

June 1967

FMF PAC: Operations of U.S. Marine  
Forces, Vietnam

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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES  
VIETNAM

JUNE 1967

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of June 1967. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering periods from March 1965 through May 1967.

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SUMMARY

The pace of enemy activity in June declined slightly from previous months, but there was no evidence of a gross change in enemy strategy or of abatement of his intensified I Corps campaign which began in late 1966. Again in June he exhibited his willingness to pay a high price in men in order to draw friendly forces into engagements in the remote highlands near the DMZ.

During the month, III MAF killed 2,382 of the enemy and captured 123, raising to 12,808 and 1,177 the number of enemy killed and captured, respectively, in the first six months of 1967. An additional 8,207 were killed and 705 captured during operations by other friendly forces in I CTZ during the same period.

A special survey was conducted in June to analyze the effects on Revolutionary Development of the enemy's 1967 campaign. It verified figures collected previously in the regular III MAF RD reporting system, which showed that there had been little progress over the past six months, and even regression in some areas. By end-June, however, a resumption of progress was visible, due mainly to the arrival of Task Force Oregon, which allowed Marine and Army forces to pursue sustained military operations near the populated regions.

Noteworthy gains in RD during the month included the attainment of 60% or higher on the III MAF RD scale (equivalent to secure status) by four villages in the important Nui Loc Son/Duc Pho areas; the continued growth of ARVN RD Teams, from 110 teams in May to 118 by end-June; the return of 259 Chieu Hoi's, as compared with the 1966 monthly average of 145; and establishment of the first Combined Action Group Headquarters to oversee the training and support of Combined Action units.

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A significant development, and one which may well prove to be a major long term weapon to combat the enemy, was the successful completion of the first phase of village and hamlet elections. In these first elections, 82.4 percent of those eligible voted in 154 village elections, while 79.8 percent cast ballots in 547 hamlet elections. Overall, 611,697 Vietnamese went to the polls in I Corps.

In June, III MAF forces conducted 15 large unit operations, concentrated principally in the populated coastal region from Danang south to the II Corps border. They accounted for 1,535 enemy killed and another 96 captured.

Despite the commitment of substantial forces to these 15 large unit operations, and to such diverse tasks as air base defense and construction of the firebreak buffer zone at the DMZ, III MAF maintained the growing pace of its counter guerrilla campaign. Company-size or smaller units conducted 37,477 patrols, ambushes, and search operations throughout the principal Revolutionary Development areas - the largest number in any month thus far in the conflict. These operations accounted for 669 enemy killed.

At the end of June it remained evident that the major enemy focus is still on the I Corps area. His recent troop buildup in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, Con Thien and Gio Linh underscores the likelihood of future, heavy action there. This situation, coupled with the enemy's reinforced campaign against the people in the lowlands, continues to create a significant troop imbalance. This is reflected, statistically, in the fact that about 32% of all the enemy forces in RVN are located in I Corps, about 44% of the total enemy incidents in 1967 have taken place in I CTZ, and about 45% of the total enemy killed in RVN in 1967 have occurred in I Corps - while only 21% of all friendly forces in RVN are located there.


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### EVOLUTION OF ENEMY STRATEGY IN I CTZ

The enemy's current strategy in the I CTZ is based on concentration of large numbers of North Vietnamese Army troops in the DMZ and nearby North Vietnam, accompanied by frequent incursions into South Vietnam in force. These incursions give substance to the threat and create a compelling requirement for substantial numbers of free world troops near the northern border. As a consequence, Marine and ARVN troops must be drawn from other, more productive missions in the densely populated lowlands, with resulting depletion of friendly power there. In simplest terms, the enemy, committing large segments of the North Vietnamese Army, has opened a second front.

### THE CURRENT ENEMY STRATEGY IN I CTZ





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In implementing this strategy, the enemy increased the number of NVA infantry battalions in the DMZ area from 18 in June 1966 to 37 in June 1967. These additions, plus shifts of III MAF/ARVN infantry battalions, are shown below.

### FRIENDLY/ENEMY INFANTRY DISPOSITIONS IN THE DMZ REGION




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The most noteworthy characteristic of the enemy's 1967 strategy has been the price in men he has been willing to pay to support his current campaign. In the first six months of 1967 he has lost over 30,000 troops in I CTZ, a figure roughly three-fourths of the combined total number of NVA, VC main force and VC local force estimated to be in I CTZ in June 1967.

### ENEMY TROOP LOSSES IN I CTZ



Although the price the enemy is paying in troop losses is large, there is as yet no indication that he intends to alter his current strategy. In fact, taking into account the issues at stake, and the uncertain politico-military situation which faces him, his present course of action may represent the most promising option at this juncture. It is aimed at the really vital issue: frustration of the Vietnamese Revolutionary Development efforts and related military operations in the coastal plain.

Events which have led the enemy to adopt his present strategy may also cause him to continue it. These events

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and the evolution of the related strategy can be traced readily. In the first six months of 1966, the areas under strong Marine influence grew by some 70%, from less than a thousand square miles to more than 1600, and the number of people living in areas considered secure more than doubled, nearing a half-million by mid-1966.

These steps were paced with growing programs which were beginning slowly to improve the health, economic posture and educational prospects of the peasant. At the same time, programs were developing the peasant's ability to defend himself against the Viet Cong, while strengthening GVN influence and control in the countryside. The number of defectors from the enemy side was increasing steadily, and growing numbers of ex-enemy soldiers were joining the Kit Carson Scout program, helping Marine units root out residual enemy elements. GVN psychological warfare programs were slowly undermining the enemy's propaganda efforts. Throughout the populated areas of I CTZ, the strength of the government was becoming more manifest.

In other words, the pacification programs were grinding away the enemy's elaborate infrastructure and his hold over the people, which he had forged laboriously during two decades. From the enemy viewpoint this was a sobering reality, for this infrastructure was the base upon which his campaign in I CTZ was built.

It was clear to the enemy that he must curtail, or at least divert, the force which was beginning to fragment the foundation of his effort. An insight into the enemy's assessment of the situation was provided by Indian ICC Commissioner Rahman, following a visit to Hanoi. He reported, "The crucial matter from Hanoi's standpoint is not the volume of communist casualties, but the survival of the guerrilla infrastructure in South Vietnam." That this is, indeed, the enemy's outlook has been borne out by his actions in the latter half of 1966.

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The enemy objectives were clear, but his efforts to achieve them were proving largely non-productive. His major military operations, which in the past had been directed at the more populous areas, brought his troops out of the remote highlands and into relatively open terrain. There, conditions were more favorable to the more sophisticated free world forces. The enemy's supply lines were stretched, he was forced to expose his movements to the growing number of peasants who were willing to report them to the free world side, and his large attacks near the coast moved him far away from his hiding places in the highlands. At the same time, free world forces were able to bring their supporting arms to bear most effectively. The result was that his attacks were almost invariably failures, and these failures were evident to the Vietnamese population among whom he had fabricated his mystique of invincibility. As Commissioner Rahman said, troop losses were not of overriding importance, but failure to stop the GVN pacification progress was.

He had seen from his bids to cross the DMZ in July and September 1966, and in his operations in II and III Corps, that if he introduced large numbers of troops into RVN, they would probably be engaged by US forces, who would inflict heavy losses on them. In such efforts around the DMZ, he had lost over 1,500 troops to Marine Operations Hastings and Prairie I, but in doing so, he had drawn as many as 8 Marine battalions into combat in the sparsely populated mountains near the DMZ, remote from the area of decision in the coastal plain.

Engagements in the mountains, such as those near the DMZ, provided the enemy a double bonus. They drained free world forces away from operations supporting the pacification effort, while they offered the enemy combat under conditions more favorable than those in the lowlands. Combat in the highlands gave the enemy shorter supply lines from his caches in the rugged mountain regions of North and South

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Vietnam and Laos, and thus helped ease the strain generated by our air interdiction campaign. And combat near the DMZ and Laos offered the enemy nearby sanctuaries, safe from ground attack, to which he could retire when he felt the need. In those havens, he could also set up long range artillery and rocket positions to harass and attrit friendly forces inside RVN.

The thick jungle cover and rugged terrain of the mountains tended to degrade the effectiveness of free world forces' supporting weapons and, at the same time, favored the enemy's ability to ambush, defend briefly and withdraw. Finally, his defeats, suffered in the unpopulated hinterland, resulted in no direct losses in control of the population, many miles away.

In simplest terms, the enemy saw combat in the highlands as resolving itself into a casualty trade for indecisive terrain on terms generally favoring himself. Beyond this, it would result in considerable relief of pressure on his weakening infrastructure in the lowlands. Hanoi's relative indifference to NVA troop losses, plus the desperate need to destroy the pacification program, made this course an attractive one. Nguyen Van Mai, a high Viet Cong official in Phnom Penh, announced that "The National Liberation Front will entice the Americans close to the North Vietnamese border and will bleed them without mercy. In South Vietnam, the pacification program will be destroyed."

If, in the communist jargon, "bleed them without mercy" means sacrificing 5,919 NVA troops to kill 1,104 Americans, then the current enemy strategy seems consistent with that statement. Between late 1966 and June of this year, the enemy not only replaced his losses near the DMZ, but moved an additional 4,000 NVA troops into that region, accompanied by large stores of artillery, rocket and mortar ammunition, and other supplies. Next, he


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drafted a campaign of operations across the DMZ patterned after his earlier bids in July and September of last year. All the while, substantial numbers of NVA troops were joining the Viet Cong effort in the foothills bordering the coastal plain.

Successive moves across the DMZ and Laos borders, principally toward Khe Sanh, Gio Linh, Con Thien and Dong Ha, caused the enemy to take unprecedented losses. Movement and unsuccessful attacks in the lowlands south of Danang increased the toll further. Predictably, III MAF losses also grew. In the first six months of 1967, the total number of enemy troops killed by III MAF and the number of III MAF troops killed by the enemy each exceeded the corresponding totals of all of 1966. The resulting ratio was six enemy killed for every US killed, a ratio which Hanoi apparently considers to be acceptable and consistent with Mai's statement about "bleeding" the Americans. These figures, since 1 January 1966, are displayed on the graph below.

### ENEMY KILLED BY III MAF VS. III MAF KIA



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The greatly increased resources and effort that the enemy funnelled against friendly forces in I CTZ were partly compensated by the arrival in April and May of US Army Task Force Oregon, which began extensive counter guerrilla operations in the coastal plain south of Quang Ngai, and by the addition of three Marine battalions from Okinawa and the Navy's Seventh Fleet. Although the enemy's intensive effort had left its mark in some areas, modest signs of resumed progress were beginning to appear in the Revolutionary Development programs, and the enemy, for all his pains, was no better off in establishing strong points in the RVN near the DMZ than he had been before the major confrontation began.

Reduced to its basic statistics, the situation in I CTZ at the end of June could be summarized as follows:

- About 44 % of the total enemy incidents of 1967 have occurred in I CTZ.

(19,975 in RVN; 8,700 in I CTZ)

- About 45 % of the total enemy killed in 1967 have been killed in I CTZ.

