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Adjutant

Provost Marshal

Clubs

Chaplain

Special Services

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Industrial Relations

Exchange

Area Auditor

Informational Services

Postal

Disbursing

Red Cross

USO

Assistant Chief of Staff G-1: Major J. C. HERGERT

Task Force X-Ray was conceived as an operational command without administrative control over units within the Chu Lai TAOR. The Spartan Staff reflects this concept. However, time and space factors have slowly passed back significant administrative routine which requires a close coordination with the Division Staff.

As the Chu Lai Installation Coordinator, the Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray is the landlord of Chu Lai Installation which contains a total military population of 30,000, over 12,000 of which the Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray has OPCON. This relationship is analogous to that of a Commanding General of a large Marine Corps Base.

OPCON less ADCON creates some frustrations and many grey areas for a G-1 and the Adjutant. All control over personnel, their replacements, transfer, rotation and incident reporting is programed by the Division Commander through his G-1 at Danang. Casualty reporting, by necessity, is channeled through our Adjutant here. In practice however your G-1 and Adjutant act as a necessary link between the units and Danang.

The Special Staff all retain a degree of relationship with the Division Staff. They are in effect your staff officers and at the same time an assistant to the Division Special Staff counterpart. This relationship produces an excellent line of communication between the general and special staff at Danang and here.

The Legal Officer, Area Auditor and Chaplain retain virtual autonomy in their duties. The Clubs Officer is in fact the Division Clubs Officer. My relation to him therefore is limited to his support of our local clubs and his accommodations for units here. Industrial Relations, Special Services, Provost Marshal and Exchange activities affect all Chu Lai Installation units and must be viewed and coordinated in this perspective. The Career Advisor, Informational Services Officer and Adjutant normally restrict their duties to matters of local Division interest. A brief outline of the activities of each of these Special Staff sections is appended.

The efforts of the USO and Red Cross are acknowledged here also. These activities provide very valuable support in morale and personal services and receive the interest and support of the G-1.

All of these special staff officers and service organization representatives are scheduled to give the General a short brief. Strength recaps for Task Force X-Ray Units and other Chu Lai Installation organizations are appended as TABS. A+B

General NICKERSON has placed strong emphasis on deaths and injuries resulting from the accidental discharge of weapons. He requires responsibility be fixed in each instance with a message report of the facts. These reports are made directly to Division by Regiments and separate Battalions with copies to Task Force X-Ray. Current reporting requirements are attached as TABS C and D.

Serious Incident Reporting (SIR) is a system whereby such reports are made by message in a format satisfying the initial need for information at higher levels. This message report is expanded as additional investigation and information becomes available. See TAB E.

ADJUTANT - Task Force X-Ray

Reporting Senior - Chief of Staff, Task Force X-Ray

Duties

1. Limited administrative processing consisting of routing traffic from higher command to the Commander and General Staff, endorsing routine correspondence and maintaining Task Force X-Ray and Chu Lai Installation Coordinator Directives.
2. Telephone Liaison for 1st Marine Division and Task Force X-Ray, consisting of relaying and obtaining information of an urgent nature, i. e., Emergency leave, Congressional interest, Welfare Reports.
3. Approval of Emergency leave and assignment of TON for Chu Lai area.
4. Custodian of Task Force X-Ray S&C Files.
5. CRCC reporting from Task Force X-Ray to 1st Marine Division.
6. Supervision of 1st Marine Division Representative at Chu Lai Air Freight.
7. Supervision of 1st Marine Division Representative at 1st Medical Battalion.
8. Guard Mail Operations.
9. Top Secret control officer.

PROVOST MARSHAL

Military Police Company has a T/O of 6 officers and 125 enlisted. The main portion of MP Company moved to Danang on 1 November 1966, leaving behind a detachment of 3 officers and 40 enlisted. Because the responsibilities of the Provost Marshal remained the same, the detachment of permanent personnel was augmented by 87 enlisted personnel from various units within the Chu Lai TAOR. The current strength is now 3 officers and 119 enlisted.

Areas of Responsibilities:

Detention Facility - This is a temporary detention facility only. Only prisoners which have a clear and compelling reason in terms of safety are confined. Sentenced prisoners are sent to III MAF Brig as soon as possible. The facility was opened on 15 July 1966, and to date 77 prisoners have been detained.

Captive Collection Compound - VC/VCS are sent in from the field units and held for interrogation and disposition.

MP Posts - Five perimeter posts, 3 on Highway #1 at MSR, RMK and Route #22. Fishermans gate near Division Beach, and MAG 36 gate at entrance to Sam Hai. Two town walking patrols at An Tan and Sam Hai. Two motorized patrols to cover roads within Chu Lai Combat Base. Hq Bn interior guard, manning two dismount points at the entrance to CP area. Exchange sentry. Guards required for VC/VCS while receiving treatment at Medical Battalion. Convoy escorts and traffic control within the Chu Lai TAOR as required.

Traffic control - The majority of traffic citations issued are for the following reasons: Speeding, failure to stop, and parking violations in the village of An Tan. Citations average about 150 per month.

Investigation - CID Section consists of two investigators to cover the entire Chu Lai area. This is considered inadequate. Accident investigation section consists of one man and is considered adequate.

Problem Areas:

Administrative matters is one of the major problem areas that is being carried out by the Provost Marshal. No provisions have been made for an administrative section to carry out this problem. At present the Provost Marshal is working on administrative duties pertaining to members of MP Company, that are rotating or being sent back to parent units and other minor administrative details.

Vehicle shortages is another problem area. When the major portion of the Company moved to Danang, all vehicles were taken with them. Vehicles being utilized are augmented from various units, but this is not considered adequate for the requirements necessary to provide vehicles to transport prisoners, posting of the relief, CID, convoy escorts, motorized patrols and other requirements as necessary.

DIVISION CLUBS

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

The 1st Marine Division Clubs system is an oddity in the Marine Corps clubs system. It is basically only three clubs; Commissioned Officer's Mess (OPEN), Staff Non-commissioned Officer's club, and Enlisted Men's club. The system presently has 65 branch clubs plus 18 battalion accounts which draw only beer and soda. The clubs are divided as follows:

	<u>CHULAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>
COM (O)	9	5
SNCO	12	10
Enlisted	15	14
Bn. Acc't	17	1

The Division Clubs Officer is a member of the Commanding General's Special Staff and operates with his central office at Task Force X-Ray in Chulai because of the greater number of clubs and battalion accounts in that TAOR.

A request has been submitted to the Commanding General to increase the T/O of the clubs system due to increased size of operations and the dual TAOR being manned by the division. The enlisted club alone, which is the central purchasing agent for the entire system, handles an account of approximately \$1,000,000 per quarter and maintains an average warehouse stock of \$250,000. The present and proposed T/O is:

	<u>T/O</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>PROPOSED T/O</u>
Officers	3	3	5
SNCO	8	6	12
Enlisted	8	7	13


The increase of two commissioned officers is necessary to provide an Assistant Clubs Officer who would be in charge of operations in DaNang, and an officer as Treasurer of the Enlisted Club. It is believed that an operation the size of our Enlisted club demands the full time attention of a commissioned officer.

Presently warehouse facilities are not available in DaNang and this is presenting difficulties to the club system. One such difficulty is the lack of decalcomanias, which are required by Marine Corps regulations, on liquor bottles used in DaNang clubs. Another difficulty is the lack of control over purchases by the DaNang clubs since each club draws its own supplies from the Army and Air Force Exchange Service in DaNang.

Difficulties encountered in ChuLai are; lack of transportation support to move materiel from the LST sand ramp to our warehouse, and unequal distribution of beer, soda, liquor, and snack items from the Army & Air Force Exchange Service between ChuLai units and units (mainly Army and Air Force) in DaNang.

Beer, soda, and liquor are shipped to ChuLai by the clubs Purchasing NCO in DaNang. He purchases these supplies from the A&AFExch. and arranges Navy shipping through the Division embarkation office. Upon arrival of ships at ChuLai the Division clubs system must supply transportation and fork-lifts to move these supplies to our warehouse. To date, we have been unable to obtain trucking from the Division at the time it is needed. Ships come in at all hours of the day and night and since our supplies are of a highly pilferable nature we must unload, move, and store it as soon as possible. Our normal recourse is to contact various Division and Non-division units, paying the drivers and dispatchers with beer and soda to haul our supplies or to provide fork-lifts. We are able to obtain these vehicles at a moments notice in this manner, even at odd times such as 2400 and 0200 hours, and yet when requesting transportation through normal channels we are told we must wait two to three days for vehicles. This delay is unacceptable and impracticable since by that time another ship may have arrived with supplies and the sand ramp would be completely covered with these highly pilferable items and the Division clubs system does not have the necessary personnel at its disposal to establish and maintain a 24 hour guard on these supplies.

The problem of unequal distribution is being resolved. The availability of warehouse facilities in DaNang will greatly assist in the solution of this difficulty by enabling us to store a large quantity of supplies in DaNang and prepare it properly for shipment to ChuLai. Even before warehouse facilities are available, however, the proposed T/O must be at least partially approved to provide personnel to man them.


R.J. Plachy
Capt USMC
Div Clubs O

CHAPLAINS OFFICE

The Chaplain at Task Force X-Ray is assigned as Assistant Division Chaplain with additional duty to the 5th Marine Regiment. The additional duty at Regiment is a temporary measure and will be terminated shortly. The Assistant Division Chaplain would ordinarily be located at the office of the Division Chaplain rather than Task Force X-Ray, but problems in Chaplain staffing makes the arrangement necessary at present.

Responsibilities at Task Force X-Ray:

Assist the Division Chaplain as a liaison in the Chu Lai TAOR.
Conduct Protestant Divine Services.
Coordinate the divine services assignments of all Chaplains; Division, Wing, and other units.
Make recommendations on proposed solutions to Chaplain staffing needs.
Coordinate the submission of weekly situation reports.
Visit Chaplains at their units when feasible.
Be available for assistance to men with problems who are temporarily without a Chaplain.

Responsibilities as Regimental Chaplain:

Conduct Protestant Divine Services as needed.
Oversee operation of Chaplains office.
Coordinate coverage of the Divine services within the Regiment.
Be available to men of the 5th Marine Regiment for counseling.
Provide guidance and training for Chaplains in the Regiment.
Advise the CO on Lay Leader Program.

Problem Areas:

There are no major problem areas. Minor problems in Chaplain coverage are being worked out by the Division Chaplain in staffing the various Chaplain billets. Both Protestant and Catholic Chaplain coverage for small units in outlying areas continues to be a pressing concern which requires constant attention.

SPECIAL SERVICES

Tasks and Activities: Liaison with Division Special Services Officer. Movie distribution to all units including Marine Air Groups, Mobile Construction Battalions, 2nd Korean Marine Brigade and Army units. Distribution of magazines, paperback books and newspapers. Coordinates visits of USO Shows, responsible for operation of Division Beach Facilities, Resale Hobby Shop, MARS Station, education and USAFI Testing and registration section, coordination and scheduling of visits by Red Cross girls three days weekly.

Support provided by Recreation Fund: Athletic clothing (shorts, socks, and tennis shoes); sports gear (generally non-varsity type); radios, tape recorders and television; beer and soda for unit parties, recreation huts and miscellaneous items such as small games and writing folios.

Future Plans: Community Facility Center, to include Hobby Shop, Handball, Volleyball and Basketball courts, Bowling Alley, Indoor Theater, library and music room, Gym, Game Room and Snack Bar. Also Beach Recreation Center, to include R&R Huts, Huts for Beach Parties, Tennis court, Volleyball courts, Basketball courts, showers and a Miniature Golf course.

Personnel Problems: Generally the problem is different in regards to T/O structure and the special requirements imposed by our separation from a base facility. The MARS Station and the Beach Facility are examples of this.

Items in short supply at the present time are Projectors and Refrigerators for Recreation Huts and Recreational clothing.

CAREER ADVISORY

Career advisory officer and NCO maintain a branch office at Chu Lai. Serving all Marine units attached to Task Force X-Ray.

Reporting senior for career advisory officer is the G-1, 1st Marine Division. Immediate superior officer is the Division Career Advisory officer.

Assistant career advisory officer maintains the career advisory office at the entrance to the Task Force X-Ray Command Post. Monitors all reenlistment option requests and has authority to sign correspondence "By direction". Assistant Career Advisory officer supervises and coordinates the activities of subordinate units.

Career advisory NCO counsels and interviews all enlisted Marines attached to Sub Unit #2, CAC units in the field and helps to maintain the career advisory office.

Problem areas: Lack of transportation. This office is not assigned a vehicle to carry out the duties assigned. This problem has been continually brought to the attention of higher command with out any results.

TASK FORCE X-RAY
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
2dLT.CHARLES M.HENDRICKS

The Task Force X-ray Industrial Relations Officer coordinates personnel activities between the task force units IRO's and the Chu-Lai installation I.R.O. He reports the status of Vietnamese laborers working within the command through a weekly status report and a weekly briefing.

Each unit within the command has an appropriated fund ceiling which III M.A.F has assigned. Other categories of employees include those paid by non-appropriated or personal funds. Both have no ceiling.

As of 18 March the number of appropriated funded employees is one hundred seventy three, (173) with a ceiling of three hundred six, (306). There are thirty five, (35) personal funded employees employed within the command with no ceiling.

Some of the present problems are a lack of transportation and adequate Marine office staff.

EXCHANGE FACILITIES

There are presently 40 Marines attached to the Exchange. In operation are ten (10) exchange sites located in and around the Chu Lai area. One site is sixty (60) miles south. In the main store are employed eleven (11) Vietnamese civilians. The combined amount of merchandise runs on the average of \$650,000. Our monthly sales run for the month of December were \$235,784.61, for January \$393,022.46 and for February \$360,009.20.

We receive on the average of 150 pallets of merchandise per week, shipped by LST from Danang. The weather plays an important role on this, if inclement weather prevails, the time delay can be as long as 7 days before the ship can reach Chu Lai.

However, we have been steadily improving our Exchange facilities. Our present goal is to be able to maintain a 45 day stock of all items in the health and comfort category. This is being accomplished by ordering only what we need to maintain our stock.

Our warehouse is on a 24 hour shift which enables us to move our newly received merchandise more quickly; not only to stock it but also to get it to our outlying sites where it is needed.

10

MARINE CORPS AREA AUDITOROFFICE OF THE MARINE CORPS AREA AUDITOR

1. The Commandant of the Marine Corps established the Office of the Marine Corps Area Auditor, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF. Marine Corps Order 7500.2C sets forth the specific duties and responsibilities of that office.

MISSION OF THE MARINE CORPS AREA AUDITOR

1. The Marine Corps Area Auditor has a two-fold mission:

a. Primary: To conduct for the Inspector General, Marine Corps, audits and inspections of designated nonappropriated funds.

b. Secondary: To provide assistance and advice to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF, in matters pertaining to the audit and administration of designated nonappropriated funds.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP OF THE MARINE CORPS AREA AUDITOR

1. The Marine Corps Area Auditor is a field representative of the Inspector General, Marine Corps, and is under his operational and technical control, and in the execution of his primary duties, the Area Auditor is responsible solely to the Inspector General, Marine Corps.

2. In the execution of his secondary mission, the Marine Corps Area Auditor is a member of the Division Special Staff. In this capacity he is responsible to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF, and his staff, and his services may be utilized for the following purposes germane to nonappropriated funds:

a. To provide additional audit and inspection reports for local use in the case of authorized nonappropriated funds.

b. To perform local audits of such other miscellaneous non-appropriated funds, as defined in Chapter 7, Marine Corps Manual, as are specifically approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

c. To perform the duties of an advisor in connection with the administration of nonappropriated funds which are either assigned or approved for audit service. In this capacity, the Area Auditor may be used as an consultant to governing and advisory bodies; however, it is not desired that he be appointed a member thereof. The Marine Corps Area Auditor shall be appointed as an ex-officio member of all local councils or inventory boards for the purpose of conducting audits normally required of these bodies.

LOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE MARINE CORPS AREA AUDITOR

1. The Office of the Marine Corps Area Auditor, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF, is presently located within the Headquarters of Task Force X-Ray, because this is where the majority of the activities that they audit are located. Normally the Office of the Marine Corps Area Auditor is staffed with an officer and three enlisted personnel.

INFORMATIONAL SERVICES SECTION
GASE WOOD K-RAY

I. STRENGTH: One officer, eight enlisted.

II. MISSION: Produce news material on
 (1) defense of Chu Lai air base and vital areas.
 (2) the defeat of Viet Cong main forces and LVA units.
 (3) the destruction of guerrilla forces and the removal of their infrastructure.
 (4) civic action.

PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: Production of operational news material that results from direct contact with the enemy.

III. CHANNELS TO CARRY OUT MISSION: (1) Civilian media representatives in country.
 (2) News releases and photos produced by NTF ISO and photographers.
 (3) Fleet Home Town News Center releases.
 (4) Taped interviews produced by ISO radio-TV personnel.

IV. METHOD OF OPERATION: (1) ISO provides guides, information, briefings, transportation, housing, messing, etc., for civilian newspaper correspondents in Vietnam.
 (2) A team, generally consisting of a writer, a still photographer and a motion picture photographer, is assigned to each battalion on an operation. When two or more battalions are on one operation an additional writer-photographer team is assigned to the regimental command post to provide assistance to civilian correspondents and control the activities of the teams within the battalions.
 (3) Working through Technical Information Contact Officers (TICO) assigned to each battalion, a continuous flow of fleet home town news releases is sent to the United States through the TINFO at Great Lakes, Ill. Success of the program is directly related to command attention and to the zeal of the TICO. The 1st Marine Division publishes a monthly bulletin showing the results of the program within each battalion. NTF results are included in this bulletin.

V. DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS: Only COMUSMACV can release material in Vietnam. Copy and photos produced by the NTF ISO are sent to the III MAF Combat Information Bureau, which checks the material, has it approved by a representative of MACV and distributes it to outlets in Vietnam and the United States.

- VI. RELATIONSHIP WITH 1st MARINE DIVISION ISO: The Desk Force X-Ray informational services officer is the assistant informational services officer for the 1st Marine Division. His fitness report is marked by the 1st MarDiv ISO with a concurrent fitness report from the Chief of Staff, MFX. Personnel for this section are provided by the 1st MarDiv ISO, and when required, additional men are sent M4D to MFX to augment the section.
- VII. INTERNAL INFORMATION: The SEA TIGER, a publication of III MAF, is the organ used by all Marines in Vietnam for internal information on activities of Marines in Vietnam. Material for the SEA TIGER is channeled through the CIN and MACV.
- VIII. ROUTINE PRODUCTION: In addition to operation coverage, the MFX ISO covers routine events -- promotions, awards, changes of command, career advisory matters, housekeeping -- and does feature articles on support activities when feasible, and when the event merits attention without distracting from the primary mission.
- IX. OFFICIAL PRODUCTION: Since MFX was formed on Oct. 10, 1966, MFX ISO has produced 380 news releases (an average of 76 per month) and 5,717 Fleet Home Town News forms (an average of 1140 per month.) MFX ISO has produced more news releases in 1967 than the entire 3rd Marine Division ISO. Our current goal is to at least double the Fleet Home Town output.
- X. PROBLEM AREAS: (1) At present, the biggest problem confronting ISO is lack of transportation. Since it is an ISO responsibility to transport civilian correspondents and get our own ISO teams to places where news coverage is desired, it is a continuous and time-consuming problem to find transportation to accomplish the tasks.
- (2) Maintaining a balance between operational news and routine news is a problem. Since it is III MAF and 1st MarDiv policy to devote most of the informational effort to operations and civic action activities, it is imperative that the routine "handshake" activities receive less attention than is normally the case in COMUS. Commands should understand that while ISO is interested in their routine activities, we cannot always respond to the request for coverage.

NOTE: is a matter of interest, the combat correspondents and photographers attached to MFX take part in every named operation within the TIGR. Inasmuch as they are required to be at the scene of action they probably see more combat than any other members of the MFX headquarters staff.

