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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES
VIETNAM

JULY 1967

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of July 1967. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering periods from March 1965 through June 1967.

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UNCLASSIFIEDSUMMARY

During July, the confrontation in I Corps continued in the pattern of the previous month. There was heavy fighting in the DMZ area, where the enemy was again frustrated in his attempts to reduce the Marine outposts, but where his substantial troop and logistic buildup continued, despite heavy US fire support efforts. There was also heavy fighting in the coastal plain, where the enemy campaign against the Revolutionary Development program met growing resistance.

The intensity of the conflict was reflected in the casualty figures for both sides. III MAF forces (including Task Force Oregon) killed 2,983 of the enemy and captured 246, while suffering 413 killed and 3,208 wounded. The enemy losses were the second highest to date, exceeded only by May's total of 3,914.

During the month, III MAF units and the two Marine Special Landing Forces of the 7th Fleet were engaged in twenty large scale operations - a record level of III MAF large unit offensive activity for the entire war. The previous high of fifteen occurred in June. The July large unit effort accounted for 1,864 enemy killed, the bulk in the DMZ area, where the enemy committed as many as five battalions in coordinated attacks on Marine positions. Two encounters are worthy of note. On 6 July, a Marine company observed two hundred NVA in a draw just northeast of Con Thien, called in artillery fire to block their escape, and then attacked the pinioned enemy, killing 154. There were no Marine losses. And shortly before midnight on the same day, another Marine company surprised four hundred of the enemy moving along a trail towards Con Thien and, in heavy night fighting, killed 155. Three Marines were killed.

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Not all engagements were favorable. On 2 July, eighty-four Marines were killed and 190 wounded when a company patrol northeast of Con Thien was attacked by five enemy battalions, who employed mortars, flamethrowers, and massed artillery with great effect. And, on 29 July, a Marine battalion suffered twenty-four killed and 202 wounded when it was attacked by a two battalion force near the DMZ boundary.

Powerful air attacks - some 2,300 USMC sorties - and artillery interdiction in the DMZ area damaged the enemy and caused him significant material and personnel losses, but did not halt his buildup of power within the sanctuary area.

Despite the drain on its resources imposed by sustained combat near the DMZ, work on the strong-point obstacle system, and heavy commitments elsewhere in I Corps, III MAF maintained the increasing pace in its counter-guerrilla campaign. Marines conducted 34,662 patrols, ambushes, and company size operations, while an additional 5,104 were undertaken by US Army units of Task Force Oregon. These resulted in 1,076 enemy killed, a monthly total exceeded only by the 1,518 killed in May of this year. In addition, sixty-one enemy were captured and 306 weapons were seized.

It was evident, at the end of the month, that the enemy's campaign to disrupt the Revolutionary Development program had failed to bear significant fruit. The resumption of RD progress in I Corps, which first was noted in June, continued during July. Forty GVN RD teams completed the political, social, and economic programs in their hamlets and either had moved elsewhere, to begin the process anew, or were preparing to move. Route 1 was opened from Duc Pho south to the II CTZ border, which means that the highway is now open the entire length of I Corps. Measurable

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gains in local security and self-government were made by thirty villages in the principal III MAF pacification areas, and 224 of the enemy defected during the month, raising to 1,504 the number of Chieu Hoi returnees in I Corps thus far in 1967 - a 62% increase over the comparable period a year ago.

On the night of 14-15 July, the enemy attacked Danang Air Base with 122mm rockets, despite an intensive program of patrols, observation and listening posts, searchlight posts and ambushes. Heavy damage was caused to facilities and aircraft at the base. Although friendly reaction was prompt, with fire on the enemy rocket positions within 3 minutes, the success of the attack underscores the need for obtaining from the Vietnamese people more and better information about the enemy's intentions in order to prevent the attacks in the first place.

The Combined Action program, an endeavor aimed at both getting more out of the thinly spread Marine assets and increasing the effectiveness of the Popular Forces, fell behind in its progress toward 114 combined platoons by the end of the year. Seventy-five platoons were in being at end-July, the same number as for the two previous months. This condition is attributable chiefly to a shortage of Marines for new units. Approval for additional Marine spaces for the program has been pending since April.

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GOALS
And Progress Toward Achieving Them

Major goals sought by III MAF in 1967, and progress toward their attainment, are being reported at bi-monthly intervals. They will be discussed next in the August report.

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UNCLASSIFIEDOperations in the Western DMZ Region

June closed with Marines, in Operation Crockett, having successfully countered enemy movements north and east of Khe Sanh. In the first two weeks of July, contacts in Crockett were greatly diminished, and the operation was terminated in mid-month. Cumulative results were 206 enemy killed, two captured, and twenty-six weapons seized. Marine casualties were fifty-two killed and 285 wounded.

Concurrent with the diminution of activity in Operation Crockett, there were continuing attempts by the enemy to establish positions in force in the western DMZ region. As a consequence, Operation Ardmore was initiated on the 17th, with two battalions of the 26th Marines conducting search and destroy operations aimed at impeding enemy infiltration from both Laos and the north. On the 21st, patrolling rifle companies uncovered several NVA platoons in the mountains eight miles northeast of Khe Sanh. With air and artillery support, the Marines routed the enemy, killing at least ten.

Later that same afternoon, two miles south of the 26th Marines' contact, a patrol from the 3d Marines encountered an enemy battalion along Route 9. Two Marine rifle companies maneuvered rapidly to reinforce the patrol and, with Marine air and artillery support, killed twenty-four NVA before the enemy fled. The eleven Marine air strikes triggered ten secondary explosions.

On the 24th, aggressive patrolling in the same area of Route 9 exposed a large scale enemy ambush. An enemy minefield some two thousand meters long, on the south side of Route 9, was discovered by a patrol and destroyed by Marine engineers.

As the month drew to a close, it was apparent that North Vietnamese Army units were still threatening the

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
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remote Khe Sanh outpost from both the west and east, while at the same time attempting to interdict Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Cam Lo.

ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN DMZ AREA - JULY 1967



Operations in the Eastern DMZ Region

The major operation in the eastern DMZ region during July was Operation Buffalo, which led to one of the heaviest and most costly engagements of the war to date. At 1000 on 2 July, Company B of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, on a patrol a mile and a half northeast of Con Thien, made contact with what appeared to be a small but well-entrenched enemy unit. The action developed rapidly into a well-coordinated attack by five NVA battalions. The enemy, for the first time in the war, employed both light and medium artillery in mass and in close coordination with his ground attack, in addition to using both mortars and flame throwers.

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The remaining companies of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines maneuvered rapidly, both overland and by helicopter, to reinforce and relieve the pressure on Company B. They came under heavy mortar and artillery fire as they entered the action, and the battle throughout was intense and at close quarters. Marine aircraft, in the first few hours of the engagement, flew twenty-eight close air support sorties, delivering ninety tons of ordnance. The air attacks, in close coordination with Marines engaged on the ground, were credited with killing sixty-five of the enemy and destroying fifteen bunkers. Marine artillery fired 453 missions during the day, and 7th Fleet ships added their support with 142 rounds of 5 inch naval gunfire.

In his efforts to impede maneuver by Marine reinforcements, the enemy on the 2d fired a record number of artillery and mortar rounds (1,065) on Gio Linh and Con Thien. Over seven hundred rounds fell on the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines alone. In mid-afternoon, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines entered the battle by helicopter from Dong Ha, and quickly launched an attack on the enemy left flank, which caused the NVA force to break contact and withdraw to the north. Initial confirmed enemy losses were fifty-five enemy killed, with another eighty-eight listed as probably killed. However, Marine casualties on the 2d were heavy - eighty-four killed, 190 wounded and one Marine missing.

In the face of what appeared to be a growing artillery supported NVA effort in the eastern region of the DMZ, III MAF undertook to reinforce the 9th Marines. As the 1st Battalion's contact on the 2d was developing, Marine Special Landing Force Alpha was committed to land in eastern Quang Tri and, at the same time, Special Landing Force Bravo, which also was afloat, was alerted. In less than twenty-five hours after the 9th Marines' initial contact, SLF Alpha (BLT

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
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1/3 and HMM-362) began landing by helicopter a mile south-east of Con Thien. Both the infantry battalion and artillery battery were in place by the afternoon of the 3d.

A day later, SLF Bravo (BLT 2/3 and HMM-164) landed by helicopter near Cam Lo and moved northward, on the western flank of the activity, toward Con Thien. This landing, Operation Beaver Track, took place only two days after the same BLT had completed Operation Beacon Torch in the Pagoda Valley, one hundred miles to the southeast. The map below displays the actions in Operation Buffalo from the 2d to the 5th of July.

OPERATION BUFFALO 2-5 JULY 1967



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Following the vigorous action at the start of Operation Buffalo, except for probes on Marine units and small meeting engagements, enemy units avoided contact for several days. However, on the morning of 6 July, a NVA force, supported by mortars, attacked the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines near Con Thien. The attack was unsuccessful and cost the enemy 35 confirmed killed. At about the same time, Company A of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines sighted about two hundred NVA concentrated in a draw, two miles northeast of Con Thien. Calling in artillery fire to fix the enemy in place, the company attacked and killed 154 NVA, before the enemy remnants were able to escape. There were no Marine casualties.

That same day, just before midnight, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines surprised an NVA four hundred-man battalion moving along a trail in column, about three miles northeast of Con Thien. The Marines struck hard at the enemy and, in heavy night fighting, killed 155 NVA. Marine casualties were three killed.

On the 8th and 9th, the Special Landing Force units made contacts with additional NVA units southwest and southeast of Con Thien, killing eighty-four of the enemy there.

By the end of Operation Buffalo, on the 14th, enemy losses stood at 1,290 confirmed killed, two captured and another 513 probably killed. One hundred weapons, including twenty-one mortars and machine guns, were captured. Marine losses, by comparison, were 159 killed and 345 wounded.

Of the total enemy losses in Buffalo, supporting Marine air, artillery and naval gunfire were credited with 475 NVA confirmed killed, 164 bunkers destroyed, fifteen enemy artillery and rocket positions destroyed and forty-six secondary explosions from hits on ammunition dumps. Between the 2d

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
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and the 10th, the period of the heaviest ground fighting, 1,066 tons of aviation ordnance, over forty thousand rounds of III MAF artillery, and 1,500 five inch and eight inch naval gun-fire rounds from 7th Fleet ships supported Marine infantry.

The map below depicts the major actions in Operation Buffalo on 6-14 July.

