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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

VIETNAM

SEPTEMBER 1967



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This is a summary of activities of US Marine Corps forces in Vietnam for the month of September 1967. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through August 1967.

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UNCLASSIFIEDCONTENTS

THE SUMMARY	3
LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS	5
SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS . .	26
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.	34
BASE DEFENSE	50
AIR OPERATIONS.	55
LOGISTICS	62
THE CONCLUSIONS	75
STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS	76

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SUMMARY

In September the enemy continued to focus his efforts on the I CTZ. His preoccupation with this area is reflected in the facts that during the period 1 May - 30 September 57% of all enemy losses (killed) in RVN occurred in I CTZ, and 56% of all US losses in RVN have also occurred in I CTZ.

For the third time in six months, the enemy mounted a major combined arms effort against III MAF forces in the DMZ region. Directed for the second consecutive time against Con Thien, the enemy's artillery supported assault was detected by Marine reconnaissance, and was destroyed by a combination of heavy fire support and ground maneuver. In his September failure to drive the Marines from their Con Thien strongpoint, following his April defeat in the Hill 881-861 complex north of Khe Sanh and the failure of his combined arms thrust against Con Thien in July, the enemy was denied once again the military and propaganda victory he is seeking.

Continuing the campaign against the 2d NVA Division in its harboring areas within the heavily populated, rice-rich Nui Loc Son basin, III MAF Operations Swift and Wheeler killed 999 NVA/VC, at a cost of 168 friendly killed. The ARVN Operation Lien Ket 116, conducted in conjunction with the Marines' Operation Swift, killed an additional 212 NVA/VC.

The September GVN election produced substantial evidence that the III MAF counterguerrilla campaign and its companion ARVN pacification effort are slowly eroding enemy influence in the coastal plain of I CTZ. The exceptionally heavy voter participation--over 86%--attested to the growing ability of the GVN to protect the Vietnamese within the vital region.

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Following the election, counter guerrilla efforts continued at near - record levels. III MAF units conducted over 37,000 of these small unit operations and accounted for 489 enemy killed within the III MAF tactical areas. Nearby, ARVN units, charged with searching out and destroying the enemy in and near RD priority areas, also killed over 400 enemy.

Companion with these counter guerrilla efforts by III MAF and the GVN, the Revolutionary Development program in I Corps achieved modest gains in September. Four new RD teams were added, bringing their total to 125--within range of the 1967 GVN goal of 138 teams deployed. Other modestly encouraging signs appeared in pacification, as 35 villages improved their status, while only 6 sustained reverses. At the end of September, the number of people residing in secure portions of III MAF tactical areas was 717,705, an increase of 10,131 persons over the preceding month.

The October realignment of forces will see three US Army infantry battalions replacing two Marine infantry battalions in the Nui Loc Son basin area. The two Marine battalions and the regimental headquarters, thus freed, will displace to northern Quang Tri, increasing infantry forces in that area from seven to nine battalions.

The northeast monsoon arrived, early and with exceptional violence. It had seriously adverse effects on both tactical and logistic operations.

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Operations in the DMZ Area

September combat in northern Quang Tri was concentrated in the area around Con Thien. In this area, the full spectrum of US fire support means delivered a record number of rounds of heavy weapons fire against the enemy, the enemy fired the greatest number of rounds of any month of the war, and preparations for a major enemy attack on Con Thien were discovered and thwarted before the attack could begin.

Enemy rocket and artillery fire from positions in North Vietnam continued, in September, to provide a canopy under which enemy ground elements sought to infiltrate, marshal and prepare for a major assault. It was increasingly evident that the weapons positions in North Vietnam, immune from infantry attack by III MAF, were the key to the enemy fire support structure in northern Quang Tri. Unable to overrun these positions, it was essential that our forces exploit every opportunity to neutralize or to destroy them.


To place pressure on the enemy guns, III MAF fired a total of 12,577 rounds at known and suspected enemy positions in the DMZ area during September. B-52 bombers of the Strategic Air Command continued their high rate of attack in the DMZ region, including a daily average of about fifteen sorties a day north of the Ben Hai River. Ships of the Seventh Fleet fired 6,148 rounds on the NVN positions in the same area. And COMUSMACV, on 13 September, authorized a temporary application of additional tactical air effort against the area harboring the threatening gun positions, to include sixty-five tactical sorties daily by the 7th Air Force and thirty-six by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

The chart on the following page displays the geographic region of principal concern - the sanctuary in North Vietnam which contains those NVA artillery and rocket positions which have delivered heavy fires on Marine units in the DMZ area, over the past six months, followed by graphs which portray the magnitude of the US fire support in the DMZ region.




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
SUPPORTING FIRES IN THE DMZ REGION



DAILY NUMBERS OF ROUNDS OR BOMBS DELIVERED ON TARGETS IN THE RED HATCHED AREA ABOVE.



DAILY TOTALS ARE APPROXIMATE, BASED ON A TYPICAL B-52 LOAD OF 42 750 POUND BOMBS AND 24 500 POUND BOMBS.




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The heavy volume of fire which the enemy delivered during September directs attention to the pattern of those fires over the past six months. The diagram below exhibits the total daily rounds of enemy heavy weapons fire in the DMZ region since 1 April 1967.

ENEMY INITIATED ARTILLERY/ROCKET/MORTAR ATTACKS IN DMZ



The chart above portrays that, in the past six months, there have been three periods of intensified enemy high explosive fire: in late April, in early July and throughout most of the month of September. Each of these periods of violent fire support relates to enemy infantry action, reflecting three major enemy combined arms efforts to achieve a ground victory.

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The first of these was the April operation launched against Khe Sanh by an enemy force of two regiments. This effort was discovered by Marine reconnaissance in its early stages, and was defeated in a violent air/ground team attack on the Hill 881-861 complex north of Khe Sanh. Over 900 NVA troops were killed.

The July peak marked another major enemy combined arms attempt, this time focused on the Con Thien area. This triggered Operation Buffalo, during which the enemy attack was thrown back with the loss of almost 1,300 NVA dead. In that effort, the enemy made extensive use of NVN based artillery in close coordination with his ground attack. The high volume of that fire is apparent on the chart above.

In September, the enemy heavy weapons fire followed much the same pattern as the preceding two, except that both volume and duration were greater. The high volume during the first part of the month supported what was obviously intended to be a multiple pronged attack leading to the seizure of Con Thien. Details of his defeat in this attempt are described below.

Ground Activity Around Con Thien

The bulk of the combat activity during September was focused in a geographic area of about twenty square miles in extent, centered generally around the small 158 meter hill called Con Thien. The hill itself was never physically occupied by much more than a reinforced battalion. Most of the action, and the resulting Marine casualties, actually occurred as a result of contact between Marine units maneuvering in the surrounding region and NVA forces seeking to get set for a major attack on the hill.

During the first few days of September, Marine units operating to the south and southwest of Con Thien encountered increased enemy activity, characterized by engagements with small NVA units in bunkers. On the 4th, however, a platoon

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patrol from Company I, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines engaged an NVA company, four miles south of Con Thien. The patrol was quickly reinforced by the rest of Company I, along with a second company which joined the action with tanks. The two Marine companies, supported by artillery and air, killed thirty-seven NVA in this engagement.

On 7 September, a company from the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines made heavy contact with an NVA force, about three miles south of Con Thien. Quickly reinforced by a second company, and employing tanks, artillery, and close air support, Marines killed fifty-one NVA in a five hour battle.

On the evening of the 10th, the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines made heavy contact with an NVA regiment, three and one-half miles southwest of Con Thien. In this case, it was evident that the continuous patrolling had exposed a major attack in the making, and aimed at Con Thien.

In intense fighting on the 10th, and making full use of artillery and close air support, the Marines inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, forcing him to withdraw at 2200. For the rest of the night, Marine artillery and air delivered fires on all enemy routes of withdrawal. In this four hour battle the enemy lost 140 confirmed killed, while another 315 were listed as probably killed, but not confirmed due to the difficulty of searching the dense undergrowth.

At 0325 on the 13th, following a heavy concentration of artillery, an NVA Force launched an attack against the north-east sector of Con Thien's defensive perimeter. However, the enemy thrust was repulsed, and the force withdrew.


At 0750 on the 21st, two companies of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines operating east of Con Thien, encountered heavy automatic weapons fire from a large enemy force. The enemy was well entrenched in a system of heavily fortified, mutually supporting, camouflaged bunkers, constructed in dense hedge-rows and fronted by flat paddies. It was plain that the position had been organized to entrap an inferior force.

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The companies requested assistance, and then launched an attack which closed to within thirty meters of the enemy positions. At this time they consolidated their positions and awaited reinforcements, while continuing to direct artillery and air strikes on the enemy. When the reinforcing elements made contact, the attack was resumed and lasted until dusk. Total enemy losses in this engagement were thirty-nine NVA confirmed killed, with another 149 probably killed.

COMBAT ACTIVITIES AROUND CON THIEN - SEPTEMBER 1967



This sequence of enemy attacks, persisting over a three week period, appears to reflect the enemy's desperate desire for a military victory, one which would also gain for him a measure of beneficial world-wide propaganda. When his successive infantry drives, launched from three directions and supported strongly by artillery fires, failed to carry the Marine strongpoint, it is likely that he decided to attempt to reduce the position by a massive artillery attack. This latter scheme also failed.

Viewed in retrospect, the enemy's September defeat in the Con Thien region may be attributed to four major factors:

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-The intensified US firepower of tens of thousands of aircraft bombs and rounds of artillery and naval gunfire.

-The Marines' resolute and aggressive air-ground team action which intercepted the enemy's attack columns, and inflicted heavy losses on them before they could initiate a coordinated assault.

-The likelihood that the accelerated pace of his own heavy weapon fires caused the enemy to run short of artillery, rocket, and mortar ammunition in his forward dumps.

