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*FMF, Pacific: Operations of U.S.
Marine Forces, Vietnam*

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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES
VIETNAM
JUNE 1968



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This is a summary of activities of US Marine Corps forces in Vietnam for the month of June 1968. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through May 1968.

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SUMMARY

Marine helicopter pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Special Landing Forces Alpha and Bravo, flying a record 70,494 sorties during June, surpassed by 7,657 the previous high (62,837) established in May 1968. The June effort resulted also in new marks for the total number of passengers (98,163) and tons of cargo (8,871) lifted during a one-month period by these helicopter units. Marine A-6A's, with 483 (also a new monthly record) of their total 858 sorties executed out-of-country, delivered over 2,270 tons of ordnance on 1,713 Laos and North Vietnam targets, 1,369 (or 80%) of which were moving targets. And, taking full advantage of its all-weather capabilities, 450 (or 93%) of this attack aircraft's out-of-country sorties were flown at night.

Highlighting III MAF large unit operations during the month was the heliborne penetration by two Marine regiments of NVA strongpoints south of Khe Sanh. This action, coupled with other large unit operations against an I CTZ enemy currently unwilling to risk major engagement, resulted in an enemy loss of 3,368 killed, and the capture of 286 soldiers and 2,197 weapons.

These large unit successes were complemented in good measure by the III MAF counterguerrilla effort, which numbered in June 8,991 patrols, 5,405 ambushes, and 75 company-size search operations. Although the guerrilla followed the lead of his NVA cohorts, and avoided contact where possible, he nevertheless lost 386 soldiers and 156 weapons to the small unit actions of III MAF.

With the exception of long range artillery attacks against the installations at Cua Viet and Dong Ha, enemy ordnance attacks against the major bases in I CTZ were largely frustrated during June. In the Danang area, the publicly pro-

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claimed enemy plan to launch massive rocket and mortar attacks against III MAF installations was fragmented, albeit temporarily, as Marine units, thrusting deep into his base areas in the piedmont southwest of Danang, captured 58 rocket launchers and 146 rockets.

The pacification program in I CTZ displayed progress in June, as the civilian population within those III MAF areas considered secure rose by more than 48,000 over that of May. And consolidation of Marine influence in the Phu Loc area, 16 miles southeast of Phu Bai, resulted in the inclusion of four secure villages, all situated along Route 1, in the Phu Bai pacification area. As of 30 June, therefore, all of the villages astride Route 1 between Danang and Hue were considered secure.

Combined Action Platoon 3-3-6, activated on 28 June in Hoa An hamlet, five miles northeast of Hue, brought the total of the combined Popular Force/Marine platoons to 86. During June, these combat teams conducted a record 6,841 patrols and ambushes, 4,694 (or 69%) of which were night operations. Enemy losses to the CAP's were 115 killed and 70 prisoners and 53 weapons seized.

As indicated on the graph which follows, operations of III MAF units and the two Special Landing Forces during the first six months of 1968 have resulted in 38,815 enemy killed, while Vietnamese forces and Republic of Korea Marines in I CTZ accounted for an additional 19,101 killed. During the same six-month period, 3,012 enemy (696 North Vietnamese soldiers and 2,316 Viet Cong) were captured in I Corps Tactical Zone.


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ENEMY TROOP LOSSES IN I CTZ 1 JAN - 30 JUN 1968



It is of interest to note that the combined total (57,916) of enemy troops confirmed killed in I CTZ during the first half of 1968 exceeds, by 16,744, the number of enemy confirmed killed (41,172) in I CTZ during 1967.

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
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~~SECRET~~LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

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There were 15 US large unit operations in progress during June; 14 by III MAF and one by the 7th Fleet Special Landing Force (SLF) Bravo. Despite the relatively reduced level of enemy activity encountered throughout I CTZ, these operations maintained constant pressure against the enemy, his base areas, and his lines of communication. Only in the Khe Sanh area, and in scattered instances in the Quang Tri/Hue and Danang regions, did the enemy offer determined, organized resistance - an effort which remained costly and unsuccessful.

The locations and results of the III MAF and SLF operations are shown on the map below.

III MAF AND SLF OPERATIONS - JUNE 1968

* Includes 1,630 enemy killed and 221 enemy and 1,607 weapons captured by US Army operations.
US Army casualties: 139 killed and 941 wounded and evacuated.

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Operations in Northern I CTZ

In contrast to the four months of sustained combat following the enemy Tet offensive, a generally diminished level of action was encountered by the III MAF large unit operations in northern I CTZ during June. Only in western Quang Tri, where Marine combat operations in the hills south of Khe Sanh confirmed the presence of two newly infiltrated NVA regiments (the 88th and 102d, 308th NVA Division), did enemy resistance display any pattern of consistency. Obviously feeling the effect of battle damage to both his combat and support mechanisms, the enemy largely concentrated his efforts on refurbishing his units, reconstituting his forward stores of supplies and ammunition, and extending his lines of communication - all in preparation for regeneration of his offensive campaign.

The enemy achieved little success, however, in his effort to conserve his troop assets in this region. Taking full advantage of superior battlefield mobility and firepower, the large unit actions prosecuted by the 3d Marine Division and the US Army 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) and 101st Airborne Divisions accounted for over 2,000 enemy killed in Quang Tri and northern Thua Thien provinces during June.

A salient feature of III MAF action to further increase its mobile posture was the deactivation of the Khe Sanh combat base, a project begun in late June and completed on 5 July. The commensurate reduction of forces tied to specific terrain in a static mission, in favor of maximum offensive action against the strong enemy threat to the two northern provinces, promises to be a more productive application of III MAF combat power.

-Operations in the DMZ Area

May closed with Marines in the western DMZ area successfully countering attempts by the 304th NVA Division to advance on the Khe Sanh combat base from the south. To

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exploit this tactical success, the Marines launched an early June, multi-regiment heliborne assault deep into the densely canopied hill country south of Route 9 - an offensive maneuver calculated to trap the enemy before he could reassemble and reequip his formations. The operation encompassed two concurrent phases, controlled by the 1st and 4th Marines, respectively.

Following five days of extensive preparation of the general target area by some 1,000 tons of bombs, delivered by 219 fixed wing attack and 30 B-52 sorties, and by over 10,000 rounds of artillery, the 1st Marines initiated phase I, helilifting 2d Battalion, 4th Marines and 1st Battalion, 1st Marines into Landing Zones Loon and Robin, five miles southeast of the combat base on 2 and 3 June. The battalions then commenced an attack to the north, toward blocking positions established south of Route 9 by 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. On 3 June, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, reinforced by artillery and engineer elements, commenced lifting into these zones and began their development as fire support bases for the second phase of operations, a penetration to the south.

The attacking battalions encountered little enemy resistance during their ground and heliborne thrusts toward the blocking positions to the north. Abandoned enemy equipment, well used trails, and vacant bunker complexes, along with empty, hilltop defensive positions, gave evidence that the enemy had occupied the area, but had departed hurriedly. Enemy contact, occurring primarily in the western sector of the operating area, was characterized by fire fights with small stay-behind units, and probing attacks against friendly positions.

By 12 June, the Marines seized their final objective unopposed, thus completing this phase of the operation. The results were 92 NVA killed and two captured, along with hundreds of fortifications destroyed, at a cost of 16 Marines

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killed and 130 wounded and evacuated. The majority of the friendly casualties were caused by enemy supporting arms fire, with mortars and recoilless rifles being reinforced by fires from enemy artillery hidden within the Co Roc massif, just inside Laos. During this ten-day engagement, the Marines were supported by 688 fixed wing sorties and over 25,000 rounds of artillery.

Concurrently, however, a series of battles was fought in the south, around the westernmost landing zone, code named Loon. At 0600 on the 4th, an NVA company attacked Company F, 4th Marines, deployed just south of Loon. Forced to break contact at first light, without having penetrated the position, the enemy left 34 dead behind. Friendly casualties were two killed and 24 wounded and evacuated.

Two days later, on the 6th, and also at 0600, elements of Companies C and D, 4th Marines stopped a second NVA thrust against Landing Zone Loon. Supported by artillery and air attacks, the two platoons killed 56 NVA and captured 11 weapons. Thirteen Marines were killed in this action.

The map on the following page describes the 1st Marines' action south of Khe Sanh during the period 2-12 June.