OPERATION BUFFALO 6-14 JULY

-Hickory II

To exploit Operation Buffalo, COMUSMACV directed that another sweep be made of the DMZ south of the Ben Hai River. The operation was intended to destroy enemy fortifications and mortar and artillery positions in the southern half of the DMZ. The concept was similar to that employed during

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
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Hickory I (18-26 May), when five ARVN and eight US Marine battalions moved rapidly to the Ben Hai River and then swept southward. In Hickory II, two Marine battalions again drove north to the Ben Hai River, wheeled about, and attacked southward to the Cam Lo River, where two Marine battalions had set up blocking positions. BLT 2/3 (Special Landing Force Bravo) screened the west flank, while three ARVN infantry battalions and an armored personnel carrier troop advanced into the DMZ on Route 1, then turned and attacked southward. East of the ARVN thrust, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion operated in the coastal sand dunes.

CONCEPT; OPERATION HICKORY II 14-16 JULY



The operation met with little resistance. One major contact occurred on the 15th, when the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion engaged an enemy force about four miles east of Gio Linh. After a

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day long engagement marked by extensive use of artillery and air attacks, as well as direct fire from 105mm howitzer-armed amphibian tractors, the enemy withdrew, leaving 25 KIA behind. Marine casualties, when the operation terminated on the 16th, were four killed and ninety wounded. Total NVA and Viet Cong losses were thirty-nine killed, twenty-three probably killed and nineteen weapons captured. From the light contact in Hickory II, it was apparent that the bulk of the enemy had previously withdrawn north of the Ben Hai River.

-Special Landing Forces

At the close of Hickory, the two Special Landing Forces reembarked in their amphibious shipping, refurbished, and resumed a ready status off the coast of I Corps.


Within three days, SLF Bravo landed again, in Operation Bear Chain, which was centered in the coastal region between Quang Tri City and Hue. The purpose of Bear Chain was to strike the exposed, seaward flank of the Viet Cong 806th Battalion, and to destroy that unit or drive it westward toward ARVN forces in Operation Lam Son 87. As it turned out, the enemy moved west to evade the Marines, abandoning over thirty-seven tons of rice stores in their haste to escape. In their withdrawal, the enemy ran into the ARVN, who stood firm, killing 252 VC and capturing eighteen others. Its purpose achieved, Bear Chain was terminated on the 26th. Ten Marines were killed in the operation.

The map on the following page portrays activity in Operation Bear Chain.

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OPERATION BEAR CHAIN / LAM SON 87



SLF Alpha, meanwhile, had landed again and was engaged in counter guerrilla sweeps in the coastal area, eighteen miles southeast of Hue. This operation, called Beacon Guide, was conducted as part of III MAF's overall program to maintain pressure on guerrilla units in the rice-rich coastal regions of I Corps. In these operations, results often are intangible. As a rule, the enemy casualty total is not high, and there generally are few large-scale engagements. The benefits, nevertheless, are real. Enemy activity in the area is disrupted, as the guerrillas are forced to leave the region or risk capture or death; vacated enemy facilities are destroyed and, even though these may be rebuilt, the guerrilla knows that they are likely to be destroyed again. Finally, the populace is made aware of the weaknesses of the guerrilla force in comparison with the strength of the free world forces. In brief, they provide evidence of a strong and continuing friendly presence, a key factor in Revolutionary Development.

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In this regard, Beacon Guide was typical. There were only small clashes with guerrillas, although there was considerable evidence of recent VC activity. Four guerrillas were captured, and an enemy base camp was uncovered and destroyed, along with an extensive cave and tunnel complex.

In terms of enemy losses, results of SLF operations continued to be substantial. During July, they accounted for 445 enemy killed and six captured, which raised to 1,883 the number of enemy killed during thirteen SLF operations thus far in 1967. During the seven-month period, 248 Marines of the SLF's were killed and 1,313 wounded.

-Operation Kingfisher

While the two Special Landing Forces were moving from Operation Buffalo to launch the amphibious attacks just described, the other battalions from Buffalo were being committed to Operation Kingfisher, in the Con Thien area.

Kingfisher, like other operations in the DMZ area which preceded it, was aimed at blocking NVA entry in force into Quang Tri province. From the 16th through the 27th, it was characterized by minor contacts. On the 28th, however, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines discovered an enemy base at Thon Cam Son, in the DMZ on the banks of the Ben Hai river, five miles northwest of Con Thien. With supporting Marine tanks, amphibian tractors, and Ontos, the battalion began a systematic destruction of the base, which contained over 150 bunkers and an extensive water supply system, the latter with an estimated capacity of ten thousand gallons a day. Other than firing small arms at Marine aircraft striking north of the Ben Hai, the enemy avoided contact.


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On the morning of the 29th, the battalion began to move southward, but the lead company soon encountered strong resistance, including mortar fire, command-detonated mines and small arms fire. A company of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines quickly advanced northward toward the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, relieving the pressure on that unit, and causing the enemy to break contact. By noon the following day, all elements of the battalion had moved south of the DMZ without further enemy resistance. Confirmed enemy losses stood at forty-eight killed, two weapons captured and a regimental size base camp destroyed. Marine casualties were twenty-four killed and 142 wounded-evacuated. An additional sixty Marines who received minor wounds returned to duty within the day.

OPERATION KINGFISHER-16 JULY-31 JULY 1967



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The contact on the 29th was the last significant contact for Kingfisher during July. As the month ended, cumulative enemy losses stood at 159 enemy confirmed killed and fifteen weapons captured. Marine casualties were forty-one killed, 215 wounded seriously enough to be evacuated, and 140 additional Marines wounded slightly.

Artillery Fire in the DMZ and North Vietnam

During the month, some 15,249 rounds of artillery were delivered on enemy forces and installations in the DMZ and northward. This heavy effort, coordinated with an intensified air interdiction campaign (see Air Operations section) served to impede enemy logistic activity and interfere with his troop marshalling and movement. However, it was not of the magnitude or intensity needed completely - or even largely - to halt a growing buildup of enemy power in the DMZ sanctuary facing our forces in the Gio Linh-Con Thien-Khe Sanh area.

Enemy Losses in DMZ Area

In all, enemy losses in the DMZ area during July were substantial -- 1,513 confirmed killed, an additional 935 probably killed, and thirteen prisoners and 134 weapons taken. In the year that has passed since Operation Hastings thwarted the enemy's initial bid in Quang Tri, enemy losses in the DMZ region total 7,458 NVA confirmed killed, eighty-two captured, and 1,363 weapons captured. Marine casualties in the same period were 1,318 killed and 7,122 wounded. Most of the latter returned to action within twenty-four hours.

Operations in Southern I Corps - Operation Malheur II

In the populated region of southern Quang Ngai province, two US Army infantry battalions, with a cavalry

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troop in support, continued their search for guerrillas and main force units of the enemy's 2d and 22d Regiments. Action, in the main, was characterized by the extensive use of helicopter-borne reconnaissance teams who sought to draw fire from the enemy. When the enemy disclosed his position, other helicopters loaded with infantry were called in. These tactics netted good results against the enemy in this area; during July, 253 enemy were confirmed killed, thirty-four captured and seventy weapons seized. This brought the total for Malheur II, which began on the 8th of June, to 471 enemy killed, fifty-two prisoners taken and 147 weapons captured. US Army losses for the month were nine killed and 106 wounded. Cumulative friendly losses for Malheur II were twenty-nine US killed and 258 wounded. Particularly noteworthy is the contribution of these operations to Revolutionary Development progress in southern Quang Ngai, which has long been a VC stronghold. RD progress in this area is discussed in detail in the Revolutionary Development section.

Sting Ray Operations


While the battalions and regiments of III MAF were heavily committed to larger scale operations during the month, the small, deep reconnaissance patrols were busy directing surprise air strikes and artillery or naval gunfire missions on the enemy. 115 of these Sting Ray patrols during July controlled 164 artillery missions and fifty-six air strikes on the enemy moving about in the hinterland. These accounted for forty-three enemy confirmed killed and an additional 172 probably killed, but not confirmed due to the patrols' reliance on covert measures for security. Marine casualties in Sting Ray operations were five killed and thirty-seven wounded.

The graph on the following page shows casualties resulting from Sting Ray operations since their initiation in May 1966.

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CASUALTIES IN STING RAY OPERATIONS



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COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS
And Their Relationship To Large Unit Operations And
Revolutionary Development

In July, 29,743 patrols, 9,732 ambushes and 291 small unit search and destroy operations were carried out by III MAF against enemy guerrillas.

The total of 39,766 small unit counter guerrilla operations represented an increase of 2,289 over June's total. This was a continuation of the accelerated pace of these operations which began in November of 1966. Each month has seen the level of activity exceed that of the preceding month, and the aggregate growth since that time has been substantial. In October 1966, 10,713 small unit counter guerrilla operations were conducted; in July 1967, there were 39,766 - an increase of over two hundred percent, or an average growth of 3,228 per month. In July these operations maintained heavy pressure on the enemy infrastructure and resulted in 1,076 enemy killed, sixty-one captured and 306 weapons seized.

The vital relationship of the small unit counter guerrilla campaign to the Revolutionary Development program has long been evident. In July, there was also becoming apparent a growing interrelationship between these small unit efforts, large unit operations and the RD program. This combination of large and small offensive operations has resulted in mounting and coordinated free world pressure against the enemy's activity in the coastal plain.

Fifty-eight large unit operations of this coastal campaign thus far in 1967 have resulted in 5,350 enemy troops confirmed killed, another 549 captured and 898 weapons seized. Small unit patrols, ambushes, and search and destroy operations have accounted for another 5,239 killed. These and related data are displayed on the following page.


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
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III MAF OPERATIONS IN THE I CTZ COASTAL PLAIN 1 AUGUST 1966 TO 31 JULY 1967


SMALL UNIT PATROLS, AMBUSHES
AND SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS




LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS*



ENEMY KILLED BY SMALL UNIT PATROLS, AMBUSHES
AND SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS



ENEMY KILLED BY LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS*



* Figures do not include 19 Large Unit Operations and 7,458 enemy killed in DMZ area since July 1966.

The significance of those companion large and small unit campaigns becomes clear when they are viewed in relation to the current enemy effort in the coastal plain, his failure to defeat the GVN RD program there, and the price he is paying in attempting to do so.

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Late in 1966, the enemy began to introduce substantially larger numbers of NVA troops in an effort to strengthen his eroding infrastructure and to defeat the GVN Revolutionary Development program. Since that time he has been willing to accept large losses in the DMZ region in order to draw free world forces away from support of the Revolutionary Development program in the coastal plain. He has so far lost an estimated 10,400 troops near the DMZ in 1967 in order to kill 980 free world troops and to occupy the attention of as many as 15 free world battalions.

The cumulative effects of these losses, plus the large and small operations in the coastal plain, are apparent in prisoner interrogation reports gathered during June and July, which underscore enemy problems derived from shortages of personnel, food, and equipment. Typical reactions of returnees, ralliers, and POW's are shown below:

-Phan Van Tin, a fourteen year old NVA who surrendered under Chieu Hoi in July, stated that he received orders to report for induction at age thirteen. All of the men of his village between the ages of twenty and thirty had already been drafted and all boys who were fourteen or near fourteen were drafted with him.