-The heavy rains, deep mud and extensive monsoon flooding which drove the enemy out of many of his protected positions, and curtailed his resupply movements.

Operating together, it is plain that these factors united to give the enemy a substantial defeat.

Operation Fortress Sentry

To the east of Con Thien, amphibious operation Fortress Sentry was initiated in the coastal region of Quang Tri to remove the threat to the eastern flank of the Kingfisher area. The combined amphibious/heliborne assault was launched by Special Landing Force Bravo (BLT 2/3) on 17 September against elements of the 270th NVA Regiment and local force VC units known to be operating in the area between Cua Viet and Dong Ha, north to the Ben Hai river. This represented the 44th amphibious effort by USN/USMC units in the war.

Only sporadic enemy resistance was encountered during the first days of the operation, which saw BLT 2/3 reorient the attack on a north-northwest axis, toward the DMZ, with elements of the 1st ARVN Division screening the left flank. On the 23rd, a 4-man patrol was attacked by a VC company, 4 miles northwest of Cua Viet. The fire team repulsed the attack killing 20 enemy troops and sustaining no casualties itself.

The next morning, two Marine companies located and

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Unsuccessful Attack on Marine Convoy

On 7 September, an NVA battalion set a deliberate ambush on Route 9, between Thon Son Lam and Ca Lu. The ambush site was established on favorable terrain two miles north of Ca Lu, and was designed to intercept one of the Marine resupply convoys which periodically travel the route between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. It became evident, however, that the enemy commander was either unaware of, or chose to ignore the fact that a similar ambush, attempted in nearly the same spot only seventeen days before, had been defeated. The earlier attempt, on 21 August, had resulted in 109 NVA confirmed killed, with another 305 probably killed by artillery and Marine close air support aircraft. The enemy commander of the 7 September effort also apparently miscalculated the proximity of Marine forces, their ability to maneuver in support of the convoy, and the speed with which supporting arms could be brought to bear upon the ambush.

At 1010 the Marine convoy, consisting of two cargo trucks, a fuel tanker, two smaller vehicles, and two escorting tanks, triggered the action, as the enemy attacked with mortars and automatic weapons. The convoy returned fire with all available weapons, and within fifty minutes a reinforcing Marine company had moved from Ca Lu and one from Thon Son Lam. Both established contact with the enemy and, in heavy fighting which lasted until early evening, Marines, employing artillery and air strikes, killed 92 NVA and captured 3 machine guns. Another 93 enemy were listed as probably killed, while friendly losses were 5 killed and 56 wounded and evacuated.


The similarity of the errors committed by the enemy in the 21 August and 7 September ambush attempts is evident in the diagrams on the following page.

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
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UNSUCCESSFUL NVA AMBUSH - 21 AUGUST 1967



UNSUCCESSFUL NVA AMBUSH - 7 SEPTEMBER 1967



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Factors Which Require Friendly Forces In The DMZ Region

The enemy's concentration of force on friendly units in the DMZ region, and the intermittent bursts of violent combat which have occurred over past months raise the question of why Marines are operating in the DMZ region at all. There are four principal reasons:

-Construction of the Strong Point Obstacle System

III MAF, having been assigned responsibility for the installation, maintenance, and manning of the system, is obliged to protect the forces installing it. While Marine units man Gio Linh and Con Thien (strong points A-2 and A-4 in the obstacle system), other Marine forces must continue to maneuver throughout the area between Route 9 and the DMZ, protecting these strong points and providing overall security for the system's development.

-Defense against enemy invasion

COMUSMACV's perception, in 1966, of a major enemy invasion threat in the DMZ led to III MAF deployments into this region and, subsequently, to the enemy's major defeats in Operations Hastings and Prairie and, most recently, in Kingfisher. The Marines remain in the area to forestall further invasion threats.

-Defense of Route 9

The basic GVN - COMUSMACV policy establishes Route 9, the major east-west artery north of Quang Tri city, as an essential communication route which must be secured, opened, and kept open. This can only be done if friendly forces are deployed north of the road, and in strength.

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-Assumption of former ARVN security functions

The major reorientation, in January 1967, of ARVN forces to the vital Revolutionary Development program drew some of these forces from Northern I CTZ, and has forced COMUSMACV to assume the ARVN offensive tasks.

Thus, while Marine presence in the DMZ region is a heavy and challenging commitment, it is a necessary one. It is that presence which provides a shield against North Vietnam, and behind which other, vital internal, military, civil and political programs in South Vietnam can proceed.

Nui Loc Son Area

In September III MAF continued its offensive campaign to destroy enemy forces in the densely populated, agriculturally rich Nui Loc Son basin area, 25 miles south of Danang. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the North Vietnamese Army and Main Force Viet Cong units in this area. During the period May through August 1967, the enemy deployed the entire 2d NVA Division in this coastal basin, in an attempt to reassert his increasingly tenuous influence in this rice-rich region, and to bolster the guerrilla forces there.

The 2d NVA Division is composed of the 3d and 21st NVA Regiments and the 1st VC Regiment. The 3d NVA Regiment entered South Vietnam in March 1966 and for over a year, confined its activities principally to southern Quang Nam province. Six months later, the 21st NVA Regiment completed its infiltration into South Vietnam and began operations with the 1st VC Regiment in Quang Ngai province. Although elements of the 2d NVA Division had been encountered in the Nui Loc Son basin as early

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as mid-1966, the 21st NVA was the first enemy regiment to appear there in force, arriving in May of this year. Following in trace, the 1st VC and 3d NVA completed their moves to the basin in July and August, respectively. The headquarters of the parent organization, the 2d NVA Division has been confirmed in the basin since July 1966.

Beginning in late April, 1967, with Operation Union I, and followed in the succeeding months by Operations Union II, Adair, Calhoun, Brown, Cochise, and September's Operation Swift, Marine large unit operations in the Nui Loc Son basin have exacted a heavy toll from the 2d NVA Division, killing 2,491 of its soldiers. ARVN operations against this division have accounted for an additional 594 enemy killed. As a result of these III MAF efforts, the 21st NVA Regiment is currently listed as not combat effective while its sister regiment, the 3d NVA, is reported as only marginally combat effective.

September actions in the Nui Loc Son basin (Operation Swift, conducted by the 5th Marines, Operation Wheeler, by four US Army battalions and Operation Lien Ket 116 by ARVN), have achieved significant results in further destruction of the combat effectiveness of the 2d NVA Division. These operations, described in detail below, resulted in a total of 1,211 enemy troops confirmed killed.

-Operation Swift


Following their heavy losses to Operations Cochise, Lien Ket 112 and Benton in mid-August, 2d NVA elements avoided contact with friendly forces. However, at 0500 on 4 September, a company of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines located and engaged an estimated NVA battalion near Hill 63.

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When a second Marine company, maneuvering to reinforce the first, also made heavy contact with the enemy force, two additional companies from the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines were heli-lifted, at 0910, to a position to the northeast of the action. Striking to the southwest, both companies were heavily engaged by early afternoon, as was a third company moving from Thang Binh with tanks. During the first thirty-six hours of Operation Swift, the 5th Marines, supported by artillery and air, killed 190 NVA and captured 54 weapons.

INITIATION OF OPERATION SWIFT - 4 SEPTEMBER 1967



Heavy fighting resumed again on the evening of the 6th, six miles northeast of Nui Loc Son, as the enemy made a series of company - size probes against forward Marine elements. Exploiting these probes, and employing artillery

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and close air support, the 5th Marines launched a night attack, engaging a large enemy force. This battle continued until 0200, when the enemy broke contact, leaving behind 150 dead.

Then, at 0330, an NVA company attacked the Marines' rear guard company. The Marines returned fire with all organic weapons and directed artillery fires on the enemy, killing 34.

Documents taken from the enemy killed in these night actions confirmed the presence of the 1st VC and the 3d NVA Regiments in the area, and included a map which depicted the defensive posture of one battalion of the 1st VC Regiment. The map included locations of company positions, reserve positions, mortar positions, ammunition caches, and the battalion command post. This highly perishable information was immediately passed to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, which drove to the east on the 7th, directing heavy artillery and air strikes against positions depicted on the enemy map.

Largely as a result of the information gained from the captured documents, Operation Swift continued with significant contact for eight more days, accounting for an additional 191 enemy killed. An ammunition cache located on the 9th, contained 54 cases of small arms ammunition, 26 cases of both 82 and 60mm mortar rounds, 18 cases of recoilless rifle rounds, 10 cases of hand grenades, and 6 cases of B-40 anti-tank rockets. The last major ground engagement occurred on the night of the 11th, as two Marine companies maneuvered to kill 70 NVA.

Much of the success of Operation Swift can be attributed to the immediate availability to engaged ground units, of the Marine's organic close air support capability. With a total of 275 close air support missions being flown during the operation,


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Marine units were able quickly and successfully to exploit each ground contact.

Final results for Operation Swift, which terminated on 15 September, were 571 enemy killed, 8 captured, and 85 weapons seized, with another 529 probably killed in collapsed tunnels and bunkers. Marine losses were 127 killed, with 334 wounded and evacuated. Lien Ket 116, an ARVN operation conducted northeast of Nui Loc Son in conjunction with Swift, killed 212 NVA. The locations of Marine and ARVN contacts in Swift and Lien Ket 116 are shown below.

OPERATION SWIFT/LIEN KET 116



Operation Swift demonstrated again that NVA units which are removed from their North Vietnam sanctuary cannot prevail against our forces which are free to maneuver and uninhibited by geographic boundaries. Marine units repeatedly flanked the enemy, cut off escape routes and utilizing their organic air mobility and close air support, were able to defeat NVA units in each successive engagement of this operation.

