

April 1968

Fm FMac: Operations Of U.S. Marine  
Forces, Vietnam

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# OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES VIETNAM

APRIL 1967

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of April 1967. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering periods from March 1965 through March 1967.

In April, US Army forces were introduced for the first time, in strength, into the I Corps Tactical Zone. Significant events in the operations of Army units will be reported in these summaries, whenever they relate directly to those of the US Marines, and to the extent necessary to make the USMC historical record complete.

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SUMMARY

Before the month of April was over, it was clear that the enemy had made the I Corps Tactical Zone the object of his current main effort.

He had intensified greatly his efforts to neutralize the Marine and Army artillery positions near the Demilitarized Zone, to damage our forward logistic base at Dong Ha, and to damage our air bases at Chu Lai and Phu Bai. In the process, he fired over 2,300 rounds of mortar, rocket and artillery into these areas, causing moderate damage and 478 casualties.

Concurrently his guerrilla campaign had grown, and his efforts to impede the Revolutionary Development program increased in strength, coordination, and boldness.

Finally, he launched a series of major ground attacks to seize the tactical initiative, resulting in some of the most severe fighting of the war in the Demilitarized Zone area.

COMUSMACV, perceiving the evident determination of the enemy to build up his effort in the I Corps Tactical Zone, moved, early in April, to diminish the burden on III MAF by introducing Task Force Oregon, a six battalion force, into the Quang Ngai-Chu Lai area, thus relieving three Marine battalions to meet other critical needs. By month's end, the Marine battalions freed in the Chu Lai area were all heavily engaged in operations against enemy base areas southwest of Danang, as well as in operations in the DMZ region.

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A total of 15 large unit operations were mounted by the Marines against the enemy during the month, as compared with 13 in March and an average of 10.5 for the past year. Operations were undertaken against major base areas between Danang and Chu Lai and northwest of Hue. Other important base areas, such as that in the A Shau Valley, were not attacked because of force limitations.

Most significant of the large operations was the major confrontation north of Khe Sanh, where a division size enemy attempt to overrun that outpost was frustrated by a combined Marine air-ground effort, at a cost of 661 enemy killed. Outstanding among the characteristics of this engagement was the performance of Marine Corps aviation forces which, in the space of about four days, delivered over 1,000 sorties in close support of the attacking Marines on the ground.

The Revolutionary Development program suffered during April as a result of several convergent factors: the intensified enemy activity, preoccupation of US and ARVN forces with other critical tasks, and the widespread redistribution of units incident to introduction of Task Force Oregon. Great morale loss was suffered by local Vietnamese as a result of the major enemy raid on Quang Tri city on 6 April, although this unfavorable development was partially neutralized later in the month by a series of successful ARVN operations in the Hue/Quang Tri area, where two large enemy forces were defeated and substantial quantities of equipment were captured.

Marine units, despite heavy involvement elsewhere, conducted the second highest level of small unit counter-guerrilla operations of any month of the conflict. They aggregated 26,814 patrols, ambushes, and company size operations, only slightly below March's record of 28,229.

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An additional 2,939 were conducted by US Army units of Task Force Oregon. 600 of the enemy were killed, - within 32 of the highest number killed in such operations in any month.

The Combined Action program continued to develop satisfactorily during April. There are now 72 Combined Action platoons, and their growing impact on Revolutionary Development is evident. Wherever a Combined Action platoon is established near one of the Revolutionary Development teams, progress toward rural stability is steady and heartening. The program for formation of Combined Action platoons is on schedule.

In every area of the conflict, April was an intensive month. The level of intensity can be measured in many ways, but is reflected clearly in the casualties. With little to show for his pains, the enemy suffered 3,157 killed throughout the I Corps and 3,174 probably killed. In addition, he lost 472 prisoners and 432 weapons.

The cost to us was not small. 292 Marines were killed and 2,527 wounded. Of the latter, about 50 percent did not leave the theater.

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~GOALSAnd Progress Toward Achieving Them

Progress toward III MAF's six major goals for 1967 is described below.

Goal One

The first goal for III MAF, derived from CINCPAC/MACV directives, is to neutralize two enemy base area groupings in I Corps. This adds one base area to the one previously described in the February issue of this report, which was located in southern Quang Ngai province. Within the two groupings, COMUS-MACV has defined a total of 9 individual base areas, although it is worth noting that some of the base areas, when they are penetrated, turn out to be only harboring sites, without a significant infrastructure.

CINCPAC defines neutralization as follows: "A neutralized base area is one that can no longer be used for its intended purpose. This can be accomplished by extensive destruction of facilities found within the area, by repeated ground operations within the area, or by the positioning of friendly forces in or around the area in such a manner as to prevent the enemy having free and unrestricted access to it. Neutralization is not necessarily permanent and must be re-evaluated each month."

Progress toward this first goal is considered to be satisfactory. Thus far in 1967, 29 operations of battalion size or larger by III MAF and other Free World forces, supplemented by 390 Marine Sting Ray missions, have been conducted within or in the vicinity of the two designated groupings. In all, the operations have accounted for 3,219 enemy killed.

The locations of the enemy base areas, neutralization operations directed against them, and the results of these operations, are depicted on the map on the following page.

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III MAF's second 1967 goal is to inflict losses on the VC/NVA at a rate in excess of his monthly input from infiltration and recruitment.

Thus far in 1967, III MAF operations have resulted in 6,512 enemy killed and 659 captured. At the same time, 4,483 of the enemy were killed and 292 captured by ARVN and Korean Marine forces. The number of enemy confirmed killed in I CTZ for this four month period, then, is 10,995. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV have determined that 35% of the number of confirmed enemy killed reflects a reasonable estimate of the number of enemy who die of wounds after a battle or who become permanently incapacitated. Applying the 35% rate to the 10,995 confirmed killed total raises the enemy losses in I CTZ, for the first four months of 1967, to 15,794 (14,843 killed and 951 captured).

These losses, when compared with CINCPAC's average I CTZ monthly infiltration rate for 1966 of 1,500, plus the estimated monthly in-country recruitment rate of 1,500 for I CTZ, tend to validate the conclusion that satisfactory progress is being made toward achieving the goal. However, two factors bear on this conclusion. The infiltration and recruitment figures cited are 1966 averages, since it is too early to determine accurate 1967 data. Further, the presence of three NVA divisions in or north of the DMZ, capable of crossing into RVN for brief periods almost at will, depreciates reliance on past data, particularly since some of the enemy casualties occurred in these units.

Goal Three

The third 1967 III MAF goal is to open 70 miles

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of critical road in I CTZ, and to secure 221 additional miles.\* (The latter figure is a decrease of 28 miles from that contained in the February report, reflecting a more accurate mileage measurement). Of the designated 70 miles to be opened, 48 were open at end-April, which compares with 41 at end-February. Of the 221 miles to be secured, 97 were secure, a condition unchanged from the previous report. It is evident that while the level is satisfactory for a four month period, the overall rate of progress is unsatisfactory.

The status of each of the critical routes is summarized and then portrayed graphically below.

	<u>Goal for end 1967</u>	<u>Status on 30 April</u>
<u>Route 1</u>		
- Open, from the DMZ south to Dong Ha (12 miles).	-All open. 100% of goal.	
- Secure, from Dong Ha south to Quang Ngai (189 miles).	-81 miles secure; 108 miles open. 42% of goal.	
- Open, from Quang Ngai south to the II CTZ border (41 miles).	-19 miles open. 48% of goal.	

\*Directives published by COMUSMACV classify roads as follows:

- "Open" (Amber): Used by RVN/US/FWMAF em-

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<u>Goal for end 1967</u>	<u>Status on 30 April</u>
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Route 5

- Secure, from Route 1 west to An Hoa (18 miles).
- 7 miles secure; 11 miles open. 39% of goal.

Route 9

- Open, from Dong Ha west to Thon Son Lam (17 miles).
- All secure. 100% of goal.

National Priority Area

- Secure, major roads in the NPA, including Route 14 from Hoi An west to Lac Thanh Tay (42 miles). This total also includes 28 miles of north-south Route 1 referenced above.
- 37 miles secure; 0 miles open; 5 miles closed. 88% of goal.

ploying thorough security measures. Frequent incidents may occur.

- "Secure" (Green): Controlled by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with minimum security measures required. Isolated incidents may occur.

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
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
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ROADS

END DECEMBER 1967 GOALS



1967 PROJECTION



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Goal Four

The fourth goal for III MAF is to open 167 miles of the National Railroad in I CTZ and to secure 30 miles in the National Priority Area.\* At the end of April, 9 of the 30 miles in the NPA were secure - the same status as reported at end-February. None of the designated 167 miles were open, which compares with 51 miles open two months ago. The adverse change was caused by the enemy's destruction, on 20 March, of four railroad bridges between Danang and Hue. Thus, there has actually been a retrogression in terms of achieving the fourth goal. This condition is largely a derivative of the shortage of forces which has prevailed for the past few months. The status of the railroad at the end of April is described, and then depicted graphically, below.

Goal for end 1967

- Open, from Dong Ha south to the northern edge of the NPA (87 miles).
- Secure, throughout the NPA (30 miles).
- Open, from the southern edge of the NPA to Ba Ren and west to An Hoa (14 miles).

Status on 30 April

- 0 miles open. 0% of goal.
- 9 miles secure; 11 miles open; 10 miles closed. 30% of goal.
- Closed. 0% of goal.

\*Directives published by COMUSMACV classify railroads

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- Open, from Ba Ren south to Quang Ngai (66 miles).

Status on 30 April

- Closed. 0% of goal.

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as follows:

- "Open" (Amber): Segment between two terminals physically open. Security of surrounding area is such that thorough security measures, including armed escorts, are required for all trains. Frequent incidents may occur.

