 8,375, bringing to 19,915 the total confirmed enemy losses for the year in I CTZ. Beyond the number of enemy troops known killed, there occur also a considerable number lost to air strikes, artillery and naval gunfire, where the enemy bodies are not counted. An additional number die later of wounds. Standard factors for estimating this additional total range from 28% to 70%, the latter figure coming from a captured NVA doctor, who stated that there are two gravely wounded NVA for each killed and that a third of the wounded die later. Taking a middle figure, 50%, the number of enemy killed by all allied forces in I CTZ comes to 29,416. This figure will grow further when augmented by numbers of deserters, defectors and those who die of disease.

A year ago COMUSMACV estimated that there were 12,569 enemy troops in the five provinces of I CTZ. By summer, his estimate of the figure had grown to 16,000. At about this time, the 324 "B" and 341st NVA Divisions began

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
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to concentrate forces near the DMZ and, in July and September, elements of the 324 "B" moved into northern Quang Tri province for several brief and unsuccessful encounters with Marine and ARVN forces.

Since mid-October, aggressive efforts by friendly forces have uncovered little evidence of the continued presence of large enemy units in Quang Tri. It is clear that the 324 "B" has, at least for the present, largely withdrawn into, or across the DMZ.

Estimates of enemy strength in I CTZ must give some account to the actions of the 324 "B" Division since that unit, even north of the DMZ, is still a threat, although not located in Quang Tri. Placing the 324 "B" in this category, the enemy strength estimated by COMUSMACV to be in I CTZ grew to 18,490 by end-1966. The chart below displays COMUSMACV's estimates of enemy growth in I CTZ during 1966. The strength of the 324 "B" Division is portrayed by red hatching.



On this chart, the trace represents an estimated enemy net growth of 5,921 during 1966. During the time

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he registered this gain, he lost at least 29,416 troops. This means, in relation to I CTZ, that the enemy paid five troops killed for each gain of one soldier in troop strength inside South Vietnam in 1966.

The first Honolulu goal specifically requires that the enemy be attritted at a rate equal to his ability to put troops in the field. So long as North Vietnam possesses an army of several hundred thousand men, that nation will have some capability to supplement the large force it already has in South Vietnam. The extent to which NVN does this will depend partly upon that nation's willingness to accept the heavy losses that attend such steps. It will depend also upon the intensity and effectiveness of the allied aerial bombing programs, and upon a variety of other factors external to I CTZ.

In sum, and assuming that our enemy order of battle figures are accurate, the first Honolulu goal was not met, in the literal sense which requires attrition equal to the enemy capability to reinforce, although he was made to pay a heavy price for the relatively small gains he made in his in-country strength.

The second Honolulu goal was to increase the percentage of the base areas denied the enemy by about 30%.

Of the eight enemy base areas initially defined by COMUSMACV, only one, the Do Xa area west of Chu Lai, was located in I CTZ. Reconnaissance of that area through 1966 disclosed only limited enemy activity there. It appeared, instead, that the enemy had shifted to other areas for training, logistic support, rest and rehabilitation. The 1966 Marine major operation campaign took this into account. The foldout at page 20 exhibits the locations and patterns of those operations.

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Although the Do Xa itself appeared to be relatively inactive, the 20 large Marine operations concentrated in the Tra Bong and Tra Khuc corridors, and in the belt between the Do Xa and the sea, were profitable. It is not possible to develop a mathematical assessment of the degree to which the Do Xa region and its eastern approaches have been denied the enemy. It is, however, evident that the pressure of these operations, and the loss of 1,644 enemy killed and 486 weapons, have done much to deny him its use.

The third Honolulu goal for end-1966 was a 20% increase in critical roads and railroads open for use.


In I Corps, there are 236 miles of railway, which generally follow the coastline from Mo Duc in Quang Ngai province northward to Dong Ha near the DMZ. At the beginning of 1966, 62% of the railroad in I Corps was closed and 38% marginally open. By the end of the year, 74% of the railroad was closed and 26% marginally open, mainly the portion from Danang to Hue. Where the railroad is concerned attainment of the third Honolulu goal was more remote at end-1966 than at the beginning.

Relating to the condition of roads, Highways 1, 9 and 14 are the critical routes in I Corps. When the Marines landed in Vietnam in the spring of 1965, 39% of the 373 total miles of these routes were open. By the end of 1966, the mileage open had been increased to 64%, with 12% more in marginal condition, or substantially more than the Honolulu target.

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The status of roads and railroads in I Corps since Spring, 1965, is shown below.



The fourth goal set at the Honolulu Conference was to increase the population living in "secure areas" from 50% to 60%, or an increase of 10%.

There is at present no universally-accepted definition of "secure area" but, as a reasonable basis for evaluation, "secure area" is taken to represent an area of "firm GVN/US influence", or one which has attained a 60% level on the III MAF pacification scale.

Using as a basis the February 1966 figure of 217,522 persons living in secure areas in I Corps, a 10% increase

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of 21,752 persons was necessary during the year to attain this goal. In 1966, this mark was bettered by a considerable margin. Throughout the year, there was an average monthly increase of 38,081 people living in secure areas, bringing to 598,335 the number of persons living in secure areas at year's end - an achievement 165% greater than the fourth Honolulu goal. The charts on pages 8 and 42 describe this growth in detail.

The fifth goal set at the Honolulu Conference was aimed at increasing the "pacified" population in the four selected National Priority Areas by 235,000, throughout the nation. One of the four, the Ngu Hanh Son area, with a total population of 23,971, is in I CTZ, located ten miles south-southwest of Danang.

"Pacified", like "secure", is an imprecise term. However, taking the 60% level on the 100 point pacification scale as descriptive of "pacified", an assessment of pacification levels in the I CTZ National Priority Area can be made.


In February 1966, the month in which the Honolulu goals were set, the five villages in the Ngu Hanh Son area stood at 20% to 40% on the III MAF Revolutionary Development scale, or, by definition, not pacified. By end-December 1966, the total population of this priority region - 23,971 - had been raised to a 60% or higher "pacification" level. Thus the goal was attained. Rates of advance in that National Priority Area since February

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are shown on the chart below.

RD GROWTH IN I CTZ NATIONAL PRIORITY AREA*



MONTHLY POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

UNDER 20%	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
20%	9,714	9,714	9,714	10,819	5,619	—	—	—	—	—	—
40%	14,257	3,795	3,795	4,095	4,095	4,095	—	—	—	—	—
60%	—	10,462	10,462	9,057	10,462	16,081	20,176	20,176	20,176	20,176	20,176
80%	—	—	—	—	3,795	3,795	3,795	3,795	3,795	3,795	3,795

* Measured against III MAF 100 point scale

The sixth Honolulu goal requires the effective defense of all military bases, political and population centers and food producing areas now under government control.

There were no successful enemy attacks on bases whose defense was the responsibility of the Marines, and none on I CTZ population centers. There were, however, a number of hit-and-run attacks on bases and on remote Vietnamese military and paramilitary outposts during the year. One of these, A Shau, turned into a considerable battle, where the enemy overran the outpost. They lost an estimated 400 troops in the action, but GVN losses were also heavy.

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The level of security among the population in the rural countryside, a key factor in real progress, showed encouraging improvement during the year. This was demonstrated, during the Buddhist riot period in May and June, by the enemy's inability to mount a successful attack under the conditions of political unrest, and again in September when 87% of the eligible voters went to the polls despite violent terrorist threats.

With regard to protecting the food producing areas of I CTZ, almost all the food produced in the five northern provinces comes from the coastal plain which is the central target for most of the III MAF activity in Vietnam. Because of this orientation, all military operations conducted by the Marines contribute directly or indirectly to defense of the food producing areas in I CTZ. Specifically, however, the Golden Fleece series of operations were conducted for the express purpose of protecting the periodic rice harvests. As a result, in 1966 the Viet Cong's take of the harvest was estimated at only 40% of previous years. Overall, it is considered that the sixth Honolulu goal was adequately fulfilled.

In summary of progress toward attainment of the six goals, all were accomplished except for opening additional miles of railroad and attriting enemy forces at a rate equal to their ability to put men into the field. As a qualification to the latter it should be noted that the enemy forces were attrited at a rate adequate to hold the net enemy strength in I CTZ approximately level through the last months of the year.

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THE THREE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING AREAS

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS
AIM: DESTROY GUERRILLA FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Cut the link between guerrilla and Hanoi.

LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS
AIM: DESTROY VC AND NVA MAIN FORCES

Support Revolutionary Development by diminishing threat of large scale enemy attack. Destroy enemy propaganda image.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
AIM: ASSIST IN NATION BUILDING

**MARINE
LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS
IN I CTZ**

1 JANUARY-31 DECEMBER
1966


THE PROGRAMS

WATCH


STRIKE

THE SUBPROGRAMS

CONDUCT DEEP GROUND RECONNAISSANCE: ATTACK




RECONNOITER BY AIR




EXECUTE STAY BEHIND RECON


After major operations, small reconnaissance elements operate in objective area to detect return of enemy.




CONDUCT LARGE UNIT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS




Enemy losses from Marine large unit ops, 1966: 11,139




ATTACK FROM THE AIR



EXPLOIT FRIENDLY MOBILITY



EXPLOIT FRIENDLY ARTILLERY AND NGF



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
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~~SECRET~~LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

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Throughout the year 1966, large operations were mounted whenever opportunities appeared to engage major enemy forces. These operations were productive, in terms of enemy killed and enemy resources destroyed, since they provided the opportunity to exploit our superiority in firepower and mobility. The first chart below shows the numbers of enemy troops killed in Marine large unit operations, and the number of Marines killed on those same operations. It will be noted that the kill ratio is approximately 10 to one in favor of our forces. The other charts show the number of enemy troops and weapons captured in these operations.

RESULTS OF MARINE LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

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Large unit operations during 1966 were prosecuted in three general areas. The first was in the region around Chu Lai, covering the approaches to the enemy's Do Xa secret base area.