-Hoang Van Minh, a fourteen year old squad leader with the 72nd VC Battalion, who rallied at Que Son, stated morale in his unit was low, as most personnel were forcibly inducted.

-MSgt Dao Van Ho, a Chieu Hoi returnee in June, stated that his unit, the 60th Battalion, 1st Regiment, lost over two hundred killed and many weapons during April-June. He further reported that all battalions of the regiment were so understrength that they are referred to as "reinforced companies."

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-Tran Manh Giang, of the 3d NVA Division, stated that he was drafted, along with two hundred men from his street in Nam Dinh (NVN), and that the only way to be exempt from the draft was to be minus a limb, have a serious disease, or weigh less than 50 kilos.

-Tran Van Cuu, a squad leader with C-19B Sapper Company, who gave himself up to the Mo Duc National Police in mid-June, stated that he was forcibly inducted, along with ten other youths from his hamlet.

-Nguyen Truong Hung, a NVA 2d Lt returnee, stated that his unit had suffered 30% battle casualties and that the attrition rate during infiltration was high, due to malaria. No replacements had been received since arrival in RVN and the unit will not conduct joint operations with local VC units, due to low VC morale.

-Dinh Van Binh, a Chieu Hoi returnee from the 48th VC Battalion in Quang Ngai, reported that his unit's strength was down to seven men per squad. Morale was low because of a lack of food and the necessity of remaining constantly on the move.

-Tran Thu, a NVA private captured north of Hue, stated that his company had only 85 men, because of casualties and desertions. Morale was low because there was no other food available to supplement a meager rice ration and eighteen soldiers from his battalion had defected in the past two months.

-Duong Tung, a local VC returnee in Gio Linh, stated that the morale of the local VC is very low due to forced induction of many of them.

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-Do Van Bach, a NVA soldier captured by 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, stated that his unit (K-4 Bn) numbers only 4-7 men per squad, and that morale is low because most of the personnel were drafted.

These conditions were brought about partly by the bombing of infiltration routes and supply points outside RVN, and partly by the large losses the enemy suffered near the DMZ. But a substantial share of the enemy's difficulties in I CTZ have been caused by the combination of large and small unit operations in the coastal plain, conducted by III MAF and the ARVN to defeat the enemy's major effort against the RD program.

This is an effort which the enemy is continuing to pursue, despite the cost. Its progressive development and present status can be traced in the shifting patterns of enemy activity, particularly in attacks during past months. A detailed, province-by-province inspection of those patterns is presented on the following pages.


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Quang Nam Province

The graph below displays the pace of enemy activity, measured in number of attacks since July 1966, and distinguishes between attacks by fire (artillery, mortars or rocket) and attacks employing troops.



On this graph, the generally level monthly enemy attack rate is apparent through end-1966. The sharp rise in January marks the beginning of the enemy's accelerated campaign against the RD program, coinciding with his intensified activity near the DMZ, which is evident on the chart relating to Quang Tri province, at the end of this section.

The drop in April and subsequent months coincides with the arrival of the nine US Army battalions of Task Force Oregon, which freed five Marine battalions in the Chu Lai area for operations in southern Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces.

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Of particular note on the chart on the preceding page is the red shaded portion, which displays the number of enemy attacks by mortars or rockets only, without ground follow-up. The relatively small number of these attacks is deceptive. Danang and Marble Mountain airfields present attractive targets for enemy mortar or rocket attacks, such as the one on the night of 14-15 July against Danang, and a limited number of attacks can cause considerable damage. As pointed out elsewhere in this report, such attacks remain an enemy capability, and even the most rapid reaction will not stop the attack. This can only be accomplished by improved intelligence, realized mainly through the Revolutionary Development program, a fact which the enemy recognizes.

US intelligence field evaluations, collected in June and July, underscore this fact and point out enemy concern over Revolutionary Development progress. One such report states, in part, "...VC problems were in replacing local support in the face of RD successes in winning support of the population... VC policy in Quang Nam province remains directed against Government of Vietnam programs - specifically, Revolutionary Development and the September elections and against Allied military forces...."

The locations of recent enemy attacks in the populated region around Danang, such as Hoi An, the province capital, around Que Son, a district headquarters and RD center, and throughout the villages where Danang's RD effort is focused, make clear the anti-RD orientation of the enemy military effort. The map on the following page reflects this.


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LOCATION OF ENEMY ATTACKS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE: 1 JAN - 31 JUL 1967

Quang Ngai Province

Quang Ngai province, especially the coastal region south of Quang Ngai city, has been for many years a traditional Viet Cong stronghold. Some steps had been taken by III MAF to improve the security in that area so that Revolutionary Development could move ahead. 3,135 enemy had been killed there in 24 III MAF large unit operations in 1965 and 1966 and, beginning in December 1966, a battalion-size outpost was established near Nui Dau in an effort to maintain a level of friendly presence in the area. In general, however, III MAF troop shortages and pressing combat commitments elsewhere had prevented full development of the area.

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
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When the enemy accelerated his campaign at the end of last year and increased sharply his rate of attack, the thinly spread III MAF resources were insufficient to turn the offensive, and the 1966 trend toward gradually diminishing enemy activity was reversed. December saw the beginning of a rising rate of enemy attacks. In March there were twenty-three enemy attacks in this area (mostly on Vietnamese civilians and Regional and Popular Forces), a figure more than three times as great as his average monthly rate since mid-1966.

In April, COMUSMACV assigned six US Army battalions to III MAF, followed by three more in May. The results of this reinforcement of III MAF were almost immediately apparent, not only in the southern Quang Ngai coastal region, where the newly arrived Army battalions had taken over the Marine program of small unit operations, but in Quang Tin and Quang Nam provinces, which had been reinforced by Marines who were relieved by Army troops. This sequence of events can be seen in the graph below, and in those graphs describing enemy activities in Quang Nam and Quang Tin.


ENEMY ATTACKS IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE 1 JULY 1966 - 31 JULY 1967

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The general pattern of enemy attacks in Quang Ngai province makes clear their anti-RD orientation. The map below shows the locations of the attacks in Quang Ngai thus far in 1967, with each major grouping identified by the nature of the target.

LOCATION OF ENEMY ATTACKS IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE: 1 JAN - 31 JUL 1967



Additional US intelligence field reports illuminate the situation in which the enemy now finds himself in Quang Ngai, both as a result of his own heightened effort and as a result of the heavy pounding to which he has been subjected over the past few months. The following excerpts are pertinent:

- "Since April 1967, operations of Allied forces in southern Quang Ngai province have caused heavy casualties

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among the Viet Cong forces, especially local force companies. The remnants of district guerrilla units have required augmentation by new recruits in order to continue effective operation...."

"...Units are being commanded and instructed by trusted party cadres in an effort to prevent widespread desertion. This policy appears to be in use among guerrilla units throughout the province."

"In the southern part of Quang Ngai province, US forces were engaged in annihilating VC troop concentration areas and safe havens, destroying many regular and local guerrilla units. These operations have liberated many persons who have been under VC control for a long time and have now provided a degree of security for them...."

"...The casualty rate among VC forces has increased during June, creating manpower shortages which have not been remedied. The primary VC effort is to cling to the people for support and to disperse the provincial battalion level units and the district company level units."

The broad orientation of enemy effort, and an insight into enemy intentions, are found in his cadre training programs. Those programs in Quang Ngai include courses and meetings addressed to methods of inducing the people to oppose the GVN RD program, instructions for attacks on police forces and on New Life Hamlets, and means of obtaining counterattack fund contributions. Language classes are being conducted in both English and Korean for students ranging from thirteen to thirty-five years of age, for use in the collection of information and in terrorism against American and ROK troops.

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
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Quang Tin Province

The graph below displays the general pattern of enemy attack activity in the province since mid-1966.

ENEMY ATTACKS IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE 1 JULY 1966 - 31 JULY 1967



It is evident that the monthly enemy attack rate in Quang Tin increased markedly in January, generally matching the conditions throughout I CTZ. However, unlike Quang Nam and Quang Ngai, where the rate continued to rise until April, the pace of enemy attacks in Quang Tin dropped sharply in February, but has continued since that time at a rate slightly higher than 1966. Overall, however, the level of enemy activity in Quang Tin is considerably lower than in any other provinces of I CTZ.

The reason for the recession of enemy activity after the initial surge in January can be attributed to the movements in December of a Marine battalion into the heart of that area, near Nui Loc Son and Viet An, the subsequent vigorous small

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unit counterguerrilla operations carried out there by the Marine units, and the heavy losses suffered by the enemy in that region in April and May (1,842 confirmed killed).

The result is that the enemy in Quang Tin is experiencing acute troop shortages. A recent U.S. intelligence field report describes this situation as follows:

"VC problems in Quang Tin are mainly in the manpower category. Recent allied operations in the province have caused heavy losses not yet replaced either through recruitment of new personnel or from outside replacements, despite the fact that one full regiment has recently moved into the province. Morale continues to be low due to illness and lack of medicines for treatment and, because there is no leave policy for the soldiers, they are constantly on the alert, both day and night."

Overall enemy policy in Quang Tin has remained much the same for the past several months. An intelligence field report describes it as follows:


"During the month of July 1967 Viet Cong policy in Quang Tin province generally was one of watching and waiting, and digging in and training. A primary goal remained the disruption of the Revolutionary Development program by attacks on RD teams and New Life Hamlets and by assassination and kidnappings of Government of Vietnam officials, and RD workers. Another prime VC target was the disruption of provincial lines of communication, with emphasis placed on National Highway 1 and the bridges along it. There was also an increase in rice seizures and tax collections. Because of military setbacks the VC began to organize many demolition and suicide teams for use in Tam Ky, the province capital. These teams are to be targeted against GVN administrative agencies and personnel."

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This policy is reflected in the locations and targets of enemy attacks. The strong anti-RD orientation is apparent: 30 out of 43 attacks through July were against RD teams, or Regional or Popular Forces troops which provide the main security elements of the RD program. Altogether, in 1967, 70% of the enemy attacks in Quang Tin have been directed against such targets. All except 5 of the remaining 13 were mortar attacks which involved no maneuver of troops. The map below provides an overview of the general pattern of enemy attacks in 1967.

LOCATION OF ENEMY ATTACKS IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE: 1 JAN - 31 JUL 1967



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
Thua Thien

Although March, April and May were months of increased enemy attack activity in Thua Thien, the intensification of this activity was not as great as in the other provinces of I CTZ.

Noteworthy in the enemy pattern of attacks has been the increased use of mortars. From the enemy standpoint, this is entirely rational, since these attacks can often be carried out with less risk, and only a few troops.

The graph below displays the level of monthly enemy attacks since mid-1966. The relatively constant rate of attacks by troops is apparent, as is the rise in the number of mortar attacks, which make up the greater share of the increased level of enemy effort in Thua Thien.