(46,000 in RVN; 21,015 in I CTZ)

- About 46 % of the total friendly troops killed in 1967 have been killed in I CTZ.

(6,760 in RVN; 3,137 in I CTZ)

- About 32 % of all the enemy forces in RVN are located in I CTZ.

(119,000 in RVN; 38,000 in I CTZ)

- But only 21 % of all the friendly forces in RVN are located in I CTZ.

(1,068,600 in RVN; 223,000 in I CTZ)

In short, it was clear at the end of June that the most intensive enemy effort in Vietnam was being made in the I CTZ, and recent augmentation of friendly strength there, while tending to redress the imbalance of forces, was not yet adequate.

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GOALS  
And Progress Toward Achieving Them

Thus far in 1967, III MAF has made progress toward those goals which derive from the conduct of large unit campaigns in the hinterlands, such as neutralization of the enemy's base areas and attrition of his forces. At the same time, up to the end of June there had been little progress toward those goals which relate to Revolutionary Development and achieving an improved condition of tranquility in populated areas. Indeed, there has been regression in some areas. However, the recent augmentation of III MAF by Task Force Oregon and other Marine battalions is beginning to restore a share of the momentum in RD lost over the past six to eight months.

Below, and on the pages which follow, is a discussion of III MAF's progress - or lack thereof - toward each of its six major goals.

Goal One

III MAF's first goal, derived from CINCPAC/MACV directives, is to neutralize two major enemy base area groupings in the hinterland in I Corps Tactical Zone.

It will be recalled that CINCPAC defines a neutralized base area as one "that can no longer be used for its intended purpose. This can be accomplished by extensive destruction of facilities found within the area, by repeated ground operations within the area, or by the positioning of friendly forces in or around the area in such a manner as to prevent the enemy having free and unrestricted access to it. Neutralization is not necessarily permanent and must be re-evaluated each month."

In the first six months of 1967, III MAF and other

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free world forces have conducted 47 operations of battalion size or larger within or proximate to the two assigned base area groupings, accounting for 5,859 enemy killed. At the same time, 525 Sting Ray missions, small Marine reconnaissance/observer teams which direct artillery fire and air strikes on the enemy, have resulted in another 490 killed, for a cumulative total of 6,349 enemy killed in and around these two base areas since January of this year. There is every evidence that the enemy enjoys no real sanctuary in the two regions, and progress toward realization of the first goal is thus regarded as satisfactory.


The locations of the enemy base areas, neutralization operations directed against them, and the results of these operations, are depicted on the map on the next page.

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# NEUTRALIZATION OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY BASE AREAS JANUARY-JUNE 1967



• Sting Ray Operations

## ENEMY KILLED IN BASE AREA NEUTRALIZATION OPERATIONS-1967

MONTH	BY MARINES		BY ROK MC	BY ARVN	BY USA
	LARGE UNIT OPN	STING RAY OPN			
JAN	191	55	140	24	
FEB	718	144	16	465	
MAR	504	118	—	161	
APR	510	50	25	98	
MAY	919	90	155	348	369
JUN	800	33	120	60	241
TOTAL	3,642	490	456	1,151	610

Total enemy killed during all base area neutralization operations: 6,349

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In addition to the activity portrayed on the previous page, III MAF also has conducted neutralization operations against enemy Base Area 114, located in the mountains twenty miles west of Hue. Although COMUSMACV had not designated this area as a priority target for 1967, evidence of the enemy's presence there caused III MAF, in May and June, to conduct two large scale operations in the area (Operations Shawnee and Choctaw). These resulted in 264 enemy confirmed killed, 23 captured, and 122 weapons seized by end-June.

Details of these and other base neutralization operations conducted in June are contained in the Large Unit section.

#### Goal Two

The second goal for III MAF in 1967 is to inflict losses on the enemy at a rate in excess of his monthly input from infiltration and recruitment.

COMUSMACV estimates that the enemy regular and main forces in I CTZ have increased in strength from about 32,800 to about 38,000 during 1967. This represents a net gain of about 5,200 enemy troops, which means that ground has actually been lost in the pursuit of Goal II.

There is another factor, however, which bears directly on this situation - one which may have more enduring significance than progress toward achieving the goal as it is presently stated. This is the price the enemy is willing to pay, in terms of his existing regular forces in North Vietnam, in order to attrit our forces and to distract them from Revolutionary Development.

From January 1967 through June, 12,808 enemy were killed and 1,177 captured in III MAF operations. An

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additional 8,207 were killed and 705 captured during operations by other friendly forces during the same period. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV have concluded that 35% of the number of enemy confirmed killed is a reasonable estimate of the number of enemy who die of wounds after a battle or who become disabled. Using the 35% rate in relation to the 21,015 confirmed killed total raises the enemy's losses thus far in 1967 to 30,252 (21,015 killed; 7,355 disabled; and 1,882 captured).

It is not likely that enemy infiltration can ever be reduced to absolute zero. This will always be a function of his willingness to pay the price. In the case of I CTZ in the first six months of 1967, the price was about 85% of the enemy's personnel investment. To accrue a gain of 5,000 troops, he had invested over 35,000. This means that 6 out of every 7 enemy troops that were recruited or infiltrated were killed, disabled or captured.

There is, as yet, no indication that the enemy finds this price prohibitive, nor has he yet exhibited where his upper limit may be.

### Goal Three

III MAF's third goal in 1967 is to open 70 miles of critical roads in I CTZ and to secure an additional 221 miles (COMUSMACV's classification of roads as "open" or "secure" is defined on page 19). At the end of June, 55 miles (79%) of the designated 70 miles were open, a seven mile increase over the condition that existed at end-April. Of the 221 miles to be secured, 107 miles (49% of goal) were secure, versus 97 (44% of goal) at end-April. Thus, the status at the mid-year point was satisfactory, although progress in recent months has been slower than desired. This condition reflects the recent accelerated enemy effort, plus

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the extended commitment of large III MAF forces to the hinterland, remote from the populated lowlands through which the principal communication routes pass.

The status of each of the critical routes is summarized below and then depicted graphically.


<u>Goal for end 1967</u>	<u>Status on 30 June</u>
<u>Route 1</u>	
-Open, from the DMZ south to Dong Ha (12 miles).	-All open. 100% of goal.
-Secure, from Dong Ha south to Quang Ngai (189 miles).	-91 miles secure; 98 miles open. 48% of goal.
-Open, from Quang Ngai south to the I CTZ border (41 miles).	-26 miles open. 63% of goal.
<u>Route 5</u>	
-Secure, from Route 1 west to An Hoa (18 miles).	-7 miles secure; 11 miles open. 39% of goal.
<u>Route 9</u>	
-Open, from Dong Ha west to Thon Son Lam (17 miles).	-All secure. 100% of goal.
<u>National Priority Area</u>	
-Secure, major roads in the NPA, including Route 14 from Hoi An west to Lac Thanh Tay (42 miles). This total also includes 28 miles of north-south Route 1 referenced above.	-37 miles secure; 0 miles open; 5 miles closed. 88% of goal.

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## ROADS

END DECEMBER 1967 GOALS



Directives published by COMUSMACV classify roads as follows:

- "Open" (Amber): Used by RVN/US/FWMAF employing thorough security measures. Frequent incidents may occur.

- "Secure" (Green): Controlled by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with minimum security measures required. Isolated incidents may occur.

- "Closed" (Red): Closed either by VC/NVA military control of the area or by extensive physical interdiction. Requires major operations or engineering efforts to open.

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Goal Four

The fourth goal for III MAF is to open 167 miles of the National Railroad in I CTZ and to secure 30 miles in the National Priority Area (COMUSMACV's classification of railroads as "open", "secure", or "closed" is defined on page 21 ). At end-June, the status of the railroad was the same as reported in April: 9 (30%) of the 30 miles in the NPA were secure, and none of the designated 167 miles was open. The 51 mile segment between Danang and Hue, which was in an open status at the beginning of the year, remains closed because four bridges, destroyed by enemy sabotage teams on 20 March, have not yet been repaired.

Thus, progress toward improving the condition of the railroad in I CTZ has been nil. Beyond this, the railroad is so degraded mechanically that it would probably take a year - even if there were no war - to replace the road bed and assemble the necessary trackage and rolling stock.

<u>Goal for end 1967</u>	<u>Status on 30 June</u>
-Open, from Dong Ha south to the northern edge of the NPA (87 miles).	-0 miles open. 0% of goal.
-Secure, throughout the NPA (30 miles).	-9 miles secure; 11 miles open; 10 miles closed. 30% of goal.
-Open, from the southern edge of the NPA to Ba Ren and west to An Hoa (14 miles).	-Closed. 0% of goal.


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## RAILROADS

END DECEMBER 1967 GOALS

PROGRESS AS OF 30 JUNE 1967



Directives published by COMUSMACV classify railroads as follows:

- "Open" (Amber): Segment between two terminals physically open. Security of surrounding area is such that thorough security measures, including armed escorts, are required for all trains. Frequent incidents may occur.

- "Secure" (Green): Segment between two terminals physically open. RVN/US/FWMAF control of the surrounding area is such that trains can operate during daylight hours with relative freedom from VC sabotage, attacks or harassment. Armed escort not required. Isolated incidents may occur.

- "Closed" (Red): Rail line between two terminals does not meet criteria for the Green or Amber classifications.

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Goal Five

The fifth goal is to increase to 1,782,000 the population living in areas assessed at 60% or higher on the III MAF Revolutionary Development scale.

At the end of June, 646,674 persons were living within secured areas at Danang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai. This is an increase of 46,231 over the figure reported in May, attributable mainly to the continually-refined assessments of village populations in those areas. Elsewhere in the III MAF area, an additional 43,711 persons live in secured areas at Dong Ha, Khe Sanh, Duc Pho and Nui Loc Son, and another 146,000 reside in Hue, Quang Tri, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai, which have been evaluated at 60% or higher on the III MAF scale. The mid-year total is 836,385, or 47% of the year-end goal, which compares with 777,893, or 40% of the goal, in April.

Although the bulk of this change resulted from the population resurvey mentioned above, it should be noted that progress in the Nui Loc Son basin and Duc Pho areas, made possible by the arrival of Task Force Oregon in I Corps, has begun to move III MAF toward its goal again, after five months of little change. The continued presence of III MAF forces in those two critical areas should result in accelerated progress during the balance of the year.

Progress in the first half of 1967, slow though it has been, is nevertheless noteworthy in that it occurred in the face of strong enemy counter-efforts and the simultaneous diversion of Marine forces from the primary RD regions.

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


Goal Six

III MAF's sixth goal is to increase to 114 the number of Combined Action platoons.

Fifty-seven of these platoons were in-being on 1 January, leaving a requirement for 57 additional platoons to be formed throughout the year. To achieve a straight line growth toward the goal, 85 platoons were required by end-June. In actuality, 75 platoons were in existence, a gain of 3 platoons since April, when the program was on schedule. In addition, a number of the platoons were under-strength, a fact which CG I Corps has asserted he will correct.