A total of 20 large unit operations were conducted in this general area during the year, resulting in 1,644 enemy killed and 486 weapons captured.

A second area where Marine large operations were focused in 1966 was in the region south of Danang and along the banks of the Thu Bon river. These operations were aimed at destroying the centers of the enemy guerrilla infrastructure and in opening the route from Danang to the An Hoa industrial complex. Enduring operations, such as Georgia and Macon, accounted for 610 Viet Cong killed. An additional 27 Marine operations, 3 of them combined with ARVN, brought the total enemy casualties to 1,256 VC killed and 149 captured.

A third area where large Marine operations were concentrated was in the coastal region north from Hai Van pass, along Route #1, to the strip south of Dong Ha. These operations were aimed at keeping open the main line of communication, and, on several occasions, moving to the assistance of ARVN units committed in that region. Four such operations, New York, Oregon, Jay and Chinook, accounted for 462 enemy killed.


The locations of all these operations are shown on the following page, along with the two large DMZ operations, Hastings and Prairie, and the amphibious landings Deckhouse II and IV.

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THE WHERE AND WHEN OF MARINE LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS 1966



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It is evident that the enemy was punished severely by Marine large unit operations during the year. In this connection, actions during July and September in Quang Tri province deserve special attention. The enemy effort represented a major incursion into South Vietnam by elements of two North Vietnamese regular army divisions, and was the closest approach to conventional warfare that the Marines had encountered since they landed in Vietnam. The enemy selected a battlefield well-suited to his purpose. Northern Quang Tri is close by the sanctuary of the Demilitarized Zone, where he could build up a logistic base with immunity from ground reaction. The region is remote, favoring him with interior lines and working to our disadvantage through extension of our own supply lines.

The overall result of this bid, from the enemy viewpoint, was a mixture of marginal success and costly defeat. It was marginally successful in that it forced the northward shift of a large number of Marine units to counter the threat. Between four and eight infantry battalions, with a complete supporting arms package, were relocated, with a resulting drawdown on forces employed farther south in the critical pacification task.

On the other hand, the enemy's bid in northern Quang Tri was costly, in that he suffered severe losses, both in attack and defense. When he probed or patrolled, he was pursued by Marine infantry - heliborne or on the ground - and was pounded by air, artillery and naval gunfire. The effort cost him an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 NVA troops killed or disabled and 414 weapons lost. These reverses, coupled with his losses in the coastal plain, besides being costly in resources, meant a severe loss of prestige, and a further erosion of the morale of his troops.

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Therefore at the end of the year it was not surprising to see evidence that the enemy had begun to shift some of his effort away from conventional, or "mobile warfare", toward the more productive (from his standpoint) guerrilla tactics.

His major Main Force and North Vietnamese formations have been relatively inactive in I CTZ since September, as far as large unit actions are concerned. However, by the end of December, corresponding increases were already beginning to appear in rates of guerrilla activity.

Exceptions to the enemy's reluctance to commit large units to combat were a brief stand made by elements of the 324 "B" Division to defend Nui Cay Tri ridge in Northern Quang Tri in October (102 NVA killed) and two costly attack efforts of approximately battalion size. The first of these was an attack on the ROK Marines west of Quang Ngai on 25 November, which led to the combined Dragon Eye-Rio Blanco-Lien Ket 70 operations. These cost the enemy 328 killed.

The second was a series of efforts against 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines, in Operation Chinook in December, which cost the enemy 159 Main Force troops killed.

Operation Chinook began on 19 December, when the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines, with supporting arms, was withdrawn from Operation Prairie and moved south to exploit intelligence reports of enemy activity in the Pho Trach area, 18 miles west of Hue. Operation Chinook marked the first reappearance of the 802nd VC Main Force Battalion since that unit's crippling experience on 29 June 1966.

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
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At that time, the 802nd set a careful ambush for the 2nd Vietnamese Marine Battalion on Highway 1 north of Hue. Local arrangements for the ambush were adequate and the affair began well for the 802nd. However, the VC commander had overlooked the fact that a large portion of the 4th U. S. Marine Regiment, plus supporting artillery, had moved into an area only 5 miles to the northeast. Howitzers positioned for support of the 4th Marines engaged the enemy unit shortly thereafter, followed by the arrival of a number of ARVN units. Within two hours from the initiation of the enemy attack, one USMC battalion, one VNMC battalion, and five additional ARVN battalions had joined the battle. The action, and the pursuit which ensued, cost the 802nd 202 killed, at no loss in killed to U. S. Marines or ARVN, beyond the 54 Vietnamese lost in the initial minutes of the ambush. The strength of the 802nd prior to the ambush was estimated at about 400.

JUNE AND DECEMBER OPERATIONS BY 802ND VC BATTALION



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In its first reappearance since that time, the 802nd, in the early morning hours of 21 December, attacked the Chinook force which consisted of a Marine battalion, reinforced by Marine and U. S. Army artillery, a force of about 1,200 men. The attack began with mortar fire followed by an infantry assault. It was repulsed at a cost to the VC of 59 known killed.

Early the following morning the enemy launched another assault under cover of a mortar attack. It was again repulsed, this time costing the VC 23 confirmed killed and 21 weapons left behind.

Chinook was still in progress at the end of the year. By that time, after 13 days of the operation, Marines had killed 159 enemy, mostly from the 802nd VC battalion. In addition, five enemy were captured, 58 suspects were apprehended and 42 weapons captured. Marine losses were 4 killed and 73 wounded.

Sting Ray:

As a complement to battalion size operations such as Chinook, Marines, in the last eight months of 1966, employed small reconnaissance teams deep in the highlands to observe the enemy and direct artillery and attack aircraft on any enemy forces detected.

Called Sting Ray patrols, these lightly-armed and lightly-equipped teams are generally inserted by helicopter near the objective area, then move by stealth overland to their predesignated observation point, where they remain for several days or until their presence is discovered. They have proved to be an effective means

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of inflicting substantial casualties at relatively low cost to our forces. To date, 620 of the enemy have been killed by Sting Ray teams, as compared with the loss of 12 Marines.


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THE THREE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING AREAS




Support Revolutionary Development programs by freeing population from guerrilla oppression.

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

AIM: DESTROY GUERRILLA FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Support large unit operations by severing recruiting and food resupply lines to main force.



MARINE COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN I CTZ













1 JANUARY-31 DECEMBER 1966

THE PROGRAMS

KILL VC GUERRILLAS

DESTROY VC INFRASTRUCTURE

PHASE IN RVN LOCAL SECURITY FORCES



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COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

As Marine power and influence grew in I CTZ, beginning in the spring of 1965, changes favorable to our forces began to appear. The improving conditions were visible in the central pacification regions, built around Marine areas at Danang, Phu Bai and Chu Lai. In these areas programs were going ahead combining around-the-clock, saturation counterguerrilla operations, with aggressive efforts to improve the lot of the peasant and win his confidence.

In the Marine areas, assassinations and kidnappings of rural officials, traditionally the target of the guerrilla terrorist, dropped by more than 50% in the second half of 1965. The number of citizens murdered also dropped by more than 50%, and the number of citizens kidnapped decreased by 36%. Armed attacks decreased by 21%. Acts of minor harassment, on the other hand, almost doubled, exemplifying the trend toward lower levels of insurgency.

Outside the Marine areas, in the rest of I CTZ, the same general pattern was emerging, although less pronounced in degree and lagging in time. Terrorism of rural officials, kidnappings and murders were all down markedly.

The number of armed attacks in I CTZ in the first six months of 1966 was only about 3% below the 1965 average, a negligible improvement, but one which assumes more significance when it is noted that the







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nationwide enemy attack rate increased by 13% in the same period. Within the Marine areas, the attack rate decreased 35% below the 1965 average, and other enemy activity followed a similar pattern. The exception was minor harassment, which continued to climb.




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At the beginning of 1966, the enemy began to shift his efforts toward military units and facilities, and away from civilians and civil facilities. Then, with the onset of the political troubles in Hue and Danang beginning in March and April of 1966, he generated a major guerrilla and propaganda effort among the people, obviously aimed at bringing about a result similar to that of 1963, when political trouble and Buddhist riots in Hue led to collapse of the Diem government. This increased enemy effort is portrayed in the following charts.



The Marines intensified their counter guerrilla activity correspondingly in April, May and June, with almost 37,000 separate counter guerrilla operations. The result was that in those months 1,076 guerrillas were killed by Marines in small unit operations and 174 Viet Cong and 169 weapons were captured.

As events developed, the political situation did not deteriorate into chaos and, by August, the shaky

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mechanism of the northern provinces was beginning to get itself back into operation.

Shortly after the beginning of the political troubles, and after the enemy's initiation of his efforts to exploit them in the coastal plain, the NVA had also begun a move in the north, building up forces and supplies of two NVA divisions in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone. Then, in late June, one of them - the 324 "B" Division - started to move into northern Quang Tri province in force. The results of this effort have been discussed earlier; the enemy suffered heavy losses in this first meeting with Marines in conventional warfare. By the end of August, having come off badly, the enemy effort there slowed. At about the same time guerrilla activity in the coastal lowlands also diminished.

Then, in September, in what appears now to have been something approaching a maximum effort, virtually all enemy activity, Main Force and guerrilla alike, was greatly increased. This was an apparent effort by the enemy to destroy the national elections and to salvage prestige lost in his failures of May, June and July. The pace of the enemy's guerrilla operations in I CTZ rose sharply and, in the north, refurbished regular NVA units also joined the effort, repeating their challenge to the Marines in conventional combat. The main result was that the enemy had more troops killed by Marines in September (1,789) than in any month since the war began, and the election which they sought to impede was a success, with 87% of the eligible voters turning out.

By the end of September, the enemy found himself under heavy pressure in and around all the Marine areas.

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His hold over the population of I CTZ was being diminished slowly as friendly influence and local government control expanded. He was no longer free to range the countryside without fear of ambush and his food supply was growing progressively shorter. His guerrilla forces had been heavily tapped to build up and fill vacancies in NVA and VC Main Force units, which, in turn, had suffered severe losses. His local manpower pool had reached the point that he was recruiting young boys. Food, medicine and morale were low.