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-Operation Wheeler

While the 2d NVA Division was suffering heavy casualties from Marine forces in Operation Swift, Operation Wheeler was initiated on the 11th, directly to the south of Swift, against enemy forces and base areas west of Tam Ky. The four US Army battalions involved in Operation Wheeler had a two fold objective in III MAF's continuing offensive against the 2d NVA Division. The first was to exploit contacts made by Marines against the 1st VC and 3d NVA Regiments, believed to be fleeing to the south and, second, to locate and destroy elements of the 21st NVA Regiment, believed to be located in the hill mass north of Thien Phuoc.

Although there were no individual large unit engagements, Operation Wheeler produced significant results throughout the month. Multiple platoon and company size contacts were developed and effectively exploited by rapid heliborne movement, coupled with artillery and air strikes. Operating in a large area five miles wide and ten miles long, west of Tam Ky, US Army units have accounted for 428 VC/NVA killed through 30 September, while friendly casualties have been 41 killed and 171 evacuated with wounds.

Operation Dragon Fire

In northern Quang Ngai province on the 5th, 14 miles south of Chu Lai, ROK Marines launched a coordinated heliborne/amphibious assault against the Batangan peninsula to establish a tactical base for the newly formed 5th ROKMC Battalion. The Batangan area has long been under Viet Cong domination and recent intelligence reports gave evidence that the 48th VC battalion (Local Force) had returned to the area for recruiting and tax collection purposes.

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
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Dragon Fire, a three battalion ROK Marine effort enjoyed continued success against these forces. In conjunction with the heliborne amphibious assault by one battalion against the peninsula, two additional battalions swept toward the sea from the west and trapped the enemy in large numbers. Supported extensively by air, artillery, and naval gunfire, ROK Marines have killed 404 enemy and captured 14 prisoners and 28 weapons, while friendly losses stand at 39 killed and 166 wounded.

The location of Operation Dragon Fire in the Batangan peninsula area is shown below.

OPERATION DRAGON FIRE



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Realignment of Forces in I CTZ

Throughout 1967 the enemy has concentrated his effort against the I CTZ. Since May, the pace of activity, measured in terms of US and enemy troops killed, has been greater than all the rest of RVN combined.

-About 57% of all enemy killed in Vietnam since 1 May have been killed in I CTZ (37,400 in RVN; 21,300 in I CTZ).

-About 56% of all US troops killed in Vietnam since 1 May have been killed in I CTZ (3,960 in RVN; 2,227 in I CTZ).

To counter the enemy's growing effort in I CTZ, COM-USMACV, in late September, instituted planning for the reinforcement of III MAF. The initial plan, as stated, was scheduled for execution in the following three increments:

(1) By 4 October, one brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), consisting of three battalions, would deploy to I Corps, freeing a Marine regiment to deploy north to the DMZ area.

(2) On or about 25 October, the 1st Cavalry Division Headquarters, with four additional battalions would deploy to I CTZ, allowing additional Marine forces to move north.

(3) In early 1968, it was planned that the remainder of the 1st Cavalry would join the division, giving III MAF a total increase of nine infantry battalions in I CTZ.


Subsequent plans however, have reduced the total reinforcement effort. Thus, beginning in early October, three US Army battalions will replace the two battalions of the 5th Marines in the Nui Loc Son basin area, enabling III MAF to move two Marine battalions and a regimental headquarters into Northern Quang Tri province. Plans for movement of the remaining Army forces, as originally

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contemplated, have been deferred.

These additional US Army forces will raise the I CTZ share of friendly forces from 18% to 20% of those in RVN. The net result of this projected realignment of forces is displayed below.

INFANTRY REALIGNMENTS PROJECTED TO 4 OCTOBER 1967



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SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

A testimonial to progress in the counter guerrilla campaign in I CTZ was registered at the polls in early September. The enemy had avowed publicly his intent to stop the elections, and his campaign to disrupt them probably represented the maximum effort of which he was capable. But in spite of his political maneuvering, his overt attacks, terrorist violence, threats and propaganda, 86% of the eligible voters in I CTZ went to the polls on election day. This turn-out, in the face of the enemy's all-out opposition can be regarded as a validation of the protective program executed, in coordination, by Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces and by US elements.

III MAF's long term campaign against the guerrilla remained at a high level through the election period and the remainder of the month, even though hampered by the beginning of the northeast monsoon. In all, 37,285 small unit patrols, ambushes and company size search and destroy operations were conducted by III MAF, an average of over 1,240 a day. Noteworthy was the fact that 23,870 or 64% were conducted at night. Marine units were responsible for 33,306 of the total number, and elements of the newly designated U. S. Army Americal Division in the southern portion of I CTZ carried out 3,979.

These and related figures are displayed on the graphs on the following page. Also, because of the shifting pattern of enemy troop structure, and his increasing preoccupation with the Revolutionary Development Program, there are displayed similar figures related to III MAF large unit operations. This growing convergence of large unit operations and small unit counter guerrilla operations is discussed in more detail following the graphs.


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
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III MAF OPERATIONS IN THE I CTZ COASTAL PLAIN 1 OCTOBER 1966 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1967


SMALL UNIT PATROLS, AMBUSHES
AND SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS




LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS



ENEMY KILLED BY SMALL UNIT PATROLS, AMBUSHES
AND SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS



ENEMY KILLED BY LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS



In addition to the figures above, 7,457 enemy have been killed in 18 Large Unit Operations in the DMZ area since September 1966.

The number of enemy killed in small unit counter-guerrilla operations in September was 489, a relatively low figure compared to past months, but one which points to a major change in the character of the enemy. The number, strength and influence of the Viet Cong Main Force have gradually been diminished over the past two years, and the enemy has consequently been obliged to commit progressively greater numbers of regular NVA troops in order to maintain pressure on the populated regions of the I CTZ coastal plain.

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Since March 1965, over 59,000 enemy troops have been confirmed killed in the I CTZ. There is no method of determining precisely how many of these were Viet Cong and how many were North Vietnamese; however, the changing enemy order of battle provides a clue to this. The enemy forces who faced the Marines in the spring of 1965 were virtually all Viet Cong. Today, in I CTZ only 32% of the regular and main force enemy are Viet Cong; the rest are North Vietnamese Army regulars, most of them conscripts. Enemy order of battle estimates show a peak Main Force Viet Cong strength of 11,253 in December of 1965. In September 1967 the figure had dropped to 4,875.

These losses of Viet Cong Main Force troops, an important element of the enemy infrastructure, have made it progressively more difficult for him to cope with the pressure of the GVN Revolutionary Development Program. The hard-core Viet Cong guerrilla is not replaceable on a man-for-man basis by the NVA regular. Two years ago, Main Force Viet Cong units were made up largely of tough, resourceful, determined guerrilla soldiers, whose leaders had long combat experience, reaching back to the Viet Minh. The highest ambition to which a young Viet Cong militia recruit could aspire was one day to become a member of a Viet Cong Main Force unit, a process which required years.

The Main Force VC soldier, as a result, represented a very considerable problem to the free world side. He knew the terrain, since it was his home. His actions, speech, and mannerisms were those of the local populace, so that it was a simple matter for him to melt away into the country side. And, being from the south, he usually had friends and family who, although not communists or Viet Cong, would give him food, shelter, support and information.

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




Replacement of losses among such troops with NVA regulars tends to change the overall character of the enemy in I CTZ. The NVA soldier generally is better equipped, and better armed than the Viet Cong, but overall is less effective against the pacification programs because he lacks the guerrilla's skills and ties with the local population. The result is that the enemy must try to compensate in numbers for the decreased individual troop effectiveness.

This set of conditions provides an insight into the shifting trends in enemy offensive effort in I CTZ. It explains his introduction of the 2nd NVA Division into the Nui Loc Son basin, to bolster his infrastructure, which was being seriously eroded by III MAF's long term Danang and Chu Lai counter guerrilla campaigns. It accounts for the repeated large unit contacts, with subsequent heavy enemy losses, that III MAF has been able to achieve, mainly because the NVA units lack the elusiveness of the Viet Cong Main Force. However, the infusion of strength that the 2nd NVA Division brought has made possible the slightly increased enemy attack rates around the Nui Loc Son basin (Quang Nam and Quang Tri provinces), while the overall I CTZ number of enemy ground attacks in September (36) was generally an extension of the 1967 average (31). The more advanced weapons of the NVA have brought about the enemy's increased rate of mortar, rocket, and artillery activity. These and other details of the current trends in the enemy offensive pattern are exhibited on the following graphs.

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ENEMY ATTACKS IN I CTZ PROVINCES 1 OCT 1966 - 30 SEP 1967



GROUND ATTACKS

ATTACKS BY MORTAR, ROCKET OR ARTILLERY

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-Kit Carson Scouts

During the month, the sixty-seven Kit Carson Scouts attached to Marine units participated in 467 patrols. The volunteer Chieu Hoi returnees were directly responsible for killing two Viet Cong, finding three weapons and uncovering three caves with tunnel complexes. But more important, the Scouts discovered thirty explosive devices which, if left in place, could have maimed or killed Marines.

An example of the aggressiveness and spirit of the Scouts took place during an enemy ambush of a patrol on 14 September, three miles north of Phu Bai. A Scout was next to the lead Marine moving through the brush, when an intense burst of fire was directed at the patrol, severely wounding the Scout and five others. Disregarding his painful wound, the Scout remained in his position and delivered a heavy volume of suppressive fire which successfully thwarted the enemy attack.

Of interest also during the month was the effective monitoring of an enemy radio transmission by a scout accompanying a Marine reconnaissance patrol in the region approximately twelve miles northwest of Hue. From the radio intercepts, he discovered that his patrol was being watched by an enemy observation post which was directing another enemy unit to establish an ambush. The Scout quickly relayed this information to the patrol leader, and the Viet Cong attempt was foiled.

