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FMFAC: Operations of U.S. Marine
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10770 P942 of 12 October 1971.

P. B. Tiffany

1 Mar 77

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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

VIETNAM

JANUARY 1967

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine Forces in Vietnam for the month of January 1967. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering periods from March 1965 through December 1966.

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SUMMARY

The major development in the I Corps area in January was the reorientation of the ARVN effort to Revolutionary Development tasks. By the end of the month, four ARVN battalions were committed to the RD program in Quang Nam (Danang) province, with two battalions engaged in the program in each of the other four provinces of the Corps. These units were, in the main, undergoing RD-oriented training or conducting counterguerrilla operations.

III MAF forces, meanwhile, began their deployment to the back-country to assume functions hitherto discharged by the ARVN. To date, Marines have committed nine companies to occupation of outposts in the hinterland manned previously by ARVN or GVN paramilitary units. While freeing seven ARVN battalions for employment in the RD program, this new commitment has limited further the Marines' flexibility for the prosecution of offensive operations. They are now engaged over a front which extends some 200 miles from Khe Sanh near the DMZ to Duc Pho, in southern Quang Ngai.

The enemy's efforts to increase his emphasis on guerrilla warfare, which began in late 1966, continued through January 1967, and the III MAF response was an intensification of its own counterguerrilla campaign. Marines undertook 20,501 small unit counterguerrilla actions - the highest monthly total since their commitment to Vietnam, and some 8,796 over the 1966 monthly average. In 1,109 contacts, Marine patrols, ambushes, and company-size searches killed 632 of the guerrilla enemy, also a new record.

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Operations of battalion size or larger were conducted in all five provinces of I Corps, and the Special Landing Force of the Seventh Fleet attacked enemy positions in the Mekong Delta. Overall, these large unit operations were characterized by brief and generally light contact. They resulted in only 278 of the enemy killed, a figure substantially less than the average of the past year.

In January, Marine attack aircraft flew 4,300 combat sorties in South Vietnam, 490 in Laos, and 268 in North Vietnam, while an additional 214 photo reconnaissance and electronic countermeasure sorties were flown north of the Demilitarized Zone. The air effort in South Vietnam killed 202 of the enemy. There were 31,788 helicopter sorties, 27,103 of them in support of III MAF.

Revolutionary Development progress in the Marine areas showed small statistical gains, with fourteen villages advancing in some degree in their pacification level. At month's end, 600,205 villagers were living in areas considered to be under firm government control. As time passes it becomes increasingly plain that progress in Revolutionary Development must depend largely on ARVN effectiveness in their newly assigned RD mission.

As a part of the Revolutionary Development program, 13 County Fairs were conducted in January, the highest total since September. In these operations, GVN authorities processed 8,351 villagers, raising to 54,970 the cumulative number screened, fingerprinted, photographed, and issued identity cards in the 101 Marine County Fair operations since February 1966. Fourteen enemy were killed and 10 captured, bringing to 478 the number of enemy killed or captured in County Fairs to date.

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Combined Action Companies - integrated Popular Force and U. S. Marine infantry - continued to exhibit their effectiveness as local security forces in support of Revolutionary Development. In January, they conducted 3,090 squad size patrols and ambushes, 14 platoon size search and clear operations, and 19 operations in combination with Marine units. CAC's killed 25 of the enemy and captured 56, the latter figure, in particular, an indication of the CAC's ability to obtain, and respond to, information about Viet Cong.

The substantial nature of the CAC program is becoming more visible as time passes, not only in terms of the effectiveness of the Popular Forces involved, in comparison with other Popular Force units, but in the hard achievements of the CAC formations. As a basic unit of measure, since the program began, the Viet Cong have never been able to reestablish control over an area seized from them by a CAC unit.

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GOALS FOR 1967

Past issues of this report have measured progress by the Marines in terms of the 1966 goals established at the Honolulu Conference of February, 1966. Progress attained toward accomplishment of those goals was summarized in the December 1966 issue.

Goals for 1967 have not been similarly stated at the national level. However, both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV have articulated goals and bench marks for 1967. Basic CINCPAC 1967 goals are:

- Neutralize the VC/NVA base areas in the first ten priority groupings.
- Begin to inflict losses on the VC/NVA forces at a rate which exceeds their input.
- Open 100% and secure 50% of the roads essential to friendly operations.
- Open 65% of the railroads and secure those segments in the National Priority Areas.
- Increase the percentage of the population living in secure areas from 56.8% to 66%, and secure 800 additional hamlets.

Based on these CINCPAC goals, COMUSMACV has given instructions to CG III MAF, which result in the following as a reasonable distillation of the goals which III MAF seeks in 1967:

- Neutralize enemy base areas in southern Quang Ngai province.

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- Inflict losses on the VC/NVA at a rate in excess of their monthly input from infiltration and recruitment.

- Open Route 9 from Dong Ha to Thon Son Lam; open Route 1 from the DMZ to Dong Ha and from Quang Ngai to the boundary between I CTZ and II CTZ. Secure all roads in the National Priority Area of I CTZ, Route 5 from Danang to An Hoa, and Route 1 from Dong Ha to Quang Ngai.*

- Open 255 kilometers of railroad in I CTZ and secure that portion of the railroad within the National Priority Area around Danang.

- Increase to 1,782,000 the population living in areas assessed at 60% or higher on the III MAF Revolutionary Development scale.

- Increase to 114 the number of Combined Action Platoons.

Henceforward, Marine progress will be measured against these goals.

* The following definitions are contained in directives promulgated by COMUSMACV:

Roads:

- "Open": Used by RVN/US/FWMAF employing thorough security measures. Frequent incidents may occur.

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- "Secure": Controlled by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with minimum security measures required. Isolated incidents may occur.

Railroads:

- "Open": Segment of rail line between two terminals physically open. Security of surrounding area is such that thorough security measures, including armed escorts are required for all trains. Frequent incidents may occur.


- "Secure": Segment of rail line between two terminals physically open. RVN/US/FWMAF control of the surrounding area is such that trains can operate during daylight hours with relative freedom from VC sabotage, attacks or harassment. Armed escort not required. Isolated incidents may occur.

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The largest engagement of the month occurred during Operation Tuscaloosa (24-28 January), 20 miles south of Danang. This operation was launched when intelligence reports revealed that the Viet Cong were returning to the region west of the National Railway, between the Ky Lam and Ba Ren Rivers. Earlier, the Viet Cong had been driven from the area, with a loss of 507 men, by Operation Macon (July-October).

OPERATION TUSCALOOSA 24 - 28 JANUARY



After two days of minor contact, Companies F and H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines engaged elements of the R.20 Local Force Battalion and drove them west along the Ba Ren River. Helicopter-borne exploitation forces (Sparrow Hawk), supported by air and artillery, landed behind the enemy and, in concert with the overland attack of Companies F and H, routed the Viet Cong. Enemy losses in this one encounter were 74 dead and 4 weapons. Marines suffered 15 killed and 36 wounded. There was no further significant contact in the next several days and Tuscaloosa was terminated on 28 January.

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Operation Prairie, in the northernmost area of the I CTZ, was terminated at the end of January after 5 months duration. Prairie, which at times involved up to 9 US Marine infantry battalions, accounted for the largest number of enemy killed in a single Marine operation to date: 1,397 NVA and VC killed, 7 NVA and 20 VC captured and 248 weapons seized. More important, Prairie and its predecessor in the same area, Hastings, successfully thwarted NVA attempts to establish forces in strength in Quang Tri Province. In later months, it has provided security against both mass NVN incursion and infiltration.