Based on these facts, progress toward the sixth goal during the past two months is considered as less than satisfactory, although not critically defective.

**1967 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON PROJECTION**

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LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

In June, III MAF continued to concentrate its large unit efforts in the four critical areas of I CTZ: the Nui Loc Son basin, the approaches to Hue, the Duc Pho region of southern Quang Ngai province and the DMZ area.

South of Danang, the process of driving NVA and Main Force Viet Cong units from the Nui Loc Son basin was pursued in Operations Union, Adair, Arizona, Calhoun and Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force Operation Beacon Torch. The continuing presence of Marines in this densely populated region set the scene for the advancement of Revolutionary Development.

Near Hue, Operations Choctaw, Cumberland, and Bear Bite supported ARVN offensive and RD-oriented operations in the coastal plain.

In Quang Ngai province, Operation Malheur, under control of Task Force Oregon, made steady progress toward the removal of Viet Cong influence in the Mo Duc-Duc Pho area.


In the DMZ region, where the prolonged presence of major enemy forces has drawn Marine strength from the more enduring gains of operations in the populated coastal plain, the enemy continued to threaten overt invasion, while launching sporadic ground and almost daily artillery, rocket and mortar attacks against III MAF positions. A cleared trace between Con Thien and Gio Linh was being developed which, when completed, would tend to divert infiltration and invading NVA troops into the unpopulated valleys and ridges west of the coastal plain.

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In all, there were 15 large unit operations by III MAF units and the Special Landing Forces of the Seventh Fleet. Their locations are shown below.

### III MAF & SLF LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS - JUNE 1967



\* Includes 242 enemy KIA, 11 captured and 77 weapons by US Army in Malheur I-II  
USA casualties: 20 killed and 165 wounded.

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Operations in the Nui Loc Son Basin

The heavy fighting during May in the Nui Loc Son area, 30 miles south of Danang, was followed by one ARVN and five USMC operations during June, which brought the total enemy losses in the region since 21 April to 2,070 confirmed killed, 247 captured and 136 weapons seized.

-Union II

The most significant of these operations was the wind-up of the Union series. This operation had been quickly launched in late May to exploit intelligence reports that the 3rd and 21st NVA Regiments were present in the Nui Loc Son basin.

The initial heliborne assault of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines made contact with a small portion of the 3rd NVA Regiment and by the end of May had killed 214 of the enemy, with Marine losses of 37 killed and 95 wounded. It also became apparent that the assault had failed to make contact with the 21st Regiment, which now appeared to be located to the southeast.

Accordingly, the 5th Marines, with an ARVN Ranger Group and elements of the 6th ARVN Regiment, reoriented their attack to the southeast. By the first day of June, they began to develop contacts, soon closing on the enemy's main positions on a hill mass south of the Nui Loc Son basin. The NVA were well bunkered but were not prepared for the speed of the Marine and ARVN assault. Held in place by artillery and 138 Marine air strikes, the enemy had no choice but to fight.

In the heavy fighting which began at midday on the 2d and continued until the following morning, Marines

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were obliged to fight from bunker to bunker. Resistance slackened on the 3d, and there was little contact thereafter. By the evening of the 5th, when Union II was terminated, 701 enemy killed had been counted, another 1,041 were estimated probably killed or trapped in collapsed bunkers and tunnels, 23 prisoners were taken and 14 suspects detained. Marine losses were heavy, but less than might be expected for an operation involving successive assaults on an extensive complex of well fortified positions. This was due primarily to the heavy use of artillery and air power. For the operation, Marine losses were 110 killed and 241 wounded.

-Adair

Operation Union was followed on the 15th by Operation Adair, when a company of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines engaged a two company enemy force near the railroad, four miles south of Thang Binh. A rapid build-up of Marine strength was made by helicopter, and within hours, most of two infantry battalions had the area sealed off. Twenty-five of the enemy were killed by nightfall. The remainder of the operation was characterized by light contacts with small groups of the enemy, and Adair was terminated on the 24th. Final casualties were 74 enemy confirmed killed, 6 captured and 14 weapons taken. Marine losses were 11 killed and 41 wounded.

-Beacon Torch

Special Landing Force Bravo, comprised of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines and HMM-164, landed on 18 June, 6 miles south of Hoi An, by organic helicopters and LVT's from US Seventh Fleet ships. In coordination with Adair, the Battalion Landing Team conducted a detailed search to the west, including "Pagoda Valley", a narrow compartment which is a main avenue of approach into the MACV defined Base Area 116.


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At noon on the 18th, two miles from the beach, one Marine company engaged an enemy force of 100. Augmented by extensive air strikes and artillery, the rifle company outmaneuvered the enemy, killing 50 before he broke off the engagement. Thereafter, as the Special Landing Force searched to the west up Pagoda Valley and then swept the area back toward the sea, contacts were light and sporadic. As the month ended, enemy casualties were 85 confirmed killed, 84 probably killed and small quantities of rice and weapons captured. Marine losses were 11 killed and 72 wounded.

### III MAF OPERATIONS IN THE NUI LOC SON BASIN AREA



#### CASUALTIES

UNION II 26 May-5 June		ARIZONA 14-22 June		ADAIR 16-24 June		BROWN 18-22 June		BEACON TORCH 18 June-Cont		CALHOUN 25 June-2 July	
ENEMY	USMC	ENEMY	USMC	ENEMY	USMC	ENEMY	USMC	ENEMY	USMC	ENEMY	USMC
701 KIA	110 KIA	80 KIA	8 KIA	74 KIA	11 KIA	20 KIA	0 KIA	85 KIA	11 KIA	24 KIA	6 KIA
23 Capt	241 WIA	2 Capt	85 WIA	6 Capt	41 WIA	1 Capt	23 WIA	72 WIA	3 Capt	37 WIA	
31 Wpns		10 Wpns		14 Wpns				2 Wpns			

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Three other operations north of the Nui Loc Son area - Calhoun, in enemy Base Area 116 at the northern edge of the basin; Arizona, northwest of the An Hoa industrial complex; and a coordinated USMC/ARVN operation, Brown/Phi Phung-27 in the river complex to the northeast - resulted in a total of 192 enemy killed, 13 captured and 17 weapons seized. The single notable contact developed when the 4th Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment engaged an enemy battalion, killing 68 and capturing 7 Viet Cong. Marine losses in all three operations were 14 killed and 145 wounded.

#### Operations Near Hue


The 4th Marines controlled two operations during the month in the area west of Hue. Choctaw was initiated on 22 May, to block enemy forces from the Revolutionary Development areas in the heavily populated plain between the mountains and the sea. In all, ARVN units conducted 9 battalion size or larger operations with search and destroy missions or security missions in the vicinity of the RD Priority Areas near Hue. Only two of these showed significant contacts, but 236 enemy were killed, 50 captured and 107 weapons seized while ARVN losses were 47 killed and 245 wounded. During June, one Marine battalion from Choctaw was positioned at the eastern edge of the Choctaw area to provide a blocking force for Special Landing Force Operation Bear Bite, sweeping an area to the east.

The map on the following page depicts the location of Marine and ARVN large unit operations in the region around Hue during June.

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## OPERATIONS NEAR HUE-JUNE 1967



## CASUALTIES

CHOCTAW 22 May-Cont		BEAR BITE 2-12 June		CUMBERLAND 3 June-Cont		COLGATE 7-11 June		MARYLAND 25-28 June		ARVN OPNS 1-30 June	
ENEMY	USMC	ENEMY	USMC	ENEMY	USMC	ENEMY	USMC	ENEMY	USMC	ENEMY	ARVN
151 KIA	17 KIA	21 KIA	3 KIA	1 KIA	0 KIA	35 KIA	3 KIA	7 KIA	0 KIA	236 KIA	47 KIA
15 Capt	136 WIA		29 WIA	1 Capt	25 WIA	8 Capt	29 WIA	4 Capt	4 WIA	50 Capt	245 WIA
34 Wpns		8 Wpns				11 Wpns		7 Wpns		107 Wpns	

In Bear Bite, Special Landing Force Alpha (BLT 1/3 and HMM-263), in close coordination with the ARVN 1st Regiment and airborne units in Lam Son 63, landed by helicopter 18 miles northwest of Hue on the 2d. In the detailed search conducted during the next ten days, little contact was established, although ARVN units to the north of the Marines made major contacts on the 2d, engaging an enemy battalion two miles northeast of Quang Tri city. In a brief but intense battle, the 3d and 7th Airborne Battalions killed 150 Viet Cong in two hours.

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Meanwhile, only minor contacts were being made by the four battalions of the 1st ARVN Regiment. When the ARVN operation ended on the evening of the 3d of June, results were 243 enemy confirmed killed, 8 prisoners and 67 weapons captured. ARVN losses were 7 killed and 98 wounded, including 4 US advisors wounded.

Bear Bite continued for another 9 days, during which light, sporadic contacts were made with small groups of the enemy. Final results were 21 Viet Cong killed and 8 weapons captured, while SLF losses were 3 Marines killed and 29 wounded.

Choctaw continued through the month, with little major action. The most significant contact occurred when 60 of the enemy were ambushed at night by a single Marine squad. Employing small arms, grenades and artillery against the enemy unit, the Marines killed 21 Viet Cong. The series of contacts between Marines and small enemy units during the month resulted in 110 enemy killed, 15 VC and 28 weapons captured, as well as 3 ralliers received. Marine losses during June were 12 killed and 111 wounded. Added to the results of May, Operation Choctaw has netted 151 enemy confirmed and 252 probably killed, compared to Marine casualties of 17 killed and 136 wounded.

In two other Marine operations southeast of Hue, Maryland and Colgate, light contact was made with the enemy. In the sand dunes along the coast, a traditional Viet Cong stronghold, 42 of the enemy were killed and 12 captured. The seizure of 18 weapons from the enemy damaged further the local guerrillas in the area. Marine losses in the two operations were 3 killed and 33 wounded.

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# OPERATION CUMBERLAND



Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension on the transformation efficiency of *Agrobacterium* strains. The concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension was 10<sup>6</sup> cells/ml (a), 10<sup>7</sup> cells/ml (b), 10<sup>8</sup> cells/ml (c), and 10<sup>9</sup> cells/ml (d). The concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension was 10<sup>6</sup> cells/ml (a), 10<sup>7</sup> cells/ml (b), 10<sup>8</sup> cells/ml (c), and 10<sup>9</sup> cells/ml (d). The concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension was 10<sup>6</sup> cells/ml (a), 10<sup>7</sup> cells/ml (b), 10<sup>8</sup> cells/ml (c), and 10<sup>9</sup> cells/ml (d). The concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension was 10<sup>6</sup> cells/ml (a), 10<sup>7</sup> cells/ml (b), 10<sup>8</sup> cells/ml (c), and 10<sup>9</sup> cells/ml (d).

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Despite the fact that provincial Route 547 passes between two MACV defined base areas, the enemy presence was evident only through occasional sniper fire and minings. On the 28th, the first increment of construction, upgrading of the road from Hue, was completed as the engineers and 1st Battalion, 4th Marines reached a point 17 miles west of Hue. At the month's end, casualties from the operation were 1 VC killed and 1 captured, while 25 Marines were wounded.