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ACTION SOUTH OF KHE SANH: 2-12 JUNE 1968



On the afternoon of 6 June, with a heliborne landing of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines into a zone three miles southeast of Landing Zone Loon, and 1,000 meters from the Laotian border, the 4th Marines triggered phase II. Deactivating Landing Zone Loon that same day, due to its vulnerability to artillery fire from Co Roc, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines executed a 7 June heliborne assault into Landing Zone Torch. Located three miles southeast of Loon, Torch was quickly developed as a new fire base to support subsequent insertions of additional battalions. This southward penetration was aimed at interdiction of a new enemy road leading from Laos

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across the southern extremity of western Quang Tri, and at the destruction of large enemy forces, material, and fortifications likely to be located in the immediate vicinity thereof.

Enemy resistance to the landings was light, but both battalions found evidence of recent, extensive road work and many bunkers and fighting holes, evidently used by NVA soldiers and laborers. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, attacking southwest along the road, captured 21 prisoners and uncovered several abandoned supply caches, containing a considerable quantity of explosives. The captured enemy explosive material proved useful -- the Marines employed it as a field expedient to blow culverts and to crater the road.

Persisting in his attempts to disrupt the artillery fire bases, the enemy mounted a company-size attack against Landing Zone Torch at 0215 on the 11th. Supported by mortar fire, and armed with automatic weapons, RPG rockets, and satchel charges, the enemy attacked simultaneously from the south and west. The Marines repulsed the attack at close quarters, with the cannoneers of Battery C, 12th Marines depressing the muzzles of their 105mm howitzers to fire point-blank into the ranks of the attackers. Although the enemy succeeded in reaching one gun parapet, the attempt was repulsed by 0400. Twenty-eight enemy bodies remained around the positions at first light, but our losses were also heavy - 14 killed and 113 wounded and evacuated.

On 14 June, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines joined the action with a heliborne assault four miles southwest of Torch, and attacked to the northeast, generally along the trace of the enemy road. Once again little resistance was encountered, but evidence of recent enemy presence was abundant. One extensive bunker complex (over 500 bunkers) was found near the road, along with 400 pounds of explosives of an ammonium nitrate base, and a one and one-half ton truck and motor driven welder. The truck and a nearby stone bridge were destroyed with the captured explosives.

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The two major actions of the attack to the south were fought by 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. Landed on 10 June near Lang Hole, a Montagnard hamlet nine miles south of the Khe Sanh combat base, the 3d Battalion executed search operations until the morning of 16 June, with light contact. About an hour before sunrise on the 16th, an NVA battalion mounted a mortar-supported attack against the battalion, deployed in night positions. Detected by the Marine outposts, the enemy effort was broken, and subsequently routed with heavy casualties, by a counterattack. Integrating artillery and air support in close coordination with its maneuver, the battalion then pursued the enemy through most of the day, eliminating disorganized pockets of resistance until contact was lost during mid-afternoon. Two hundred nineteen NVA were killed by the Marine counterattack, and 11 prisoners, 82 weapons, and 20 radios were captured. Friendly losses in the action were 16 killed and 58 wounded seriously enough to require evacuation.

A second pre-dawn attempt to penetrate the battalion's position took place on 18 June, only 600 meters south of the 16 June engagement. Again the Marines employed all available supporting arms firepower to repulse the attack, and counterattacked to maintain contact with the withdrawing enemy force. A highlight of the coordinated air-ground action this day was the close air support provided by three Marine A-4E attack aircraft of VMA-311. Guided to a retreating enemy platoon by a forward air controller, the Skyhawks delivered sixteen 250-pound bombs and four napalm bombs, killing 20 NVA. Total NVA losses on the 18th were 131 killed and 43 weapons captured, while friendly casualties were 11 killed and 30 wounded and evacuated.

On 19 June, the Marines redeployed to areas adjacent to the Khe Sanh garrison, having successfully completed this second phase of the offensive in the southernmost sector of western Quang Tri. In addition to inflicting considerable damage on enemy units, material, and fortifications during


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this, the first friendly foray in force into the area, the Marine battalions captured NVA soldiers who confirmed the presence of two regiments of the 308th NVA Division in northern I CTZ. The 88th and 102d Regiments probably replaced like elements of the 304th NVA Division, punished severely during April and May. And the conspicuous absence of major elements of the 304th Division during the month likely reflects a forced withdrawal of that unit from the combat area.

The map below portrays the area of operations and the results of the 6-19 June actions south of Khe Sanh.

ACTION SOUTH OF KHE SANH: 6-19 JUNE 1968



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The end-June deactivation of the Khe Sanh combat base reflected those several factors which now influence the dynamic tactical situation in I CTZ. First, the increase in enemy forces in the DMZ area and northern I CTZ during the past six months (from 39 infantry battalions in January 1968 to 47 confirmed battalions in June 1968) renders the semi-permanent positioning of friendly combat units in static defense of hinterland installations undesirable. Not only does this employment of forces provide stationary targets for enemy attacks-by-fire, but it also inhibits the ability of maneuver battalions to apply maximum combat power to the mission of seeking out and destroying enemy large units.

Secondly, with three US divisions and their full complement of supporting arms now stabilized in northern I CTZ, III MAF has the forces, firepower, and mobility to attack, intercept, or reinforce any point at which a lucrative enemy target might appear.

A third factor, specifically relative to Khe Sanh, is the increased enemy effort directed at the construction and utilization of alternate infiltration routes. With the enemy now relying less on the Route 9-Ba Long Valley approaches into the I CTZ coastal plains, continued use of the Khe Sanh base as an interdiction point is unnecessary.

Other decisive considerations which favored deactivation of the Khe Sanh garrison and the subsequent shift of forces eastward, to Ca Lu and Landing Zone Stud, included shorter supply lines (some 15 less road miles and 18 fewer bridges to maintain), and the displacement of installations beyond the 17 and a half mile range of the enemy 130mm guns at Co Roc. Should the enemy attempt forward displacement of his artillery, to within range of Ca Lu or Stud, he will expose it to the hazard of ground attack by our forces.

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The displacement from Khe Sanh, completed on 5 July, was an orderly one. Constantly patrolling the approaches and occupying critical high-ground outposts, the covering Marine air and ground forces ensured the enemy kept his distance while supply and ammunition stocks were retrograded. Simultaneously, Marine engineers and US Navy Seabees ensured that no usable fortifications or material were left in the area.

Although harassing artillery fire from the guns dug into the escarpments at Co Roc was received during the displacement, III MAF counterbattery fire, delivered by 175mm and 155mm artillery pieces and 90mm M-48 tank guns, effectively suppressed the enemy fire before grave damage was done.

The forces screening the move from Khe Sanh made several contacts with enemy units attempting to disrupt the operation. One developed into a major engagement with an NVA battalion two miles southeast of the combat base.

At 0530 on 1 July, a squad security patrol, south of Company I, 4th Marines' night positions, observed an NVA platoon advancing through a draw. The Marines opened fire, observing several NVA fall before the enemy unit dispersed. In the succeeding 45 minutes, other forward security elements exchanged small arms fire with small NVA units south of the company position, actions which fragmented the enemy's attempt at a coordinated, large scale attack.

Alerted to the presence of a substantial force, Company I recalled its security elements to the company perimeter, simultaneously placing the supporting fires of 105mm howitzers, 81mm mortars, and 106mm recoilless rifles on the enemy routes of approach. Throwing back two company-size NVA attacks at the defensive wire between 0630 and 0730, the Marine counterattack quickly developed into a

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physical pursuit of the enemy. With an air observer overhead to spot targets for artillery and Marine F-4B and A-4E attack aircraft, the friendly assault maintained uninterrupted momentum until contact was lost during mid-afternoon. Marine pilots, flying in close support of the ground maneuver, were credited with killing 62 NVA in the day's action. Final results of the engagement were 173 NVA killed and 90 weapons captured, while Marine losses were two killed and nine wounded and evacuated.

No major actions developed during the period 2-5 July and, at 2000 on the 5th, the Khe Sanh combat base was closed.

During the period the Marines held the Khe Sanh combat base, the enemy moved elements of at least three NVA divisions into combat in western Quang Tri. Usually outnumbered, the Marines nevertheless successfully repulsed each enemy attempt to take the outpost, extracting a high casualty toll from enemy front line units. Beginning in late-April 1967, with the first strong NVA incursion stopped in the Hill 881-861 complex north of Khe Sanh, and ending with the 1 July 1968 battle south of Route 9, III MAF operations on the western flank of the DMZ accounted for over 6,200 known NVA dead. Thousands more undoubtedly were killed by the hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs and rounds of artillery delivered in support of the friendly operations.

Marines, however, will continue to operate in the Khe Sanh area, relying on mobility and firepower to thwart enemy intrusions in the western sector of the DMZ region.

