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# OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

## VIETNAM

### FEBRUARY 1967

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## FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of February 1967. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering periods from March 1965 through January 1967.

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SUMMARY

In February, the enemy continued his accelerated pace of operations which first appeared in December 1966. Strong action against our and ARVN forces in the hinterland, coordinated guerrilla activity against the Revolutionary Development structure, coupled with widespread mortar and rocket attacks on ARVN outposts and US bases, gave substance to the North Vietnamese premier's assertion that the current six months is to be a period of violent counter attack. This effort, although costly to the enemy, has heavily extended the US and GVN resources in the I CTZ.

Meeting the enemy's increased pace, the intensity of Marine operations proceeded at record, or near-record highs. In the single month there were 13 large unit operations, including one amphibious landing; 21,829 small unit counterguerrilla actions of up to company strength (monthly average in 1966 was 11,705); 119 Sting Ray missions (monthly average in 1966 was 79); and 3,765 attack aircraft sorties (monthly average in 1966 was 3,402).

The enemy's February effort resulted in heavy losses to him, with little compensatory gain. He suffered 1,721 troops known killed by Marines, second only to September (1,789 enemy KIA) when he made a strong, but unsuccessful bid in the DMZ area. Concurrently, the ARVN and ROKMC in the I CTZ killed 1,485.

More prisoners were taken by Marines in February (209) and there were more Chieu Hoi returnees in I CTZ (279) than in any month of the war to date. Prisoner and defector reports continued to produce a consistent theme of fear, sickness and low morale on the part of the enemy.

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Efforts by III MAF to exploit the opportunities offered by the enemy's increased exposure were limited by broad commitments throughout the I CTZ, which spread the Marines' resources thin. Concurrently, the ARVN entry into support of the Revolutionary Development program caused further drain on the Marine resources. Introduction of thirteen Vietnamese infantry battalions into the RD program was accomplished at an investment of two and one half Marine battalions, which assumed the responsibility for outposts which the Vietnamese had hitherto manned. There is optimism that the Vietnamese pursuit of Revolutionary Development will be productive. Few concrete results are yet visible.

One endeavor aimed at getting more out of the thinly spread Marine assets was the Combined Action Program, which, by end-February, was beginning to pick up some of the load. Sixty Combined Action Platoons were in existence, converting some 1,600 relatively unproductive Popular Forces troops into effective soldiers, as they worked, lived, and fought alongside the Marines who were integrated into the Combined Action units.

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**GOALS**

And Progress Toward Achieving Them

Benchmarks articulated by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV produce six major goals for III MAF operations in 1967. Not necessarily in order of priority or importance, these are:

Goal One: Neutralize enemy base areas in southern Quang Ngai province.

Goal Two: Inflict losses on the VC/NVA at a rate in excess of their monthly input from infiltration and recruitment.

Goal Three: Open Route 9 from Dong Ha to Thon Son Lam; open Route 1 from the DMZ to Dong Ha and from Quang Ngai to the boundary between I CTZ and II CTZ. Secure major roads in the National Priority Area of I CTZ, Route 5 from Route 1 to An Hoa, and Route 1 from Dong Ha to Quang Ngai.

Goal Four: Open 167 miles of National Railroad in I CTZ and secure that portion of the railroad within the National Priority Area around Danang.

Goal Five: Increase to 1,782,000 the population living in areas

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assessed at 60% or higher on the III MAF Revolutionary Development scale.

Goal Six: Increase to 114 the number of Combined Action Platoons.

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Goal One

The first goal relates to neutralization of base areas localized along the fringe of the highlands south of Quang Ngai city. Fulfillment of this goal requires effort beyond military operations directed exclusively at the vaguely defined enemy base areas. It is necessary to separate the enemy from the rich coastal plain nearby, with its sources of food and intelligence and other support. It is necessary, further, to interdict the enemy's movement in and around those areas. And it is necessary to make him pay each time he attempts to mass troops for overt offensive operations.

The enemy's embarkation, in December 1966, on an accelerated offensive program has caused him to assemble troops and to move them toward the coastal plain.

This movement was met by the Marines' program of surveillance and offensive operations in the region south of Quang Ngai, which has cost the enemy severely.

Encompassing the immediate base areas, and the adjacent plains region to the east, Operation Sierra was terminated in January, and Operations DeSoto and the Deckhouse VI amphibious attack were continuing at end-February. Those three operations resulted in 570 of the enemy known to have been killed.

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Immediately north of these base areas are the avenues of approach to the Chu Lai air bases and the western approaches to the city of Quang Ngai. In that region, another five large operations by Marines and Free World forces were conducted. Those operations accounted for another 588 enemy confirmed killed.

Beyond this, 51 Sting Ray missions have been conducted against the highland region in which the enemy bases are located. The number of enemy killed by those missions, 128, is important, but more important is the effect it has on the enemy's mobility and security in the mountain environment. Observing him, as they do from hidden locations deep in the country where he had heretofore felt secure, artillery fire or aircraft bombs may surprise him at any time. All of his movements must now take this threat into account.

A summary of results of actions against the enemy in this area, plus an orientation map, is shown on the following page.

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Goal Two

III MAF's second goal for 1967 involves inflicting losses on the NVA/VC in excess of their monthly input from infiltration and recruitment. At the close of the reporting period, the end of the second month of the year, it was not yet possible to determine with any reasonable degree of reliability the current enemy personnel input from either infiltration or recruitment.

It was possible, however, to reach hard conclusions regarding the losses he has suffered in the first two months of the year, and to measure them against earlier infiltration and recruitment figures.

Since the beginning of the enemy's accelerated operations in December of 1966, he has presented the Marines with frequent opportunities to destroy his forces. Beyond this, the intensified Marine counter-guerrilla campaign, plus the array of other complementary programs, has kept a strong and steady pressure on the enemy. Progressively greater numbers of prisoners and defectors told the same story of shortage of food and lowering morale.

Marine operations in January and February of 1967 resulted in 2,704 enemy killed, 329 captured and 403 weapons seized. ARVN and ROK operations during the same time accounted for another 2,056 killed and 32 captured. To this must be added those of the enemy who die of wounds after a battle, become permanently disabled, desert or defect. CINCPAC/MACV have concluded that 35% of the number killed should be added to reflect the number who die of wounds or are permanently disabled. Using the 35% rate raises the enemy losses in I CTZ to 6,779 thus far in 1967. Ignoring deserters or

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defectors, if this is measured against the MACV accepted and possible average infiltration rate for the entire country of 5,400 per month (October 1965 - February 1967) there is good reason to conclude that in I CTZ the enemy's losses are in excess of his monthly input from infiltration. This conclusion must be conditional, however, since experience to date exhibits that a period of three to six months is required to stabilize infiltration data.

Goal Three

The third III MAF 1967 goal is to open 70 miles of critical roads in I CTZ and to secure an additional 249 miles. At the end of February, 41 of the designated 70 miles were open, and 125 of the 249 miles were secure. Progress attained in terms of specific routes is described below and depicted graphically on page 12.\*

<u>Goal for end 1967</u>	<u>Status on 28 February</u>
<u>Route 1</u>	
- Open, from the DMZ south to Dong Ha (12 miles).	- All open. 100% of goal.
- Secure, from Dong Ha south to Quang Ngai (189 miles).	- 81 miles secure; 108 miles open. 42% of goal.
- Open, from Quang Ngai south to the II CTZ border (41 miles).	- 12 miles open. 29% of goal.

\*Directives published by COMUSMACV classify roads as follows:

- "Open" (Amber): Used by RVN/US/FWMAF em-

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Goal for end 1967

Status on 28 February

Route 5

- Secure, from Route 1 west to An Hoa (18 miles).
- 7 miles secure; 11 miles open. 39% of goal.

Route 9

- Open, from Dong Ha west to Thon Son Lam (17 miles).
- All secure, 100% of goal.

National Priority Area

- Secure, major roads in the NPA, including Route 14 from Hoi An west to Lac Thanh Tay (42 miles).
- 37 miles secure; 0 miles open; 5 miles closed. 88% of goal.

ploying thorough security measures. Frequent incidents may occur.

- "Secure" (Green): Controlled by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with minimum security measures required. Isolated incidents may occur.

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

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ROADS

END DECEMBER 1967 GOALS


PROGRESS AS OF 28 FEB 67



LEGEND

- OPEN
- SECURE
- CLOSED

1967 PROJECTION



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Goal Four

III MAF's fourth goal for end-1967 is to open 167 miles of the National Railroad in I CTZ and to secure the 30 miles of railway in the National Priority Area. On 28 February, 51 of the 167 designated miles were open, and 9 of the 30 miles in the NPA were secure.