ENEMY ATTACKS IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE 1 JULY 1966 - 31 JULY 1967



Except for two mortar attacks on the Phu Bai perimeter, there was little enemy offensive activity near the

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
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Marine area in the first six months of the year. The city of Hue, however, was attacked on three occasions by mortars, and on one occasion was subjected to a raid.

Like his activity elsewhere in I CTZ, the enemy effort in Thua Thien was directed toward targets related to the Revolutionary Development program. The general nature of these targets, and their locations, are displayed on the map below.

LOCATION OF ENEMY ATTACKS IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE : 1 JAN - 31 JUL 1967



Quang Tri Province

The pattern of enemy activity in Quang Tri province in 1967 is distinctly different from that in any other province in I CTZ.


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In northern Quang Tri, and nearby in North Vietnam and Laos, the enemy has concentrated almost three divisions of North Vietnamese troops. His aim is to utilize the sanctuary to a maximum, forcing combat under conditions most favorable to himself, and drawing free world forces away from support of Revolutionary Development in the other provinces. This has been discussed in detail elsewhere in this issue and in other reports of this series. One aspect, however, which invites attention at this time is the large number of artillery, mortar and rocket attacks against free world forces. Of the 170 enemy attacks since 1 January 1967, 134, or 79%, have been attacks by fire. This is portrayed on the chart below.

ENEMY ATTACKS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE 1 JULY 1966 - 31 JULY 1967



Although the enemy devoted some attention to friendly personnel and facilities related to the RD program, by far the greater share of his effort was directed toward regular military units. The map on the following page makes this distribution clear.


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LOCATION OF ENEMY ATTACKS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE: 1 JAN - 31 JUL 1967



In sum, the enemy military campaign to defeat the RD program made headway during the spring and early summer. However, in the past two months the combined friendly counter-guerrilla and large unit efforts have increased in tempo and effectiveness to the point where the enemy effort is registering little success, and the RD program is now moving ahead slowly.

Detailed progress in the RD area during July is discussed in the following section.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

The modest resurgence of the Revolutionary Development program in I Corps, which first was noted in June, continued during July. Slight, but perceptible, advances were evident in the III MAF areas or in regions where III MAF operations are being conducted, especially in the Duc Pho area of southern Quang Ngai, where the continued presence of Task Force Oregon units has resulted in measurable gains. Forty GVN Revolutionary Development Teams completed the political, social, and economic development programs in their assigned hamlets and either had moved on to other hamlets, to begin the process anew, or were preparing to move. ARVN units assigned to the support of the RD program showed increasing effectiveness in their operations. And, during the month, 224 of the enemy defected in I Corps, which raised to 1,504 the number of defectors thus far in 1967 - a 62% increase over the comparable period last year.

Pacification Progress in III MAF Areas

During July, thirty-one villages in the Danang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai areas registered gains on the III MAF RD evaluation scale. At the same time, twenty-one villages showed small drops - due principally to increased enemy activity in those villages. Overall, the population in areas considered secure (60% or higher on the III MAF evaluation scale) remained the same as in June - 646,000 persons.

The detailing, in these reports, of RD progress in the III MAF areas, to the seeming exclusion of progress in other parts of I Corps, is not meant to imply that there is no Revolutionary Development progress

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except in the III MAF areas. Revolutionary Development is a GVN program, and progress at varying rates is being made by GVN units in areas where their efforts are focused. However, III MAF can only report authoritatively on those villages where its RD effort is concentrated and where, through its own command structure, it is competent to assess progress or the lack thereof.

This III MAF assessment, it will be recalled, is performed monthly, on a village-by-village basis, so that trends, progress, and regression can be measured on a regular basis. The measurement system has as its basis the evaluation of a detailed list of RD indices, which were selected to give a balanced reflection of all the key elements related to RD progress. The evaluation is accomplished through the repetitive, direct observation of a village by Marines; it is not dependent on data submitted by ARVN or GVN administrative personnel. The detailed list of indices is displayed on the next page. It is followed by maps portraying the status of each of the three III MAF areas, and specific examination of nine key indices.

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
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT INDICES

	POINTS
1. DESTRUCTION OF ORGANIZED VC MILITARY FORCES	
a. VC local/main force units destroyed or driven out	15
b. GVN/FWMAF capable of defending the area	5
TOTAL	20
2. DESTRUCTION OF VC INFRASTRUCTURE	
a. Census completed	2
b. VC infrastructure discovered and destroyed or neutralized	8
c. GVN intelligence network established	5
d. Census grievance teams completed interviewing each family	2
e. Principal grievances processed	3
TOTAL	20
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL SECURITY	
a. Defense plans completed	2
b. Defense construction completed	3
c. Local defense forces trained and in place	12
d. Communications established with supporting unit	3
TOTAL	20
4. ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT	
a. Village chief and council elected and functioning	4
b. Village chief lives and sleeps in the village	3
c. Hamlet chiefs and councils elected and functioning	4
d. Hamlet chiefs live and sleep in the hamlet	4
e. Psyops and public information services established	3
f. Village statutes enacted	1
g. Village social and administrative organization completed	1
TOTAL	20
5. COMPLETION OF INITIAL NEW LIFE HAMLET PROGRAMS	
a. Necessary public health works, required to meet initial needs of populace, completed	4
b. Necessary educational requirements, to satisfy initial needs, have been met	4
c. Necessary agricultural works completed	4
d. Adequate ground transportation into and out of the area has been established	4
e. Necessary markets established	4
TOTAL	20
MAXIMUM POINTS	100

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - DANANG AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUL-66	JAN-67	JUL-67	JUL-66	JAN-67	JUL-67	JUL-66	JAN-67	JUL-67
Under 20%	650	648	654	94,735	138,869	204,889	40	33	46
20%	93	49	103	62,386	76,385	69,009	20	17	16
40%	114	102	60	100,182	91,421	50,534	19	18	11
60%	52	94	59	54,988	85,051	83,434	11	17	15
80%	90	106	172	338,785	347,711	406,361	14	19	24
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	999	999	1,048*	651,076	739,437	814,227*	104	104	112*

*Reflects minor realignment of area to coincide with GVN administrative boundaries.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - CHU LAI AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUL-66	JAN-67	JUL-67	JUL-66	JAN-67	JUL-67	JUL-66	JAN-67	JUL-67
Under 20%	341	164	220	88,125	71,953	92,825	28	20	23
20%	20	101	67	16,508	48,314	30,639	3	10	6
40%	28	49	68	23,663	32,373	51,982	4	6	7
60%	37	85	93	20,773	41,705	48,083	4	7	10
80%	33	133	85	24,926	75,736	55,032	6	14	11
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	459	532	533*	174,015	270,081	278,561*	45	57	57

*Reflects minor realignment of area to coincide with GVN administrative boundaries.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - PHU BAI AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUL-66	JAN-67	JUL-67	JUL-66	JAN-67	JUL-67	JUL-66	JAN-67	JUL-67
Under 20%	49	40	41	10,381	10,381	11,199	11	11	11
20%	49	42	17	18,573	9,524	3,585	3	2	1
40%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
60%	8	24	76	5,296	14,345	35,259	1	2	5
80%	56	56	28	—	33,787	17,994	7	7	5
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	162	162	162	68,037	68,037	68,037	22	22	22

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN III MAF AREAS



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UNCLASSIFIEDProgress Outside the Primary RD Areas

In addition to the three primary RD areas near Danang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai, III MAF also is able to measure the RD status of regions where friendly forces are in a semi-permanent status, such as the DMZ region and in southern Quang Ngai.

-Northern I CTZ

Although Marines in the DMZ region are concerned primarily with combat operations against the large NVN forces based in the DMZ sanctuary area, the GVN RD program is being supported by both military and civic action operations. Offensive operations in the vicinity of the RD priority areas have assisted the ARVN in limiting enemy incursions into the priority areas and have enhanced security. Civic action operations in the DMZ region are typified by the program pursued by the 3d Marines in the vicinity of Camp Carroll, which resulted in over 3,000 civilians receiving medical treatment and 8,600 meals during July. Another example of the civic action program was found in the recently constructed brick factory at Cam Lo. The factory, constructed as a joint Vietnamese/Marine effort, exhibits the resurgence of industry in the area, provides employment for refugees and produces construction material for community self-help projects.

These operations have produced signs of modest progress in pacification in the DMZ region.

-Two additional hamlet chiefs now remain in their hamlets overnight.

-Security has improved in two other villages, to the extent that local chiefs and governing councils were

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installed in office following free elections. Nine out of thirteen villages in the Dong Ha-Khe Sanh area now have elected officials in office.

-A census was initiated in another village as a population control measure aimed at eliminating the VC infrastructure. In all, nine villages have begun censuses.

-Another village began to develop plans for local defense, and one other village completed defensive works, raising to nine the number of villages in the Dong Ha-Khe Sanh area developing local defense plans or having completed defensive installations.


The RD status of villages measured in the DMZ area is depicted on the map on the following page.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN NORTHERN I CTZ



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	OCT-66	JAN-67	JUL-67	OCT-66	JAN-67	JUL-67	OCT-66	JAN-67	JUL-67
Under 20%	—	—	68	—	—	9,236	—	—	4
20%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
40%	—	21	21	—	1,793	1,793	—	1	1
60%	102	119	81	19,014	19,884	19,058	6	7	7
80%	10	23	19	10,799	13,654	12,576	2	3	2
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	112	163	189	28,813	35,331	42,663	8	11	14

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-Southern Quang Ngai Province

Progress also has been visible in the Duc Pho region of southern Quang Ngai province, where Task Force Oregon has been operating since late April. In this area, the situation is considerably different from that at the DMZ, where the presence of a strong enemy force, operating from a sanctuary only a few miles distant, weighs against the permanence of any progress that is achieved.

In southern Quang Ngai, the enemy, although in one of his traditional strongholds, has long lines of communications, finds it more difficult to replace his losses, has no immediate sanctuary to which he can retreat, and, if he is to interfere with RD, must move about in the open where he is subject to attack. Conditions in the coastal plain around Duc Pho, therefore, do not favor the enemy as they do near the DMZ, and progress, once achieved, can be made more permanent. Among the gains noted in this region during July were these:

- One additional village completed a local census.
- Defensive plans were completed in another village.
- An active and continuing psychological operations service, designed to gain the willing support of the populace for the GVN, was established in another village.
- Three Revolutionary Development Teams assigned to Duc Pho District were able to concentrate on their primary mission, free of enemy interference, to the extent that 80% of their hamlet development programs were completed.

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-Two new schools were being built and three other schools were renovated, all as self-help projects.

-Route 1 was opened from Duc Pho to the II CTZ border. The highway now is open throughout the entire length of I Corps.

These signs of progress, and others related to the III MAF evaluation scale, evidence the important, first steps toward progress in southern I Corps.