-Combined Action Units

The Combined Action program, initiated by Marines in August, 1965 to improve the effectiveness of Popular Forces - the local militia - again contributed to III MAF's


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
counterguerrilla campaign, conducting 5,524 patrols and ambushes. Results included forty-five confirmed enemy killed, twelve enemy captured and forty-eight weapons seized. This compares favorably with previous months, as depicted below.

COMBINED ACTION UNIT ACTIVITY


NIGHT OPERATIONS




DAY OPERATIONS



ENEMY KILLED



ENEMY CAPTURED




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-Sting Ray Patrols

Sting Ray patrols, inserted deep into enemy dominated regions to locate and direct fire on enemy units, killed 88 enemy during September with air strikes, artillery missions, and small arms fire.

The monsoon season is expected to limit Sting Ray effectiveness from October through January, due to limited visibility and poor flying weather. A graphic portrayal of Sting Ray operations conducted for the past year is shown below.

CASUALTIES IN STING RAY OPERATIONS

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

The Revolutionary Development program in I Corps registered moderate gains in September, following the successful completion of balloting in the national elections. Pacification gains were registered in twenty-four villages within the III MAF tactical areas and, within the RD Priority Areas, the ARVN achieved noteworthy results, conducting 21 operations in support of RD, during which over 400 enemy were killed.

Other noteworthy achievements were seen in the RD Team program. By the end of the month, 125 teams were functioning in I CTZ, an increase of 4 teams from August which brings the total within 13 of the number needed to meet the 1967 GVN goal (138).

A critical factor, which affected RD activities (as well as virtually everything else in I CTZ) was the onset of the northeast monsoon. In September, the downpour ranged from 16 inches at Danang to 20 inches near Phu Bai. It slowed RD construction, impaired security and communications, upset transportation schedules and hampered commerce.

Despite the interference created by the continuing monsoon, September closed on a note of promise of even greater Revolutionary Development progress in the future. The impending insertion of a fourth US Army brigade into I Corps, scheduled for early October, will permit movement of additional Marine forces northward to Quang Tri while also strengthening III MAF in and near the coastal RD Priority Areas.

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Pacification Progress

The September evaluation of villages within the III MAF tactical areas at Danang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai again disclosed moderate pacification progress. Twenty-four villages improved in status, seven of them sufficiently to advance to higher categories on the III MAF evaluation scale. Only six villages sustained losses, and none of these moved to a lower category.


Evaluation also disclosed marked progress within the tactical area at Duc Pho, where ten villages gained, including two which moved to higher categories. In northern I Corps, where enemy activity was heaviest, the status of pacification remained almost unchanged this month. One village increased on the pacification scale; none lost ground.

On the following pages, five maps depict the status of RD progress in the Danang, Phu Bai, Chu Lai, Duc Pho areas and in northern I Corps. These are followed by a series of graphs showing the growth of local government and improvement of village security in those areas.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - DANANG AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67
Under 20%	667	630	645	144,747	132,088	193,826	34	32	44
20%	52	65	83	86,425	79,448	55,464	19	17	13
40%	84	102	83	84,892	93,031	66,422	16	18	15
60%	102	75	66	85,718	68,337	89,175	17	15	16
80%	94	127	151	339,243	366,533	409,640	18	22	24
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	999	999	1,048	741,025	739,437	814,527	104	104	112

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - CHU LAI AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67
Under 20%	207	156	213	100,272	63,389	65,940	25	19	22
20%	68	105	43	32,168	52,289	24,475	6	10	5
40%	69	53	96	46,365	36,962	60,161	8	7	8
60%	87	85	57	36,316	41,705	51,567	7	7	11
80%	81	133	124	62,457	75,736	57,291 *	11	14	11
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	532	532	533	277,578	270,081	279,424*	57	57	57

* Reflects minor census adjustment.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - PHU BAI AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67
Under 20%	40	41	35	10,381	10,381	11,199	11	11	11
20%	41	41	17	9,524	9,524	3,585	2	2	1
40%	17	—	—	8,049	—	—	1	—	—
60%	8	24	63	5,296	14,345	29,003	1	2	4
80%	56	56	47	33,787	33,787	22,734 *	7	7	6
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	162	162	162	66,037	66,037	66,521 *	22	22	22


* Reflects minor census adjustment.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS - DUC PHO AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES		CIVILIAN POPULATION		VILLAGES	
	MAR-67	SEP-67	MAR-67	SEP-67	MAR-67	SEP-67
Under 20%	—	—	—	—	—	—
20%	43	36	32,799	28,466 *	6	6
40%	—	89	—	54,711	—	8
60%	—	32	—	18,669	—	4
80%	—	5	—	7,133	—	1
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	43	162	32,799	108,979 *	6	19

* Reflects minor census adjustment.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN NORTHERN I CTZ



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	OCT-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	OCT-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	OCT-66	MAR-67	SEP-67
Under 20%	—	—	51	—	—	5,275	—	—	3
20%	—	—	13	—	—	4,641	—	—	1
40%	—	29 *	44	—	4,803 *	14,719	—	2 *	3
60%	102	119	63	18,014	19,884	17,216	6	7	6
80%	10	23	37	10,799	13,654	15,277	2	3	3
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	112	171 *	208	28,813	38,341 *	57,128	8	12 *	16

* Adjusted total


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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN III MAF AREAS*

DATA AREA COMPLETE



*Danang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Duc Pho, northern I CTZ

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RD Progress Evaluation

Since July, there has been a progressive evaluation of pacification progress as measured according to the Marine system and the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Although the HES technique was based originally on the Marine system, and while there remains a considerable similarity between the two systems, they differ in several important areas. The HES is oriented at the hamlet level, while the Marine system is based on village status. HES uses a letter grading scale, while the Marine system employs a 100-point numerical scale. HES derives its information from the advisor system; the Marine program utilizes the military structure for its information. The grading system of HES is not weighted, each of its six measurement categories being accorded equal importance. The Marine system assigns security factors more importance than civil factors. The result is that the HES assessment is oriented more directly upon administrative, political and economic matters, while the Marine system is oriented more toward measurement of military conditions. Thus, there may be considerable variation between the scores of the two systems for individual villages.

Nevertheless, and despite these understandable differences in emphasis, the two systems co-relate reasonably well. They are complementary and tell generally the same overall story about conditions in the countryside of I CTZ, although the Marine system tells a story one or two months more current. A test was made, using reports on the 224 villages in the Marine areas for the months of July and August (the latter being the most recent HES report). In the test, a hamlet which moved up or down one letter-grade according to HES was listed under the appropriate "gain or loss" column.

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Similarly, a village which moved up or down one 20 percentile in the Marine system was shown as a corresponding loss or gain. The results are shown here.

1967	HES (HAMLETS)			MARINES (VILLAGES)		
	GAIN	LOSS	NET	GAIN	LOSS	NET
JULY	62	53	+9	8	4	+4
AUGUST	45	5	+40	13	3	+10
TOTAL	107	58	+49	21	7	+14

The figures above exhibit general agreement on July and August pacification level changes between the two systems. It is significant that both systems reflect change in the same direction and, on the basis that there is an average of four hamlets per village, the numbers co-relate reasonably well.

To assess the correlation on a village-by-village basis in a single month, a second test was undertaken. A technique for making gross estimates of equivalents between the two systems was devised. This was based on three categories, generally representing villages which are at an advanced stage of pacification (Category I), those at an intermediate

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level (Category II), and those in the early stages where much remains to be done (Category III). Accordingly, the following table of equivalents was used:

HES GRADE	MARINE SCORE	EQUIVALENT CATEGORY
A or B	100% to 70%	I
C	69% to 35%	II
D, E or V	34% to 0%	III

In order to conduct the test, a HES village grade was developed, based on the average grade of its hamlets. Then, using the table above, each village was given two grades: one based on its HES grade and the other based on the score according to the Marine system. Again, the systems tended to converge.

Eighty-seven (78%) of the 112 villages turned out to have the same category grade, and only 11 (less than 10%) differed in a gross degree.

In sum, the two systems tended to validate and reinforce each other. HES offers an evaluation in areas where there is little US military presence, while the Marine program gives an in-depth appraisal in areas under our influence. The Marine system will continue to be used in this series for the areas accessible to US military reporting and the HES reports will be employed in addressing other areas.

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
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ARVN Contributions to RD

During late August and early September, ARVN forces in I Corps were engaged in providing close-in protection for polling places, in what proved to be an effective effort to prevent enemy interference with the September 3rd national elections. Behind an outer protective screen of III MAF forces, the ARVN, with national and local police and Regional and Popular Force elements, succeeded in providing the protection required to free I Corps voters of Viet Cong intimidation. The degree of their success can best be judged by the I Corps voter turnout of over 86%.

Following the elections, there was little letdown in the ARVN activity in support of RD. Twenty-one search and destroy operations were conducted during the month, just short of the record of 24 RD support operations undertaken in August. The September total, which greatly exceeded the 1967 average of 12 operations per month, accounted for 403 enemy killed, 93 others captured and 116 weapons captured.

ARVN units have been employed in direct support of RD only since the start of 1967. As shown on the graphs below, the ARVN effort has had a steadily increasing effect.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF ARVN UNITS SUPPORTING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

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By end September, GVN forces committed to the direct support of the RD program in I CTZ included fourteen ARVN battalions, one Regional Force battalion, twenty-six Regional Force companies and 191 Popular Force platoons. In general, these support activities involve aiding the provincial RD plan by driving enemy units out of villages and hamlets before RD Teams are inserted therein, while conducting extensive patrolling and other counter guerrilla activities to ensure that the enemy does not reenter previously cleared areas.