It needs to be noted that attainment of each of these sub-goals is not related to enemy activity alone. Throughout I CTZ, extensive roadbed maintenance is required before the trains can run, even in patently secure areas, as many miles of track have been dismantled and carried off for various purposes by Vietnamese civilians, ARVN troops, or enemy guerrillas.

The status of the railroad in I CTZ at the end of February is described below and portrayed on page 15.\*

National Railway

<u>Goal for end 1967</u>	<u>Status on 28 February</u>
- Open, from Dong Ha south to the northern edge of the NPA (87 miles).	- 51 miles open. 59% of goal.
- Secure, throughout the NPA (30 miles).	- 9 miles secure; 11 miles open; 10 miles closed. 30% of goal.

\*Directives published by COMUSMACV classify railroads as follows:

- "Open" (Amber): Segment between two terminals physically open. Security of surrounding area is such

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National Railway (cont'd)

Goal for end 1967

- Open, from the southern edge of the NPA to Ba Ren and west to An Hoa (14 miles).
- Open, from Ba Ren south to Quang Ngai (66 miles).

Status on 28 February

- Closed. 0% of goal.
- Closed. 0% of goal.

that thorough security measures, including armed escorts, are required for all trains. Frequent incidents may occur.

- "Secure" (Green): Segment between two terminals physically open. RVN/US/FWMAF control of the surrounding area is such that trains can operate during daylight hours with relative freedom from VC sabotage, attacks or harassment. Armed escort not required. Isolated incidents may occur.


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## RAILROADS

END DECEMBER 1967 GOALS


PROGRESS AS OF 28 FEB 67



## LEGEND

- OPEN
- SECURE
- CLOSED

## 1967 PROJECTION



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Goal Five

III MAF's fifth goal for 1967 relates to Revolutionary Development progress. Measurement must involve both the Marines and Vietnamese, since their efforts throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone are inseparable. It involves increasing to 1,782,000 the number of Vietnamese living in areas assessed at 60% or higher on the III MAF Revolutionary Development scale.

The favorable rate of RD growth in the Marine areas during most of 1966 declined at the end of the year, as increased commitments dispersed the Marines more and more widely and diminished their RD capability. Until the recent policy decision was made, ARVN support of the RD program had been minimal. The announced policy that the ARVN will participate in the RD program and, more recently, occupation by two and a half Marine battalions of outposts hitherto manned by thirteen ARVN and Regional Force battalions, was a step toward bringing greater numbers of ARVN to bear on the RD problem.

The major shift of ARVN units (this is discussed at greater length beginning on page 39) occurred during February, and little progress is yet apparent. Beyond this, the ARVN does not have a system of measurement of RD status against which meaningful assessments of progress can be made.

In an effort to establish a benchmark from which to measure future progress, however, certain estimates can be made for the regions outside the Marine areas.

It is reasonable to consider the 146,000 population of the urban areas of Hue, Quang Tri, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai as secure and stable. They are well above the 60%

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level on the III MAF RD scale. An additional 33,538 people are in the 60% or greater area at Dong Ha. This represents a population bloc of 179,538. Adding to this the population in the Marine areas judged to be at the 60% or higher level (598,355), provides a total of 777,893 people, or 44% of the end-1967 goal of 1,782,000 for the I CTZ.

Goal Six


The sixth goal of III MAF in 1967 is to increase to 114 the number of Combined Action Platoons.

The prime purpose of the Combined Action Program is to convert Popular Force units into useful entities, capable of functioning effectively as local security forces in the countryside. Benefits derived from the program to date continue to validate its worth. In brief, villages with Combined Action Platoons have advanced about twice as fast toward a condition of peace and stability as have those without Combined Action units. And, since the program's inception in 1965, the enemy has never been able to reestablish control over an area in which a Combined Action unit was operating.

The 1967 goal of 114 Combined Action Platoons is based, primarily, on the number of Marines who can be committed to the program, within current personnel ceilings. Attainment of the goal, however, will depend on the number of Popular Forces personnel actually made available by the GVN during the year.

The planned growth of Combined Action Platoons in 1967 is shown on the following page.

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**UNCLASSIFIED****1967 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON PROJECTION**

By end-February there were 60 platoons, and there is indication that the program will continue to mature about as planned.

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**UNCLASSIFIED****LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS**

North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong was quoted recently as saying that December through April would be a crucial period in the war. At that time, "a heavy attack will be staged which, with continued US casualties over a span of time, would have an anti-war effect upon voters in the US elections in the fall of 1968." The enemy is aiming, it would appear, at the political convictions of the United States. Increased enemy activity throughout I CTZ over past months, particularly February, is consistent with this statement.

Results thus far, however, do not trend toward reverses to the Free World side. In fact, the contrary has occurred, and the enemy is paying a heavy price for accomplishment of little. Acceleration of his counteroffensive effort has made it necessary for the enemy to mass forces and expose his troops, thus providing greater opportunities for Marine large unit operations to inflict losses upon his forces.

February was the most active month, in terms of Marine large unit operations, since the enemy's bid in northern Quang Tri province during the July - September period, 1966. A total of 13 Marine large unit operations were conducted, despite the short month and the four day Tet stand-down. These 13 operations resulted in the highest number of enemy killed in large unit operations - 1,048 - since September 1966. 136 of the enemy were captured in February, more than three times the 1966 monthly average of 35, and almost four times the number captured in January.

The locations of Marine large unit operations in February are shown on the following page.

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
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with the operation continuing into March.

Deckhouse VI began on 16 February, when the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines landed by surface assault craft and helicopters on the coastline just north of the border between Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh provinces. The amphibious assault provided the means to attack the enemy, already engaged with Marine units in Operation Desoto farther inland, on his exposed seaward flank. The enemy was denied escape by a Marine heliborne landing at the northern edge of the objective area on D-Day.

Once underway, the operation was characterized by the painstaking rooting-out of a determined enemy who fought from a complex of bunkers, tunnels, and caves.

### OPERATION DECKHOUSE VI



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During Deckhouse VI, ground operations were supported by 87 attack air sorties and 99 naval gunfire missions. In contrast to the 241 enemy killed, 5 Marines were killed and 64 were wounded. By the end of February, operations had shifted slightly to the north, near Thach Tru, where continued close-in fighting was developing.

In the same general area as Deckhouse VI, two Marine battalions were continuing Operation Desoto at end-February, aimed at clearing the enemy from two of his three designated base areas in southern Quang Ngai. Desoto, which commenced on 26 January, was similar in nature to Deckhouse VI, characterized by tedious efforts to dislodge an entrenched enemy (probably the 38th Local Force Battalion) from well-prepared defensive positions.

Again, naval gunfire and attack aircraft were active in support. Marine tactical aircraft flew 501 air attacks, and naval gunfire was credited with 86 Viet Cong killed or probably killed. In all, 181 Viet Cong were killed in Desoto during February, bringing to 218 the number of enemy killed in that operation. Cumulative Marine casualties for the operation to date were 31 killed and 299 wounded.

Three other engagements in the critical region of Quang Ngai province involving other than US Marine forces relate to the Marine tactical situation.

Prior to dawn on 15 February, an estimated enemy battalion, probably from the 21st North Vietnamese Regiment, attacked the 11th Company of the 2d ROK Brigade, 10 miles northwest of Quang Ngai. The enemy assaulted after an intense mortar and recoilless rifle preparation, penetrated the ROK position, and attempted to destroy ammunition bunkers with flame throwers. A counterattack by the ROK Marine company, supported by heavy artillery fire, reversed the situation. Considering that the ROKMC positions were

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well covered by approximately 40 US Marine, ROK Marine, and US Army artillery pieces, the enemy's decision to attack at this place and time reflected questionable military judgment. The attempt, however, did provide additional evidence of the enemy's intention to accelerate his offensive role, even at great cost. This particular effort cost him 243 confirmed killed, and considerable equipment loss - 35 individual weapons, a mortar, light machine gun and a radio. ROK Marines losses were 18 killed and 33 wounded.

Beginning on 17 February, 15 miles to the southwest, ROK Marines in Operation Giant Dragon encountered only light resistance, but produced an unusually high number of enemy who voluntarily surrendered - 92 in a six-day period.

On 19 February in Operation Lien Ket 81, 16 miles west of Quang Ngai city, three ARVN airborne battalions engaged two Viet Cong battalions who chose to remain in place and fight. The day-long engagement resulted in 388 enemy confirmed killed and 178 weapons captured. ARVN casualties were 47 killed and 176 wounded.