#### Operations in the DMZ Area

In northern Quang Tri province, the presence of up to three enemy divisions threatening our outposts at Khe Sanh, Gio Linh, and Con Thien continued to occupy six Marine infantry battalions of III MAF and one BLT of the US Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force Bravo.


Although the NVA command, control and logistic structure in the southern portion of the DMZ had been disrupted by the Hickory series of operations in late May, a resurgence of NVA presence and activity became increasingly evident immediately south of the DMZ as the month progressed.

The map on the following page shows the confirmed enemy infantry battalion order of battle within a 25 mile distance from the DMZ.

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## ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE DMZ AREA-30 JUNE 1967

Cimarron

Operation Cimarron, the continuation of the Hastings-Prairie series which began in early July 1966, was initiated on the 1st of June, with the purpose of diminishing the NVA threat in the DMZ. The first few days showed little contact but, as the month progressed, increased sightings and engagements with NVA platoon size units confirmed the enemy's intention to return to the positions he had occupied prior to the Hickory series of operations.

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Extensive patrolling by Marines led to the discovery and destruction of some 2,500 NVA bunkers which had escaped the sweeps of Hickory and at least 25 NVA patrolling southward were killed by Marine air.

During the month the enemy stepped up his artillery, rocket and mortar attacks on III MAF positions in the DMZ area. A total of 1,646 enemy artillery rounds were received in the Gio Linh, Con Thien, Camp Carroll and Cua Viet areas during the month. This compares to 1,013 artillery rounds the enemy fired on the same forward bases in May. This significant increase in artillery fire showed that, despite constant air strikes and artillery fire missions on enemy lines of communication, the NVA were able to increase supply stocks to a level sufficient to fire an average 55 rounds per day during the month. Conversely, the number of enemy mortar rounds and rockets received by Marine outposts in northern Quang Tri decreased. 879 mortar and 123 incoming rocket rounds were recorded, compared to 1,295 mortar and 173 rocket rounds received in May. The increased dependence on longer range artillery tended to substantiate estimates that the NVA were preparing for renewed offensive operations into the south.

Marine countermortar and counterbattery fires, as well as air attacks, regularly were directed at suspected artillery and rocket launching positions, and were credited with 3 artillery pieces destroyed, 11 NVA killed in artillery positions, and several series of secondary explosions.

In the eastern DMZ area, III MAF artillery shifted positions almost daily, as an additional counter to NVA artillery fire on the strong points of Con Thien and Gio Linh. It was noted that the enemy watched our artillery carefully, usually firing at these positions only when the artillery had not moved.

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In the last days of June, small contacts between Marine patrols and dug-in NVA troops both north and southwest of Con Thien gave evidence of increased enemy activity in that area. It was plain that a concerted enemy buildup was again underway.

Construction of the DMZ firebreak buffer zone continued during June. The previously cleared area, 200 meters wide from Con Thien through Gio Linh and eastward to the high water point on the coastal flood plain, has been widened to 600 meters for the entire 13.5 kilometers of its length. Plans for additional development of this area into a major obstacle to NVA infiltration include the installation of barbed wire obstacles, minefields, watch towers and strong points and, ultimately, emplacement of sensors for detection of movement in and near the zone.

Thus far, the construction has had no real effect on the enemy, but implementation of the entire plan will make direct attack across the zone difficult, make detection of small patrols or infiltration groups easier, and tend to divert enemy infiltration westward into the mountains, where the NVA effort will accrue additional logistical disadvantages.

A total of 12 watchtowers, 6 strong points and three battalion base areas are planned for the zone. The 11th Engineer Battalion has, so far, expended 10,000 man hours and 4,480 tractor hours in the effort. ARVN units have contributed 570 man hours and 183 equipment hours.

The current and projected development of the firebreak is shown on the following page.

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The map shows the DMZ area in NVN, with the DMZ running diagonally from the top left to the bottom right. Key locations include CON THIEU, USMC, ARVN, and DONG HA. A road labeled 'Route 561 to be paved' is shown. A scale bar indicates 0 to 3 KILOMETERS. A legend at the bottom explains the symbols used on the map.

**Legend:**

- Zone, 800 meters wide cleared of vegetation. Work proceeding to site strong points, construct observation towers, install wire obstacles and set minefields.
- Planned zone extension.
- Strong point.
- Planned strong point.
- Planned observation tower.
- Planned battalion base area.

Following the pattern which evolved in late May, enemy activity in the vicinity of Khe Sanh continued to increase during June, beginning on the sixth, when 20 rounds of 120mm mortar fell along the perimeter at Khe Sanh. At 0200, the 18-man Marine radio station on Hill 950, five miles north of Khe Sanh, came under heavy ground attack from the west and northeast. Artillery and mortar fire from Khe Sanh responded rapidly to a call for supporting fires and, although the enemy penetrated

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the position, he was quickly forced back by the small detachment of Marines. The enemy left 10 of his dead behind, 1 NVA soldier who was captured, and seven weapons. Interrogation of the prisoner revealed him to be from the 325 C Division, which had been severely hurt west of Khe Sanh in April and May.

The following day, 2 NVA companies were encountered a mile northwest of Hill 881 South. Artillery and air strikes supported the heavily engaged Marines and additional elements of the 26th Marines reinforced them. By nightfall, the enemy broke off the contact, leaving 63 dead on the field.

To counter the apparently renewed enemy interest near Khe Sanh, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines moved from Cimarron to Crockett in mid-month. Increased patrols made possible by the additional Marines led to the discovery of many recently used, but unoccupied, NVA bunkers in the area around Khe Sanh. Several platoon and company size NVA units sighted by reconnaissance teams were attacked by Marine aircraft, which killed at least 25 NVA troops.

In the early morning hours of the 27th, the enemy launched an extensive mortar and rocket barrage at Khe Sanh. Fifty 102mm Chicom spin-stabilized rockets, as well as a number of 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds, fell on Khe Sanh and Lang Vei, resulting in 6 Marines killed and 96 wounded. Effects of Marine counterbattery fire could not be determined. A Combined Action unit patrol, at noon on the 27th, made contact with two NVA companies on Hill 689, a mile west of Hill 881 South, where the enemy threat in April was turned back. Two Marine rifle companies quickly reinforced the CA patrol by helicopter and overland movement. The battle lasted until after dark, when the Marines took the hill after

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killing 23 of the enemy and destroying a number of enemy bunkers and emplacements.

As the month ended, the casualties for the period tallied 136 NVA confirmed killed, 2 captured and 50 weapons seized. An additional 243 enemy were probably killed. Marine losses for the month were 49 killed and 226 wounded. The cumulative casualties since Crockett began on 13 May stood at 187 enemy confirmed killed, with 51 Marines killed and 224 wounded.

#### Malheur

In the Duc Pho region of southern Quang Ngai province, Army units of Task Force Oregon continued to press the Viet Cong units in the area. Operation Malheur I, which had commenced on 11 May, ended on 8 June. Final results of Malheur I were 392 enemy confirmed killed, 6 prisoners taken and 160 weapons captured. Army casualties were 15 killed and 285 wounded.

Malheur II was initiated in the same area on the 8th. A series of company size contacts, rapidly exploited by extensive use of helicopters, resulted in 242 enemy killed, 11 captured and 77 weapons seized by the end of the month. Friendly casualties were 20 US soldiers killed and 152 wounded.

A more significant event was the drive northward, which cleared and reopened National Route 1 from Duc Pho to Mo Duc for the first time in two years. Of even more lasting importance, the continued presence of US troops and the erosion of enemy strength in the area has begun to help the populace back to a sound and comparatively peaceful life and to break down the deeply rooted guerrilla fabric.

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
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The map below displays the Malheur area as it relates to the densely populated coastal plain.

### OPERATION MALHEUR I - II OPERATING AREA



### Sting Ray Patrols


Sting Ray operations - advanced reconnaissance teams capable of directing air strikes, artillery missions and in some cases naval gunfire missions - were still a productive method of killing the enemy in his remote areas. During June, 178 of the enemy were confirmed killed by these patrols, compared with the loss of 5 Marines killed and 36 wounded. The chart on the following page displays graphically the results of Sting Ray operations since they commenced in May 1966.

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# CASUALTIES IN STING RAY OPERATIONS




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~~SECRET~~SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS


In June, the III MAF counter guerrilla campaign maintained the increasing pace of recent months. Marine units conducted 31,394 patrols, ambushes, and company size operations, with an additional 6,083 undertaken in southern I Corps by Army units of Task Force Oregon. In the aggregate, III MAF accounted for 669 enemy killed - the second highest number killed in small unit operations to date - and captured 57 prisoners and 142 weapons.

The sharp rise in the level of counter guerrilla activity since December 1966 is evident in the two charts below. As noted in previous reports, much of the May-June increase, in terms of both numbers of operations and results achieved, derived from the arrival in I Corps of Task Force Oregon and its initiation of a sustained counter guerrilla campaign in southern Quang Ngai.

SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS\*



ENEMY KILLED BY SMALL UNITS\*

Enemy Guerrilla Activity

The increased III MAF effort in 1967, however, was barely sufficient to meet the enemy's intensified campaign to control the people and disrupt Revolutionary Development progress. That campaign, in June, was





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little changed from recent months, with continuing enemy attacks against elements of the RD program, widespread mortar and rocket attacks on ARVN outposts and US bases, and increased attempts to sever lines of communication.

Enemy armed attacks decreased slightly from the preceding month, although the 1967 monthly average within I CTZ thus far still is well above the average of the last six months of 1966. On the other hand, minor harassment by the enemy decreased appreciably during the same period, with a monthly average of 164 fewer occurrences in 1967 than in 1966.

### ENEMY ACTIVITY







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Combined Action Unit Operations

Combined Action units continued to make a notable contribution to III MAF's counter guerrilla campaign. They conducted 5,582 patrols and ambushes, approximately the same number as in May, but well above the April figure of 3,622. Combined Action units killed 25 of the enemy in June, captured 10, and seized 20 weapons.

The increasing rate of Combined Action unit activity since June 1966, and the results it has achieved, are depicted below,

**COMBINED ACTION UNIT ACTIVITY****NIGHT OPERATIONS****DAY OPERATIONS****ENEMY KILLED****ENEMY CAPTURED**

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To enhance further the effectiveness of the Combined Action program, CG III MAF in June organized a provisional Combined Action Group headquarters at Danang. Its primary purpose is to oversee the training and support of CA units. A school for Marine Combined Action platoon replacements, emphasizing the problems encountered in Combined Action service and stressing the need for understanding between Marines, Popular Forces and hamlet dwellers, will commence on 10 July, under supervision of this Group. Additional details of the Combined Action program are discussed in the Revolutionary Development section.

#### Kit Carson Scouts

Another program initiated by III MAF to augment its counter guerrilla campaign also produced noteworthy results in June. This is the Kit Carson Scout program, which involves the use of volunteer Chieu Hoi returnees who, for little else than personal satisfaction, risk their lives to ferret out the enemy's hiding places, ambush sites, caches and mines; identify guerrillas known to them, and participate in psychological warfare activities.