- "Secure" (Green): Segment between two terminals physically open. RVN/US/FWMAF control of the surrounding area is such that trains can operate during daylight hours with relative freedom from VC sabotage, attacks or harassment. Armed escort not required. Isolated incidents may occur.

- "Closed" (Red): Rail line between two terminals does not meet criteria for the Green or Amber classifications.

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
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
## RAILROADS

END DECEMBER 1967 GOALS

PROGRESS AS OF 30 APRIL 1967



## 1967 PROJECTION

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Goal Five

The fifth goal calls for increasing to 1,782,000 the number of people living in secure areas of I CTZ - that is, areas which are assessed at 60% or higher on the III MAF Revolutionary Development scale.

At the end of April, there were 600,443 people living in secure areas within the Marine regions at Danang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai, with an additional 33,538 in the Dong Ha area. To those can be added the 146,000 people resident in Hue, Quang Tri, Tam Ky, and Quang Ngai, since each of these areas is considered to meet the criteria of a secure area. The total is 779,893 persons living in secure areas, as compared with 777,893 in February and a year-end goal of 1,782,000. At the current rate of progress it is plain that the year-end goal will not be met.

Goal Six

The sixth 1967 goal for III MAF is to increase to 114 the number of Combined Action Platoons.

At the beginning of 1967, there were 57 platoons in being. By the end of February there were 60 platoons, and, on 30 April, there were 72. This is a satisfactory rate of growth, and the platoons are performing effectively. Planned development of the Combined Action program in 1967 is shown graphically on the following page.


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## 1967 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON PROJECTION



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I CTZ TACTICAL SUMMARY:  
JULY 1966 - APRIL 1967

Tactical developments in I Corps during the month of April portray a steadily approaching climax. These events will appear in better perspective if examined in the light of earlier activity.

In the summer of 1966 North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong announced that December (1966) through April (1967) would be a crucial period in the war. He stated that during that period heavy attacks would be launched which, "with continued US casualties over a span of time, will have an anti-war effect upon voters in the US elections in the fall of 1968." As events later developed, Dong's promise of "heavy attacks" beginning in December was fulfilled on schedule and, at end-April, the enemy was pursuing a level of combat activity which had grown for the fourth straight month.

Before December, the North Vietnamese Army had made two bids to establish positions of strength in the northern part of RVN. The first was an overt trans-DMZ invasion in July 1966. It was met by the Marines in Operation Hastings, which accounted for more than 800 enemy troops confirmed killed, and over 900 probably killed. After the battle, the enemy withdrew the bulk of his attacking troops from RVN to positions in the Demilitarized Zone and immediately north of it, where he continued to pose a threat to the northern provinces of I Corps Tactical Zone. In consequence it was necessary to maintain 3 to 4 Marine battalions in the northern I CTZ area for security purposes.

In September, the enemy again crossed into RVN, this time in simultaneous moves into the hills north of Cam Lo and into the coastal plain northeast of Dong Ha.

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With these two new incursions, Marine forces in the region north of Cam Lo (Operation Prairie) were built up to six battalions and became heavily engaged by mid-month. Concurrently, the Marine Special Landing Force of the Seventh Fleet conducted an amphibious landing in the coastal plain, five miles south of the DMZ. Altogether, Marines of III MAF and the Special Landing Force killed a confirmed 780 enemy troops near the DMZ in September, and almost 1,000 more were listed as probably killed.

Again the enemy withdrew the bulk of his forces northward and, by the end of September, actions had diminished to occasional patrol engagements between small units. Marine troop dispositions, however, now remained oriented northward, in face of the evident and persistent enemy threat. What had begun as a search and destroy operation in early summer had developed into a continuing deployment of large Marine forces aimed at securing continually over 300 square miles of the DMZ region. Included in this arrangement was assignment of one Marine battalion to the Khe Sanh Special Forces camp on Route 9 (near the junction of the RVN-NVN-Laos border).

This extensive task in the DMZ area was thus additive to the commitment of forces to other large unit offensive operations, and was reflected in a heavy drawdown on Marine units available for anti-guerrilla pacification operations, and for the defense of the major US installations in I CTZ.


To keep pace with the general shift of Marine forces to the north, the First and Third Division headquarters were both displaced northward in October. These moves are depicted on the chart shown on the following page.

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## OCTOBER REORIENTATION OF 1ST AND 3D MARINE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS



November and December remained relatively quiet in the DMZ region, but the prolonged heavy commitments of Marine battalions in regions remote from the central pacification regions were having their effect on the Revolutionary Development program. Essentially no growth was registered in the size of the Marine tactical areas after summer and, by September, the earlier steady growth of the 60% and 80% pacified areas had slowed substantially. In order to maintain the momentum, efforts were intensified to cause the ARVN to increase its support for the RD pro-

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gram. As a direct action, 7 Marine companies were assigned to security outposts in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, relieving a dozen ARVN battalions for support of RD. The new commitment of the 7 Marine companies served further to stretch Marine resources.

All of these events had resulted in the dispersal of infantry battalions of III MAF over a linear distance of some 200 miles, from Khe Sanh in Quang Tri to Nui Dau in Quang Ngai. Marine units were faced simultaneously with a threat of incursion by NVA forces of up to three division size across the DMZ, by the possibility of flanking action at Khe Sanh or through the A Shau and Ba Long valleys, by attacks in southern I CTZ by the large enemy forces located there, and by attacks by sizeable guerrilla bands against the less well defended RVN villages and hamlets of I CTZ. (This threat was discussed in detail in previous reports of this series). At the same time, the Marines maintained their responsibility for the defense of three large base area complexes with five major airfields (684 combat aircraft) and other vital installations and supplies.

It was in this widely diffused condition that the Marines faced Pham Van Dong's promised "heavy attacks" of December-April. The first outward indications of the enemy offensive were an acceleration of activity in mid-December, and evidence that the enemy was channelling substantially more resources into his guerrilla campaign. There were increasing attacks against elements of the RD program and Combined Action platoons, widespread mortar and rocket attacks on ARVN outposts and US bases, and an increased effort to disrupt lines of communications. However, while enemy guerrilla activity grew throughout I CTZ, the enemy forces in and north of the DMZ remained relatively inactive.

This overall tactical situation persisted through February. The enemy kept up his accelerated guerrilla activity in the coastal plain while his regular NVA forces held to their positions in NVN, Laos and the DMZ, building up supply

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points in the DMZ and Laos, and generally improving their readiness to support offensive operations into RVN. This enemy preparatory activity was disturbed on 25 February, when permission was given to III MAF to fire on military targets in and north of the DMZ. In the next four days, 2,171 rounds of artillery were fired at enemy units and supply points in the hitherto inviolable area.

The enemy reacted sharply. Marine artillery positions at Gio Linh were attacked nine times by enemy mortars or rockets during March. In addition, large elements of the NVA 324 B Division, moving southward from the DMZ, were intercepted by Marines, disrupting what appeared to be a major attack aimed at the artillery bases at Camp Carroll and Con Thien. In a series of engagements in March, 541 NVA were confirmed killed in the area around the artillery positions at Camp Carroll, Cam Lo, Con Thien and Gio Linh. Companion with this major effort, there were continual small contacts in the DMZ area during March, with minor patrol engagements and forward observers or reconnaissance teams calling air strikes and artillery missions on small groups of the enemy.

At end-March, enemy dispositions and enemy capabilities in and around the DMZ were quite different from the mid-summer period when Operation Hastings was conducted. Major troop changes during that period are shown on the chart on the following page.

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
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## ENEMY DISPOSITIONS - DMZ AREA

JUNE 1966

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
Total troop strength  
in DMZ area:  
16,780



MARCH 1967

0 5 10  
KILOMETERS

Total troop strength  
in DMZ area:  
20,560




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While it had occurred gradually over the months, the disposition of Marine units was also substantially changed over the same period. Major unit changes by Marine units are shown on the chart below.

## LOCATION OF MARINE INFANTRY BATTALIONS

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By the end of March, the enemy's new effort was entering its fourth month. Although the tempo of the war had increased substantially, there had been few results favorable to the NVN side, in terms of engagements won, despite heavy losses in personnel and materiel. Earlier progress in the RD program in I CTZ had slowed visibly, but the RD organizational structure was still entirely viable, and the relatively large scale entry of the ARVN into the RD program spelled new future problems for the enemy. The Combined Action program, grown to 69 platoons in March, was proving to be progressively more effective. The number of defectors from the enemy side had increased substantially and there was some evidence of disenchantment among his troops. All of these factors, combined with his costly and largely non-productive new military campaign, put the enemy in the position of needing desperately a major military victory.

The time for such a major effort appeared to be propitious in April. In spite of the aerial interdiction campaign against his supply lines, the enemy had succeeded in building up large stores of supplies in the border area of RVN, and in Laos and North Vietnam. He now had over 20,000 troops in the vicinity. And the month of May would bring May Day, the anniversary of Dien Bien Phu, and Ho Chi Minh's and Buddha's birthdays, any of which could provide a good basis for propaganda, if the situation could be made to develop favorably. By early April, these all contributed to the likelihood of a major offensive operation by the enemy.


Perceiving the likelihood of this development, COMUS-MACV constituted a force, Task Force Oregon, made up of six US Army battalions, and deployed it to the Chu Lai and Duc Pho regions beginning in mid-April. By 20 April approximately 7,500 US Army troops had moved into southern I CTZ, relieving three Marine infantry battalions for

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northward deployment. Moves of major units incident to deployment of Task Force Oregon are shown on the chart below.

**INFANTRY BATTALION REALIGNMENTS RESULTING FROM DEPLOYMENT OF TASK FORCE OREGON  
AS OF 30 APRIL 1967**



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As will be seen later, this redeployment of Marines, timely as it was, did not fully redress the situation.