During January, enemy contacts by US patrol and reconnaissance elements were numerous in the Prairie area, but no large enemy formations were encountered. Enemy losses for the month were 79 killed, 15 captured and 43 weapons, while nine Marines were killed. Overall, for the five month Prairie operation, Marines have suffered 225 killed. Upon termination of Prairie, a follow-up search and destroy operation in the same area, called Prairie II, was scheduled to commence on 1 February, with four US Marine infantry battalions committed.

The chart below summarizes the results of Marine operations in the DMZ region since 1 July.

RESULTS OF MARINE OPERATIONS IN DMZ REGION

1 JULY 1966-31 JANUARY 1967

MONTH	OPERATION	ENEMY				USMC	
		KIA Confirmed	KIA Probable	Captured	Weapons Captured	KIA	WIA
1966 JULY	HASTINGS	769	929	0	226	126	448
	DECKHOUSE II	3	0	0	0	0	0
AUGUST	HASTINGS	55	10	14	0	0	0
	PRAIRIE	219	495	2	68	32	140
SEPTEMBER	DECKHOUSE IV	56	64	0	20	17	84
	PRAIRIE	724	890	0	33	98	364
OCTOBER	PRAIRIE	259	141	4	54	39	261
NOVEMBER	PRAIRIE	74	37	2	24	8	61
DECEMBER	PRAIRIE	42	47	4	26	39	226
1967 JANUARY	PRAIRIE	79	103	15	43	9	107
TOTALS		2,280	2,716	41	494	368	1,591

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Operation Sierra, which began on 12 December, 30 miles south of Quang Ngai, involved numerous small contacts in the first half of the month, but decreasing encounters thereafter, as it became evident that the enemy had left the area. The operation terminated on the 21st, having cost the enemy 111 killed, 9 captured, 36 weapons lost and 7 ralliers. Marine losses were 10 killed and 50 wounded.

Five days later, Operation DeSoto commenced in the same area. From the outset, the DeSoto operations revealed the enemy to be well-entrenched. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, and 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines encountered a determined enemy (probably the 38th Local Force Battalion) who often fought from concrete bunkers in fortified villages. The Marine units employed naval gunfire and close air support in their efforts to dislodge the entrenched enemy force, but progress was costly and slow. At month's end, with the operation still in progress, 37 Viet Cong had been killed, compared with 11 Marines killed and 61 wounded.

The remaining larger III MAF operations - Lincoln, Cleveland, and Shark - were of brief duration and without significant contacts.


While III MAF forces were engaged generally throughout the length of I CTZ, 400 miles to the south the Marine Special Landing Force of the US Seventh Fleet launched an amphibious raid on 6 January against enemy positions in Kien Hoa province in IV CTZ. The landing, called Deckhouse V, was made in concert with two Vietnamese Marine battalions, the second time that US and Vietnamese Marines have joined in amphibious operations against the enemy. The previous occasion was Operation Blue Marlin I (10-12 November 1965), in Quang Tin province.

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Throughout the 10 days of Deckhouse V, contacts were sporadic. The absence of major enemy elements, coupled with recurrent reports that the Viet Cong had withdrawn just prior to the Marine landings, accented the likelihood that the enemy had been forewarned of the operation. Despite this disappointment, the operation generated a number of benefits. Among them was the effect of introducing US forces into IV CTZ, displaying to the enemy our intention to prosecute the war in that area. Also on the positive side of the ledger was the experience gained in a major amphibious operation by Vietnamese Marine battalions; and the destruction of a supply, training and rest area which the Viet Cong have long used without interference. Additionally, two enemy small arms and mine factories were discovered and destroyed, and forty-two tons of rice, forty-four weapons, and a quantity of medical supplies were captured. Twenty-one Viet Cong were killed and 11 captured by US Marines. Marines suffered 7 killed and 35 wounded. The objective area of Deckhouse V is shown on the map below.

OPERATION DECKHOUSE V; 6 - 15 JANUARY 1967



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Sting Ray Operations

Companion to the 8 large unit operations conducted by III MAF in January, and similarly aimed at maintaining constant pressure on the enemy, were Marine Sting Ray operations. The Sting Ray program, it may be recalled, involves insertion of small Marine reconnaissance/observer teams, both in the hinterland and in regions of the coastal plain where the enemy might otherwise move unmolested. Sting Ray, in essence, is a technique which is intended to gain maximum benefit from the Marines' thinly spread fire support resources.

During the month, 105 Sting Ray teams were employed, controlling 7 air strikes and 85 artillery missions on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops far inland, in areas where the enemy least expects contact with our forces. Results were 59 enemy killed. In January the Sting Ray teams themselves suffered their heaviest casualties of any month since these operations began, with 5 Marines killed and 30 wounded. The 739 Sting Ray missions to date have accounted for 679 enemy killed, versus 17 Marines killed and 89 wounded.

Naval Gunfire Support

Operations during January continued to underscore the immediate usefulness of naval gunfire. Besides the growing contribution it is making to the support of ARVN and other Free World operations throughout the coastal regions of Vietnam, naval gunfire plays its classic Marine support role, both in the prosecution of large unit efforts and in attacking targets of opportunity in the small unit counter guerrilla campaign.

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In January naval gunfire ships fired 41,000 rounds in support of ground forces throughout the four Corps Tactical Zones. Confirmed results show 407 enemy killed and 726 structures destroyed.

The ability of naval gunfire ships to range the entire coastline, usually outside Viet Cong observation, coupled with the long range of their guns (17 miles in the case of the heavy cruisers), generates not only surprise but great striking power.


Naval gunfire is most effective when it is controlled by observers and spotters on shore. This is accomplished in III MAF by naval gunfire teams which are organic to the Marine divisions. For the other US and Free World military units which do not have this organic capability, a Marine Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, assigned to COMUSMACV, provides specialized teams to fulfill the task.

A total of 161 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ANGLICO personnel are now serving with various ARVN and Free World units, in all four Corps Tactical Zones. They are organized into Shore Fire Control Parties, Naval Gunfire Liaison Teams, Radar Beacon Teams and Tactical Air Control Parties. At end-January 1967, ANGLICO personnel were operating from sites shown on the map on the following page.

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LOCATION OF ANGLICO TEAMS IN RVN



Between 1 March 1966 and 31 December 1966, ANGLICO teams and the naval gunfire spotters organic to III MAF, supporting US, ARVN and Free World forces, controlled the firing of some 365,000 rounds of naval ammunition throughout South Vietnam. Results were 1,714 confirmed enemy killed and 15,127 structures destroyed.

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SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Evidence continues to be uncovered in the Marine areas exhibiting that the enemy is seeking to increase his emphasis on guerrilla warfare and political/military activity. Extracts from captured documents substantiate this trend. A few examples follow:

- "...it behooves us to...step up guerrilla warfare and motivate the people at large to take part in the military - political struggle and in proselyting action designed to win the people's heart and minds...."

- "Thanks to the effort of the Province Party Committee and the Province Unit Operations and Coordination Committee, the activities of the guerrillas, especially the village guerrillas, were stepped up."

- "The trend of activities from now until TET should be steered toward motivating the population to join local guerrilla and Civilian Laborer Forces, as well as safeguard production, and attempt to frustrate the enemy's pacification plan."