At the end of June, 51 Scouts were being used by III MAF, with an additional 19 undergoing training and loyalty evaluation. The service of those employed thus far has been commendable: 108 VC captured, 42 killed, and many personal acts of heroism and loyalty by individual Scouts. This zealousness reflects the deep anti-communist motivation of Vietnamese men who have endured the Viet Cong. One Scout in June killed 31 of the enemy in a single engagement, and prevented a company of the 5th Marines from entering an ambush. While operating with the lead elements of the company, the Scout detected an NVA ambush in a rice paddy thirty-five yards ahead of the Marines. He immediately fired into the ambush, killing four of the enemy, and then ran into the paddy and personally killed

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the 27 remaining VC. He has been recommended for the highest award of the Republic of Vietnam and a U. S. award, as well.

Kit Carson Scouts also made a noteworthy contribution to psychological operations during the month. Their knowledge of the enemy methods and locations made it possible to identify and exploit weak points in the enemy infrastructure and morale. To this end, Scouts addressed villagers on 24 occasions during the month, describing Viet Cong intentions and techniques and urging local support of the GVN. The Scouts also assisted in the preparation of psychological warfare tape recordings which were subsequently aimed at villages throughout I CTZ.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

The enemy's current strategy in I CTZ, and his accelerated campaign of the past six months, are oriented upon reasserting his control in the densely populated lowland areas. This is apparent in his efforts near the DMZ to draw our forces away from the populated areas, coinciding with sharp intensification of his anti-RD operations in the lowlands.


The enemy's willingness to support this intensification with a high expenditure of troops has generated heavy pressure on the RD program. Cumulative results of the effort were apparent in the June RD status figures, where a greater number of villages showed regression than advances. At the same time, however, there were clear signs of resumption of earlier RD progress, partly as a result of the maturing of a number of existing US and GVN programs, and partly because of the addition in April and May of nine Army battalions, whose counter guerrilla operations in the southern I CTZ coastal plain began to bear fruit. It is apparent, however, that numbers of friendly troops are not yet wholly adequate to counter the enemy's efforts against the RD program. The pattern of his offensive activity makes this clear.

Of 376 attacks in I Corps since January 1967, 250 (or 66%) occurred in or near the RD Priority Areas - the regions selected as the focal points for the GVN RD program in 1967. The map on the following page portrays these Priority Areas in green, with red dots representing those enemy attacks which took place in June.

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## ENEMY ATTACKS AGAINST GVN PRIORITY AREAS - JUNE 1967




Since January, the enemy also has directed an increased number of incidents against the Revolutionary Development Teams, which are organized to assist villages and hamlets in attaining improved government and better security. In 122 incidents against them thus far in 1967, 107 RD Team members have been killed, 171 have been wounded and 24 are missing.

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
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In efforts during June aimed at disrupting the RD program, the VC initiated 40 acts of terrorism, launched a mortar attack on Hue, and directed 33 incidents at RD teams. Six GVN officials were assassinated, one candidate for election was killed, and 53 homes in 3 refugee settlements were destroyed.

ENEMY INCIDENTS AGAINST RD TEAMS



RD TEAM CASUALTIES



This heightened enemy effort against the RD program led the Marines during June to make a painstaking village-by-village survey to cross-check the validity and timeliness of the reported village RD status in terms of the III MAF RD indices. The survey revealed that the reported status of some of the villages had not yet caught up with the actual situation on the ground, particularly in cases where village or hamlet officials had been the target of violent enemy terrorism. In other cases, villages which for several months had been losing points within a category, dropped to the next lower category. Generally, changes assessed in June reflected the cumulative effects of the six month enemy effort against the RD program.

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Around Danang, 17 villages dropped into a lower category. These fell mainly in Dien Ban and Hieu Nhon Districts, which sit astride known Viet Cong infiltration routes. It was to be expected that any enemy resurgence would be stronger at these points where GVN influence is weakest. Even so, the movement upward of two villages on the edges of this area into the 80% pacified category, and one other into the 60% category, tended to balance the scales. Progress in coming months may be abetted by the GVN Operation Hung Quang I, which has brought about relocation of large segments of the population of Dien Ban district into more secure areas.

In the Chu Lai area, the special village-by-village reassessment disclosed that 7 villages had decreased in RD status. All but one of these were in Binh Son District, in the southern portion of the tactical area, an enemy stronghold where progress in the past has been most difficult. Similar to the condition near Danang, the Binh Son area also sits astride known enemy infiltration routes.


Near Phu Bai, recent enemy activity has weakened the resolve of the populace in some villages and has affected the functioning of local officials. Attacks such as those which occurred on 28 April, when the enemy fired mortars at Phu Bai airfield, adversely affected Vietnamese morale in an area kept on edge by almost continuous agitation in nearby Hue. Even so, the Phu Bai situation appeared to be stabilized at end-June: 2 villages lost ground, but 2 others showed measurable gains.

The RD status of Danang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai is shown on the maps and graphs which follow.

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - DANANG AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUN-66	DEC-66	JUN-67	JUN-66	DEC-66	JUN-67	JUN-66	DEC-66	JUN-67
Under 20%	401	649	607	89,007	138,869	155,626	34	33	37
20%	94	54	104	80,692	79,887	72,746	17	18	17
40%	75	96	51	62,425	87,919	50,534	12	17	11
60%	31	94	54	37,770	85,051	78,868	9	17	14
80%	75	106	183	296,627	347,711	411,821	10	19	25
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	676	999	999	566,521	739,437	769,585*	82	104	104

\*Revised total reflects result of population reassessment conducted in June 67.

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - CHU LAI AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUN-66	DEC-66	JUN-67	JUN-66	DEC-66	JUN-67	JUN-66	DEC-66	JUN-67
Under 20%	234	164	216	73,038	71,953	97,775	23	20	23
20%	20	111	68	16,508	52,627	30,539	3	11	6
40%	22	39	67	14,260	27,560	51,982	3	5	7
60%	43	85	96	30,196	41,705	48,083	5	7	10
80%	38	133	85	29,372	75,736	54,659	6	14	11
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	357	532	532	163,374	269,581	283,038 *	40	57	57


\*Revised total reflects result of population reassessment conducted in June 67.

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# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - PHU BAI AREA




PERCENT	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUN-66	DEC-66	JUN-67	JUN-66	DEC-66	JUN-67	JUN-66	DEC-66	JUN-67
Under 20%	49	40	41	10,381	10,381	11,199	11	11	11
20%	49	41	17	18,573	9,524	3,585	3	2	1
40%	—	17	—	—	9,049	—	—	1	—
60%	11	8	76	7,747	5,296	35,259	2	1	5
80%	53	56	28	31,336	33,787	17,994	6	7	5
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	162	162	162	68,037	68,037	68,037	22	22	22

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# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN III MAF AREAS



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### Gains During June

In spite of the enemy's greatly intensified activity, focused on the RD programs, notable gains were registered on the GVN side. These included:

- A new, streamlined organization, CORDS ( Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support ), was established for the coordination of US assistance to the RD program.

- Two more ARVN battalions were added to those supporting RD.

- The RD Teams continued to grow in number and experience.

- There was highly encouraging peasant response in the local elections.

- Important contributions were made to RD in offensive operations by Marines and US Army troops in the coastal regions between Danang and the southern I CTZ boundary.

- The Combined Action program expanded and its control structure was improved by the formation of the first Combined Action Group headquarters at Danang.

- Psychological operations continued to achieve encouraging results. A near record number of Chieu Hoi returnees responded to GVN offers of amnesty and rehabilitation.

- Armed Propaganda Teams, comprised of groups of former enemy, provided noteworthy assistance to III MAF by guiding Marine patrols to enemy locations and providing information about the enemy for use in psychological operations.

Specific evidences of progress in these key RD areas are summarized on the following pages.

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-Establishment of CORDS

The reorganization of US assistance to the RD program by establishment of CORDS commenced in I CTZ in June. US agencies charged with direct support of the program were joined under CG, III MAF, a step which brought about more clearly defined areas of authority, responsibility and coordination.

As a result, the new organization placed the former Office of Civil Operations (OCO), which included all civil agencies, within the III MAF RD support structure. The former OCO Region I (I CTZ) Director was designated as III MAF Deputy for CORDS and tasked with supervising the formulation and execution of all US plans, policies and programs in support of the I Corps CORDS effort. Selected III MAF general staff personnel, functioning primarily in RD support tasks, were reassigned to the new CORDS office as part of an integrated civil/military section to be supervised by the former assistant OCO regional director, who was redesignated Assistant Deputy for CORDS.

In each of the five I Corps provinces, an integrated advisory team, composed of the former OCO provincial team and the MACV sector advisory team, has been organized to carry out CORDS functions under a single chief who will report through the Assistant Deputy for CORDS. A similar integration of civil and military staffs will also be accomplished in some I CTZ districts in the near future.

-Additional ARVN Battalions for RD

One of the major obstacles to RD progress in I Corps has been the lack of adequate security for GVN personnel engaged in RD activities. In June, the I Corps Commander assigned two additional battalions to direct support of RD, making a total of 14 ARVN battalions so assigned. The addition of the two new battalions should contribute to the Vietnamese ability to protect RD workers.

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-RD Teams

The RD teams in I CTZ grew in numbers and experience in June. There are now 118 teams (out of 124 programmed for 1967) with an average strength of 54 men (59 men authorized). Their performance improved to the point where the GVN is preparing to expand the program by relocating some teams to new RD hamlets as their activities in current locations approach completion. Teams were engaged in projects throughout I CTZ to foster Revolutionary Development. For example, one unit at Cam Lo was assisting in resettlement of refugees in the DMZ area by aiding with registration procedures and helping families to build homes. Others were functioning in "New Life" hamlets in other areas, aiding villagers with self-help projects and improving local government and security. As a result, the planned 1967 RD projects for these villages are now 70% complete.

-Local Elections

The GVN moved in June to reinforce and expand local government in I CTZ through village and hamlet elections. This is an effort which may well prove to be the single most effective long term weapon to combat VC/NVA actions against Revolutionary Development. Phase I of these elections was concluded on 11 June, when the final 156 hamlets scheduled for elections completed their balloting.

The initial phase of elections saw 611,697 Vietnamese ignore Viet Cong threats and harassments in order to participate in the voting for chiefs and councils. In all, 82.4 percent of those persons eligible voted in 154 village contests, and 79.8 percent of the eligible Vietnamese cast ballots in 547 hamlet elections.

Phase II of the GVN program, scheduled for later this summer, involves a continuing series of village/hamlet elections. During the initial phase, elections were scheduled only

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in relatively secure villages and hamlets. In Phase II, other villages and hamlets will hold elections when they achieve a degree of security sufficient to make balloting practicable.