As events developed, the enemy did attack, and in force. Subsequent actions in the Khe Sanh-Hill 881 region involved some of the most intense fighting by Marines of the war, and some of the heaviest losses to the enemy. Events which took place after a Marine patrol detected a large enemy force moving toward Khe Sanh on 24 April are described in the section that follows.

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LARGE UNIT OPERATIONSThe Action at Khe Sanh


At 1100 on the morning of 24 April, a Marine forward observer and a security platoon made contact with an unknown number of enemy in a location about five miles northwest of Khe Sanh. What was expected to be another brief patrol engagement developed into one of the heaviest battles of the war; a battle which lasted until the 6th of May, and cost the enemy 661 known dead, and another 673 probably killed in that immediate area alone. The battle included a resolute defense by the enemy of critical terrain, the first such instance encountered by the Marines in the war. In retrospect, it appears now that the determined actions by the small Marine unit precipitated the destruction of an elaborate enemy plan, involving actions as far east as the coast, and intended to culminate in the overrunning of the Khe Sanh base.

In retrospect, it is possible to reconstruct the probable enemy plan. -- He would first isolate the battlefield. Initially, mortar attacks would be made on Dong Ha, Gio Linh, Con Thien and Camp Carroll, all designed to upset Marine fire support and logistic arrangements. A mortar attack would be made on Phu Bai, to degrade the Marines' helicopter transport capabilities. Demolitions would be used to cut key stretches of Route 9, in order to isolate Khe Sanh from overland assistance, and a diversionary attack would be carried out against Lang Vei, four miles west of Khe Sanh on Route 9, so as to present a threat from that direction. All of this was to be ancillary to the main effort, a strong ground attack on Khe Sanh, coming southward from the mountainous region near the Laos-RVN-DMZ corner. The essential elements of this plan are shown on the map on the following page.

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## THE ENEMY PLAN



The fire support aspects of the plan were executed on April 27th and 28th, in close coordination, against positions at Phu Bai, Dong Ha and the artillery and supply bases in the DMZ region. Some 1,200 rounds of rocket, artillery and mortar fire fell on these days, killing 10 US and wounding 226 US personnel. The diversionary attack was launched against Lang Vei, and Route 9, between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh, was actually cut. All of these actions appear to have proceeded according to plan. The main effort, however, was obviously triggered prematurely, and frustrated by the vigilance and determination of the Marine small units which first engaged the large enemy force north of Khe Sanh on 24 April, and by the prompt actions of larger Marine units on subsequent days.

When the initial contact was made on the 24th by the Marine forward observer and security platoon, the enemy appeared to be another reconnaissance unit and, as the Marines endeavored to exploit the contact, they found the enemy reluctant to fight. Simultaneously another platoon, headed northward with the purpose of relieving the platoon which made

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
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the contact, had a light encounter. Here, also, there was no effort on the part of the NVN to react to the attack. Both of the Marine units sought to exploit their contact but, in retrospect, it appears that the North Vietnamese, not yet ready to join the action, were probably anxious that the patrols depart the area so as not to expose the overall plan for the ground attack. However, the aggressiveness of the two Marine platoons ultimately caused the NVN to try and eliminate the small Marine units. They moved aggressively to do this and, of the Marines in the platoon sized unit that made the initial contact, 13 were killed and 17 wounded. By this time, however, it had become apparent that a large enemy force was present in the hills north of Khe Sanh, and action by other Marines in the area followed promptly.

#### ACTION AT KHE SANH - 24 APRIL




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The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, operating from Dong Ha, was moved to Khe Sanh to exploit the contact. By 1830 on the 25th, one of its companies was heavily engaged with what was estimated at the time to be a reinforced NVA company. By morning of the 26th it was apparent that the enemy force was of battalion size or larger, and that it occupied well prepared positions. Marine Special Landing Force "B" of the US Seventh Fleet, then conducting Operation Beacon Star 15 miles east of Quang Tri City, was quickly airlifted to Khe Sanh on the 26th. The headquarters of the Third Marine Regiment also arrived from Dong Ha and by 1920 that day, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines linked up with the 3d Battalion at Hill 861. By nightfall on the 27th, after extensive artillery fire and air strikes, the two battalions had assaulted and seized Hill 861.

#### ACTION AT KHE SANH - 25-27 APRIL

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After consolidating the position and mopping up on the 29th, the two Marine battalions prepared to assault two other hills held by the enemy; 881 North, 2 miles to the northwest, and 881 South, 3 miles to the west.

On the 30th, coordinated attacks were launched against enemy forces which were well dug-in on the two hills, and reinforced with heavy automatic weapons, mortars, and recoilless rifles. Throughout the day close air support and artillery were employed against the enemy in his fortified positions. By evening, after intense fighting, elements of the 3d Battalion seized Hill 881 South, while elements of the 2d Battalion remained heavily engaged on the slopes of Hill 881 North. Radar controlled air strikes were continued throughout the night.


On the 1st of May, the 2d Battalion continued the coordinated air and ground attack on Hill 881 North against an enemy now estimated to be a regiment. Bloody fighting ensued and Marines accounted for 253 enemy confirmed killed and 453 probably killed as the fighting continued into the night. On 1 May, aircraft of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew 107 close air support and 45 direct air support sorties, the highest number of sorties flown in support of one battalion in a single day since Operation Starlite in August 1965. One air strike, directed against a large concentration of enemy troops, resulted in 81 enemy confirmed killed. While the 2d Battalion consolidated positions preparatory to continuing the attack on the 3d, 57 attack sorties were conducted in that area, resulting in 59 enemy confirmed killed.

The action on Hill 881 North continued throughout the night of the 2d and the 3d day of May. After much hard fighting, the 2d Battalion, Third Marines gained substantial control of the hill by the close of the day. Mopping up of the extensive fortified enemy positions on Hill 881 North continued until the 6th of May.

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## ACTION AT KHE SANH -30 APRIL -3 MAY



By then, the enemy's threat to Khe Sanh had been broken, at least for the time being. His casualties in the action from 24 April through 6 May stood at 661 NVA confirmed killed, 673 probably killed and 37 weapons captured. Marine losses were also high; 131 killed and 393 wounded.

Much of the credit for overwhelming the enemy force belongs to the First Marine Aircraft Wing, which flew continuous air strikes against the enemy's well camouflaged bunkers and trench lines. Tactical air attacks, employing heavy bombs and napalm, were conducted against pinpoint targets and were particularly effective in uncovering the bunkers and other fortifications.

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This effort by the First Marine Aircraft Wing is described in greater detail in the Air Operations section.

While severely punished, there was no assurance that the significant victory at Khe Sanh would deter the enemy from his earlier announced purpose.

#### Major Operations Against Viet Cong Bases

While heavily occupied with countering the enemy threat from Laos and the DMZ, III MAF committed some of the forces freed by the deployment of Task Force Oregon to operations against the enemy base areas elsewhere in I CTZ. These operations, centered in the areas south of Danang and northwest of Hue, were designed to destroy NVN/Viet Cong bases and to deny him access to the heavily populated coastal plain and its spring rice harvest. Other base areas, notably in the A Shau Valley, were not attacked because of force limitations.

In areas south of Danang and northwest of Hue, where the Viet Cong infrastructure has traditionally been strong, eight Marine large unit operations, including Operation Beaver Cage, an amphibious attack by the Marine Special Landing Force "A" of the Seventh Fleet, accounted for 463 Viet Cong killed, 387 probably killed and 116 captured. Sixty-one Marines were killed and 344 wounded. The two principal operations in this area, Union and Shawnee, are described below.

#### Operation Union

Operation Union was initiated on 22 April after a company of the 1st Marines made contact a day earlier with a well dug-in and concealed Viet Cong Main Force battalion, 29 miles south of Danang. A rapid build-up of Marines from

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during April were 282 enemy confirmed killed, 290 probably killed and 34 prisoners and 14 weapons taken by Marines. Marine casualties were 50 killed and 172 wounded. The ARVN portion of the operation, Lien Ket 102, which terminated on the 29th, netted 15 enemy killed and 77 detainees, with Ranger losses of six killed and 13 wounded.

#### Operation Shawnee

One day after Operation Union began in Quang Nam province, the 4th Marines, in coordination with ARVN units, launched a major offensive against a major enemy base area, 18 miles northwest of Hue. This operation was the first brigade size penetration into VC base areas in this region. Marines made only light contact with small groups of enemy troops, as an intensive search of the mountainous area was conducted. ARVN forces uncovered a possible enemy regimental headquarters, capturing a quantity of communications equipment and 10 tons of rice. At the end of April, the Marines in Operations Shawnee had killed 47 Viet Cong, captured two and probably killed another twenty. Marine casualties were 2 killed and 46 wounded. ARVN units killed 2 VC and captured two with losses of 5 killed and 7 wounded. The area concerned had not yet been fully searched, and this operation continued into May.

In all, during April, there were 15 large unit operations conducted in I CTZ under III MAF control. Their locations and duration are shown on the map on the following page.


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record 190 of the enemy were confirmed killed. An additional 389 were probably killed but not confirmed, due to the inability of the patrols to move far from their observation points without disclosing their positions. A total of 5 Marines were killed and 69 wounded in Sting Ray actions.

### CASUALTIES IN STING RAY OPERATIONS

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AIR OPERATIONS

Fixed Wing

The First Marine Aircraft Wing flew 6,574 combat sorties during April, which included 4,200 strike sorties in South Vietnam, 544 in North Vietnam, and 394 in Laos.

In South Vietnam, 26 percent of the 4,200 strike sorties were in close support of Marines, Army, ARVN and ROKMC forces engaged on the ground. 6,100 tons of bombs, 1,332 napalm bombs, 7,500 air to ground rockets and 225,000 rounds of 20mm were placed on enemy targets throughout I CTZ. Discernible results were 201 enemy confirmed killed, 95 secondary explosions, 57 fires, and 139 bunkers, 62 caves and tunnels and 1,222 other structures destroyed. An additional 467 enemy troops were probably killed.