POSTAL

The postal services for the First Marine Division are provided by Branch 12867, N.Y.N.Y. and 12 units of which, 11 are active-one unit inactive at the present time.

Personnel:

Chu Lai postal personnel consist of one officer and 55 enlisted. Twenty-eight enlisted serving outlying units in the Chu Lai area.

All phases of postal service are provided.

Money order business averages almost \$2,000,000.00 per month.
Stamp sales average \$35,000.00 per month.

Incoming mail averages 500.00 lbs per month.
Outgoing mail averages 250.00 lbs per month

Transportation is furnished by 7th Motor Transport Battalion.

B

DISBURSING**BRIEFING OUTLINE****Points to Be Covered**

- (a) Organizational status of the Disbursing Office with relation to Task Force X-Ray.
- (b) Organizations paid by this office and number of accounts maintained.
- (c) Monthly disbursements including, but not restricted to, Military Payrolls and Public Vouchers.
- (d) Piasters sales at the rate of 118 to \$1.00 and 80 to \$1.00.
- (e) Additional Mission(s) performed by the Disbursing Officer.

Discussion

The current organizational status of the Disbursing Office, Task Force X-Ray is that of a "Satellite" or Deputy Office of the 1st Marine Division Disbursing Office currently located at Danang. Our mission is, but not limited to, providing disbursing services to Marine and Navy Units of the 1st Marine Division and attached Units located in the Chu Lai area.

This office currently renders disbursing services to the following Units:

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| (1) Sub-Unit #2 | (11) 1st Shore Party Bn |
| (2) FLSC/B | (12) 7th Comm Bn |
| (3) 3d Bn 7th Marines | (13) 9th Eng Bn |
| (4) CAC | (14) 1st Recon minus B&C Co |
| (5) B - 1st Med Bn | (15) 5th Marines minus 2/5 |
| (6) 1st Hosp Co | (16) 11th Marines minus 3/11 |
| (7) Sub-Unit #1 1st Radio Bn | (17) Navy Acc'ts |
| (8) 7th Motors | |
| (9) 3d AmTracs | |
| (10) A - 1st Tank | |


Our office is currently maintaining approximately 12,500 military pay records, however, this figure varies as units enter into and move away from our area and hence from under our cognizance.

The monthly disbursements of this office is currently 2½ million dollars a month. This include Military Payments Certificate, U.S. Currency and Vietnamese Piasters. The bulk of our disbursements being military payrolls.

Our Piaster sales at 118 to \$1.00 run approximately \$28,000.00 a month. At the rate of 80 to \$1.00 used for Solatium payments, civilian payrolls, Government Contracts and other payments for service rendered by local Vietnamese personnel approximately \$12,000.00 per month with this figure be increased to over \$30,000.00 a month commencing 15 March 1967. In Piasters this is 2 million 400 thousand Piasters.

BRIEFING OUTLINE (CONT'D)

In addition to the foregoing, the disbursing officer personally handles all payments to the Combined Action Companies; He funds all Sea Bee's Disbursing Officers and Navy Disbursing Officers arriving and leaving the Chulai area. He monitarily supports all Retail Outlets within our "TACR" and finally acts a a direct liaison between the 7th Marines Deputy Disbursing Office and the 1st Marine Division Office.


R.R. REUSCHLING

Enclosure (1) page 2



THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS

Sub Unit # 2 Hq Co
First Marine Division
FPO SF 96602

17 March 1967

Subject: American Red Cross Activities

To: Commanding General
Task Force X-Ray

1. The American National Red Cross, Services at Military Installations, field office at Task Force X-Ray provides counseling, reporting and communications and financial assistance to personnel assigned to the Chu Lai Combat Base.
2. The field office is staffed by a field director, William J. Burtscher and four assistant field directors. The normal tour of duty for Red Cross personnel in Viet Nam is twelve months.
3. The largest category of service consisted of reporting for families and servicemen concerning matters of distress at home. The next largest category was reporting on medical or other emergent matters to serve as bases for military commanders to determine emergency leave status. Of particular interest to staff, in this office, is a third type of service wherein professional counseling is provided concerning personal and marital problems in cooperation with Service to Military Families, our counterpart serving as chapters in the CONUS. It is believed that such counseling can do much to assist families and service members adjust to the stresses of separation.
4. The field director's office also provides comfort items, such as razors, razor blades, soap and etc., for patients in the two hospital facilities, who are admitted without such gear.
5. Contributing much to military personnel morale is the Supplemental Recreational Activities overseas (SRAO) Program. Each week Tuesday through Thursday two female staff members, of this activity, popularly entitled "Clubmobile Program", visit with personnel assigned within the Chu Lai military complex. The SRAO's main unit, for the IV Corps is located at DaNang and their activities consisting essentially of audience participation games and friendly visiting, are coordinated by the Special Services Office. The field director exercises no authority over this program nor over the staff members concerned. The SRAO unit director maintains close liaison with the Commanding General.

W. J. Burtscher
William J. Burtscher
Field Director

USO CLUB

Mission in Vietnam:

To establish a direct line of communication from the people back home, to the servicemen in Vietnam. To express a tangible concern and support of Americans everywhere for our fighting forces.

Operation:

Presently there are 11 USO's operating in Vietnam. By mid-year 6 additional clubs will be in operation. During September 1966, the Chu Lai extension of the USO was opened and to date over 180,000 servicemen have utilized our facilities.

Facilities:

The USO is presently occupying four quonset huts, with an additional two being constructed. Presently contained in the four buildings are a snack bar, game room, library and reading room.

Personnel:

Two professional staff members comprise the executive staff of the Chu Lai club. Employed are 14 Vietnamese civilians, also several part time U.S. Marine volunteers.

16

CHU LAI INSTALLATION

UNIT	USMC		USN		USA		ROK		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
MAG-12	214	2148	5	36	0	0	0	0	2403
MAG-13	215	2056	7	28	0	0	0	0	2306
MAG-36	264	1804	8	28	0	0	0	0	2104
MACS-7	22	209	0	3	0	0	0	0	234
FLSG-B	69	1826	2	43	0	0	0	0	1940
2d LAAM	29	487	1	12	0	0	0	0	529
MASS-3	26	172	0	2	0	0	0	0	200
1st Radio Bn (1st Flt)	1	41	0	0	0	0	0	0	42
NavSuptDet	0	0	19	828	0	0	0	0	847
MCB-8	0	1	24	785	0	0	0	0	810
MCB-40	0	1	21	717	0	0	0	0	739
AEWRON-1 (Det "C")	0	0	14	56	0	0	0	0	70
TMA MACV	0	0	0	0	1	8	0	0	9
Sub Sector Advisory Tm	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
29 Civil Affairs	0	0	0	0	3	10	0	0	13
244 PSY OPNS	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	3
Task Force Burgess	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	12
37th Signal Bn (Det)	0	0	0	0	1	32	0	0	32
Btry A, 2/94	0	0	0	0	5	110	0	0	115
ROK (MC)	0	0	0	0	0	0	255	4234	4489
ROK (ARMY)							85	873	958
TOTAL	840	8745	101	2538	12	175	340	5107	17858

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

G-1

17

OPCON TASK FORCE X-RAY


	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
HqBn	74	703	16	41	837
5th Mar	78	2540	6	104	2728
7th Mar	122	3505	10	157	3794
11th Mar	128	1971	7	40	2146
1st Engr Bn	21	523	1	10	555
1st SP Bn	17	381	1	12	411
1st Recon Bn	16	334	1	14	365
3rd AmTrac Bn	17	531	1	7	556
7th Comm Bn	22	427	1	9	459
7th MT Bn	18	335	1	6	360
9th Engr Bn	*31	*823	2	14	870
Co "A", 1st Tk Bn	4	131	0	1	136
Co "C", 1st MT Bn	3	69	0	1	73
Co "C", 1st AT Bn	6	109	0	1	116
Co "D", 1st Med Bn	0	60	23	131	214
1st Force Recon Co	3	41	0	3	47
1st Hosp Co	0	37	9	76	122
TOTAL	560	12520	79	626	13785

* 1 officer, 30 enlisted from 1st Bridge Co, Danang.

NOTE: 9th Engr Bn included in total.

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G-1



HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

DivO 5101.1
1/DEG/jhw
8 Dec 1966

DIVISION ORDER 5101.1

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Accidental Discharge of Weapons

Ref: (a) ForceO 5101.2

Encl: (1) Format for Reporting Accidental Discharge of a Weapon

1. Purpose. To direct command attention to the unacceptable number of accidental discharges from firearms.

2. Information

a. Since arrival of this Division in-country there have been numerous deaths attributed to accidental discharges from firearms. A large number have been seriously wounded from the same cause. This needless loss of life has not only brought grief to the families and friends of personnel concerned but also has obvious effects on manpower availability and morale. It is unnecessary and senseless and reflects adversely on individual training as well as on the professional soldierly quality of the entire Division.

b. Safety precautions for handling firearms are adequately described in various applicable publications. Fundamentally, the cause of accidental discharges is attributable to a lack of individual care and respect for the lethality of various weapons. The most prevalent occurrences stem from handling loaded weapons believed to be clear, cleaning weapons prior to ensuring positive unloading, and failure to practice the professional assumption that all weapons are loaded, regardless of the circumstances.

c. Close supervision of personnel while handling firearms is an inherent duty of all officers and noncommissioned officers. Proper supervision on each level can effectively eliminate the waste of human life connected with these accidents. Failure to exercise such supervision should be appropriately noted in reports and records which reflect the performance of individual duties. Accidental discharge of weapons is also chargeable as a military offense under Articles 119, 134, or other articles of the UCMJ depending upon the circumstances.

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
DivO 5101.1

8 Dec 1966

3. Action

a. Commanding officers are directed to immediately initiate a program to reduce the number of accidental discharges of weapons. The goal will be the complete elimination of the unnecessary loss of life involved in these accidents.

b. Organizations will report to this Headquarters (Attn: AC/S, G-1) in the format of enclosure (1), all accidental discharges of weapons within 24 hours of the occurrence. The report will include information as to what disciplinary action was taken in each case, if any.


SIDNEY J. ALTMAN

Distribution: "L" C. "M"

DivO 5101.1
8 Dec 1966

FORMAT FOR REPORTING ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE OF A WEAPON

5101.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn:
AC/S, G-1)

Subj: Accidental Discharge of a Weapon; report of

Ref: (a) DivO 5101.1

1. In compliance with the provisions contained in reference (a),
the following report is submitted:

- a. Date of accident:
- b. Organization (To Co/Btry level):
- c. Type and caliber of weapon:
- d. General location of accident:
(Tent, barracks, office, etc.)
- e. Cause of accident:
(Include reason weapon was being handled, conduct of personnel
involved, direct cause of discharge)
- f. Results of accident:
(Including number of person(s) killed and/or injured)
- g. Property damage:
- h. Disciplinary action taken:
(If any)

Enclosure (1)

CO	INFO	ACT
Asst CO		
Adj		
Sgt Maj		
S1		
S2		
S3		
S4		
Legal O		
Comm O		

Sir: This is good info for Officers school.

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein, M)
FPO, San Francisco, California 94122



From: Commanding General

To: Commanding Officers, All Units ADCON or OPCON to 1st Marine Division

Subj: Deaths or Injuries Resulting from Accidental Discharge of Weapons

1. During the year 1966, ninety-eight separate incidents resulted in Marines of this Division being killed or injured as the result of an "accidental discharge" of a weapon. Of this total, fifty incidents occurred within a company area or command post resulting in eleven killed and thirty-nine injured. There were forty-eight incidents outside a company area or command post of which nine resulted in death and thirty-nine resulted in injuries. This is an alarming figure when you consider that every Marine is carefully schooled in the proper care and safety to be exercised in the handling of weapons from the time he starts his training in boot camp. It is even more alarming when you consider the uncounted number of "accidental discharges" which fortunately did not result in injury or death.

2. It seems apparent to me that Marines of this Division are being allowed to forget the few simple steps which must be taken to insure against an "accidental discharge". When this is allowed to happen it can point to only one glaring deficiency, lack of command interest and leadership. Where positive, direct and continued command interest is exercised "accidental discharges" will be minimized. I intend to make certain that intense command interest is exercised at every level of command from Division Headquarters to the basic unit of the fire team. "Accidental discharges" will be minimized, if not eliminated, in all commands under the control of this Division.

3. Every Commander will be expected to immediately inaugurate a positive, active, forceful and continuing program within his command to insure against the "accidental discharge". This will require the issuance of clear and concise orders on the subject, frequent and repeated drills and instructions in the safety procedures required in handling all weapons and constant and strict inspection procedures to ascertain that every weapon is cleared and checked before entering an area where there is no requirement to have ammunition or a magazine in a weapon.

4. I expect every Marine to maintain the highest degree of professional perfection when it comes to the safe handling of any weapon and I will demand that every Commander, whether Regimental, Battalion or Company, insist on this same degree of perfection.

17/TH/1968
1500

5. In order to insure that the above outlined program is being implemented in every organization under the Command of this Division, in each incident involving an "accidental discharge" I expect to receive a message report from the Regimental or separate Battalion Commander involved outlining the following points:

- a. The state of individual training of the Marine who fired the weapon.
- b. When that Marine was last schooled and instructed in proper weapons handling by his Officers or NCO's.
- c. What inspection procedures were employed or omitted that would allow the incident to happen.
- d. Any additional facts bearing on the incident, including degree of supervision at the time of the incident and any action contemplated.

6. In those instances where the degree of instruction, supervision and inspection is below these professional standards which are expected of every command I shall consider the commander of that organization responsible for the incident and shall take such administrative or disciplinary action as may be considered appropriate under the circumstances.

Hickerson
H. HICKERSON, JR.

DISTRIBUTION: "A", "B" and "F"

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602


DivO 5720.4
5A:FEH:wcw
15 Dec 1966

DIVISION ORDER 5720.4

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Policy and Procedures for Reporting Serious Incidents

Ref: (a) MCO 05740.2
(b) FMFPacO 5700.1D
(c) ForceO 3480.1A
(d) 1stMarDivO P3040.1
(e) 1stMarDivO 5101.1



Encl: (1) Format for Serious Incident/Backlash Report
(2) Flow Chart - Serious Incident/Backlash Reports

Reports Required: I. Serious Incident Report (par. 4a)
II. Backlash Report (par. 4b)

1. Purpose. To prescribe policies and procedures for reporting incidents which may be of concern to U. S. National authorities.

2. Background

a. References (a), (b) and (c) prescribe the policies and procedures for reporting significant incidents. The Commanding General, 1st Marine Division is charged with reporting such incidents to the Commanding General, III MAF, who in turn is responsible for reporting to higher authority. The Commanding General, III MAF has also been charged with the responsibility for coordinating release to the press of information concerning serious incidents.

b. This order is not intended to abrogate, alter or supersede the casualty reporting system as set forth in reference (d). All units will continue to report hostile and non-hostile casualties through administrative channels as required by Sections II and III of reference (d).

3. General. The nature of the war in Vietnam and the degree of national and international interest in all activities in this theater make mandatory the prompt and accurate reporting of any incident likely to be of interest to the Commandant or other U. S. National authorities. Incidents to be reported include, but are not necessarily limited to the following:

DivO-5720.4
15 Dec 1966

a. Injury, death or mistreatment of noncombatants, or of captivities/detainees in the course of tactical operations.

b. Serious injury, death or substantial mistreatment of any Vietnamese Nationals that does not arise in the course of tactical operations.

c. Voluntary or involuntary manslaughter or assault with intent to commit manslaughter.

~~d. Negligent discharge of a fire arm resulting in serious injury or death~~

d. Significant damage to Vietnamese property brought about by actions of U. S. Nationals.

e. Burglary, robbery, arson, misappropriation, fraud or extortion of major significance.

f. Riots or other disorders resulting from an incident caused by U. S. Nationals.

g. Blackmarketing, smuggling, and currency manipulations.

h. Involvement of U. S. Nationals with military or civilian personnel of a foreign power in a criminal incident of immediate or potentially serious significance from a political, military or public relations standpoint.

4. Action. Procedures outlined below will be followed in reporting incidents. There are two general classes of incidents: those involving U. S. Nationals only, and which are not likely to affect U. S.-Vietnamese relations, and those in which both U. S. and Vietnamese Nationals and/or property are involved and which may adversely affect U. S.-Vietnamese relations.

a. Cases involving U. S. Nationals only:

(1) The commander of any unit OPCON to the 1st Marine Division immediately notifies the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (Isherwood 1) by the most rapid available means, using the format in enclosure (1), and follows with an amplifying message within 24 hours. If a unit is not under 1st Marine Division ADCON, the unit with ADCON should be an info addressee on the amplifying message. Units under 1st Marine Division ADCON only will report initially through their operational channels, with 1st Marine Division as an info addressee on the amplifying message.

(2) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 consults as necessary with the Commanding General or Chief of Staff and reports the incident by message through the Division COC to III MAF COC, including in the report a recommendation as to whether the report should be sent to higher authority. (Reporting of U. S. casualties will be accomplished under standing operating procedures set forth in reference (d).)

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15 Dec 1966

(3) The reporting unit will submit additional reports to this Headquarters as required by developments in a given case. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, in coordination with the Division Legal Officer, will in turn prepare or endorse the necessary follow-up reports to III MAF.

(4) In the event a case is referred to trial, the Division Legal Officer assumes full responsibility for the case and will handle reporting in accordance with established procedures, preparing the necessary communications to keep CMC, CG, FMFPac and CG, III MAF informed as to date of trial, findings, sentence, etc.

b. Cases involving U. S. Nationals and Vietnamese persons and/or property. (BACKLASH Reports)

(1) Same procedure as given in 4a(1) above, except that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 (Isherwood 46) will be notified instead of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

(2) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 consults as necessary with the Commanding General or Chief of Staff and reports the incident by message through COC to III MAF COC, including in the report a recommendation as to whether the report should be sent to higher authority. (Reporting of U. S. casualties will be accomplished under standing operating procedures set forth in reference (d).)

(3) The reporting unit will submit additional reports to this Headquarters as required by developments in a given case. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, in coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 and the Division Legal Officer, will in turn prepare or endorse the necessary follow-up reports to III MAF.


(4) In the event a case is referred to trial, the Division Legal Officer assumes full responsibility for the legal aspects of the case and will handle reporting in accordance with established procedures, preparing the necessary communications to keep CMC, CG, FMFPac and CG, III MAF informed as to date of trial, findings, sentence, etc. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 will continue to monitor and report on the case as necessary from the point of view of Vietnamese reaction.

c. Task Force X-Ray is the reporting command for serious incidents in the area under that headquarters' operational jurisdiction.

d. Press inquiries concerning serious incidents will be referred by subordinate commands to the Division ISO who will in turn pass the inquiry to III MAF CIB. In no case will any member of this Division respond to press inquiries of this nature without the permission of the Commanding General or Chief of Staff.

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15 Dec 1966

e. Accidental discharges of weapons resulting in injury or death will be reported as serious incidents only if falling under the purview of paragraph 3 above. Accidental discharges, regardless of whether they result in injury or death will also be reported in accordance with reference (e).


SIDNEY J. ALTMAN
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "A" and "B"
plus: TF X-Ray (15)
NinthMar (30)
3dTkBn (8)
3dMTBn (8)
3dEngrBn (8)
3dMedBn (8)
1stAmTracBn (8)

DivO 5720.4
15 Dec 1966

FORMAT FOR SERIOUS INCIDENT/BACKLASH REPORT

SPOT REPORT

SERIOUS INCIDENT/BACKLASH REPORT

1. Type of incident.
2. Time and date of incident.
3. Location of incident. Report the exact location, using identifiable landmarks, miles to the nearest town, city or village. Map grid coordinates will be used only when other means of identifying the location are impracticable, and then only when the map is completely identified.
4. Name, grade, and organization of individual rendering report.
5. Name of person(s) involved, to include victims, subjects and witnesses, including information as to their:
 - a. Grade or title.
 - b. First name, middle initial, last name.
 - c. Service number.
 - d. Organization or address.
 - e. Sex and date of birth.
 - f. If civilian, indicate their status, i. e., DAC, dependent, etc. in place of service number.
6. A complete narrative summary of factual information concerning the incident. When indicated because of the nature of the incident, the extent of injuries to personnel and estimated dollar value of damages or loss will be included.
7. Status and location of personnel involved.
8. Designation of the organization or offices, military and civilian, conducting the investigation.
9. Statement as to actual or anticipated reaction, by the civil populace, to the incident and news items relative to the incident.
10. Include a statement that the local G-2 or Intelligence Officer has or has not been notified of this incident.