The status of villages in this area at the end of July is depicted on the following page.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS - DUC PHO AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES		CIVILIAN POPULATION		VILLAGES	
	MAR-67	JUL-67	MAR-67	JUL-67	MAR-67	JUL-67
Under 20%	—	—	—	—	—	—
20%	43	36	32,799	26,215	6	5
40%	—	72	—	40,326	—	6
60%	—	9	—	5,691	—	2
80%	—	5	—	7,133	—	1
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	43	122	32,799	79,365*	6	14

*Population figures reflect revised census.


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By the end of the month, twenty-eight I Corps RD Teams had completed their political, social, and economic development programs in their assigned hamlets and had been moved to new locales, there to repeat the same process. In those hamlets where the teams' work is completed, hamlet chiefs have been elected, the VC infrastructure diminished, self-defensive measures initiated, and schools constructed. In essence, the VC hold over the hamlets has been broken. Twelve other teams also had completed their programs, but had not yet been relocated. Of the remaining seventy-nine RD Teams, fifty-one had completed over 70% of their projects.


Portrayed below are the locations of those hamlets where RD Teams have completed their tasks, and the hamlets to which teams have been relocated.

RD TEAM PROGRESSDECLASSIFIED
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The enemy's concern over the accomplishments of the RD Teams is evidenced by the fact that he continues to expend great effort against them. In July there were thirty-three incidents directed against RD Teams, a number which equals last month's record high. For the third straight month, however, casualties among team members declined, from a high of eighty-two in April to twenty-eight in July, reflecting improvement in security enjoyed by the teams.

The graphs below show the rising number of enemy incidents against RD Teams, and the comparative decline of team casualties.



ARVN Contributions to RD Progress

The decline in RD Team casualties can be attributed, in part, to the growing effectiveness of

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GVN forces committed to the support of the RD program. At the end of July, fourteen ARVN battalions, one Regional Force Battalion, twenty-nine RF companies and 201 Popular Force platoons were assigned to this role.

ARVN forces in support of RD conducted seven large unit operations in the RD Priority Areas, accounting for 295 VC killed and 35 captured. This raises the total number of large unit ARVN operations in the priority areas to 51 for the year, in which some 2,000 VC were killed and over 300 captured. Noteworthy among the operations during July was Lam Son 79, conducted in the Quang Tri Province Priority Area on 8-9 July. This operation - which included RF participation - netted 201 VC killed, 11 VC captured, and 100 weapons captured. Proximate to the RD Priority Areas, Operation Lam Son 87 was conducted twelve miles northeast of Hue. This operation not only produced excellent results in terms of enemy losses - 252 VC killed, eighteen captured, and fifty-four weapons captured - but also resulted in the relocation of 5,500 villagers to more fertile farmland in more secure areas.

During July, ARVN units demonstrated a growing awareness of the importance of establishing rapport with the civil populace, as evidenced by their construction of three schools, 550 individual dwellings, five wells, five bridges and two churches. In addition, ARVN medical teams administered 4,000 immunizations and trained six village health workers. Commodities distributed included 400 pounds of clothing, 3,000 pounds of food, and 15,000 pounds of fertilizer.

Psychological Operations

Psychological operations in I CTZ remained at a high level during July, with more than 100 million leaflets distributed, 1,502 aerial and ground broadcasts made and 437 plays and films presented.

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
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This effort is aimed at complementing the constant pressure exerted on the enemy by the tactical operations of III MAF, GVN and other free world forces. The success of the psyops campaign is reflected in the increasing number of enemy defectors. In July, 224 enemy or their supporters defected, raising to 1,504 the number of Chieu Hoi who have rallied in 1967 - a 62% increase over the comparable period last year.

One recently initiated outgrowth of the Chieu Hoi program is known as Doan Ket. Whereas the Chieu Hoi psychological effort is aimed at causing the enemy rank and file to rally, the Doan Ket program is targeted upon the middle and higher enemy echelons. It extends an offer of full citizenship - including the right to vote and hold public office - to those who respond. During July, III MAF support for Doan Ket included dissemination of 15 million leaflets and over 325 hours of broadcasts. It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the program.

The growing number of Chieu Hoi returnees since July 1966 is portrayed graphically below.

CHIEU HOI RETURNEES



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Combined Action Program

Two Combined Action Group headquarters and two Combined Action company headquarters were activated in July. In addition, a pilot project for the expanded employment of the company headquarters was undertaken.

The activation of the Group headquarters at Phu Bai and Chu Lai and the two new company headquarters at Danang will improve control of Combined Action platoons in those areas and will provide for coordinated logistic support and more effective training. One other Group headquarters was organized at Danang in June and plans call for another in Dong Ha shortly.

Another measure instituted to improve coordination and control of Combined Action units was undertaken during July in Dien Ban district, south of Danang. There, Combined Action Company D has been tasked with serving as a coordination center for the Combined Action units in the district to insure that their activities are effectively related to those of RD Teams, Popular Force elements, and ARVN and Marine units in the district. Areas in which coordination will be accomplished are fire support, Revolutionary Development, and intelligence gathering.

As of the end of July, there were 1,384 Marines and US Navy Corpsmen and 2,001 Popular Forces personnel in the CA program.


The number of platoons in being at end-July was 75, the same as for the two previous months, and the program is falling behind in its progress toward 114 platoons by end-1967. The deficiency is due, in part, to a shortage of available Popular Forces, but is attributed mainly to a lack of Marine personnel to man the new units. Approval of additional Marines for the program has been pending since April.

Locations of CA units are portrayed on the following page.


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
DISTRIBUTION OF COMBINED ACTION UNITS




DANANG			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
GROUP HQ	1	61	0
COMPANY HQ	5	41	0
PLATOONS	37	491	897
TOTAL STRENGTH		593	897



CHU LAI			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
GROUP HQ	1	44	0
COMPANY HQ	3	60	0
PLATOONS	15	228	519
TOTAL STRENGTH		332	519



PHU BAI			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
GROUP HQ	1	46	0
COMPANY HQ	2	17	4
PLATOONS	14	235	351
TOTAL STRENGTH		298	355



DONG HA/KHE SANH			
UNIT	NUMBER	STRENGTH	
		USMC	RVN
GROUP HQ	—	—	—
COMPANY HQ	2	17	0
PLATOONS	9	144	230
TOTAL STRENGTH		161	230

LEGEND

- * GROUP HQ
- ★ COMPANY HQ
- PLATOON

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BASE DEFENSE

Shortly after midnight on 15 July, the enemy attacked Danang Air Base with 122mm surface to surface rockets. Although the firing positions were discovered immediately and taken under air and artillery attack, the enemy's first volley was sufficiently accurate to cause heavy damage to facilities and aircraft at the base.

Launching sites for the attack were located in Hoa Hung village, which lies six miles southwest of Danang. The rockets were fired from a standard, seven foot long, rail type launcher mounted on a tripod. The 122mm rocket is seventy-six inches long, weighs 100-120 pounds, can reach a maximum range of 12,000 meters, and has a bursting radius of thirty meters. It is a high trajectory weapon, capable of being emplaced in virtually any position that would accommodate a mortar. The firing position, launcher, and rocket can be prepared for firing in less than thirty minutes.

All the firing positions used in the 15 July attack were proximate to hamlets or friendly military units - a choice probably made to deter retaliation. One launch site, for example, was in a small hamlet, within 250 meters of a Popular Forces post at the district headquarters; another was within the outer edge of an extensive defense complex, in which over 5,000 men were actively engaged, at the moment of the attack, in seeking to prevent it.







The extent of the coordinated anti-rocket security effort is portrayed graphically in the series of maps on the next two pages.

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
SECURITY SITUATION, DANANG AREA, NIGHT OF 14-15 JULY
























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SECURITY SITUATION, DANANG AREA, NIGHT OF 14-15 JULY



LEGEND

- | | |
|---|--|
|  ROCKET LAUNCH SITES |  POPULAR FORCES PLATOON |
|  IMPACT POINTS |  COMBINED ACTION PLATOON |
|  12,000m MAXIMUM RANGE OF 122mm ROCKET |  ARTILLERY POSITION |
|  MARINE REGIMENTAL COMMAND POST |  TANK POSITION |
|  MARINE BATTALION COMMAND POST |  ARMORED AMPHIBIAN PLATOON POSITION |
|  MARINE COMPANY COMMAND POST |  OBSERVATION POST, OBSERVATION TOWER,
LISTENING POST, OR SECURITY/OBSERVATION POST |
|  MARINE PLATOON COMMAND POST |  SEARCHLIGHT POSITION |
|  ARVN REGIMENTAL COMMAND POST |  DAY OR NIGHT PATROL ROUTE |
|  ARVN BATTALION COMMAND POST |  DAY OR NIGHT AMBUSH SITE |
|  REGIONAL FORCES COMPANY |  HELICOPTER ALERT AIRCRAFT |
|  FIXED-WING ALERT AIRCRAFT | |

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The foregoing charts reflect that some 5,000 Marines, plus half that many Vietnamese military, were at large and busily engaged in seeking to prevent what happened.

That the attack could be carried out in the face of this friendly activity underscores the gravity of the problem which, simply stated, is to prevent the launching of rockets, whose emplacement takes less than thirty minutes, from any given point in an area of two hundred square miles, and in which over 300,000 people live. The problem is complicated by the geography of the area, which affords the enemy many excellent firing positions and multiple access routes which are reasonably near to North Vietnam; a population which cannot yet be counted on to report the enemy's intentions because of the fear of enemy reprisal and uncertainty over long-term friendly presence in the area; the size and vulnerability of the target itself; and the simplicity of the enemy's weapons system. The same factors affect III MAF's task of defending five other critical air bases in the I Corps area.


Response to the enemy's first volley on 15 July was swift. Almost instantly, a number of friendly units reported the firing and, within three minutes after the rockets were launched, an airborne Air Force alert plane attacked the launch sites. Likewise within three minutes, Marine artillery had accurately located the enemy's firing positions and, two minutes later, both the launch sites and the enemy's probable escape routes were taken under heavy artillery attack. These and other activities by friendly units in reaction to the attack are detailed graphically on the following page.