A significant portion of this effort was in support of the battle around Khe Sanh and Hill 881. In this area alone, between 24 April and 6 May, Marine pilots flew 1,004 strike sorties, expending 1,502 tons of ordnance. Details of that support, and the results it achieved, are reflected on the map on the following page.


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## MARINE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT-KHE SANH-24 APRIL-6 MAY



10 Location and number of strikes

1004 SORTIES; 1502 TONS OF ORDNANCE. ENEMY KILLED BY AIR: 112 CONFIRMED; 41 PROBABLE.

## DAMAGE

Bunkers destroyed	328	Tunnels damaged	7
Bunkers damaged	40	Automatic weapon	
Structures destroyed	14	positions destroyed	11
Structures damaged	4	Secondary fires	10
Trenches damaged	12	Secondary explosions	14
Tunnels destroyed	5		

**STAKES**

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In Laos, Marine aircraft contributed 394 strike sorties to the interdiction of infiltration and supply routes. 795 tons of bombs and 161 rockets were expended, resulting in 18 secondary explosions, 16 fires, 68 road cuts, 8 fords destroyed, 9 landslides, 5 trucks and one tractor destroyed and 6 trucks and another tractor damaged. RF-4B's flew 7 photo missions over the extensive network of trails and roads through which supplies and manpower have moved in the past from North Vietnam.

Over North Vietnam, 544 strike sorties and 339 photo and electronic countermeasure sorties were flown during the month. 1,446 tons of ordnance were delivered on fixed and moving targets. Marine F-4B's, A-4E's and F-8E's flew 335 of the strike sorties, including 33 at night under radar control, expending 651 tons of ordnance. Known bomb damage includes 13 NVA confirmed killed, one bridge destroyed and another damaged, 15 roads cut, 2 trucks destroyed and 5 damaged. Four secondary explosions and two fires were observed, with one antiaircraft position destroyed.

#### The A-6A

The two squadrons of Intruders now assigned to the First Marine Aircraft Wing flew 546 combat sorties during the month. 337 were in support of US, ARVN and ROK Marine forces in I CTZ and the remaining 209 were over North Vietnam.

In the south, 993 tons of ordnance were delivered on enemy targets in support of friendly forces on the ground. VMA(AW)-533, which arrived in-country on the last day of March, conducted its shakedown and area familiarization flights in South Vietnam before being assigned missions north of the DMZ.

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April marked the initiation of A-6A full systems strikes north of Route Package I in North Vietnam. From 11 April until the end of the month, 59 strike sorties were flown into Route Packages II and III, attacking 47 targets. The remaining 150 Intruder sorties into the north struck military targets in the Route Package I area and in the DMZ. Ordnance delivered in the north amounted to 815 tons of bombs and 3,821 air to ground rockets. The 206 fixed targets struck included barracks, radars, highway and railroad bridges, ferries, fords, truck parks, supply areas and one SAM site. Results of attacks on these targets were 17 secondary explosions and 8 fires. 251 trucks, boats and other moving vehicles were attacked, using airborne moving target indicator systems. It will be recalled that the moving target indicator and electronic attack systems of the A-6A provide its crew with the ability to locate and destroy moving vehicles or boats during darkness or when weather causes poor visibility. Results of these strikes were limited to the 20 secondary explosions, 6 fires which were observed by crew members, and one boat sunk.


The locations of Marine Intruder strikes into North Vietnam during April are shown on the map on the following page.

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## MARINE A-6A ATTACKS IN NORTH VIETNAM APRIL 1967

Aircraft Losses

One A-6A was lost over North Vietnam from an unknown cause, when it disappeared while on an attack run near Vinh. One A-4E and one F-4B were lost to ground fire in South Vietnam. The crew of the F-4B was recovered but the A-4 pilot did not eject. Thirty-two other fixed wing aircraft received combat damage from antiaircraft fire but these managed to return safely to their bases. This brings total loss figures to 40 fixed wing aircraft destroyed and 88 rotary wing aircraft destroyed since our commitment to RVN.

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~~SECRET~~Air Control

Construction of facilities at Monkey Mountain for Marine Air Control Squadron-4 and the Marine Tactical Data System, a semi-automated air defense system, progressed according to schedule.

The advance party of MACS-4 arrived at Danang on 27 April to facilitate turnover when their squadron arrives in early June. At that time, MACS-7, presently at Danang, will return to CONUS.

As a part of the MTDS equipment, a tactical aircraft data communications central will deploy shortly after the main body of the control squadron, to provide a real time tie in with the Navy Tactical Data System already operational with the US Seventh Fleet. The entire complex will provide the capability for instant display at Monkey Mountain of those enemy aircraft detected by the Navy Tactical Data System in the Gulf of Tonkin and those detected by MTDS radars. Integral computers of the MTDS can then provide instant solutions to intercept problems, whether USAF, USN or USMC aircraft fly the mission. The complex will also provide direct firing instructions and data to HAWK batteries to permit missile intercept. Ultimately, when the digital computer capability of the US Air Force is available, a data link with the Air Force Backup Interceptor Central (BUIC) will permit mutual exchange of air defense information.

Helicopter Operations

First Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters flew 38,060 sorties during the month, lifting 45,199 personnel and 4,467 tons of cargo in support of ground operations in I CTZ.

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The four CH-53A's of the detachment of HMH-463 performed notably, flying 821 sorties, an average of 6.8 sorties per aircraft each day, compared to 4.1 sorties per day during March. A total of 1,210 tons of cargo and 1,964 personnel were lifted. The varied missions performed were cargo and troop lift, casualty evacuation and tactical recovery of downed aircraft and damaged equipment.

The eight plane detachment of CH-37C's, the older heavy lift helicopter in the Marine inventory, flew a respectable 799 sorties, transporting 2,382 personnel and 484 tons of cargo in support of III MAF, ARVN and ROK Marines in I CTZ. These aircraft, which have been in service for 10 years, are scheduled to be replaced by CH-53A's with the arrival of the main body of HMH-463 in May. This squadron was embarking in the USS Tripoli (LPH-10), with 22 CH-53A helicopters, at the end of April, destined for Danang.

The bulk of the helicopter support in I CTZ was provided by the UH-34D and CH-46A squadrons. The UH-34's flew 13,146 sorties, transporting 16,948 personnel and 974 tons of cargo. The CH-46's, with their greater lift capability and speed, lifted 19,523 personnel and 1,727 tons of cargo in only 6,079 sorties.

The Marine helicopter squadrons assigned to the two Special Landing Forces of the US Seventh Fleet flew 1,757 sorties, transporting 2,582 personnel and 74.9 tons of cargo in support of Operations Beaver Cage, south of Danang, and Beacon Star, near the DMZ. These brought the total Marine helicopter sorties in South Vietnam and combat zone waters to 39,817 during the month.

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
Combat losses during the month were four, compared to 5 in March. 126 helicopters were damaged while flying combat missions, in addition to the 30 damaged during the enemy mortar and rocket attacks at Dong Ha and Phu Bai on the 27th (see Base Defense section).

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~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONSEnemy Guerrilla Activity

Although down slightly from last month, rates of enemy activity in I CTZ continue to reflect the intensified guerrilla effort which has formed a part of the enemy campaign plan. These rates are depicted on the graphs below.

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The enemy guerrilla campaign, which began to intensify in December, grew in boldness during April. One example was the destruction of the Nam O Bridge across the Ca De river, on Route #1 north of Danang. This bridge, located 12 kilometers north of the city, was blown by enemy swimmers at 0450 on 13 April. A center span, approximately 75 feet in length, collapsed as a result of the explosion, severing the main highway and railway north of Danang. Marine engineer units rapidly assembled a floating bridge at the site and late on the following day, vehicular traffic on Route #1 was again possible.

Another bold enemy action was the raid on Quang Tri, on 6 April. In a series of early morning attacks, the enemy succeeded in entering the city, freeing 250 VC prisoners from the province jail and inflicting casualties on both US and ARVN forces. Ten US personnel were killed and 15 wounded. ARVN units, engaged in fierce fighting which included point-blank firing of artillery, suffered 67 killed, 81 wounded, and 5 missing. Enemy losses were heavy: 102 killed and 34 weapons. Three VC prisoners were taken.

III MAF met the heavy guerrilla challenge with the highest level of operations yet recorded.

During April, Marines conducted 26,814 patrols, ambushes, and company size operations. An additional 2,939 small unit actions were undertaken by US Army units of Task Force Oregon. The aggregate of 29,753 surpassed by 1,524 the previous high established in March. There were 1,067 contacts with enemy forces, which resulted in 600 enemy confirmed killed, a record exceeded only by the January 1967 total of 632. In addition, 97 enemy were captured and 90 weapons were seized.

Two company size actions are particularly worth noting.

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- On 9 April a platoon reconnaissance patrol from Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines made contact with 3 VC, 10 miles south of Danang. The enemy were pursued and, as they fled north, were seen by an aerial observer, who called in an air attack. The observer then noticed 30 to 40 additional enemy in the same area. Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was moved rapidly to a blocking position. While Company C and the Company B platoon held their blocking positions, artillery and air attacks were delivered to the north and south to complete the isolation of the enemy. Casualties resulting from this action were 25 VC confirmed killed. One Marine was wounded.

- Early on 21 April, two platoons from Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, conducting a search and destroy operation near the Nui Loc Son outpost 30 miles south of Danang, encountered an estimated enemy battalion, well-concealed and entrenched. Although outnumbered, the Marines maintained contact with the enemy and, after the arrival of two companies of reinforcements, assaulted the enemy's positions. 46 Viet Cong were confirmed killed, with 50 others probably killed; 29 Marines were killed and 94 wounded. To exploit this contact, Operation Union was initiated on 22 April (see Large Unit Operations section).