- "There is a shortage of political cadre, especially in certain districts where most cadre were women and over age. It is necessary for the cadre to win the sympathy of the youth and organize them since youth always constitute the progressive elements and potential cadre for the revolution. The destruction of tyrants, the attack of the enemy by guerrillas, and construction of combat villages and hamlets should also be stepped up to battle the enemy in pacification plan."

- "The fierceness of the fighting, especially in the last months of 1966, considerably lowered the morale of

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
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the populace and caused many families to make an attempt to call back their members working for the revolution. The agricultural production was greatly affected by the war, and caused people to move to enemy controlled areas for a living and for security."

- "Our action will be directed at the Rural Pacification cadre, officers and U. S. personnel...."

The altered pattern of enemy activity was also apparent in the sharply increased number of attacks by units of company-size and smaller, characteristic of guerrilla tactics. Activity of larger units, however, remained relatively level. This is apparent in the chart below.

ENEMY ATTACKS IN I CTZ



To counter the enemy's intensified guerrilla program, the pace of Marine small unit operations was accelerated during January. Patrols, ambushes and company size search and destroy operations reached a new high - 20,501, an increase of 8,796 over the 1966 monthly average of 11,705. These operations resulted in a record high of 632 confirmed enemy killed during

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the month. Both of these new highs were achieved despite the fact that four infantry battalions continued to be committed to security, surveillance and anti-infiltration tasks in the DMZ area.

There were 1,109 contacts with enemy guerrilla forces during January. Three of the larger and more significant contacts are detailed below.

-On 13 January, an enemy force of 60 VC, probably the 70th Company of the 409th Sapper Battalion, probed the perimeter positions of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines in the Chu Lai area. The enemy attack, embodying small arms and automatic weapons fire, supported by 82mm mortar fire and rifle grenades, was detected before it gained momentum. It was repulsed, costing the VC 17 confirmed killed along with 7 prisoners and 14 weapons captured. Marine casualties were 5 wounded.

-On 14 January, the 1st Marine Regiment was advised by a Revolutionary Development Cadre that there would be a meeting of Viet Cong provincial and district leaders 11 miles south of Danang. Operating on that information, Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines conducted a heliborne raid on the area. Upon landing, Company C surprised a VC force deployed in the hamlet. The enemy, believed to be two companies of the R-20 Battalion, fought with small arms and automatic weapons, supported by 60mm mortar fire. Their defensive efforts were ineffective in the face of the heliborne maneuver and heavy fire support. There were 61 confirmed VC killed. Marine losses were 5 killed and 23 wounded.

-On 15 January, Company K, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines was attacked by a VC force, believed to be the V75 Mortar Battalion supported by mortar and recoilless rifle fire. The attack was discovered before it gained momentum,

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
and the enemy lost 60 confirmed killed, with 14 weapons and other material captured. Marine losses were 13 killed and 22 wounded.

Small unit activity by elements of the individual battalions of III MAF is depicted on the following three pages.

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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA




In the Danang area there were 11,749 small unit operations, including 9,460 patrols, 2,085 ambushes and 204 company size search and destroy operations. This is more than double the total of 4,734 counter guerrilla operations conducted in January 1966.

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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHU LAI TACTICAL AREA




During January, Marine units in the Chu Lai area conducted 7,145 small unit counter guerrilla operations. These operations included 5,115 patrols, 1,951 ambushes and 79 company size search and destroy operations. This total was 4,316 greater than those conducted during the same month in 1966.

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PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PHU BAI TACTICAL AREA



At Phu Bai, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines conducted 1,607 small unit operations during January. This was an increase of 798 over the total conducted during January 1966.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

In December, the decision was made to polarize ARVN efforts in 1967 upon Revolutionary Development, and to deploy Marine forces to the hinterland to assume functions hitherto pursued there by the ARVN. It was recognized that the quality of the ARVN reaction to the major conversion would determine, to a large extent, the rate of progress in Revolutionary Development in the Marine areas.

By the end of January there was evidence that the senior ARVN commanders in I CTZ were aggressively pursuing the basic policies of the conversion program, although little hard performance was yet visible. Four ARVN battalions were engaged full time in Revolutionary Development in Quang Nam province, with two battalions assigned to the program in each of the other four provinces.

ARVN Revolutionary Development plans are still incomplete in some areas - chiefly, Quang Tin province. However, some contributions to this effort have begun to appear. Approximately 121 battalion days of search and destroy operations were conducted in January by ARVN battalions in those priority areas where Revolutionary Development cadre teams have been established, or will be established in the near future.


III MAF units, meanwhile, were beginning their movement to the hinterland to assume tasks formerly performed by the ARVN. To date, Marine companies have occupied nine former ARVN or GVN para-military outposts in Quang Tri, Quang Nam and southern Quang Ngai provinces.

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Occupation of these outposts by Marines was an essential step toward accelerating ARVN Revolutionary Development efforts in I CTZ. At the same time, it has intensified further the already wide dispersion of Marine infantry units, and has limited further the tactical flexibility of III MAF. The chart below shows the distribution of III MAF rifle companies at end-January 1967, including those companies which were participating in large unit operations at the time.

DISTRIBUTION OF III MAF RIFLE COMPANIES-31 JANUARY 1967



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Revolutionary Development Cadre

Revolutionary Development Cadre teams, 59 man units organized and trained to assist villages and hamlets to achieve an improved measure of government control, are presently employed in 69 villages or hamlets in I Corps. These locations are in the more heavily populated coastal regions centered on Quang Ngai City, the Song Thu Bon (river), Hoi An, Danang, Hue and Quang Tri City. GVN plans for 1967 call for expansion of the cadre locations to 65 other points, mainly along the coastal plain of I Corps.

The Office of Civil Operations

Following the creation (by the US Mission in South Vietnam) of the US Office of Civil Operations (OCO) to supervise the entire spectrum of non-military U. S. assistance to the RD program at the GVN level, a regional OCO director was appointed for the I Corps region during January. Additionally, provincial level OCOs are being established.

Subsequent to these actions, a reorganization of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council took place in order to exploit the authoritative position of the Regional OCO. The Deputy Director of the Regional OCO was designated as the deputy chairman for the Council, and three other OCO representatives assumed the functions of the USAID, JUSPAO and USMACV Combined Studies Division representatives, who formerly were members of the Council. Current membership of the Council includes representatives from the GVN (civil and military); OCO; III MAF; I Corps Advisory Group, USMACV; US Embassy (POLAD) and Naval Support Activity, Danang.

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Revolutionary Development Progress

In the Marine areas, January reflected continued slow progress in the RD program, particularly as relates to County Fairs, Civic Action and the Combined Action Company program. Quang Tri province exhibited the greatest pacification progress, as the Dong Ha combat base produced improved levels of pacification in eight villages.

Fourteen villages in the three Marine tactical areas moved upward moderately on the Revolutionary Development scale during January. Two villages, with populations totalling 8,315, advanced from the 20% category to 40%, and one village moved into the 60% group. A total of 600,205 persons are now living in the 76 villages in the 60% or higher classification, a category considered equivalent to "firm government control".

It will be recalled that the Revolutionary Development Indices are the basis of a special measurement system devised by the Marines more than a year ago to permit an orderly assessment of pacification progress in the Marine areas. Indices were selected that would give a balanced reflection of all of the key elements of measurement. For example, great gains cannot be made in "Establishment of Local Government" unless substantial gains have already been made in "Destruction of Enemy Units." Or a high mark in "Establishment of New Life Hamlet Program Development" will be possible only if accompanied by gains in security and in the establishment of local government.