-Offensive Operations in the Southern Coastal Plain

As the enemy heightened his efforts against RD in the past few months, two rich coastal areas received his particular attention. One was the Nui Loc Son basin, between Danang and Chu Lai; the other was the Duc Pho region south of Quang Ngai City. Gains achieved there by earlier operations were being attenuated by enemy activity, while numbers of Marines were not sufficient to continue previous offensive counterguerrilla and pacification operations there. With the arrival of the US Army Task Force Oregon, this situation was changed substantially.

Task Force Oregon provided troops which promptly picked up the counterguerrilla effort in the Duc Pho region and the base defense tasks around Chu Lai, permitting Marine forces to intensify their operations in the Nui Loc Son basin.

Results in both areas have been significant. In the Nui Loc Son basin region after the arrival of Task Force Oregon, Marines killed 2,070 enemy troops in the next two and a half months. Farther south, in the Duc Pho region, continuing in the same favorable pattern as Marine operations Sierra, Desoto and Deckhouse VI, US Army units killed 634 enemy troops in Operation Malheur I and II. Thus, in the aggregate, III MAF forces have accounted for over 2,700 enemy troops in and around the coastal plain since late April. In the same period, 236 enemy have been captured there, and 143 weapons seized - overall, a substantial contribution to the establishment of security in those two key regions.

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Other indicators of progress were also noted.

-In May and June, the number of "Chieu Hoi" returnees in Quang Ngai province increased sharply, as compared with March and April: 262 versus 58.

-During June, 12 of 14 villages in the Duc Pho area showed pacification gains.

-RF and PF units in the Duc Pho area conducted 16 security operations in June, reflecting increased confidence. Previously, their efforts to combat the Viet Cong were negligible.

-National Highway 1 between Chu Lai and Duc Pho was reopened on 15 June, when an armed convoy of both military and civilian vehicles moved the entire distance without significant enemy interference. The highway had been closed for many months due to weather damage and enemy action.

-Vietnamese near Nui Loc Son began to resist Viet Cong "tax collection" efforts and, in one case, disclosed to Marines the identity of a Viet Cong revenue collector.

-The GVN flag was displayed over a village near Nui Loc Son for the first time in years.

-Two village chiefs began living in their villages near Nui Loc Son; two others did the same in the Duc Pho region.

-Village government was functioning in nine communities near Duc Pho and in two villages near Nui Loc Son.

-Two villages in the Nui Loc Son basin, as well as two in the Duc Pho area, had reached an estimated 60% RD level.


In sum, these indicators described modest beginnings of Revolutionary Development progress in areas which have been a traditional communist preserve. Tentative village assessments of RD status according to the III MAF scale are now being made in 3 villages containing 15,266 people in the Nui Loc Son basin and 14 villages in the Duc Pho region containing 21,109 people. These short term assessments have

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yet to be validated over a longer period of time; however, to give a general impression of RD status in those regions, the four villages which are now estimated to have reached the 60% level are shown on the map below.

### RD PROGRESS IN SOUTHERN I CTZ

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~~SECRET~~Revolutionary Development in the DMZ Region

At the far northern end of I CTZ, a measure of RD activity was taking place in the vicinity of Khe Sanh and Dong Ha. The heavily reinforced enemy units close by, their frequent incursion into South Vietnam in force, and the rocket, artillery and mortar attacks against friendly positions, all operated to counter RD progress. Yet in this area, also, favorable developments were visible.

- 8 of 12 villages in the Dong Ha/Khe Sanh areas have achieved levels of 60% or higher on the III MAF scale.

- 9 of 12 villages have functioning elected councils.

- 6 village chiefs were residing in their villages on a full time basis.

- Commerce has resumed and local markets are functioning on at least a part time basis in all of the villages.

- All but one village have functioning local communication nets.

- Village defense plans were complete in 4 communities and partially complete in the remainder. Local defense forces were being trained in all villages.

- Major roads, including National Highway 1 and Route 9, are open in the Dong Ha/Khe Sanh area (see Goals section).


These and other benefits which arise from operations near Dong Ha/Khe Sanh, Nui Loc Son and Duc Pho, and from other activities outside the tactical areas, can continue only as long as friendly forces remain. Removal or reduction of friendly units before GVN influence has solidified will cause a corresponding reduction in RD progress as enemy elements return.

Estimated RD status in the DMZ area at end-June is depicted on the map on the following page.

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# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - DONG HA/KHE SANH



## DONG HA

## KHE SANH

PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES			JUNE 1967		
	OCT-66	JAN-67	JUN-67	OCT-66	JAN-67	JUN-67	OCT-66	JAN-67	JUN-67	SQ MI	POP	VILLAGES
Under 20%	—	—	8	—	—	2,543	—	—	1	—	—	—
20%	—	—	38	—	—	434	—	—	1	—	—	—
40%	—	21	37	—	1,793	3,683	—	1	2	—	—	—
60%	102	119	39	19,014	19,884	11,487	6	7	4	8	3,000	1
80%	10	23	31	10,799	13,654	15,277	2	3	3	—	—	—
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	112	183	153	28,813	35,331	33,404	8	11	11	8	3,000	1

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Combined Action Program

The III MAF/GVN Combined Action program continued to expand in June as the first Combined Action Group headquarters was activated near Danang. The Group headquarters will function to oversee training and support of Combined Action units presently in its area and eventually will supervise 8 to 10 planned companies with 50 to 60 platoons. Other Group headquarters will be organized in the near future at Phu Bai, Dong Ha and Chu Lai.


All told, there were 1,247 Marines and US Navy Corpsmen and 2,129 Popular Forces personnel assigned to Combined Action units at the close of June. This compared to 1,194 III MAF personnel and 1,949 Vietnamese so assigned at end-May. The number of companies and platoons remained at 10 and 75, respectively. The locations and strengths of Combined Action units are shown on the following page.

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
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
## DISTRIBUTION OF COMBINED ACTION UNITS




DANANG			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
GROUP HQ	1	43	—
COMPANY HQ	3	18	—
PLATOONS	37	491	845
TOTAL STRENGTHS		552	845



CHU LAI			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
GROUP HQ	—	—	—
COMPANY HQ	3	54	—
PLATOONS	15	229	473
TOTAL STRENGTH		283	473



PHU BAI			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
GROUP HQ	—	—	—
COMPANY HQ	2	14	3
PLATOONS	14	241	277
TOTAL STRENGTH		255	280



DONG HA/KHE SANH			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
GROUP HQ	—	—	—
COMPANY HQ	2	16	—
PLATOONS	9	141	213
TOTAL STRENGTHS		157	213

## LEGEND

- \* GROUP HQ
- ★ COMPANY HQ
- PLATOON

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
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### Psychological Operations

Along with those tactical operations aimed at countering the enemy actions against RD described earlier in this report, psychological operations in I CTZ, which also serve this purpose, continued at a high level in June. All told, 81 million leaflets, 1,920 broadcasts and 220 visual presentations were directed at the enemy during the month.

Partially as a result of this effort, 259 "Chieu Hoi" returnees responded to GVN offers of amnesty and rehabilitation. This total was just below the record months of March 1967 and May 1967, when 284 and 278 returnees, respectively, were received. Thus far this year, there have been 1,255 returnees, compared to 738 for the same period a year ago. The charts below show the level of psychological operations and results achieved, in terms of "Chieu Hoi" returnees, during the past year.

### I CTZ PSYWAR ACTIVITY



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### Armed Propaganda Teams

A program which makes use of former enemy who have rallied to the GVN is the Armed Propaganda Team (APT) psychological effort. In this program, "Chieu Hoi" returnees have been organized into 7 platoons of 36 men each and trained to move among the people in teams of 4, describing the GVN "Chieu Hoi" amnesty-rehabilitation program so as to encourage enemy defections.


While APT's provided extensive support throughout I CTZ during June, particularly noteworthy results of their activities were evident in Operations Colgate, Bear Bite, and Maryland. In Colgate, APT's captured 7 Viet Cong, located numerous enemy positions for the advancing Marines, and induced 2 enemy to respond to their "Chieu Hoi" appeals. In Bear Bite and Maryland, other APT's accounted for one Viet Cong killed and 11 ralliers. One of these ralliers later volunteered to guide Marine units and personally killed 2 Viet Cong and captured 2 others.

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~~SECRET~~BASE DEFENSE

There were no attempts by the enemy to attack the major Marine air bases during June.

The end-June disposition of aircraft located at the major I Corps bases under Marine protection is depicted below.

AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT MAJOR AIRFIELDS IN I CTZ AS OF 30 JUNE 1967

\* 75 Marine aircraft undergoing repair or maintenance out-of-country.

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AIR OPERATIONSFixed Wing

First Marine Aircraft Wing pilots flew 6,850 tactical fixed wing sorties in support of III MAF, ROKMC and ARVN forces in I CTZ, the Rolling Thunder campaign in North Vietnam and the Steel Tiger effort in the Laotian panhandle. These sorties included tactical strike, armed reconnaissance, photo and electronic countermeasures sorties.

South Vietnam

A full 35% of the 5,111 Marine attack sorties in South Vietnam were closely integrated with the fire and maneuver of Marine, ROKMC, or ARVN units on the ground. Another 3,287 attack sorties were flown in direct support of Marine, ARVN and ROKMC operations at distances from ground troops which did not require the close coordination of a close air support sortie. 8,899 tons of bombs, 2,598 napalm bombs, over 11,000 rockets and 164 thousand rounds of 20mm were delivered on NVA and Viet Cong targets in I CTZ. The rate of 1.99 tons of ordnance delivered per attack sortie in June compares favorably to the 1.86 tons per sortie average since January. Confirmed in-country damage assessments included 99 enemy killed by air, and 569 bunkers or mortar and automatic weapons positions destroyed. Two bridges and 14 sampans also were destroyed and 28 secondary explosions attested to hits on ammunition caches.

Of these total in-country strikes, F-4B's of VMFA-314, VMFA-542 and VMFA-115 flew 1,623 combat sorties in I Corps. Just over half of them, 812, were in the close air support category. These Marine F-4B's delivered the

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largest share of aviation ordnance dropped in I CTZ, 3,055 tons of bombs, 1,227 napalm bombs and over four thousand air to ground rockets. The more numerous A-4's of VMA's 211, 311 and 223, based at Chu Lai, flew 664 close air support, 1,414 direct air support, and 154 helicopter escort sorties during the month. Crusaders of VMF(AW)'s 232 and 235, with only 27 aircraft on hand, flew 1,316 combat sorties, dropped 1,542 tons of bombs and fired 5,783 five inch Zuni and 2.75 inch rockets. The 24 A-6A's of VMA-(AW)'s 242 and 533 flew slightly over half of their 503 total sorties in South Vietnam, delivering 2,179 tons of bombs in direct support of large unit operations and US Special Forces outposts.

A significant amount of the Marine air effort not in close support of ground forces was directly related to our ground action, being targeted upon the increased enemy presence in A Shau valley. Since the early part of the year enemy activity, in the form of road and bridge construction in and around this major route of access from Laos, has been on the increase. He is apparently building a major logistic base in that area to support operations in Quang Tri, Thua Thien and possibly Quang Nam provinces.