#### Combined Action Operations

As in previous months, Combined Action units made a sizeable contribution to III MAF's counterguerrilla campaign.

During April, Combined Action units conducted 1,498 day patrols, 2,124 night patrols and ambushes, and 9 search and clear operations. These resulted in


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
35 VC confirmed killed, 75 probably killed, 27 VC captured and 10 weapons seized.

## COMBINED ACTION UNIT ACTIVITY


## NIGHT PATROLS AND AMBUSHES




## DAY PATROLS AND AMBUSHES



## VC KILLED



## VC CAPTURED



Five actions during the month are typical of the daily activity of Combined Action units.

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- On 10 April at 8 P.M. a Combined Action patrol northwest of Danang made contact with an estimated enemy company. Small arms fire was exchanged at close quarters - close enough, in fact, for one Marine to engage a VC in hand to hand combat, and kill him with his M-16 rifle butt. The enemy withdrew, leaving behind 2 VC confirmed killed.

- Another Combined Action patrol in the same vicinity on 18 April observed an estimated 60 VC setting up an ambush in the vicinity of the hamlet of Phu Loc. Small arms fire was exchanged, with the enemy also employing 60mm mortars. An artillery mission, fired from the Phu Loc District Headquarters, forced the enemy to fall back. The results of this action were 10 VC confirmed killed. 2 Marines and 4 PF's from the Combined Action unit received minor wounds.

- Prior to daybreak on 19 April, a Combined Action platoon command post, 11 miles southwest of Danang, was attacked from three sides by a reinforced enemy platoon. The enemy, employing small arms, hand grenades, and satchel charges, penetrated the position and destroyed three bunkers. A reaction force, Company K, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was immediately dispatched and, after engaging the enemy, made contact with the Combined Action unit. The results of this action were 3 VC confirmed killed and 12 VC probably killed. Two Marines were killed and 5 were wounded, along with 2 PF's killed and one wounded.

- On 20 April a squad ambush from another Combined Action platoon engaged 5 VC, 13 miles south of Danang, killing two. There were no friendly casualties.

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- At 11:30 A. M. on 28 April, while providing security for Vietnamese workers harvesting corn, 13 miles southwest of Danang, a Combined Action platoon flushed 3 armed VC from the field, and captured one of them.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Revolutionary Development progress in I CTZ continued the pattern of the past five months, showing very slow growth. The principal cause was the enemy's intensive anti-RD campaign. Other factors, however, contributed to the limited progress. The Viet Cong attacks on Quang Tri and in the Hue area had a damaging effect upon the morale of the people and generally impeded the program. Another factor was the unsettled condition resulting from extensive friendly troop shifts which occurred during the month. RD efforts in areas directly affected by the shifts were somewhat degraded and will remain so until the new units gain familiarity with their areas of responsibility and with the Vietnamese people who live there.

Pacification Progress in the Marine Areas


Specifically in the Marine areas, RD status remained virtually unchanged. There were minor fluctuations on the III MAF evaluation scale in 34 of 183 villages, but there was no change of significance. At the end of April, 600,443 persons were residing in villages considered secure (the term "secured villages" refers to those rated 60% or higher on the III MAF evaluation scale). This is the same level that has prevailed since February of this year.

The RD status of each of the principal three III MAF tactical areas is shown on the maps which follow. These are followed by a series of graphs depicting progress in village security and the growth of government control in III MAF areas.

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - DANANG AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	MAR-66	OCT-66	APR-67	MAR-66	OCT-66	APR-67	MAR-66	OCT-66	APR-67
Under 20%	428	644	630	95,489	138,960	132,088	47	33	32
20%	56	56	71	35,054	86,425	81,205	8	19	18
40%	31	102	96	17,483	90,679	91,274	7	17	17
60%	45	91	75	53,539	79,321	68,337	9	16	15
80%	29	106	127	210,000	345,840	366,533	1	19	22
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	589	999	999	411,565	741,025 *	739,437 *	72	104	104

\* The apparent decrease in the April population is the result of a census adjustment in November 1966. The actual population in the Danang Marine area has not changed substantially since September 1966.

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - CHU LAI AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	MAR-66	OCT-66	APR-67	MAR-66	OCT-66	APR-67	MAR-66	OCT-66	APR-67
Under 20%	193	207	156	58,460	100,272	63,389	16	25	19
20%	34	68	105	18,240	32,168	52,289	3	6	10
40%	25	89	53	26,802	46,365	36,962	5	8	7
60%	22	87	85	9,267	36,316	41,705	2	7	7
80%	—	81	133	—	62,457	75,736	—	11	14
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	274	532	532	112,769	277,578 *	270,081 *	26	57	57

\* The apparent decrease in the April population is the result of a census adjustment in November 1966. The actual population in the Chu Lai Marine area has not changed substantially since September 1966.

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - PHU BAI AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	MAR-66	OCT-66	APR-67	MAR-66	OCT-66	APR-67	MAR-66	OCT-66	APR-67
Under 20%	22	40	41	17,760	10,381	10,381	3	11	11
20%	7	41	41	4,055	9,524	9,524	1	2	2
40%	8	17	—	7,551	9,049	—	1	1	—
60%	1	8	24	483	5,296	14,345	1	1	2
80%	47	56	56	23,229	33,787	33,787	5	7	7
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	85	162	162	53,078	68,037	68,037	11	22	22

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN MARINE AREAS

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~~SECRET~~GVN/ARVN Revolutionary Development Efforts

GVN/ARVN Revolutionary Development progress in I Corps was impeded during April by the enemy's intensive efforts to disrupt the program. Nothing occurred during the month to alter the conviction that the GVN program and its organization for prosecution of RD are adequate. However, progress is only going to come as a result of a heavy commitment of forces, coupled with painstaking follow-through by both US and GVN. This fact has become even more clear since the enemy has made the RD program a major target.

In an effort to meet the increased threat to the RD program, CG, I Corps shifted ARVN battalions assigned to RD support, and added two ARVN battalions to those assigned this mission. At the end of April, 14 ARVN battalions and 1 Regional Forces battalion were engaged in RD support. It will be recalled that since January 1967, 12 ARVN and 1 RF battalions have been assigned the RD mission. These were distributed, two to a province, except in Quang Nam, where 4 ARVN battalions and the RF battalion were assigned. Following the April readjustment, the distribution of units is as follows:

	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>RF</u>
Quang Tri	2	-
Thua Thien	3	-
Quang Nam	3	1
Quang Tin	4	-
Quang Ngai	2	-
Total	14	1


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In Quang Nam province, ARVN units continued Phase II of Operation Hung Quang I within the National Priority Area, south of Danang. There, three battalions of the ARVN 51st Regiment and the 59th Regional Forces Battalion have relocated 130 families from areas of high Viet Cong density into two resettlement hamlets, Yen Ne and Le Son in Hoa Vang district. Hung Quang I forces had killed 19 enemy and captured 2 others at the end of April. Hung Quang I will continue into the summer months following the plan described in the March report of this series.

Results of ARVN actions in support of RD, in terms of losses to the enemy, are shown below.

#### ACHIEVEMENTS OF ARVN UNITS SUPPORTING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT



One favorable development during the month was found in the aggressive manner in which forces of the 1st ARVN Division attacked and defeated large enemy forces in the Hue/Quang Tri area, and captured substantial quantities of equipment and supplies. Reacting quickly to initial small contacts on 17 and 29 April, ARVN forces seized the initiative and, after intense fighting, registered two victories - killing 139 of the enemy and capturing 6. A third operation which gained only light contact with the enemy resulted in the location and capture of 97 tons of rice, 18 radios of Chinese

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and Soviet manufacture, and 2 tons of uniforms. These three actions helped to restore the confidence lost as a result of the Viet Cong raid on Quang Tri.

#### Refugees In the Vicinity of the DMZ

The heavy fighting and the threat of further NVA activity in the DMZ area has necessitated the relocation of substantial numbers of civilians in that region.

On 1 April 1967, the Commanding General, I Corps approved preliminary plans for the evacuation of 23,000 civilians living along the DMZ to the fertile lowland area along Route 9, between Dong Ha and Cam Lo. This relocation operation was undertaken to enable the GVN to provide greater security for these civilians and to reduce civilian casualties resulting from intensified operations near the DMZ. Preliminary plans include provision for piaster payments for each family prior to relocation and allocations of land in the resettlement area to each family for farming.

The initial movement of families from the DMZ area commenced on 10 April, with Marine and ARVN forces providing transportation. By 30 April, 630 refugees had been moved to temporary refugee housing areas established near Cam Lo. Construction of permanent housing for the refugees has been initiated by ARVN engineers in the vicinity of Cam Lo. III MAF is providing assistance by clearing and leveling house sites.

Despite the increased tempo of III MAF offensive operations in northern I Corps, Marines have expanded their aid to refugees in that area. During the month, 641,520 meals were fed by Marines to refugees near Dong Ha/Cam Lo. This effort required 319,760 pounds of food. The scope of this aid may be gauged when it is realized that during March the totals for all of I CTZ were 204,386 persons fed 102,194 pounds of food.

Other III MAF assistance to the relocation operation

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includes security, medical assistance and distribution of clothing. III MAF has also assigned the Refugee Team from the 29th Civil Affairs Company to assist the Vietnamese. The Office of Civil Operations is providing building materials, food and technical assistance to the GVN elements with the primary responsibility for the relocation.

Local Elections in I Corps

The GVN program to re-create or strengthen local government began to take form in I Corps during April, as elections were held in 166 villages or hamlets. The fact that over 82% of eligible Vietnamese - 319, 231 of 387, 877 eligibles - ignored Viet Cong threats and terrorism in order to take part in the voting, reflects favorably on the Vietnamese desire for self-determination at the local level.