Taking his troubles into account, it was logical that he would make some alterations in organization and tactics, aimed at getting more direct benefit from his assets. The first of these emerged in December, when evidence began to accumulate that the flow of personnel, which in the past had been upward in the enemy military hierarchy, that is, from guerrilla unit to Main Force unit, was being altered. More emphasis seemed to be going into strengthening guerrilla units, and there were reports that some Main Force troops were being moved down into VC guerrilla units. Further, evidence appeared that some NVA are being assigned a role in support of the guerrillas, and there are even a few indications of fragmentation of NVA units into smaller formations with a guerrilla mission. Evidence of these changes appeared in the enemy's behavior in late November and December, and in intelligence holdings and prisoner interrogations.

According to prisoners it was learned in December that certain Viet Cong district committees had received information that the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front had decided to replace troops in lower echelons with those from higher echelons,

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as opposed to the previous policy of replacing higher echelon troops from the lower level. According to the plan, district forces would be sent to villages to strengthen guerrilla units, province forces would be sent to districts, and regional Main Force units would be sent to provinces.

Recent enemy radio broadcasts throw additional light on this matter. In late December, the "Liberation Radio", followed by Radio Hanoi, broadcast a program which had as its main theme the point that, despite the allies' troop buildup, superior weapons and air power, they could still be stopped by guerrilla action.

Prisoner interrogations in I CTZ in December told the same story, besides carrying with them the theme pervading many interrogations in recent months - shortage of food and low morale.

Pham Van Dong, a communication runner who rallied to the GVN, had been a member of a Viet Cong sapper unit. He reported that about 60% of the troops of his unit are now NVA. He also remarked that the morale of his unit was low and that many of the NVA and VC want to go home or rally, but are uncertain of the treatment they will receive.

Mai Trong Bong, a North Vietnamese second lieutenant, who was captured on 26 December by ARVN, reported that the heavy weapons support companies in his regiment were being disbanded to furnish personnel for the infantry companies. He also reported that the regiment was short of food. Additional rice and salt were supposed to have been provided by the local committee chiefs; however, he said that no rice depots remain.

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Pham Ngoc Cuong, a sergeant who rallied on 28 December from a Viet Cong guerrilla unit, reported that his unit has suffered heavy casualties, and that now they have received NVA replacements.

Vo Tam, a cell leader who rallied in mid-December from a large guerrilla band, reported that there were 20 NVA troops in his guerrilla unit, and that his unit had a sapper squad composed of boys between the ages of 13 and 15. He said there was not enough food, morale was low, and that the men fear the constant US artillery and air bombardments.

Bui Van Thong, a regular North Vietnamese soldier originally from the 341st NVA Division, who was captured on 3 December, reported that the mission of his squad leader had been changed to that of training guerrilla snipers and that the mission of his squad was now to snipe and help the people provide rice.

Tran Van Bang, a hamlet guerrilla who rallied on 15 December, reported 2 platoons of NVA troops in Mai Dam training area, where low level VC guerrillas are trained. Bang said that he rallied because he was hungry.



Nguyen Thu, a regular NVA squad leader, who was captured on 30 December, reported that his unit had received the order to work with local guerrillas and support the villagers in farming.

Beyond this pattern in prisoner reports, an indirect reflection of greater emphasis on smaller units by the enemy was apparent in the growing numbers of enemy killed by Marines in small unit engagements.

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The charts here display the number of enemy killed monthly by Marine units of battalion size and larger (left, below) and the number killed by units of squad and platoon size. The change of pattern in November and December is noteworthy.



The emphasis upon guerrilla tactics by the enemy indicates his understanding that a guerrilla is more difficult to find and more troublesome to fight than the enemy regular soldier operating with a large unit. Beyond this, guerrilla tactics tend to equalize our superiority in supporting arms.

All told, the 140,471 Marine small unit operations during 1966 had a damaging effect on the guerrilla infrastructure. However, the current increase in enemy emphasis on this part of his campaign presages intense and critical action for the forthcoming months.



The Marines have already started decisive action to counter the enemy emphasis on guerrilla war. The pace of the counter guerrilla effort in December was accelerated by more than 65% over November. During the month, a record high of 18,369 small unit counter guerrilla operations were conducted,

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as compared with 11,256 in November, 10,713 in October and 10,372 in September. This is 5,168 higher than the previous record of 13,201 registered during May. The results were apparent in the number of enemy killed: 361, which was 24% above the 1966 monthly average.



In addition to the small unit operations, a battalion-size counter guerrilla effort, Sierra, was launched on 12 December in the troublesome Mo Duc Strip region south of Chu Lai. Previous operations in the area during the year were Double Eagle I in January and February, Oakland in June and July and Fresno in September which, combined, killed 405 guerrillas.

The largest single encounter of Sierra occurred on 22 December, when a Marine platoon encountered an estimated 70-man VC company west of Mo Duc. During the ensuing engagement, the Marine platoon, with artillery support, killed 26 VC and captured 1, without a friendly casualty.

On the 26th, a Marine reconnaissance team in the mountains to the south of Mo Duc observed a

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100-man guerrilla unit sortie from its mountain base. A combination of artillery, naval gunfire and pursuit by a heliborne Marine rifle company, caused the enemy to leave 15 dead and 2 weapons behind.

On the 27th, one company of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was lifted into the coastal region east of Duc Pho. In a series of small engagements, 16 VC were killed, 3 VC captured and 2 suspected guerrillas apprehended.

By month's end, with the operation still underway, the count of enemy losses reached 89 Viet Cong guerrillas killed, 13 VC captured, 1 rallier to the GVN cause, 12 weapons captured, 27 Viet Cong suspects apprehended and 45,000 lbs of rice captured.


Additional details on counter guerrilla operations by the individual battalions of III MAF are presented on the three following pages.

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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA




During December, Marine battalions in the Danang area conducted 11,270 small unit operations, including 8,825 patrols, 2,331 ambushes, and 114 company size search and destroy operations. This compares with a total of 4,230 counter guerrilla operations in December, 1965. On 3 December, the 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry (US Army) returned to the operational control of the 173rd Brigade, leaving a total of 9 battalions in the Danang area.

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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHU LAI TACTICAL AREA



In the Chu Lai area, 5 battalions and a detachment of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion conducted 5,742 small-unit actions, including 4,095 patrols, 1,615 ambushes and 32 company size search and destroy operations. This was 3,682 more small unit actions than were conducted during December, 1965. There were no changes to units assigned to the tactical area.


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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PHU BAI TACTICAL AREA



At Phu Bai, there were 1,357 small unit operations, which compares with 506 operations conducted during December, 1965. On 15 December, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines departed for Okinawa.

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THE THREE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING AREAS

LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS
 AIM: DESTROY VC AND NVA
 MAIN FORCES

Support large unit operations by consolidating government control and strengthening base of resistance to enemy. Strengthen village defense against large scale attack.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

AIM: ASSIST IN NATION BUILDING

Support counterguerrilla operations by improving relationship between military and civilian and by bringing improved living conditions to the countryside. Destroy basis for propaganda. Collect intelligence.

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

AIM: DESTROY GUERRILLA FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

**MARINE
 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
 PROGRAMS IN 1 CTZ**
 1 JANUARY-31 DECEMBER
 1966

THE PROGRAMS

ESTABLISH
 VILLAGE SECURITY

TRAIN LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES
 78 new villages had defense forces in training by end 1966; 18 combat ready

ESTABLISH
 VILLAGE GOV'TS

CONDUCT VILLAGE CENSUS
 Censuses taken in 56 villages in 1966; 44 more in progress

IMPROVE
 LOCAL ECONOMY

ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING LOCAL MARKETS
 21 new markets established in 1966; 71 more under construction

IMPROVE PUBLIC
 HEALTH

GIVE MEDICAL TREATMENT
 1,021,351 persons given medical treatment in 1966

IMPROVE PUBLIC
 EDUCATION

SUPPORT STUDENTS
 38,883 students supported in 1966

SUPPORT GVN
 REFUGEE PROGRAM

ASSIST IN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
 146 refugee camps housing 262,000 refugees built in 1 CTZ; 46 camps housing 100,000 refugees in Marine areas completed

THE SUBPROGRAMS

HELP VILLAGES DEVELOP DEFENSE PLANS
 38 villages completed defense plans in 1966; 43 more in progress

HELP ESTABLISH VILLAGE INTELLIGENCE NETS
 120 new village intelligence nets being established by end 1966; 12 completed

HELP ESTABLISH VILLAGE PSYWAR AND PHO INFO PROGRAMS
 By end 1966, 14 villages had effective programs; 34 more in progress

ASSIST IN INSTALLING GOV'T OFFICIALS
 Working gov'ts installed in 78 villages in 1966; 32 more under development

RESTORE SECURITY FOR GOV'T OFFICIALS
 In 1966 59 new village defense began leading in their own villages

MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH GOV'T OFFICIALS
 49 meetings of 1 CTZ Joint Coordinating Council in 1966; daily personal contact at lower levels

PROTECT RICE HARVEST
 Amount enemy rice taken reduced by 80%

IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS
 60 villages now linked with district; 38 villages linked with their hamlets

ASSIST IN LOCAL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
 1,116 Marine sponsored construction projects completed in 1966

EVACUATE THE SICK
 1,853 critically ill civilians evacuated in 1966

GIVE MEDICAL TRAINING
 500 persons given medical training in 1966

FEED THE HUNGRY
 2,116,076 pounds of food distributed in 1966

TEACH ENGLISH
 1,353 English language classes conducted in 1966

HELP BUILD SCHOOLS
 117 schools constructed in Marine areas in 1966

GIVE VOCATIONAL TRAINING
 Marines sponsored vocational training of 71,837 students in 1966

ENCOURAGE RESETTLEMENT
 5 resettlement complexes sponsored by Marines, DAOI through self help; 486 houses completed; 2,300 Vietnamese resettled

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Revolutionary Development, as an indispensable companion to offensive military operations, is the means by which the gains made in purely military victories are preserved. Without effective Revolutionary Development, friendly progress can be nullified by an enemy who is able to move in behind a departing friendly force, and reassert his domination over the peasant.