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15 Dec 1966

11. Additional information, if applicable.

Note 1. When forwarding report to III MAF, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division recommendation as to whether the report should be passed to higher authority will be expressed.


Note 2. Both speed and accuracy in reporting must be emphasized.

ENCLOSURE (1)

2

SERIOUS INCIDENT/BACKLASH REPORTS

FLOW CHART

DAVO 5720.4
15 Dec 1966

G-2


SECTION

G-2 SECTION
INDEX


TAB

1. DEFINITIONS USED BY G-2
2. ENEMY SITUATION 20 MARCH 1967
3. PRINTREP NO 4-67 TFX 0206-67 Copy 19 of SD Burned


DEFINITIONS (Source MACV (J2) PerIntRep)



North Vietnamese Army (NVA)- A unit formed, trained, and designated by North Vietnam as an NVA Unit, and composed completely or primarily of North Vietnamese. Some native South Vietnamese may be assigned to this unit as filler or replacement personnel.



Main Force (MF) (Incl VC) Unit- Those military units which are directly subordinate to COSVN or to a Military Region.



Local Force (LF)- Those military units which are directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and normally operate only within a VC province or district.

Guerrilla- One of several VC categories grouped under the term "Militia". Guerrillas are full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which do not always live in their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terrorist and sabotage activities.

Militia- The VC category composed of guerrillas, self-defense, and secret self-defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet level VC organization. These forces are not usually completely armed and perform a wide variety of missions in support of VC activities.

DEFINITIONS:

Detainee: A detainee is a person who is taken into custody by U. S. Forces when he is either suspected or known to be affiliated with the Viet Cong. After interrogation by ITT, detainees are classified as falling into one of the following:

Prisoner-of-War: All North Vietnamese soldiers, MFVC and any person overtly bearing arms at the time of capture. PW's are forwarded to III MAF compound, Da Nang.

Civil Defendant: Guerrillas not openly bearing arms, association members, suspected spies, saboteurs, terrorists or criminals not qualifying as PW's, above. Civil Defendants are forwarded to civil authorities at their home District Headquarters.

Returnee: A person who voluntarily returns to government control from active Viet Cong affiliation. Returnees are forwarded to the Chieu Hoi Center of their home district.

Innocent Civilians: Persons free of involvement or complicity with the Viet Cong. Innocent Civilians are forwarded to their District Headquarters for further transportation to their homes.

ENEMY SITUATION 20 MAR, 1967

UNIT	TYPE	STRENGTH	LOCATION
MILITARY REGION 5 (Hq)	NVA	650	W SON HA/KONTUM BORDER
2nd Div Hqs	NVA	100	BT 0022
(5 Sep Bns & Arty Regt)		2450	
1st VC Regt	MF	2410	BS 5056
(Hq & Sup Units)		800	
60th Bn	MF	250	BS 6252
70th Bn	MF	500	
80th Bn	MF	460	BS 6552
90th Bn	MF	400	
21st Regt	NVA	2000	BS 5082
(Hq & Sup Units)		200	BS 4579
1st Bn	NVA	600	BS 4877
2nd Bn	NVA	600	BS 5482
3rd Bn	NVA	600	
3rd Regt	NVA	1500	AT 9531
(Hq & Sup Units)		300	BT 0227
1st Bn	NVA	400	
2nd Bn	NVA	400	
3rd Bn	NVA	400	AT 9912
3rd Div Hq	NVA	500	BS 7024
(6 Separate Bns)		1800	
2nd Regt	MF	1500	BS 7233
(Hq & Sup Units)		500	
93rd Bn	MF	500	
95th Bn	MF	500	BS 7338
97th Bn	MF	500	

UNIT	TYPE	STRENGTH	LOCATION
12th Regt	NVA	750	BINH DINH (P)
(Hq & Sup Units)		300	
7th Bn	NVA	145	
8th Bn	NVA	145	
9th Bn	NVA	160	
22nd Regt	NVA	1100	BS 7923
(Hq & Sup Units)		300	
7th Bn	NVA	350	
8th Bn	NVA	250	
9th Bn	NVA	200	
Quang Ngai (P)			
20th Trans Bn	MF	450	BS 3061
21st Indep Co.	LF	130	BS 6989
38th Bn	LF	400	BS 6758
48th Bn	LF	500	BS 7079
*19th Bn	LF	400	BS 7554
*307th Bn	LF	400	BS 7437
409th Sapper Bn	MF	400	BS 6034
506-A Sapper Co	LF	90	BS 7057
1506th Engr Bn	MF	400	BS 2568
506-B Sapper Co	LF	80	BS 7083
C-17th Co	LF	140	BS 7659
C-19th Co	LF	100	BS 6858
8th Co	LF	80	BS 4087
C-21st Co	LF	100	BS 6550
* Probable Units			

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
C-212th Co	LF	100	BS 5737
C-219th Co	LF	100	BS 7737
P-31st Co	LF	110	BS 5190
T-18th Co	LF	80	BS 7379
T-20th Co	LF	100	BS 5780
Quang Tin (P)			
72nd VC Bn	LF	450	BT 2119
K-51st Co	LF	120	BT 2339
K-52nd Co	LF	100	BT 1611
K-53rd Co	LF	140	BT 3904
K-54th Co	LF	120	BT 2322
14th Co	LF	100	BT 3416
74th Co	LF	60	BT 2810
75th Co	LF	125	BT 3014
706th Co	LF	100	BT 3710

VC STRENGTH

	<u>QUANG TIN</u>	<u>QUANG NGAI</u>
NVA	4050	5910
MF	70	5090
LF	1315	2730
Guerrilla	<u>6405</u>	<u>8395</u>

Total 11,840

Total 22,125

(Grand Total TF X-Ray Area - 33,965)

G-3

SECTION

G-3 SECTION
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3. COMMANDERS AND CP LOCATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS NOT UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF TASK FORCE X-RAY.
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17. SKETCH MAP, OTHER MAJOR UNITS, CHU LAI
18. SKETCH MAP, DUC PHO AREA OF OPERATION AND RECON ZONE
19. AIRCRAFT SUPPORT TASK FORCE X-RAY
20. ARTILLERY WEAPONS STATUS

GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF OFFICERS
TASK FORCE X-RAY

TASK FORCE COMMANDER	BGEN F. C. LAHUE
CHIEF OF STAFF	COL F. E. HAYNES JR.
ASST CofS, G-1	MAJ J. C. HERBERT JR.
ASST CofS, G-2	MAJ D. Z. BOYD
ASST CofS, G-3	LTCOL R. E. HUNTER JR.
ASST CofS, G-4	LTCOL B. LUBKA
ASST CofS, G-5	MAJ J. T. SMITH
ADJUTANT	2DIT J. A. DOBBS
AIR OFFICER	MAJ J. C. BYRAM
ARTILLERY OFFICER	MAJ C. E. MCDANIEL
NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER	Lt H. C. DRAUGHEN, USN
COMM ELECT OFFICER	LTCOL A. G. ZIEGLER
ASST DIV CHAPLAIN	CDR E. H. KICKLIGHTER, USN
ASST DIV CAREER ADVISORY OFFICER	2DIT M. E. CARSON
ASST DIV ISO	2DIT C. B. TYLER
ASST DIV SPECIAL SERVICES/EDUCATION OFFICER	2DIT R. A. CORNELL
CLUBS OFFICER	CAPT R. J. PLACHY
LEGAL OFFICER	LTCOL J. L. ZORACK
POSTAL OFFICER	2DIT W. NEW
PROVOST MARSHALL	CAPT W. A. BARNER
EMBARKATION OFFICER	1STLT G. J. DESTEFANO
ENGINEER OFFICER	MAJ H. I. FREY
MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	MAJ F. B. OKONSKY
ORDNANCE OFFICER	MGYSGT A. O. BRINK

ASST DIV SUPPLY OFFICER

LTCOL J. N. DILLARD

AREA AUDITOR

CAPT F. FERRANTE

DEPUTY DIVISION DISBURSING OFFICER

CAPT R. R. REUSCHLING

EXCHANGE OFFICER

2DIT A. CASEY

ASST DIV FOOD SERVICES OFFICER

CAPT E. V. COX

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICER

MR. J. JONES

AMERICAN RED CROSS

MR. W. J. BURTSCHER

USO

MR T. HEBERT

DET 1ST RECON BN	BT 563043	MAJ F. RINEY
1ST ENGR BN	BT 550015	MAJ C. O. NEWTON
1ST SP BN	BT 538100	LTCOL E. H. JONES
7TH MT BN (REIN), FMF		
7TH MT BN, FMF	BT 537103	MAJ S. H. BATCHELDER
"C" CO 1ST MT BN	BT 537103	CAPT J. A. FREEMAN
3RD AMTRAC BN, FMF	BT 561048	MAJ F. N. VAN SANT
7TH COMM BN, FMF	BT 527098	LTCOL W. M. CLELLAND
DET 1ST MED BN	BT 532109	CMDR P. D. COOPER, USN
1ST HOSP CO, FMF	BT 534103	CMDR F. M. ROBERTS, USN
DET 1ST DENTAL CO, FMF	BT 531092	LT D. M. BARE, USN
CIDG	BT 524089	LTCOL E. B. ANDERSON

COMMANDERS AND CP LOCATIONS OF
ORGANIZATIONS UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF TASK FORCE X-RAY

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>COMMANDING OFFICER</u>
TASK FORCE X-RAY	BT 531092	BGEN F. X. LAHUE
SUB UNIT #2	BT 531092	LTCOL R. V. MOLESKY
9TH IT TEAM	BT 531092	CAPT G. E. GAUMONT
7TH CI TEAM	BT 531092	1STLT W. T. JACKSON
1ST PLAT SU #1 1ST RADIO BN	BT 531092	2NDLT V. J. JOHNSON
4TH AA PLAT 29TH CA CO USA	BT 531092	1STLT B. D. DREES
6TH AA PLAT 29TH CA CO USA	BT 531092	1STLT J. F. CRAFT
5TH MAR	BT 439079	COL K. J. HOUGHTON
1ST BN	BT 397145	LTCOL P. L. HILGARTNER
2ND BN (OPCON 1ST MARDIV)	DANANG TAOR	LTCOL M. C. JACKSON
3RD BN	BT 464073	LTCOL E. E. ESSLINGER
7TH MAR	BT 546018	COL C. C. CROSSFIELD
1ST BN	BS 630995	LTCOL J. D. ROWLEY
2ND BN	BS 565959	LTCOL W. P. KITTERMAN
3RD BN 7TH MAR (OPCON TFX)	BS 814384 (DUC PHO AO)	LTCOL E. J. BRONARS
1ST FAG	BT 511039	LTCOL W. J. PLASKETT
2ND BN 11TH MAR	BT 440084	MAJ J. J. MARRON
3RD BN 11TH MAR	BT 549014	LTCOL A. S. RUGGIERO
4TH BN 11TH MAR	BT 441100	LTCOL J. M. LANEY
3RD 155MM GUN BTRY, FMF	BT 438097	CAPT S. C. ADKINS
3RD 8" HOW BTRY, FMF	BT 439096	MAJ T. W. HANCOCK
BTRY A (REIN) 2ND BN 94TH FA	BS 635848	CAPT J. D. HEARD
"A" CO 1ST TK BN, FMF	BT 514041	CAPT J. H. COWMAN
"C" CO 1ST AT BN	BT 512040	CAPT R. J. ESPOSITO

COMMANDERS AND CP LOCATIONS OF
ORGANIZATIONS NOT UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF TASK FORCE X-RAY

MAG-12	BT 537068	COL G. P. GIBSON
MAG-13	BT 541050	COL D. H. JOHNSON
MAG-36	BT 525113	COL V. A. ARMSTRONG
MACS-7	BT 538067	MAJ T. K. BURK JR.
MASS-3	BT 531092	LTCOL D. L. FENTON
2D LAAM BN	BT 552054	LTCOL T. I. GUNNING
9TH ENGR BN, FMF	BT 515046	LTCOL G. A. BABE
FLSG-B	BT 532104	LTCOL E. C. CARPER JR.
NAVSUPDET	BT 524130	LCDR E. A. BANKE, USN
JUNK FLEET	BT 521119	SENIOR ADVISOR IIT A. COTE, USN
SWIFT BOATS	BT 525130	IIT P. GRAFTON, USN
MCB-8	BT 527125	CMDR P. A. PHELPS, USN
MCB-40	BT 550059	CMDR B. L. SARAVIA, USN
"C" CO 37TH SIGNAL BN, USA	BT 531092	CAPT J. W. HARKINS
DET TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AGENCY, USA	BT 531092	2NDLT C. B. TORRES
DET 8 15TH AERIAL PORT SQDN, USAF	BT 541050	1STLT R. E. GREGORY

TASK ORGANIZATION, TASK FORCE X-RAY
20 MAR 1967

TASK FORCE X-RAY

SUB UNIT #2, HQ CO, HQ BN (REIN)
DET, HQ BN (REIN)
DET, HQ CO, 5TH MAR
7TH CIT (-), FMF
9TH ITT (-), FMF
4TH PLAT, 29TH CA CO (USA)
6TH PLAT (-), 29TH CA CO (US)
1ST PLAT, SU #1, 1ST RADIO BN

5TH MAR

HQ CO
1ST BN (-)
H&S CO (-)
CO B
CO C
CO D
3RD BN

7TH MAR (-) (REIN)

HQ CO (-)
1ST BN
2ND BN (-) (REIN)
2ND BN (-)
H&S CO (-)
CO G
CO H
CO D, 1ST BN, 26TH MAR

3D BN (REIN), 7TH MAR

3D BN
DET, SUB UNIT #2, HQ CO, HQ BN (REIN)
DET, ISO
DET, PHOTO
DET, 7TH CI TEAM, FMF
DET, 9TH IT TEAM, FMF
DET, MP CO, 1ST MP BN
DET, 6TH AA PLAT, 29TH CA CO (USA)
CO F, 2ND BN, 7TH MAR
DET, SCOUT-SNIPER PLAT, HQ CO, 7TH MAR
DET, BTRY I, 3RD BN, 11TH MAR
CO A, DET, 1ST RECON BN
3RD PLAT (REIN), CO C, 1ST ENGR BN
3RD PLAT (REIN), CO A, 1ST TK BN, FMF
3RD PLAT (5 M48A3)
DET, FLAME PLAT, H&S CO (1 M67A2)
DET CO B, 3RD AMTRAC BN, FMF (2 LVTP-5)

3RD PLAT, CO B, 1ST AT BN (5 M50A1)
 DET, RR/CONST CO, 7TH COMM BN, FMF
 DET, 1ST SP BN (HST)
 DET FLSG-B
 CLEARING PLAT (REIN), CO B, 1ST MED BN

1ST FAG

HQ BTRY (REIN)
 HQ BTRY
 DET, HQ BTRY, 11TH MAR
 2ND BN (-), 11TH MAR
 HQ BTRY
 BTRY D (6 105MM HOW TD)
 BTRY F (6 105MM HOW TD)
 MORTAR BTRY (6 107MM MORTARS)
 3D BN, 11TH MAR (18 105MM HOW TD, 6 107MM MORTARS)
 4TH BN, 11TH MAR (18 155MM HOW SP, 6 155MM HOW TD)
 3D 155MM GUN BTRY (SP), FMF (6 155MM GUN SP)
 3D 8" HOW BTRY (SP), FMF (6 8" HOW SP)
 BTRY A (REIN), 2D BN, 94TH FA, USA (4 175MM GUN SP)

CO A (-) (REIN), 1ST TK BN, FMF

CO A (-)
 CO HQ (1 M48A3)
 DET, FLAME PLAT, H&S CO (1 M67A2)

CO C (REIN), 1ST AT BN

CO C (15 M50A1)
 1ST PLAT CO B, 1ST AT BN (5 M50A1)

DET, 1ST RECON BN

DET, H&S CO
 CO A (REIN)
 CO A
 3RD PLAT, CO B
 CO D
 DET, 1ST FORCE RECON CO, FMF

1ST ENGR BN (-)

H&S CO
 ENGR SUPPORT CO (-)
 CO B (-)
 CO C (-)

1ST SP BN

H&S CO (-)
 CO B
 CO C (-)

7TH MT BN (REIN), FMF

7TH MT BN, FMF
 CO C, 1ST MT BN

3RD AMTRAC BN (-), FMF
H&S CO
CO B (REIN)
CO B
4TH PLAT, CO A

(3 LVTC, 8 LVTE-1, 1 LVTR-1, 12 LVTP-5)

(3 LVTC, 1 LVTR-1, 44 LVTP-5)
(1 LVTC, 11 LVTP-5)

7TH COMM BN (-), FMF
HQ CO (-)
COMM CO (-)
RR/CONST CO (-)

DET, 1ST DENTAL CO, FMF

1ST HOSPITAL CO, FMF

DET, 1ST MED BN
CO D
CO C
CO B (-)
CO HQ

CIDC

DET, H&S CO, 1ST BN, 5TH MAR
CO A, 1ST BN, 5TH MAR
CO E, 2ND BN, 7TH MAR
PROVISIONAL RIFLE COMPANY
DET, CO A (REIN), 1ST TK BN, FMF
1ST PLAT
2ND PLAT
DET, FLAME PLAT, H&S CO

(5 M48A3)
(4 M48A3)
(1 M67A2)

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER

1. GENERAL

a. Location of TF FSCC and related FSCC/TOC's (Chu Lai Area)

- (1) TF X-Ray FSCC (TF X-Ray CP) (Devote Bailey)
- (2) 5th Mar FSCC (5th Mar CP) (Select Bailey)
- (3) 7th Mar FSCC (7th Mar CP) (Bonnie Hero Bailey)
- (4) ROKMC FSCC (2d BDE ROKMC CP) (Chung Po Do)
- (5) 2nd ARVN Div/Province TOC/Advisors TOC (Quang Ngai ARVN Compound)
- (6) 6th ARVN Regt/Province TOC/Advisors TOC (Tam Ky ARVN Compound)

5

b. Communications

(1) Hot Lines (wire radio relay) between TF X-Ray FSCC and:

- | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
| (a) 1st MarDiv FSCC | (d) 6th Regt ARVN TOC |
| (b) 2d BDE ROKMC | (e) 1st MAW (Moment 3) |
| (c) 2d ARVN Div TOC | (f) MAG-36 (Nailfile 3) |

(2) Radio Circuits (Manned 24 hrs)

- (a) Artillery Regt'l TAC Net
- (b) NGF Spot Net (manned only when ship is assigned in General Support of TF X-Ray)
- (c) NGF Support Net

2. ARTILLERY REPRESENTATIVE

a. Clear and coordinate all fires in the RZ and outside the RZ (This includes Arc Lights, Daylight Air Strikes, TPQ-10's, Artillery fires, and Naval Gunfire). Clearance inside the TAOR is the responsibility of the appropriate Regimental FSCC--this also applies to operations outside the TAOR. Clearance may be achieved by contacting Province or District Chiefs or the 2d ARVN Division at Quang Ngai.

b. Pass Sav-a-planes for artillery missions to the DASC.

c. Establish and cancel NF/FF Zones in conjunction with the G-3.

d. Maintain an up to date record of all planned Arc Lights, Daylight. Air strikes, TPQ-10's, Artillery H&I's, in order to insure no fires fall on friendly forces.

e. Advise the G-3, when requested, on artillery support and fire support coordination matters.