The elections will continue in other villages during the next few months, and will be extended to other areas as they reach a degree of security which permits the safety of voters to be assured. Thus far, about 11.8% of the I Corps populace has voted.

Psychological Operations

III MAF/GVN psychological operations in I CTZ set another all-time high during April, as 104, 987, 968 leaflets were distributed and 827 broadcasts and 198 visual presentations were made during the month. These compared to 102.4 million leaflets, 323 broadcasts and 110 visual presentations given during February 1967, the previous record month.

Psychological Operations Exploitation Teams (POET) Activities

During April, twenty POET's were dispatched to lo-

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cations throughout I CTZ to gain information for use against the Viet Cong. Information was gained concerning an anti-VC rally, mortar attacks on hospitals and villages, and the VC mining of civilian vehicles. Refugees and Chieu Hoi returnees also were interviewed by the POET's. As a result of information gathered by the POET's during the month, 23 leaflet and 3 poster distributions were made and 3 tapes prepared by the 244th Psychological Operations Company. This compares with 22 POET's dispatched during March, when 32 types of leaflets, 2 poster distributions and 1 tape recording were prepared.

Vietnamese Aid to III MAF

There were twenty-one instances of Vietnamese volunteering information directly to US Forces in I Corps during April. Eighteen of these involved Vietnamese turning in equipment, ammunition or propaganda leaflets to Marines. The remainder were instances of Vietnamese leading III MAF units to caves, mines, or suspected Viet Cong positions. Examples of this assistance follow.

- On 4 April, a III MAF patrol was led by a Vietnamese male to the site of a two hundred fifty pound bomb rigged as a command detonated mine. A wire led from the fuze to a nearby village, located twenty-three miles southeast of Quang Ngai City. The Vietnamese who led the patrol also cut the wire leading to the bomb.

- On 18 April, a patrol from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, eight miles northwest of Chu Lai, was led by a Vietnamese to a market place where she disclosed five rounds of 105mm and eighteen rounds of 81mm ammunition.

- A Vietnamese civilian pointed out two M-16

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mines, two 57mm projectiles rigged as anti-personnel mines and another explosive device to 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, eight miles southwest of Chu Lai, on 20 April.

#### The Kit Carson Scout Program

Kit Carson Scouts continued to provide valuable assistance to III MAF forces in both tactical and psychological operations during the past month. The Scouts have proved highly adept at screening and interrogating Vietnamese. Knowledge by Kit Carson Scouts of enemy tactics and techniques makes them capable of obtaining valuable intelligence information. After gaining the confidence of local villagers, the Scouts also have been able to spread psychological operations messages over large areas using the "village grapevine" to gain support for Marines and the GVN.

At present, thirty-four Kit Carson Scouts are working for III MAF; twenty-one Scouts are assigned to the 1st Marine Division, while thirteen are with the 3d Marine Division. 37 potential Scouts are now in training or are ready to start training, nine at the 1st Marine Division and twenty-eight at the 3d Marine Division.

As a result of Scout activities during April, 16 Viet Cong were captured, 1 enemy killed, 4 guerrilla positions and 7 explosive devices located and destroyed.

#### County Fair Operations

As in March, County Fair operations during April were limited by other commitments which occupied III MAF and ARVN forces in I CTZ. Nevertheless, four large County Fairs were conducted and these set a new record, as 9,482

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Vietnamese were screened, fingerprinted, photographed and interrogated, exceeding the previous high of 8,351 persons processed during January. Additionally, 2,862 villagers were treated by III MAF/GVN medical teams during April. County Fair forces killed 13 Viet Cong and captured 29 others, bringing the total enemy casualties from this type operation to 526 since County Fairs began in February 1966.


Combined Action Program

Three new Combined Action platoons and one company headquarters were organized during April as this program progressed toward its 1967 year-end goal of 114 platoons. At the end of the month there were 72 Combined Action platoons and 10 Combined Action company headquarters functioning in I Corps. These had a total Marine strength of 1,114 men (including 67 Navy hospital corpsman). There were 1,784 Popular Forces soldiers assigned to the program. A graphic projection of the 1967 program is shown in the Goals section. Maps portraying the locations of Combined Action units are shown on the following page.


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
## DISTRIBUTION OF COMBINED ACTION UNITS




DANANG			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	4	26	1
PLATOONS	36	496	846
TOTAL STRENGTHS		522	846



CHU LAI			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	2	18	—
PLATOONS	15	220	487
TOTAL STRENGTHS		238	487



PHU BAI			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	2	13	—
PLATOONS	14	223	217
TOTAL STRENGTHS		236	217



DONG HA/KHE SANH			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
COMPANY HQ	2	13	—
PLATOONS	7	105	234
TOTAL STRENGTHS		118	234

★ COMBINED ACTION COMPANY HQ

● COMBINED ACTION PLATOON

● ACTIVATED DURING APRIL

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~~SECRET~~BASE DEFENSE

Three major bases - Chu Lai, Phu Bai and Dong Ha-all sustained enemy attacks during April. Damage varied from light to moderate.

On 12 April, the enemy attacked the Chu Lai Air Base with 30 to 40 rounds of mortar fire. One aircraft was slightly damaged and two US personnel were killed and 45 were wounded. On 28 April, Phu Bai received 70 rounds of 60mm/81mm mortar fire, resulting in 67 Marines wounded, 21 aircraft damaged and 18 vehicles damaged. An hour later, the Dong Ha Combat Base received 50 rounds of mortar, artillery and rocket fire. This attack resulted in 8 US personnel killed and 74 wounded, 9 aircraft damaged, and 3 vehicles destroyed.

In conjunction with the relocation of infantry forces in I CTZ, there was, during the month, a shift in the positioning of helicopter units at bases within I CTZ.

On 15 April one Marine helicopter squadron (24 UH-34's) deployed from the Marble Mountain Air Facility at Danang to Dong Ha, while another squadron (21 CH-46's) moved from Ky Ha (Chu Lai) to Marble Mountain. On 22 April a CH-46 helicopter squadron (21 CH-46's) was shifted from Marble Mountain to Phu Bai.

In addition to these shifts of Marine aviation units, one US Army Aviation Company (28 helicopters) deployed to the Chu Lai Air Base.

At end-month, the aircraft population of the critical bases in I Corps was as shown on map on the following page.


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## AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT MAJOR AIRFIELDS IN I CTZ AS OF 30 APRIL 1967



\* 76 Aircraft undergoing repair or maintenance out-of-country.

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~~SECRET~~LOGISTICS

There was continued improvement in the weather throughout the III MAF area during April. Logistic indicators reveal that progress during the month exceeded that of any previous month in many areas. Cargo input to I CTZ was a record high, supply availability increased at all levels, movement of materiel increased over sea and land LOC's, and construction progressed satisfactorily.

Supply

Class I - There were sufficient stocks on hand to support all III MAF operations.

Class II - Stocks were adequate for the support of tactical operations.

Class III - Sufficient stocks of all types of POL were available to support tactical operations. An 8 inch and a 12 inch fuel line have been installed at Chu Lai, except for a minor seaward extension to obtain proper mooring depth. Upon completion of the extension, anticipated during May, input capacity will increase to 130,000 barrels per day.

Class IV - The shortage of concertina and sand bags described in the March report was alleviated and sufficient assets were on hand during April to satisfy demands.

Class V and VA - No change in ground and aviation stocks.

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~~SECRET~~~~CLASSIFIED~~Logistic Support for the Special Landing Force

Normally when the SLF is landed in a contingency deployment which cannot be supported by CG, III MAF and which promises to continue longer than 15 days, or when it is landed to become a part of a force build-up, the CG, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade on Okinawa insures that follow-on supplies are shipped to the SLF.

With the decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April to commit the SLF's to extended operations in Vietnam, the normal logistic support procedure required some changes. The CG, III MAF now provides logistic support when the SLF operates in areas contiguous to III MAF logistic installations. When operating in areas isolated from established logistic support areas, ground units of the SLF utilize their own resources, with stocks reconstituted as practicable from the Force Logistic Command. While operating from the LPH, aviation units of the SLF will be supported by the LPH but, when operating ashore in the III MAF area of operations, support by the First Marine Aircraft Wing will augment that positioned by Ninth MAB aboard ship. If the operations ashore extend beyond fifteen days, support of helicopters will become the responsibility of CG, III MAF. When the SLF operates ashore in locations other than I CTZ (after 15 days), CG, III MAF will provide only aeronautical spares and special support equipment. All other logistic support responsibilities will remain with CG, Ninth MAB. Any major end items furnished by the FLC will be replaced by CG, Ninth MAB.

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~FMFPac Ground Equipment Repair/Rebuild Program

The FMFPac Equipment Repair/Rebuild Program (described in the March issue of this booklet) continued to provide rehabilitated essential equipment, such as trucks and generators, to III MAF units. To date, the maintenance support facilities in Japan and on Okinawa have completed rehabilitation of the following items of equipment:

- 53 - M-36 2 1/2 Ton Cargo Trucks
- 28 - M37/43 3/4 Ton Cargo Trucks/Ambulances
- 6 - M-51 5 Ton Dump Trucks (this program has been terminated)
- 33 - M-54 5 Ton Cargo Trucks (this program will be terminated upon completion of 61 additional vehicles currently at the rebuild facility.)
- 104 - Generators (66 - 20 KW PU-239; 14 - 30 KW PU-590; 1 - 45 KW PU-296; and 23 miscellaneous generators)
- 30 - Miscellaneous Marine aviation ground support items

An additional item to be added to the rebuild program in August will be the 30 KW PU-482 generator. A monthly goal of six has been established.