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SIGNIFICANT EVENTS, DANANG AREA, NIGHT OF 14-15 JULY



TIME	EVENT
① 0025	ENEMY FIRES 122mm ROCKETS AT DANANG AIR BASE.
② 0025	FLASHES AT ROCKET LAUNCH SITES OBSERVED BY AIRBORNE ALERT AIRCRAFT, ARTILLERY OBSERVATION POSTS AND LISTENING POSTS.
③ 0025	MARINE ARTILLERY ALERTED. MARINE HELICOPTERBORNE FORCE ALERTED. MARINE NIGHT RADAR BOMBING AIRCRAFT ALERTED.
④ 0028	ARTILLERY DETERMINES LOCATION OF ROCKET LAUNCH SITES. AIRBORNE AIR FORCE ALERT PLANE ATTACKS LAUNCH SITES.
⑤ 0030	ADDITIONAL UNITS REPORT LOCATIONS OF ENEMY LAUNCH SITES. ENEMY LAUNCH SITES ILLUMINATED. AIRBORNE ALERT AIRCRAFT TAKES SITES UNDER FIRE. TWO ARTILLERY BATTERIES FIRE ON LAUNCH SITES.
⑥ 0035	ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY FIRES ON LAUNCH SITES.
⑦ 0040	TANKS FIRE ON LAUNCH SITES.
⑧ 0100-0306	ARTILLERY SHIFTS FIRES FROM LAUNCH SITES AND FIRES ON ENEMY'S PROBABLE ESCAPE ROUTES.
⑨ 0100-0600	RADAR CONTROLLED AIR STRIKES DROP 45,500 LBS. OF BOMBS ON ENEMY'S PROBABLE ESCAPE ROUTES.

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
Reaction to the attack could not have been much more prompt. Plainly, where the improvement needs to be made is in the information-gathering program in the villages, so that III MAF or GVN authorities will have warning of the enemy's intentions, not at the last, pre-firing minute, but in sufficient time for the attack to be thwarted. To this end, III MAF has intensified its intelligence effort. Much of this effort is centered on increased Revolutionary Development activities in areas the enemy probably would use in making an attack. In addition, III MAF has increased by 40% the number of deep reconnaissance patrols along the enemy's approach routes and by 25% the number of patrols in or near probable launch sites; established or improved fourteen observation posts; and assigned three observation aircraft exclusively to rocket defense tasks.

In sum, however, the attack at Danang on 15 July illustrated that a small team of enemy troops with a well-executed plan, and willing to take the risk, can probably manage to launch an indirect fire type of attack against any of our facilities. Considering that even those attacks which cause little damage result in propaganda gains for the enemy, it is reasonable to expect that more attacks will be attempted in the future, and against bases other than Danang. Any one of the key installations shown on the following page is a worthwhile target.

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AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT MAJOR AIRFIELDS I CTZ AS OF 31 JUL 1967



* 60 Marine aircraft undergoing repair or maintenance out-of-country.

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AIR OPERATIONSFixed Wing

During July, Marine fixed wing aircraft flew 7,735 tactical sorties in I Corps Tactical Zone, North Vietnam, and in the Laotian panhandle. The effort in the latter two areas was aimed at stemming the enemy's intensified program of infiltrating men and material.

-South Vietnam

There were 6,625 in-country strike sorties, of which 5,670 were flown in direct response to requirements of maneuvering ground units. In-country operations were highlighted by the support given Operations Buffalo and Kingfisher, both of which were covered in detail in the Large Unit section. The former was supported by 941 support missions, in which every First Marine Aircraft Wing fighter-attack squadron participated. The Marine pilots dropped over one hundred eighty thousand pounds of ordnance within the initial fourteen hours of the engagement, resulting in sixty-five enemy killed and an additional fifty-five probably killed. Kingfisher was supported by 931 missions.

Other in-country sorties consisted of helicopter escort and reconnaissance missions. 236 escort sorties were flown, wherein fixed wing aircraft provided protective cover for helicopters. 172 photo, infrared and Side Looking Airborne Radar sorties were flown by RF-4B's, the reconnaissance version of the Phantom II, while 257 visual reconnaissance sorties were flown by O-1C aircraft.

Ordnance expenditures in-country included 11,602 tons of bombs, 2,624 napalm bombs, over six thousand 2.75 and 5 inch air to ground rockets, and over 219 thousand 20mm rounds. This represents an increase of over 2,700 tons of hard ordnance when compared with June.

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Results achieved by the Marine air effort in South Vietnam were substantial: 283 confirmed enemy killed, over sixteen hundred enemy structures destroyed, 241 secondary explosions and 173 secondary fires, giving evidence of enemy ammunition or POL caches being ignited, 605 bunkers destroyed, 211 road cuts made, and 103 gun positions destroyed. Other damage could not be confirmed, as much of the ordnance was delivered on enemy supply points, troop concentrations and gun positions at night or during periods of inclement weather when only a limited bomb damage assessment could be made. This is particularly true for Marine Air Support Radar Team controlled missions. In July, the five teams in I Corps controlled over 1500 fixed wing direct air support missions.

-North Vietnam and Laos

There were 1,110 sorties out of country, predominantly in North Vietnam. Included were 647 strike sorties by A-6A Intruders, F-4 Phantom II's, A-4E Skyhawks and F-8E Crusaders; 94 reconnaissance sorties by RF-4B's; and 369 electronic countermeasure flights by the EA-6A and EF-10B airplanes. This powerful effort, coupled with an even larger one by the USAF, was still not able completely to halt the heavy enemy southward movement of men and material, although it caused him heavy losses.

Over North Vietnam, A-6A Intruders, capable of carrying thirty 500 pound bombs, flew 239 sorties and delivered 1,191 tons of high explosives on approximately 360 enemy targets. All but three were flown at night and all but thirty, which were TPQ-10 controlled, were flown using the Digital Integrated Attack and Navigation Equipment. This system allows the aircraft to attack targets, stationary or moving, in level or mountainous terrain, under all weather conditions. A detailed description of the A-6A system is


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contained in the January edition of this series. Depicted below are the A-6A attacks throughout North Vietnam in July.

MARINE A-6A ATTACKS IN NORTH VIETNAM JULY 1967

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Electronic countermeasure support for the A-6A was provided by the EF-10B in the area just north of the DMZ, and by the newer EA-6A in the more northern regions. The A-6A and EA-6A have proven to be an effective team for attacking targets in North Vietnam under any conditions of weather and visibility. The EA-6A can detect and counter enemy surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft radars, thus denying the enemy a capability to oppose the A-6A's attack. Although both have the same basic airframe, the EA-6A does not carry a bomb load and therefore has greater endurance than the A-6A. This allows ECM coverage of the objective area prior to the arrival of the A-6A, and until it departs. The success of this team effort is evidenced by nightly attacks, with relatively little opposition, in areas of heavy surface-to-air missile and radar-directed antiaircraft artillery concentrations.

Twenty flights were flown into Laos in support of the Steel Tiger program, a decrease from previous months. The lowered rate of activity in Laos is due to the heavy commitment of aircraft to operations in the Demilitarized Zone and to the low ceilings and thunderstorm activity which prevailed over the infiltration routes in the Laotian highlands.

Enemy Missile Activity

During July the North Vietnamese continued to maintain a surface-to-air missile threat in the DMZ area, as evidenced by the firing of eleven SAM's during the month and the loss of a Marine A-4E on the night of 6 July, the second Marine aircraft lost thus far to an enemy surface-to-air missile. The pilot, after ejection, landed in the northern portion of the DMZ. Air cover was provided for the downed pilot throughout the night by Marine A-6A's and A-4E's and he was extracted the following morning.

Other signs of enemy missile activity included the sighting, through photographic interpretation, of missile transporters, and the intercepting of SAM associated

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electronic signals. To date, seven missile sites have been detected just north of the DMZ; four currently are carried in the enemy order of battle.

Marine Tactical Data System

During July, a milestone was passed when the Marine Tactical Data System (MTDS), located at Monkey Mountain, Danang, became operational and successfully interfaced with the Navy Tactical Data System aboard naval ships on Yankee Station. This continuous, twenty-four hour exchange of information is the first use of a real time tactical data link in an active combat environment.

Catapult Operations at Chu Lai

Since 15 July, the CE-1-3 catapult, newly positioned on the crosswind runway at Chu Lai, has launched 66 A-4E Skyhawks, 56 of these at gross weights of twenty-two thousand pounds. Use of the CE-1-3, coupled with the M-21 arresting gear, will insure that there is no degradation of launch or recovery operations during the monsoon season. The CE-1-3, powered by two modified J-79 jet engines, enables a fully combat loaded A-4 to become airborne within 1,000 feet, without ordnance load restrictions. With a well trained crew, aircraft can be launched every ninety seconds, and only two minutes are required to clear the runway for the recovery of aircraft.


Helicopter Operations

During the month, Marine helicopters flew 51,649 sorties, lifted 68,182 personnel and transported 6,894 tons of cargo in support of operations within I Corps. Of the totals, CH-53's of HMH-462 lifted over 56% of the cargo carried. CH-46's of HMM-164 and 262 lifted over 32% of the personnel transported. These totals reflect the continuous increase in helicopter operations since the fall of 1966, as shown on the following page.


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PERSONNEL TRANSPORTED BY HELICOPTER




CARGO LIFTED BY HELICOPTER



There were 355 Marine helicopters in Vietnam and with the two Marine Special Landing Forces at the end of July; of these, 218 were turbine powered. The increase in turbine powered helicopters, from thirty-five (or 16% of total assets) in January 1966, to a projected total of 265 (or 75% of assets) in March 1968 is displayed on the graph below.

INCREASE IN HELICOPTER STRENGTH




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Lift capabilities have correspondingly increased as more CH-46 and CH-53 turbine powered helicopters have arrived in-country. This is illustrated, in particular, by the CH-53, which can carry over 35 combat-loaded Marines or approximately 9,000 pounds of cargo, a capability nearly twice that of the CH-37, which it replaced. Below is a portrayal of the past and projected increase in the lift capabilities of Marine helicopters in Vietnam.

GROWTH OF HELICOPTER LIFT CAPABILITY



Aircraft Losses and Damage

-Fixed Wing

In addition to the loss of the A-4 to a surface to air missile, one F-4B and one F-8E were downed while on attack missions in northern Quang Tri province, bringing to fifty the number of jet fighter-attack aircraft lost due to enemy action since March 1965. In addition, 34 aircraft received combat damage during July as compared with 26 during June.

-Helicopters

Three helicopters were lost during the month, two CH-46's and one UH-34, as compared to seven in June,

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which brings the total lost to enemy ground fire since March 1965 to 103. There were also 102 helicopters damaged, 22 more than the preceding month. Over half of those hit by ground fire were damaged between ground level and 500 feet, in the critical phase of operating within a landing zone during troop, cargo and medical-evacuation lifts.

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LOGISTICSGeneral

Favorable weather conditions and continually improving logistic techniques enabled III MAF to provide uninterrupted service and support to tactical operations in July.

Supply

Class I - Sufficient stocks were on hand to support all operations.

Class II - The 3rd Force Service Regiment has been directed to ship 655 platform trucks (mechanical mules - M274A2) to the Force Logistic Command for issue to the 1st and 3rd Marine Division and the FLC. Repair parts for these vehicles are being air-shipped to RVN.

Class III - Stocks were adequate to support assigned tasks.

Class IV - Sufficient stocks were on hand to support all tactical operations.

Class V - A review of the projected WestPac stock level of 81mm HE munitions revealed a projected shortage during late September. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has been requested to issue shipping directives to alleviate this situation.