3. NAVAL GUNFIRE REPRESENTATIVE

a. Coordinate requests for Naval Gunfire support from all TF units and submit consolidated requests to Isherwood (1st MarDiv).

b. When Ship(s) are assigned G/S TF X-Ray or G/S Southern I Corps FSA, maintain communications with the ship, conduct briefings for the ship, and assign the ship its gunfire support missions.

c. Process Sav-a-planes for NGF missions.

d. Advise G-3, when requested, on Naval Gunfire Support matters.

4. AIR REPRESENTATIVE

a. Process requests for Helicopter support for all TF units and submit to 1st MAW.

b. Advise G-3 when requested, on air support matters.

NAVAL COASTAL FORCES IN VIETNAM

1. GENERAL. The Naval Coastal Forces in Vietnam are basically divided into two parts: (A) The Vietnamese Navy (VNN) Coastal Forces, and (B) the US Navy (USN) Market Time Forces. These two forces are operated separately and independently, with somewhat different missions as shown in paragraph 2. The organizational structures, though, are closely parallel at each level of command. In the VNN Coastal Forces, the VNN Commander is provided with a senior advisor (SA) from the USN. At the higher levels of command, this duty of SA is assigned as a collateral duty to the USN commander of the corresponding Market Time Forces. At the (Motorized Junk) coastal group level, however, a USN officer is assigned primary duty as SA to the Group Commander. This can be seen more clearly from enclosure (1).

2. MISSIONS. The VNN Coastal Forces, consisting mainly of Junk Boats patrol the inland waterways, rivers, lakes, canals, harbors and delta regions. The USN Market Time Forces consist of PCF's (Swift Boats), WPB's (Coastguard Cutters) MSO's & MSC's (Mine Sweepers) & DER's (Radar Picket Destroyer Escorts). Their mission is mainly one of off-shore surveillance of boats and small craft, including the board & search mission.

3. LIAISON & COORDINATION. Liaison can be effected at the Task Force level with both the USN & VNN Coastal Forces for the purpose of coordinating for ground operations. Command relationships are such that the VNN forces may authorized direct liaison with and direct support to ARVN forces & US forces at the local level. Task Force X-Ray FSOC affects this liaison with VNN Coastal Group 15 Chu Lai and 16. (Song Tra Khuc Confluence) prior to liaison with the USN forces, however, approval must be obtained from the SA to the Coastal Zone Commander (ie the TG Cmdr) thru the normal chain of command. After such approval for direct support on a given operation, local liaison may then be affected. Task Force X-Ray affects this liaison with Coastal Division 12 DET (Swift Boats) Chu Lai.

VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN)

MARKET TIME (USN)

SAIGON

CNO VNN
(CAPT CHON)

CTF 115/SA VNN
(RADM WARD)

DANANG

IV
COASTAL
ZONE
COMMANDER

III
COASTAL
ZONE
COMMANDER

II
COASTAL
ZONE
COMMANDER

I
COASTAL ZONE
COMMANDER
(CDR THONG)

CTG 115.1/
SA I COASTAL ZONE
(CDR STARK)

CTG
115.2/
SA II
COASTAL
ZONE

CTG
115.3/
SA III
COASTAL
ZONE

CTG
115.4/
SA IV
COASTAL
ZONE

COASTAL
(SWIFT)
DIV
12
(PEF)

OTHER
FORCES
(INCL
WPB, MSO
MSC, DER)

COASTAL
(SWIFT)
DIV
&
OTHER
FORCES

COASTAL
(SWIFT)
DIV
&
OTHER
FORCES

COASTAL
(SWIFT)
DIV
&
OTHER
FORCES

QUANG
NGAI

CHU LAI

COASTAL
(JUNK)
GROUPS

COASTAL
(JUNK)
GROUPS

COASTAL
(JUNK)
GROUPS

COASTAL
(JUNK)
GROUP
16

COASTAL
(JUNK)
GROUP
15
(LT COTE)

COASTAL
(SWIFT)
DIV
12
DET
(LT
GRAFTON)

OTHER
DET-
ACHMENTS

DETACH-
MENTS

DETACH-
MENTS

DETACH-
MENTS

DETACH-
MENTS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

Annex G (Rules of Engagement) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) 1st MarDiv Bulletin 03400 dtd 8May66

1. GENERAL

- a. The rules of engagement set forth herein are prescribed to minimize non-combatant personnel and property losses which may occur in the execution of military operations against enemies of the Republic of Vietnam.
- b. The use of unnecessary force leading to non-combatant battle casualties in areas temporarily controlled by the enemy will embitter the population, drive them into the arms of the enemy, and make the long range goal of pacification more difficult and costly. Accordingly, these circumstances call for the exercise of restraints not normally required on the battlefield. All unit commanders will apply only that force necessary to accomplish their mission, giving due regard to the safety of their command and the importance of preventing injury to the non-combatant populace.
- c. Incidents of non-combatant casualties and destruction of property by RVNAF and US combat forces are exploited by the enemy to the fullest extent to enhance their objectives to foster resentment against the GVN and the United States and to effect the permanent alienation of the people from the government.
- d. The 1st Marine Division (Rein) will establish the reputation of being able to move at will throughout assigned areas of responsibility and to defeat any enemy force encountered. Concurrently, the 1st Marine Division (Rein) will constantly demonstrate its concern for the safety of non-combatants, compassion for the injured and willingness to aid and assist the sick, hungry and dispossessed.

2. APPLICATION. All commanders are directed to plan and conduct operations in accordance with the following guide lines:

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

G-1

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- a. Both the military and psychological objectives of each operation will be considered. Pre-strikes in populated areas, reconnaissance by fire into hamlets, and poorly selected harassing and interdiction fires are examples of military measures which will be counterproductive in the long run.
- b. Troop indoctrination briefings will be held before each operation to emphasize both the short and long range importance of minimizing non-combatant battle casualties.
- c. Concurrent air/ground planning to ensure the proper selection of helicopter landing zones and the proper employment and integration of artillery, naval gunfire and air strikes will avoid unnecessary damage to lives and property of non-combatants.
- d. Forward air controllers will be briefed on areas to be avoided due to the presence of friendly or potentially friendly populace. Such information must be sought from local officials at province and district level.
- e. Free strike zones should be configured to eliminate populated areas except those in accepted enemy bases.
- f. Operations should be planned in coordination with province and district chiefs with due regard to security of plans. A liaison officer from Marine forces conducting operations in a particular province should be positioned at the district headquarters for coordination. The district advisors will perform this function in the absence of a liaison officer.
- g. With due regard to security and success of the mission, the people will be warned of impending air strikes or operations by leaflets and broadcasts whenever possible. This warning should emphasize that the enemy by his presence makes the action necessary. Further, that the enemy is directly responsible for damages incurred resulting from combat in populated areas.
- h. Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgement of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.
- i. Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.
- j. The participation of Vietnamese forces in operations will be encouraged so that the war does not appear to be a US action

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against the Vietnamese people. Regional and Popular Force participation will be sought at Marine battalion or company level so that they may assist in the search of private dwellings, obtain information and contribute to the desired effect of the cooperative war effort.

- k. In carrying out search and destroy operations, take all practicable measures to minimize the destruction of indigenous private property and to ensure proper control, disposition, and safeguarding thereof. Plans will include procedures for the protection of private property and reporting, security and disposition of excess supplies.
- l. A civic action plan will support each operation even if the area has been controlled by the enemy. As the situation dictates, operation plans will provide for utilization of all available assets to include a program for dispensing of medical supplies; transportation and distribution of emergency rations; medical evacuation of injured or sick regardless of suspected or known political affiliation; and light engineering work within the capabilities of tactical units.
- m. Whenever possible, utilize appropriate leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, ground loudspeakers and/or face-to-face teams to separate non-combatants from the enemy. Annex H (Psychological Warfare).
- n. Established rules of good military conduct and discipline will be enforced.

3. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

a. General

(1) During hours of darkness the sequence of engagement will be:

- (a) Challenge.
- (b) If the person challenged makes an overt attempt to avoid apprehension, opens fire or commits any other hostile act and thereby endangers the life of the challenger, the challenger may fire.
- (c) Unit commanders may prescribe illumination prior to firing if local circumstances allow.
- (d) The requirement for challenge may be waived by the local commander if required by the tactical situation and no friendly forces are known to be operating in the area.

(2) Magazines will not be inserted in weapons in a camp area during daylight hours unless under attack.

(3) Warning shots will not be employed on contact with the enemy with the exception of daytime control of waterborne traffic. Craft failing to respond to challenge may be warned by fire.

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- (4) Rounds will not be chambered in individual weapons unless contact with the enemy is imminent. The senior Marine present will determine if, in his judgement, the measure must be taken to preserve the lives of 1st Marine Division (Rein) personnel. Initiation of any offensive or defensive formation implies imminent contact with the enemy.
- (5) Within the TAOR and RAOR, and during operations in areas external thereto, the establishment of a curfew is the responsibility of GVN officials. Assistance in enforcing the curfew will normally devolve upon 1st Marine Division organizations and units. In such instances, indigenous personnel will be informed of the time limits involved and the requirement for strict adherence. It will be further explained that the purpose of the curfew is to ensure that innocent civilians are not mistaken for the enemy and shot.

b. Destruction of VN Property

- (1) Civilian dwellings will not be burned, nor will private property, including livestock, be destroyed except as an unavoidable consequence of combat actions.
- (2) Destruction of Vietnamese dwellings and livestock as a measure of denying their use to the enemy is left to RVNAF units. Requests from Vietnamese authorities for employment of 1st Marine Division (Rein) forces to perform such destruction will be referred to this Headquarters.

c. Artillery/Naval Gunfire

- (1) Artillery and naval gunfire against known or suspected enemy targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants are governed by the following criteria:
 - (a) All attacks will be controlled by airborne or ground observers or RVNAF observers and will be executed only after US-GVN-RVNAF approval, as appropriate.
 - (b) Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.
- (2) In areas exclusive of villages and hamlets, artillery fire and naval gunfire may be directed against enemy forces in contact in accordance with normal procedures. However, unobserved fire will be directed only at targets or target areas declared hostile by GVN, VN liaison personnel, or air and/or ground observers. Further, unobserved naval gunfire will be employed only under exceptional circumstances and in cases where:

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- (a) The requested naval gunfire support missions cannot be observed due to geography, weather or other factors.
- (b) No US ALO's, FAC's or airborne artillery spotters trained in naval gunfire spotting are available. (Conduct of naval gunfire support missions under this provision must be undertaken as an acknowledged deviation from standard procedures).
- (3) All supporting arms missions with the exception of barrages and preplanned unobserved fires will be controlled by an airborne or ground FAC, forward observer, NGF Spot Team or RVNAF observer. All observed and unobserved fires, except barrages, will be executed only after US/GVN/RVNAF approval, as appropriate.

d. Air

- (1) When possible, coordination with the unit ground commander and the appropriate Direct Air Support Center will be obtained prior to initiating an air strike. In the case of fire suppression in an approved target area where all friendly locations are known, the strike may be accomplished immediately at the FAC's discretion.
- (2) Strike Aircraft in Close Air Support Role.
 - (a) USAF, USMC and USN strike aircraft will normally be controlled by the following in the order of preference as listed:
 1. US FAC/TAC(A)/ALO
 2. VNAF FAC/FAO
 3. USMC ASRT (TPQ-10)
 4. MSQ-35 Ground Directed Bombing
 - (b) Under emergency conditions when none of the above means of controlling strike aircraft are available, the following personnel may designate the target for an aircraft except as otherwise restricted herein:
 1. The commander of a ground unit engaged with the enemy.
 2. US Advisor to a ground unit engaged with the enemy.
 3. US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting 1. or 2. above, who has radio contact with the ground unit involved and/or can identify all friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.

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- (c) ALO/FAC or other controller on close air support missions will ensure that the positions of friendly troops are known and the information passed to the strike aircraft. When friendly troop positions are uncertain, the ground commander will be required to mark or otherwise identify his position prior to the strike. If time permits, the controller will be briefed on the ground scheme of maneuver, and friendly troops will be made aware of the time and place of the impending air strike.
- (d) Close air support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages always must be controlled by an FAC. Such an attack will be executed only after US/GVN/RVNAF approval, as appropriate. Obtaining this approval is the responsibility of the unit requesting the strike. Hamlets or villages may be attacked by air without prior warning to the inhabitants if the attack is in conjunction with ground operations involving the movement of ground forces through the area and if, in the judgment of the ground commander, the mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

- (3) US Armed Helicopters. If the target involves non-combatants, such as in a hamlet or village, and if the attack on the village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US/GVN/RVNAF approval is required. If the attack is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operations, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker systems prior to the attack and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

4. CONTROLLED ITEMS. Control measures will be established in order to limit enemy access to the following specific items - rice, money, medicine, contraband and food caches consistent with the guidelines below:

a. Rice

- (1) The rice which fills enemy caches is the product of an increasingly burdensome enemy tax program imposed on the peasantry in areas which the enemy control or to which they have access. The discovery of this rice and its return to villages in the immediate area constitutes an opportunity for generation of major psychological impact in support of US/Republic of Vietnam objectives. Use of recovered rice for civic action purposes also reduces the drain on government rice supplies and transportation. It is desired, therefore, that Marine commanders be alert to exploit enemy rice stocks for civic action purposes.
- (2) Rice harvests will be controlled on a planned basis within the capability of available forces. Requests to destroy rice or rice fields which cannot be controlled will be referred to this

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Headquarters. Approval for such destruction will be granted only when assurances that the legitimate food needs of the local populace can be anticipated and provided for by GVN provincial authorities, monitored and assisted by the US members of the Provincial Team.

(3) Procedures to be followed in the protection of rice crops are:

- (a) Determine the areas which produce large quantities of rice. Establish priorities for protecting these areas.
- (b) Conduct joint and combined military and police operations to protect the people during rice harvesting.
- (c) Protect convoys transporting rice harvests to agricultural cooperatives and farmers associations.
- (d) Initiate propaganda activities, using PsyWar and Rural Construction Cadre, urging the people to sell their rice only to GVN authorities or legal rice traders.
- (e) Deny to the enemy rice from paddies farmed or controlled by enemy. If the enemy rice paddies are not accessible, consideration will be given to the use of herbicides to destroy the crop. Final decision to use herbicides always rest with the GVN and always requires complete coordination of US and GVN agencies involved.

b. Money. The enemy relies heavily on extortion of money from the RVN populace to finance their aggression. The best estimate of the effort indicates that they have extorted from 2 to 4 billion piasters during the past twelve months. About 75% of this money was extorted from the people in the form of an alleged tax on agricultural produce and industrial goods; the balance was extorted from the commercial civilian traffic on the roads, trails and waterways of RVN. Many of the "tax collection" points are in areas which are accessible within the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility and can be successfully interdicted. Within the assigned sector of the TAOR and during operations outside the TAOR, organizations will coordinate with ARVN, PF and RF those activities aimed at neutralizing enemy sources of money and money instruments. These activities are primarily the attack of enemy "tax collection" points on roads and waterways and providing assistance to the local populace in evading so-called enemy taxes and bond-selling efforts.

c. Medicines. The enemy obtains medicines from Communist countries and by direct or indirect purchase in RVN from commercial establishments. Army of North Vietnam units bring a basic supply of medicine with them from North Vietnam and thereafter depend primarily on local purchase. Medicines are transported from the cities and towns by every means of transportation using roads, trails, and waterways to enemy distribution points. Some medicines are also obtained by selective hijacking

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of civilian traffic. Local enemy sources of medicine must be identified and neutralized. Captured stocks of medicines will be reported and turned into this Headquarters for disposition.

- d. Contraband. All contraband seized by units will be turned in to this Headquarters for appropriate disposal.
- e. Food Caches. Large food caches, obviously over and above the needs of the local population as determined by local GVN officials, will be reported to this Headquarters for appropriate disposal. For extractions, a receipt system will be utilized where private ownership is claimed. General security for extraction operations and the furnishing of packaging materials and transportation may be provided upon request from GVN officials. Plans should provide for the availability of these resources. The following measures, as a minimum, should be coordinated with local GVN officials:
 - (1) Procedures for informing GVN officials of locations and amounts of food supplies discovered.
 - (2) Procedures for provision of necessary labor, packaging materials, and transportation to permit extraction.
 - (3) Provision for GVN to furnish receipts for supplies extracted when private ownership is claimed.
 - (4) Procedures for use of 1st Marine Division (Rein) personnel to furnish security elements during extraction operations.

5. POST OPERATIONS

- a. Where feasible, follow each operation with a PsyWar/CA team to explain to the population what happened and how to avoid future non-combatant casualties.
- b. Following each operation wherein non-combatant casualties and/or property damage have occurred, coordinate with the province/district chief concerned on prompt identification of those affected. Consideration should also be given at this time to appropriate civic action measures.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. USMC units do not have the authority to exercise police powers over the Vietnamese people; hence the majority of controls will have to be established by the National Police, Army of Vietnam Military Police, or other ARVN military units and Regional and Popular Force units as appropriate. In the event of civil disturbance, the nearest Vietnamese National Police establishment will be notified. 1st Marine Division units will take no action other than to defend themselves and property of the U. S.

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b. Use of RCA. Reference (a).

SUPPORT OF INSTALLATIONS/ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF CHU LAI TAOR

1. CIDG Camps. When directed by the First Marine Division, in coordination with I Corps Forces and U. S. Advisory personnel, Task Force X-Ray will: provide supporting arms fire in defense of designated CIDG Camps; conduct spoiling attacks in vicinity of camps threatened with attack; conduct operations to reinforce or relieve camps under attack; reestablish camps if seized; and, pursues and destroys enemy force involved. The following operation plans/orders are designed to fulfill the above responsibilities:

a. Tien Phuoc	5th Mar OpO 303B-66	260800H Sept 66
	3/5 OpO 23-66	270800H Oct 66
	3/5 OpO 23A-66	270800H Oct 66
	3/5 OpO 23B-66	280800H Oct 66
b. Ha Thanh	2/7 OpO 303-66	170800H Jul 66
c. Gia Vuc	2/7 OpO 303C-66	170800H Jul 66
d. Ba To	1/7 OpO 303-66	140800H Jul 66
e. Minh Long	1/7 OpO 303-66	270800H Oct 66
f. Tra Bong	3/7 OpO 303-66	310800H Aug 66

2. Revolutionary Development Activities. Due to enemy intentions to continue attacks on low level Government structures the First Marine Division upon notification of attack on RVN installation in the area of responsibility and after appropriate clearance has been obtained First Marine Division provides supporting arms fire within capability as requested. Reaction forces from appropriate element of the First Marines Division move expeditiously day or night to reinforce/relieve beleaguered enemy installations as requested.

3. Province/District Headquarters. Task Force X-Ray is responsible for reinforcement of relief of the following Province/District Headquarters:

5th Marines

Tam Ky (BT 309227)
Tien Phuoc (BT 116138)
Ly Tin (BT 416124)
Hau Duc (BT 063067)

7th Marines

Quang Ngai (BS 674430)
Binh Son (BS 601921)
Mo Duc (BS 730545)
Son Ha (Ha Thanh) (BS 392707)
Tra Bong (BS 339877)
Son Tinh (BS 587769)
Tu Nghia (BS 669685)
Nghih Hanh (BS 617643)
Minh Long (BS 537518)
Ba To (BS 557327)
Duc Pho (BS 807378)

GOLDEN FLEECE OPERATIONS

Task Force X-Ray conducts operations to protect Vietnamese Nationals in harvest of rice crop during main harvest seasons, to deny food to VC, stifle VC control over local populace, and aggravate VC logistics problems.

HARVEST SEASONS

Quang Tin	15 Mar-15 Apr 15 Sep-1 Sep
Quang Ngai	22 Feb-15 Apr 15 Sep-1 Nov

COUNTY FAIR

COUNTY FAIR is a clearing operation combining and coordinating governmental, civic and psychological warfare activities to re-establish GVN control over populace of a given area. It is designed to flush Viet Cong from community in which he is a member or a parasite, while at same time ensuring that populace is not alienated toward Government. Military actions are accompanied by vigorous civic action and psychological warfare program, purpose of which is to convince people that GVN is an effective government, that it is interested in welfare of people, and that GVN victory against VC is inevitable.