To provide increased availability of materiel handling equipment, a pilot rebuild program was approved during April. Work will be divided equally between PWC Yokosuka and the 3d Force Service Regiment. Rehabilitation will involve both 6,000 lb. rough terrain forklifts and 4,000 lb. commercial items. Upon completion of the rebuild of this equipment, data will be ana-

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lyzed to determine the feasibility of establishing a formal rehabilitation program.

#### RED BALL Program

The number of RED BALL items continued to decrease during April. The continuing decrease is attributed to a healthier supply system and command attention to determining requirements and submitting requisitions on a timely basis. One hundred and fifty items remained on RED BALL at the end of April. This represents a net decrease of 118 items for the month, and a decrease of 750 items since November 1966.

#### Aviation Logistics

The planned introduction of new weapons systems and associated specialized maintenance complexes in the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific inventory has presented calibration problems of an unprecedented nature. Although these support problems were primarily attributed to the inherent complexity of the systems involved, they have been compounded by deployments to areas remote from established calibration laboratories.

One solution to these problems was the deployment of an in-country calibration complex (ICE CUBE), established at Danang in April. While ICE CUBE is oriented primarily to the RF4B and EA6A aircraft, it has been tasked to provide Wing-wide support of other weapons systems and calibration of avionics test equipment. ICE CUBE is expected to provide a timely response that could not be achieved by sending equipment to laboratories in Japan or the Philippines for calibration. The complex is manned currently by Marine and civilian technicians; however, it is expected that Marines will replace the civilians by 1 January 1968.

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The Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) Program continued as an effective means of maintaining the maximum number of aircraft in an operationally ready status. At the end of April, a total of 43 aircraft were undergoing scheduled rework (PAR) as follows:

A4E - 7	UH1E - 6
F4B - 7	CH46A - 16
F8E - 6	TF9J - 1

In addition, 33 aircraft were undergoing repairs for battle damage.

NORS/NORM data for the month of April remained relatively the same as the preceding month. Noteworthy changes were a 10% decline in the operational readiness status of the F-4 due to combat losses. Rates since June 1966 are shown on the graphs on the following page.


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
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## NORS/NORMS - WESTPAC AIRCRAFT

A-4 (ATTACK)



F-4 (FIGHTER)




F-8 (FIGHTER)




CH-46A (HELO)




UH-34D (HELO)




UH-1E (HELO)



A-6 (ATTACK)



CH-53A (HELO) \*



\* Readiness Objective not established

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~Logistic Impact of Troop Redeployments

The introduction of Task Force Oregon into the Chu Lai area necessitated major changes in the logistical posture of III MAF. The substantial reduction in Marine forces in the area has reduced the burden on Force Logistic Support Group - Bravo, and supplies, not now required in the Chu Lai area, have been shipped north to Dong Ha and Danang. Additionally, Dong Ha has been upgraded to a full third echelon maintenance capability, while Chu Lai has been reduced from limited fourth to a third echelon capability.

FLSG-Bravo continues to operate in the Chu Lai area, supporting the remaining Marine ground units, elements of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Army units, and the Republic of Korea Marine Brigade.

This realignment of the logistical posture of III MAF has been a substantial one; however, it has moved forward smoothly with no reduction in the support to using units.

Engineer Operations

Favorable weather in April permitted substantial progress in engineer projects. Most notable of the projects undertaken were replacement of the damaged Nam O Bridge and clearing of a "firebreak buffer zone" south of the DMZ.

Nam O Bridge

Immediately following the destruction of the Nam O Bridge (discussed earlier in the Small Unit section), Marine engineers of the 7th Engineer Battalion commenced construction of a combination M-4 and M-4T6 floating bridge. A span of 403 feet was constructed, which per-

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mits single lane vehicular traffic up to class 55. The floating bridge, construction of which began on 13 April, was completed in 36 hours.

#### Firebreak Buffer Zone

III MAF and ARVN engineers began, in April, to clear a firebreak type buffer zone 200 meters wide along the southern edge of the DMZ. By the end of the month, the strip from Gio Linh to Con Thien - 10,000 by 200 meters - had been cleared. The basic growth in the area, which extended ten to fifteen feet in the air, has been skimmed off and the strip is completely clean. Five of twelve planned tripod construction towers have been completed. It is planned to man these with machine guns, infra-red scopes, and perhaps searchlights.

The strip will be widened, beginning in May, to 600 meters; circular discs of that width already are being created around Con Thien and Gio Linh, with 70% of this latter effort completed. Widening of the Con Thien - Gio Linh strip is expected to take about fifty days with the existing engineer equipment. The project has drawn down heavily on the Marine engineer capability, with as many as 36 Marine bulldozers employed in ground clearing operations.

#### Airfield and Road Improvement

During the month, work commenced on upgrading An Hoa airfield to accept C-130 aircraft. This entails lengthening the runway to 3,500 feet, constructing a 450 foot long parking apron and improving the shoulders, drainage and overruns. During April the runway and turn-around were completed.

Maintenance continued on the Khe Sanh airfield,

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with night repairs of damage resulting from two enemy mortar attacks.

Maintenance of Ky Ha helicopter facility consisted of reworking the helicopter parking zone apron, cutting and grading the remaining 2,500 feet of taxiway, spreading, grading, and compacting rock. Additionally, 12,000 square feet of taxiway matting at the neighboring Chu Lai airfield was picked up and repaired.

Also during the period, 165 miles of existing roadway in I CTZ were maintained. Ten bridges of varying length and capacity (see Statistics section) were completed and five were under construction. Repair of five bridges was completed and two were undergoing repair. Seven wells were completed, with three being drilled. Eleven bunkers of various size were finished.

#### Port Facilities

<u>Danang (completed)</u>	<u>Capacity (ST/BBLS per day)</u>
Deep draft	
2 Permanent piers (600'X90')	2,000 ST each
Shallow draft	
Museum Site, Danang	
Main	
2 LST ramps	400 ST
2 Causeway sections (lighterage)	360 ST
Quay Wall (1600')	1,800 ST
Bridge cargo facility	
2 LST ramps w/finger pier	500 ST
2 LCU ramps	360 ST

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Tien Sha facility, Danang

East

3 LST ramps	600 ST
3 LCU ramps	540 ST
Lighterage site	100 ST

Ferry Landing, Danang East

2 LST ramps w/finger pier	500 ST
---------------------------	--------

POL facilities

2 - 4" assault lines	14,000 BBLS
2 - 10" lines (commercial) (China Beach)	120,000 BBLS

Total facility capacity

Cargo	10,500 ST
POL	134,000 BBLS

Planned/under construction (Danang)      ST/BBLS per day      BOD

Deep draft

Remaining 100' of Delong pier	140 ST	UNK
-------------------------------	--------	-----

Shallow draft      None

POL facilities

2 - 12" lines	160,000 BBLS	UNK
---------------	--------------	-----

Chu Lai (completed)      ST/BBLS per day      BOD

Deep draft      None

Shallow draft

4 LST ramps	800 ST
3 LCU ramps	540 ST

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Marginal Wharf 700 ST  
(700')

POL facilities  
1 - 4" assault line 7,000 BBLS

Total facility capacity

Cargo 2,040 ST  
POL 7,000 BBLS

<u>Planned/under construction (Chu Lai)</u>	<u>ST/BBLS per day</u>	<u>BOD</u>
---	------------------------	------------

Deep draft None

Shallow draft  
2 LST ramps 400 ST Jul67

POL facilities  
8" line\* 50,000 BBLS May  
12" line\* 80,000 BBLS May

<u>Hue, Tan My, Dong</u>	<u>ST/BBLS per day</u>	<u>BOD</u>
<u>Ha and Cua Viet (completed)</u>		

Deep draft None

\* Partially operational. Requires seaward extension to obtain proper depth before becoming fully operational.

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Shallow draft

3 LCU ramps	180	ST
(Hue City)		
3 LCU ramps	180	ST
(Tan My)		
3 LCU ramps	180	ST
(Dong Ha)		
2 LST ramps	400	ST
(Cua Viet)		

POL facilities

1 - 4" assault line	7,000 BBLS
(Hue - Tan My)	
1 - 4" assault line	7,000 BBLS
(Cua Viet)	

Total facility capacity  
Cargo 950 ST  
POL 14,000 BBLS

Planned/under construction, Hue, Tan My, Dong Ha, Cua Viet and Dam Son (com-

Shallow draft  
4 LST ramps 800 ST UNK  
(Dam Son)

POL facilities  
T-2 POL terminal 30,000 BBLS UNK  
and pipeline

## HTTP Requests

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~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~Movement and Resupply

April began with the arrival of BLT 1/4 at Dong Ha, from Okinawa. On 3 April, BLT 1/3 and HMM-263 (SLF B) commenced loading at Okinawa to relieve SLF A (BLT 2/3 - HMM-164) at sea on 19 April. On the same day, BLT 3/4 commenced loading at Dong Ha for rotation to Okinawa, arriving on 11 April. Upon being relieved by SLF BRAVO, SLF ALPHA departed Subic for special operations in I CTZ. On 26 April, 3d MP Bn (-) commenced loading at San Diego for deployment to Danang.

One LST arrived at Danang on 19 April with replacement and resupply motor transport equipment aboard.

Port Operations

During April, cargo operations were uneventful except for one day of adverse weather. A daily average unloading rate of 13,833 M/T resulted in a record high of 414,980 M/T of cargo being unloaded in all I CTZ ports during the month. Also, 155,813 M/T of cargo were backloaded.

On 30 April, there were 3 cargo ships in the port of Danang with 10,271 M/T awaiting unloading. This compares with 6 ships with 19,176 M/T embarked on 31 March. Average cargo backlog at Danang during April was 13,488 M/T.

The airlift situation was favorable as 1,394 S/T were lifted from Okinawa to I CTZ. Of this amount, 878 S/T were shipped via MAC channel from Kadena to Danang, and 516 S/T were lifted by USMC aircraft to Phu Bai, Dong Ha, Chu Lai and Danang.