The same accelerated effort which caused the enemy to attack, or stand and fight under unfavorable conditions, also led him to expose himself in areas where he had previously been defeated. Recurring reports of increased enemy activity in the Thu Bon and Vu Gia river valleys south of Danang led to two operations - Stone and Independence - which were successful in inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy: 430 enemy killed (confirmed) versus 18 Marines killed. Both operations were characterized by multiple small engagements and high numbers of prisoners and voluntary returnees.

In Operation Stone, (12 February - 22 February 1967), three Marine battalions cordoned a 26 square kilometer area, and sweeping back and forth during a ten day period, killed 291 Viet Cong, probably from


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the Viet Cong R-20th Battalion. In the main, the enemy sought to avoid engagement and attempted to break through the cordon or hide in spider holes and caves. The repeated sweeps over the same area exposed most of his hiding places. In all, 65 of the enemy were captured, the largest number of any single Marine operation to date, excepting Prairie. Marine casualties were 9 killed and 77 wounded.

Marine snipers were used with success to cover the open areas in the cordon. Fourteen Viet Cong were killed attempting to move over routes which appeared secure but which were covered by Marine sniper teams using long range rifle fire.

### OPERATIONS STONE AND INDEPENDENCE



Operation Independence, in the Song Vu Gia - Song Thu Bon valleys 20 miles southwest of Danang, commenced on 1 February, with two reinforced Marine infantry battalions

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working in conjunction with Civil Irregular Defense Group forces from the Thuong Duc Special Forces Camp. The objective was to search out and destroy local force Viet Cong operating in the area. Throughout the operation there were frequent long range sightings of small guerrilla units which were subjected to artillery fire or air strikes, although many Viet Cong were found hiding in caves and hideaways. Results included 139 Viet Cong confirmed killed, 20 prisoners and 11 voluntary returnees. Friendly casualties were 9 Marines killed and 35 wounded, out of some 1,800 Marines involved in the operation. It may be recalled that in these same valleys during 1966, Operations Georgia, Macon and Kern took a toll of 685 guerrillas confirmed killed.

100 miles to the north, in Quang Tri province, Operation Prairie II commenced on 1 February, with three Marine infantry battalions. Contacts during most of the month were similar to those in the previous two months - sightings of small groups of North Vietnamese or Viet Cong by reconnaissance teams, infantry patrols and aerial observers who called in artillery and air on the enemy. Several minor contacts occurred, as Marines discovered enemy in caves and bunkers. Some of them chose to die inside, but 8 prisoners were taken during the month - 6 Viet Cong and 2 North Vietnamese soldiers.

On the 25th, a sharp contact occurred 1 mile west of Khe Sanh airfield when a patrol from Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, based at Khe Sanh, engaged an estimated 15 NVA. Artillery fires were called and another patrol was sent to the area as reinforcement. While searching the area hit by the artillery mission, contact was made with an estimated 50 NVA. Marine attack aircraft were called in and the NVA fled, leaving behind 8 killed, one 82mm mortar tube, 3 baseplates, 380 rounds of 82 mm mortar, and two individual weapons. One Marine was killed and another wounded in this action.

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On the 25 February 1967, III MAF was authorized by MACV to conduct artillery fire missions into and north of the DMZ, against purely military targets. This authority was granted in order to augment air strikes against clearly defined military targets in the DMZ area during periods of reduced visibility, to provide protection for long range aerial reconnaissance by attacking suspected AA positions, and to disrupt lines of communication over which the North Vietnamese were resupplying their units in the DMZ.

Through 28 February, the following missions were fired into and north of the DMZ.

<u>TARGET</u>	105mm HOWITZER		175mm GUN	
	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Rounds</u>	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Rounds</u>
Antiaircraft Positions	37	286	40	312
Automatic Weapon Positions	9	164	14	111
Command Posts	---	---	5	114
Staging Areas	---	---	16	237
Fortified Positions	2	85	16	136
South Bound Convoys	2	112	2	25

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Artillery Positions	12	114	18	159
Troop Concentra- tions	---	---	4	88
Harboring Sites	12	223	1	5
	<u>74</u>	<u>984</u>	<u>116</u>	<u>1,187</u>

Care has been taken not to fire at non-military targets or military targets in or near built-up civilian areas.

The enemy's reaction to this increased pressure was immediate and intense. Beginning on 26 February, Marine artillery positions near the DMZ began to receive heavy mortar and 132 mm assault rocket fire (over 400 rounds at Gio Linh in a single seventeen minute period). By the end of the month, the enemy had fired almost 1,000 rounds at the Marine artillery. The effect of this considerable enemy effort was small; two Marines were wounded and one 105 mm howitzer was slightly damaged. An attempt by the two battalions of the 812th North Vietnamese Regiment to penetrate Marine positions at the end of the month also was unsuccessful.


III MAF gains a substantial advantage from this authority to fire at targets in or north of the DMZ. Infiltration, along routes into or through the DMZ, now can be interdicted on a 24-hour, all-weather basis. And, hereafter, there will be no safe haven, within the range of our artillery, for the enemy to store his supplies, bivouac his troops, position his own artillery, or mass for a major attack.

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The map shown below shows the disposition of III MAF artillery units in the DMZ area.

### III MAF ARTILLERY IN THE DMZ AREA



### Sting Ray Operations


The manning of observation posts in Viet Cong controlled or disputed areas continued to hamper the move-

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ments of the guerrilla and Main Force units alike. The 119 Sting Ray patrols conducted during February called 130 artillery missions and 29 air attacks on targets of opportunity spotted by these patrols. Confirmed results were 117 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers killed while another 330 probable kills could not be confirmed. Marine casualties from Sting Ray were 8 killed and 24 wounded.

### CASUALTIES IN STING RAY OPERATIONS



### Naval Gunfire

During February, 2 cruisers, 7 destroyers and 3 rocket firing landing ships provided naval gunfire support for Free World Forces in I CTZ. These ships fired 1,179 missions and 13,070 rounds.

Particularly noteworthy was the fire support provided by the USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR-409), in support

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of Operation Deckhouse VI during the period 17-26 February.

These fires accounted for at least 33 enemy killed, 8 sampans destroyed, and 14 secondary explosions.

Shown below, by Corps areas, are the February naval gunfire statistics.

	I	II	III	IV	TOTAL
Missions	1,179	386	147	72	1,784
Rounds					
Expended	13,070	8,107	3,213	3,387	27,777
Enemy KIA	67	12	0	0	79
Structures					
Destroyed	495	183	3	46	727
Structures					
Damaged	326	163	3	95	587

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
During February the enemy's increased emphasis on guerrilla warfare continued in the face of intensified pressure placed on him by Marines, ARVN and other Free World Forces in I CTZ.

In February, a record high of 21,829 small unit actions complemented the 13 large unit operations, 119 Sting Ray patrols, and 1,179 naval gunfire missions in seeking out and destroying the enemy in I CTZ. Of the 1,721 enemy killed by Marines in February, small unit operations accounted for 296.


In spite of this heavy pressure from all sides, however, overall rates of enemy guerrilla activity remained high in February for the third straight month. In December, the first month in which the enemy's accelerated effort became apparent, he lost 361 troops killed by Marine small unit counterguerrilla actions and in January he lost a record number of 632 killed. Overall, for the three months of his current intensified effort, the enemy has lost 1,289 killed as a result of Marine small unit actions.

The pace of enemy activity may be traced in his attack rate; his losses of personnel follow the same general pattern.

ENEMY ATTACKS




ENEMY KIA BY MARINES

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The enemy's capability to operate at this accelerated pace obviously had not run out by end-February. However, his actions were providing opportunities for the Marines to deplete enemy forces and attrit enemy resources and support.

## ENEMY CAPTURED BY MARINES



The number of prisoners taken in February (209) was a record high. Their comments, and those of the rising number of Chieu Hoi's (see page 57), told a consistent story of lowering morale, fear, homesickness and hunger. Typical of reports of interrogations of prisoners and deserters collected during January and February are these:

- Pham Xuan Trinh, a North Vietnamese Army master sergeant, who defected on 19 January, reported that he deserted because he could no longer stand the misery of living in unhealthy conditions.

- Dao Xuan Hoa, a NVA private first class who defected on 5 February, reported that morale was bad and that the men were tired and afraid. He said that during infiltration through Laos, 300 men of his unit

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became seriously ill and that 8 died from illness. He stated that in RVN 30 to 50 percent suffered from malaria in August of 1966 and that the present rate was about 30 percent. He stated that the psywar leaflets are very effective and understood by the people, and that they are for the most part believed. Those leaflets influenced his decision to defect.

- Vo Minh, a Viet Cong Main Force private who defected on 10 February, reported that morale in his unit is very low, that 80 to 90 percent of the troops are suffering from malaria and that there is no medicine to treat it. He stated that his battalion is living in the homes of the villagers and that the unit's relationship with the villagers is weak.