1966 has seen modest progress in this area, as well as the emergence of a new challenge in Revolutionary Development which will certainly affect the whole of the war in Vietnam. Referred to is the decision to reorient the ARVN to the Revolutionary Development task, and away from conventional warfare.

During 1966, 889 square miles, 90 villages, and 640,000 people were brought under some measure of Marine influence, resulting in 1,077,055 Vietnamese, or 45% of the population of the coastal plain, being afforded increased security. For a large share of these people, this improved security was substantial. At the end of the year, the number of villagers living in areas under firm friendly influence (60% or more on the III MAF scale) exceeded 598,335 as compared with approximately 210,000 when the year began; village defense plans had been established in 38 villages, versus five at the beginning of the year; and defense forces were organized in 13 villages, where there were none in January.


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The following charts portray Revolutionary Development progress in the Marine areas during the year.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IN MARINE AREAS




Other indices of progress in 1966 are shown graphically on the next page, followed by three maps depicting the overall Revolutionary Development situation in each Marine area at the end of the year. A map of the Dong Ha area is included to show the RD status in eleven villages where Marines are located near the DMZ.

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1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN MARINE AREAS




Note: There are 579 villages in I CTZ, 372 in the I CTZ coastal plain and 183 in the Marine areas.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - DANANG AREA




%	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
Under 20%	457	428	512	515	401	650	684	687	644	648	649
20%	57	56	62	59	84	93	43	52	56	54	54
40%	18	31	28	31	15	114	103	84	102	96	96
60%	26	45	43	43	22	52	48	102	91	93	94
80%	31	29	31	31	15	90	101	94	106	108	106
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	689	589	676	676	676	999	999	999	999	999	999
Under 20%	94,491	95,489	163,432	116,723	89,007	94,735	115,000	144,747	138,960	138,869	138,869
20%	36,258	35,054	33,102	11,417	80,892	62,386	95,552	86,425	86,425	79,887	79,887
40%	16,100	17,483	34,562	33,100	12,234	100,182	95,541	84,892	90,679	87,919	87,919
60%	19,036	53,539	32,596	26,401	8,710	64,988	69,119	85,718	79,321	77,727	85,051
80%	175,000	210,000	218,668	289,120	296,027	338,765	339,848	339,243	345,640	355,035	347,711
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	340,885	411,565	482,360	482,360	566,521	651,076	736,440	741,025	741,025	739,437	739,437
Under 20%	53	47	57	57	34	40	39	34	33	33	33
20%	9	8	8	2	17	20	18	19	19	18	18
40%	4	7	7	9	12	13	17	16	17	17	17
60%	5	9	8	7	10	12	17	16	16	16	17
80%	1	1	2	7	10	14	18	19	20	20	19
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	72	72	82	82	82	104	104	104	104	104	104

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - CHU LAI AREA




%	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
Under 20%	244	193	264	264	234	341	376	207	207	195	164
20%	30	34	73	24	20	20	44	68	68	80	111
40%	—	25	—	—	22	28	32	89	89	39	39
60%	—	22	—	—	43	37	27	87	87	85	85
80%	—	—	—	—	38	38	63	81	81	133	133
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	274	274	347	347	357	469	532	532	532	532	532
Under 20%	91,145	58,460	103,843	106,378	73,038	88,125	137,441	100,272	100,272	88,483	71,953
20%	21,624	18,240	38,045	8,036	16,508	16,508	28,745	32,168	32,168	36,097	52,627
40%	—	26,802	—	22,198	14,260	23,583	26,139	46,365	46,365	27,560	27,560
60%	—	9,267	12,083	17,159	30,196	20,773	12,455	36,316	36,136	41,705	41,705
80%	—	—	4,191	4,191	29,372	24,926	41,033	62,457	62,457	78,736	78,736
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	112,769	112,769	157,962	157,962	163,374	174,015	245,813	277,578	277,578	269,581	269,581
Under 20%	21	16	30	30	23	28	29	25	25	24	20
20%	5	3	7	2	3	3	5	6	6	7	11
40%	—	5	—	4	3	4	5	8	8	5	5
60%	—	2	2	3	6	4	3	7	7	7	7
80%	—	—	1	1	6	5	8	11	11	14	14
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	26	26	40	40	40	45	50	57	57	57	57

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - PHU BAI AREA




%	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
Under 20%	22	22	98	88	48	49	49	40	40	40	40
20%	25	7	—	10	—	49	0	41	41	41	42
40%	—	8	15	—	—	—	9	17	17	17	—
60%	38	1	3	10	—	—	8	8	8	8	24
80%	—	47	46	—	—	56	—	56	56	56	56
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	85	85	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
Under 20%	17,740	17,760	16,583	13,408	10,381	10,381	10,381	10,381	10,381	10,381	10,381
20%	11,852	4,055	—	1,676	18,573	18,573	9,524	9,524	9,524	9,524	9,524
40%	—	7,651	10,090	—	—	—	9,049	9,049	9,049	9,049	—
60%	23,486	483	952	7,445	7,717	29	5,296	5,296	5,296	5,296	14,345
80%	—	23,229	26,542	26,442	31,536	33,787	33,787	33,787	33,787	33,787	33,787
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	53,078	53,078	54,167	54,167	68,037	68,037	68,037	68,037	68,037	68,037	68,037
Under 20%	4	3	14	13	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
20%	2	1	—	1	3	3	2	2	2	2	2
40%	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—
60%	5	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2
80%	—	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	7	7	7
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	11	11	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY - DONG HA REGION



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	OCT	DEC	CHANGE OCT-DEC	OCT	DEC	CHANGE OCT-DEC	OCT	DEC	CHANGE OCT-DEC
40%	—	38	+38	—	3,663	+3,663	—	2	+2
60%	102	102	—	18,014	18,014	—	6	6	—
80%	10	23	+13	10,799	13,654	+2,855	2	3	+1
TOTAL	112	163		28,813	35,331		8	11	

NOTE: Advanced RD status is largely a result of long term GVN efforts in this region. However, Marines have participated actively since July.

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ARVN Support of RD:

A major development of 1966 was the beginning of reorientation of the ARVN toward Revolutionary Development tasks, which, in turn, requires the deployment of more Marines to the hinterland to assume the functions of the ARVN forces. It is intended that the Marines will support and assist the ARVN as they make this major change. At the same time, and while protecting the flanks of the ARVN RD endeavor, the Marines will also continue to expand their civic action efforts, and will continue to develop Combined Action Companies as security personnel who can remain in the villages when the basic pacification project is completed.

There was evidence that the ARVN leadership in I CTZ is determined to carry out the basic policy of the conversion. In December there was a program ready to start, aimed at educating each ARVN battalion on the importance of the RD effort, and plans for employment of the ARVN units in RD were well advanced.

How well the ARVN will progress in this new and wholly different direction is not yet predictable. The RD role runs contrary to the traditional image of the Vietnamese soldier, who is not characteristically compassionate where the common people are concerned. Revolutionary Development tasks have, in the past, been generally regarded by the ARVN soldier as less befitting his stature than pursuit of Viet Cong regiments and battalions. It is plain that much Marine support, encouragement and example are going to be needed if the scheme is to have any hope of maturing.

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Revolutionary Development Management:

Problems connected with the ARVN conversion should be diminished somewhat by the functioning of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council which, in 1966, became an effective agency for the management of the overall RD effort in I Corps.


When first organized, at III MAF suggestion, in late 1965, the Council included only US membership. Now the Council includes, as well, key Vietnamese military and civilian officials involved in Revolutionary Development. Its primary purpose is to coordinate the available civilian and military resources with the various competing programs. In 1966, the Council was instrumental in the establishment of a school for rural health workers and a vocational training program for refugees, priority repair of the Ha Thanh dam in the Ngu Hanh Son area, expeditious delivery of long-overdue bridging material, and distribution of clothing and foodstuffs donated by other countries.

In I CTZ, the combined GVN/US organization for Revolutionary Development reaches to the village and hamlet level. The formal structure is thus far in operation down through provincial councils. At the district and village levels, coordination is by direct liaison between the US Advisory Group personnel and personnel of III MAF. The overall GVN/US RD management structure is shown on the chart on the following page.

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ORGANIZATION FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IN I CTZ







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Civic Action:

Marines support the Revolutionary Development Council in many ways, but none is more important than the III MAF civic action program. In 1966, for example, it involved over 25,000 separate visits by Marines to hamlets or villages for the express purpose of engaging in civic action activities. Over one million Vietnamese were given medical treatment and 2,000 of the more critically ill were evacuated to civilian or military hospitals. Approximately three million people were fed and 93,000 pounds of clothing distributed.




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
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Also during the year, 588 Vietnamese were given medical training; some 36,000 school children were provided with tablets, pencils, and other supplies; 1,553 English language classes were held; and approximately \$16,000 was donated to Vietnamese charities. At the same time, 1,118 construction projects were completed - most of them joint Marine/Vietnamese ventures, and over 110,000 pounds of soap were passed out to villagers.


PERSONS MEDICALLY TRAINED




STUDENTS SUPPORTED



ENGLISH LANGUAGE CLASSES IN PROGRESS




MONEY DONATED

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
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CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS COMPLETED



POUNDS OF SOAP DISTRIBUTED

County Fairs:

There were five County Fair operations conducted during December, compared with four during November, five in October, and 14 in September. A total of 6,032 persons were screened and processed by ARVN or GVN authorities during the month; 1,496 of these received medical or dental treatment by U. S. Navy or Vietnamese medical personnel. Five guerrillas were killed and 14 others captured, raising to 454 the total number of enemy killed or captured during the 88 County Fair operations conducted in 1966.





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The charts below show the major activity in the County Fair program since its beginning.