Assessment and recording of the essential indicators is performed regularly, on a village-by-village basis, so that change, trends and progress can be measured

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from month to month against a single common base. This measurement system provides the basis for the various detailed Revolutionary Development maps and charts which are shown in this chapter. On the next page, the detailed list of indices is displayed. They are followed by geographic displays of RD status in the Marine areas, specific examination of status of certain key indices, and RD status in the Dong Ha region, where Marines have been directly assisting ARVN RD efforts over the past four months.

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
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT INDICES

	POINTS
1. DESTRUCTION OF ORGANIZED VC MILITARY FORCES	
a. VC local/main force units destroyed or driven out	15
b. GVN/FWMAF capable of defending the area	5
TOTAL	20
2. DESTRUCTION OF VC INFRASTRUCTURE	
a. Census completed	2
b. VC infrastructure discovered and destroyed or neutralized	8
c. GVN intelligence network established	5
d. Census grievance teams completed interviewing each family	2
e. Principal grievances processed	3
TOTAL	20
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL SECURITY	
a. Defense plans completed	2
b. Defense construction completed	3
c. Local defense forces trained and in place	12
d. Communications established with supporting unit	3
TOTAL	20
4. ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT	
a. Village chief and council elected and functioning	4
b. Village chief lives and sleeps in the village	3
c. Hamlet chiefs and councils elected and functioning	4
d. Hamlet chiefs live and sleep in the hamlet	4
e. Psyops and public information services established	3
f. Village statutes enacted	1
g. Village social and administrative organization completed	1
TOTAL	20
5. COMPLETION OF INITIAL NEW LIFE HAMLET PROGRAMS	
a. Necessary public health works, required to meet initial needs of populace, completed	4
b. Necessary educational requirements, to satisfy initial needs, have been met	4
c. Necessary agricultural works completed	4
d. Adequate ground transportation into and out of the area has been established	4
e. Necessary markets established	4
TOTAL	20
MAXIMUM POINTS 100	

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - DANANG AREA




%	FEB	APR	JUL	OCT	JAN
Under 20%	457	512	650	644	648
20%	57	82	99	56	49
40%	18	2	10	102	102
60%	26	1	13	91	94
80%	31	1	60	106	106
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	669	676	999	999	999
Under 20%	94,491	163,432	94,735	138,960	138,869
20%	36,258	33,102	62,386	86,425	76,385
40%	16,100	3,362	10,112	90,679	91,421
60%	19,036	3,259	5,988	79,321	85,051
80%	175,000	21,663	33,770	345,640	347,711
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	340,885	482,360	651,076	741,025	739,437
Under 20%	53	57	40	33	33
20%	9	8	20	19	17
40%	4	1	13	17	18
60%	5	3	11	16	17
80%	1	2	1	19	19
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	72	82	104	104	104

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - CHU LAI AREA




%	FEB	APR	JUL	OCT	JAN
Under 20%	244	264	341	207	164
20%	30	7	68	101	49
40%	—	—	89	85	133
60%	—	—	87	81	—
80%	—	—	—	—	—
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	274	347	459	532	532
Under 20%	91,145	103,643	88,125	100,272	71,953
20%	21,624	38,045	16,508	32,168	48,314
40%	—	—	23,681	46,365	32,373
60%	—	—	20,773	36,136	41,705
80%	—	—	24,922	62,457	75,736
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	112,769	157,962	174,015	277,578	270,081
Under 20%	21	30	28	25	20
20%	6	7	6	10	6
40%	—	—	8	7	14
60%	—	—	—	—	—
80%	—	—	—	—	—
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	26	40	45	57	57

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - PHU BAI AREA




%	FEB	APR	JUL	OCT	JAN
Under 20%	22	98	49	40	40
20%	25	49	41	42	42
40%	—	17	8	24	—
60%	38	8	56	56	—
80%	—	—	—	—	—
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	85	162	162	162	162
Under 20%	17,740	16,583	10,381	10,381	10,381
20%	11,952	—	18,573	9,524	9,524
40%	—	—	—	9,049	—
60%	23,486	—	—	5,296	14,345
80%	—	—	—	33,787	33,787
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	53,078	54,167	68,037	68,037	68,037
Under 20%	4	14	11	11	11
20%	2	—	3	2	2
40%	—	—	—	1	—
60%	5	—	—	1	2
80%	—	—	—	7	7
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	11	22	22	22	22

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN MARINE AREAS




There are 579 villages in ICTZ; 372 in the ICTZ coastal plain, of which 183 are in the Marine areas.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY - DONG HA REGION



%	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN
40%	—	38	38	21
60%	102	102	102	119
80%	10	10	23	23
Total	112	150	163	163
40%	—	3,663	3,663	1,793
60%	18,014	18,014	18,014	19,884
80%	10,799	10,799	13,654	13,654
Total	28,813	32,476	35,331	35,331
40%	—	2	2	1
60%	6	6	6	7
80%	2	2	3	3
Total	8	10	11	11

NOTE: Advanced RD status is largely a result of long term GVN efforts in this region. However, Marines have participated actively since July.

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County Fair Operations

January was a record month for County Fair operations, in terms of the number of persons screened (8,351) and the number receiving medical treatment (5,179). 13 such operations were conducted by combined III MAF/GVN units. These totals exceeded the previous records set in July when 6,846 persons were screened and 4,912 Vietnamese received medical care.

Several other "firsts" were registered during these operations, including the initial County Fair to be held in the Dong Ha area. It was conducted on 7-8 January and involved screening 2,200 people in Bong Son and Doc Kinh villages.

A new County Fair technique was also produced during January, when 10 "Kit Carson Scouts" accompanied forces operating in An Tra (1) in the Danang area on 21-22 January. The "Scouts" are from a group of former Viet Cong who have rallied to the GVN, and whose antagonism to the Viet Cong is so deep as to cause them to willingly aid Marines in searching out and identifying the enemy. In the County Fair application, the "Scouts" individually addressed small groups of villagers, describing Viet Cong methods and intentions, while also recounting the benefits of the GVN Revolutionary Development Progress.

January County Fair statistics show that 468 persons received dental treatment, and that 8,460 pounds of food, 705 sewing kits and 4,500 bars of soap were distributed to villagers in I Corps. The charts on the following page display County Fair results to date. Fourteen enemy were killed and 10 captured, bringing to 478 the number of enemy killed and captured to date.


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COUNTY FAIR RESULTS


NUMBER OF COUNTY FAIR OPERATIONS

TOTAL TO DATE: 101




VIET CONG KILLED

TOTAL TO DATE: 206 killed; 272 cap'd




PERSONS SCREENED

TOTAL TO DATE: 54,970



PERSONS GIVEN MEDICAL TREATMENT

TOTAL TO DATE: 25,185

Combined Action Company Program

Combined Action Companies continued to prove their effectiveness during January, as they conducted 3,090 counter-guerrilla patrols and ambushes, along with 14 platoon-size search and clear operations and 19 combined operations with Marines.

The CAC's killed 25 Viet Cong and captured only 56 during these operations. However, killed and wounded are only a

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partial reflection of their effectiveness. CAC's have also demonstrated an ability to obtain and use information about Viet Cong activity in their areas. A recent example of this occurred near Danang on 17 January. There, a CAC squad, having obtained knowledge of Viet Cong plans to establish a road block, set an ambush which upset the enemy plans and killed at least 2 guerrillas. Another instance occurred near Hoi An on 22 January, when another CAC unit captured a finance chief for the Viet Cong cadre in Cam An village, as a result of information provided by local Vietnamese.