- Le Van Lum, a Viet Cong Main Force private who defected in early February, stated that morale in his battalion was low and that the unit had a high malaria rate. He reported that he had seen the people suffer in the VC controlled areas and, because of this, the people seem to be disaffected with members of the VC Main Force. Many villagers are starting to ridicule and despise the VC because of their lack of ability to defeat the Americans and ARVN. Lum stated that he defected because life under the VC was too difficult.

- Thang In, Thang Lao, and Thang Hien, Viet Cong guerrillas who were captured on 29 January, reported that captives were forced to serve the VC against their will. They said morale was low because of fear of death, lack of food and medicine and because of aircraft strikes.

- Le Danh Ngo, a NVA private captured on 4 February, said that morale was bad because most of the company do not want to fight in RVN. He said most

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of the company were draftees, with little training. He had received only ten days marksmanship training, and was allowed to fire only 3 rounds in practice.

- Cha Chin, a Viet Cong guerrilla who was captured on 31 January, reported that he was forced to serve the VC against his will, and that the people were not allowed to enter NVA bivouac areas.

- Dang Hoan, a Viet Cong guerrilla captured on 3 January, reported bad morale in his unit. He said he was forced to work for the VC against his will.

- Tran Xuan Quang, a NVA private captured while on a mission to find food, reported that morale was low because there was not enough food, and that 30 to 40 men of his unit were sick with malaria. He said he had had no military or political training, and that he had joined the NVA only a few days prior to infiltrating.

- Nguyen Bao, a NVA private captured on 15 January, reported that many men in his unit were homesick and wanted to return to the north. He said 50% of the battalion (the V-75 Mortar Battalion) were suffering from malaria. He reported inadequate food, medicine and ammunition, and said that supplies were taken from the villages.


The pattern of saturation patrols and ambushes in the central pacification regions around the Marine areas has played a large part in bringing about this lowering enemy morale and shortages of food. It is this system of small unit operations that tends to isolate the NVA and VC Main Force units and separate them from their food and support in the heavily populated coastal plain. Intensity of this activity has tracked with the enemy's

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current accelerated level of operations. For the third straight month Marine small unit operations have been conducted at record high rates. Monthly totals since mid-1966 are shown below.

### MARINE SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS\*




Small unit counterguerrilla activity by elements of the individual battalions of III MAF during February is depicted on the following pages.

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## PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA




At Danang, Marine units conducted 8,903 patrols, 1,825 ambushes, and 98 company size search and destroy operations in February. These compare with a total of 4,557 small unit actions conducted during the same month in 1966.

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## PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHU LAI TACTICAL AREA



In the Chu Lai area there were 8,771 small unit operations, including 6,525 patrols, 2,228 ambushes and 18 company size search and destroy operations. This is almost triple the total of 2,826 conducted during February 1966.


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## PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PHU BAI TACTICAL AREA

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During February, there were 2,232 small unit operations conducted in the Phu Bai area, 1,391 more than the number conducted in February 1967.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

At the end of February, there was further evidence that the growing dispersal of III MAF forces and the consequent diffusion of effort had diminished its RD capability. Major activity during the month occurred in the Combined Action Program, where three new platoons were organized; in psychological operations, where increased endeavors resulted in a record number of Chieu Hoi's; and in the ARVN conversion to RD tasks.

ARVN Conversion to RD

During February, the focus of the Revolutionary Development campaign was on the movement of ARVN into the program. Clearly, the effectiveness of ARVN units in this new role will determine to a large extent the rate of progress in the RD program. And, since RD is closely interlocked with the military and other programs of the total campaign, ARVN performance in RD will also be a major determinant of progress in the overall effort in I CTZ.

Through their knowledge of the people, language and terrain, along with their military training and equipment, the 33 ARVN battalions of I Corps represent a large potential contribution to RD. The need to realize a greater share of this ARVN potential has been underscored in recent months by the broadening range of commitments of the maneuver battalions of III MAF. Beyond the vigorous Marine campaign against the guerrilla forces and infrastructure, their far-reaching RD support, and the continuing efforts to engage the enemy's large units, there has been added the semi-static watch of the DMZ in Quang Tri. This, in turn, has lead to a major northward reorientation of Marine resources, with a

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corresponding limitation of flexibility, and attenuation of forces with which to continue to expand the central pacification regions. The need for introduction of ARVN into this program led to the assumption of responsibility in January for seven ARVN military outposts, by two Marine battalions and two reinforced companies, in exchange for which thirteen VN battalions (12 ARVN and 1 RF) were shifted into the RD program.

The general technique used in this shift involves a combination of counterguerrilla and civic action programs by ARVN, complemented by extensive RD tasks being carried out simultaneously by the 116 RD Cadre groups which, during February, completed relocation to villages and hamlets slated for accelerated pacification. It will be recalled that the RD Cadre groups are specially trained teams of 59 personnel each, with the mission of assisting villages and hamlets to achieve an improved measure of government control and security. They are located in the heavily populated regions of the five provinces: 14 are in Quang Tri, 16 in Thua Thien, 25 in Quang Nam, 18 in Quang Tin and 43 in Quang Ngai.

The 12 ARVN and one RF battalions, now supporting the RD Cadre Group teams, are also spread throughout the five provinces of I CTZ, with two in each province, excepting Quang Nam, where there are five. Those in Quang Nam are located in the National Priority Area south of the city of Danang, within the Marine area there. The balance of the RD support battalions operate outside the three central pacification areas.

The program being in its infancy, concrete evidences of progress were few. However, there is no doubt of the sincere determination of the ARVN leadership to accomplish effectively this major reorientation of their role.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**Combined Action Program

The validity of the concept of ARVN conversion to RD has been highlighted by the increasing success over the past year of the Combined Action Program.

It will be recalled that the Combined Action Program, bringing together Marines and Vietnamese Popular Forces in wholly integrated units of platoon size, was initiated by the Marines in August of 1965. The prime purpose of the undertaking was to improve the effectiveness of the Popular Forces - the local militia - upon whom a great share of the future success of the Vietnam campaign must depend.


The basic Combined Action unit is the Combined Action Platoon, formed by adding a Marine rifle squad of 14 Marines plus one Navy corpsman to a PF platoon. This PF element retains its basic organization, while the Marines become advisors to the entire platoon, with the Marine squad leader serving as the advisor to the Vietnamese platoon leader. The individual Marines are integrated into the PF squads. Marine members of the CAP's live in the same tents, eat the same food, and conduct the same patrols and ambushes as their Vietnamese counterparts. Platoon members of both nationalities learn the other's language and customs. Marines provide training in basic military skills to the Popular Force members, most of whom have had no earlier training of consequence.

The basic organizational structure is shown in the chart on the next page.

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## COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION OF A COMBINED ACTION PLATOON



The Combined Action Platoon is, in actuality, still a Popular Force element, but one which is now receiving personalized training by US Marines, while at the same time performing a vital security role. Thus, as the VN troops acquire new skills, gain self-confidence and observe a gradually improving security situation in the surrounding countryside, they are able to assume more and more tasks, permitting the Marines to move

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
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on to other Combined Action units, other combat missions, or ultimately to depart, leaving behind a more substantial Vietnamese rural security structure.


Military performance of the Combined Action Platoons is encouraging, and the Combined Action Platoons now in being are already making a significant contribution to the overall effort.

Effectiveness of these units over the past year may be seen in the graphs below.


NIGHT PATROLS AND AMBUSHES




DAY PATROLS AND AMBUSHES



VC KILLED



VC CAPTURED



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

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The III MAF/GVN Combined Action Program continued to grow during February, with a new company activated at Khe Sanh, the first such unit for that area. The company includes 3 Combined Action Platoons, raising the number of Combined Action units in I CTZ to 9 companies and 60 platoons.

The locations of Combined Action units at end-February are displayed on the following page.



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**UNCLASSIFIED****DISTRIBUTION OF COMBINED ACTION UNITS****DANANG**

UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	5	30	—
PLATOONS	31	316	668
TOTAL STRENGTHS	346	668	

**CHU LAI**

UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	1	6	—
PLATOONS	13	158	412
TOTAL STRENGTHS	164	412	

**PHU BAI**

UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	2	12	—
PLATOONS	13	207	402
TOTAL STRENGTHS	219	402	

**KHE SANH**

UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	1	6	2
PLATOONS	3	51	96
TOTAL STRENGTHS	57	97	

**LEGEND**

- ★ COMBINED ACTION COMPANY HQ
- COMBINED ACTION PLATOON
- ACTIVATED DURING FEBRUARY

**28 FEBRUARY 67 TOTALS**

UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	9	54	2
PLATOONS	60	732	1,577
STRENGTHS		786	1,579

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A principal advantage of the Combined Action formula is that it serves to recover a portion of the large investment already made in the Popular Force Program, which is not now highly productive.