Aviation Logistics

The in-country calibration complex (ICE CUBE), established at Danang in April to test and repair calibration

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equipment, has thus far exceeded expectations. In June, 721 pieces of test equipment were calibrated or repaired, a level of accomplishment which continued until 15 July, when ICE CUBE received damage from the enemy rocket attack on Danang. Emergency repairs were accomplished and ICE CUBE should be operating at full capacity by 15 August 1967.

The Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) programs and repair of combat damaged aircraft continued at various aircraft plants in Japan. At the end of July, a total of sixty aircraft were out-of-country undergoing depot level maintenance, a reduction of fifteen from June.









	<u>PAR</u>	<u>Repair of Combat Damage</u>
A-4E	6	6
F-4B	5	1
F-8E	4	2
TF-9J	2	-
CH-46A	8	7
UH-1E	5	3
UH-34D	-	9
C-117D	-	1
CH-53	-	1

NORS/NORM data for July remained essentially unchanged from the preceding month. NORS/NORM rates for selected Marine aircraft in WestPac are displayed on the following page.

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NORS/NORM RATES-WESTPAC AIRCRAFT



* Readiness Objective not established

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To improve the NORS/NORM rates of specific aircraft, a number of actions have been taken.

- A-6A/EA-6A: A major problem regarding A-6A and EA-6A aircraft is the shortage of ground air conditioners. Two NR5B mobile air conditioners and six Stratos air cycle air conditioners have been shipped to the 1st MAW.

- RF-4B: Failures of the main landing gear strut assembly are primarily responsible for the high NORS rate. A modification is being made to the strut.

- O-1C: The procurement of the 540-2D engine will alleviate current shortages of engines and spare parts for this aircraft.

- CH-46A: The high failure rate of aft transmissions made the inspection of all aft transmissions necessary, and caused the replacement of additional transmissions which required repairs. Investigation of the high failure rate is continuing.

Medical

During the month, 1,739 patients were admitted to the Dong Ha, Phu Bai, Danang and Chu Lai medical facilities. Of these, battle injuries accounted for 689 direct admissions, non-battle injuries for 244 and diseases for 806. Also during the month, 608 patients were evacuated out-of-country, eight died in hospitals, 846 were returned to duty and 270 remained hospitalized.

Movements

During July, the following Marine units arrived in Vietnam: the 5th 155mm Gun Battery; detachments of the

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5th, 11th and 15th Interrogation-Translation Teams; 1st Platoon, 5th 8 inch Howitzer Battery and Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines.

Resupply

During July, the 3d FSR shipped 5,073 M/T of cargo to III MAF by MSTs. Although this is a decrease in the Okinawa-RVN route, there was a significant increase in CONUS-RVN shipments, in the amount of 36,083 M/T. July 1967 represented the largest amount of surface cargo (CONUS to RVN) received in-country since the buildup of forces commenced in March 1965.

Project HI ROLL

To expedite the movement of cargo, a pilot project, HI ROLL, has been developed. The program entails loading trailers at the point of origin and shipping them, via LST, direct to the consignee. After unloading, trailers are repacked with retrograde cargo and returned to the originator. The project is designed to expedite the movement of intra-theater cargo by accelerating loading and unloading time. In addition, cargo will receive increased in-transit and terminal security. The pilot program will commence 1 August. Initially, implementation of HI ROLL service will be from Okinawa to Danang and back to Okinawa, with possible later expansion to Chu Lai and Dong Ha.

Engineer Operations

Twenty-two miles of new road were constructed, the highest one month total to date. More than fifty-six miles of roadway were upgraded or constructed, with the shortage of crushed rock being the primary deterrent to more rapid progress. An additional 161 miles of road were maintained. In other areas of engineer activity, over 23 million

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gallons of potable water were produced and five wells drilled; fourteen bridges of various size were constructed, six were under construction and nine ferries and rafts were in operation.

Marine Corps Service Funded Military Assistance Programs

In FY 1967, the U.S. Marine Corps was assigned responsibility for service funding the Vietnamese Marine Corps (RVNMC) and all other allied Marines participating as Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) in Vietnam. Service funding, therefore, was provided the RVNMC and the 2d Brigade, Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC). Funds also were provided to support the reconstitution of equipment taken out-of-country by the Korean Marines and for additional costs incurred by the ROKMC in Korea to support the deployed 2d Brigade.

In August 1966 it was determined that all service funded support would be programmed under MAP procedures, even though materials and other support were to be provided through service channels.

A brief summary of the support programs for the RVNMC and 2d Brigade ROKMC follows:

- RVNMC

The material program supporting the RVNMC was assumed with certain exceptions. The only areas not supported by the Marine Corps, but nevertheless included in the program, were POL, ammunition and vehicle repair parts. These items were funded by the U S Army program, since they are drawn from the RVNAF logistic system by the RVNMC on an "as required" basis.

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- 2d Brigade ROKMC

The Brigade was deployed from II Corps to southern I Corps in September 1966, and thereafter was dependent upon the U S Marine Corps for logistic support. On 8 October, CMC provided funds and guidance for support of the Brigade, which resulted in establishing fiscal procedures and the dispatch of a liaison team from FLC to assist the Brigade in logistic matters. The Brigade actually arrived in I Corps with a shortage of combat essential equipment, and action was taken to eliminate the shortages. This program will continue during FY 68.

The figures below recapitulate the approximate dollar value of the service funded programs executed during FY 1967.

RVNMC	\$3.2 million
2d Brigade, ROKMC	\$32.6 million
Support in Korea	\$5.1 million

Ammunition Renovation

The effect of climatic conditions in RVN on ammunition is such that certain items are rendered unserviceable when stored over relatively long periods. To reduce the quantity of unserviceable ammunition on hand and to continue providing III MAF with a wide range of usable assets, a Mobile Ammunition Evaluation and Renovation Unit (MAERU) was established at the Force Logistic Command. This unit is comprised of civilian technicians, augmented by Marines, with the necessary equipment and components to identify and renovate unserviceable ammunition. To date, 350 tons of unserviceable ammunition have been segregated and eliminated.

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Dairy Products

Since March 1967, Marines in III MAF have been receiving recombined milk daily and ice cream every other day. The program has proven to be successful. The milk can be held for as long as seven days in an unfrozen state; it can be frozen and, if kept in that state, can be held almost indefinitely. Currently, troops at Dong Ha, Phu Bai, Khe Sanh, Danang, An Hoa and Chu Lai are receiving one pint of milk per day. Upon completion of the milk plant now being constructed at Chu Lai, this amount will increase to one and one-half pints per man daily.

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THE APPLICATION OF USMC AMPHIBIOUS
ORGANIZATION TO THE VIETNAM WAR

Since March 1965, when the 9th Marines landed at Danang, Marines have carried out 40 amphibious operations in Vietnam, killing 3,673 enemy troops, capturing 190, and seizing 295 weapons. These operations have broadened the effectiveness of other operating forces, by merging the flexibility and striking power of the amphibious task force with the tactical capabilities of units operating ashore, and thus meeting important tactical requirements which would otherwise have gone unfulfilled.

-In August of 1965, amphibious Operation Starlite enveloped an enemy force pinioned by other Marines ashore, and provided the key to the first successful large scale operation in Vietnam.

-In September of 1965, Operation Piranha, an amphibious landing, cut off the retreat of a large Viet Cong force fleeing from the advance of other Marine forces ashore.

-In December of 1965, in Operation Harvest Moon, the timely amphibious landing of a Marine battalion successfully blocked major elements of the 1st VC Regiment from escaping a trap formed by other Marine battalions maneuvering ashore.

-In January 1966, the largest amphibious operation of the war to that time, Double Eagle I, saw three Marine battalions, landing by helicopter and surface, outmaneuver Viet Cong forces at every turn in their traditional stronghold, southern Quang Ngai province.

-In September of 1966, a Marine amphibious operation in conjunction with Operation Prairie, surprised the enemy, striking a flank of a unit which threatened a friendly artillery position at Gio Linh and the Dong Ha base.

-In February of 1967, in amphibious Operation Deckhouse VI, a Marine Special Landing Force surprised the enemy,

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striking, without warning, the rear of enemy elements engaging other Marines of Operation Desoto.

-Two weeks after Deckhouse VI, the same Marine Special Landing Force, reembarked and refurbished, carried out another amphibious operation 200 miles to the north, complementing Operation Prairie in the DMZ area.

-In April of 1967, a Marine Special Landing Force was landed on brief notice, forty miles inland, to envelop enemy forces which were pressing outnumbered Marines engaged at hill 861 near Khe Sanh.

-In May of 1967, a Marine Special Landing Force made a surprise landing, and succeeded in intercepting North Vietnamese Army forces moving northward toward the Ben Hai River and North Vietnam.

Also in May, another Special Landing Force made an amphibious landing to intercept other North Vietnamese Army forces engaged with Marine units, before they fled to their sanctuary in North Vietnam.


-In June of 1967, a Marine battalion made an amphibious attack designed to drive a North Vietnamese battalion into positions manned by waiting ARVN troops. The maneuver was abundantly successful.

These eleven operations, characteristic of the forty which have taken place, accounted for 2,703 enemy killed. But, more important, they underscored the flexibility of the amphibious task force. Secure from enemy interference or observation, capable of a 400 mile shift in position in a day, this versatile force, with its mobile base, is capable of contributing more to the conflict than its small numbers imply. There is no question but that the amphibious operation is playing a vital role in a war that, on its face, is often regarded as a land mass conflict. The map on the following page shows the locations of the forty Marine amphibious operations to date.

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40 MARINE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, MAR 65-JULY 67



The role of the amphibious operation in the conflict directs attention to the flexibility of Marine Corps units, organized, trained and equipped mainly for amphibious warfare, to adapt to the needs

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of the complex terrestrial struggle in southeast Asia. In a number of cases, existing units designed for amphibious combat have been specially adapted to the Vietnam requirements. Some of the more noteworthy examples are:

- The Shore Party battalions (one per Marine division), designed to fulfill a specialized logistic function at the shore-line, have been shifted to air-head and helicopter landing zone operations, as well as to heavy engineer tasks. On occasion, such as at Dong Ha, they are used to run a port.

- The division service battalions, designed to give each Marine division logistic balance in amphibious operations, have been withdrawn from the divisions, and now form the hard core of the Force Logistic Command.

- The two amphibian tractor battalions, designed primarily for troop transport in the ship-to-shore movement in the amphibious assault, have been converted to armored personnel carriers, river patrol and terrestrial logistic tasks. They are frequently found operating ten or twenty miles from the sea.

- The armored amphibian units, designed to spearhead the surface landing attack with direct fire support, have been diverted to river monitor tasks and to mobile artillery functions, where their 105mm howitzers are most effective.

- The two Marine MP battalions, designed primarily for traffic control and related actions in the beach-head area, have been converted to airfield defense units, freeing the equivalent of 1 1/2 infantry battalions for other employment.