COUNTY FAIR RESULTS



In spite of the gains made during the year in increased security for the people and in better methods of operation, the number of County Fairs conducted falls far short of the goal of

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
10 per week. The shortfall continues to be attributable to a lack of ARVN and GVN support on the scale needed, although recent events give some encouragement in that direction.

Kit Carson Scouts:

Another effective product of RD, in 1966, involves the use of carefully selected Chieu Hoi returnees who voluntarily participate in Marine counter guerrilla searches and psywar operations. Called "Kit Carson Scouts", the former VC help ferret out enemy hiding places, caches and mines; identify guerrillas known to them, and broadcast pro-GVN propaganda.

At year's end, 19 Kit Carson Scouts were in the employ of III MAF. Plans call for increasing the number to 50 by April and 100 by July. This increase is a direct result of the success of the first 19 scouts. Their familiarity with the terrain and VC tactics has led, so far, to the killing or capture of 47 enemy, the capture of 16 weapons and discovery of 18 mines and tunnels.

There should be no difficulty in obtaining additional scouts. In December alone, 171 of the enemy came over to our side, raising to 1,531 the number of military Chieu Hoi in I Corps for the year. Monthly rates are shown below.



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
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Revolutionary Development Cadre Groups:

On the GVN side of the Revolutionary Development effort, an important development was the increased emphasis placed by the GVN on Revolutionary Development Cadre Groups. These groups are organized and trained to assist villages and hamlets to achieve an improved measure of government control and security.

Although groups and teams of varying dimensions charged with an RD role have been in I CTZ for some time, it was not until June 1966 that the first cadre teams arrived from the Vung Tau academy established specifically to train cadre personnel. Four cadre groups were inserted in the National Priority Area south of Danang at that time. Since then, an additional 65 groups have been added and during 1967 it is hoped to bring the total up to 134 cadre groups committed in I Corps.

The RD Cadre Group is made up of 59 Vietnamese, male or female, and is organized as follows:

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE GROUP (Strength-59)

The Command Element includes the group leader, a deputy group leader who is also the political officer, an intelligence officer, 2 communications-liaison cadre, and 2 medics.

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
The Military Element provides protection for the Cadre Group and reinforces hamlet security. In addition, the element organizes and trains the hamlet militia.

The Construction Element is made up of two teams - civil affairs and development. The civil affairs team assists the group leader and the hamlet officials in the administration of the hamlet's political, economic and social affairs. This team is composed of three cells of three men each. These are the Census Grievance Cell, the Motivational Cell and the Administration Cell.

The Development Team is responsible for the pursuit of New Life Development Programs. It is composed of six cells of one man each. These are the Educational/Cultural Cell, the Sanitation and Hygiene Cell, the Land Reform Cell, the Agriculture and Cottage Industry Cell, the Cooperatives Cell and the Public Works Cell. Each of these cells has a responsibility for working with the various individuals in the hamlets who have an interest in the particular activity.

Within each province, a Provincial RD Cadre Group supervises each of the 59 man RD Cadre Groups operating within its boundaries. This group is organized as follows:

PROVINCIAL RD CADRE GROUP (Strength-15)

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Within I CTZ, RD Cadre Groups are controlled and assigned by the Province Chief or the Province Revolutionary Development Chief, in accordance with the annual RD Plan for the Province.

When assigned to a village, the cadre may be employed in full group strength or task organized teams may initiate programs to be joined at a later date by additional teams in the group.

The first order of business is to take the census and interview the populace to determine their grievances and aspirations. The Cadre determines the status of the local government officials and conducts a survey of the situation to determine needs. The remainder of the program builds on this base. The Cadre continues to work with the local government, strengthening it and eventually sponsoring elections. The Cadre organizes self-help projects and obtains the material and funds necessary for their completion. The entire process can take up to one year or longer to complete in any village, depending on the effectiveness of the cadre and the reception accorded them.

Refugees:

Another important development in 1966 was the large increase in refugees. During the year the number in I CTZ rose from 165,000 to 282,000. The influx has had the favorable effect of denying the VC a needed labor and agriculture force, and of decreasing the manpower base from which to impress recruits. But it has also taxed GVN resources for care and rehabilitation. Of the total refugee population, about half is residing in 149 refugee camps dispersed throughout I Corps. The remaining 141,000 have elected to shift for themselves, living with friends and relatives or in squatters' shanties. Although tabulated as refugees, this latter segment receives no aid from the Vietnamese government.

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The GVN agency charged with administering the refugee program is the Special Commissariat for Refugees, which is subordinate to South Vietnam's Prime Minister. Through it, and the subordinate Regional and Provincial level Special Commissariats, USAID as the primary US agency, and various private or semi-official philanthropic groups provide food, clothing, tools, medical and educational facilities, and technical assistance for the relief and resettlement of refugees.

The task of finding new homes for these people in refugee centers and integrating them into the society progressed slowly during 1966 due to a shortage of land in I Corps for permanent resettlement, and to some extent because of the changing attitudes of the people themselves. Where many initially wanted to return to their homes as soon as possible, now many prefer not to risk leaving the sanctuary of comparative peace, and want to stay until the war ends.

For some, the refugee center represents safety in unsettled times - free from the fear of VC retribution and oppressive taxation. Others look also to the opportunities for their children to receive an education and learn skills.

III MAF's contribution to refugee relief and rehabilitation during 1966 took the form of providing food, clothing and medicine to help satisfy the immediate needs of some 100,000 people living in 48 camps throughout the Marine areas, as well as sponsorship of self-help construction projects. Five resettlement hamlets containing 466 dwellings have been built under Marine supervision and assistance. 390 families, representing almost 2,400 people, have occupied these hamlets.

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Combined Action Companies:

In 1966, the Combined Action Company Program moved forward steadily. The CAC Program, it will be recalled, was initiated by III MAF in 1965, in relation to the long term goal of helping the Vietnamese form a professional local security force of their own throughout the countryside. By December 1965, six platoons were in being; a year later, the number of platoons had grown to 58. There were 31 platoons at Danang, 14 at Chu Lai, and 13 at Phu Bai, with a total strength of 1,494 Vietnamese and 762 US Marines and Navy personnel.

Particularly noteworthy in 1966 was the quality and effectiveness of the units, a result of III MAF's concerted effort to arm the Vietnamese, train them well, and inspire them with confidence. During the year, CAC units conducted 20,103 small unit patrols and ambushes, which resulted in 129 enemy confirmed killed and 137 others captured - with the loss of 6 Marines and 5 Popular Force soldiers.

In the CAC units, there is no evidence of jealousy or problems respecting authority or prerogatives. The willingness of the Marines and Popular Force members to live together, eat together, patrol at night together and sleep in the same tents has effectively exhibited the soundness of the program. The absence of problems of relationship suggests the high likelihood that this same formula can be applied with success to Regional Force and ARVN units. At year's end, in fact, the effectiveness of the close Marine/Vietnamese relationship has caused the I Corps Commander to agree to an arrangement which will put one Marine platoon with a regular ARVN company in the prime pacification region.

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BASE DEFENSE

Among the missions assigned the Marines by COMUSMACV is defense of the airfield complexes at Phu Bai, Danang and Chu Lai, where 37% of the attack and fighter aircraft in Vietnam are based.

The US capital investment represented by those complexes is noteworthy.

BILL

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Estimated Dollar Value</u>
243	Jet Aircraft	\$992,069,000.00
153	Propeller Aircraft	34,550,000.00
287	Rotary Wing Aircraft	193,587,000.00
	Vertical Airfield Facilities	25,234,000.00
	Horizontal Airfield Facilities	39,031,000.00

Total estimated dollar value--\$1,284,471,000.00

Throughout 1966, defense of these installations was closely integrated with the overall III MAF offensive activity. The basic system is a defense in depth, employing mutually supporting positions organized to absorb an enemy attack prior to it reaching its objective. Supplementing the defense in depth has been aggressive offensive pressure exerted against the enemy, keeping him occupied with defending himself and denying him the opportunity to organize and launch an effective attack upon the airfields.

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This defense was oriented toward three major threats: attack by enemy ground forces, attack by enemy air, and possible disruption of air base operations resulting from political unrest.

During 1966, the major threat to the air base complexes occurred during the political unrest which erupted during March following General Nguyen Chanh Thi's removal as I Corps Commander by Premier Ky. Fanned by the Buddhists, who called for the removal of all military men from the government in Saigon, the unrest spread rapidly throughout I Corps. During the ensuing two months, incidents of armed conflict between opposing Vietnamese factions seriously threatened Marine operations. III MAF's new headquarters facility was fired upon, mortar fire was received on the Danang airfield, the Danang River Bridge was threatened with destruction and mob action threatened to bring about open civil war. CG, III MAF, through swift and positive action, was instrumental in restoring normal conditions.

The second threat, attack by enemy ground forces, consisted of only three ineffective hit-and-run type mortar attacks.

The third threat, attack by enemy aircraft, failed to materialize during 1966. Prepared to oppose it are two Hawk battalions, a total of 69 Marine fighters, 55 Air Force fighters and 88 US Army multiple .50 caliber or 40 mm weapons.

The aircraft population of the five major airfields in I CTZ at end-1966 is shown on the map on the following page.