The 60 Combined Action platoons in-being at the end of February represent an investment of 786 Marines and 1,579 Vietnamese Popular Force troops. These 60 platoons are performing security tasks which would otherwise be assigned to Marines. The trade-off is probably not one of platoon for platoon, but there can be no doubt that the 60 Combined Action Platoons are providing substantial relief to the heavily burdened forces of III MAF.

Apart from this, an equal benefit is found in the certainty that there are 1,579 additional PF troops who are now making a regular and valuable contribution to the US/GVN effort in I CTZ - a far greater contribution than their non-Combined Action counterparts.

This highly equitable trade-off tends to validate a substantially greater expansion of the Combined Action Program. There are (or will be) 656 Popular Force platoons in I Corps, according to GVN plans. Hopefully, a large part of these may ultimately be assigned to the Combined Action program. As an additional bonus of the program, Combined Action units lend themselves readily to an orderly and selective phase-out of US forces, leaving behind a viable security structure.

#### Revolutionary Development Progress

Six villages in the Marine areas registered gains in their status, as measured by the III MAF scale. In most cases, these gains were attributed to improved village

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security, GVN initiation of a village Census Grievance Program, and neutralization of local Viet Cong infrastructures. At the same time, however, one village dropped from the 40% category to 20% due to increased Viet Cong activity. At end-February, 598,335 Vietnamese in the Marine Tactical Areas and 33,538 villagers at Dong Ha were residing in 76 villages classed as 60% pacified or higher, a figure not substantially different from recent months.

During the month, also, three villages in the Khe Sanh area, representing 4,189 in population and 74 square miles, were evaluated on the III MAF pacification scale for the first time. All three are considered to be 40% pacified, due largely to the increased security now enjoyed by the inhabitants. The improved security condition results from the activation at Khe Sanh of a Combined Action Company with three Combined Action platoons, and the presence of a Marine rifle company, now manning the Khe Sanh outpost.


There is little likelihood, because of the scarcity of Marine resources, of an early expansion of the Marine areas. Consequently, the number of people who fall within the 0 to 20 percent pacified category will not change, and the overall statistical portrayal of progress will reflect a level situation.

Maps of the Marine areas showing the RD status of each are included on the next three pages, followed by a graphic representation of progress in village security and growth of government control in the Marine areas. Maps depicting Revolutionary Development progress at Dong Ha and Khe Sanh are included.

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS- DANANG AREA




%	FEB 66	APR	JUL	OCT	FEB 67
Under 20%	457	512	650	644	630
20%	57	62	93	56	70
40%	18	28	14	102	99
60%	26	43	52	91	74
80%	31	31	60	106	126
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	569	676	999	999	999
Under 20%	94,491	163,432	94,735	138,960	132,088
20%	36,258	33,102	62,386	86,425	85,191
40%	16,100	34,562	100,182	90,679	89,396
60%	19,036	32,696	54,988	79,321	66,229
80%	176,000	216,668	338,785	345,640	366,533
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	340,985	482,360	651,076	741,025	739,437
Under 20%	53	57	40	33	32
20%	9	8	20	19	17
40%	4	7	19	17	19
60%	5	8	11	16	14
80%	1	2	14	19	22
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	72	62	104	104	104

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - CHU LAI AREA



*Source: [REDACTED]*


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%	FEB-66	APR	JUL	OCT	FEB-67
Under 20%	244	264	341	207	156
20%	30	73	10	68	109
40%	—	—	28	89	49
60%	—	—	37	87	85
80%	—	—	33	81	133
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	274	347	459	532	532
Under 20%	91,145	103,643	88,125	100,272	63,389
20%	21,624	38,045	16,508	32,168	56,197
40%	—	—	3,683	46,365	33,054
60%	—	12,083	20,773	36,136	41,705
80%	—	4,191	24,926	62,457	75,736
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	112,769	157,962	174,015	277,576	270,081
Under 20%	21	30	28	25	19
20%	5	7	4	6	11
40%	—	—	4	8	6
60%	—	—	4	7	7
80%	—	—	6	11	14
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	26	40	45	57	57

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - PHU BAI AREA




%	FEB-66	APR	JUL	OCT	FEB-67
Under 20%	22	98	49	40	40
20%	25	16	16	41	42
40%	—	16	8	17	—
60%	38	46	56	8	24
80%	—	—	—	56	56
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	85	162	162	162	162
Under 20%	17,740	16,683	10,381	10,381	10,381
20%	11,652	10,090	10,573	9,524	9,524
40%	—	—	—	9,049	—
60%	23,486	952	5,296	5,296	14,345
80%	—	26,542	83,787	33,787	33,787
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	53,078	54,167	68,037	68,037	68,037
Under 20%	4	14	11	11	11
20%	2	—	3	2	2
40%	—	—	—	1	—
60%	5	—	1	1	2
80%	—	—	7	7	7
100%	—	—	—	—	—
Total	11	22	22	22	22

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY - DONG HA/KHE SANH REGION

PACIFICATION STATUS  
DONG HA


%	OCT	NOV	DEC	FEB-67
40%	—	38	38	21
60%	102	102	102	11
80%	10	10	23	11
Total	112	150	163	163
40%	—	3,663	3,663	1,793
60%	18,014	18,014	18,014	18,384
80%	10,799	10,799	13,654	13,654
Total	28,813	32,476	35,331	35,331
40%	—	2	2	1
60%	6	6	7	—
80%	2	2	3	—
Total	8	10	11	3

## KHE SANH

FEB-67
74
—
—
74
4,189
—
—
4,189
3
—
—
3

**SQUARE MILES**  
**POPULATION**  
**VILLAGES**

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**UNCLASSIFIED****REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN MARINE AREAS** PARTIALLY COMPLETE COMPLETE

There are 579 villages in I CTZ; 372 in the I CTZ coastal plain, of which 183 are in the Marine areas.

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



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County Fair Operations

County Fair results declined from January. Six County Fair operations screened 3,849 persons and medically treated 1,934 Vietnamese, compared to 8,351 persons processed and 5,179 medically treated during the 13 County Fairs held in January. Three Viet Cong were killed, compared to 14 the previous month.

Activity during February and overall results of the County Fair program to date are portrayed below.

## COUNTY FAIR RESULTS



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The decline in County Fair operations during the month is attributable to two factors. The celebration of Tet reduced activity during the first half of the month, as County Fairs during the Vietnamese holidays would have generated more ill-feeling among the populace than could be offset by the benefits of the operations. And the requirement for Marine battalions in other forms of endeavor limited their availability for County Fair operations.

Civic Action

Although other Revolutionary Development activities showed a decline due to Tet, III MAF civic action efforts continued at previous levels. In some categories, in fact, the civic action program exhibited increases. For example, 688,764 persons were fed during the month, a four-fold increase over the 158,219 fed during January. The amount of food distributed exceeded that in January by over 265,000 pounds, while the number of students supported by Marines rose to 5,685, exceeding by a considerable margin the previous month's 2,655.

101 construction projects were completed - over twice the monthly figure for the last quarter in 1966, and bringing to 1,609 the number of projects completed by Marines to date.

Considerable support continues to be provided the growing refugee population. During the month, in the area in which Operation Desoto was conducted, some 1,500 villagers requested to be resettled in an area free from Viet Cong influence. These people were fed by the Marines, who supplemented US rations with enemy foodstuffs captured during the operation, and moved to the district town of Duc Pho, where province officials undertook the task of housing them.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**Revolutionary Development Communications

The establishment of communications between hamlets, villages and higher headquarters and military units continued to show only slow progress during February. As the graph on page 52 shows, one more village now has a completed communications net, raising to 39 the number of villages with fully functioning systems, and three more villages have partially developed nets, raising the number of villages with communications systems installation in progress to 54.

The Combined Action Program has been particularly effective in increasing communications between villages and supporting military units. The US members of each Combined Action Platoon have a radio, normally an AN/PRC-10 FM set, with which they contact the nearby Marine battalion for coordination of their operations.

Previous reports of this series stated that an infusion of new radios into I Corps could be expected during 1967. This is part of the nationwide program by USAID to replace old radios, whose 5 year life expectancy ends this year, as well as to introduce radios into newly pacified areas. All told, some 9,000 radios are programmed for installation from 1967 through 1969.