- Operations in Southern Quang Tri and Northern Thua Thien Provinces

The coordinated actions by III MAF forces and elements of the 1st ARVN Division in southern Quang Tri and

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northern Thua Thien continued successfully to block enemy avenues of approach into the two province capitals (Quang Tri City and Hue), and to keep traffic moving on the area's overland and waterway lines of communication. Although the enemy displayed a reduced disposition for combat, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on the north, the 101st Airborne Division on the south, and the 1st and 3d ARVN Regiments in the coastal area and southwest of Hue, in Base Area 114, maintained pressure against enemy units and base areas, and continued the unearthing of large quantities of weapons, supplies, and equipment.

One NVA base camp, discovered by an ARVN battalion 15 miles southwest of Hue, was believed to have been the command post of the 803d Regiment, 324B NVA Division. Two officers of this regiment were identified among the enemy killed by the ARVN during the advance on the camp. The subsequent search of the area uncovered 29 NVA killed by air attacks, 102 underground bunkers, 99 huts, two mess-halls, 1,037 NVA uniforms, 24 weapons, and a large quantity of ammunition, general supplies, and medical equipment.

From 27 through 29 June, a major battle took place on the coast, seven miles northeast of Quang Tri City. At 0905, a US Army armored cavalry troop received small arms fire from an enemy force occupying Binh An hamlet. After subsequent probes disclosed the presence of a dug in, battalion-size enemy force in Binh An, the attacking Army unit requested reinforcement and fire support. By noon, two companies of infantry and an additional armored cavalry troop arrived to surround the hamlet. Through the remainder of the day and night, a sustained volume of supporting arms fire, to include artillery, naval gunfire, and Marine air, was directed at the enemy positions in preparation for the next day's assault.

Beginning at first light on the 28th, the two-day, detailed search of Binh An proved a testimonial to the effectiveness of supporting arms fire. The Army units, advancing

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against only minor resistance, captured 38 NVA soldiers and 78 weapons, and counted 225 NVA dead in their destroyed fortifications. The comparatively low number of US casualties, three killed and 35 wounded and evacuated, also was directly attributable to the efficiency of the supporting arms attacks.

- Artillery Support in Northern I CTZ

A major factor in the success of III MAF operations against enemy incursions in northern I CTZ is the fire support provided by 59 artillery firing batteries. Ranging in caliber from the 105mm howitzer to the 175mm gun, the latter capable of propelling a 147-pound shell 24 miles, these artillery weapons provide overlapping sectors of fire support throughout the Provisional Corps Vietnam area of operations. The requirement for such fire support flexibility is underscored by the presence in this critical area of the preponderance of the enemy's I CTZ combatant units.

The chief advantage of artillery as a supporting weapon lies in its immediate availability to the ground commander - 24 hours a day and uninhibited by weather conditions. During June, III MAF artillery delivered over 350,000 rounds in aggregate support of the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), and the 101st Airborne Division, firing in response to requests from engaged ground units, air observers, and long range reconnaissance patrols, as well as in interdiction of enemy lines of communication. An additional 20,747 rounds were fired against known and suspected enemy positions in and north of the DMZ.


Shown on the map on the following page are the general locations and overlapping sectors of fire of the US artillery firing batteries supporting III MAF units in northern I CTZ.

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***III MAF ARTILLERY LOCATIONS AND COVERAGE
IN NORTHERN I CTZ: JUNE 1968**



*As a number of artillery batteries are split (i.e., two or more separate firing positions), not all locations shown constitute a complete firing battery. For example, the 8" howitzer positions shown in Quang Tri province contain 1 platoon (2 howitzers) each.

Operations South of Danang

ALLEN BROOK and MAMELUKE THRUST, two operations launched during May against enemy forces south and southwest of Danang, continued to achieve tangible results in June. Exploiting

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the full capability of helicopter support, up to five Marine battalions ranged from the Go Noi Island-An Hoa basin area deep into enemy redoubts located in the Thuong Duc and Happy Valleys, and along Charlie Ridge. These campaigns caused the enemy substantial troop and material loss and effectively denied him opportunity to initiate offensive action against Danang.

A series of engagements in the Thu Bon river valley-An Hoa basin region resulted in the majority of the enemy troop losses. There, in an area 12-15 miles south-southwest of Danang, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines and 1st Battalion, 27th Marines continually outmaneuvered elements of the 308th NVA Division's 36th and 38th Regiments, and provided security for a major engineer land clearing effort on Go Noi Island.

The first significant contact was initiated by the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines on 5 June, just west of Go Noi. At 1030, Company A engaged an unknown size enemy unit in a moving fire fight. Joined by Companies B and D, the Marines pursued the enemy to the east, toward a blocking position set by Company C, 27th Marines. The two forces linked up within the hour, trapping and killing 23 NVA in the action. Marine losses were one killed and 28 wounded and evacuated by helicopter.

Departing the ALLEN BROOK area to join Operation MAMELUKE THRUST on the 6th, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines commenced a sweep toward the industrial complex at An Hoa, eight miles to the southwest. By 0730 on the 8th, the battalion was heavily engaged with an NVA battalion occupying defensive positions in My Loc hamlet, three miles northeast of An Hoa. Covered by artillery and fixed wing air attacks, the Marines maneuvered to envelop the NVA battalion and successfully overran the position by mid-afternoon. A search of the enemy fortifications and the hamlet disclosed 94 enemy dead and 16 weapons. Seventeen Marines were killed in the attack through the fortified area.

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Following the action at My Loc, little contact was generated in the An Hoa area, and the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines deployed to the north side of the Thu Bon river. Despite enemy attempts to avoid engagement, Marine patrols developed significant contacts on the 13th and 15th, in the area between Go Noi Island and the 27th Marines' regimental command post on Hill 55, three miles to the north.

The first contact began at 0845 on the 13th, when one company attacked an enemy unit dug in with its back to the river, just north of Go Noi Island. The enemy, armed with mortars, rockets, and automatic weapons, made a determined stand throughout most of the day, but withdrew northward under the cover of darkness. Forty-four of his dead were left behind, killed in their bunker positions.

The pursuing Marines regained contact at about noon on the 15th. Encountering a heavy volume of fire from a tree-lined stream bed two miles south of Hill 55, the battalion immediately maneuvered to a position of advantage and requested both artillery and air support. With fire superiority thus achieved, the Marines executed a flanking assault through the enemy positions, killing 84 NVA in the action. Friendly casualties were seven killed and 15 wounded and evacuated, the majority in the first few minutes of the fire fight.

Earlier on the 15th, at 0300, an enemy unit of undetermined size attempted an assault against Company B, 27th Marines on Go Noi Island, four miles southeast of Hill 55. Company B held its position and, with 8 inch and 155mm howitzer support from Hill 55, repulsed the enemy attack, killing 20 and seizing ten weapons. Three Marines were wounded and evacuated to Danang by helicopter.

Thereafter, through the end of June, the enemy steadfastly refused exposure of his large units in the valley area. Except for a sizable enemy force attacked by a reconnaissance patrol on the 25th, contact was limited to small unit engagements with evading enemy units. The reconnaissance

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
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patrol controlled artillery and air attacks against NVA forces attempting to vacate Go Noi Island, accounting for 64 enemy killed that afternoon.

The map below illustrates the major actions in the area between An Hoa and Go Noi Island during June.

OPERATIONS MAMELUKE THRUST/ALLEN BROOK: JUNE 1968



Meanwhile, 25 miles west-southwest of the Danang airfield, the Marines pressed the search for enemy forces and material in the mountainous, densely canopied Happy Valley-Charlie Ridge area. While the results were not so dramatic as those achieved in the more easily trafficable river valley, they were no less substantial. The operations uncovered and subsequently destroyed numerous enemy base camps, harboring sites, tunnels, and bunkers. Several arms caches, containing both ready-to-fire 122mm

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and 140mm rocket rounds and stores of rocket warhead and motor components also were seized, evidence that major elements of the 368B Artillery/Rocket Regiment had been forced to retreat deeper into the mountains of western Quang Nam. A total of 146 rocket rounds and 58 rocket launchers were captured during the month in Operation MAMELUKE THRUST, disrupting, at least temporarily, the enemy capability to launch other than minor attacks-by-fire against friendly installations in the Danang area.

Thus at end-June, the enemy had yet to show signs of having recovered from the punishment administered him during May. However, his residual capacity to absorb major defeats and to refurbish his units quickly is a well established reality.

Alignment of US Forces in I CTZ

During late January and early February 1968, III MAF combat assets were increased by two US Army divisions and a Marine Regimental Landing Team. Occurring at a critical time - at the height of the enemy Tet offensive - this reinforcement strengthened III MAF's capability to forestall the largest enemy threat of the war to date. From 1 February through the end of May, the III MAF large unit counteroffensive in I CTZ stopped the enemy short in his bid to gain control of the cities and the roads, ejected his forces from Hue, and drove two NVA divisions from the field in western Quang Tri--killing 25,027 enemy soldiers and capturing another 706 in the process.