TASK FORCE X-RAY OPERATIONS SINCE 10 OCT 1966

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
KENT	10-15 OCT 66	2/7
DOVER	19-30 OCT 66	1/5
RIO BLANCO	20-27 NOV 66	1/7
SUTTER	1-6 DEC 66	1/5
CORTEZ	7-12 DEC 66	3/5
TRINITY (SHARK)	30 JAN-1 FEB 67	1/7
CLAY	31 JAN-3 FEB 67	1/5
SIERRA	12 DEC 66-21 JAN 67	2/7
DESOTO	26 DEC 66-	3/7+1/5
DECKHOUSE VI	20 FEB-3 MAR 67	1/4
RIO GRANDE	17-22 FEB 67	1/5
TIPPECANOE	13-18 MAR 67	1/5
GOLDEN FLEECE 1-2	8-14 NOV 66	2/7
COUNTY FAIR 7-4	28 OCT-1 NOV 66	2/7
" " 5-8	14 NOV 66	3/5
" " 7-5	10-12 JAN 67	1/7

OPERATION RIO GRANDE

Duration: 17 February 1967 - 22 February 1967

Location: Generally in the Song Tra Bong and Song Tra Khuc River Valleys from (BS 4085) east to (BS 6085) south to (BS 6070) west to (BS 4070)

Type: Search and Destroy

Forces Assigned: 7th Mar (-) (Rein)
 Hq Co (-) 7th Mar
 Det, Sub Unit #2 Hq Bn 1st MarDiv
 Det, 9th ITT, FMF
 Det, 7th CITT
 Det, MP Co
 Det, ISO
 6th Civ affairs plat (AA) 29th CA Co
 Co C (-) 1st Engr Bn
 Co A (-) 1st Recon Bn
 Det, Co G 1st SP Bn
 Det, Co D 1st Med Bn
 1st Bn (-) (Rein) 5th Marines
 3rd Bn (-) (Rein) 1st FAG, 11th Marines
 Co C, 1st AT Bn

Mission: 7th Marines (-) (Rein) conducts coordinated search and destroy operations with ARVN and ROK forces in the area west of Quang Ngai in the Song Tra Bong and Song Tra Khuc Valleys, Quang Ngai Province, RVN for a period of approximately seven days.

12

Concept of operations: Phase I 7th Mar CP and designated supporting elements displace from Chu Lai Combat Base to selected sites in operational area on D-Day. 7th Marines insert 1st Bn (-) (Rein), 5th Marines by Helicopter on D-Day into selected landing zones and conduct coordinated search and destroy operations within assigned zone of action for a period of approximately seven days.

Results:

OPERATION RIO GRANDE / GIANT DRAGON / LIEN KET 81 17-22 FEB 67

VC:	KIA	7	USMC:	KIA	4
	KIA (P)	7		WIA	16
	WIA (P)	8			

VC:	KIA	10	ROKMC:	WIA	4
	DET	116			
	RALLIER	92			

VC:	KIA	640	ARVN:	KIA	47
	(VC) PW	37		WIA	176
	DET	17		MIA	1

TOTAL VC KIA - 657 KIA (P) 7 WIA (P) 8

OPERATION DECKHOUSE VI

Duration: 16 February 1967 - 3 March 1967

Location: FM (BS 923213) a radius of ten miles on land and 20 miles at sea.

Type: Search and Destroy

Forces Assigned:

Amphib Ready Group

CTG 76.5

CTG 79.5

Det, TacRon

Det, BJU

Det, COMSEC

BMU

HMM 365

BLT 1/4

CTF 1/5 Units

Surgical Team

Mission: ARG/SLF conducts amphib assault commencing at H-Hour on D-Day to destroy local guerrilla force and main force units in Sa Huynh Area; Prepare on order to conduct search and destroy opns along natural littoral and Suoi Nga Man Valley (8331) approaches into Duc Pho area; Prepare to link up with and support Task Force X-Ray opns in area.

Concept: (A) In phase I land in ship to shore movement by assault craft and helicopters in vic (BS 8247) and attack south western boundary in the Song Cau River.
(B) In phase II opcon passes FM CTG 76.5 to Task Force X-Ray and BLT 1/4 continues search and destroy as directed.

Results: VC: 280 KIA, 236 KIA (Prob), 1 PW (VC), 19 Detainees
USMC: 6 KIA, 80 WIA

Remarks: D-Day for the SLF was set back one day due to bad weather and commenced on 16 February 1967. The initial landing was made with one company assaulting over Blue Beach and two companies landing by hcptr in designated LZ's. Opcon passed to Task Force X-Ray on 20 February 1967 and phase II of opn Deckhouse VI commenced. On 26 February 1967 BLT 1/4 repositioned and landed in the northern area of the operation. One Co going into an LZ recd heavy small arms fire and diverted to the beach to join the company making a boat assault. Good contact was made and movement south commenced. On 3 March 1967 the operation terminated and control was passed back to CTG 76.5.

13

Remarks: This operation was preceeded by a large contact with the 11th Co ROKMC on 15 February 1967 and spoiled a large enemy force normally in the operational area. Cum cas were: 243 VC KIA, 60 KIA (Prob), 2 PW (VC). ROKMC losses were: 15 KIA, and 33 WIA. It was the second tri-nation operation with the ROK Marine Corps and ARVN Forces and improved coordination was observed.

OPERATION DESOTO

Duration: 26 January 1967 to present

Location: Extends on north fm (BS 670490) to (BS 811490) then south along coast line to (BS 938124) then west along trace of Quang Ngai/Binh Dinh Province boundary to (BS 670243) then north on trace of NS grid line 67 to (BS 670490).

Type: Search and Destroy

Forces assigned:

Task Force X-Ray (-) (Rein)

3rd Bn 5th Mar (-)

Co K 3/5 (-)

Co C 1/7 (-)

Btry I 3/11 (-)

3rd Bn 7th Mar

Co I 3/7

Co K 3/7

Co L 3/7

Co M 3/7

Co F 2/7 (-)

Co M 3/5 (-)

1st Bn 5th Mar (-)

Co B 1/5 (-)

Co C 1/5 (-)

Co D 1/5 (-)

1st FAG, 11th Mar (-)

1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein)

1st Engr Bn (-) (Rein)

1st SP Bn (-) (Rein)

Co C (-) (Rein) 1st AT Bn

1st Med Bn (-)

Mission: Seize, occupy, defend and pacify designated area in the vic of Duo Pho, Quang Ngai Province, RVN for an indefinite period of time.

Concept: Conduct road survey in the vicinity of Nui Dang, then establish a Bn Combat Base and conduct operations as directed.

Results:

VC: 248 KIA, 531 KIA (Prob), 79 WIA (Prob), 91 Detainees


USMC: 34 KIA, 330 WIA, 3 DOW


Lien Ket #90:


VC: 46 KIA, 7 PW (VC), 23 Detainees


ARVN: 3 KIA, 12 WIA

Remarks: Opn Desoto initially began when Co M 3/5 came in heavy contact while making a road survey and an O1-E A/C was downed. Co C 1/7 (-) and Cmd Gru FM 3/5 were launched. On 28 January 1967 3/7 moved into the area and established a CP and LSA in preparation for occupying a TAOR. They initially retained opcon Co M 3/5 (-) as a reinforcement. On 16 February 1967 3/7 (Rein) moved into blk g psn in conjunction with the SLF on their operation Deckhouse VI. On 23 February 1967 Co F 2/7 (-) relieved Co M 3/5 (-) and Co M displaced back to the Chu Lai TAOR. On 25 February 1967, the 7th Mar and Task Force X-Ray advance parties moved to Nui Dang in anticipation of 1/5 (-)'s movement into the operation and Lien Ket #90, an ARVN operation in conjunction with opn Desoto and opn Deckhouse VI. On 26 February 1967 1/5 was landed in their respective LZ's and commenced moving east. Lien Ket #90 secured on 2 Mar 1967. On 3 Mar 1967, 1/5 (-) secured FM the opn and commenced a helilift back to the Chu Lai TAOR. 3rd Bn 7th Marines continue on operation Desoto.









AIRCRAFT SUPPORT TASK FORCE X-RAY

	UNIT	TYPE	AMOUNT
MAG-13	542	F4B	16
	314	F4B	16
	323	F4B	15
	H&M 13	C-117	1
	H&M 13	F9	4
MAG-36	HMM 165	CH 46	22
	HMM 262	CH 46	23
	HMM 362	UH 34 D	24
	VMO 6	UH 1 E	22
	H&MS 36	UH 34	4
	H&MS 36	C-117	1
MAG-12	214	A4C	20
	121	A4E	20
	223	A4E	20
	211	A4E	20
	H&M 117	C-117	1

ARTILLERY WEAPONS STATUS

UNIT	TYPE	T/E
2/11	105MM HOW	12
	107MM HOW	4
3/11	105MM HOW	18
	107MM HOW	6
4/11	155MM SP	16
	155MM TD	6
8" HOW	8" HOW SP	6
155MM GUN	155MM GUN SP	6
2D BN 94TH ARTY	175MM SP	4
TOTAL		80

G-4

SECTION

G-4 SECTION
INDEX

TAB

1. EMBARKATION
2. ENGINEER
3. FOOD SERVICE
4. MEDICAL
5. MOTOR TRANSPORT
6. ORDNANCE
7. SUPPLY
8. NAVAL SUPPORT DETACHMENT
9. REAL ESTATE

EMBARKATION

1. Task Force X-Ray Embarkation Section coordinates all sea and air shipments of direct concern to Task Force X-Ray.

2. SHIPPING REQUESTS.

a. Routine to DaNang.

(1) Submitted to Traffic Management Agency (TMA), Chu Lai.

(2) TMA is an Army managed tri-service agency.

b. Special (Destination other than DaNang, large bulky shipments or tactical requirements) Submitted to III MAF.

3. AIR REQUESTS.

a. Routine to DaNang submitted to FLSG-B Shipping and Receiving.

b. Special (Destination other than DaNang, large bulky shipments, or tactical requirements) Submitted to III MAF.

ENGINEER

2

1. ENGINEER ORGANIZATION.

a. 1st Engineer Battalion (-) (OpCon TFX)

- (1) H&S Company (-)
- (2) Support Company (-)
- (3) Company B (-)
- (4) Company C

b. 1st Shore Party Battalion (-) (OpCon TFX)

- (1) H&S Company (-)
- (2) Company B
- (3) Company C

c. 9th Engineer Battalion (-) Reinforced, MMF (OpCon III MAF, AdCon 1st MarDiv)

- (1) Headquarters Company
- (2) Service Company
- (3) Company B
- (4) Company C
- (5) Company D
- (6) Platoon 1st Bridge Company, MMF

d. MCB 8 (Organic to MCB 30)

e. MCB 40 (Organic to MCB 30)

2. FUNCTIONS.

a. 1st Engr Bn provides mine sweeps, limited road building, light construction, field fortification construction, demolitions and operates water points.

b. 1st SP Bn provides limited field fortification construction (installation of defensive barbed wire), Helicopter Support Teams, Material Handling Equipment, limited mine sweeps, and limited minor construction.

c. 9th Engr Bn provides deliberate construction, MSR maintenance, bridging to include both fixed and floating bridges, and operates water points.

d. HCBs' provide vertical construction to include erection of Butler and Quonset buildings, road upgrading and maintenance, and other assigned deliberate construction.

3. ROAD MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. National Route 1 (NR-1)

(1) From south of Quang Ngai to Binh Son: ARVN

(2) From Binh Son to CLDC: HCB-8

(3) From CLDC to Tam Ky: 9th Engr Bn

(4) From Tam Ky north: ARVN

b. Roads within CLDC: 9th Engr Bn and HCB-8

c. Roads within the TAOR: 1st Engr Bn and 9th Engr Bn

d. NR-1 upgrading: Will be upgraded to a 30' wide roadbed to provide two way traffic.

4. BRIDGES.


a. Bridge classification is approximately equal to the gross weight in tons of the vehicle it will support. Road classification has the same meaning as bridge classification.


b. M2 Bailey Bridge: Tactical panel bridge no longer used by the Marine Corps. This bridge is still used by the Army and the ARVN. The panels are 10 feet long.

c. M6 Panel Bridge: Aluminum tactical panel bridge used by the Marine Corps. Panels are 15 feet long.


d. M4 and M4T6 Bridges: Hand erectable floating tactical bridges using aluminum balk decking. The M4 bridge uses aluminum boats for support and the M4T6 uses air inflated rubber pontoons. Both can be used to make rafts. The balks may also be made into a fixed bridge.


e. Following map sheets indicate bridges and fords.





TRÀ BỒNG





5. ELECTRICAL POWER.

a. The following generators are on hand:

Type	Qty
100 KW	4
60 KW	9
FU 482 (30KW)	26
FU 239 (20KW)	10
FU 348 (8KW)	13
Floodlight, (5KW)	10

b. At a minimum, all Battalion and larger Command Posts have electrical service.

6. WATER SUPPLY.

a. 9th Engr Bn operates 6 water points including one water point at ROKMC Headquarters.

b. 1st Engr Bn operates 8 water points including one located at the Duc Pho LSA and one located at the Quang Ngai LSA.

c. When LSA's are established in support of operations, water points are established and operated by the 1st Engr Bn.

7. MAJOR ENGINEER EQUIPMENT.

Type	Total Density
Detecting Set, Mine PRS4 (non-metallic)	55
Detecting Set, Mine P153	52
Compressor 105 CFM	9
Compressor SP 125 CFM (rubber tired, self propelled)	4
Compressor 315 CFM	2
Crane, Bay City, M37 (tracked 12½T)	9
Crane, Koehring 2N (tracked 12½T)	9
Crane, Bay City, 150 T46 (wheeled 12½T)	8
Crane, 3 Ton, M60 (wheeled)	6
Floodlight Set, trl	16
Grader, Adm 550	9
Loader, TL16 (front loader, rubber tired)	11
Scraper 10 yd	6
Scraper 16 yd	7
MRS 200 (prime mover for scraper, rubber tired)	7
MRS 100 (prime mover for scraper, rubber tired)	16
Tractor TD 15 (tracked bulldozer)	22
Tractor TD 18 (tracked bulldozer)	27
Tractor TD 24 (tracked bulldozer)	13

Type	Total Density
LINCO (tracked bulldozer)	32
Forklift ART 30 (rough terrain 3000 lb capacity)	4
Forklift RPK 60 (rough terrain 6000 lb capacity)	5
WTR Unit WUF 1157 (water purification equipment)	9
Truck, Dump M51	100
Truck, Tractor M52(prime mover for machinery trailer)	16

FOOD SERVICES

1. GENERAL.

3

a. 54 messes are currently drawing rations from FLSC-B issue point.

b. Types of rations issued are as follows:

(1) "A" Rations: Daily

(2) "B" Rations: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday.

(3) Produce: Daily when available.

c. Messes in Chu Lai feed from 16 to 2,200 men daily. Messes range from strong-backed tents to adequately equipped advance base messes.

2. COST OF FEEDING.

a. There is no fixed ration value at present in Vietnam.

b. Cost of feeding for "A" and "B" rations has averaged \$1.36 per man per day.

c. Cost of feeding for all types of rations has averaged \$1.43 per man per day.

3. TASK FORCE X-RAY FOOD SERVICES OFFICER.

a. The Task Force X-Ray Food Services Officer is also the 1st Marine Division Food Services Officer as well as the Chu Lai Installation Coordinator Food Services Officer.

b. As Division/Task Force X-Ray Food Services Officer, responsibilities include recommendation for assignment of mess personnel to Division/Task Force X-Ray messes, inspection of messes, procurement of plant account mess equipment, and emergency redistribution of T/E mess equipment.

c. As Chu Lai Installation Coordinator Food Services Officer, responsibilities include allocation of fresh produce and "A" rations to all Chu Lai messes on a pro rata basis.

MEDICAL

1. MEDICAL ORGANIZATIONS (OpCon Task Force X-Ray).

a. Detachment, 1st Medical Battalion

(1) Company B (-) - (Duc Pho)

(2) Company C - (Chu Lai)

(3) Company D - (Chu Lai)

b. 1st Hospital Company, FMF

2. DETACHMENT, 1ST MEDICAL BATTALION.

a. Mission: To provide for collecting, life saving surgery, temporary hospitalization of casualties of supported units, and evacuation of casualties.

b. Beds

(1) Duc Pho: 30

(2) Chu Lai: 120

3. 1ST HOSPITAL COMPANY, FMF.

a. Mission: To provide a treatment facility for medical diseases in the Chu Lai area.

b. Beds: 100

4. PLANS. In the near future the Detachment, 1st Medical Battalion and the 1st Hospital Company, FMF, will be combined at the 1st Hospital Company location. Facilities construction is in progress. The combined facility will provide centralization of all medical services in the Chu Lai area. 220 beds are planned. The ability to deploy collecting platoons for operations will not be degraded by this merger.

5. EVACUATION POLICY USMC/USN.

a. Patients requiring no special surgical or medical care are treated at Chu Lai depending on the availability of beds.

b. Patients requiring less than 60 days hospitalization are evacuated by air to the Station Hospital, Naval Support Activity, DaNang, or the USS Repose.

c. Patients requiring more than 60 days hospitalization are evacuated by air to Clark Air Force Base Hospital, Republic of the Philippines,

for further transfer.

6. ROKMC.

a. Overload patients are evacuated from location, via helicopter, directly to Detachment, 1st Medical Battalion and later transferred to Qui Nhon.

b. Patients are evacuated from ROKMC medical facility to the Korean Army Hospital, Qui Nhon, for treatment requiring less than 60 days hospitalization. Patients requiring more than 60 days hospitalization are returned to Korea.

7. VIETNAMESE. Emergency patients, both civilian and military, are treated at Detachment, 1st Medical Battalion. Patients requiring lengthy hospitalization are further transferred to civilian hospitals.

8. CHAIN OF EVACUATION.

a. Casualties within the TAOR are evacuated from location, via helicopter, directly to Detachment, 1st Medical Battalion.

b. Casualties outside the TAOR.

(1) Casualties are evacuated from location, via helicopter, directly to Collecting Platoon located at the ISA. The Collecting Platoon after initial treatment, evacuates casualties, via helicopter to Detachment, 1st Medical Battalion.

(2) When the USS Repose is on station, casualties are evacuated from location, via helicopter, directly to the ship.

9. USS REPOSE.

a. Has normal operating schedule on station in Chu Lai Tuesday and Wednesday of each week.

b. During operational planning, the ship is requested to be on station in the operating area permitting direct evacuation of casualties from location to the ship.

MOTOR TRANSPORT

1. MOTOR TRANSPORT ORGANIZATION (OpCon Task Force X-Ray).

- a. 7th Motor Transport Battalion, FMP
- b. Company "C", 1st Motor Transport Battalion

2. ASSETS.

- a. 7th Motor Transport Battalion

	Vehicle	Type
Company A	30	M54, 6x6, 5T Cargo
Company B	30	M36, 6x6, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T Cargo Long Bed
Company C	29	M36, 6x6, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T Cargo Long Bed
Transport Co.	<u>30</u>	M52A2, Tractor Trailer, 12 Ton Cargo
Total	119	

- b. Company C, 1st Motor Transport Battalion

	Vehicle	Type
	29	M35, 6x6, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T Cargo
	<u>7</u>	M-76 (Otter) 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ T Cargo
Total	36	

- c. Grand Total 155 Cargo Vehicles (all types)

3. VEHICLES.

a. The M52A2 Tractor Trailer combination is referred to as a "high bed" and is capable of transporting 12 tons of cargo. These vehicles are newly arrived in Chu Lai.

b. Multi-Fuel Engines

(1) In the near future, all standard cargo vehicles in support of Task Force X-Ray will be replaced by vehicles with multi-fuel engines.