Since its inception in late 1965, the Combined Action Company program in I Corps has produced a successful joining of Marine infantry personnel with Vietnamese Popular Forces into a single operational unit, with mutual benefits. Based historically on similar units such as the Garde d'Haiti or the Philippine Constabulary, the idea of blending trained military personnel into indigenous forces is a proven technique for obtaining dependable forces for stabilizing emerging countries. The growth of the project in I Corps has been slow, due to shortages of PF personnel and to the fragility of GVN support. Nevertheless, it shows promise, and is accelerating steadily.

Vietnamese personnel in the Combined Action Company program are provided from the 593 Popular Force Platoons and 381 separate PF squads in the five I Corps provinces. The PF commanders are responsible, through their village chiefs, to district and province chiefs.

Typically, the PF Platoon consists of 1 officer and 38 enlisted, organized into 3 rifle squads of 11 men each under a 5-man platoon headquarters. To this base,

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one Marine rifle squad is added, along with a US Navy hospital corpsman, to make a Combined Action Platoon (CAP). The Combined Action Company is an administrative grouping of 2 or more CAP's with a company headquarters. The CAC is normally commanded by a Marine captain, with an ARVN lieutenant as his executive officer. To date, 8 CAC headquarters and 57 CAP's have been formed, to which 729 Marines and 74 corpsmen are assigned.

The CAP's are positioned on critical terrain or at significant locations, usually selected by the District Chief. Their missions are:

1 - Destruction of the Viet Cong infrastructure in the village/hamlet area for which they are responsible.

2 - Provision of public security and maintenance of law and order.

3 - Protection of the friendly government structure.

4 - Protection of bases and communications axes within their assigned areas.

The objectives of Marine/Navy participation center on the motivation, training and guidance of the PF assigned. Upon full achievement of these objectives, the Marines will be removed and the PF unit will continue its mission alone, while the Marines move to another PF unit and recommence their leadership and training efforts.

The Combined Action Platoon is trained as an integrated unit, and military instruction is conducted in both English and Vietnamese. Demonstrations and practical application of techniques are stressed.

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Included in the training syllabus are marksmanship, scouting and patrolling, counter guerrilla techniques, intelligence collection and prisoner handling, communications, population control, etc. Participating Marines are also given preliminary instruction dealing with the political-military structure of the RVN, artillery observation procedures, the Vietnamese language, characteristics and customs of the people, and other subjects designed to prepare them to understand and assist their Vietnamese counterparts.

While the results of the CAC program are impressive, when viewed in terms of the accompanying statistical chart, perhaps of even greater significance are several less tangible indices. One useful result of the program is the increased effectiveness of the Popular Forces involved. At the bottom of the RVN military ladder, poorly paid and ill-equipped, they are generally not highly effective. Those in the CAC's are as productive as any element of the RVN military establishment. Another beneficial result of the program derives from the Marines living in the hamlet or village and sharing its culture. This has increased mutual understanding and confidence, while providing a de facto representative of the United States among the townsfolk. The Marine squad leader is a continuing source of information and, by virtue of his stature can promote confidence in the United States and in US efforts in Revolutionary Development.


But the most important evidence of their effectiveness is the fact that the Viet Cong have never been able to reestablish control over an area, once security has been established by a Combined Action Platoon. During the twelve months experience in this endeavor, the presence of a CAP in a village complex has removed that village from further use as a Viet Cong sanctuary.

The gradual growth of the CAC program and the locations of CAC units in the Marine areas are displayed on the following page.


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
DISTRIBUTION OF COMBINED ACTION UNITS



DANANG			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	5	30	—
PLATOONS	31	316	668
TOTAL STRENGTHS		346	668



CHU LAI			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	1	6	—
PLATOONS	13	158	412
TOTAL STRENGTHS		164	412



PHU BAI			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	2	12	—
PLATOONS	13	207	402
TOTAL STRENGTHS		219	402


LEGEND

- ★ COMBINED ACTION COMPANY HQ
- COMBINED ACTION PLATOON

31 JANUARY 67 TOTALS

UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	8	48	—
PLATOONS	57	681	1,482
STRENGTHS		729	1,482

GROWTH OF COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS



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Civic Action

The responsiveness of the joint US/GVN civic action program to the needs of the people of South Vietnam was evidenced in Hoa Tho village on 24 January. The occasion was the dedication of 32 new homes to replace those destroyed in the accident on 24 December, when a commercial cargo aircraft crashed in the village, causing the deaths of 110 Hoa Tho villagers.

Dedication of the new homes, just one month from the date of the accident, was the culmination of an emergency project undertaken by US Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 58. Other US agencies joined Vietnamese local and national government authorities in providing other emergency aid in the form of solatium payments, medical treatment, food, clothing and shelter.

Generally, the civic action program in January continued to grow at about the same level as December. In addition to an increase in construction activity from 51 projects in December to 192 in January, other significant increases took place in activities associated with medical aid. 104,743 Vietnamese civilians were treated by III MAF medical personnel, an increase of 23,771 persons over the previous month. Additionally, the number of critically ill civilians evacuated increased from 236 to 276. Further, 54 civilians were given medical training as compared to 23 persons so trained during December.

Psychological Operations

During January the number of "Chieu Hoi" (Open Arms) returnees in I Corps reached a new high of 213, providing evidence of the increasing effectiveness of III MAF/GVN psychological operations. The highest

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number of returnees for a previous month was in February 1966, when 205 former Viet Cong or Viet Cong sympathizers rallied to the GVN as a result of the amnesty program.

Also during the month, there was a marked increase in the level of psychological operations related to the approaching "TET" holiday. Activities included distribution of over 36 million leaflets, 213 broadcasts and 65 other visual presentations, compared to 28 million leaflets, 107 broadcasts and 55 visual presentations in December.

Revolutionary Development Communications

By the end of January, 38 villages in I Corps had established communications systems between the village headquarters and its component hamlets, as well as between the village and its district headquarters. At the same time, some 52 other villages had partially established such nets.

The equipment positioned in these villages and hamlets includes 1,351 radio-phones provided from the US Office of Civil Operations (OCO) or from GVN resources. These are low cost, battery-powered instruments, suitable for use by inexperienced personnel. The system, which was set up between 1962 and 1964, will receive an infusion of new equipment during 1967 and 1968, in accordance with plans of OCO and the GVN Special Commissariat for Administration.

In addition to the OCO village/hamlet system, another means of communication available to village, district, provincial and military officials has been provided by the III MAF Combined Action Company program. Radio (FM) equipment is presently on hand or to be

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provided for each of the Combined Action Platoons in the Marine tactical areas (see map on page 39).

At the district and provincial level, telephones and a command and operations radio net presently link all headquarters. A supplementary voice/code net exists as a back-up link between province and district headquarters. Additionally, a police AM/FM net has terminals at the various province and district headquarters and in selected villages. A Revolutionary Development net also ties each district headquarters to 69 RD Cadre Teams throughout I Corps, at villages where the teams are presently employed. A total of 333 AM radios and 149 FM radios are held by all of these GVN elements. This total will also be raised as new equipment becomes available and RD programs expand their scope, according to 1967 - 1968 OCO/GVN plans.

III MAF units are able to enter any of the above radio nets, as required, and battalions and regiments are connected by telephone and radio with neighboring district headquarters. Thus, the more than 6,800 radios in the III MAF communications system are able to complement or expand the GVN communications capability whenever such a need may arise.