Marine aircraft have flown 1,438 combat sorties in A Shau valley and along Route 9 since the 1st of March. These included 717 attack sorties, 259 armed reconnaissance, 95 visual reconnaissance, 59 photo, 16 tactical air controller sorties and a total of 292 air support radar controlled attack missions.

The 1,715 tons of bombs and rockets expended in these missions resulted in 30 enemy killed, 11 vehicles destroyed or damaged, 413 road cuts, 30 secondary explosions, 73 bridges or dams and 29 fords or river crossings destroyed or damaged.

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The repeated attacks in the A Shau valley have restricted enemy movement on one of his main lines of communication. Aerial photographs showing significant road cuts also reveal great effort by the enemy to repair or bypass the damaged areas.

#### North Vietnam

The A-6A heavy attack bombers of VMA 242 and VMA-533 took on a greater share of the First Marine Aircraft Wing effort north of the DMZ during the month. Of the total 410 Marine attack sorties in North Vietnam, the Intruders flew 253, mostly at night. This compares with 209 sorties into the north in May. F-4B's flew 70, A-4's flew 47, and F-8's flew 40 sorties, the majority of their strikes during daylight or under control of the Marine Air Support Radar Team at Dong Ha.

1,437 tons of bombs and rockets were expended on the enemy lines of communication and military installations and equipment from Route Package I to Route Package VI B near the northern border of North Vietnam. Bomb damage assessment in the north was limited to 70 secondary explosions, 3 artillery pieces, 3 antiaircraft positions and 4 bunkers destroyed.

The level of enemy activity has increased significantly in I CTZ since the major influx of enemy supplies during the TET stand-down. For example, during the period from the end of the truce, 12 February to end-June, the enemy fired 18,115 mortar rounds in I CTZ, most of it in the DMZ area. This is six times the total of 3,337 known fired in the 2 1/2 month period prior to TET. And it was in March, after TET, that the NVA started using artillery in the DMZ area. Although the artillery may have been north of the DMZ for some time previously, there was no record of its being fired before. Rocket fire at Marine

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bases also began after TET, with 51 rounds in February, 219 in March, 40 in April, 353 in May and down to 153 in June when larger caliber artillery started to replace the less accurate rockets.

The continued increase in artillery and mortar attacks in recent months points up the fact that our increased air operations north of the Ben Hai River may be hurting but certainly are not stopping his resupply. The enemy determination to move surface to air missile systems into the region just north of the DMZ at heavy cost is a measure of his need to defend against air attacks. In the last six months the estimated conventional antiaircraft capability in Route Package I has almost doubled, 958 weapons compared to 514 in January.

#### Aircraft Losses

There were no Marine fixed wing aircraft lost during June to enemy action. The overall losses since the March 1965 commitment of Marine attack aircraft remained at 47. A total of 26 fixed wing aircraft did receive combat damage in June, compared to 40 during the previous month.

#### Helicopter Operations

The mobility given the ground forces by the Marine helicopter served to help overcome to some extent the dispersion of Marine infantry and artillery units. In June, First Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters flew 43,737 helicopter sorties, 38,906 in support of III MAF, with the rest in support of ROKMC and ARVN operations. The two squadrons with the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces, HMM-164 and HMM-362, flew 5,747 sorties in support of Marines ashore. A total of 62,957 personnel were transported and 6,452 tons of cargo moved by helicopter during the month. Both figures were new records.

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During the month, 12,205 helo sorties were flown for the Marine large unit campaign. Union II was supported by 561 helicopter sorties in just five days; Cimarron, which involved 6 Marine battalions, by 7,303 helicopter sorties through the month; and three battalions in Operation Arizona, by 1,128 sorties.

The UH-34D's flew 22,769 sorties during the month and CH-46's, 7,247. The aircraft of VMO-2, VMO-3 and VMO-6 flew 10,218 UH-1E sorties, including 2,558 armed helicopter, 221 reconnaissance, 186 command and control missions and 61 tactical airborne controller missions.

The heavy CH-53's of HMH-463 performed well, flying 3,503 sorties, more than twice the number flown in May (1,540). Their missions included logistic and combat cargo lifts, logistic troop lifts, tactical recovery of downed aircraft and evacuation of casualties.

The many flights during June exposed an increased number of helicopters to enemy small arms fire. Seven Marine helicopters were lost to antiaircraft fire, bringing to 100 the number lost to enemy fire since March 1965. Although this was an increase of one over the loss of 6 in May, the number damaged dropped from 142 in the heavy combat in May, to 80 during June.

#### Air Control

The activation of the Marine Air Control Squadron-4 4 Marine Tactical Data System on Monkey Mountain in June is a milestone in the tactical control of combat air power. The portions of the expeditionary semi-automated air defense information center already activated permit the positive control of Marine aircraft from south of Chu Lai to the vicinity of Vinh. The elevation of Monkey Mountain (Hill 647) is such that control facilities at Phu Bai,

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where a detachment of MACS-7 has been employed since 1965, are no longer necessary. The first operational step has been taken toward obtaining real time vital combat air defense data from US Seventh Fleet ships and aircraft hundreds of miles to the north. Installation of the Tactical Data Communications Central, which arrived at Danang in June, will complete the capability for instantaneous reception of information from these ships and, in addition, provide the capability to interchange air defense information with the existing USAF/VNAF air control system at Danang.

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~~SECRET~~~~DECLASSIFIED~~LOGISTICSGeneral

Logistic support of the 80,000 personnel of III MAF and of their varied undertakings was adequate throughout the month. Highlights during June were the uninterrupted support of 15 large scale operations extending from the DMZ to the II Corps border; the completion of the 1,800-foot reinforced concrete Danang River Bridge; the installation of a Marine Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System at An Hoa, to support increased air activity related to operations in the Nui Loc Son basin; and the continued progress in clearing the firebreak buffer zone south of the DMZ.

Supply

Class I - Sufficient stocks were on hand to support all operations.

Class II - Two shipments of repair parts and cleaning gear for the M16 rifle were shipped to III MAF, and issue of the second and third increments of M16 rifles to non-US forces was completed.

Class III - Stocks were adequate to support assigned tasks. Amphibious Assault Fuel System capacities were increased by 90,000 gallons in the Phu Bai/Col Co area, and by 30,000 gallons at Danang to accommodate increasing demands. A Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System was installed at An Hoa to support the increased helicopter activity which has resulted from operations in the Nui Loc Son basin. Capacities at An Hoa are now 20,000 gallons of JP-4 and 10,000 gallons of AVGAS.

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Class IV - Stocks were adequate for the support of all tactical operations.

Class V - Stocks were adequate to support III MAF operations in all tactical areas. Construction commenced for Mobile Ammunition Evaluation and Renovation Unit (MAERU) facilities at supply points at Danang and Chu Lai.

Maintenance







The overall material deadline rate reflected little change from the pattern of previous months. The charts on the following page show the rates for five critical categories and their composite deadline rate for the past twelve months.

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## MATERIAL DEADLINE COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT




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During the first six months of 1967, 23,311 combat essential work orders were received by the 3d FSR and FLC. In the same period 23,320 were completed, for a completion rate of slightly over 100%, which correspondingly reduced the backlog. The following charts illustrate the number of work orders processed monthly during 1967 by major supporting units, and exhibit the volume of heavy maintenance and rebuild of equipment performed by the FMFPac WestPac logistic organizations.



### Motor Transport

During April, CG, III MAF was authorized to place in service all multi-fuel vehicles as they arrived in-country. Prior to that time 381 M-35A2C and 177 M-51A2 trucks had been received by III MAF. No others were received until June, when 23 M-54A2 wreckers arrived. At the end of the month, 63 M-35A2C trucks were enroute from CONUS to RVN.

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With the arrival and issue of the new family of multi-fuel trucks, some technical problems were encountered. For example, M-35A2C vehicles developed structural and welding deficiencies on drop sides and beds. The large number of structural and welding failures appear to be a function of manufacturer quality control.

The trucks replaced by the new multi-fuel vehicles are being cannibalized for useable components or disposed of through normal channels. M-35 gasoline trucks in good condition are redistributed in III MAF to fill shortages pending receipt of multi-fuel replacements while the older M-35's are cannibalized and disposed of through normal procedures.

#### Medical

During the month, 470 hospital beds were available within III MAF organic medical units: 180 at Danang, 140 at Chu Lai, 120 at Phu Bai, and 30 at Dong Ha. An additional 404 beds were available at the Naval Support Activity, Danang and 560 each on the USS REPOSE and USS SANCTUARY. Marines also are being treated at the USA 6th Convalescent Center at Cam Ranh Bay for diseases such as infectious hepatitis, malaria and others requiring prolonged convalescence.

#### Aviation Logistics

The Shohorn modification program (installation of an airborne missile warning system) continued for F-4 aircraft assigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. By end-June, 9 F-4B and 3 RF-4B aircraft had the modification completed by the rework facility at Atsugi, Japan.

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The Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) program and repair of combat damaged aircraft also continued at various aircraft plants in Japan. At month's end, a total of 75 aircraft were out of country undergoing depot-level maintenance:

	<u>PAR</u>	<u>Repair of Combat Damage</u>
A-4E	5	4
F-4B	7	2
F-8E	5	-
TF-9J	2	-
CH-46A	22	6
UH-1E	5	4
UH-34D	-	12
C-117D	-	1

The high number of CH-46A aircraft undergoing rework can be attributed to the large number of these aircraft becoming due for PAR at the same time. This, combined with the number inducted for battle damage repair, has generated a workload which the rework facility cannot handle. To alleviate the backlog that has developed, the Naval Air Systems Command Representative Pacific is organizing a program in which those aircraft requiring both battle damage repair and scheduled rework will be returned to the Naval Aircraft Repair Facility at San Diego.

In addition to PAR and battle damage repair, inspection of all CH-46 aft transmission systems, in response to a helicopter accident described in the May report, was completed during the month. Inspection of 115 transmission systems included 56 First Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters, 17 Special Landing Force helicopters and 42 helicopters and spares at the rework facility in Japan. Of these, 46 were rejected. Also

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during June, another problem area was highlighted when a CH-46 crashed at Dong Ha, due to a still undetermined cause. However, the malfunction under strong suspicion is failure of the aft vertical shaft thrust bearing. Consequently, until final determination can be made, and as an interim measure, proper installation methods and lubrication procedures have been re-emphasized to maintenance personnel.

NORS/NORM data for June remained relatively unchanged from the preceding month. Parts requirements that place aircraft in a down status for supply (NORS) frequently are items of a non-recurring nature. Problems of a repeating character, although less frequent, initially influence the NORS rate to a substantially higher degree due to the critical fleet-wide need, thus draining assets and generally increasing the difficulty in obtaining the part. Examples of aircraft parts causing repeated difficulty, with actions taken, follow.

A-6A - Module. SACE Module repair kits have been procured and distributed to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, enabling the intermediate maintenance activities to repair the parts.

F-8 - Constant Speed Drives. Testing capabilities have been established at Japan, to eliminate the need to return CSD's to CONUS. This has reduced required lead time and the aircraft NORS rate.