Psychological Operations

During February an intensified psywar campaign was initiated throughout I Corps as part of a nationwide attempt to induce the enemy to defect to the GVN during the Tet holiday season. Over 102 million propaganda and safe conduct leaflets were distributed throughout the five provinces, as compared with some 36 million during

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January, and a 1966 monthly average of 8 million. Additionally, 324 hours of oral messages were broadcast, compared to 213 hours the previous month, and 128 visual presentations were given, twice the number given in January.

The success of the intensified campaign was evidenced by the 185 VC/NVA military, 56 VC political cadre and 38 VC supporters who rallied to the GVN cause during the month. A year ago during Tet, when a more modest campaign was carried out, a total of 80 Chieu Hoi, both military and civilian, came over to our side.

Another productive technique used by psywar units during February was the extensive employment of Psychological Operations Exploitation Teams (POET).

Upon receipt of a report of a VC initiated act of terrorism, the three man POET moves to the scene of the atrocity, where they obtain photos, testimonials, and recorded messages for use in developing situational propaganda. This information is rapidly prepared and aerial broadcasts and leaflets are delivered over the area in which the victims lived. During the month, 25 POET's were dispatched to exploit VC incidents; they prepared 47 different themes for leaflets and 60 oral tapes describing VC terrorist acts.

The combination of a more active program of leaflet distribution and prompt exploitation of psywar targets of opportunity has contributed to the growing number of Chieu Hoi returnees in I CTZ. The relationship


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
between the overall pace of the psywar program and the Chieu Hoi is shown on the chart below.

## I CTZ PSYWAR ACTIVITY

## PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS DISTRIBUTED



## CHIEU HOI RETURNEES

Joint Coordinating Council

Noteworthy Council actions in February included the following.

- During the 7 February JCC meeting, the Administrative Assistant to the CG, I Corps requested assistance in getting transportation for a special grant of 7,000 tons of rice, which had been requested by GVN officials in I CTZ for distribution to both GVN civilians and military prior to Tet. This rice was available in Saigon, but shipping was not available prior to mid-February. Transportation was arranged and the rice was distributed prior to Tet.

- Plans were made for the formation of Provincial Public Health Committees.

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- At the request of the Mayor of Danang, all future MEDCAP activity within the city will be coordinated through the office of the Mayor.

- The question of how to form cooperatives was raised, with an agreement between JCC members that GVN procedures are very complex and require considerable time. All matters pertaining to cooperatives will be referred to the office of the Credit and Cooperatives Advisor of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) in Danang.

- The JCC formulated plans to provide training for technical cadre elements of the RD Cadre Teams located within Quang Nam province. The Assistant Regional Director for New Life Development, OCO, announced that the OCO Regional Agricultural Representative will assist the Quang Nam Provincial RD Council in the establishment of this technical training program. This program will begin with the training of Agricultural Cadre, and then be later extended to provide technical training in other functional areas. Quang Nam province plans to implement this plan as a pilot project. If successful, other provinces will be expected to develop similar programs, based upon techniques developed in Quang Nam. OCO Representatives have been alerted to assist with the development of this program.

- The OCO Regional Agricultural Representative briefed the Council during the 7 February meeting on the current status of the joint project for supplying fertilizer for use in I CTZ in support of the winter rice planting season. This project, initiated in mid-November, has resulted in delivery of 5,700 tons to Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces, and 4,000 tons to the three northern provinces - despite adverse operating conditions attendant to the monsoon. It is anticipated that the I CTZ

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spring rice crop yield will be increased by 20-30 thousand tons as a result of this successful project.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**BASE DEFENSE

In the early morning hours of 27 February, the enemy took the Danang Air Base complex under attack with 140mm surface to surface rockets. This was the first time that this weapon had been employed in the war.

Between 0310 and 0320, approximately fifty rounds fell, scattered over a three square mile area. Eleven US personnel were killed, 26 were wounded, and 17 aircraft damaged. A number of rounds fell in a nearby village, killing 32 civilians, wounded 40 and destroying 200 civilian houses.

The attack was delivered from a site on a river bank, seven kilometers southwest of the Danang Air Base. In all, there were 134 firing positions, separated into two groups of 70 and 64. Each group was arranged in a straight line, perpendicular to the general direction of the airfield. The firing positions themselves consisted of holes, scooped out to 8 inches in depth, 18 inches wide and 30 inches long.

Discovered at the site by Marine forces were two launching tubes and numerous 140mm cannisters, live rounds and duds. The launching device consisted of a single metal tube mounted on a wooden board, containing a simple elevation and deflection mechanism. The rockets recovered at the site were determined to have been manufactured in the Soviet Union in 1962.

The identity of the enemy unit conducting the attack has not been determined; however, elements of the R-20, V-25, and 402d Sapper Battalions are known to operate in the Danang area. A detainee, claiming to be an ammunition porter from the R-20th Battalion, stated that

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North Vietnamese soldiers conducted the attack. He further revealed that on the day prior to the attack, his porter group met approximately 100 North Vietnamese soldiers in the mountains southwest of Danang. This force then moved from the mountains to the ammunition pick-up point, where they met additional porters. With the North Vietnamese soldiers carrying the launchers and the porters carrying the rockets (two porters carrying one round on a pole), the force moved to the vicinity of the Ai Nghia River, 18 kilometers southwest of Danang. Here the rockets were secured on submerged rafts and towed by swimmers to the launch site. Being among those assigned the task of policing the launch site after the firing, the detainee remained at the site while the remaining porters and North Vietnamese soldiers withdrew along the approach route.

Prior to policing the area, his group was taken under fire and dispersed by US aircraft. After being hidden in underground tunnels and shelters by the local guerrillas for two days, the detainee was captured by PF forces.


The attack is graphically depicted on the following page.

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## ENEMY ROCKET ATTACK ON DANANG 27 FEBRUARY



The rocket attack at Danang, and those near the DMZ reported in the Large Unit Operations section, have serious implications. The range of the rockets increases the area surveillance problem considerably, to compensate for the 9,735 yard range of the 140mm rocket, as compared with the 6,235 yard range of the 120mm mortar. To patrol thoroughly this additional 3,500 yard band at the rear of the main thrust of Marine operations is a difficult undertaking, considering the limited troop availability in both

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
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III MAF and I Corps. Of equal concern is the flexibility of the rocket systems themselves. They are simple in construction, and can be introduced, set up, and fired in a very brief period without extensive preparations or highly skilled personnel.

There were no other incidents of significance in the Marine base areas during the month.

At end-month, aircraft population of the critical bases was as shown below.

**AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT THE FIVE MAJOR AIRFIELDS  
IN I CTZ AS OF 28 FEBRUARY 1967\***



\*66 Aircraft undergoing repair or maintenance out-of-country

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AIR OPERATIONS

Fixed Wing

Marine jet attack, fighter, fighter-attack, photo and electronic countermeasure aircraft flew a total of 5,798 combat sorties during the month. 699 sorties were flown in North Vietnam, 359 in Laos and 4,740 in South Vietnam. Good flying weather at the bases, with only minor exceptions, permitted attainment of this new high total, although weather over targets caused the cancellation of 702 sorties. Marine air support radar teams controlled 1,855 sorties flown under conditions of poor target visibility.

Of the 3,765 attack sorties flown in South Vietnam, 842 - over 22% - were close air support sorties in support of engaged Marine ground units.

Direct air support sorties, which include pre-planned armed reconnaissance, interdiction and attacks on enemy forces relatively far into enemy-held territory, accounted for another 2,923 in-country attack sorties. In addition, 920 visual and photo reconnaissance, 47 air defense, and 8 escort sorties were flown during the month.

The 5,755 tons of ordnance placed on targets in the south included 1,304 napalm bombs, over ten thousand 2.75 inch folding fin aerial rockets, and almost four hundred 5 inch rockets. In addition, 135,742 rounds of 20mm cannon ammunition were expended on strafing runs. Damage assessments for these strikes include 257 enemy confirmed killed, 62 bunkers destroyed and 35 others damaged. The 129 secondary explosions from these attacks attest to the large quantity of munitions probably destroyed.

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First Marine Aircraft Wing sorties into North Vietnam delivered 1,004 tons of bombs and 1,130 rockets on military targets. Results that were discernible included 22 secondary explosions, 14 road cuts and 9 antiaircraft gun positions destroyed or damaged.

Sorties over Laos, to interdict enemy infiltration of personnel and supplies into the Republic of Vietnam, dropped 670 tons of bombs, achieving 52 secondary explosions, cutting 52 roads and 11 fords and destroying 8 bridges, 14 bunkers and damaging 4 trucks.

One A-4 attack aircraft was lost to enemy fire during the month and 26 fixed wing aircraft received combat damage, compared with 2 lost and 38 damaged in January.