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Hue Phu Bai

- 1 Marine Helo Sqdn (21 UH-34)
- 1 Marine Obs Sqdn (-) (12 UH-1E)
- 2 USA Avn Co's (13 OV-1, 21 O-1, 1 U-1)

Marble Mountain

- 3 Marine Helo Sqdns (47 CH-46, 23 UH-34)
- 1 Marine Obs Sqdn (26 UH-1E)
- 1 Marine Acft Maint Sqdn (8 O-1, 8 CH-37, 6 UH-34, 1 CH-46, 2 UH-1E, 1 C-117)

Danang

USMC

- 1 Marine Ftr/Atk Sqdn (11 F-4)
- 1 Marine All-Weather Ftr Sqdn (16 F-8)
- 1 Marine All-Weather Atk Sqdn (12 A-6A)
- 1 Marine Photo/ECM Sqdn (7 EF-10B, 5 EA-6A, 9 RF-4B)
- 2 Marine Acft Maint Sqdns (3 TF-9J, 3 C-117, 5 UH-34, 2 US-2B)

USN

- Minc (2 EC-121)

USAF

- 1 Tact Air Spt Sqdn (30 O-1)
- 3 Tact Ftr Sqdns (49 F-4)
- 2 Det Air Rescue Sqdns (2 HH-43, 5 HH-16)
- 2 Air Commando Sqdns (13 C-123, 3 AC-47)
- 1 Det Ftr Interceptor Sqdns (6 F-102)

USA

- 1 Aviation Co (30 UH-1)

VNAF

- 1 Liaison Sqdn (17 O-1, 7 U-17)
- 1 Ftr Sqdn (23 A-1)

Ky Ha

- 3 Marine Helo Sqdns (48 CH-46, 24 UH-34)
- 1 Marine Obs Sqdn (21 UH-1E)
- 1 Marine Acft Maint Sqdn (6 CH-46, 5 UH-34)

Chu Lai





- 4 Marine Atk Sqdns (79 A-4)
- 3 Marine Ftr/Atk Sqdns (42 F-4)
- 2 Marine Acft Maint Sqdns (4 TF-9J, 2 C-117)
- 1 ROK Marine Avn Plaf (3 O-1)

* Does not include 74 Marine aircraft undergoing repair or maintenance out-of-country.

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AIR OPERATIONS

Throughout 1966, the air operations of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing contributed substantially to realization of the six Honolulu Goals. During the year, 60,544 fixed wing combat/combat support sorties were flown in support of III MAF and other Free World forces. Monthly sorties for the majority of Marine fixed wing aircraft are shown below.

MARINE FIXED WING AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY-1966


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
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MARINE HELICOPTER ACTIVITY-1966


UH-34D (HELO)




CH-46A (HELO)



UH-1E (HELO)



MARINE HELICOPTER SORTIES-1966




In December, a total of 6,293 combat and combat support sorties were flown - 82% of them in support of III MAF operations and 270 of them supporting ARVN and ROK Marines in the Republic of Vietnam. 643 additional sorties were flown in North Vietnam and Laos. Of these, 4,252 attack sorties delivered 6,345 tons of ordnance on enemy targets. The 370 sorties flown by the 12 A-6A Intruders delivered a significant portion - 1,888 tons, or 28% of the total ordnance with less than 8% of the attack aircraft. The greater portion of the A-6A strikes (325 sorties) were flown under night or limited visibility day-

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light conditions when the capabilities of this all weather attack plane permitted close air support strikes during adverse conditions.

Bomb damage assessment showed 1,849 enemy buildings destroyed or damaged, and 43 sampans destroyed with another 11 damaged. Confirmed kills credited to the aviation side of the air/ground team, during December, were 124, or 19% of the total NVA/VC killed by Marines in I CTZ.




While December weather in base and target areas caused the cancellation of over 500 sorties, ASRTs controlled 1,467 air strikes in support of Marine and ARVN units during conditions of low visibility.

Helicopter operations were also hampered by adverse weather and low ceilings. Nevertheless, 30,192 sorties were flown on combat troop lift, combat logistic support, medical evacuation, search and rescue, tactical control and reconnaissance missions. Over 79.5% of these missions supported Marine operations. In Operation Sierra, the battalion size counter guerrilla operation in a 270 square mile area south of Quang Ngai, 376 helo sorties were flown in the first 19 days of the operation. The results obtained, to 31 December, are largely due to the

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ability to maneuver swiftly with helicopters to exploit contacts and sightings. This form of operation, discussed in the Counterguerrilla section on page 35, may prove to be the rule in the future, should the enemy continue his emphasis on guerrilla operations.



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
~~SECRET~~LOGISTICS

During 1966, the logistic system supporting III MAF completed its evolution from an amphibious orientation to a complex designed specifically for support of the Marine endeavor in Vietnam.

In the spring of 1965, less than 600 Marine support personnel provided service support to the initial 6,000 man Marine force. By 31 December 1966, over 5,500 men assigned to the Force Logistic Command were providing service support to the III MAF force of 70,617.

The in-country portion of the complex, the Force Logistic Command, developed three main components in 1966 - at Phu Bai, Danang and Chu Lai. In addition, three Logistic Support Areas were established at Khe Sanh, Dong Ha and An Hoa to support operations in those areas. The organization of the FLC is such that additional elements can be constituted to support other combat operations as the need arises. The layout of the end-1966 Marine logistical complex in I CTZ is portrayed below.

III MAF LOGISTICS FACILITIES, END-1966



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A single inventory control system, managed by the Force Logistic Command through electronic data processing systems, now provides continuous inventory at all Marine logistic activities under its command. This prevents a shortage in one outlying support area when there might be an overage at another. Data is also interchanged daily between the Force Logistic Command and the Marine off-shore logistic support organization at Okinawa, the 3d Force Service Regiment. The latter command, in turn, provides data to Marine Corps Supply Centers and control points at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Barstow, California; and Albany, Georgia.

Logistical highlights of 1966 were:

- Establishment of the logistic support base at Dong Ha to support Operations Hastings and Prairie near the DMZ.
- Completion by the US Navy of two permanent and one De Long deep water piers in Danang harbor, providing the first facility for alongside unloading of deep draft ships.
- Increase of Marine engineer battalions from 2, in January, to 5 in December.
- Installation of permanent fuel storage facilities at Danang, Cua Viet (Hue) and Chu Lai.
- Major improvements to base areas and construction of storage and maintenance facilities.

While the rains of the northeast monsoon were heavier in 1966 than in 1965, they had considerably less effect. The extensive work completed during the year on roads, ports and covered storage facilities degraded the effects of the 1966 monsoon to the extent that no essential operations were impeded due to lack of logistic support.

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A review of the month-to-month logistical situation by major functional area shows the progress made during 1966.


Supply:

Class I - It was possible to reduce the original stock-age objective for rations from 52 days to 38 days during October due to greater consistency in shipments. Covered and refrigerated storage facilities constructed during the year were adequate to provide sufficient fresh rations throughout the month despite a considerable increase in forces.

Class II - Supply support continued to improve over the year. Of the 79,408 demands placed on the 3d Force Service Regiment during December, 53% were filled, while the Force Logistic Command filled 42% of the 69,248 demands placed on it.

The 1966 gross fill rate is one measure of the overall effectiveness of the supply system supporting III MAF. During 1966, a total of 1,400,293 requisitions were levied upon the FLC and 3d Force Service Regiment. A total of 887,248 requisitions were filled during the same period. This equates to a gross fill rate of 85.2% for 1966. The chart following displays the cumulative fill rate, by month, of WestPac Marine supply agencies.

TOTAL WESTPAC FILL RATE

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Class III/IIIA - During December 1966 heavy seas created some difficulty in ship-to-shore delivery of bulk fuel supplies. A permanent bottom-laid pipeline was completed at Chu Lai during the month. Stock levels of 5 days drummed, 15 days bulk and 30 days of package products are maintained. The increase in POL storage facilities in I CTZ is shown under engineer operations, on page 81.

Class IV - Stock levels have remained sufficient to meet the daily demands to support continuing tactical operations. The day to day demands for fortification materials for construction at advanced areas such as Dong Ha and An Hoa were consistently met over the year. Class IV materials were maintained at a 45 day level.

Class V - Ground stocks remained at the established stockage of 45 days. However, in December, CINCPAC assumed managerial allocation of seven items of ground munitions which were in critical supply, to ensure a fair share distribution. Items being so allocated are: 5.56mm ball, 60mm high explosive, 60mm illumination, 81mm high explosive, 81mm illumination, 105mm high explosive and 4.2 inch high explosive. There has been no adverse effect on III MAF operations deriving from shortages of these items.

Class VA - Stocks are maintained within the CINCPAC allocations. With increased production and pipeline fills, the shortages or maldistribution of certain items of aviation ordnance which existed in early 1966 have disappeared. There has been no adverse effect on III MAF air support of Marine or ARVN operations arising from allocations of ordnance.

Maintenance:

The material deadline rate, which has shown an overall improvement throughout the year, continued to improve during December. The initial FMFPac concept for maintenance in RVN provided for performance of first through third

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echelon in-country; fourth echelon at the 3d FSR on Okinawa, and all depot, or fifth echelon, in CONUS, primarily at Marine Corps Supply Centers, at Barstow, California, and Albany, Georgia. Due to the effects of climate and sustained usage, maintenance requirements have demanded a maximum effort to keep tactical units in a combat-ready posture. Because of the long supply and maintenance pipeline, and as forces in-country have steadily grown, transportation has become more critical, causing maintenance efforts to be shifted toward the using units. Some fourth echelon maintenance was consequently moved to Vietnam in 1966 while the capability at 3d FSR, to include limited fifth echelon repair, was increased, and additional rebuild capabilities were arranged in Japan.

The overall material deadline rate of combat essential equipment decreased from 12.5% at the beginning of the year to 8% at year's end. In the face of this favorable trend, there was essentially no improvement in deadline rates on engineer equipment. Throughout the year there was a shortage of parts, in a degree which affected adversely the operations of III MAF.







The deadline of general supply items remained under 5%. The communication-electronic, ordnance and motor transport combat essential deadline rates decreased considerably. The charts on the following page show the rates for each type of item.

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MATERIAL DEADLINE COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT





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Related to deadline rates are repair activity statistics affecting the major supporting units. During 1966, 43,822 combat essential equipment work orders were received by the 3d FSR and FLC. 42,370 of these were completed. This equates to a job completion rate of 97%. The following charts display by month, the status of work orders processed during 1966 by major supporting units, and exhibit the volume of heavy maintenance and rebuild carried out by the FMFPac logistic structure.



Resupply:

A daily average discharge rate of 8,221 M/T was attained during December, resulting in 254,881 M/T of cargo being unloaded at I CTZ ports during December. 91,201 M/T of cargo were back-loaded, bringing the total throughput in I CTZ ports for the month to 346,082 M/T, 325,983 M/T through Danang alone.