With five US divisions now stabilized in I CTZ, three in the critical northern provinces and two in the region between Phu Bai and the II CTZ boundary on the south, III MAF is in improved position to prosecute its mobile offensive campaign through the remaining months of the dry season. The map on the following page delineates the US divisional boundaries in I CTZ, and the areas encompassed by named operations, as of 30 June 1968. The area of operations controlled by the 2d Brigade, ROK Marine Corps, is also portrayed.

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SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

During June, the III MAF counterguerrilla effort consisted of 8,991 patrols, 5,405 ambushes, and 75 company-size search operations as four Marine battalions near Danang and three US Army battalions in southern I CTZ continued tasks to destroy the guerrilla. To this end, III MAF small unit activities accounted for 386 enemy killed and 156 weapons captured.

The 14,571 operations conducted during June again portray the nature of counterguerrilla warfare, and reemphasize that small unit actions remain a principal deterrent to guerrilla influence. Despite the low level of enemy activity during the month, III MAF's wide-ranging daylight patrols and a saturation of night ambushes established 688 guerrilla contacts. This ratio of but one contact for each 22 activities evidenced the arduous nature of the specific tasks required to weaken the Viet Cong and his infrastructure.

Often labeled a "squad leader's war", the effort along the coastal plain of central I CTZ was characterized during June by the activities of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. In addition to performing 3,450 night defensive assignments and other static position security missions, the battalion's 36 rifle squads conducted 3,086 counterguerrilla patrols and ambushes. Concurrently, a myriad of associated daily tasks were accomplished -- destruction of guerrilla fieldworks, protection of routes of communication, screening of transient civilians, protection of rice harvest operations -- all of which contribute to the continuing erosion of the guerrilla influence.



The graphs on the following page reflect the III MAF counterguerrilla effort, and the resultant enemy losses, during the first half of 1968.

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SMALL UNIT PATROLS, AMBUSHES, AND
SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONSENEMY KILLED BY SMALL UNIT PATROLS,
AMBUSHES, AND SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONSEnemy Activity

Following the surge of hostile activity in May, NVA and VC attack efforts in June declined to the lowest level since December 1967. Consisting of 12 ground attacks and 25 attacks-by-fire, these mid-year efforts were of limited intensity and, as in May, were unable to inhibit III MAF offensive operations.

Along the DMZ, the NVA launched one-half of the month's ground effort against III MAF combat bases and the Marine units which continued to range into former NVA harboring sites. Also of significance in Quang Tri province was the reduction of enemy ordnance attacks; averaging 35 attacks each month since March 1968, attacks-by-fire numbered nine during June.

Down from a record high of 65 enemy initiated incidents in May, attacks in Quang Nam province totaled 12 during the month. Significantly, enemy elements mounted but two limited rocket attacks against the province's principal target, the Danang combat base complex; the Force Logistic Command, on 14 June, received 12 rounds and, on the 27th, seven rounds were directed at Marble Mountain Air Facility. The Marine capture of sizable rocket

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
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caches in the area rimming Danang (pictured in the Base Defense Chapter), although not precluding future rocket threats, had noteworthy impact on the enemy indirect fire attack capability.

Portrayed below are the monthly totals of NVA/VC attacks launched in I CTZ since June 1967.

ENEMY ATTACKS IN I CTZ: JUNE 1967 - JUNE 1968



Danang-Dai Loc-Hoi An Triangle

For almost three years, the 123 square mile coastal triangle bounded by Danang, Dai Loc, and Hoi An has served as the battleground for the most intense counter guerrilla war in I CTZ. Bordered on the west and south by jungle-covered mountains containing numerous enemy base sites, this area, with its large indigenous population and broad rice producing tracts, continues to be of singular importance to both hostile and friendly forces.

Prior to the 1965 introduction of III MAF units into this region, an enemy force of four Viet Cong battalions commanded sufficient popular support from the estimated 241,000 inhabitants to insure the procurement of necessary guerrilla recruit replace-

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ments and food supplies. By mid-1966, however, Marine operations had expanded throughout the low plain, providing the lodgment necessary for reestablishment of GVN influence among the local populace.

Indicative of the intensity of Marine counter guerrilla operations during the first half of 1967, elements of the four VC battalions were the targets of 22 large unit operations, with six of these operations centered in the triangle. The application of helicopter mobility and overwhelming, well-coordinated supporting firepower during these battles resulted in 966 VC killed and 314 prisoners captured, or a loss equal to these battalions' June 1967 total strength. Under the constant stress of widespread patrolling and ambushing, and another 13 large unit counter guerrilla operations in the last half of 1967, the area, by end-1967, had been rendered untenable for a sustained enemy effort.

Unable to prevail against the III MAF counter guerrilla campaign, Quang Nam's hostile force underwent significant structural change with the introduction of NVA units in early 1968. Supported by three VC battalions, the NVA strength in Quang Nam now totals 13 infantry and three rocket battalions. Countering these intrusions, Marine forces in the first half of 1968 launched eight large unit thrusts into the central Quang Nam enemy base areas and harboring sites. And while the major efforts against guerrilla targets in 1967 averaged six days in duration, the most recent multi-battalion Marine offensives (Operations MAMELUKE THRUST and ALLEN BROOK), are now in their second month of action.


On the following page, the map of the Danang-Dai Loc-Hoi An triangle compares major actions of the counter guerrilla war in this region during the first half of 1967 with the effort thus far in 1968.

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A COMPARISON OF MARINE LARGE UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN THE DANANG - DAI LOC - HOI AN TRIANGLE: JAN-JUN 1967--JAN-JUN 1968



1967 OPERATIONS

1 LINCOLN	5 INDEPENDENCE	9 LAFAYETTE	13 CANYON	17 GRAND	21 BROWN
2 CLEVELAND	6 STONE	10 YUMA	14 DIXIE	18 WEBSTER	22 CALHOUN
3 TUSCALOOSA	7 PUTASKI	11 NEW CASTLE	15 HUMBOLDT	19 BUTLER	
4 SEARCY	8 LANORE	12 EARLY	16 YELL	20 ARIZONA	

1968 OPERATIONS

23 NUTCRACKER	27 JASPER SQUARE
24 TAMPA	28 BALLARD VALLEY
25 ROCK	29 ALLEN BROOK
26 WORTH	30 MAMELUKE THRUST

Although few large Viet Cong targets have been detected in the triangle during 1968, low echelon enemy elements, small sapper teams, and individual agents and cadre personnel continue to traffic the area. And the continuing enemy need for the manpower resources of the region were again emphasized in June when VC recruiters levied recruit quotas of 150 men, to include guerrillas and youth groups, on each of the villages bordering Danang.

To curtail guerrilla movement and covert activity, Marines conducted 11,966 small unit activities in the triangular lowland during June. Although enemy daylight movement was monitored by 3,313 patrols and observation teams, 210 scout sniper missions, and continual aerial reconnaissance, over 70% of the

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
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counterguerrilla activity occurred at night. Detailed knowledge of the terrain and of enemy habits, gained during three years of fighting in the triangle, was evident as ambushes in this area succeeded in impeding guerrilla movement on 129 occasions during the month.

Repeated usage of waterway routes of communication and known harboring sites increases the vulnerability of the guerrilla. A compilation of Marine-initiated contacts, plotted on the following map, shows the pattern of enemy waterway movements into the triangle. His daylight activities, requiring a more general overland movement throughout the populated areas, were monitored by a daily June average of 109 patrols.

MARINE INITIATED SMALL UNIT CONTACTS IN THE DANANG - DAI LOC - HOI AN TRIANGLE DURING JUNE 1968



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Reconnaissance Operations

Marine STING RAY patrols, employed primarily in the area south and west of Danang, continued to hinder Viet Cong and NVA movement during the month by conducting 41 operations. From mountain top observation posts overlooking enemy base areas and routes of communication, the STING RAY teams and 421 other 1st Reconnaissance Battalion patrols outposted the battle area, directing supporting arms on hostile movement, and providing intelligence to assist Marine ground maneuver.

On 12 and 13 June, a STING RAY patrol monitoring the Thu Bon river valley directed artillery fires on seven NVA/VC troop movements, accounting for 40 enemy killed by dusk on the 13th. Similar activities by other reconnaissance units, against targets of opportunity and in support of Marine and US Army large unit operations, accounted for 215 NVA and VC killed.