In one action during the month, the ARVN demonstrated creditable strength in dealing with the enemy. Early on September 6th, an attack was launched on the Quang Tin provincial headquarters at Tam Ky, defended by elements of the 6th ARVN Infantry Regiment. The enemy force, later identified as the 70th Battalion, 1st Viet Cong Regiment and the 72nd Viet Cong Local Force Battalion, began the action with an intense mortar and recoilless rifle preparation, followed by a ground attack. The ARVN positions were severely tested but the defending force held fast and, with close air support, repelled the enemy, killing 217 Viet Cong while sustaining 22 killed and 60 wounded, themselves.

Among other highlights of ARVN activity in support of RD last month was Operation Lam Son 120, a multi-battalion operation conducted during the period 5-8 September in the Thua Thien RD Priority Area, east of Hue, which resulted in 78 VC killed and 11 captured. Within the Quang Ngai priority area, two multi-battalion size operations conducted during the month netted 194 enemy killed, 50 captured and 58 weapons seized.

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Revolutionary Development Teams

Despite coordinated enemy opposition, Revolutionary Development Teams improved in both growth and performance in September. Four new teams were formed during the month, bringing the total number functioning in I CTZ to 125. This represented an improvement over the growth rate achieved in recent months, when the GVN averaged just over one team formed per month. If the present rate continues for the remaining months of the year, the 1967 goal of 138 teams deployed should be very nearly achieved.

A typical example of effective RD Team performance was evidenced during the month by one of those deployed in the hamlet of Da Ngan, just north of Quang Ngai City. This team has already completed 60% of its assigned mission after only two months in the hamlet. It has encouraged and supported numerous self-help projects such as reconstruction of over 600 meters of fence previously damaged by the Viet Cong, the digging of 8 wells, and the repair of hamlet roads and culverts. In addition, in this short time, the team has completed a census in the hamlet and created a functioning local intelligence net to expose the enemy infrastructure. Partially as a result of knowledge obtained through this intelligence system, three enemy attacks were repelled in September.


Chieu Hoi Program

In September, there was a sharp decline in the number of Chieu Hoi ralliers in the I Corps. Seventy three returnees materialized during the month, far below the 1967 monthly average of two hundred. In considering possible reasons for the decrease, it has been noted that the preponderance of the US/GVN psychological warfare effort in September was directed at matters

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dealing with the national elections rather than appeals for ralliers. It is interesting, though perhaps coincidental, that a similar drop occurred last April, at the start of the Vietnamese local elections. The graph below shows Chieu Hoi results this year and in 1966.



Combined Action Program

Again in September, the Combined Action program failed to keep pace with its 1967 growth schedule. Only one new platoon was formed (at Danang). All told, 1,343 Marines and Navy corpsmen and 2,074 Popular Forces members were assigned to Combined Action units at the end of the month.

The 1967 Combined Action plan calls for expansion to 4 group headquarters, 19 company headquarters and 114 platoons. To man these, authorization was requested

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in April from the Secretary of Defense for 799 Marines and 49 Navy corpsmen, in addition to the 1,112 Marines and 74 corpsmen now authorized. Currently, this increase has been approved for planning purposes but final approval is pending. In the meantime, a further draw-down has been levied by CG, III MAF against the already thin III MAF personnel resources in order to man the presently organized units at their current level.

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BASE DEFENSEAir Base Loading

The major changes in the aircraft population of the six major air bases in I CTZ during the month were:

-VMFA-122 with 15 F-4 aircraft arrived at Danang from El Toro on 1 September. On the same day VMF(AW) 232 was reassigned to El Toro.

-VMA-121 replaced VMA-211 at Chu Lai on 5 September in a routine intra-theater rotation and VMA-211 was redeployed to Iwakuni.

-HMM-361 was moved from Dong Ha to Marble Mountain on 14 September, and thereby was removed from the continual threat of an attack from enemy long range artillery located in and north of the DMZ.


-At Phu Bai on 28 September, the 190th Army Aviation Company, with 31 UH-1 helicopters, joined III MAF. This unit will provide temporary helicopter augmentation while Marine CH-46's are undergoing modification.

The end of the month aircraft population of the major bases in I Corps was as is shown in the map on the next page.

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AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT MAJOR AIRFIELDS 1 CTZ AS OF 30 SEP 1967



Note: 80 Marine aircraft undergoing repair or maintenance out-of-country.

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September Enemy Attacks of Combat Bases and Major Airfields

Danang sustained attacks by enemy 140mm rockets twice during the month. One attack, on 2 September, was described in the August issue of this series. On 9 September, Danang received its second attack as the enemy fired three rockets, killing one US airman and wounding eleven others. One F-4C, one A-1E and a barracks were damaged. An air observer detected the launch, and soon thereafter Marine ground forces located eight abandoned rockets, four miles southwest of the airfield. These abandoned weapons gave testimony of the enemy's hasty departure.

In conjunction with enemy attacks on other military installations in the Phu Bai area early on the morning of 1 September, the Phu Bai Combat Base received a twenty minute, sixty round barrage of 60 and 82mm mortar fire. Three Marines and one US soldier were killed, and forty-nine Marines and three soldiers were wounded. Only fourteen of the wounded were injured severely enough to warrant medical evacuation.

During sixteen days of the month, a total of 146 rounds of mixed artillery, mortar and rocket rounds struck the Dong Ha Combat Base, nine miles south of the DMZ. The single noteworthy attack occurred when forty-one artillery rounds fell on the base early in the morning of 3 September. Forty Marines and two US Army personnel were wounded; however, only one Marine required medical evacuation. An ammunition storage area and a fuel farm were destroyed, and seventeen helicopters, fourteen of which had already been damaged in earlier action, received moderate to heavy damage. Response

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by III MAF counterbattery fire and air strikes was immediate. In addition, twenty-nine friendly aircraft, airborne at the time of the attack, were diverted to bomb the enemy artillery position. Three secondary explosions were observed as a result of the air strikes.

III MAF Countermeasures

Varying tactical, geographic, and civilian populace considerations influence the offensive and defensive measures taken in defense of the major, fixed Marine installations. The massive defensive efforts being executed in the defense of the Danang vital area (which may be reached by the enemy's rockets from any point within an area of 200 square miles, in which 300,000 Vietnamese live) are larger in scale, but typical, of the measures taken in defense of the five other major airfields shown on page 51.

The July edition of this series depicts graphically the rocket belt around the vital area of Danang. Swung on two arcs of 12,000 and 8,000 meters respectively, the belt represents both the maximum range from which a rocket attack can be launched, and the most likely areas of maximum penetration by enemy launching units.

Among the major preventive actions now being taken within this belt are: centralized control of all aspects of the counter-rocket effort; an intensive program of patrols and ambushes, to the number of some 800 daily; thrice-daily overflights of the rocket belt itself, by aerial observers, including one flight at dusk; increased overflights of the numerous possible avenues of approach, to the limit of reconnaissance aircraft availability; the delivery of a daily average of 2,400 H & I rounds and 12 air strikes on likely avenues of approach; thrice-weekly counter rocket drills by all control and troop elements committed to the counter-rocket effort; and institution of

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a detailed waterway control plan, which includes positive control of the extensive system of waterways flowing into and within the rocket belt; denial, in coordination with the GVN province chief, of traffic 24 hours a day on certain waterway segments, and an 1800 - 0600 curfew on all other segments.

Nevertheless, it remains clear that indirect fire attacks against the fixed major air fields in I CTZ will continue to remain an enemy capability, despite the intensive preventive efforts. In no other type of engagement can the enemy hope to achieve such dramatic results, with the commitment of so small a force.

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AIR OPERATIONSFixed Wing

During the month, Marine fixed wing aircraft flew 6,674 combat and combat support sorties in support of III MAF and other Free World forces within I Corps, North Vietnam and Laos. This brought the 1967 total number of sorties to within approximately seven hundred of the 60,544 sorties flown during the whole of 1966. The monthly effort was hampered somewhat by the unseasonably early arrival of the northeast monsoon. The associated rain, low clouds and fog caused cancellation of 332 fixed wing sorties during the month, compared with 79 during the same period in 1966. The weather limitation was met, in part, by a substantial increase in radar bombing, employing the TPQ-10 air support radar.

- TPQ-10 Operations

Presently two Marine Air Support Squadrons (MASS-2 and 3) are in-country, with five TPQ-10 equipped Air Support Radar Teams. Each radar team is capable of controlling an aircraft in bombing of targets at distances up to fifty miles from the radar site, during all weather conditions. Teams are positioned at Chu Lai, Danang and Phu Bai, while two are located at Dong Ha in order to permit the conduct of two controlled bombing attacks simultaneously in the DMZ.


I CTZ and the DMZ area are covered effectively by the TPQ-10 radar. If required, 945 sorties per day, at a sustained rate, could be flown under TPQ-10 control; 315 flights of two aircraft each and the remainder with one aircraft. This is far in excess of the number of sorties that can be generated daily with current aircraft assets.

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
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Following is a map illustrating TPQ-10 operations and the relatively low target weather cancellation rate of sorties due to the all weather attack control capability of the TPQ-10.


MARINE AIR SUPPORT RADAR TEAM LOCATIONS & COVERAGE



TPQ-10 SORTIES



IN-COUNTRY BOMB TONNAGE DELIVERED



-South Vietnam

Marine pilots flew 4,560 in-country attack sorties, nearly 70% of them in response to the requirements of ground forces attacking the enemy during large unit operations. In all, 32,550 bombs, 5,702 rockets, 98,139 rounds of 20mm ammunition and 2,540 napalm bombs were delivered against enemy targets, which compares favorably with past performances. The total tonnage of bombs - 8,136 - exceeded the 1967 monthly average by 422 tons.

The result of this effort was 403 enemy dead - the highest in 1967 save May - another 325 probably killed, 44 artillery positions destroyed, 98 rocket positions destroyed, and 357 secondary explosions and fires ignited.