On 31 December, there were 9 cargo ships in the port of Danang, with 22,036 M/T of cargo waiting to be unloaded. This compares with 13 ships and 44,160 M/T on 30 November.



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Over the year, cargo throughput at Danang increased from a January 1966 figure of 188,180 M/T to 325,983 M/T in December. At the beginning of the year there was no deep draft cargo ship berthing capability in the Danang port. By year's end four ships could be accommodated at piers. The average number of ships arriving in port each month during the year was 27. The average number of ships being unloaded was 26. Ships awaiting unloading averaged one.

Cargo unloaded and awaiting unloading at Danang during the year, and the number of ships unloaded by month are portrayed below.



Airlift Status:


After initial difficulties, which carried over from 1965 in the availability of airlift from Okinawa to RVN, the establishment of a MAC channel direct to Danang in the early part of the year permitted smoother flow of critical cargo.

The airlift situation continued favorable in December as 1,792 S/T were airlifted from Okinawa to I CTZ during the month. Of this amount, 1,477 S/T were shipped on the

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MAC channel from Kadena to Danang, 283 S/T were lifted by organic USMC aircraft, and 32 S/T were moved on special airlift by the 315th Air Division. The graph below shows the tonnage airlifted during the year.



Movement:

December began with the loading of BLT 1/9 at Okinawa for duty with the Special Landing Force of the Seventh Fleet, relieving BLT 3/26, which moved into RVN.

Upon arrival of BLT 3/26 in-country, BLT 1/4 departed RVN for Okinawa to undergo rehabilitation and re-training. Early in December, elements of the 11th Engineer Battalion and equipment for MATCU-62 arrived at Dong Ha. During the latter part of the month, HMM-262 arrived at Danang, along with elements of the 11th MT Bn, 7th Separate Bulk Fuel Company and more than 2,600 replacement personnel.

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December movements brought the total units moved into the III MAF areas of I CTZ during the year to 30 combat, combat support and service support battalions compared to 20 moved in during 1965.

In addition, a total of 4 Battalion Landing Teams and 14 aircraft squadrons rotated to Okinawa and Japan for training and refurbishing of equipment.

Aircraft Maintenance:

The year 1966 saw the introduction of four new types of aircraft into the Marine inventory in Vietnam - the A-6A attack plane, the EA-6A electronic countermeasure aircraft, the RF-4B photo reconnaissance aircraft and the CH-46A helicopter.

The first month's operations of the CH-46A helicopter, which arrived at Danang in March, uncovered problems with excessive dust intake into the turbine engines. Development and fitting out of the aircraft with full airflow filters was accomplished in coordination with the manufacturer and the problem appeared to be overcome by the end of the year. Difficulties were also encountered with shortages of UH-1E and UH-34D helicopter blades, but these disappeared as the rebuild facilities and pipeline expansion caught up with the growing numbers of deployed helicopters.

The Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) program in WestPac parallels, but by its nature is more extensive than, rebuild of ground equipment. Through this system, Marine aircraft are processed through an extensive rework (in most

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cases, completely dissassembled and rebuilt) in Japan at specified intervals. The PAR intervals for Marine aircraft by type are:

A-4 C/E	18 months
F-4B, RF-4B	15 months
CH-46A	16 months
UH-1E	25 months

In addition to the complete overhaul of aircraft in WestPac, a significant shift of intermediate level maintenance took place in December, as the location of T-58 jet engine rebuild was moved from Cubi Point in the Philippines to MAG-16 at Marble Mountain.

One maintenance problem has arisen which is not yet completely resolved. Teflon bearings in the rotor head of the UH-1E have shown excessive wear due to the dust environment in landing zones. Replacement by steel needle bearings has been proposed by the manufacturer with delivery to in-country squadrons to commence in February 1967.


NORS/NORM rates, discussed in detail in the November 1966 edition of this report, are a measure of the operational readiness of total aircraft on hand. NORS, "not operationally ready due to supply" and NORM, "not operationally ready due to maintenance" reflect aircraft not available for operations. All aircraft not in these categories are ready to perform missions assigned. This measurement system came into being in the Pacific area in June of 1966, and does not correspond to measurements which can be applied to previous reporting systems.

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The first half of the year is therefore not depicted in the following graphs.

NORS/NORM - WESTPAC AIRCRAFT



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Engineer Operations:

The lack of adequate roads to meet logistic requirements, coupled with the adverse effects of the 1965-1966 monsoon on the roads that did exist, required a great effort during the year to build new roads and maintain those which existed. During 1966, Marine engineers and NMCB's added 107 miles of new roads and did maintenance on or improved 1,582 miles of existing roads. Prefabricated bridging was utilized by the two Marine bridge companies and NMCB's in support of tactical and logistic operations. A total of 48 bridges of all types, from Class 60 bridges capable of supporting Marine M-48 tanks, to the foot treadways installed to facilitate small unit movements, were constructed during the year. Pontoon ferries were employed in many cases until bridges were completed or the requirement no longer existed due to changes in areas of tactical operations.

Significant engineer effort was expended in upgrading the Dong Ha airfield for support of operations in northern Quang Tri, as well as making major improvements to the Chu Lai expeditionary airfield.

At the latter base, a 4,000 foot expeditionary crosswind runway was built, with taxiways to the original 8,000 foot expeditionary aluminum runway. This new crosswind runway will provide added flexibility for air support in I CTZ, especially for the A-4 aircraft which is sensitive to winds across the main axis of a runway.


The original aluminum airfield, built in a month by a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion in May - June 1965, has seen heavy usage during its 18 months existence. Over 115,000 takeoffs and landings have been made from that runway to date. Attesting to the durability of the AM-2 matting and the validity of the system is the fact that during a restablization of the subsurface accomplished in November and December only 1,728 square feet of the 331,774 square feet of matting needed replacement.

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

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Improvements to cantonments and construction of storage and maintenance areas received a major portion of the construction effort. Covered storage and maintenance facilities were increased from the 150,000 square feet which existed on 1 January 1966 to 1,444,764 square feet by the end of the year. The total POL storage facilities in NSA and III MAF areas were increased from 314,000 barrels as the year began to 578,000 barrels in December. A total of 46 fresh water wells were drilled during the year. The following graphs show the month to month progress of significant portions of the construction effort in support of III MAF operations during the year.


MILES OF ROAD WORK, by month



BRIDGES CONSTRUCTED, by month

GROWTH OF POL STORAGE FACILITIES IN I CTZ
(Thousands of barrels)

WELLS DRILLED, by month

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The 1966 road, bridge, and well construction or repair effort was triple that of 1965. The major benefits of these undertakings were not measurable in any spectacular way. It may simply be stated that there was no diminution of the logistic support provided to the III MAF during the 1966 monsoon. And many Marines and huge quantities of supplies were much drier this Christmas than last, despite the 29 inches of rain which fell in the last 10 days of the year.

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1966 STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE (within 25 miles)

DANANG

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
REGION OR SUB-REGION HQ	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
DIV HQ	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
REGT HQ	0 1	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	1 0	1 0
BATTALIONS	3 5	2 3	3 3	4 3	4 3	4 3	4 3	2 3	4 2	3 2	6 2	6 1
COMPANIES	8 2	8 2	5 2	5 2	5 2	4 2	4 2	4 2	4 2	5 2	5 2	5 2
TOTAL STRENGTH	1,840 1,525	1,540 925	2,190 1,425	2,590 1,425	2,590 1,425	2,140 1,325	2,140 1,325	1,340 1,325	2,130 1,025	1,780 1,025	3,300 1,025	3,300 700

— CONFIRMED — PROBABLE

CHU LAI

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
REGION OR SUB-REGION HQ	0 0	0 0	1 0	1 0	1 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
DIV HQ	0 0	0 0	0 0	1 0	1 0	1 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
REGT HQ	0 0	0 0	2 0	2 0	2 0	0 0	2 0	1 0	1 0	1 0	0 0	2 0
BATTALIONS	4 2	5 2	10 2	8 2	9 1	1 1	7 1	7 1	7 1	9 1	6 1	9 1
COMPANIES	11 0	9 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	12 0	9 0	9 0	10 0
TOTAL STRENGTH	2,190 600	2,110 600	6,559 600	6,500 600	7,000 300	1,600 300	5,400 300	4,600 300	4,580 300	4,720 300	2,600 300	6,000 300

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1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE (continued)

PHU BAI

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
REGION OR SUB-REGION HQ	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
DIV HQ	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
REGT HQ	0 0	0 0	1 0	0 0	1 0	1 0	1 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
BATTALIONS	2 1	2 1	7 0	4 0	7 0	7 0	7 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0
COMPANIES	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	3 2	3 2	3 2	3 2
TOTAL STRENGTH	955 550	995 550	3,695 150	1,795 150	3,795 150	3,595 150	3,695 150	1,695 150	1,785 150	1,785 150	1,800 150	1,800 150

— CONFIRMED — PROBABLE

DONG HA

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
REGION OR SUB-REGION HQ	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 0	1 0	1 0	1 0
DIV HQ	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 0	2 0	2 0	2 0
REGT HQ	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7 0	7 0	7 0	7 0
BATTALIONS	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	28 0	30 0	30 0	30 0
COMPANIES	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1
TOTAL STRENGTH	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	19,376 120	19,349 120	19,300 120	19,100 120

— CONFIRMED — PROBABLE

Note: Dong Ha totals include 17,000 NVA troops in and north of DMZ within 25 miles of Dong Ha.