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~~SECRET~~STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS1. PHU BAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
2dBn, 26thMar	9Apr	Arrived	Danang
2dBn, 4thMar	11Apr	Arrived	Danang
3d Dental Co	17Apr	Arrived	Danang
HMM-265	22Apr	Arrived	Danang
1st 8" How Btry	23Apr	Arrived	Danang
26thMar (Fwd)	25Apr	Arrived	Okinawa
3dForReconCo(-)	25Apr	Arrived	CONUS

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Northern Sub- Region Hq	1	1			
Regimental Hq	1	1			
Battalions	5	5			
Companies	1	1	Companies	2	2
Total strength	2950	2150	Total strength	150	150

Phu Bai Order of Battle totals, besides minor adjustments in the estimated strength of some units, mainly reflect the addition of 735 NVA personnel credited to the Northern Sub-Region Headquarters. This headquarters is now considered to have seven subordinate support companies which are normally located in Base Area 114 and traverse Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces in support of enemy operations.

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~~SECRET~~2. DONG HAMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
3d Bn, 4th Mar	11 Apr	Departed	Okinawa
9th Mar	12 Apr	Arrived	Danang
HMM-363	15 Apr	Arrived	Danang
2d Bn, 12th Mar	23 Apr	Arrived	Danang
1st AmTrac Bn	24 Apr	Arrived	Danang
Btry K, 4th Bn, 13th Mar	27 Apr	Arrived	Okinawa

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u> <u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Probable</u> <u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>
Northern Sub- Region Hq	1	1			
Division Hq	2	2			
Regimental Hq	7	7			
Battalions	33	33			
Companies	3	3	Companies	2	2
Total			Total		
Strength	20,800	19,980	Strength	200	200

Dong Ha Order of Battle totals, besides minor adjustments in the estimated strength of some units, mainly reflect a 735 NVA personnel increase credited to the Northern Sub-Region Headquarters. This headquarters is now considered to have seven subordinate support companies which are normally located in Base Area 114 and traverse Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces in support of enemy operations.

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~~SECRET~~3. DANANGMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
HMM-363	3Apr	Arrived	TG 79.5
HMM-164	3Apr	Departed	TG 79.4
2d Bn, 26thMar	9Apr	Departed	Phu Bai
2d Bn, 7thMar	11Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai
2d Bn, 4thMar	11Apr	Departed	Phu Bai
3d Bn, 7thMar	12Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai
9thMar	12Apr	Departed	Dong Ha
7thMar	12Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai
1st Bn, 7thMar	13Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai
3d Bn, 11thMar	15Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai
HMM-363	15Apr	Departed	Dong Ha
HMM-262	16Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai
3d Dental Co	17Apr	Departed	Phu Bai
1st SP Bn	18Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai
3d AmTrac Bn	20Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai
HMM-265	22Apr	Departed	Phu Bai
3d 8" How Btry	22Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai
1st 8" How Btry	23Apr	Departed	Phu Bai
2d Bn, 12thMar	23Apr	Departed	Dong Ha
1st AmTrac Bn	24Apr	Departed	Dong Ha
1st Engr Bn	26Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai
4th Bn, 11thMar	28Apr	Arrived	Chu Lai

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

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~~SECRET~~~~CLASSIFIED~~DANANG (Cont'd)ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u> <u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Probable</u> <u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>
Regimental Hq	1	1	Regimental Hq	0	0
Battalions	5	5	Battalions	1	1
Companies	6	5	Companies	0	0
Total strength	2400	2200	Total strength	400	400

A comparison of the April and March totals show an increase of 200 enemy personnel. This is attributed to the K-51 Company, which shifted to a position within the 25 mile Danang perimeter, and an increase of 100 personnel credited to the R-20th Battalion.

4. CHU LAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
VMA(AW)-533	1Apr	Arrived	CONUS
VMA-214	3Apr	Departed	CONUS
2d Bn, 7th Mar	11Apr	Departed	Danang
3d Bn, 7th Mar	11Apr	Arrived	Duc Pho
3d Bn, 7th Mar	12Apr	Departed	Danang
7th Mar	12Apr	Departed	Danang
1st Bn, 7th Mar	13Apr	Departed	Danang
3d Bn, 11th Mar	15Apr	Departed	Danang
HMM-262	16Apr	Departed	Danang
1st SP Bn	18Apr	Departed	Danang
3d AmTrac Bn	20Apr	Departed	Danang
3d 8" How Btry	22Apr	Departed	Danang
1st Engr Bn	26Apr	Departed	Danang
4th Bn, 11th Mar	28Apr	Departed	Danang

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~CHU LAI (Cont'd)CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Mar</u>
<u>Within 25 miles</u>			<u>Within 25 miles</u>		
Division Hq	1	0			
Regimental Hq	1	2			None
Battalions	8	9			
Companies	13	14			
Total strength	3900	4800	Total strength	0	0

A comparison of April and March Order of Battle totals shows a decrease of 900 enemy personnel due to several major adjustments. This difference is attributed to the shift of the 1st VC Regiment, minus its 70th Battalion, to a location which is just outside of the 25 mile perimeter. Additionally, the K-51 Company shifted outside of the Chu Lai 25 mile boundary. The 2d NVA Division's Rear Headquarters is now carried within 25 miles of Chu Lai.

5. ENEMY LOSSES FOR APRIL (III MAF)

<u>April</u>		<u>Total 1967</u>	<u>1966 monthly</u>
		<u>to date</u>	<u>average</u>
1,649	Killed	6,512	885
258	Captured	661	76
268	Weapons	968	129

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~~SECRET~~6. CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS

<u>April</u>	<u>March</u>		<u>Total as of 30Apr67</u>
103,705	117,369	Persons given medical treatment	1,631,481
76	76	Persons given medical training	983
475,624	102,194	Pounds of food distributed	3,264,248
3,223	4,772	Pounds of soap distributed	173,828
7,064	1,934	Pounds of clothing distributed	249,864
242	307	Critically ill civilians evacuated	7,226
275	277	English language classes conducted	2,632
\$472	\$413	Cash donations	\$38,372
953,248	204,386	Persons fed	5,234,755
2,256	3,026	Students supported	54,617
35	52	Construction projects	1,696

7. MARINE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>April</u>	<u>March</u>		<u>Total as of 30Apr67</u>
22,178	21,856	Patrols	179,070
7,164	6,074	Ambushes	80,156
411	299	Company opns	3,244
1,053	1,381	Sniper posts	8,152
9	9	Battalion opns	149
6	4	Regimental or larger opns	60
6,228	7,101	Combat/combat support sorties	102,896
38,060	40,325	Helo sorties	703,071

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~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~8. III MAF STRENGTH - ON 30 APRIL 1967

	Marines			Navy		
	Off	Enl	Total	Off	Enl	Total
Danang	2075	30780	32855	164	931	1095
Chu Lai	1031	14341	15372	80	494	574
Phu Bai	623	10671	11294	79	580	659
Dong Ha	610	14406	15016	44	371	415
Total	4339	70198	74537	367	2306	2743

9. MARINE TACTICAL AREAS - ON 30 APRIL 1967

	<u>Square miles</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Villages</u>
Danang	999	739,437	104
Chu Lai	532	270,081	57
Phu Bai	162	68,037	22
Total	1,693	1,077,555	183
Goals	3,340	2,400,000	372
Percent of goal achieved	51%	45%	49%

10. LOGISTICSa. Supply levels at end of period

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
<u>Class I</u>				
(1000 of rations / days of supply)				
MCI rations	244/49	165/41	56/19	88/29

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~~SECRET~~a. Supply levels (Cont'd)

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
B rations	330/11	173/87	138/69	185/62
A rations	277/8	54/4	64/7	2/0

Class III and IIIA (Bulk)

(1000 gals/days of supply)

JP-4	5979/14	3122/12	92/4	104/26
AVGAS	832/12	497/28	43/5	55/7
MOGAS	925/27	428/12	63/6	42/4
DIESEL	1027/23	525/14	41/3	49/3

Class V and VA      Danang      Chu Lai      Phu Bai

Ground ammunition (days of supply)	45	45	45
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Aviation Ordnance - Stocks maintained within CINCPAC allocations.

b. Resupply Status

## (1) Surface Shipping Status (All I CTZ)

Cargo unloaded (April)	414,980 M/T
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Average daily discharge rate	13,833 M/T
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~~SECRET~~Port of Danang

Ships in port 31 March	5
Ships arriving during April	50
Ships unloaded during April	52
Ships in port 30 April	3
Cargo backlog 31 March	19,176 M/T
Cargo unloaded April	260,152 M/T
Cargo backlog 30 April	10,271 M/T
Average backlog (April)	13,184 M/T

(2) Air Shipping Status

Cargo lifted into RVN	1,394 S/T
Cargo awaiting lift on Okinawa as of 30 April	215 S/T

c. RED BALL Summary

Items at beginning of period	268
Items added	46
Items removed	164
Items remaining at end of period	150

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~~SECRET~~d. Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN to 3dFSR	2,281
Items repaired at 3dFSR	3,664
Items returned to CONUS from 3dFSR or disposed of on Okinawa	509

e. Construction Projects

Roads rehabilitated or - 165 miles maintained.  
constructed

Bridges - Completed 4 CL 60 timber  
bridges, 1 CL 60 M4T6 floating  
bridge, 1 CL 25 M4T6 fixed  
span, 3 CL 60 steel stringer,  
and 1 CL 60 multiple culvert  
causeway bridge. 4 CL steel  
stringer, and 2 CL 60 timber  
bridges under construction. 5  
bridges repaired, and 2 under  
repair.

Wells drilled - 7 completed, 3 in progress.

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