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Of interest during the month was the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's campaign against the known enemy activity in A Shau Valley. Intelligence sources, which included air-borne sensors, gave evidence during the spring and summer that the A Shau Valley, which lies parallel to the Laotian border 30 miles west-southwest of Hue, remained a major infiltration route for enemy troops and supplies. A campaign was therefore developed to create barrier points, by overlapping bomb craters within the valley, to impede enemy personnel movement and to halt vehicular traffic. III MAF assigned the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as coordinator and within a six day period, 7 through 12 September, two barriers were established, one at the northwestern end of the valley, the other approximately at midpoint. Precision dive bombing by Marine attack and fighter aircraft developed, along with damage already present, the required overlapping craters within the barriers. In addition, area bombing by three B-52 strikes in the vicinity of the barriers, contributed to their effectiveness. All told, 274 sorties were flown by Marine pilots and 27 B-52 sorties were flown by Air Force pilots. As shown by subsequent daily photographic surveillance flights, this endeavor rendered the two points impassable to vehicular traffic. Rain, filling craters with water and forming mud from the loose soil, further enhanced the barrier's effectiveness. Maintenance of the barriers was continued during the month by TPQ-10 controlled attacks.

In addition to the in-country attack endeavor, 1,013 other sorties were flown, including 818 reconnaissance flights which were capable of providing III MAF only a small portion of that aerial reconnaissance coverage required for continued operations.

-North Vietnam and Laos

A total of 1,101 out of country sorties were flown, a slight decrease of 167 from that flown during August. This was due mainly to low ceilings and poor visibility; 141 sor-

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ties were cancelled due to base, target or enroute weather. Marine aircraft flew 842 attack sorties and devoted 81%, or 772 sorties, to the attack of enemy artillery, troop and logistics positions and areas in the southern portion of North Vietnam. A total of 10,661 air strikes were conducted in North Vietnam by Marine, Navy and Air Force aircraft, of which 48% were flown in the southern-most Route Package. For a further discussion of the air effort in and directly north of the DMZ see the large unit chapter of this edition.

Other out of country sorties included 47 reconnaissance flights which provided intelligence imagery and 198 ECM flights which provided electronic protection to attacking aircraft.

-A-6A Intruders

A-6A Intruders of Marine All Weather Attack Squadrons 242 and 533 delivered 26% of the total Marine ordnance tonnage dropped by fixed wing strike aircraft during the period 1-20 September, while flying only 12.4% of the sorties. Over 79% of the A-6A sorties were flown at night or under instrument flying conditions.

During September, Intruders flew 223 deep support missions into North Vietnam, of which 219 were at night, and delivered 3,881 bombs.

Helicopter Operations

During September, Marine helicopters of III MAF and the Special Landing Forces flew 42,202 sorties, transported 47,891 personnel and lifted 6,622 tons of cargo in support of ground forces throughout I Corps. 7.5% of the III MAF helicopter hours were committed to support of other than Marine forces, compared with 13% during August. For example, 3,648 flights were devoted to the support of ROK Marines during operation Dragon Fire, during which endeavor nearly two thousand troops were transported

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and over 750 tons of cargo lifted.

In all, the total personnel and cargo lifted was a decline from the record performance of August, due mainly to the loss of the substantial lift capability of the CH-46 during the month.

-The CH-46 Situation

The August summary provided a brief statement of the accidents which made it necessary to restrict to combat use III MAF's CH-46 helicopters.

During September, an on-site investigation of the CH-46 was conducted by representatives of Naval Air Systems Command; Aviation Safety Center; Headquarters, FMFPac; and the Boeing/Vertol Company. Although the specific causes of the CH-46 accidents were varied, it was established that the ultimate structural failures occurred in the area of the after pylon. Modifications, primarily structural reinforcement and system changes, have been directed and will begin in October on forty aircraft pre-positioned at the Marine Corps Air Facility, Futema, Okinawa. This modification program, which will require about 1,000 man hours per helicopter, will be performed by personnel of the Boeing/Vertol Company. Marines will disassemble and reassemble the aircraft.

Modification of all West Pac aircraft, including those presently undergoing progressive aircraft rework in Japan, will be completed by the end of this calendar year. CH-46's of the 3d Marine Aircraft wing at Santa Ana, California will undergo a similar program, with thirty aircraft of HMM-364 to be completed by 10 November followed by immediate deployment to WestPac.


The necessity for correcting promptly the aircraft's structural deficiencies is underscored by the fact that the 105 Marine CH-46's in the western Pacific represent 48%

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
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of the cargo lift and 47% of the personnel lift capability. The graphs below reflect the loss of this lift capability.

PERSONNEL TRANSPORTED BY HELICOPTER



CARGO LIFTED BY HELICOPTER



To augment the present 1st Marine Aircraft Wing assets and to sustain the general mobility of III MAF and ARVN forces, while the modification is in progress, ten Marine CH-53 and twenty-three Marine UH-34 helicopters will be shipped to WestPac during October. In addition, thirty-one US Army UH-1's were placed under the operational control of CG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing on 28 September.

Aircraft Combat Losses and Damage

-Fixed Wing

September saw the loss of five fixed wing aircraft; three F-4B's, one RF-4B and one A-4E, all due to enemy antiaircraft fire. This compares with four in August and three in July, bringing the total number of Marine aircraft lost in action, since March 1965, to fifty-nine. In addition, thirty-eight aircraft received combat damage during the month. Two of these required extensive repair, while the

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remaining thirty-six received light damage which Marine maintenance personnel could repair.

-Helicopters

The loss of four helicopters, three UH-34's and one UH-1E, brought the total number of Marine rotary wing aircraft lost to enemy ground fire to 114, since March of 1965. This monthly loss of four compares with eight during August, four of which were damaged beyond repair during the enemy artillery, mortar and rocket attacks on Dong Ha and Marble Mountain. There were an additional 148 helicopters damaged, twelve severely. This was forty-six more than August, which attests to the increased intensity of enemy ground fire.

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LOGISTICS

Logistic support of Marine forces remained satisfactory throughout the month, although operations were noticeably affected by both enemy artillery and rocket fire on logistic support areas in Northern Quang Tri, and by the initial phase of the northeast monsoon. In spite of these impediments, support was furnished 13 III MAF large-unit operations and 37,285 small unit actions.

On 3 and 4 September the III MAF combat base at Dong Ha received intense artillery and mortar fire from positions in and north of the DMZ. The specific major material losses sustained by 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Logistic Command, and Seabee installations there are listed at the end of this chapter.

Port Construction and Operations

Cua Viet- This port has a ramp accommodation for two LST, three LCU and three LCM. These ramps are essentially complete. Seabees are laying a 40,000 square yard soil-cement staging area, completion of which is scheduled for 1 November. The throughput capability of the port has been limited by shoals in the river mouth, caused partly by the effects of the monsoon rain.

The continuing vulnerability of III MAF's northern Quang Tri bases and positions to enemy artillery north of the Ben Hai was emphasized on the 26th, when the Navy dredge Davidson was attacked by enemy artillery fire in the Cua Viet channel. Having been bracketed on successive dredging runs, the Davidson was forced to confine its dredging efforts to the hours of darkness. The dredging effort in the channel is expected to be finished by 1 November. By 1 January 1968, the daily throughput capability of the Cua Viet port is expected to reach 3,000 M/T.

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Dong Ha - Due to the 17 inch rainfall in mid-September, the river crested at seven feet above normal, making upriver passage slow and difficult. At the same time, four LCU ramps at the port were three-fourths under water for several days, precluding their use by landing craft. Except for the clearing of the siltage caused by the heavy rains, no additional construction work is being undertaken. By 1 January 1968, tonnage arriving at Dong Ha, through Cua Viet, is expected to reach 3,000 M/T daily.

Hue-Tan My - Movement of the Red Beach pontoon causeway, now at Danang, to Tan My will be completed, and the causeway in operation at Tan My, by 1 November. In addition to this new one-LST capability at Tan My, four additional LST ramps are under construction there, with an estimated completion date of 1 January 1968. By this date, the daily throughput capability of the Hue-Tan My port is expected to reach 1,800 M/T.

Northern I CTZ Port/Airfield Facility Summary

The total northern I CTZ tonnage requirement, by port, together with the current, and anticipated 1 January 1968, throughput capability of the various port facilities, is indicated on the following page. It is followed by a similar presentation for airfields. All tonnage received through III MAF airfields supplements seaport throughputs. With the increase in port capabilities anticipated by 1 January 1968, air shipments should diminish, but will still represent a significant reserve capability.

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CURRENT AREA TONNAGE REQUIREMENTSVSPORT THROUGHPUT CAPABILITY

<u>Port</u>	<u>Daily Requirements</u>	<u>Daily Throughput Capability</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Cua Viet/ Dong Ha	2,800 M/T	1,500 M/T	-1,300 M/T
Hue/Tan My	1,600 M/T	1,250 M/T	-350 M/T

ANTICIPATED (1 JAN 68) TONNAGE REQUIREMENTSVSPORT THROUGHPUT CAPABILITY

<u>Port</u>	<u>Daily Requirements</u>	<u>Daily Throughput Capability</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Cua Viet/ Dong Ha	2,800 M/T	3,000 M/T	+200 M/T
Hue/Tan My	1,600 M/T	1,800 M/T	+200 M/T

AIRFIELD THROUGHPUT CAPABILITY

<u>Airfield</u>	<u>Daily Current Capability</u>	<u>Daily Capability by 1 November</u>
Phu Bai	800 M/T	800 M/T
Dong Ha	400 M/T	800 M/T
Quang Tri	(under construction)	800 M/T

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Construction of C-130 Capable Airfield at Quang Tri City

Seabees continued their work on the C-130 airfield under construction 2 1/2 miles northwest of Quang Tri city. The 3,600 foot, aluminum matting runway and the 500-man cantonment is scheduled for completion by 1 November. The companion helicopter pad, on which 57 helicopters will be initially accommodated, should be finished by 20 November. Seventy aircraft revetments are planned at the field, of which 4 will be large enough to handle C-130's. Twenty ARMCO revetments are being moved from Dong Ha to the new airfield, while 4,200 lineal feet of 8 foot high revetment sections are ready at Danang for subsequent movement to the field.