Kit Carson Scouts

The Kit Carson Scouts continue to be a valuable adjunct to the counter guerrilla effort of III MAF. Accompanying 1,357 combat patrols in June, the Scouts were credited with 28 guerrilla and NVA killed, four Chieu Hoi returnees, and 57 weapons seized. Their knowledge of enemy tactics and habits assisted the Scouts in finding 37 mines and other explosive devices, 46 grenades, 43 caches, and 50 caves and tunnels. As evidence of their direct involvement in III MAF operations, Scout casualties in June were four killed and five wounded.


Expanding 37% since March 1968, the 19-month old program currently has 267 Kit Carson Scouts assigned to the five III MAF divisions and the Marines' 1st Combined Action Group. The growth of the increasingly effective program, since June 1967, is shown on the following page.

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GROWTH OF KIT CARSON SCOUT PROGRAM JUNE 1967 - JUNE 1968



Intelligence Volunteered by Vietnamese Civilians

Small unit operations were benefited further during June as Vietnamese civilians volunteered information concerning local hostile units and continued to submit ordnance materials to III MAF forces. Local civilians, portraying their desire to cooperate, provided intelligence data or ordnance items on 45 occasions in June.

Illustrating the confidence gained by association with local III MAF forces, four villagers, on 25 June, led a combat patrol to an enemy bunker three and one-half miles north of Hue, where one Czech submachine gun, two carbines, and one M-16 rifle were captured. And significant among the ordnance delivered by civilians to III MAF elements during June were one 60mm mortar, 61 artillery and 20 recoilless rifle projectiles, 254 mortar rounds, and 59 land mines.

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
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
The graphs below display the ARVN operations conducted during the past 13 months in support of revolutionary development in I CTZ, and the enemy losses attributed to these operations.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF ARVN UNITS IN SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT


OPERATIONS CONDUCTED




ENEMY KILLED



ENEMY CAPTURED



WEAPONS CAPTURED



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ARVN Support for Revolutionary Development

Throughout June, ARVN forces in direct support of the RD program in I CTZ continued their aggressive campaign of eliminating enemy forces operating within, or on the periphery of, provincial RD campaign areas.

In Quang Tri province, ARVN units conducted eight operations in support of the RD campaign. Highlighting these operations was LAM SON 235, a two-day (26th and 27th), three-battalion operation east of Quang Tri City, which inflicted substantial damage to an NVA battalion threatening the eastern portion of the provincial RD area. Assisted by III MAF supporting arms, ARVN forces killed 148 NVA, captured ten others, and seized 46 weapons and two radios.

ARVN RD support battalions in Thua Thien province conducted three RD support operations during June, which, in addition to protecting a major portion of the rice harvest, contributed to the 36% reduction in enemy incidents against RD teams - 22 in May and 14 in June.

In the southern three provinces of I CTZ, ARVN aggressiveness in the 25 RD support operations conducted during June resulted in a reduction of enemy penetrations into the RD priority areas. In May, 65 enemy incidents against RD teams were recorded in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai provinces. In June, this figure was reduced to 23 incidents, a 65% decrease.

In providing increased security for the RD program, ARVN units during June conducted 36 operations within, or contiguous to, RD priority areas in I CTZ, accounting for 464 enemy killed and 86 prisoners and 230 weapons captured.

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
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PACIFICATION PROGRESS IN III MAF AREAS

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


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PACIFICATION STATUS - DUC PHO AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68
Under 20%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20%	87	,31	23	9,099	21,250	28,810	9	5	4
40%	26	45	45	6,768	34,321	29,246	3	6	6
60%	7	69	77	5,242	30,238	40,404	2	5	6
80%	—	17	17	—	38,165	16,163	—	3	3
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	120	162	162	21,109	123,974	114,843	14	19	19


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PACIFICATION STATUS - CHU LAI AREA



★ Province capital


PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68
Under 20%	216	206	275	97,775	79,171	67,386	23	20	23
20%	68	46	55	30,539	25,675	39,226	6	5	6
40%	67	111	133	51,982	70,780	74,441	7	10	11
60%	96	57	100	48,083	51,565	74,312	10	11	15
80%	85	128	123	54,659	57,348	11,058	11	11	2
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	532	548	686	283,036	284,539	286,423	57	57	57

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PACIFICATION STATUS - DANANG AREA



★ Province capital


PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68
Under 20%	607	639	201	155,626	193,210	163,473	37	44	33
20%	104	69	60	72,746	61,752	57,269	17	13	12
40%	51	40	57	50,534	31,732	45,068	11	9	11
60%	54	105	138	78,858	110,111	124,325	14	19	25
80%	183	195	143	411,821	425,240	406,861	25	27	21
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	999	1,048	599 *	769,585	822,045	796,422 *	104	112	102 *

* Includes 14 square miles, 13,266 civilians, and three villages in the Nui Loc Son area.

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PACIFICATION STATUS - PHU BAI AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68
Under 20%	41	35	—	11,199	11,199	—	11	11	—
20%	17	17	17	3,585	2,879	2,879	1	1	1
40%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
60%	76	64	104	35,259	34,115	55,658	5	4	8
80%	28	46	128	17,994	24,004	34,881	5	6	6
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	162	162	249*	68,037	72,197	93,418**	22	22	15

* Area estimates adjusted due to recent GVN survey revisions and addition of 4 villages southeast of Phu Bai.


** Population estimates adjusted due to census revision and addition of 4 villages southeast of Phu Bai.

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PACIFICATION STATUS - NORTHERN I CTZ



★ Province capital

PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68	JUN-67	DEC-67	JUN-68
Under 20%	8	48	82	2,543	2,643	2,643	1	2	6
20%	38	13	50	434	4,641	18,741	1	1	3
40%	37	53	26	3,663	23,285	14,893	2	8	4
60%	47	66	19	14,487	19,524	8,633	5	8	2
80%	31	82	34	15,277	26,039	24,708	3	5	2
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	161	262	211*	36,404	76,132	69,618**	12	24	17***

* Area estimates adjusted to reflect deletion of 9 villages at Khe Sanh.

** Population estimates adjusted due to census revisions.

*** Reflects deletion of 9 villages at Khe Sanh.

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May of some 42,000 in the total civilian population of the Danang pacification area, there was a June increase of more than 21,000 civilians considered secure.

- In southern I CTZ, none of the 57 villages in the Chu Lai area, the three villages in Nui Loc Son, or the 19 villages in the Duc Pho area experienced change, as 150,662 (or 36% of the 414,322 civilians in the 79 villages) continued to enjoy the security provided by III MAF units.

On the following six pages are five maps, depicting the status of III MAF pacification areas, and nine graphs, picturing the achievements of the Vietnamese in developing their communities.

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In previous editions of this publication, all land areas within the III MAF tactical zones were included in the pacification progress statistical analysis. However, 24 of the 236 reported villages (11 in the Phu Bai area and 13 in the Danang area), as well as large tracts of sparsely inhabited public land west of Danang, are not included officially in the III MAF pacification areas. In order to present more accurately the progress in III MAF pacification areas, these villages no longer will be reported.

During June, several significant developments occurred in the pacification effort:

- In northern I CTZ, the deactivation of the Khe Sanh combat base precipitated the deletion of the nine villages previously reported in the Khe Sanh area. The remaining 17 villages in the Cam Lo, Dong Ha, and Cua Viet areas of northern I CTZ were affected by a GVN census revision, which reported a population decrease from approximately 81,000 in May to 62,118 at end-June. Of these 62,118 civilians, 33,341 (or 54%) lived in secure villages on 30 June.

- Further south, in the Phu Bai region, increased Marine and CAP combat and pacification activity over the past months in the vicinity of Phu Loc resulted in the inclusion, during June, of four more villages (Loc Tri, Loc Thuy, Loc Tu, and Loc Hai) in the Phu Bai pacification area. All four villages, situated along Route 1 between Phu Bai and Danang, are considered secure, adding 26,333 people to the secure population of III MAF areas.

- III MAF and RVNAF operations, along with an increase in local self-defense forces, generated substantial progress around Danang. Despite a decrease from

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
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According to Nguyen Ti Be, a prisoner captured on 28 May, Viet Cong who rally to the GVN are to be tried in absentia and most likely awarded the death penalty. Whenever possible, the condemned man is to be notified of his fate through the enemy's infrastructure network.

Pacification

By the end of June, 787,023 (or 59%) of the 1,353,597 Vietnamese civilians in the III MAF pacification areas were living in the 90 secure villages within the areas. This represents an increase, since February, of nearly 52,000 civilians classified as living in secure III MAF areas. The steady, but moderate, resurgence in pacification progress, attained by III MAF since the Tet offensive, is displayed on the following graphs.