#### A-6A Aircraft

Availability of the Intruders, although far from the readiness objective of 55%, improved during the month to 24% in the last week, compared with a 16.8% readiness average in January. Although full digital integrated attack and navigation systems were not always available, air frame availability was good, with an average 9 of 12 aircraft operational daily, compared with an average 6.6 ready during January. The multiple systems of the aircraft permitted completion of 395 attack sorties, 170 of these in North Vietnam. In the remaining 225 sorties flown in support of III MAF, ROKMC and ARVN forces in I Corps, 1040 tons of ordnance were dropped on Viet Cong targets. The Intruders were credited with 7 VC killed, 111 probably killed, 137 buildings destroyed and 21 secondary explosions. In the north, where 528 tons of bombs were dropped, bomb damage assessments for the A-6A were limited to 6 secondary explosions due to the limited

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visibility under which most missions were flown. Several moving targets, probably trucks, were detected and attacked using airborne moving target indicator radar but results were not discernible.

#### Air Control

Preparations were being made to locate Marine Air Control Squadron 4 at Monkey Mountain when that unit arrives from CONUS in April. This squadron is equipped with the Marine Tactical Data System (MTDS), an advanced automated air control system. Deployment of this system to the Danang area will provide the capability to interchange information vital to air defense between the shipboard Navy Tactical Data Systems of the 7th US Fleet and the present US Air Force in-country air control system.

#### Helicopter operations

Marine helicopters flew 33,670 sorties during February - 29,147 in support of III MAF units and the remaining 4,523 in support of ARVN and ROK Marine units in I CTZ. The varied tasks performed included the lift of 46,936 personnel, delivery of 5,682 tons of cargo to combat units and forward logistic support areas, and evacuation of 2,597 casualties - US and ROK Marines, ARVN soldiers, civilians, and enemy captives.

Other missions performed by helicopters were search and rescue, reconnaissance of potential landing zones, tactical recovery of downed aircraft and armed escort for combat troop lifts.

The four CH-53A helicopters of HMH-463 lifted 651 tons of cargo and 1,005 passengers in the first month of operations, while flying 444 sorties. The sortie rate



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Over 1000 hours per aircraft attests to the reliability of this new heavy lift helicopter, exceptional for initial introduction to combat.

The eight CH-37C helicopters being replaced by the CH-53A flew 530 sorties during the month, an average of over 2.3 sorties per day. This is a respectable rate for a 10 year old workhorse.

Increased exposure of helicopters to ground fire due to the tempo of ground operations resulted in 162 helicopters receiving combat damage during the month, compared with 138 helicopters which received combat damage during January. There were no combat losses. The graphs below show the relationship between the helicopter sorties and antiaircraft incidents in I CTZ.



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During February, rainfall throughout the Marine Tactical Areas decreased substantially, although persistent crackin fog restricted resupply operations, often grounding even helicopters. On several days gusty winds whipped up four to six foot swells in Danang harbor, requiring the suspension of lighterage operations.

Logistic Support Organization

On 15 February the organization of the Force Logistics Command was realigned following the transfer of the First Force Service Regiment headquarters from Camp Pendleton, California to Danang. With this re-alignment the logistic organization in RVN on 28 February was as follows:

Danang: Force Logistic Command Headquarters  
First Force Service Regiment  
Fleet Stock Account C2

Phu Bai: Force Logistic Support Group Alpha  
Third Service Battalion

Chu Lai: Force Logistic Support Group Bravo  
First Service Battalion  
Fleet Stock Account A2

Dong Ha: Force Logistic Support Unit 1

Upon the planned activation of Fleet Stock Account A1 at Danang during the spring of 1967, Fleet Stock Account C2 will be transferred to Force Logistic Support

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Group Alpha at Phu Bai. This will result in three active Fleet Stock Accounts in RVN.

Supply

Class I - Adequate stocks were available to support operations, with the exception of some shortage in long range patrol rations. Air shipments are expected to overcome this deficiency by 15 March 1967.

Class II - Stocks were adequate for the support of all military operations. During the month there was a reduction in obligations of 9,000 at the FLC. Of the 77,734 demands placed on the 3d FSR, 45% were filled, while the FLC filled 45% of the 70,385 demands placed on it.

Class III - Adequate stocks of POL were on hand to support all tactical and logistic operations in I CTZ. The present military POL capacity of 152,000 barrels per day in I CTZ is expected to increase to 264,000 barrels per day during the early spring and to 294,000 barrels per day later during 1967.

Class IV - No significant change occurred during February. There are adequate supplies on hand to satisfy demands.

Class V - There were no changes in ground stock levels. Class VA levels were maintained within CINCPAC allocations. Due to increased production and pipeline fills, shortages or mal-distribution of certain items of aviation ordnance which existed during 1966 have been corrected.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**Aviation Logistics

At the end of February there were 42 aircraft undergoing Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) in Japan, while 24 others were receiving unscheduled repairs for damage. Type and number of aircraft undergoing PAR are as follows:

TF9J - 1	F4B - 6
F8E - 5	UH1E - 8
A4E - 9	CH46A - 9
A4C - 4	


In February the NORS/NORM rates for WestPac aircraft were virtually unchanged from previous months. Rates since June 1966 are depicted on the graphs on the following page.

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
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## NORS/NORM - WESTPAC AIRCRAFT


A-4 (ATTACK)




F-4 (FIGHTER)




F-8 (FIGHTER)




CH-46A (HELO)




UH-34D (HELO)




UH-1E (HELO)



A-6A (ATTACK)



CH-53A (HELO)\*



\* Readiness Objective not established

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On 1 February, BLT 1/9 departed Okinawa for RVN, arriving on 5 February. The 5th 155mm Gun Battery (SP), the 1st Platoon, 5th 8" Howitzer Battery (SP), and the 1st Platoon, 5th MP Company departed San Diego for Okinawa on 1 February, arriving on 22 February. BLT 1/3 commenced embarkation on 5 February at Danang for rotation to Okinawa, arriving there on 13 February. On 24 February, BLT 3/9 sailed for RVN from Okinawa and was still enroute at the end of the month.

Port Activity

Cargo operations at the Port of Danang were occasionally interrupted by adverse weather conditions. However, unloading kept pace with requirements, and there were no adverse effects on military operations of III MAF.

A daily average unload rate of 8,356 M/T resulted in 233,983 M/T of cargo being unloaded at all I CTZ ports during the month. In addition, 94,745 M/T of cargo were backloaded during the same period, resulting in a total throughput of 328,728 M/T.

On 28 February there were 10 cargo ships in the port of Danang, with 24,262 M/T of cargo awaiting unloading. This compares with 5 ships and 1,436 M/T on 31 January.

A new concept was tested during the month by the use of two LST's to provide logistic support of the First Marine Division during Operation DeSoto. The basic concept for the logistic support ships was that they could act as floating dumps for support of forces ashore, with

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supplies being airlifted by helicopter. This concept proved sound, but problems were encountered due to the limitation of the LST as a helicopter refueler and their lack of stability as a helicopter landing platform during rough weather.

The airlift situation continued favorable during February as 1,590 S/T were lifted from Okinawa to I CTZ. Of this amount, 1,212 S/T were shipped on the MAC channel from Kadena to Danang and 378 S/T were lifted by organic USMC aircraft.

Engineer Operations

Engineer operations were focused on the northern provinces during February. A total of 18 bridges were constructed or installed, ranging from float bridges to pile bent. Five ferries were in operation, including one Class 60, seven float raft. 7,614 cubic yards of crushed aggregate were produced which supported the construction of eight miles of new road and the maintenance of 127 miles of existing roads. Present III MAF covered storage includes 104,000 square feet completed, with 216,000 square feet under construction. Nearly nine and one-half million gallons of potable water were produced at Danang, Chu Lai and Dong Ha. The upgrading of I CTZ airfields continued with night maintenance operations conducted at Khe Sanh due to sub-grade erosion caused by heavy rains.

Increased VC activity in the southern provinces, requiring additional defensive consolidation, will require a heavy increase in bunker building in these areas, along with improvements in LOC's. To meet the demand for logistic support, the development of port facilities, improvement of existing road networks, and the upgrading of airfields will require major engineer effort, and may

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necessitate diversion of engineer units to this area.

Maintenance

The overall material deadline rate of combat essential equipment was relatively unchanged from the 1966 and January 1967 level. Thus far in 1967, the rate for engineer equipment has declined to 15%, which compares with a February 1966 rate of 27% and an end-1966 rate of 20%. The material deadline rate for January and February 1967, in comparison with the 1966 average, follows:

	Average 1966	January 1967	February 1967
<b>Communications -</b>			
Electronic	9%	6%	7%
Ordnance	3%	3%	2%
Motor Transport	8%	7%	9%
Engineer Equipment	21%	15%	15%
General Supply	3%	2%	3%
Composite Deadline Rate	9%	6%	7%

Contributing to the declining deadline rates in WestPac is the maintenance activity of the major supporting logistics organizations. During January and February, the Force Logistics Command and 3d Force Service Regiment received 7,741 work orders, and completed 7,484 - a 97% completion rate.