(2) The multi-fuel capability permits utilization of gasoline, diesel fuel, JP, or kerosene.

c. M-76 (Otter) is a marginal-terrain vehicle. It is used primarily for transportation during the monsoon season to supply outlying company combat bases when the roads are impassable to tracked or wheeled vehicles and helicopters cannot be used.

4. ROUGH RIDER.

a. The purpose of the Rough Rider is to demonstrate to the Vietnamese that National Route #1 between Chu Lai and Da Nang is secure and can be used by Marine Forces at anytime.

b. Round trips from Da Nang to Chu Lai are conducted on a monthly basis and are normally originated by the 1st Marine Division.

c. The composition of the convoy provides a balance of cargo vehicles, engineer vehicles (Dump Trucks) to provide temporary road repairs as required, communications vehicles, CNTOS, and infantry personnel to provide security.

d. The payload is normally general cargo.

e. Rough Riders are provided with an airborne observer whose function is to conduct continuous airborne reconnaissance of the road and act as TAC (A) in the event air strikes are required to support the convoy. Artillery forward observers are also available to call artillery in support of the convoy.

f. OpCon of the convoy passes to Task Force X-Ray at checkpoint 21 (BT 1445-intersection of National Route 1 and the Ly Ly River) on its southward movement. OpCon passes to 1st Marine Division at the same point on the northbound movement.

5. ROADMASTER PROGRAM.

a. A roadmaster program is in effect to ascertain combat readiness of vehicles and to reduce hazardous or unsafe driving practices.

b. All units having organic motor transport are required to designate a Roadmaster.

c. Roadmasters are authorized to stop and inspect vehicles regardless of unit as well as issue traffic citations. Reports are submitted to the unit commanders by this Headquarters via the chain of command.

6. SUPPORT OF ROK MARINE CORPS. Task Force X-Ray provides motor transport augmentation on request in accordance with III MAF Letter of Instruction.

7. STATISTICS.

a. January 1967

(1) 162,147 miles traveled

(2) 5,060 troops transported

(3) 2,235 tons of cargo transported

(4) 2,756 trucks dispatched

b. February 1967

(1) 122,302 miles traveled

(2) 6,840 troops transported

(3) 3,360 tons of cargo transported

(4) 2,975 trucks dispatched

ORDNANCE

1. MAJOR ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT.

a. 105 mm howitzer	30
b. 107 mm howtar	12
c. 155 mm howitzer	6
d. 155 mm gun M-53, SP	6
e. 8" howitzer M-55, SP	6
f. 155 mm howitzer M-109, SP	18
g. M48A3 90 mm gun tanks	16
h. M67A2 flame tanks	3
i. M51 Heavy Retrievers	4
j. M50A1 Ontos 106 mm RR	24
k. LVTP5A1 Amphibian Tractors	65
l. LVTP5A1 Command Vehicles	7
m. LVTE1 Mine Clearing Vehicles	7
n. LVT1A1 Amphibian Retrievers	2

2. M-16. Issue of the M-16's to infantry battalions and the reconnaissance battalion is imminent.

3. AMMUNITION LEVELS. All units are required to maintain their basic allowance and five days.

SUPPLY

1. FLSC-B/1ST SERVICE BATTALION (DIRECT SUPPORT CHU LAI TAOR)

2. MISSION.

a. Supply Provide:

(1) Task Force X-Ray - Class I, II, III, IV and V.

(2) Wing Units - Class I. IIA (Marine managed aviation peculiar), IV and VA.

(3) ROKMC - Class II (Marine peculiar)

b. Maintenance Provide:

(1) Task Force X-Ray: Back up 2d, 3d and limited 4th echelon maintenance.

(2) Wing Units: 2d, 3d and limited 4th echelon for Marine peculiar items.

(3) ROKMC: 2d, 3d and limited 4th echelon for Marine peculiar items.

c. EOD. Provide EOD for all units Chu Lai less Class VA EOD on runways.

3. STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES.

a. Class I	DOS
"A" Rations	8
"B" Rations	12
"C" Rations (MCI)	10
b. Class II	45
c. Class IIA	90
d. Class III Packaged	45
e. Class III Bulk	15
f. Class IIIA Bulk	15
g. Class IV	45
h. Class V	45
i. Class VA	45

7

4. ADDITIONAL CLASS I. FISC-B/1st Service Battalion produces the following:

- a. Bread 4 tons daily
- b. Ice 14 tons daily
- c. Doughnuts 600 doz daily
- d. Ice Cream 200 gal daily

5. TASK FORCE X-RAY ORGANIC ACCOUNTS - 24

6. OPERATING LEVELS. Task Force X-Ray units are authorized to maintain 30 days operating level.

7. AMMUNITION DUMP.

- a. Operated by FISC-B
- b. Capacity:
 - (1) Class V - 9,000 tons
 - (2) Class VA- 2,000 tons

8. DISTRIBUTION: Supply point distribution.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF TAOR

1. GENERAL. Support is provided by task organizing logistic elements. This organization is tailored to provide the specific supplies and services required for each operation.

2. EXAMPLE. The following is illustrative of the techniques used in the Frag Orders to accomplish the necessary logistics support.

a. Task organization:

(1) Log Support Unit.

(a) Det, 1st SF Bn (-)

(b) Det, MAG-36

(c) Det, 1st Engr Bn (-)

(d) Det, MP Co (-)

(e) Clearing Plt, (Rein), Co D, 1st Med Bn

(2) 1st Engr Bn (-)

(3) Det, MP Co (-)

b. Friendly forces (Para 1b logistic units)

(1) First MAW

(a) General Support

(b) Provide 2 medevac helicopters Tam Ky 24 hours a day during operation.

(c) Provides 4 resupply helicopters daily for unit replenishment.

(2) 9th Engr Bn

(a) General Support

(b) Operates ferries

(c) Provides tactical bridging and other road repairs as required on Route 1 and objective area.

c. Logistics (Para 4b)

(1) FLSG-B is source of supply for all classes of supply.

(2) Prescribed loads.

(a) 5th Mar (-) (Rein): as directed by CO, 5th Mar.

(3) Distribution from LSA:

(a) Infantry Units: Unit distribution by helicopter.

(b) All other: Supply point distribution by vehicle.

(4) Med Evac: D-Day by helicopter to Ky Ha; subsequently by helicopter to LSA, Tam Ky.

(5) Aerial Delivery: Submit request to LSU.

(6) Log Support Unit.

(a) Establish and operate LSA vicinity Tam Ky D-Day.

(b) Provide the following:

1 Three days stock level Class I, III, and V.

2 Min essential Class II and IV.

3 Four company emergency helicopter Class V packages at Hill 54 on D-1.

4 BB 451 battery recharging capability.

5 Limited 2nd and 3rd echelon electronic, Engr, MT Transport and Ordnance maintenance.

6 Limited float of Comm-Elect end items and accessories.

7 Potable water.

8 Security and control of captives.

9 Medical facility.

d. 1st Engr Bn:

(1) Provide Engr support to artillery units during movement to objective area.

(2) Be prepared to provide Engineer support to convoys on order this Headquarters.

e. Det, MP Co (-): Establish and maintain TCP as directed by this Headquarters.

f. Miscellaneous:

(1) LSU provide this Headquarters (Devote 4) daily dump status for LSA at Tam Ky by 2000 as of 1800.

(2) Submit requests for Motor Transport support to this Headquarters (Devote 35).

(3) Units provide density list of weapons and major items of equipment to FLSG-Bravo (Valve 403) D-1.

(4) CO, 5th Mar (-) (Rein) provide four PP 3240 battery chargers and ten BA 386 batteries to LSU D-Day.

(5) In event bridge or road cut convoy halt and all vehicles pull to right side of road, in order to permit rapid movement of Engr traffic.

(6) Units ensure slings, baskets and pennants are returned to LSA by most expedient means.

3. LSA LOCATIONS. Normally LSA is established at the airfield at Quang Ngai for operations to the south and at the airfield at Tam Ky for operations to the north.

NAVAL SUPPORT DETACHMENT

1. MISSION. To provide supply support to all U. S. and third country forces in the Chu Lai Combat area and to operate the beach and port area of the Base.

2. FUNCTIONS.

a. Port.

- (1) 4 LST Ramps
- (2) 3 LCU Ramps
- (3) 700 ft marginal wharf
- (4) Offload capacity of 1950 short ton/day
- (5) Beach clearance capability of 975 ton/day

b. Class I Supply.

(1) 42,000 cubic ft reefer space provides 14 days "A" Rations for 34,000 personnel.

(2) 40,000 square ft warehouse provides 45 days supply "B" Rations for 34,000 personnel.

(3) 15 days operating level and 15 days safety level "C" Rations held in open storage.

c. Class II & IV Supply.

- (1) Common item support for all tenant activities.
- (2) 48,000 square ft (12 Butler Bldgs) warehouse class II & IV items.

d. Class III & IIIA Bulk Fuel Storage (Rigid tanks).

- (1) 2,600,000 gals of JP-4
- (2) 168,000 gals AVGAS
- (3) 280,000 gals LOGAS
- (4) 312,000 gals Diesel

e. TAFDS capacity for 560,000 gals JP-4.

REAL ESTATE

1. GENERAL.

a. A function of the Chu Lai Installation Coordinator is the acquisition, allocation, and reallocation of real estate within Chu Lai.

b. Real estate in Vietnam is defined as:

- (1) Land and interest therein.
- (2) Quarries, laterite, and barrow pits.
- (3) Leaseholds, standing timber, permanent buildings, and improvements.
- (4) Piers, docks and warehouses.
- (5) Rights of way, easements, and real property.

c. All U. S. and Free World Forces are subject to MACV real estate procedures.

(1) The U. S. may not acquire title to real property in Vietnam.

(2) There are two methods by which formal authority to use land may be obtained:

(a) Land Grant Use: Written agreement with GVN accomplished through U. S. Military channels.

1 Land Grant Use agreements usually involve indemnification of Vietnamese for their loss of rice crops, bamboo, houses, relocation of graves, etc as a result of the Land Grant Use Agreement.

2 Indemnification is based on an inventory (tabulation) conducted by Vietnamese district or province officials. Indemnification is paid through ARVN channels.

(b) Written Lease: Written leases deal primarily with acquiring existing buildings from private owners for use as offices and billeting areas.

(3) During operations, the principal of military necessity applies and therefore, none of the above agreements are required.

2. CHU LAI PROCEDURES.

a. As a matter of simplicity, the principal of military necessity is applied whenever possible for all areas outside of the Chu Lai Defense

Command.

b. Whenever the principal of military necessity cannot be applied, a simplified procedure is used.

(1) Coordination is made with the District Chief to familiarize him with the desired area.

(2) Upon approval of the District Chief, the move is made.

(3) The formal request for real estate is submitted in accordance with 1c(2)(a) above.

c. Another phase of real estate control is the allocation or reallocation of real estate within the Chu Lai Defense Command.

(1) Land is assigned within the Chu Lai Defense Command to occupying units by the Chu Lai Installation Coordinator.

(2) Change of land use or occupancy is controlled by the Chu Lai Installation Coordinator.

G-5

SECTION

G-5 SECTION
INDEX

TAB

1. MISSION AND CIVIL AFFAIRS
2. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
3. CLIC O 5080.1 (COORDINATION OF CIVIC ACTION IN THE CHU LAI TAOR)
4. G-5 SECTION (PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS, BY RANK)
5. SIGNIFICANT DATA
6. CONSTRUCTION DATA
7. CIVIC ACTION INDICATORS
8. CLIC O 5080.3 (SUPPORT FOR THE GVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, CALANDER YEAR 1967)
9. TASK FORCE X-RAY PSY OPS BY MONTH
10. JOINT LETTER MACV/OCO, (GUIDANCE ON 1967 VILLAGE AND HAMLET ELECTIONS)
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G-5 SECTIONMISSION:

1. To coordinate the Civil Affairs program within the CHU LAI TAOR and DUC PHO AO. This includes assignment of Areas of Responsibility to various units; the monitoring of unit programs; and the coordination and guidance of the programs as required. (TAB "A")
2. To maintain liaison and coordination with the Government of Vietnam officials located at QUANG NGAI and QUANG TIN Provincial headquarters and LY TIN, TAM KY, BINH SON and DUC PHO District headquarters, and their MACV advisors and Office of Civil Operations (OCO) counterparts.
3. To conduct Psychological Operations as deemed appropriate in support of military and civil affairs operations.

ORGANIZATION: TAB "B"

SIGNIFICANT DATA: TAB "C"

CIVIL AFFAIRS

CIVIL AFFAIRS(CA): Civil Affairs encompasses those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area, or occupied country or area when military forces are present.

CIVIC ACTION: Civic Action is any action performed by military forces of a country or by U.S. forces serving in that country which utilizes military manpower, equipment, material and skills in cooperation with the civil authorities, agencies and groups which is designed to improve the economic and social conditions of a country and its people.

CONCEPT: QUANG NGAI and QUANG TIN are rural, agricultural Provinces. The people are simple in outlook and needs. Civil Affairs projects, therefore, must reflect these facts. Civil Affairs in application is kept to the battalion level whenever possible to assure the closest contact between the people and the sponsor involved in each project. Projects are not undertaken unless they are desired by the people. Emphasis is placed on self-help by the people wherever possible with the Marines providing material, and equipment and technical guidance if needed.

PROJECTS:

Construction statistics, TAB "D"

MED/DENT CAP statistics, TAB "E"

SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT:

All military and civil operations are considered to be in support of the Revolutionary Development Program.

There are 9 59-man Revolutionary Development Cadres (RDC) in the U.S. Marine sector of the CHU LAI TAOR and 2 RDC's in the DUC PHO AO. Coordinating instructions concerning the conduct of Civic Action in support of RD is contained in CLIC Order 5080.3, (TAB "F")

SUPPLIES: Building materials are furnished upon request by the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) Provincial representative as appropriate. Other supplies, such as paint, seeds, medicines, and used clothing are obtained from the III MAF Civic Action Warehouse, DANANG.

A supply warehouse is maintained by G-5. A 15-day MEDCAP supply is maintained also since this type of supply is in great demand.

Supplies are moved from DANANG to CHU LAI by Rough-Rider, LST, or aircraft.

Supplies are moved from CHU LAI to DUC PHO by helicopter. Use of LST's or junks is under consideration.

G-5 has a FVMAF Civic Action Imprest Fund of 100,000\$VN for purchasing supplies when necessary.

U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS:

Two Civil Affairs Platoons of the 29th Civil Affairs Company are attached to Task Force X-Ray (G-5). They are assigned to act as coordinators for Civil Affairs between the District headquarters and the various units located in each District; to make appropriate area economic, educational, and social studies; to provide technical assistance to units as required.

A detachment of one platoon is maintained in the DUC PHO AO.

Refugee Teams of the 29th Civil Affairs Company provide technical assistance in the handling of refugee matters.

REFUGEES

There are approximately 11,000 refugees in the DUC PHO AO. Of these, approximately 7500 are permanent refugees who will need building materials and other assets. OCO, QUANG NGAI will provide the materials. A 29th Civil Affairs Company Team will coordinate the shipments. Marine Corps helicopters, or LST's will be used for transportation.

Steps are underway to resettle approximately 1600 refugees located at BINH SA (V), BINH SON District into a permanent camp. A CA Platoon of the 29th Civil Affairs Company, and the 3rd AmTracBn are sponsoring this project.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

2

MISSION: To conduct psychological operations as deemed appropriate in support of military and civil affairs operations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS): These operations include psychological warfare and encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (PSYWAR): The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

METHODS OF CONDUCTING PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

By airborne loudspeaker and leaflets dropped from Air Force U-10 aircraft or Marine helicopters.

By hand-delivered posters, leaflets, newspapers, magazines, and other printed matter.

By Army ground loudspeaker teams accompanying patrols, and other ground movements.

By movie shows conducted by Army audio-visual teams or G-5 provided projectors and films.

By psychological operations exploitation teams (POET) used to rapidly exploit situations unfavorable to the VC publication of which will cause an immediate negative reaction by the population.

LOCAL RESOURCES

Liaison team, 244th Psychological Operations Company (1 officer, 1 NCO) located in G-5 office (supports Southern I Corps).

Audio-Visual team (1 NCO, 2 Marines) of 244th Psychological Operations Company, attached to liaison team. (Acts as combat loudspeaker team and psychological operations exploitation team, when needed).

Stock of approximately 7,000,000 leaflets, newspapers, etc.

MAJOR THEMES EMPLOYED

1. VC, return to the GVN via the Chieu Hoi program.
2. Citizens support the GVN which provides a stable life; reject the VC which causes destruction.
3. The Marines are your friends; do not shoot at them. Allied power retaliates.

4. Rewards for information, equipment, arms.

CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

An appeal to VC/NVA soldiers to return to the GVN. Food, clothes, shelter, reunification with family, job retraining, salary, political readjustment promised returnees. (This is the major PsyWar theme employed.)

KIT CARSON SCOUT PROGRAM

PROCUREMENT: Division G-5 recruits former VC at Provincial Chieu Hoi Centers for specific area of employment. (Task Force X-Ray serves as local liaison).

USE: Act as scouts for units on operation, conduct interrogations, face-to-face confrontations, loudspeaker appeals.

TRAINING AND EVALUATION: Conducted by unit to which assigned. After acceptance by unit, usually after approximately 6 weeks field work, the scout is paid 5,000\$VN/month, given a weapon. Prior to this, he is paid only reward money for the results of his work.

SCOUTS/TRAINEEES ON-BOARD:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SCOUTS</u>	<u>TRAINEES</u>
1st Battalion, 5th Marines	1	1
1st Battalion, 7th Marines	2	1
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines	1	
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines	1	1

TASK FORCE X-RAY PSY OPS BY MONTH: TAB "G"

HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Division (Rein.), FPO/Chu Lai Installation Coordinator
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3

CLICO 5080.1
46/JTS/rh
27 January 1967

CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINATOR ORDER 5080.1

From: Installation Coordinator
To: Distribution List

Subj: Coordination of Civic Action in the Chu Lai Tactical Area of Responsibility

Ref: (a) For/NSO 5081.1A
(b) ICCI 5030.1
(c) ForO 5020.1

Encl: (1) Civic Action Areas, Chu Lai TAOR
(2) Overlay of Selected Civic Action Areas
(3) Recommended Actions For a Successful Civic Action Program
(4) Civic Action Survey Checklist

1. Purpose. To provide coordinating instructions concerning Civic Action within the Chu Lai TAOR.

2. Background. The displacement of units to the Danang TAOR has necessitated a realignment of certain Civic Action Areas with the Chu Lai TAOR. In making these assignments consideration was given to the following:

- a. Proximity of the assigned unit to the area assigned.
- b. Civic Action principles of adhering to political boundaries when assigning areas of responsibility.
- c. The desires of the many units clustered around the Chu Lai Air Field/Industrial Area to actively participate in the Civic Action program.

3. Action

a. Commanding Officers will conduct Civic Action within the areas listed in enclosure (1). Enclosure (2) has been prepared to ensure clarity in those areas of high unit density.

b. The assignments contained in enclosure (1) do not preclude Civic Action in other areas. Civic Action may be conducted after coordination with the unit assigned the area on enclosure (1).

TAB "A"

CLICO 5080.1

46/JTS/10th

27 January 1967

The unit conducting the Civic Action will report it on its Daily Action Report in accordance with reference (a).

c. Enclosure (3) and (4) have been prepared to provide basic information concerning Civic Action methods of operation.

d. An unassigned unit may conduct Civic Action in any area. Coordination and reports as described in subparagraph 3.b, above.