Preparations for the Monsoon Season

Planning and preparation for the northeast monsoon season began even while the 1966-67 monsoon was underway. It was recognized that shipping schedules and distribution systems would be disrupted, bridges and roads washed out, and that a general increase in the problems associated with supply and maintenance operations would occur during the forthcoming adverse weather conditions.

Based on lessons learned in past monsoons, several specific actions were taken to eliminate potential problem areas. The principal of these are summarized below.

-Supply

The expected increase in requirements for spare parts initiated revised requisitioning objectives. Where possible, increased requirements have been stated and action taken to have these items either on hand or in the pipeline. The following have been, and are being, procured on an accelerated basis: rain clothing and individual equipment; weapons cleaning and preservative materials; general

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purpose tents; poncho liners; blankets; field jackets; plastic siding for enclosing tropical structures; shower shoes, wool shirts and medical supplies.

-Maintenance

Organizational maintenance has been stressed, as well as driver training and maintenance under poor weather conditions.

-Construction of Covered Storage and Maintenance Facilities

Upon completion at the end of the month of the 16 buildings now under construction at the Force Logistic Command at Danang, 64,000 additional square feet of covered storage and maintenance space will be available at that place. This leaves a covered storage shortfall of about 100,000 square feet, which is programmed to be eliminated during calendar year 1968. An additional 48,000 square feet of covered storage space, and 78,420 square feet of covered maintenance space, was completed at the other III MAF bases. Construction of open storage areas at FLC is also progressing rapidly, where two hardstand lots totaling 44,467 square yards were complete except for surfacing. Still under construction throughout III MAF are an additional 112,000 square feet of maintenance facilities. The FLC at Danang was also allocated 944,340 square feet of steel matting during September, which will be used as surfacing material.

Engineer Operations

The onset of the northeast monsoon, which dropped 17 inches of rain on Dong Ha in three days, imposed increased burdens on III MAF engineers. Upgrading and maintenance of lines of communications, however, continued,

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with III MAF engineers and Seabees repairing two culverts which had been washed away, and three bridges which, through flooding, had been made impassable. Repairs to numerous short stretches of washed-out roadway, three floating bridges, and eleven fixed bridges, were accomplished.

Work also continued on the upgrading of airfields throughout I Corps. At Ky Ha a 50' X 600' apron was graded, rock placed, rolled and covered with asphalt. This project eliminated the need for steel matting. The seal coat on the Phu Bai runway, taxiways and parking aprons was completed. The spare parts required for repair of the catapult at Chu Lai are now on hand and the catapult should be in full operation by 20 October. Repairs to the subgrade of the Chu Lai runway, which required temporary removal of 37,500 square feet of runway matting, have been completed. Additionally, a new concrete slab at the catapult site on the crosswind runway was completed by the end of the month. Fifteen hundred feet of rock base has been laid on the Khe Sanh runway, a project which is proceeding in 1500-foot increments.

The Ha Tanh dam near Danang, is now 50% completed. When finished in approximately six weeks, weather permitting, the dam will provide irrigation and flood control of a 12,500 hectare area, and will permit the harvesting of an additional crop of rice (making an annual total of two crops).

-Bridge and Road Improvement

Nine bridges of varying capacities were completed during the month, including a 658' M4 floating bridge at Danang. Three additional bridges were still under construction. During September, III MAF engineers also operated five ferries, constructed 3.4 miles of new road,

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continued construction of 55.4 miles of road and maintained 158.7 miles of existing road. There has been no appreciable reduction of logistic movement on Route 9 from Dong Ha to Thon Son Lam as a result of artillery and rocket attacks. The road remains open.

-Additional Construction Projects

During September, Marine engineers completed 94 bunkers and 5 new wells, while 6 more wells are in progress. Additionally, water purification units produced 13,984,245 gallons of potable water. Production of crushed rock (9,819 cubic yards during the month) remained far below the overall I CTZ requirement of 75,000 cubic yards per month. The three crushers presently on hand are each rated at only 50 tons per hour. Because of age, and consequent continuing breakdown, they cannot provide even the 12,000 cubic yards per month required by each of the three Force Engineer battalions now in country. This represents a major material deficiency.

Supply

Class I - Sufficient stocks were on hand to sustain all elements of III MAF.

Class II - Stocks remained adequate to support all tactical operations.

Instructions were provided to III MAF and 3d Force Service Regiment on the introduction of the M151A1 1/4 ton truck into I Corps. This vehicle will replace the M422A1 "Mighty Mite" and the M38A1 "Jeep". One thousand and fifty M151A1s will be prepositioned on Okinawa prior to January 1968, to be used to fill table of equipment shortages, and to replace those in-country M422A1 and M38A1 vehicles in poorest condition. The 1050 M151A1 trucks represent approximately fifty percent of the authorized allowance for III MAF in-country.

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Pending completion of the replacement program, Force Logistic Command has been authorized limited cannibalization of the M422A1 and M38A1 vehicles.

As an additional measure of assistance, one hundred M422A1 engines were air shipped to WestPac to assist III MAF in maintaining current assets of these vehicles until the replacement vehicles become available.

Class III - Sufficient stocks were available to sustain all III MAF tactical operations. The POL stocks which were destroyed by the enemy attack during 3-4 September at Dong Ha have been reconstituted.

Class IV - Stock levels remained sufficient to satisfy the daily demands of tactical operations.

Class V - Sufficient stocks were maintained to satisfy all requirements of III MAF.

Shipments of Supplies

During September, III MAF shipped a total of 8,582 M/T of retrograde cargo, of which 1,106 M/T moved by amphibious ships, and 7,476 M/T by MSTs. As of 30 September, 4,962 M/T of retrograde cargo were awaiting shipment. Cargo shipped within I Corps by III MAF during the month was 62,691 M/T.

Medical

In September, 2,537 patients were admitted to the four major organic medical treatment facilities in I Corps - Dong Ha, Phu Bai, Danang, and Chu Lai. Of the 2,537 direct admissions, battle injuries accounted for 1,233, non-battle injuries for 374, and disease for 930 admissions; 772 patients were evacuated out-of-country, 11 died in III MAF facilities, and 317 remained hospitalized as of midnight, 30 September.

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Aviation Logistics

During September, forty-four aircraft underwent Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) at various aircraft plants in Japan, while thirty-six others were under repair for combat damage. The total of eighty aircraft undergoing depot level maintenance out-of-country exceeded August's total by thirteen.

	<u>PAR</u>	<u>Repair of Combat Damage</u>
A-4E	6	9
TA4F	-	1
F-4B	6	2
RF-4B	-	1
F-8E	3	2
TF-9J	2	-
A-6A	-	1
CH-46A	18	1
UH-1E	9	4
UH-34D	-	11
C-117D	-	1
CH-53A	-	3









September NORS/NORM data for selected Marine aircraft in WestPac are displayed on the following page.

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NORS/NORM RATES-WESTPAC AIRCRAFT



* Readiness Objective not established

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8 - Inch Howitzer, SP, M110

During September, the 8 Inch Howitzer, Self-Propelled, M110 was introduced into RVN as a replacement weapon for the 8 Inch Howitzer, SP, M55, which is being phased out of the Marine Corps inventory. The replacement will be on a one-for-one basis, for a total of 14. An additional four M110's will be placed in the maintenance float. Intended for use as a general support artillery weapon, the M110 weighs 29 tons, is air transportable, has a cruising range of 45 miles and can attain a maximum speed of 34 MPH. This self-propelled howitzer fires a 200 pound high explosive projectile to a maximum range of 16,930 meters.

Material Losses at Dong Ha, 3-4 September

The specific major material losses sustained as a result of enemy mortar and artillery fires at Dong Ha are listed on the following pages.

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MATERIAL LOSSES AT DONG HA
3-4 SEPTEMBER

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
Mogas (42,000 gals)	X	
Diesel fuel (28,000 gals)	X	
JP-4 (11,000 gals)	X	
Aviation gas (56,000 gals)	X	
Ammunition (15,000 short tons)	X	
Troop hut	57	65
Quonset hut	-	5
Butler building	-	4
Messhall	1	2
Maintenance building/ warehouse	1	2
Hospital building	-	1
Tent	32	-
Rough terrain forklift	1	3
Radio set, AN/PRC-25	2	-
Water trailer, 400 gallon	3	1

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MATERIAL LOSSES AT DONG HA
3-4 SEPTEMBER
(Continued)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
Ambulance	1	-
Truck, 1/4 ton	2	3
Truck, 3/4 ton	3	2
Truck, 2 1/2 ton	-	1
Truck, 5 ton	-	4
Truck, dump	-	13
Tractor	-	6
Amphibious Assault Bulk Fuel System	2	-
Small arms weapons	165	-

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CONCLUSIONS

-The enemy sustained a major defeat in the DMZ region in September. However, the defeat was tactical in nature, and his strategic position in the DMZ area has not been altered. When his forces are re-marshalled, there is no reason why he cannot undertake offensive action similar to that in which he was defeated this month.

-The Viet Cong Main Force strength and the guerrilla hold on the countryside continues to be eroded slowly. Revolutionary Development and intensive anti-guerrilla operations are combining to exert heavy pressure on the enemy infrastructure. At the present rate of progress, however, the prospect is still one of a protracted battle.

-US troop deployments in I CTZ have partially redressed the troop imbalance in that area. There still are inadequate forces at hand to do all that needs to be done, within a reasonable time period.