PACIFICATION STATUS IN III MAF AREAS DEC 1967 - JUN 1968



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
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October, 201 in November, and a record 375 in December. January's total of 250 continued at a high pace, but the enemy's Tet offensive, during late January and early February, brought the number of ralliers in February down to 86.

Now, for the past four months, the rate again has demonstrated a constant, and substantial, increase. Since February, the number of Chieu Hoi returnees in I CTZ has increased by an average of more than 66 each month, to the near record 352 in June.

As pictured in the following graph, the number of ralliers has peaked prior to the last three major enemy offensives in I CTZ. The recent growth in the rate of Chieu Hoi returnees well may be a harbinger of future enemy efforts in I CTZ.




Enemy leaders are reacting strongly to the effects of the Chieu Hoi program. Since 1965, 6,624 enemy personnel have rallied to the GVN in I CTZ; this represents approximately three regiments of combat troops lost to the enemy through defections. To counter this loss of more than 155 men a month, the Viet Cong has adopted a new policy concerning ralliers.

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CHIEU HOI RETURNEES - I CTZ



It is interesting to note that, during the past year and a half, the rate of Chieu Hoi returnees in I CTZ has correlated with the enemy's periodic offensives. In February 1967, for example, the record 279 former enemy rallying to the GVN in I CTZ was accepted as attributable to the spirit of homecoming generated by Tet; however, another explanation might have been the then-pending NVA offensive against the Marine positions along the DMZ, and the forthcoming Viet Cong campaign to disrupt the local elections in the coastal plains. Both materialized in April.

For the next four months, May through August 1967, the number of returnees averaged 252, or 19% higher than the 1967 average (212). This period of increased defections was followed by another enemy effort, the anti-election offensive of September, when enemy forces launched a record 115 attacks in I CTZ. In September, as in April, only 73 enemy returned to GVN control in I CTZ.

During the last three months of 1967, the Chieu Hoi returnee rate experienced notable increase - 164 in

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236 returnees in May, and only 23 less than the monthly record, set in December 1967, of 375 ralliers. Thus far in 1968, Chieu Hoi returnees in I CTZ number 1,291, or 25 more than during the first half of 1967. For the first time this year, the monthly average of returnees (215) is higher than the 1967 monthly average of 212.

Again in June, as in April and May, a majority of the I CTZ returnees rallied in the two northern provinces. One factor contributing to this is that, thus far during 1968, III MAF's large unit operations against the enemy in Thua Thien and Quang Tri provinces have accounted for approximately 23,000 NVA and Viet Cong killed. During the month, 246 ralliers, or 70% of the I CTZ total, returned to the GVN north of the Hai Van pass. Of these, 194, or 55% of the I CTZ total, rallied in Thua Thien, where, on several occasions during the month, enemy personnel rallied in groups.

- On the afternoon of 3 June, eight former enemy from the K-4 and K-10 VC Battalions rallied to III MAF and ARVN units operating north of Hue.

- Four days later, nine other members of the K-10 Battalion rallied to CAP 3-2-2, five miles southeast of Phu Bai.

Twelve North Vietnamese soldiers deserted to the GVN in I CTZ in June, bringing to 51 the number who have so deserted thus far in 1968. This number compares favorably with the 1967 total of 22 NVA defections in I CTZ.

The following graphs display the growing rates of Chieu Hoi returnees, particularly in the two northern provinces, and North Vietnamese defections, in I CTZ.

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
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far in 1968, for example, GVN organizations have produced 1,497 (or 54%) of the 2,780 visual presentations offered to the people in I CTZ. These presentations, including traditional Vietnamese dramatic performances and films, as well as addresses by local leaders, reached more than 580,000 civilians during the first half of the year.

During June, combined III MAF/GVN psychological operations in I CTZ accounted for the dissemination of 202 million leaflets, 1,985 ground and aerial broadcasts, and 575 visual presentations, the central targets of which were the impairment of enemy morale and the promotion of patriotism among the civilian population. On the following graph is depicted the monthly distribution, since June 1967, of propaganda leaflets in I CTZ.

PROPAGANDA LEAFLET DISTRIBUTION - I CTZ



Chieu Hoi Returnees

Enemy defections in I CTZ continued for the fourth consecutive month to increase, as 352 former enemy sought refuge in the GVN. This is an increase of 49% over the

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Civic Action

Since the Marine landing at Danang in March 1965, civic action has been an integral part of the pacification campaign in I CTZ. Currently, the III MAF civic action program, designed to assist the Vietnamese in improving their basic standard of living, is coordinated closely with GVN agencies through CORDS, to ensure the maximum benefit with a minimum duplication of effort.

As a part of the civic action effort, the III MAF Self-Help Program offers the Vietnamese materials and technical guidance for the construction of schools, dispensaries, wells, fortifications, markets, and other structures deemed essential to the welfare of the local community. Thus far in 1968, 445 of these projects have been completed. Two of the more noteworthy endeavors assisted by III MAF during June were the Cam Lo Water Project, designed to provide potable water for nearly 20,000 refugees in Cam Lo district, Quang Tri province, and the An Hoa Pipeline Project, scheduled to supply potable water for the more than 13,500 residents of Xuyen Thu and Xuyen Phu villages, 16 miles southwest of Danang.

Psychological Operations

Combined III MAF and GVN psychological operations continued during June to play an important role in the pacification effort in I CTZ. Coordinated and interdependent, the III MAF and GVN efforts complement one another. One of III MAF's primary contributions is the production and distribution of leaflets; thus far in 1968, more than 1.2 billion leaflets have been disseminated by III MAF units. While not capable of massive leaflet preparation and dissemination, GVN agencies concentrate predominantly on direct communication with the people, thereby strengthening the GVN physical presence among the populace. Thus

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
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
During June, combined action units conducted a record 6,841 patrols and ambushes, 4,694 (or 69%) of which were at night. These operations resulted in 115 enemy killed, 70 prisoners captured, and 53 weapons seized. The following graphs portray combined action unit activity, and the subsequent results, for the past 13 months.

COMBINED ACTION UNIT ACTIVITY


NIGHT OPERATIONS




DAY OPERATIONS



ENEMY KILLED



ENEMY CAPTURED



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
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members. During June, CAP operations resulted in the death of 25 VC cadre, and the detention of 162 suspected infrastructure personnel.


The tactical proficiency of the Popular Force, the improvement of which is the primary objective of the Combined Action Program, also continued to experience satisfactory progress. The most recently available MACV statistics reaffirmed that I Corps PF units integral to CAP's performed more efficiently during May than did other I Corps PF units. A statistical comparison demonstrating the increased effectiveness of the Marine-tutored Popular Force units is displayed below.

COMPARISON OF I CORPS POPULAR FORCES - MAY 1968

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED




OPERATIONS CONDUCTED




* Includes USMC/USN in Combined Action units

ENEMY CASUALTIES



FRIENDLY CASUALTIES



■ PF in CAP's

▨ Other I Corps PF

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION

The pacification status in I CTZ improved during June, as the civilian population of III MAF areas considered secure increased by more than 48,000 over that of May. Significant to note is that, as a result of the recent strengthening of III MAF influence within the Hai Van pass area, all of the villages along Route 1 between Danang and Hue were considered secure as of 30 June.

Combined action units, maintaining pressure against local Viet Cong infrastructure cadre, accounted for 185 enemy killed or captured during the month. And an increased number of enemy personnel (352), weary of continuous harassment by III MAF and ARVN operations, defected from the enemy ranks and sought amnesty and rehabilitation with the GVN.

Combined Action Program

As of 30 June, 1,836 Marines and US Navy corpsmen and 2,334 Popular Force soldiers were organized into three Combined Action Groups, 17 Combined Action Companies, 86 Combined Action Platoons (CAP's), and four Mobile Training Teams (MTT's).

These combined action units during the month achieved noteworthy results in their campaign against the infrastructure in I CTZ. The destruction of the VC infrastructure - those enemy cadre charged with the mission of covertly undermining the lawful government - continues to be the most important step in the slow process of bringing local security to the Vietnamese people. Combined action units, due to the unique rapport which has developed among the Marines, Popular Force soldiers, and local villagers, are in a singularly advantageous position to ferret out infrastructure cells within their operating areas. On the 29th, for example, CAP 1-2-3, while patrolling through Ky Xuan village, four miles north of the Chu Lai airbase, apprehended four Viet Cong suspects. These four provided information which led to the apprehension of 15 more suspects. Immediate screening identified eight of the 19 detainees as VC political infrastructure

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BASE DEFENSE

With the exception of enemy artillery attacks against the Dong Ha and Cua Viet installations, III MAF base defense operations in June were successful in limiting enemy attacks-by-fire against the major bases in I CTZ.