Public Works Support

The Naval Support Activity, Danang has begun to expand its Public Works support of III MAF. Because of this assistance, Marine personnel formerly involved in public works type effort will be released to support tactical units.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS1. PHU BAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
1stBn, 9thMar	5Feb	Arrive	Okinawa
3d MT Bn	13Feb	Arrive	Danang
Hq, 4thMar	14Feb	Arrive	Dong Ha
FLSG-A	15Feb	Arrive	Danang
FLSU-2	15Feb	Deactivated	

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Jan</u>
Within 25 miles			Within 25 miles		
Northern Sub- Region Hq	1	1			
Regimental Hq	1	1	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	5	5	Battalions	0	0
Companies	3	3	Companies	2	2
Total strength	2300	2400	Total strength	150	150

The 100 man difference between January and February confirmed Order of Battle totals reflects losses assessed against the 802nd Battalion as a result of friendly operations.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**2. DONG HAMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
Hq, 4thMar	14Feb	Depart	Phu Bai

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u> Within 25 miles	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Probable</u> Within 25 miles	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Jan</u>
Northern Sub- Region Hq	1	1	Northern Sub- Region Hq	0	0
Division Hq	2	2	Division Hq	0	0
Regimental Hq	7	7	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	30	30	Battalions	0	2
Companies	2	2	Companies	2	2
Total			Total		
Strength	19,300	17,450	Strength	200	200

The total enemy strength within 25 miles of Dong Ha includes the 324 "B" Division and 341st NVA Division which are located in the vicinity of the DMZ. The difference of 1,850 men is attributed to the upgraded strength of the 324 "B" Division which is now carried at an estimated 9,600 men. This Division has had sufficient time to replace the losses it sustained during Operations Prairie and Hastings.

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
1stBn, 3dMar	1Feb	Arrive	Khe Sanh
1stBn, 3dMar	13Feb	Depart	Okinawa
7th MT Bn	13Feb	Depart	Chu Lai
3d MT Bn	13Feb	Depart	Phu Bai
VMFA-115	15Feb	Depart	Japan
VMF(AW)-235	15Feb	Arrive	Japan
1stFSR (-)	15Feb	Arrive	CONUS
FLSG-A	15Feb	Depart	Phu Bai
HMM-361	17Feb	Arrive	Okinawa
HMM-263	18Feb	Depart	Okinawa

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u> <u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Probable</u> <u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Jan</u>
Regimental Hq	1	1	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	6	6	Battalions	1	1
Companies	5	5	Companies	2	2
Total strength	3000	3100	Total strength	700	700

The 100 man difference in Order of Battle totals within the Danang tactical area is attributed to losses assessed against the R-20th Battalion and other units during the month of February.

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
7th MT Bn	13Feb	Arrive	Danang

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u> <u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Probable</u> <u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Jan</u>
Regimental Hq	2	2	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	10	10	Battalions	0	0
Companies	13	12	Companies	0	0
Total strength	6700	6500	Total strength	0	0

A comparison of February and January 1967 confirmed Order of Battle totals show an increase of 200 enemy personnel. These totals reflect the addition of the T-20th Company.

5. ENEMY LOSSES FOR FEBRUARY

<u>February</u>		<u>Total to date</u>
1,721	Killed	15,845
209	Captured	1,753 *
159	Weapons	2,481

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\* Adjusted total

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<u>February</u>	<u>January</u>		<u>Total as of 28Feb67</u>
84,592	104,743	Persons given medical treatment	1,410,407
63	54	Persons given medical training	831
344,882	79,114	Pounds of food distributed	2,686,430
4,351	4,803	Pounds of soap distributed	165,833
5,667	7,351	Pounds of clothing distributed	240,866
242	276	Critically ill civilians evacuated	6,717
181	265	English language classes conducted	2,080
\$1,541	\$763	Cash donations	\$37,487
688,764	158,219	Persons fed	4,077,121
5,685	2,655	Students supported	49,335
101	192	Construction projects	1,609

7. MARINE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>February</u>	<u>January</u>		<u>Total as of 28Feb67</u>
16,941	15,676	Patrols	135,063
4,767	4,532	Ambushes	66,918
121	293	Company opns	2,534
450	426	Sniper posts	5,718
6	5	Battalion opns	133
7	4	Regimental or larger opns	53
6,565	6,164	Combat/combat support sorties	89,567
33,670	31,788	Helo sorties	624,686

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	Marines			Navy		
	Off	Enl	Total	Off	Enl	Total
Danang	2142	29701	31843	166	1008	1174
Chu Lai	1462	21808	23270	95	805	900
Phu Bai	460	7217	7677	63	436	499
Dong Ha	438	10502	10940	37	286	323
Total	4502	69228	73730	361	2535	2896

9. MARINE TACTICAL AREAS - ON 28 FEBRUARY 1967

	<u>Square miles</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Villages</u>
Danang	999	739,437	104
Chu Lai	532	270,081	57
Phu Bai	162	68,037	22
Total	1,693	1,077,555	183
Goals	3,340	2,400,000	369
Percent of goal achieved	51%	45%	49%

10. LOGISTICSa. Supply levels at end of period

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
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Class I

(1000 of rations /  
days of supply)

MCI rations	208/6	170/8	56/8	65/9
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	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
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Class I(1000 of rations/  
days of supply)

B rations	409/12	311/15	49/7	100/14
A rations	497/13	151/6	71/9	1/0

Class III and IIIA (Bulk)

(1000 gals/days of supply)

JP-4	2856/26	2295/7	46/5	80/27
AVGAS	569/41	152/9	46/5	67/17
MOGAS	349/9	145/6	26/5	38/5
DIESEL	160/4	121/4	16/3	31/4

Class V and VA      Danang      Chu Lai      Phu Bai

Ground ammunition (days of supply)	45	45	45
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Aviation ordnance - Stocks maintained within CINCPAC  
allocations.**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

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b. Resupply Status:(1) Surface shipping status (I CTZ)

Cargo unloaded (February)	233,983 M/T
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Average daily discharge rate	8,356 M/T
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Port of Danang

Ships in port 31 January	5
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Ships arriving during February	44
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Ships unloaded during February	39
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Ships in port 28 February	10
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Cargo backlog 28 February	24,262 M/T
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Cargo unloaded February	157,939 M/T
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Cargo backlog 31 January	1,436 M/T
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Average backlog (February)	12,559 M/T
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(2) Air Shipping Status

Cargo lifted into RVN	1,590 S/T
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Cargo awaiting lift on Okinawa as of 28 February	107 S/T
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c. RED BALL Summary:

Items at beginning of period	570
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c. RED BALL Summary (cont'd):

Items added	139
Items removed	228
Items remaining at end of period	481

d. Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN to 3dFSR	2,198
Items repaired at 3dFSR	1,041
Items returned to CONUS from 3dFSR or disposed of on Okinawa	460

e. Construction Projects:

Roads rehabilitated or constructed	- 8 miles of new road completed. 127 miles of existing roads maintained.
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Bridges constructed	- 3 CL 60 timber bridges, 3 CL 60 pile bent bridges, 2 CL 60 M4T6 fixed span bridges installed, 1 CL 35 timber bridge, 1 CL 23 M4 floating bridge with M4T6 deck installed.
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Bridges under con- struction	- 3 CL 60 pile bent bridges, 1 CL 60 - 1800', 2&4 lane ETC Apr 67 (Danang River Bridge), 1 CL 15 steel bridge,
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Bridges under construction (cont'd)

1 CL 15 Eiffel bridge repaired,  
2 CL 60 M4T6 bridges, and  
1 M4T6 fixed span bridge  
removed.

Wells drilled

- 4 completed, 3 in progress.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**CONCLUSIONS

- The enemy is suffering heavy losses in return for his determined efforts in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Concurrently, these efforts are absorbing the attention of III MAF in a degree which will preclude further expansion of the Marine areas of influence so long as the enemy maintains this level of activity.

- The ARVN program for shifting forces to Revolutionary Development tasks in the I Corps Tactical Zone is sound, but little progress by the forces so shifted is yet visible.

- The Marine Combined Action formula is producing more effectively all the time. The program should be expanded beyond its current goals.

- There is growing evidence of need for a stronger logistic base in the area between Hue and the DMZ.

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