2. ENEMY LOSSES (to Marines)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
KILLED	332	662	1262	503	658	1021	1577	975	1789	777	443	628	10,627
CAPTURED	59	58	54	71	95	158	38	71	35	45	88	141	913
SUSPECTS	618	667	793	698	579	338	308	320	156	328	487	640	5,932
WEAPONS	55	106	226	95	116	74	268	161	116	99	77	152	1,545

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5. III MAF STRENGTH DURING 1966

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
DANANG	28,153	28,952	30,783	25,346	26,030	28,375	28,751	29,934	30,203	27,193	29,560	35,255
CHU LAI	15,069	15,454	19,416	19,268	20,259	20,510	21,332	21,786	21,377	20,736	21,195	21,918
PHU BAI	2,190	2,329	4,147	7,055	8,019	6,860	7,226	5,831	6,016	4,484	4,719	5,617
DONG HA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	8,677	8,857	7,827
TOTAL	45,412	46,735	54,346	51,669	54,308	55,745	57,309	57,551	57,596	61,090	63,661	70,617

Note: Figures reflect strength at end of month. 1 January 1966 strength was 44,196.

6. MARINE AREAS

SQUARE MILES
Goal-3,340 Sq. Miles

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
DANANG	589	589	589	676	676	676	999	999	999	999	999	999
CHU LAI	274	274	274	347	347	347	459	532	532	532	532	532
PHU BAI	85	85	85	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
TOTAL	948	948	948	1,185	1,185	1,185	1,620	1,693	1,693	1,693	1,693	1,693
PERCENT OF GOAL ACHIEVED	28%	28%	28%	35%	35%	35%	48%	51%	51%	51%	51%	51%

CIVILIAN POPULATION
Goal-2,400,000

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
DANANG	340,885	340,885	411,565	482,360	482,360	566,525	651,076	736,440	741,025	741,025	739,437	739,437
CHU LAI	112,769	112,769	112,769	157,962	157,962	163,374	174,015	245,813	277,578	277,578	269,581	269,581
PHU BAI	53,078	53,078	53,078	54,167	54,167	68,037	68,037	68,037	68,037	68,037	68,037	68,037
TOTAL	506,732	506,732	577,412	694,489	694,489	797,936	893,128	1,050,290	1,086,640	1,086,640	1,077,055	1,077,055
PERCENT OF GOAL ACHIEVED	21%	21%	24%	29%	29%	33%	37%	44%	45%	45%	45%	45%

VILLAGES
Goal-372 Villages

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
DANANG	72	72	72	82	82	82	104	104	104	104	104	104
CHU LAI	26	26	26	40	40	40	45	50	57	57	57	57
PHU BAI	11	11	11	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
TOTAL	109	109	109	144	144	144	171	176	183	183	183	183
PERCENT OF GOAL ACHIEVED	29%	29%	29%	39%	39%	39%	46%	47%	49%	49%	49%	49%

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7. LOGISTICS

a. Supply levels at end of month

CLASS I
(1000 of rations/days of supply)

DANANG

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MCI RATIONS	700/28	620/25	775/31	870/30	846/31	687/25	738/25	419/13	256/12	211/9	78/3	144/5
B RATIONS	650/26	350/17	425/17	325/12	496/18	329/12	364/13	364/11	392/19	308/13	396/17	290/10
A RATIONS	33/2	17/1	22/1	27/1	27/1	84/3	84/3	70/2	70/2	158/5	206/7	272/8

CHU LAI

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MCI RATIONS	915/34	558/32	543/32	720/34	572/25	489/22	428/18	330/13	458/21	366/17	268/13	260/13
B RATIONS	233/15	315/19	598/30	418/20	765/34	468/21	403/17	365/15	320/15	322/15	383/18	343/17
A RATIONS	28/2	85/5	20/1	80/4	173/8	65/3	150/6	93/4	88/4	161/7	176/8	117/5

PHU BAI

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MCI RATIONS	79/34	83/35	136/27	122/16	242/31	230/33	210/30	306/44	348/50	309/44	268/38	191/27
B RATIONS	61/27	133/55	92/18	59/8	164/21	140/20	84/12	260/37	257/37	239/34	215/31	197/28
A RATIONS	9/4	15/6	7/1	9/1	11/1	11/2	7/1	14/2	32/5	24/3	45/11	72/10

DONG HA

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MCI RATIONS	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	209/21	230/23	136/19
B RATIONS	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	180/18	300/30	200/29
A RATIONS	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2/1	2/1	0/0

CLASS III and IIIA (BULK)
(1000 gals/days of supply)

DANANG

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
JP-4	415/5	460/5	210/2	145/6	70/4	105/5	702/4	2166/13	1814/10	1448/8	969/8	2535/18
AVGAS	98/16	109/13	58/6	105/8	113/6	100/4	196/9	364/16	397/36	201/20	230/33	193/18
MOGAS	119/9	98/7	104/9	230/14	88/6	166/7	332/16	418/20	404/17	198/8	417/30	334/13
DIESEL	66/9	8/1	64/6	134/3	125/13	114/6	257/14	309/16	258/12	413/18	167/10	388/16

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CHU LAI

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
JP-4	110/16	286/4	322/5	549/6	483/5	974/11	709/8	950/10	323/3	672/3	972/4	1619/6
AVGAS	584/9	34/4	106/9	79/5	207/16	185/12	119/9	228/29	107/6	37/3	80/8	124/16
MOGAS	42/4	89/6	192/14	102/4	188/9	284/12	243/8	103/4	115/5	172/6	76/3	227/9
DIESEL	97/9	37/3	36/2	97/3	203/6	286/9	149/5	272/9	124/4	157/5	86/3	183/7

PHU BAI

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
JP-4	42/16	23/11	40/10	39/4	20/2	45/5	43/4	45/8	49/4	36/3	52/5	45/5
AVGAS	77/35	64/16	106/11	18/4	5/1	79/18	52/6	87/22	99/25	80/20	86/22	74/19
MOGAS	29/20	77/51	34/10	42/14	8/3	23/6	49/6	44/6	63/16	58/15	60/12	54/11
DIESEL	17/24	33/47	19/6	25/10	3/1	8/2	32/4	37/4	40/7	33/6	38/10	33/8

DONG HA

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
JP-4	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	117/8	120/11	110/28
AVGAS	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	98/8	120/12	105/35
MOGAS	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	52/10	36/5	34/5
DIESEL	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	35/9	24/6	27/5

b. Resupply status

PORT OF DANANG

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
SHIPS IN PORT AT BEGINNING OF MONTH	12	9	3	9	6	11	5	11	7	5	11	13
SHIPS ARRIVING DURING MONTH	27	16	28	21	25	23	28	26	21	39	27	30
SHIPS UNLOADED DURING MONTH	30	22	22	24	20	29	22	29	23	33	25	34
SHIPS IN PORT AT END OF MONTH	9	3	9	6	11	5	11	7	5	11	13	9
CARGO BACKLOG AT BEGINNING OF MONTH*	26,650	16,111	12,565	23,785	14,388	56,930	22,197	73,206	21,261	5,127	33,471	44,160
CARGO UNLOADED DURING MONTH*	127,547	98,793	161,096	145,659	113,910	177,659	147,163	183,327	126,721	173,439	177,777	170,528
CARGO BACKLOG AT END OF MONTH*	16,111	12,565	23,785	14,388	56,930	22,197	73,206	21,261	5,127	33,471	44,160	22,036
AVERAGE MONTHLY CARGO BACKLOG*	16,901	8,122	20,955	24,432	21,152	36,684	32,094	38,423	16,031	25,658	29,220	35,117
AVERAGE DAILY DISCHARGE*	4,114	3,528	5,197	4,855	3,675	5,920	4,747	5,913	3,193	5,594	6,787	5,501

*Totals in measurement tons.

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c. Air shipments

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
CARGO LIFTED INTO RVN*	605	1,515	1,947	1,321	1,773	1,471	1,734	2,393	1,087	1,899	2,317	1,792	19,854
CARGO AWAITING LIFT TO RVN ON OKINAWA*	204	135	301	271	414	391	448	298	327	289	357	446	

*TOTALS IN SHORT TONS

d. Red Ball Summary

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
ITEMS AT BEGINNING OF MONTH	230	315	278	315	439	1,035	1,021	1,278	1,587	1,156	1,201	900
ITEMS ADDED DURING MONTH	180	87	132	313	840	574	593	637	402	420	248	101
ITEMS REMOVED DURING MONTH	95	124	95	189	244	612	336	328	833	375	549	499
ITEMS REMAINING AT END OF MONTH	315	278	315	439	1,035	997	1,278	1,587	1,156	1,201	900	502

e. Maintenance

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
ITEMS EVACUATED FROM RVN TO 3d FSR	1,326	1,121	1,582	1,029	218	2,020	1,386	1,509	981	4,044	696	620
ITEMS REPAIRED AT 3d FSR	1,123	1,701	1,366	528	533	2,008	1,619	1,092	848	2,699	342	495
ITEMS RETURNED TO CONUS FROM 3d FSR OR DISPOSED OF ON OKINAWA	856	917	1,087	538	612	1,186	788	37	0	67	120	1

f. Construction in support of III MAF

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
MILES OR ROADS REHABILITATED OR CONSTRUCTED	110	110	113	114	118	121	214	100	98	231	236	124	1,689
BRIDGES CONSTRUCTED	1	1	1	1	1	5	7	2	3	9	10	7	48
WELLS DRILLED	1	4	3	3	5	5	6	5	5	1	6	2	46

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CONCLUSIONSAs to the month of December:

- III MAF was able to reorient rapidly to counter an increased enemy guerrilla effort, while still maintaining a strong security program in the Demilitarized Zone area.

- The peak of the most vigorous monsoon of recent record was unable to diminish the Marine logistic effort in the I CTZ.

As to 1966:

- The Marine balanced program was exhibited to be sound, in a year of productive performance which showed gains in each of the three convergent sectors.

- The victories achieved over North Vietnamese regular units in the fall caused the enemy to intensify his guerrilla effort. Our success against this intensified guerrilla campaign will be a direct measure of our overall progress in months to come.

- The Combined Action Company program advanced sufficiently, and was sufficiently productive during the year to leave no doubt that it must be pursued more extensively, extending, as soon as possible, to ARVN units.

- The success of the ARVN effort in Revolutionary Development will be the basis for the greatest problems facing the Marines in the coming year, since it will influence directly the nature of the Marine effort and the level of Marine troop requirements.

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