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
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BASE DEFENSE

In January, the enemy made one known attempt to disrupt operations at the five major airfields under Marine protection. It consisted of a middle-of-the-night, hit-and-run mortar attack at Phu Bai on 20 January. Like similar attempts in recent months, it caused no damage to airfield facilities or aircraft.

At end-month, aircraft population of the critical bases was as shown below.

**AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT THE FIVE MAJOR AIRFIELDS
IN I CTZ AS OF 31 JANUARY 1967***



* Does not include 70 Marine aircraft undergoing repair or maintenance out-of-country.

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AIR OPERATIONS

During the month, Marine attack aircraft flew a total of 5,058 combat sorties: 4,300 in South Vietnam, 490 in Laos and 268 in Route Package I of North Vietnam. Electronic countermeasure and photo reconnaissance aircraft flew an additional 214 sorties north of the DMZ.

Over 6,369 tons of bombs and napalm, 11,000 rockets and 111,000 rounds of 20mm cannon ammunition were expended on enemy targets in January. Results of these attacks show 202 enemy confirmed killed by air and 1,769 buildings and 36 bunkers destroyed. Further evidence of the effects of this intense air effort came from a former member of the 1st VC Regiment who rallied to the GVN in Quang Ngai province at the end of the month. According to Le Van Lum, his company had suffered 100 casualties during late November due to bombing and artillery missions. He further stated that civilians in the countryside who had previously supported the Viet Cong were turning against them. Le said people have asked him, "What is the use of feeding you if you cannot defeat the enemy? You are only capable of drawing bombs."


Strike aircraft flew 791 sorties in close support of the eight Marine large unit operations from Prairie at the DMZ to Operation DeSoto at the southern border of I Corps. Four hundred forty-one air attacks supported Operation Prairie and 193 were flown in support of Operation Chinook in Thua Thien.

The accelerated pace of Marine air operations in support of the intensified counter guerrilla campaign led to a sharp increase in antiaircraft incidents in January. During the month, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing lost 2

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fixed wing aircraft and 6 helicopters to antiaircraft fire. In addition, a total of 38 fixed wing aircraft and 138 helicopters received combat damage ranging from single bullet holes to major damage requiring overhaul facility repairs in Japan or the Philippines. Fixed wing sorties and anti-aircraft incidents over the past 12 weeks are shown below.



The A-6A Intruder

In November VMA(AW)-242 arrived in-country, equipped with 12 A-6A aircraft. Since that time these aircraft, with a substantial all weather capability, have flown over 1,300 sorties, including 952 at night. Over 1,052 instrument flight hours have been logged without accident or incident; a creditable night/all weather record.

During January, a total of 473 A-6A sorties delivered 1,777 tons of ordnance on enemy targets in I CTZ and North Vietnam. All 67 strikes north of the DMZ were flown at night and during poor visibility, when other aircraft types were obliged to abort due to target weather. Bomb damage assessments are limited in the environment in which this

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aircraft performs. However, four secondary explosions from hits on supply dumps have been sighted and an average of 3 or 4 moving targets have been detected and attacked each night.

The bomb carrying capacity of the aircraft, complemented by automated navigational and attack problem solving systems, makes it a versatile element of the tactical air effort.

Possible ordnance loads for the A-6A include 30 MK-82 500 pound bombs which can be delivered on a target obscured by weather or darkness 500 miles distant, or 5 MK-84 2,000 pound bombs which can be placed on targets 750 miles from the launching base. Other possible loads include five 1,000 pound fire bombs, four AGM-12 Bullpup missiles, or various combinations of these weapons with bombs or external fuel tanks. In short, the A-6A represents about 3.5 times the usual bomb load capability of the A-4 or F-8 aircraft and twice that of the F-4B.

The automated systems, called Digital Integrated Attack and Navigation Equipment, short name DIANE, include a digital computer, a high resolution search radar, a target tracking radar, an inertial navigator, an automatic flight control system and an automatic defensive and passive electronic countermeasure system. The output of the various automatic systems is displayed in the cockpit to present a real world picture of terrain and/or target. Readouts of geographical location, range and bearing to a check point or target are constantly available.

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Capabilities inherent to the DIANE include the ability to detect moving targets on the ground with the search radar and initiate an immediate attack on the target with the computer system providing continuous data to the crew. Another useful capability is offset bombing by radar. Using a prominent terrain feature or a radar reflector at a known geographical point as a reference, the Intruder can be directed to targets by range and bearing from the reference point. By this method ordnance can be delivered on targets which the pilot cannot see. Nine Special Forces camps in I CTZ have been surveyed by A-6A radar and prominent terrain features charted. Two camps have been provided locally fabricated radar reflectors, and AN/PRC-25 radios have been installed in the Intruders to permit direct communication with ground units.

The complex avionics systems which give the Intruder its capabilities are not easily maintained. The average number of aircraft with complete all-weather capability, all systems functioning, has been between 1 and 2 each day. Improved intermediate level avionics support should improve this situation, as the supply pipeline expands. As an interim step in this direction, on 25 January the Chief of Naval Operations directed a realignment of priorities in allocation of spare parts for the A-6 aircraft in WestPac. The effects of this measure were not yet apparent at the end of the reporting period.

Helicopter Operations

A total of 4,262 tons of supplies were delivered

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to combat units and 47,421 personnel were lifted in I CTZ by MAG-16 and MAG-36 helicopters during the month. Of the total 31,788 sorties flown, 27,103 were in support of III MAF operations, 1,897 for I Corps ARVN and 2,806 for the 2d ROK Marine Brigade. Of these, 1,427 sorties were flown to evacuate casualties.

During January, a detachment of HMH-463 arrived from CONUS. The four CH-53A helicopters with which this element is equipped extend significantly the heavy lift capability organic to III MAF. The CH-53A can lift up to 8,000 pounds of cargo internally at a cruising speed of 150 knots to an advanced landing zone, hover for 10 minutes, land and return to the original take-off point with a 4,000 pound payload, and still have 10% fuel remaining.

The cargo compartment is 30 feet long, 7.5 feet wide and 6.5 feet high. Cargo handling is accomplished through a rear ramp. Conveyors and built in winches permit rapid loading and unloading. In addition, a hoist for external lifts is located in the center of the cargo compartment. Under ideal ambient conditions, a 2 1/2 ton truck can be lifted for limited distances. The external lift capability of the CH-53A permits it readily to lift disabled UH-34D or CH-46A helicopters and return them to base.

A secondary mission for the CH-53A is the movement of troops or casualties. In normal configuration, the helicopter can seat 37 combat equipped troops or carry 24 litters.


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The size of the CH-53A, over 88 feet long, dictates landing zones 200 feet wide on fairly level ground. The 95 knots of wind generated by the main rotor blades at maximum power make the removal or securing of any loose material in the area necessary.

In the first three weeks of combat operations in Vietnam, the four CH-53A helicopters have flown 129 sorties and, at the end of the month, had an aircraft readiness level of 66 percent.

HELICOPTER SORTIES AND PASSENGERS LIFTED



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LOGISTICSGeneral

January weather was severe in I CTZ. In fact, it has been severe throughout the monsoon season when, during October and November alone, rainfall in the Danang area exceeded 50 inches. Winds were high and temperatures low, especially in the DMZ area. High seas impeded coastal resupply, mud slowed down cross-country movement, and low ceilings reduced air resupply operations. However, despite these difficulties, logistic operations continued at a rate equal to the pre-monsoon period.


Supply

There were no changes of special significance during the month. Allocations of Class V and VA munitions had no adverse effect on Marine operations.