In northern Quang Tri, two artillery attacks were directed against Dong Ha, and seven against the Cua Viet port facility. The flat terrain around these two bases and the relatively unobstructed visibility in this region, lend themselves to the employment of observed fires by enemy long range artillery located in North Vietnam and the DMZ. Each of the artillery attacks against these two bases consisted of an initial four to six rounds, which bracketed the target, followed by accurate barrages of from 25 to 76 rounds. Damages sustained during two of these attacks were substantial, and are cited in the Logistics Chapter of this edition.

Despite the enemy's proclaimed intention of conducting extensive mortar and rocket attacks against Danang and the Marble Mountain Air Facility during June, III MAF base defense operations curtailed attacks against these two vital areas. Early in June, the Viet Cong distributed leaflets to the residents of villages and hamlets in and around Danang and Marble Mountain, announcing impending and massive rocket and mortar attacks against these two areas, and advising the citizens to begin construction immediately on protective bunkers and trenchworks. This major assault, however, never materialized, as the enemy endeavors were fragmented by Operation MAMELUKE THRUST, southwest of Danang, and his rocket capabilities ruptured, albeit temporarily, by the loss of 58 rocket launchers and 146 rockets to Marine units in the Danang area.

The following map depicts the locations of the major enemy rocket caches captured during June in the Danang area.


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ENEMY ROCKET CACHES CAPTURED NEAR DANANG DURING JUNE



□ Enemy rockets launched from within this area are capable of hitting Danang airbase or Marble Mountain.

- ① 1 June: Company I, 26th Marines located three caves containing 27 122mm rockets and one 140mm rocket.
- ② 10 June: Companies M and L, 26th Marines killed 16 NVA and captured four 140mm rocket launchers.
- ③ 11 June: Companies I and M, 26th Marines uncovered a large harboring site containing 16 140mm rocket launchers and four 122mm rockets.
- ④ 21 June: Company L, 26th Marines captured a recently abandoned cache containing 33 140mm rocket launchers, 19 140mm rockets, and 50 122mm rocket motors and 77 warheads and 40 fuzes.
- ⑤ 25 June: Company M, 27th Marines located a cache of 25 140mm rockets and five 140mm rocket launchers.
- ⑥ 28 June: Company K, 26th Marines killed 12 NVA and uncovered a tunnel system containing 15 122mm rockets and five 140mm rockets.

Although the enemy managed to initiate three attacks against Danang and Marble Mountain during June, all were of a harassing nature. Material damages from these three incidents were light, with the most significant being moderate damage to a UH-34 helicopter. However, one Marine and one soldier were killed in these actions.

The airbase at Chu Lai sustained two limited attacks during the month:

-The first occurred at 0143 on the 9th, when seven 122mm rockets impacted near Marine Aircraft Group-12's flight line. One

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USA helicopter was damaged heavily, while four others received light to moderate damage. Two soldiers were killed and four wounded in the attack.

-The second attack occurred on the night of the 23d, when 23 rounds of 82mm mortar fire were directed against Americal Division aviation assets at Ky Ha. There were no personnel casualties or material damage.

The map on the following page displays the disposition of the 469 Marine, five US Navy, 152 US Air Force, and 938 US Army aircraft at the major bases in I CTZ on 30 June.


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US AIRCRAFT BASED AT MAJOR I CTZ AIRFIELDS AS OF 30 JUN 1968



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AIR OPERATIONS

The combined total of 78,183 fixed wing and helicopter sorties flown in June by pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Special Landing Forces Alpha and Bravo, represented the highest monthly total of sorties flown by Marine pilots since the beginning of the war in Vietnam. Of these sorties (which surpassed by 6,723 the previous combined high of 71,460 flown in May 1968), 7,689 were fixed wing combat and combat support sorties flown in I CTZ, in Route Package I (the southern-most air strike sector of North Vietnam), and in the Steel Tiger region of the Laotian panhandle. In addition, 70,494 helicopter sorties were flown in I CTZ in support of III MAF, ARVN, and ROKMC forces.

Fixed Wing Operations

Marine fixed wing attack sorties in I CTZ during June totaled 5,919, of which 4,380 were close air support sorties, 1,150 were direct air support sorties, and 389 were helicopter escort, interdiction, or air defense sorties. In addition, 692 combat support sorties (visual reconnaissance and photographic, for example) were flown in I CTZ by Marine pilots. The 1,078 combat and combat support sorties flown out-of-country brought to 7,689 the total number of fixed wing sorties flown by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing pilots.

The substantial decrease in fixed wing sorties flown in June (7,689) from those flown in May (8,623) can be attributed to several causes. First, the enemy's month-long reluctance to risk his forces in significant engagements was particularly evident in the eastern region of the DMZ, where fixed wing support of Operations LANCASTER II, KENTUCKY, and NAPOLEON/SALINE decreased by more than 200 sorties from May's total of 484. Second, the termination of Operation DELAWARE VALLEY/LAM SON 216 in A Shau Valley on 17 May, accounted for only 27 Marine sorties being flown in that area during June, 424 less than were flown in May. And

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
finally, eight large unit operations terminated in May, as opposed to the three new operations which began in June.

The 5,919 combat sorties flown by Marine pilots in support of III MAF, ARVN, and Free World forces operating in I CTZ delivered 7,882 tons of bombs, 2,963 napalm bombs, 36,988 rockets, and 183,320 rounds of 20 millimeter ammunition on enemy units and positions. This firepower accounted for 353 enemy killed, 12 bridges destroyed (and an additional 16 damaged), and 1,222 bunkers and 63 weapons positions destroyed. In addition, 203 secondary explosions and 131 secondary fires evidenced the damage to enemy logistic (ammunition and POL) caches.

In order to provide ground commanders a portion of the required air reconnaissance coverage of the battlefield, Marine pilots flew 692 combat support sorties. These included 147 photographic missions, 38 infrared sensor flights, 166 electronic countermeasure flights, 40 electronic intelligence missions, 84 tactical air coordinator (airborne) sorties, and 217 visual reconnaissance flights.

The following graphs depict the monthly combat/combat support sorties flown, and ordnance delivered, by Marine pilots during the first six months of 1968.

IN-COUNTRY FIXED WING SUPPORT BY MARINE AIRCRAFT: JAN - JUN 68



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-Support of Large Unit Operations

Though June was characterized by a decline in enemy contacts, there was still a significant number of ground tactical engagements requiring fixed wing support. Nearly 1,500 sorties (25% of the month's total combat sorties) were flown in support of ground units engaged in Operation SCOTLAND II, attesting to the relatively high tempo of operations in the western portion of the DMZ. The remaining 75% (or 4,400) were flown in support of 14 other large unit operations and the Danang rocket belt, in A Shau Valley and along Route 547, and in support of small unit operations.

The following close air support missions typify the support provided ground units daily in I CTZ:

-During the evening of 7 June, two F-4B aircraft of Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron-115 attacked an enemy force located seven miles northeast of the Khe Sanh combat base. Employing twelve 500-pound bombs and 152 rockets, the Marine pilots were credited with six NVA soldiers killed and one automatic weapon position destroyed.

-On 18 June, elements of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines received an early morning probe from a large enemy force ten miles south of the Khe Sanh combat base. The Marine unit coordinated the placement of organic small arms, mortar, and artillery fires and air strikes on the enemy force for over 11 hours. A subsequent sweep of the area revealed a combined battle damage assessment of 131 NVA soldiers killed (49 of which were credited to Marine aircraft) and 34 individual weapons and nine crew-served weapons captured. Twenty of the 49 enemy killed by Marine air were the result of a close air support mission flown by three A-4E's of Marine Attack Squadron-311.

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-At 0845 on 24 June, two A-4E aircraft of Marine Attack Squadron-121 were directed on a close air support mission in support of ROK Marines then under attack by a Viet Cong force about nine miles south of Danang. The Marine aircraft struck the enemy unit with 500-pound bombs and 20mm guns, killing 13 VC and breaking the enemy assault.

-At 1515 on 25 June, in response to a request for air support from a Marine reconnaissance unit supporting Operation ALLEN BROOK, two A-4E's of Marine Attack Squadron-121 dropped nineteen 250-pound bombs on an enemy force, killing 23. One hour later, two F-4B's of Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron-542 attacked an enemy force about one-half mile from the action described above. Dropping twelve 250-pound bombs and firing 57 rockets and 600 rounds of 20mm ammunition in close support of friendly elements, the Marine aircraft accounted for 40 enemy dead.