Not all of the special demands of the Vietnam war can be met by adaptation. Some constitute new requirements.

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But the same circumstances which create the new requirements sometimes make other capabilities unnecessary, and it has been possible to shift organic resources to improve effectiveness and increase productivity. Continuing studies to disclose areas where these shifts can be made have thus far produced more than fifty such changes, most of which have been met within existing resources. Some specific examples are:

-A scout-sniper platoon has been created for each infantry regiment, out of existing resources; -- some 278 men.

-An additional 24 artillery pieces, above all allowances, have been placed in action, and manned, within existing personnel resources; - 120 men.

-Twelve extra observation aircraft are being operated, manned from existing resources; - 62 officers and men.

-59 Otter marginal terrain vehicles, a new requirement, are being manned out of existing resources; - 120 men.

-Seventy-five Combined Action platoons have been activated; - 1384 officers and men, of whom 210 have come from existing resources.

-Three additional direct air support centers (66 officers and men) have been activated to meet the needs of the dispersed environment, within present personnel resources.

-Airbase and control elements of the single Marine Aircraft Wing have been spread to meet the needs of operating six airfields.

-Essentially total logistic support is being provided from the Force Logistic Command to the ROKMC Brigade - a task requiring the efforts of about 300 men.

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-A special staff section has been added to every unit of battalion or larger size for civic affairs/civic action; - 226 officers and men, although not out of organic resources.

-And likewise, a 60mm mortar section has been added to each rifle company, from additional resources.

All of the above alterations have underscored the malleability of the Marine amphibious organization. It has fit smoothly into the mechanism of the Vietnam conflict and, in so doing, has acquired additional validity as a sound geometry for a force which is required to be ready for a broad spectrum of expeditionary employment.

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The confirmed enemy ground strength in I Corps and the DMZ area was 42,200 at the end of July. This was an increase of 4,200 men compared to June and mainly resulted from the acceptance of the 29th Regiment, 325 C North Vietnamese Army Division in the DMZ area. The balance of this increase resulted from strength adjustments to various units in other I Corps areas.


During the month, the NVA continued to employ surface-to-air missiles against US aircraft in the DMZ region. Of seven SAM sites which have been confirmed in the DMZ area, three have been destroyed by air or III MAF artillery; four unoccupied sites are currently confirmed.

On the following pages are five maps which present the July confirmed enemy order of battle. The first of these gives the locations of enemy infantry battalions throughout I CTZ and in the DMZ area. The remaining maps present a more detailed representation of all major enemy units in four areas - the DMZ area and Quang Tri province, Thua Thien province, Quang Nam/Quang Tin provinces and Quang Ngai province.

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ENEMY INFANTRY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ/DMZ




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b. DMZ/Quang Tri Province

The 29th NVA Regiment, 325 C Division, with a strength of 2,200 men, was confirmed to be in the northern Quang Tri/DMZ area during July. All told, the confirmed enemy strength in the area was 21,270 men at the end of the month. This, however, did not include an unidentified NVA division (10,000 men) near Dong Hoi (NVN) or the 559th Transportation Group (5,000 men) and the 18th NVA Battalion (400 men), both in Laos. A confirmed total of 3,030 enemy were located in Quang Tri province. The locations of major enemy units in the DMZ/Quang Tri area are shown on the following map.




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c. Thua Thien Province

The enemy confirmed strength in Thua Thien province on 31 July was 2,930 men. This was an increase of 150 men, attributed to strength adjustments. The locations of principal confirmed units are shown on the following map.




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d. Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces

The 3d NVA Regiment moved from southern Quang Nam province into northern Quang Tin province during July and the headquarters of the 1st VC Regiment and its 90th Battalion shifted from Quang Ngai province to a point east of Hiep Duc in northern Quang Tin. As a result of the latter movement and adjustment of strengths of other units, the end-month confirmed enemy strength rose to 8,025 from 5,635 in June. By province, 1,990 men were in Quang Nam and 6,035 enemy in Quang Tin on July 31st. Current major unit locations are shown on the following map.




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e. Quang Ngai Province

The confirmed strength of enemy units in Quang Ngai province at the close of the month was 6,940 men, compared to 8,940 enemy at the end of June. The decrease resulted from unit strength adjustments and from movement of the 1st VC Regimental Headquarters and the 90th VC Battalion to Quang Tin province. The July Quang Ngai enemy order of battle is depicted on the map below.



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2. ENEMY LOSSES FOR JULY (I CTZ)

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
<u>Enemy killed by III MAF</u>			
By Marines	2,056	20	241
By U.S. Army	927	61	311
By III MAF Total (July)	2,983	81	552
By III MAF Total (1967)	15,791	1,258	2,293
<u>Enemy killed by other forces</u>			
By ROKMC	102	5	1,130
By RVN	1,047	156	350
By U.S. Special Forces	97	4	22
By other forces Total (July)	1,246	165	1,502
I CTZ Total (July)	4,229	246	2,054
I CTZ Total (1967)	25,244	2,128	5,966

3. III MAF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>July</u>			<u>Cumulative III MAF total to date</u>
<u>U.S. Army</u>	<u>Marines</u>		
2,388	27,355	Patrols	259,182
2,603	7,129	Ambushes	100,605
113	178	Company operations	3,937
-	1,098	Sniper posts	11,839
1*	10*	Battalion operations	166**
1*	8*	Regimental or larger operations	72**
-	7,735	Combat/combat support sorties	125,569
42,626	51,649	Helo Sorties	884,650

*Since monthly figures include operations continued from previous months, they are not used to compute cumulative totals.

**Adjusted totals.

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4. MAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>From/To</u>
3d Marines	2Jul	Dong Ha/Camp Carroll
3d Bn., 3d Marines	2Jul	Dong Ha/Camp Carroll
3d Bn., 4th Marines	2Jul	Dong Ha/Camp Carroll
BLT 2/3	4Jul	LPH-10/Camp Carroll
HMM-164	4Jul	LPH-10/Camp Carroll
HMM-265	12Jul	Phu Bai/Camp Carroll
HMM-164	12Jul	Camp Carroll/Phu Bai
MACS-7	15Jul	Chu Lai/CONUS
5th 155 Gun Btry	19Jul	Okinawa/Danang
1st Plt., 5th 8" How Btry	19Jul	Okinawa/Danang
HMM-361	21Jul	Marble Mtn/Dong Ha
Hq Btry, 1st Bn., 13th Mar	23Jul	Okinawa/Danang
3d Bn., 4th Marines	24Jul	Camp Carroll/Dong Ha
BLT 2/3	27Jul	Camp Carroll/LPH-10
HMM-265	27Jul	Camp Carroll/LPH-10

5. UNITS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL LANDING FORCESSLF ALPHA (TG-79.4)

Battalion Landing Team 1/3
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron -362

SLF BRAVO (TG-79.5)

Battalion Landing Team 2/3
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-164 (1-4 July)
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-265 (4-31 July)

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6. III MAF CIVIC ACTION

<u>U.S. Army</u>	<u>Marines</u>		<u>Cumulative III MAF total to date</u>
32,183	86,455	Persons given medical treatment	1,985,543
18	272	Persons given medical training	1,764
2,539	82,055	Pounds of food distributed	3,737,275
1,997	2,416	Pounds of soap distributed	182,883
130	1,450	Pounds of clothing distributed	260,077
21	95	Critically ill civilians evacuated	7,916
123	126	English language classes conducted	3,253
0	\$41	Cash donations	\$41,183
5,078	164,110	Persons fed	6,180,349
170	2,112	Students supported	58,764
186	38	Construction projects	1,965

7. III MAF STRENGTH - 31 July 1967

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Danang	2,117	35,325	199	1,359	118	450
Chu Lai	797	9,418	57	339	1,040	12,192
Duc Pho					284	4,804
Phu Bai	715	10,517	101	897	36	216
DMZ Area	736	15,932	52	618	111	1,824
Totals	4,365	71,192	409	3,213	1,589	19,486

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8. LOGISTICSa. Supply levels at end of period

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
<u>Class I</u>				
(1000 of rations/ days of supply)				
MCI rations	276/35	146/73	251/84	419/60
B rations	268/67	243/122	96/48	149/37
A rations	291/9	107/9	360/30	2/0

Class III and IIIA (BULK)(1000 gals/days
of supply)

JP-4	3,404/9	3,574/13	42/3	102/20
AVGAS	658/11	271/15	53/6	112/22
MOGAS	938/25	4,531/129	61/5	39/3
DIESEL	1,343/26	286/5	53/2	38/3

Class V and VA Danang Chu Lai Phu Bai

Ground Ammunition	45	45	45
(days of supply)			

Aviation Ordnance - Stocks maintained within CINCPAC allocations.

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(1) Surface Shipping Status (all I CTZ)

Cargo received from CONUS 36,083 M/T

Cargo received from intra-WestPac 7,311 M/T

(2) Air Shipping Status

Cargo received from CONUS 2,267 S/T

Cargo received from intra-WestPac 2,216 S/T

c. RED BALL Summary

Items at beginning of period 124

Items added 40

Items removed 92

Items remaining at end of period 72

d. Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN to 3d FSR 865

Items repaired at 3d FSR 26,452

Items returned to CONUS from 3d FSR 652
or disposed of on Okinawa~~SECRET~~
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LOGISTICS (cont'd)e. Construction Projects

Roads	-22.3 miles were constructed, 56.4 miles were under construction and 161 miles were maintained.
Bridges	-Completed 14 Class 40 or larger bridges and repaired 6 others. 6 new Class 45 or larger bridges were under construction; 9 ferries/rafts were in operation.
Wells drilled	-5 were completed and 6 were in progress.
Bunkers	-20 bunkers were completed during the month.
Covered storage facilities	-96,000 sq. ft. were completed and 92,000 sq. ft. were under construction.
Maintenance facilities	-80,000 sq. ft. were completed and 108,000 sq. ft. were under construction.
Quarry operations	-7,854 cubic yards excavated.

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-Revolutionary Development progress during July justifies modest optimism, especially in terms of the effectiveness of the RD Team program and the resolve of those ARVN commanders, who are involved in RD, to meet their obligations. The real test is going to come in the immediate pre-election period, when it must be assumed that the enemy anti-RD effort will be at a maximum.

-The concentrated air-ground effort of III MAF near the DMZ has precluded any major NVN incursions into Quang Tri, but it has not prevented the continued buildup of enemy troop strength and logistic power in the northern half of the DMZ and in the area of North Vietnam immediately adjacent. As the forces on both sides grow in the DMZ area, the great benefit accruing to the enemy from his use of the privileged sanctuary becomes increasingly evident.

-There seems little doubt now that the aggregate of our effort in I CTZ has the enemy hurting, as to his programs, his personnel and his material. There has never been more conclusive evidence of the virtue of and need for powerful intensification of our offensive efforts against both his infrastructure in the lowlands and his larger forces in the back country.

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