Engineer Operations

Work continued on maintenance of 103 miles of existing roads; at the same time, nine miles of new roadway were completed. During the month, ten new bridges were constructed and four were under construction. Upgrading of airfields and construction or maintenance of living quarters, mess halls, latrines, shower facilities, and other buildings were emphasized.

During the month, for example, 391 strong-backed tin-roof living quarters were completed; 345 strong-backed canvas-roof living quarters were converted to tin-roof structures; and 9 galleys, 83 latrines,

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and 8 showers were constructed.

Work continued on the construction of a 2,400 foot airstrip and a 200 X 400 foot parking apron at Minh Long, southwest of Quang Ngai. At Tien Phuoc, west of Chu Lai, the runway was being extended from 1,690 feet to 2,400 feet, while at An Hoa, southwest of Danang, 700 gallons of asphalt were placed on the 2,030 foot runway.

Port Facilities

<u>Status of Danang</u>	<u>Capacity(ST/BBLs per day)</u>
<u>Port Construction (see drawing below)</u>	
Deep draft	
2 Permanent piers (600'X90')	2,000 ST each
Shallow draft	
Museum Site, Danang	
Main	
2 LST ramps	400 ST
2 Causeway sections (lighterage)	360 ST
Quay Wall (1600')	1,800 ST
Tien Sha facility, Danang	
East	
3 LST ramps	600 ST
3 LCU ramps	540 ST
Lighterage site	160 ST
Ferry landing, Danang	
East	
2 LST ramps w/finger pier	500 ST

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POL facilities

2-4" assault lines

14,000 BBLS

Total facility capacity


Cargo

9,220 ST

POL

14,000 BBLS

DANANG HARBOR FACILITIES



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Planned development
Danang Port

ST/BBLS per day BOD

Deep draft		
One Delong Pier	1,440 ST	Feb67
Shallow draft	None	
POL facilities		
China Beach		
2 - 10" lines	120,000	Jan67
(commercial)	BBLS	
Red Beach		
2 - 12" lines	160,000	UNK
	BBLS	

Status of Chu Lai
Port Construction

ST/BBLS per day

Deep draft	None
Shallow draft	
4 LST ramps	800 ST
4 LCU ramps	540 ST
POL facilities	
1 - 4" assault line	7,000 BBLS
Total facility capacity	
Cargo	1,340
POL	7,000 BBLS

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<u>Planned development</u>	<u>ST/BBLs per day</u>	<u>BOD</u>
<u>Chu Lai Port</u>		
Deep draft	None	
Shallow draft		
2 LST ramps	400 ST	Jul67
Wharf (300')	450 ST	Jan67
Wharf (500')	750 ST	Feb67
POL facilities		
Mooring w/submarine pipeline		
1 - 8" line	50,000 BBLs	Jan67
1 - 12" line	80,000 BBLs	Jan67

<u>Status of Port Construction,</u> <u>At Hue, Tan My, and</u> <u>Dong Ha</u>	<u>ST/BBLs per day</u>
Deep draft	None
Shallow draft	
3 LCU ramps (Hue City)	180 ST
3 LCU ramps (Tan My)	180 ST
3 LCU ramps (Dong Ha)	180 ST
POL facilities	
1 - 4" assault line (Hue/Tan My)	7,000 BBLs
1 - 4" assault line (Dong Ha)	7,500 BBLs

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Total facility capacity

Cargo	540 ST
POL	14,000 BBLs

Planned Development
Hue, Tan My and
Dong Ha
ST/BBLs per day BOD

Deep draft

None

Shallow draft

4 LST ramps
 (Hue/ Tan My)
 2 LST ramps

800 ST UNK

400 ST Mar67


POL facilities

None

Port Activities

Cargo operations during January were hampered by adverse weather conditions and a stevedore strike. Throughput, nevertheless, remained high. A daily average discharge rate of 7,831 M/T resulted in 242,750 M/T of cargo unloaded during the month. At Danang on 31 January there was one cargo ship with 1,436 M/T of cargo awaiting unloading, which compares with five ships and 22,136 M/T on 31 December, 1966. Average backlog at Danang during January was 27,896 M/T.

Airlift of cargo continued favorable, with 1,937 S/T airlifted from Okinawa. Of this amount, 1,226 S/T were shipped on MAC channel from Kadena, and 711 S/T were lifted by organic Marine aircraft, a monthly high.



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Movement and Resupply

January began with the departure of BLT 2/4 from Okinawa for rotation into RVN, where it arrived (Danang) on 5 January. On 6 January, elements of the 11th MT Bn and 7th Separate Bulk Fuel Company also debarked at Danang, followed on 7 January by detachments of VMO-3 and HMMH-463. (Another detachment of these two organizations arrived at Danang on 18 January). On 23 January BLT 3/9 rotated to Okinawa; BLT 1/9 commenced loading at Okinawa on 30 and 31 January for rotation into RVN.


Aviation Logistics

The operational readiness of WestPac aircraft was virtually unchanged in January, as compared with December, except for the F-4, which improved from 40% to 54%. (Operational readiness rates of WestPac aircraft were contained in the December report of this series). On 31 January, 41 aircraft of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were undergoing scheduled progressive aircraft rework at facilities in Japan; 29 others were receiving unscheduled repair for extensive damage. The NORS/NORM rates for WestPac aircraft since June 1966 are depicted on the graphs on the following page.

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NORS/NORM - WESTPAC AIRCRAFT



*Adjusted totals

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The A-6A, introduced in-country in November, is experiencing continued high NORS/NORM rates. The NORS rate is attributed to the inadequacies of the pack up, and a lack of system assets. The NORM rate, running consistently higher than the NORS rate, is the result of the shortage of technical skills of maintenance personnel and the lack of general and special support equipment. These rates, however, are expected to decrease as skilled maintenance personnel, adequate system assets and spare parts are received (see page 47).

The CH-53, which arrived in-country during January, has not been in-country long enough to provide a clear picture of its NORS/NORM rates. During most of January, the NORS rate was 25%, the NORM rate was 10% and the readiness rate was 65%.

Computers

During January, the first IBM-360 computer was installed at 3d Force Service Regiment, commencing replacement of the first generation IBM 1401 system. The new system will eventually replace 1401's (and the second generation 1401-B6) both at 3dFSR and the Force Logistics Command, providing the first computer system with a full memory bank capability.

The 360's will permit fully automated inventory control, deadlined equipment reporting, ammunition supply accounting, and personnel reporting, all of which were only partially computerized with the older system. In addition, the 360 systems will increase speed and accuracy in handling and accounting for assets, whether in the hands of units or in storage, and will make the entire ground supply system more responsive to the needs of supported units in terms of transaction time. One additional benefit of the 360 is that

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it will be completely compatible with the new Supported Activities Supply System, wherein supply accounting down through battalion-level will be performed by computers. The latter exceeds the capability of the 1401 series computers.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS1. PHU BAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
Det., VMO-3	8Jan	Arrive	Danang
2dBn, 26thMar	19Jan	Depart	Danang

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Northern Sub-Region Hq	1	0			
Regt Hq	1	0	Regt Hq	0	0
Battalions	5	4	Battalions	0	0
Companies	3	3	Companies	2	2
Total strength	2400	1800	Total strength	150	150

The total enemy strength within 25 miles of Phu Bai includes the Northern Sub-Region Headquarters, the 6th Regimental Headquarters, and the 806th Battalion whose locations shifted southward to positions that are within 25 miles of both the Dong Ha/Phu Bai Tactical Areas. The 600 increase in strength over December is attributed to the estimated 850 man strength of these additional units, combined with an estimated loss of 150 assessed against the 802d Battalion. Overall totals include normal Order of Battle adjustments.