4. Reports.

a. Units under the operational control of Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray, submit all Civic Action reports via that Headquarters (Attn: AC/S G-5).

b. The remaining units of the Chu Lai Installation, submit reports to Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray (Attn: AC/S G-5) in accordance with the following table:

<u>Report</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Original</u>	<u>Copy</u>	<u>Due Date</u>
Daily Civic Action	a	-	1	Daily
Significant Data	a	1	4	As required
Pacification Progress	a	1	4	22nd of month
Initial BACKLASH	b	-	1	As required
Interim BACKLASH	b	-	1	As required
REDCAP Activity	c	-	1	30th of month

c. Enclosure (1) has been annotated (*) to indicate the unit having responsibility to prepare the Monthly Pacification Progress Report for each village. The report will be submitted by the 22nd of each month after coordination with any other unit assigned or conducting civic action in the village.

Fred Haynes
FRED HAYNES
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "A" and "B"

CLICO 5080.1

46/JTS/rjh

27 January 1967

CIVIC ACTION RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN CHU LAI TAOR

<u>VILLAGE</u>	<u>HAMLET</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
Ky Hoa	(All)	*2ndLAAME
Ky Xuan	(All)	*MCB-8
Ky Ha	Trung Toan Sam Hai An Tay Xuan Trung	MACS-7 1st SPBn *7thCommBn 7thCommBn
Ky Lien	Long Binh Tich Tay Long Phu Chu Lai New Life An Tan	1stSPBn *9thEngBn 1stFAC FLSG"B" MAC-12
Ky Khuong	Khuong Long Khuong Quang Khuong Phu Khuong Dai Khuong Nhon Khuong Binh Remainder	MAC-12 MAC-12 4thBn, 11thMar 4thBn, 11thMar 3rd8"HowBtry 2ndBn, 11thMar *5th Marines
Ky Chanh	(All)	*5th Marines
Ky Trung	(All)	*5th Marines
Ky Hung	(All)	*5th Marines
Ky Bich	(All)	*5th Marines
Ky Sanh	(All)	*5th Marines
Binh Sa	Trung An Hai Ninh Vinh An	1stEngBn# *3rdAmTracBn 3rdAmTracBn
Binh Nghia	Dong Binh My Hue Binh Yen Noi	MAC-13# *MCB-40 @ 1stMTBn@
Binh Giang	(All)	*7th Marines


CLICO 5080.1
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<u>VILLAGE</u>	<u>HAMLET</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
Binh Phien	(All)	*7th Marines
Binh Thuong	(All)	*7th Marines
Binh Thang	(All)	*7th Marines
Binh Thong	(All)	*7th Marines
Binh Thuy	(All)	*7th Marines
Binh Tuy	(All)	*7th Marines
Binh Thanh	(All)	*7th Marines
Binh Thien	Phuoc Thien	*7th Marines
	Thanh Tuy	7th Marines
	Van Tuong	7th Marines

* Unit responsible for preparation of monthly Pacification Progress Report.

Coordinate with 1st Engineer Battalion in TRUNG AN.


© Coordinate with 1st Motor Transport Battalion in BINH YEN NOI.



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27 January 1967

OVERLAY OF CIVIC ACTION
AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

42
13



Map: Vietnam 1:50,000
Sheet: 6739 IV
Series: L7014



———— Village Boundary
----- Hamlet Boundary

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C4

CLICO 5080.1
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27 January 1967

OVERLAY OF CIVIC ACTION AREAS OF RES-
PONSIBILITY (BINH SA AND BINH NGHIA VILLAGES)

Map: Vietnam 1:50,000
Sheets: 6739 IV and 6739I
Series: L7014



CLICO 5080.1
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27 January 1967

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

1. Become acquainted with key members of the village and hamlet.
 - a. The Village Chief, political leader and military commander of the area.
 - b. The Hamlet Chief.
 - c. Religious leaders of the village and hamlet.
 - d. The village security chief (if any).
 - e. The schoolmaster and school teachers.
 - f. Tribal leaders and elders.
2. Gather background data if possible on key personnel of area.
 - a. Date and place of birth.
 - b. Education and religion.
 - c. Knowledge of foreign languages.
 - d. Special skills or abilities.
 - e. Military service.
 - f. Travel background.
 - g. Past activities in government.
 - h. Present job and salary.
 - i. Details of family, i.e., allegiance of sons and brothers.
 - j. Character and personality - is he honest; is he loyal; is he a doer and not just a talker; does he have initiative, drive, imagination?
 - k. Is he pro-military, pro-government, pro-American?

CLICO 5030.1

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27 January 1967

3. If time and the tactical situation permit, conduct informal civic action survey of the community. See Civic Action Survey Checklist and Format for Guidance (Enclosure (4)). Consider all aspects and make a list of needed projects.

4. Gathering the above information will be a continuing process. Record it and pass it on to the succeeding Marine units in addition to reporting it in reports required by higher headquarters.

RECOMMENDED ACTIVITIES FOR CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

1. Medical Support. Have unit Corpsman assist village doctor or health worker in sick call. If there is no doctor, unit corpsman should run sick call himself. Unit corpsman should visit all villages in area and make occasional visits to remote villages. From among the more intelligent of the young villagers, the corpsman should choose an assistant aidman with the object of training him/her eventually to become the village doctor (health worker). The village should be persuaded to build a dispensary with the theme "This will be for your village and your people. If the people want continued medical support, then build a dispensary".

2. Aid to Education. By encouraging and helping the children, the parents can be made aware of the importance of education. School supplies to be furnished include blackboards, chalk, erasers, pencil sharpeners, writing paper, tablets, multiplication tables, rulers, books, globes, and atlases. Get the material to the children through the teachers. Teach the school master to be responsible and account for the equipment, to take the books up at the end of the semester and re-issue them at the beginning of the term. Use the school aid program as a lever to get the village to repair and expand the school. USAID can assist through self-help program. Encourage the village to send all the children to school. This goal can be reached through the village chief.

3. Sanitation. This field offers the greatest possibilities for achievement and improvement. Persuade the people to police the streets, cut the grass, burn and bury rubbish, and ~~put~~ beneath and around the houses. Encourage village authorities to destroy homeless, vicious, and unwanted dogs. Start a DDT program. Teach the natives how to use the sprayers and mix the solution. Use rat poison in the village but place it out of the reach of children and chickens. Conduct a war on bedbugs and lice. Use oil to stamp out mosquito breeding area. Have family latrines dug. Instruct on covering waste. Assist the villagers in digging wells for drinking water.

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27 January 1967

Instruct families on fly control; distribute swatters. Action should be taken to prevent livestock from overrunning living areas.

4. Aid to Agriculture. Through G-5, assistance can be obtained by requesting agriculture assistance teams. These teams assist in encouraging programs for crop rotation, proper spacing, fertilizing, and spraying. This is a long-range project that takes patience, time and skillful persuasion. An Asian farmer puts all his earnings into his crop and he is very hesitant about experimenting. But once he has been shown results of this new method of growing, he will be an eager participant. In many areas the irrigation systems could be improved; small streams could be dammed, etc.

5. Transportation Improvement. Most roads in Asian countries need improvement. Get villagers to build and repair bridges, repair washouts, fill holes and lay detours. Use whatever labor is available whether it is 3 or 300 men. Sell the villagers on the advantages of trade and business.

6. Children's Playground. Having a playground presents an opportunity to influence, educate, and take part in rearing children for a better country. Stock the playground with swings, teetertotters, sliding boards, monkey bars, and parallel bars. Set up volleyball, basketball, soccer, baseball, and just plain, ordinary tag ball. Set up relay races, obstacle races, and jumping contests. Teach children sportsmanship and teamwork. Get them in top physical condition.

7. Special Tools. Through G-5, villages can lease or directly obtain a village tool kit. Since most of the construction is by hand, proper tools will save many hours.

8. Market Place. If the market place is in decay or non-existent, interest the villages in building a new one. Material for such projects can be obtained through G-5; however, such requests must be initiated by the village through District to Province. The USAID representatives at Province will coordinate.

9. Movies. You can obtain a generator and projector from G-5 in order to show Vietnamese and American movies. Films may be obtained through request to G-5. Emphasis should be placed on showing Vietnamese films. Show American films, particularly those with a simple, direct theme showing the United States at best (e.g. cowboy pictures, adventure pictures, and light comedies.) Avoid films which degrade the United States or which are extremely sophisticated and complex. The villagers love to watch American films even when they cannot understand a word. A portable public address speaker which would enable an interpreter to give the general plot line would be a big asset when showing U.S. films.

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10. Coordinate. Finally, before starting any work, coordinate at all levels to ensure that resources are available to support contemplated projects. Civic Action projects will take up many hours, but the hours will be well spent in the achievement of the objectives of building a greater, stronger, free country.

TIPS ON CONDUCT OF A CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

1. Upon arrival in a village, pay a courtesy call on the Village/Hamlet chief. Do not talk shop on the first meeting; just make friends.
2. Deal Directly with the Village/Hamlet Chief. Do not work through his subordinates. Always work through one man - the chief.
3. Do Not Stockpile Supplies. Get them distributed promptly. You must have a system of control. Have the Chief sign for everything you give him and see that he signs out the equipment to his subordinates. Since it is impossible for everyone to have a pick, shovel, grub hoe, and axe, the tools should be issued from a central point on a loan basis. When a farmer finishes with a piece of equipment, he returns it to the Chief. The Chief and his subordinates must be taught how to run this system.
4. Always Make the Villagers Share the Workload. Let them know that all these projects are village projects, not help for the helpless. Once you do one project alone, the villagers will always expect this from your unit. Do not give them something for nothing. For example, a good approach could be "I will try to get a roof for this school if you will build the school and furnish all the materials and labor".
5. Try to present your ideas to the Village Chief in such a fashion that he will think it was his idea. Let him win full credit for the completion of any project. Do not issue orders to him or demand an instant decision. When you approach him with an idea, let him have a night to think about it. But the next day, be sure to gently push him toward the decision.
6. Do Not Start Anything That You Cannot Fully Support. Never promise anything. Remember you can be moved out on a moment's notice. Try to have all the material on hand before you start any project. Check it out with your supervisors before you begin. Make certain coordination is complete.
7. Maintain the proper attitude of good-natured willingness and endless patience in the face of resentment to change and complete apathy. Be faithful; be tolerant. Show exceptional kindness to the children and the very old. Be courteous; be relaxed; and do not be in a hurry.

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8. Do not worry if the Vietnamese do things differently from what you propose. If they achieve the end result, that is all that counts.

9. Observe the Native Customs. Never force your way into a village where there is a closed celebration. Follow the native customs. Learn the customs of their religion.

10. Do Not, As a General Rule, Give Away Items for Nothing. For example if you give picks, insist that they be used to dig a well, or to ditch the streets. If you give school supplies, have the people either build a school or repair the old one.

11. Information concerning enemy military activity or the local VC infrastructure is often given to Civic Action personnel by appreciative villagers. Rewards are sometimes paid for the information. However, a reward must not be pressed on a Vietnamese who has acted only from friendship. Nor should such a person be approached in public concerning intelligence matters for the revealing of information often places the informant at great risk. Information obtained by Civic Action personnel should be forwarded immediately through normal intelligence channels.

CONCLUSION. If the tactical situation permits, the sky is the limit to what you can achieve. You cannot make a new country in one day, but it only takes one day to start.

CLICO 5080.1
46/JTS/rjn
27 January 1967

CIVIC ACTION SURVEY CHECKLIST AND FORMAT

FUNCTIONAL AREA NOTES.

1. Commerce and Industry.

- a. Is there a market place? Large enough? Clean?
- b. Are there agricultural surpluses? Can they be marketed? Locally?
- c. Is there a local handicraft? Potential for one? Baskets? Crossbows? Shoes? Fish nets? Thatching?
- d. Could a market relieve US local supply problem?

2. Civil Information.

- a. Is there an information center? Current? Eye appeal?
- b. Have either USAID or JUSPAO supported agencies supplied a radio receiver?
- c. Is there any local news publication? Any available from outside sources?

3. Displaced Persons.

- a. How many?
- b. Is temporary shelter available? Food? Clothing?
- c. Can emergency medical treatment be provided?
- d. Are USAID, MACV, RVN aware of the situation?
- e. What provincial plans, if any, exist for resettlement?

4. Food and Agriculture.

- a. Is sufficient land available? Cleared? Prepared?
- b. Are there vegetable gardens to provide dietary balance?
- c. Could overall yield be increased? More land? Fertilizer?
- d. Are there livestock (cows and pigs) and poultry (chickens, ducks and geese)?
- e. Would increased acreage create manpower shortage at harvest time? Could military assist in harvest?

CLIGO 5080.1
46/23/rj
27 January 1967

5. Public Education.

- a. Is there a school? Number of classrooms? Level of literacy?
- b. How many students? Student to teacher ratio?
- c. Are there adequate supplies (notebooks, pencils, chalk, water paints or water colors) and textbooks? Chalkboard? GVN flag?
- d. Can Province furnish and support additional teachers?
- e. Is there any playground equipment?

6. Public Health.

- a. Water Supply. Location? Year around source? Contaminated? Adequate amounts? Storage tanks? Health literature?
- b. Disease. Any obvious diseases? Treatment available? Local health workers? How trained? Payed locally or by province? Adequate medical supplies? Source of supply? Replacement of supplies?
- c. Waste Disposal. Are latrines used? Location in relation to water supply? To dispensary? To school? Are they cleaned? Adequate for size of population? Literature available? Prominently posted?

7. Public Transportation.

- a. What is the primary means of access to the area?
- b. What is the state of repair of roads? Bridges? Dikes? Ferry boats? Culverts?
- c. Are routes critical for either marketing surplus in surrounding area or acquiring commodities to sustain community?

8. Public Welfare.

- a. What is needed? Food? Clothing? Shelter?
- b. Why? Refugees? Crop failure? Military action?
- c. Who can provide needed aid? USAID? Province? District?
ARVN?
- d. How long will support be necessary? Until next harvest?

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27 January 1967

Until permanent resettlement? Until USAID and Province can take over?

e. What can recipients do to help themselves? To help us? To help someone else? (Avoid out-and-out gifts if possible and practical.)


RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Analysis. Based on your analysis of the above, what areas are recommended as appropriate for military civic action efforts?

2. Basic Consideration. Remember the basic considerations; Does it meet a need? Will it take long to complete? Can it be maintained after military support is withdrawn? WILL THE INTENDED EFFECT JUSTIFY THE EFFORT?

3. Military Civic Action. Always remember, military civic action is neither based solely on humanitarian values nor on a giveaway plan. It has definite, specific goals: to establish goodwill, to isolate the people from the insurgent, and to provide another source of intelligence governing their activities.

TAB "B"

G-5 SECTION

SIGNIFICANT DATA (TAB "C")

5

	<u>QUANG TIN</u>	<u>QUANG NGAI</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>POPULATION</u>	360,000	662,000	1,022,000
WITHIN TAOR	64,000	170,000	234,000
<u>POPULATION CONTROL</u>			
GVN	125,000	284,000	409,000
DISPUTED	207,000	288,000	495,000
VC	28,000	90,000	118,000
<u>VILLAGES</u>	71	152	233
WITHIN TAOR(S)	9	32	41
<u>HAMLETS</u>	432	480	912
WITHIN TAOR(S)	75	90	165
<u>REV DEV CADRE</u>			
NOW	16	18	34
END CY 1967	20	28	48
WITHIN TAOR(S)	3	8	11

TAB "C"

CONSTRUCTION STATISTICS (TAB "D")MAJOR PROJECTS

<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>CT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>BEGIN</u>	<u>END</u>	<u>%</u>
Refugee Support	8038	3rdBn, 7th Mar	15 Mar	-	-
Refugee Relocation	6101	3rdAmTracBn	28 Mar	-	-
Hamlet Relocation	4310	5th Marines	1 Mar	-	-
Dickie Chapelle Memorial Dispensary	5005	9thEngrBn	1 Oct 66	1 Aug	30
Long Binh Road	5108	1stSPBn	1 Jul 66	1 Jul	70
Vegetable Gardens	5800	29thCACo	15 Dec 66	-	40
District High School	4807	MAG-12	15 Jul 66	1 May	90

MINOR PROJECTS

Road Construction/Repair	11
Official Building Construction/Repair	5
School Construction/Repair	5
Dispensary Construction/Repair	7
Market Place Construction	4
Well Construction	6
Agricultural (model farm, hog shelter, etc.)	5
Miscellaneous (latrines, showers, etc.)	3

TAB "D"

CIVIC ACTION INDICATORS

	<u>MEDCAP</u>	<u>DENTCAP</u>
MONTHLY AVERAGE		
APR-JAN	19,109	1,018
FEBRUARY	18,656	1,337
MARCH (19TH)	18,494	608
APRIL		
MAY		
JUNE		

7

TAB "E"

HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF/Chu Lai Installation Coordinator
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

CLICO 5080.3
 46/JTS/rjh
 18 March 1967

CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINATOR ORDER 5080.3

From: Chu Lai Installation Coordinator
 To: Distribution List

Subj: Support for the GVN Revolutionary Development Program, Calendar
 Year 1967

Ref: (a) ICCI 5080.2
 (b) DivO 5080.4
 (c) ForO 5080.2
 (d) ForO 5800.6
 (e) ICCI 5830.1

Encl: (1) Military Civic Action and Revolutionary Development
 Program
 (2) Military Civic Action Request Form

1. Purpose. To establish procedures for the conduct of Civic Action in the CHU LAI TAOR and DUC PHO AO to assure that all projects undertaken fully complement the GVN 1967 Revolutionary Development Program.

2. Information.

a. The concept of civic action in this TAOR is based on guidance contained in directives issued by higher headquarters and is aimed at supporting the Revolutionary Development Program. Information contained in other directives is duplicated herein only where necessary to an understanding of the Revolutionary Development concept.

b. The term "Revolutionary Development" describes the total counter-insurgency effort. It includes military suppression of the insurgent Viet Cong and, behind the protective screen of military forces, the exercise of government through political, economic, and social measures designed to demonstrate to the populace that life under the GVN is practicable and desirable. The Revolutionary Development Program is GVN initiated and is the means by which the Vietnamese plan to fill the vacuum that exists between the people and their government.

c. Revolutionary Development will be accomplished in the countryside by 59-man GVN Revolutionary Development Cadres (RDC). The concept of the cadres' operation will be that of a small scale program which will be carried out through joint efforts of cadre and civilian manpower and resources. It is a self-help type program with the cadres advising and assisting the people to improve their hamlets and villages.


TAB "F"

CLICO 5080.3
18 March 1967

d. Enclosure (1) contains regulations designed to insure that civic action in the CHU LAI TAOR and DUC PHO AO interferes with neither the Provincial Revolutionary Development Programs nor the Revolutionary Development Cadres.

4. Action. The procedures set forth herein shall govern the conduct of civic action in the CHU LAI TAOR and DUC PHO AO.

5. Applicability. This order is issued in accordance with the provisions of reference (a) and is applicable to all units performing civic action in the CHU LAI TAOR and DUC PHO AO.


FRED HAINES
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: List I "C"
List II "C"

Copy to:

Sector Advisor, QUANG TIN (5)
QUANG NGAI (5)

OCO, QUANG TIN (3)
QUANG NGAI (3)

Sub-Sector Advisor, LY TIN (2)
TAM KY (2)
BINH SON (2)

CINCPAC 5080.3
18 March 1967MILITARY CIVIC ACTION AND THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

1. Scope. This order is restricted in scope to providing detailed guidance and coordinating instruction concerning the conduct of civic action so as to assure coordination with the Revolutionary Development efforts of the Government of Vietnam.

2. GVN Revolutionary Development Cadres.

a. Cadres designed by the Government of Vietnam to execute the 1967 Revolutionary Development Program will be inserted into various TAOR hamlets throughout the year. These teams, composed of a self-defense element and a technically-trained hamlet improvement element, are usually uniformed in black pajamas with the letters "X.D.N.T." (For Revolutionary Development) sewn to the jacket. Each member of the team is armed, usually with an M-2 carbine. They are a responsibility of the Province Chief and work at the immediate direction of the District Chief. The cadre mission is as follows:

(1) To create in the hamlets a Community of Responsibility by discovering and removing the VC infrastructure; learning the people's aspirations and grievances; teaching democratic ways and helping in the election of a hamlet government; instilling in the people a sense of responsibility for their own defense and forming a hamlet militia.