CH-46 - Windshield. Replacement windshields, with a special coating to reduce cuts and scratches caused by sand under the wipers, will be delivered by the first of the year.









NORS/NORM rates for selected Marine aircraft in WestPac are displayed on the following chart.

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## NORS/NORM RATES-WESTPAC AIRCRAFT



\* Readiness Objective not established

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HAWK Repair Parts Support

Parts support for the HAWK missile continues to be a serious problem due to low density of end items, high cost and wide range of parts throughout the supply system. The two Marine missile battalions in Vietnam have been directed to use a special code on HAWK requisitions to ensure identification of HAWK requirements throughout the Defense Supply Agency. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has directed mandatory stockage of essential repair parts at the missile battalions and Marine Corps Supply Centers. Parts to satisfy initial mandatory stockage have been force-fed by Marine Corps Supply Activity, Philadelphia to the LAAM battalions.

Combined Action Company Equipment

In March 1967 sufficient equipment was authorized for 10 Combined Action companies and 74 Combined Action platoons. In this authorization, it was stated that further expansion of the program would require specific approval of additional allowances and that, pending such approval, additional Combined Action units must be outfitted from currently authorized III MAF units.

This guidance was broadened by establishing allowances for each type of unit, i.e., Combined Action platoon, Combined Action company and Combined Action group, so that as new units are authorized, total allowances for the program would increase accordingly.

III MAF actions to expedite equipping of CA units are:

- Marines bring their own individual equipment when joining a CA unit.

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- Provision for immediate issue of M-38A1 vehicles available as a result of the removal of the radio from AN/MRC-38 vehicles.

- Issue of M-35 2 1/2 ton trucks excess to regular units as a result of phase-in of the multi-fuel M-35A2 trucks. These will serve as an interim substitute for the M-37 truck.

- Notifying CG, FLC and CO, 3d FSR of all outstanding documents required for initial outfitting of Combined Action units and a request that action be taken to issue the required items.

In general, there has been a steady improvement in the availability of T/E equipment, individual equipment, and clothing for the Combined Action Program, although delivery of tropical utilities, boots and AN/PRC-25 radios has been slow.

#### Movements

During the month additional Marine units arrived in Vietnam: the 1st Collection and Clearing Platoon, Company D, 5th Medical Battalion; 3d MP Battalion (-); Marine Air Control Squadron-4; HMM-263; and the 1st Searchlight Battery, FMF.

#### Engineer Operations

During June, accelerated engineer efforts continued in general support of III MAF. The 1,800 foot reinforced concrete Danang River Bridge was completed, construction of which began in early 1965 to replace a pontoon bridge, ferries and a one way Vietnamese railroad bridge. In addition, ten other bridges of various sizes were completed, 28 bunkers were constructed, 232 miles of road

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maintained and six miles of new road finished. Engineers placed seven ferries in operation and constructed six by-passes at Viet Cong damaged bridge sites. Route 9, between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh, remained trafficable despite intense enemy activity in that area. Work on the Chu Lai SATS airfield progressed, with 31,800 square yards of runway matting picked up, repaired and relaid, while upgrading continued at the Chu Lai West, Dong Ha, Phu Bai, An Hoa and the Khe Sanh airfields.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS1. PHU BAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
Hq, 1st FA Group	11Jun	Arrived	Danang
BLT 1/3	12Jun	To DMZ area	(to SLF on 29 June)
3d Bn, 26th Mar	13Jun	Departed	Khe Sanh
4th Mar	14Jun	Departed	Phong Dien
2d Bn, 4th Mar	14Jun	Departed	Phong Dien

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>			<u>Probable</u>		
<u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>May</u>
Northern Front	1	1			
Regimental Hq	1	1			
Battalions	4	5			
Companies	10	10	Companies	2	2
Total Strength	2,400	2,800	Total Strength	150	150

A comparison of the May and June totals reflects a 400 man decrease due to the relocation of the 800th VC Battalion to a position outside of the Phu Bai 25 miles radius and changes in the estimated strength of the 804th and 810th Independent Bn and the 806th Bn of the 6th Regiment.

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
BLT 2/3	11Jun	Departed	SLF (TG-79.5)
BLT 1/3	12Jun	Arrived	Phu Bai
1st Searchlight Btry	28Jun	Arrived	CONUS

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>		<u>Probable</u>	
<u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Jun</u>
Division Hq	3		
Regimental Hq	14		
Battalions	50		
Companies	20	Companies	1
Total Strength	35,500	Total Strength	120

For purposes of this section, this area is bounded on the north and south by parallel lines, each 25 miles from the DML. On the west, the area is bounded by an arc extending 25 miles into Laos from the western end of the DML. Order of Battle totals include an unidentified division, which is believed to be located south of Dong Hoi, and a transportation regiment and infantry battalion in Laos.

3. DANANGMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
MACS-4	4Jun	Arrived	CONUS
Hq 1st FA Group	11Jun	Departed	Phu Bai
7th MTBn	16Jun	Arrived	Chu Lai

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CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>			<u>Probable</u>		
<u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>May</u>
Regimental Hq	1	1			
Battalions	7	6	Battalions	0	1
Companies	6	6			
Total Strength	2650	2600	Total Strength	0	400

A comparison of the May and June confirmed order of battle totals shows an increase of 50 personnel. This increase reflects the added strength of the 105th Local Force Battalion, which had been carried as a probable unit and is now confirmed within the Danang 25 mile perimeter. This was partially offset by a reduction in the estimated strength of the 3d NVA Regiment.

4. CHU LAIMAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>From/To</u>
VMA-311	3Jun	Arrived	Iwakuni
VMA-121	3Jun	Departed	Iwakuni
5th Mar	3Jun	Departed	Thang Binh Dist
1st Bn, 5th Mar	11Jun	Departed	Que Son
HMM-263	12Jun	Arrived	SLF (TG-79.4)
7th MT Bn	16Jun	Departed	Danang
HMM-362	28Jun	Departed	SLF (TG-79.4)

CHANGES TO TACTICAL AREA

None

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ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>Confirmed</u>			<u>Probable</u>		
<u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Within 25 miles</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>May</u>
Division Hq		1			
Regimental Hq	1	1	None		
Battalions	9	10			
Companies	13	13			
Total Strength	4,400	4,800	Total Strength	0	0

A comparison of May and June order of battle shows a decrease of 400 enemy personnel. This difference reflects the relocation of the 2d NVA Division forward headquarters and the GK 33 Battalion to a position outside of the Chu Lai 25 mile radius.

5. ENEMY LOSSES FOR JUNE 1967 (to Marines)

<u>June</u>		<u>Total 1967</u>	<u>1966 monthly</u>
		<u>to date</u>	<u>average</u>
1,765	Killed	10,740 (adjusted)	885
123	Captured	672	76
233	Weapons	1,741	129

6. CIVIC ACTION STATISTICS

<u>June</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Total as of 30 June 1967</u>
129,744	105,680	Persons given medical treatment 1,866,905
450	41	Persons given medical training 1,474
197,020	191,413	Pounds of food distributed 3,652,681
1,621	3,021	Pounds of soap distributed 178,470

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<u>June</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Total as of 30 June 1967</u>
1,896	6,767	Pounds of clothing distributed 258,497
322	252	Critically ill civilians evacuated 7,800
225	147	English language classes conducted 3,004
\$1,982	\$788	Cash donations \$41,142
394,040	382,366	Persons fed 6,011,161
548	1,317	Students supported 56,482
100	45	Construction projects 1,841

7. MARINE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>June</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Total as of 30 June 1967</u>
25,998	22,178	Patrols 229,439
5,227	7,164	Ambushes 90,873
169	411	Company opns 3,646
1,332	1,053	Sniper posts 10,741
7	9	Battalion opns 61
8	6	Regimental or larger opns 68
7,253	7,685	Combat/combat support sorties 117,834
43,737	56,031	Helo sorties 790,375

8. III MAF STRENGTH - on 30 June 1967

	<u>Marines</u>			<u>Navy</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Total</u>
Danang	2,286	35,917	38,203	190	1,222	1,412
Chu Lai	838	10,113	10,951	59	424	483
Phu Bai	705	10,756	11,461	79	597	676
Dong Ha	661	14,974	15,635	48	574	622
Total	4,490	71,760	76,250	376	2,817	3,193

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9. III MAF TACTICAL AREAS

	<u>Square miles</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Villages</u>
Danang	999	769,585	104
Chu Lai	532	283,038	57
Phu Bai	162	68,037	22
Total	1,693	1,120,660	183

10. LOGISTICSa. Supply levels at end of period

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
<u>Class I</u>				
(1000 of rations / days of supply)				
MCI rations	264/38	172/91	220/44	296/42
B rations	275/69	186/93	103/34	246/62
A rations	373/12	193/15	224/25	0/0
<u>Class III and IIIA (Bulk)</u>				
(1000 gals/days of supply)				
JP-4	7016/19	2873/11	82/6	73/9
AVGAS	690/9	176/11	53/8	69/17
MOGAS	834/23	377/10	42/5	41/3
DIESEL	1427/25	402/7	67/3	35/2

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<u>Class V and VA</u>	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>
Ground ammunition (days of supply)	45	45	45

Aviation Ordnance - Stocks maintained within CINCPAC allocations.

b. Resupply Status

## (1) Surface Shipping Status (all I CTZ)

Cargo received from CONUS 21,284.0 M/T

Cargo received from intra-WestPac 34,357.0 M/T

## (2) Air Shipping Status

Cargo received from CONUS 3,301.0 S/T

Cargo received from intra-WestPac 2,529.3 S/T

c. RED BALL Summary

Items at beginning of period	134
Items added	7
Items removed	17
Items remaining at end of period	124

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LOGISTICS (continued)d. Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN to 3d FSR	1,416
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Items repaired at 3d FSR	14,590
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Items returned to CONUS from 3d FSR or disposed of on Okinawa	178
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e. Construction Projects

Roads rehabilitated	-232 miles maintained and 6 miles constructed.
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Bridges	-Completed 11 Cl-40 or higher bridges; repaired 5 others. 4 new Cl-60 bridges are under construction. 7 ferries/ rafts are in operation.
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Well Drilled	-3 completed, 6 in progress.
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Bunkers	-28 bunkers were completed during the month.
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UNCLASSIFIEDCONCLUSIONS

-The enemy has confronted the allied forces with a new and intensified situation in northern Quang Tri, where his forces, enjoying the benefits of a sanctuary, are presenting a threat which demands the major presence of free world units. This is a logical strategy, and may be expected to persist.

-Revolutionary Development which, on careful analysis, is disclosed as having regressed during the preceding few months, began to regain power and cohesion in June, despite strong enemy opposition. This is true mainly because of the increased coordination of the US civil/military effort, and because of the growing effectiveness of RVN forces in protecting the Revolutionary Development process.

-The enemy, having made a series of major attempts since the advent of dry weather to disrupt Revolutionary Development, has been largely unsuccessful. He cannot be expected to stay with his presently unproductive programs, but to seek to create new and effective ones. These must, almost certainly, include maximum use of the sanctuary immediately north of the DMZ.

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