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2. DONG HAMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Northern Sub-	1	1	Northern Sub-	0	0
Region Hq			Region Hq		
Division Hq	2	2	Division Hq	0	0
Regimental Hq	7	7	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	30	30	Battalions	2	0
Companies	2	3	Companies	2	1
Total			Total		
Strength	17,450	19,100	Strength	200	120

The total enemy strength within 25 miles of Dong Ha includes the 324 "B" and 341st NVA Divisions which are located in and just north of the DMZ, with elements periodically crossing into Quang Tri province. The difference of 1,650 men is attributed to the loss of the K-3 Company which was dropped from the III MAF Order of Battle, and a loss of 73 personnel assessed against the 808th Battalion. Additionally, adjusted Order of Battle totals for the 324 "B" and 341st NVA Divisions show a personnel increase of 540 and a decrease of 2,000 men, respectively. Additional personnel losses are attributed to normal Order of Battle adjustments.

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3. DANANGMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
2dBn, 4thMar	5Jan	Arrive	Okinawa
Det., HMH-463	8Jan	Arrive	CONUS
3dBn, 9thMar	14Jan	Depart	Okinawa
2dBn, 26thMar	19Jan	Arrive	Phu Bai
3dBn, 7thMar	23Jan	Depart	Chu Lai

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regimental Hq	1	1	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	6	6	Battalions	1	1
Companies	5	5	Companies	2	2
Total strength	3100	3300	Total strength	700	700

Order of Battle totals for the Danang Tactical Area show a reduction of 200 enemy personnel compared with December totals. This difference is attributed to recent losses suffered by the R-20 Battalion and other minor Order of Battle adjustments.

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4. CHU LAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
HMM-362	19Jan	Arrive	LPH-2 (SLF)
HMM-363	20Jan	Depart	LPH-2 (SLF)
3dBn, 7thMar	23Jan	Arrive	Danang

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Dec</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Regimental Hq	2	2	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	10	9	Battalions	0	1
Companies	12	10	Companies	0	0
Total strength	6500	6000	Total strength	0	300

A comparison of the confirmed Order of Battle during January 1967 with that of December 1966 shows an increase of 500 enemy personnel during January. The Order of Battle totals reflect the addition of the 70th Battalion and the 74th and 14th Companies, whose strengths are estimated at 500, 50, and 90 personnel, respectively. Also, during the month of January the 60th Battalion was assessed a loss of 150 personnel.

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5. ENEMY LOSSES FOR JANUARY

<u>January</u>		<u>Total to date</u>
983	Killed	14,124
120	Captured	1,599
244	Weapons	2,322

6. CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS

<u>January</u>	<u>December</u>		<u>Total as of 31Jan67</u>
104,743	80,972	Persons given medical treatment	1,325,815
54	23	Persons given medical training	768
79,114	133,043	Pounds of food distributed	2,341,548
4,803	5,932	Pounds of soap distributed	161,482
7,351	7,076	Pounds of clothing distributed	235,199
276	236	Critically ill civilians evacuated	6,475
265	170	English language classes conducted	1,899
\$763	\$1,235	Cash donations	\$35,946
158,219	266,086	Persons fed	3,388,357
2,655	3,585	Students supported	43,650
192	51	Construction projects	1,508

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7. MARINE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>January</u>	<u>December</u>		<u>Total as of 31Jan67</u>
15,676	13,784	Patrols	118,122
4,532	4,439	Ambushes	62,151
293	142	Company opns	2,413
426	133	Sniper posts	5,268
5	8	Battalion opns	126
4	1	Regimental or larger opns	46
6,164	6,293	Combat/combat support sorties	83,002
31,788	30,192	Helo sorties	591,016

8. III MAF STRENGTH - ON 31 JANUARY 1967

	<u>Marines</u>				<u>Navy</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Total</u>		<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Total</u>
Danang	2222	31499	33721	178	1152	1330	
Chu Lai	1456	20700	22156	99	833	932	
Phu Bai	407	5845	6252	62	370	432	
Dong Ha	478	10943	11421	37	328	365	
Total	4563	68987	73550	376	2683	3059	

9. MARINE TACTICAL AREAS - ON 31 JANUARY 1967

	<u>Square miles</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Villages</u>
Danang	999	739,437	104
Chu Lai	532	270,081*	57
Phu Bai	162	68,037	22
Total	1,693	1,077,555	183
Goals	3,340	2,400,000	369
Percent of goal achieved	51%	45%	49%

*Revised total.

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10. LOGISTICSa. Supply levels at end of period:

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
<u>Class I</u>				
(1000 of rations/ days of supply)				
MCI rations	111/3	183/8	121/17	154/22
B rations	406/11	225/10	213/30	190/27
A rations	374/9	134/6	39/6	2/0

Class III and IIIA (Bulk)

(1000 gals/days of supply)

JP-4	2879/20	2234/9	53/5	67/10
AVGAS	440/20	113/9	36/12	35/9
MOGAS	265/8	147/6	45/11	54/9
DIESEL	140/5	153/5	29/5	10/1

Class V and VA

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>
Ground ammunition (days of supply)	45	45	45

Aviation ordnance - (No change from December)

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b. Resupply Status:

(1) Surface shipping status (all I CTZ)

Cargo unloaded (January)	242,750 M/T
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Average daily discharge rate	7,831 M/T
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Port of Danang

Ships in Port 31 December	5
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Ships arriving during January	39
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Ships unloaded during January	43
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Ships in Port 31 January	1
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Cargo backlog 31 January	1,436 M/T
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Cargo unloaded January	178,059 M/T
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Cargo backlog 31 December	22,136 M/T
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Average backlog (January)	27,896 M/T
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(2) Air Shipping Status

Cargo lifted into RVN	1,937 S/T
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Cargo awaiting lift on Okinawa as of 31 January	552 S/T
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c. RED BALL Summary

Items at beginning of period	502
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Items added	242
Items removed	174
Items remaining at end of period	570

d. Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN to 3dFSR	1,245
Items repaired at 3dFSR	4,397
Items returned to CONUS from 3dFSR or disposed of on Okinawa	707

e. Construction Projects

Roads rehabilitated or constructed	-9 miles of new road com- pleted, 103 miles maintained.
Bridges	-Completed 5 CL 60 timber bridges, 1 CL 40 timber bridge, 2 CL 35 timber bridges and 1 CL 4 timber bridge. 1 Class 60 M4T6 bridge installed. 3 Class 60 and 1 Class 40 bridges under construction.
Wells drilled	-3 completed, 5 in progress.

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CONCLUSIONS

- III MAF weathered the monsoon effectively, and is in the best logistical situation it has yet enjoyed.

- The concerted enemy effort to intensify the guerrilla war and to thwart Revolutionary Development is now evident.

- There is cause for limited optimism in the manner which the ARVN commanders have undertaken the re-orientation toward Revolutionary Development. Hard results are not yet visible.

- Diversion of Marines to replace ARVN units in the interior to permit them to pursue Revolutionary Development, has further diffused the already widespread effort of the Marines.

- Replacement of ARVN units, intensified support of Revolutionary Development, security operations near the DMZ, all coupled with irreducible base defense and local security obligations, have seriously diminished the tactical flexibility of III MAF.

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