(2) To create a Community of Prosperity by improving education and health services, and assisting with land reform; introducing new or improved crops and agricultural methods, hand industries, and hamlet cooperatives; developing or improving lines of communications, public works and electrification; and implementing national programs recognizing the contribution of veterans and other patriotic groups to the struggle for freedom.

b. The cadres will accomplish their mission by:

(1) Initially establishing a rapport between themselves and the residents of the hamlet. They will live among the people striving to be accepted as brothers. In turn, they will exhibit the interest, understanding and concern of brothers for their hamlet.

(2) Recognizing that the people play the key role. No project will be undertaken unless the people desire it; no project will be started unless the people participate.

(3) Following the government policy of allowing the aspirations of the people to properly guide the cadre's activities. The cadres will adapt themselves to the hamlet and its customs. Change will occur through persuasion and example.

CLICO 5080.3

18 March 1967

(4) Recognizing that the population is determined to destroy the old way of life and build a new one. All cadre actions will be subject to the test of whether or not they support the search for a new and better popular life.

3. US/FMMAF Relationship with GVN Revolutionary Development Cadres

a. Civic action will not be conducted in those hamlets undergoing pacification by Revolutionary Development Cadres. Cadre locations are available from this headquarters (G-5). Assistance may be rendered the cadres on those projects clearly beyond their capability. Requests for assistance received from the cadres will be coordinated with the appropriate District headquarters by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Platoon assigned to coordinate civic action in the area. (See par. 4.) Assistance given the cadres will be restricted to technical advice, the use of equipment not otherwise available, and the construction when possible, of roads to those hamlets remote from National Route # 1 in which the Cadres are operating.

b. The Cadres will not be interfered with in any way. Units will remain clear of hamlets in which Cadres are located except when operations require entrance therein. Units experiencing any difficulties with the cadres or their operations will immediately notify this headquarters (Attn: AC/S, G-5).

4. Coordination. All civic action projects are considered to be in support of the Revolutionary Development Program. To assure full coordination of effort at all levels of supervision as well as to assure minimum resource waste and planning duplication, the following levels of coordination will be followed:

<u>GVN UNIT</u>	<u>MILITARY ECHELON</u>	<u>NOTE</u>
Hamlet	Company/Battalion/Squadron	a
Village	Battalion/Regiment/Squadron/Group	b
District	Civil Affairs Platoon	c
Province	Task Force X-Ray	d

Note:

a. At the contact echelon of civic action, emphasis will be on discovering the people's needs and a way to satisfy them. The relationship is that of two neighbors talking over a situation needing joint resolution. When both agree on the action to be taken, then the project will be formalized using enclosure (2).

Enclosure (1)

2

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b. The next echelon coordinates action within its area of responsibility assuring that a capability exists to get the project done and also that the second governmental echelon is aware of and desires the project.

c. Since more than one unit usually conducts civic action in a District, project requests and other civic action matters will be coordinated through the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Platoons as described in paragraph 5, below.

d. Coordination at the Province level will be conducted by this headquarters (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5). All major projects must have the approval of the Province Chief before construction materials will be issued.

5. U. S. Army Civil Affairs Units

a. Two U.S. Army Civil Affairs Platoons are attached to Task Force X-Ray. The platoons will be utilized in support of Revolutionary Development in the following manner:

(1) As civic action coordinators throughout the CHU LAM THON and DUC PHOAO. Numerous units now are conducting civic action in the four districts which encompass the areas of responsibility assigned this command. In order to insure a level of coordinated effort and also to assure continuity of effort when units change location or depart the TAOR, the platoons are assigned coordination responsibility as follows:

(a) LY TIN and TAM KY Districts, QUANG TIN Province, one platoon.

(b) BINH SON and DUC PHO Districts, QUANG NGAI Province, one platoon.

In addition, the platoons will coordinate all contact with the GVN Revolutionary Development Cadres assigned within the TAOR's.

(2) The platoons have a general capability to conduct broad-based Civil Affairs functions. Upon request, they will be assigned to conduct economic, social, educational or other type surveys of specific hamlets or villages. Supporting specialist teams, available from higher headquarters, may be assigned to these surveys when necessary.

(3) As technical assistants concerning the establishment of a civic action program and the methods of conducting the program. Most of the platoon members are technical specialists or have attended the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School and can be of value to unit commanders in the technical aspects of a rural development program.

6. Types of Unit Civic Action Projects. The following guidelines are designed to assure that unit civic action compliments the Province Revolutionary Development Plans:

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18 March 1967

a. Emphasis will be toward projects which bring an awareness to the people of their National and Provincial government, and the surrounding hamlets and villages of their district. New projects will be started only after coordination to assure a GVN capability to support the project in future years; for example, a class-room built without a teacher is of value only to the Viet Cong as a propaganda device. Two types of projects will be emphasized this year:

(1) Those of a short-term, high local impact, such as the repair and improvement of existing schools; the construction of latrines at schools; the improvement of existing wells or the construction of new ones; the construction of shower stalls; the repair of irrigation systems.

(2) Those of long-term value, such as the construction/improvement of roads and trails from remote areas to National Route # 1; the introduction of agricultural improvements such as new types of vegetables, farm animals, techniques, and irrigation; the construction of soccer fields or volley-ball courts near schools and the formation of school athletic leagues which emphasize traditional Vietnamese sports (rather than American).

b. Projects will not be started unless genuinely desired by the people. Self-help will continue as the method for getting projects done. U.S. personnel will participate in the active construction/accomplishment of a project only to the extent necessary to complete those aspects not within the capability of the people. Technical assistance will be offered not from the viewpoint that "Americans do things better" but with the realization that traditional Vietnamese building methods have been developed over a long span of years and are based on the climate, use, and other factors peculiar to Vietnam and are usually a satisfactory approach to the desired construction. Close liaison between hamlet officials and the sponsoring unit is recommended during project construction.

7. Civic Action Imprest Fund. This command now has available funds to be used to finance high impact civic action projects that require rapid accomplishment and for which other funds are not available. The funds may be used when necessary in support of the Revolutionary Development Program. Expenditures include the purchase of flags and other equipment including athletic uniforms for schools, and refreshments (non-alcoholic) for dedications and other ceremonies or festivities. Reference (b) contains instructions for requesting disbursements from this fund. Requests should be addressed to this headquarters (attn: AC/S, G-5).

8. Supplies.

a. Construction and other general-purpose supplies will be requisitioned in accordance with references (c) and (d). A civic action warehouse has been established by this headquarters in order to expedite supply action on certain common-use items. Construction materials will be procured from the appropriate Provincial USAID warehouse upon submission

Enclosure (1)

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18 March 1967

to this headquarters of a requisition in the format contained in enclosure (2). Use of enclosure (2) will assure that no duplication occurs with Revolutionary Development self-help projects submitted by the hamlet or village chief concerned.

b. MED/DENTCAP supplies should be requisitioned in sufficient quantity to assure a continuing program. A MED/DENTCAP warehouse has been established in this headquarters with a small quantity of medical supplies to be used either in the event of a disaster of great magnitude or during these periods when transportation difficulties between the III MAF MEDCAP warehouse and CHU LAI prevent the expected arrival of the normal supply.

c. Resources will be given to the village or hamlet chief only in these amounts which can be readily used. Construction supplies and other resources will remain under unit control until progress on the project indicates a need for them. USMC, CARE, or USAID resources will not be used for Vietnamese labor payments. Each Provincial Revolutionary Development budget contains funds for such costs when they are appropriate.

9. Reports:

a. The Daily Civic Action Situation Report, when submitted, should contain a brief but complete record of the day's civic action. A narrative report will be included when daily events warrant. Contacts with Revolutionary Development Cadres will be noted in this report as they occur.

b. A weekly narrative summary of significant economic, political, and sociological events will be attached to the Daily Civic Action Situation Report submitted each Thursday. Activities directly supporting the Revolutionary Development Program will be highlighted on this report.

Enclosure (1)

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MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PROJECT REQUEST FORMDESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT AND MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS

Province: _____ Sponsoring Unit: _____ Date: _____
District: _____
Village: _____
Hamlet: _____

CONTENT OF THE PROJECT

- Name of the project: _____
- Purpose and reasons for the project; _____

- Position and location of the project : (to include coordinates) _____

- Number of benefiting people: _____
- Importance of the project, advantages and incomes from it: _____

- Forecast starting date: _____
- Forecast completion date: _____
- Number of man days labor required (estimated) _____
- Other details, documents, maps, etc...which the hamlet wants to include in report, should be listed and attached to the next page.

RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR COMPLETION OF PROJECT

- To be voluntarily contributed by hamlet citizens:
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
- Additional aid requested:
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.
- To be provided by unit from existing resources:
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.

- How will labor be paid for (attach copy of contract as applicable):

- Hamlet Chief approval:

- Village Chief approval

APPROVAL BY DISTRICT CHIEF

Date:

(signature)

APPROVAL BY PROVINCE CHIEF


Date:

(signature)

PROGRESS:

(Complete 5 copies)

ENCLOSURE (2)

TASK FORCE X-RAY PSY OPS BY MONTH

NUMBER OF
RETURNEES

LEAFLETS
000,000

BROADCASTS
HOURS

TAB "G"

CEO

CEO. INDEX

TAB

1. COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT
2. CG FIRST MAR DIV MSG 170011Z OCT 66 (COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS)
3. TASK FORCE X-RAY RADIO AND SWITCHBOARD CALL SIGNS
4. FIRST MAR DIV UNITS (DANANG) RADIO AND SWITCHBOARD CALL SIGNS
5. TELEPHONE TRAFFIC DIRECTORY
6. RADIO RELAY AND TROPOSPHERIC SCATTER TERMINALS SERVING TASK FORCE X-RAY AND CHU LAI

Communications Support
Provided by 7th Communication Battalion, FMF

With the exception of a very few pieces of radio equipment which belong to Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Task Force XRAY has no organic communication capability. Communications support is provided by 7th Communication Battalion (-) in accordance with CG, 1st Marines Division Message 170011Z October 1966, attached. The missions provided for by this directive include those concerned with the operation and maintenance of the Task Force XRAY/Chu Lai torn tape relay and Communication Center, operation of the Chu Lai telephone system and cable plant, and maintenance of the Task Force XRAY Headquarters inter-communication systems. Additionally, 7th Communications Battalion is charged with providing communications facilities in the Task Force XRAY Command and Operations Center and Fire Support Coordination Center. The Battalion also provides communication-electronics support for Task Force XRAY tactical operations.

Specific tasking and direction in the performance of these missions is provided by the Task Force XRAY Communications-Electronics Officer. Tasking is accomplished either by work order or by appropriate combat plans and orders. 7th Communication Battalion is under the operational control of CG, Task Force XRAY, however under the administrative control of CG, 1st Marine Division.

In the discharge of its mission, the 7th Communication Battalion has available a Headquarters Company, a Communications Company (-) and a Radio Relay and Construction Company (-). At the present time, the Battalion has detachments, or temporary additional duty teams with seventeen separate organizations, some twelve of which are external to Task Force XRAY. These include a company sized unit under the operational control of 5th Communication Battalion, a sizeable group of Communication Center personnel at the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and (3) officers and (44) enlisted with (73) major items of equipment at the 3rd Marine Division.

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170011Z OCT 66
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG TASK FORCE XRAY
INFO CG III MAF
SEVENTH COMM BN
HQ BN FIRST MARDIV
BT

2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS

1. COMMUNICATION SUPPORT FOR CG TASK FORCE XRAY PROVIDED BY SEVENTH COMM BN INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING TASKS:

A. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

- (1) TORN TAPE RELAY CHU LAI
- (2) TF XRAY COMM CENTER
- (3) COMM FACILITIES IN TF XRAY COC AND FSCC
- (4) SWITCHING CENTRALS TO INCLUDE CHU LAI DEFENSE COMMAND
- (5) TF XRAY INTERCOMM SYSTEMS

B. MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION OF CHU LAI CABLE PLANT.

C. TF XRAY TACTICAL OPERATIONS C-E SUPPORT

D. STAFF AUGMENTATION OF TF XRAY AS COORDINATED WITH THIS HEADQUARTERS

2. MEMBERS OF COMM CO HQ BN AUGMENTING 7TH COMM BN WILL BE ASSIGNED TAD TO THE 7TH COMM BN.

3. SEVENTH COMM BN FURTHER PROVIDES 1ST MARDIV REIN WITH C-E SUPPORT AS REQUIRED AND AS DIRECTED, AND CONTINUES TO IMPLEMENT CURRENT 1st MARDIV ORDERS AND DIRECTIVES.

4. CG TASK FORCE XRAY/CHU LAI INSTALLATION COORDINATOR PROVIDES 1ST MARDIV WITH WORLD WIDE ENTRY INTO CDS AND NAVCOMOP NET.

5. CG TASK FORCE XRAY AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE MESSAGES EMPLOYING TF XRAY DESIGNATION WHICH DO NOT AFFECT 1ST MARDIV POLICY MATTERS.

6. 1ST MARDIV REPRESENTATIVES CHU LAI AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE MESSAGES IN NAME OF CG 1ST MARDIV WHICH THEY NORMALLY WOULD RELEASE IN THE EXECUTION OF THEIR FUNCTIONS. DATE-TIME GROUPS FOR THESE MESSAGES WILL BE PROVIDED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. COPIES OF MESSAGES SO RELEASED WILL BE FORWARDED TO 1ST MARDIV FOR FILE.

7. CIOI MODIFICATIONS TO BE PASSED SEPARATELY.

GP-4

BT

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TASK FORCE XRAY UNITS

UNIT	VOICE CALL SIGN	SWITCHBOARD CALL SIGN
Task Force XRAY	EMERY WHEEL	DEVOTE
5th Marines	DISLODGE	SELECT
Collective	CRABTOWN	
1st Bn, 5th Marines	COTTAGE	CHIME
Collective	BOOKNOTE	
3rd Bn, 5th Marines	CONNIVE	GLOVE
Collective	CEILING	
7th Marines	COMPUTATION	BONNIE HERO
Collective	CONDIMENT	
1st Bn, 7th Marines	CONSTRUE	BOOTH
Collective	DAMPEN	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines	CASTILLAN	DIXIE DINER
Collective	CHECKSTRING	
3rd Bn, 7th Marines	CREPE MYRTLE	FALSE
Collective	COMBUSTION	
1st Field Artillery Group	CROSS TIDE	IRONSIDES
2nd Bn, 11th Marines	ARNICA	PROWL
3rd Bn, 11th Marines	AVERAGE	LAUGH
4th Bn, 11th Marines	CORK LEG	PLAID
3rd 8" Howitzer Btry	BIRD NEST SOUP	BEECHNUT
3rd 155MM Gun Btry	CARNIVAL TIME	MARGARINE
1st Shore Party Bn	DRINKWATER	CONSEQUENCE
1st Reconnaissance Bn	BEACON LIGHT	IRONHAND
Collective	COMMOTION	
Reconnaissance Bn Teams	CONOHUE	
	CRANKCASE	
	CO PARTNER	
	DUCK BILL	
	BLUE BERRY PIE	
	ANTIFREEZE	
	BENNINGTON	
	CONSULATE	
	BEDPOST	
	DATELINE	
	BASKETBALL	
	APRIL DATE	
	CONTANGO	
	DIAGNOSIS	
Force Reconnaissance	CANAL ZONE	
	LEFT HOOK	
	OVERPAY	
	POTTERY	
3rd Amphibian Tractor Bn	CASTING	SLEEK
1st Engineer Bn	BEAR LAKE	BIG BUDDY
9th Engineer Bn	BARABBAS	EARTHWORM
7th Motor Transport Bn	BICKERTON	FASTER
7th Communication Bn	ALLENTOWN	MOUTH
1st Tank Bn (Co A)	CHATSWORTH ALPHA	
1st Antitank Bn (Co C)	CANTILEVER CHARLIE	
Sub-Unit #2, Headquarters Bn	BOOK COVER	
Military Police Det	EMIGRANT	
1st Motor Transport Bn (Co C)	ASPARAGUS	

3

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TASK FORCE XRAY UNITS (CONT.)

UNIT	VOICE CALL SIGN	SWITCHBOARD CALL SIGN
1st Med Bn (Co D)	CONSECUTIVE DELTA	CALHOUN
1st Hospital Co	CLASPKNIFE	

1ST MAW UNITS CHU LAI

MAG-12	OXWOOD	OXWOOD
MAG-13	SWISS	SWISS
MAG-36	NAILFILE	NAILFILE
2nd LAAM Bn	PANZER	PANZER
MASS-3	KING LEAR	KING LEAR
MACS-7	COFFERDAM	COFFERDAM
MACU-67	KILL TIME	KILL TIME
DASC	LANDSHARK ALPHA	LANDSHARK ALPHA

SUPPORTING UNITS CHU LAI

Chu Lai Defense Cmd	EVENING STAR	ANCHOR WATCH
Collective	COUNTRY GENTLEMAN	
Air Field Defense Cmd	CHOW DOWN	CHOW DOWN
FLSG-Bravo	FUMIGATE	VALVE
Naval Support Det		SHELLBACK
NMCB-8	ROCKFISH	ROCKFISH
NMCB-40	GLADSTONE BAG	GLADSTONE BAG
Junk Fleet	XRAY ECHO	
Swift Boats	LEDGER	
Sub-Unit #1 Radio Bn		
2nd Brigade ROKMC	CHUNG PO DO	CHUNG YONG
American Det, 2nd Bgde ROKMC	BURGUNDY	

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1ST MARINE DIVISION UNITS (DANANG AREA)


<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>VOICE</u>	<u>SWITCHBOARD</u>
CG, 1st MarDiv	CORSAIR	ISHERWOOD
ADC, 1st MarDiv	DINOSAUR	
1st MarDiv (Collective)	COMPLEX	
Air Observers	BLACK COAT	
Hq Bn, 1st MarDiv	BAD ACTOR	AUDITOR
Communication Company	CHICK SALE	NOTICE
Military Police Company	BOOTLEG	WEAVE
1st Marines/RLT-1	BLACKWELL	BLADE
(Collective)	BUDAPEST	
1/1	ANNUNCIATE	BOUND
(Collective)	CONNECTICUT	
2/1	CONTRIVE	CEDAR BIRD
(Collective)	COURTHOUSE	
3/1	CIRCUMFERENCE	CHUCK
(Collective)	BETTERIDGE	
11th Marines	CONTINGENCY	AMIGO
(Collective)	COLFFURE	
1/11	CHINSTRAP	MONTH
1st Recon Bn	BEACON LIGHT	IRONHAND
(Collective)	COMMOTION	
1st Anti Tank Bn	CANTILVER	DANCE CARD
1st Tank Bn	CHATSWORTH	HAPPY AGE
1st Med Bn	CONSECUTIVE	CALHOUN
1st MT Bn	ASPARAGUS	QUENCH
1st Service Bn	CREDITOR	VALVE
9th Marines	REAPPOINT	SENATOR
1/26	PINEFOLD	BELGRADE
2/26	MONEY	ARLINGTON MILLS
2/4	RIDGEBEAM	BENDIX
2/12	PIED PIPPER	WAGON MASTER

1ST MARINE DIVISION UNITS (DANANG AREA)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>VOICE</u>	<u>SWITCHBOARD</u>
1st Armored Amphib Co	COMBINED	COVETOUS
1st Amtrac Bn	MURPHY	DREAM
11th MT Bn	DANDY DANCE	CHESTERWHITE
3rd MP Bn	PLUM TREE	YACHT
3rd Tank Bn	SASSY	SMOKE ROOM
Det 3rd Shore Party Bn	SOCIALITE REAR	PANHANDLE
"C" Co, 3rd Eng Bn	PRIMROSE CHARLIE	AXE HANDLE CHARLIE

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEPHONE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM



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RADIO RELAY TROPOSPHERIC SCATTER TERMINALS SERVING TASK FORCE XRAY AND CHU LAI