-The substantial troop migration into Northern I CTZ, coming at the same time as the onset of the monsoon, is placing heavy strain on the logistic system. There is, as yet, no prospect that the system will not be able to meet the requirement.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLEa. I Corps/DMZ Summary

The confirmed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong strength in I Corps was estimated at 22,925 at the end of September. An additional force, identified as two reinforced NVA divisions, was located in or north of the Demilitarized Zone with an estimated strength of 19,540, bringing the I Corps/DMZ total to 42,465 enemy, a 430 man increase over the end-August figure.

The principal changes which affected order of battle figures during the month were the addition of the 368B Artillery (Rocket) Regiment and the 802nd NVA Battalion to the confirmed order of battle. Also, other additions totaling 2,180 were made, mainly reflecting increases in various enemy units which were assumed to have had sufficient time, 3-4 months, to have replaced earlier losses.

These strength additions, however, were offset by losses of 2,930 which were assessed against specific units as a result of actions in earlier months. Also, the shift of the 2d VC Regimental headquarters and its 95th Battalion out of I Corps to II Corps lowered enemy strength. Although not reflected as a reduction in enemy strength in the DMZ area, there has been a withdrawal of major elements of the 324B Division from the Con Thien area, north across the Ben Hai River.

While no new SAM sites were identified in the DMZ area, NVN continues to deploy SAM equipment there. Missile equipment was detected on aerial photographs taken on 10 and 11 September in an area 6 miles west of Vinh Linh, and


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SAM radar signals were intercepted on several occasions emanating from just north of the DMZ. In addition, SAM's were unsuccessfully fired at a flight of US Air Force B-52's on 17 September, southwest of Vinh Linh.

The maps which follow depict the September confirmed enemy order of battle. The first of these gives the locations of enemy infantry battalions throughout I Corps. The four remaining maps present a more detailed representation of the locations of enemy units.

ENEMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ/DMZ




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b. DMZ/Quang Tri Province


During the heavy fighting near the DMZ in early September (see the Large Unit section), the 324B, NVA Division was positioned near Con Thien, with elements of the 90th and 812th Regiments and possibly the 903d Regiment surrounding the Marine combat base. Later in the month, following heavy enemy losses, the 90th Regiment and major elements of the 812th Regiment, withdrew northward into the DMZ and NVN. The NVA confirmed strength in the DMZ was 19,540 men at the end of September. Quang Tri totals, as the result of the withdrawal of elements of the 324B Division, have decreased since the first of the month by 4,000, to 3,150 NVA troops.



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c. Thua Thien Province

The confirmed enemy strength in Thua Thien province is estimated at 5,025 men. This total represents a net increase of 720 over the August total of 4,305 men and is attributed mainly to the acceptance of the 802d NVA Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment as a confirmed unit with a strength of 500 men. A Viet Cong unit, formerly known as the 802d Battalion, has now been redesignated as the 804B Battalion.




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
d. Quang Nam/Quang Tin Province

The Quang Nam/Quang Tin order of battle totals rose to 9,825 from the August total 9,060 personnel. Most of this increase resulted from acceptance of the 368B Artillery (Rocket) Regiment, with a strength of 1,400 men, confirmed to be in Quang Nam. By Province, enemy strength at the close of September was 3,555 in Quang Nam and 6,270 in Quang Tin - - the latter was a loss of 825 from last month's total due to recent heavy losses to the 2d NVA Division and other adjustments.



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On 30 September, the confirmed strength of enemy units in Quang Ngai province was 4,925 men, compared to 5,875 men at the end of August. This decrease resulted from movement of the 2d VC Regimental headquarters and its 95th Battalion (720 men) to northern Binh Dinh province in II Corps. Other individual unit strength adjustments showed a net reduction of 950.



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2. ENEMY LOSSES FOR SEPTEMBER (I CTZ)

<u>Enemy losses to III MAF/SLF</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
By Marines	1,731	35	192
By U. S. Army	677	44	155
September Total	2,408	79	347
1967 Total	20,239	1,440	3,718

<u>Enemy losses to other forces</u>			
By ROKMC	404	14	28
By RVNAF	1,331	133	306
By Special Forces/CIDG	26	-	10
By other forces Total (Sep)	1,761	147	344
I CTZ Total (Sep)	4,169	226	691
I CTZ Total (1967)	33,200	2,910	7,611

3. III MAF/SLF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>September</u>			<u>Cumulative</u>
<u>By U. S. Army</u>	<u>By Marines</u>		<u>Total</u>
1,192	26,099	Patrols	315,578
2,511	7,033	Ambushes	119,976
276	174	Company operations	4,849
-	1,087	Sniper posts	14,143
-	5*	Battalion operations	174
2*	6*	Regimental or	80
		larger operations	
-	6,674	Combat/combat	138,599
		support sorties	
50,943	42,202	Helo sorties	1,077,689

*Since monthly figures include operations continued from previous months, they are not used to compute cumulative totals.

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4. MAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF/SLF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>From/To</u>
VMF(AW)-232	1Sep	Danang/CONUS
VMFA-122	1Sep	CONUS/Danang
VMA-121	5Sep	Iwakuni/Chu Lai
VMA-211	8Sep	Chu Lai/Iwakuni
HMM-163	8Sep	Phu Bai/LPH-3
HMM-362	8Sep	LPH-3/Phu Bai
3dBn, 4th Marines	8Sep	Dong Ha/Con Thien
2dBn, 4th Marines	12Sep	Phong Dien/Cam Lo
3dBn, 26th Marines	12Sep	Khe Sanh/Phong Dien
HMM-361	14Sep	Dong Ha/Marble Mtn.
BLT 1/3 (SLF Alpha)	22Sep	ARG "Alpha"/Hoi An
BLT 2/3 (SLF Bravo)	25Sep	ARG "Bravo"/Dong Ha
BLT 1/3 (SLF Alpha)	28Sep	Hoi An/ARG "Alpha"
3dBn, 9th Marines	29Sep	Cam Lo/Con Thien

5. UNITS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL LANDING FORCESSLF ALPHA (TG-79.4)

Battalion Landing Team - 1/3
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron - 362 (1-8Sep)
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron - 163 (8-30Sep)

SLF BRAVO (TG-79.5)

Battalion Landing Team - 2/3
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron - 262

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6. III MAF CIVIC ACTION

<u>September</u>			<u>Cumulative</u> <u>III MAF total</u>
<u>By US Army</u>	<u>By Marines</u>		
21,657	124,469	Persons given medical treatment	2,291,446
-	271	Persons given medical training	2,288
13,464	324,600	Pounds of food distributed	4,436,808
749	1,584	Pounds of soap distributed	188,385
59	600	Pounds of clothing distributed	261,838
10	64	Critically ill civilians evacuated	8,111
64	84	English language classes conducted	3,544
-	\$970	Cash donations	\$42,706
26,938	649,190	Persons fed	7,579,415
3	1,823	Students supported	62,103
1	48	Construction projects	2,085

7. III MAF STRENGTH - SEPTEMBER 1967

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Danang	2,406	31,943	193	1,211	152	547
Chu Lai	207	8,795	54	302	998	11,113
Duc Pho	-	-	-	-	527	6,689
Phu Bai	1,300	9,986	86	498	69	456
DMZ Area	802	17,205	59	551	91	1,358
Totals	4,715	67,929	392	2,562	1,837	20,163

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8. LOGISTICSa. Supply levels at end of period

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
<u>Class I</u>				
(1000 of rations / days of supply)				
MCI rations	561/19	144/18	221/25	10/1
B rations	249/31	50/17	164/55	200/40
A rations	109/11	50/17	286/57	281/47

Class III and III A (Bulk)(1000 gals/days
of supply)

JP-4	5,448/15	1,732/7	63/5	23/8
AVGAS	436/7	298/20	54/8	17/6
MOGAS	441/13	375/11	104/8	16/2
DIESEL	1,275/30	553/13	57/4	19/1

<u>Class V and VA</u>	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>
Ground Ammunition (days of supply)	45	45	45

Aviation Ordnance - Stocks maintained within CINCPAC allocations.

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LOGISTICS (cont'd)

b. Resupply Status

(1) Surface Shipping Status (all I CTZ)

Cargo received from CONUS	31,447 M/T
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Cargo received from intra-WestPac	2,731 M/T
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(2) Air Shipping Status

Cargo received from CONUS	2,425 S/T
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Cargo received from intra-WestPac	3,661 S/T
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c. Resupply Status Within RVN:(1) Surface Shipping Status

Danang to Chu Lai	23,764 S/T
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Danang to Phu Bai	17,812 S/T
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Danang to Dong Ha	21,115 S/T
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(2) Air Shipping Status

Within I CTZ	3,840 S/T
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d. Cargo Shipped Out of RVN

(1) <u>Surface from I CTZ</u>	8,582 M/T
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(2) Air from I CTZ

USMC aircraft	176 S/T
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PACAF aircraft	340 S/T
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MAC channel	153 S/T
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LOGISTICS (cont'd)e. RED BALL* Summary

Items at beginning of period	22
Items added	128
Items removed	8
Items remaining at end of period	142

* Red Ball items are urgently needed combat equipment items which require expedited processing of requisitions and priority shipment to the user.

f. Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN to 3dFSR	3,813
Items repaired at 3dFSR	6,918
Items returned to CONUS from 3d FSR or disposed of on Okinawa	535

g. Construction Projects

<u>Roads</u>	-3.4 miles were constructed. 55.4 miles were under construction and 158.7 miles were maintained.
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LOGISTICS (cont'd)

Bridges

-Completed eight Class 35 or larger bridges. Three new Class 60 or larger bridges were under construction, and fourteen other bridges were repaired.

Wells drilled

-5 were completed and 6 were in progress.

Bunkers

-94 bunkers were completed during the month.

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