-On 26 June, Company L, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines attacked an estimated North Vietnamese Army platoon located in a bunker complex four miles east of Con Thien. Coordinated supporting arms provided heavy fire on the fortified position and enemy routes of egress as the infantry assault drove the enemy into the open. A close air support strike by two F-4B's of Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron-542, loaded with twelve 500-pound bombs and 50 rockets, accounted for 53 of the 59 enemy soldiers killed in this action.

-Out-of-Country Operations

In support of out-of-country interdiction operations, Marine pilots flew 1,078 sorties during the month of June. Of this number, 846 strike sorties and 115 electronic intelligence, electronic countermeasure, and photographic sorties were flown in the Route Package I area of North Vietnam. In addition, Marine attack sortie support in the Steel Tiger region of the Laotian panhandle more than doubled over the previous month, with 117 sorties being flown against enemy targets and lines of communication.

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
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Marine pilots flew a total of 858 A-6A sorties during the month, of which 483 sorties (a record high), were flown out-of-country. This aircraft's unique ability to deliver its ordnance accurately, under instrument conditions or at night, through the utilization of its all-weather target acquisition radar and moving target indicator systems, is documented by the fact that 450 (or 93%) of the out-of-country sorties were flown at night. In the out-of-country attacks, 2,270 tons of ordnance were dropped on 1,713 targets, 1,369 (or 80%) of which were moving. One example of A-6A effectiveness was seen on 21 June, when 11 attack sorties, striking 23 moving and seven stationary targets in Route Package 1 accounted for a partial damage assessment of one 130mm gun destroyed and one damaged, one truck destroyed, three secondary explosions, and two secondary fires.

The following graph depicts the monthly A-6A attack sorties flown out-of-country since July 1967.

**MONTHLY MARINE A-6A SORTIES FLOWN OUT-OF-COUNTRY
JULY 67 - JUNE 68**



In addition to the combat strike effort, Marine ECM-equipped EA-6A's and EF-10B's, flying 89 and 25 sorties respectively, were instrumental in providing protection to US aircraft against possible SAM firings and MIG threats. During June, there were two new SAM field sites discovered in the DMZ

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area, bringing to ten the number of sites capable of launching missiles against aircraft flying in, and contiguous to, the DMZ. However, of these ten sites, only one, located 22 miles northwest of Dong Ha (and ten miles north of the Ben Hai river), was known to be occupied at end-month.

The continued presence of MIG-17 and MIG-21 aircraft in the Vinh area of North Vietnam was verified during the month. The existence of these aircraft, and the resultant threat posed to US planes operating north of the DMZ, continues to emphasize the need of the Marine ECM protection provided to US pilots.

The Single Manager Control of Tactical Air Resources
in the Republic of South Vietnam

As recounted in the May edition of this report, COMUSMACV, to correct the major system deficiencies then evident, on 30 May directed certain modifications to the single manager system. Further, an evaluation of the results of these modifications was to be conducted by 26 June.

As the June evaluation progressed, it was evident that the modifications (primarily the 70/30% split in the pre-planned weekly/daily sortie ratio) were resulting in an I CTZ air control arrangement basically similar to the Marine tactical air control system obtaining in I CTZ prior to 10 March 1968. The weekly allocation of sorties was, with few exceptions, a stable, unchanging air support schedule; the daily allocation of sorties, in turn, provided the vehicle through which COMUSMACV maintained the flexibility to mass his air strength, as required.

Although the modified arrangement is a distinct improvement over the cumbersome single manager system it replaced, the system's still-current requirement that times-on-target be prescribed one week in advance remains an ineffi-

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cient use of fixed wing sorties, and denies CG, III MAF the flexibility required for the most productive use of his air effort. In partial compensation of this shortcoming, however, 30% of III MAF's Marine air effort during the evaluation period was provided by scrambles or "add on" sorties, thereby adding increased responsiveness to the support provided to ground combat units.

In any case, by end-June the initial evaluation of the modified procedures had been completed both by COMUSMACV and CG, III MAF. The evaluations had been forwarded to CINCPAC and were under review at that level.

OV-10A Aircraft

In May, the first detachment of six OV-10A aircraft and seven pilots departed CONUS by ship enroute to the Republic of Vietnam via NAS, Cubi Point, in the Philippines. This seaborne deployment, as well as the requirement for application of several aircraft modifications (principally, improved cockpit instrumentation), and a series of test flights at Cubi Point, delayed the aircraft's arrival in Vietnam until 6 July.

A twin-turboprop, multi-purpose aircraft, the OV-10A Bronco, is intended to fill the void left by the attrited O-1 aircraft. The missions planned for the Bronco include tactical visual aerial reconnaissance and observation, forward air controller (airborne), liaison, aerial photography, aerial delivery, and such other operations as may be directed.

On 6 July, the six aircraft, having been certified operationally ready, were flight ferried from Cubi Point to their new command, Marine Reconnaissance Squadron-2, located at the Marble Mountain Air Facility, Danang. Two OV-10A's were launched on their first combat support missions (one visual reconnaissance mission and one tactical air control (airborne) mission) only three hours after their arrival in-country.

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Marine Air Support Radar Teams

The past six months have seen the relocation of several of the Marine Air Support Radar Teams (ASRT's) positioned in RVN. These teams, utilizing TPQ-10 radar equipment, are capable of directing aircraft to a pre-designated target, where, on command of the controller at the radar site, the ordnance load is released. The radar, having a functional radius of approximately 50 miles, is positioned throughout I CTZ as necessary to provide the best coverage for the ground tactical situation. Used primarily during periods of poor weather and at night, the ASRT's have run 27,175 missions, controlling 32,141 aircraft over the past 12 months.

During the period July-December 1967, five ASRT's were located in I CTZ. Since January 1968, six teams, operating at different times at Chu Lai, Danang, Phu Bai, Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, and Camp Carroll, have controlled air strikes against enemy emplacements, lines of communication, and supply dumps. As of end-June, two teams were located in the DMZ area (one at Dong Ha and one at Camp Carroll), one team was positioned at Phu Bai, two at Danang, and one at Chu Lai.


The graph on the following page portrays the number of missions and aircraft controlled by the Marine ASRT's during the past 12 months, as well as the decreased activity of the ASRT's during periods of good weather.

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MARINE AIR SUPPORT RADAR TEAM ACTIVITY: JULY 67 - JUNE 68

Helicopter Operations

During June, pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Special Landing Forces Alpha and Bravo flew a record 70,494 helicopter sorties, surpassing by 7,657 sorties the previous high (62,837) established in May 1968. Records were also set in the number of passengers transported (98,163) and in the amount of cargo lifted (8,871 tons). Support of US Army, ARVN, and ROKMC elements accounted for 4.8%, or 3,432 of the sorties flown. This percentage, though relatively small, was still a significant draw down on thinly stretched Marine helicopter assets.

In an effort to clear those enemy base sites four and one-half miles south of the Khe Sanh combat base, a multi-regiment attack within the Operation SCOTLAND II area was conducted during the period 2-19 June. The 1st and 4th Marines, supported by six 105mm howitzer batteries, two 155mm howitzer batteries, an 8" howitzer platoon, and a 175mm gun platoon, conducted this operation, with logistic support provided primarily by helicopters


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(CH-46's, CH-53's, UH-1E's, and UH-34's) of Marine Aircraft Groups 36 and 39. During the 15-day period of this operation, more than 18,700 infantry and support troops and 3,100 tons of food, water, and ammunition were helilifted into, and within, the zone of action.

The helicopter's role in the insertion/extraction of small units, as well as that of casualty evacuation, was clearly demonstrated on 3 and 4 June when a reconnaissance patrol came under heavy attack from an estimated 30 to 50 Viet Cong approximately 33 miles south-southwest of Danang. Following reestablishment of communications with the patrol, a reaction force was dispatched to the scene by helicopter to clear the area and to assist in the recovery of the Marine dead and wounded. The patrol and the reaction force were subsequently helilifted out of the area.

The following graph depicts the total monthly support provided by Marine helicopters during the last 12 months.



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Crew, Passenger, and Aircraft Losses

Since 1 January 1966, 155 crew members have been killed or listed as missing in Marine aircraft mishaps related to the war in Vietnam. Further, 105 passengers (three in fixed wing airplanes and 102 in helicopters) have lost their lives. June saw the loss of one helicopter crewman and two passengers when a UH-1E of Marine Reconnaissance Squadron-6, while taking evasive action from enemy ground fire five and one-half miles southeast of the Khe Sanh combat base, crashed into the side of a hill and burned. In addition, an A-4E pilot of Marine Attack Squadron-121 ejected from his crippled aircraft after receiving small arms fire during a close air support mission 32 miles northwest of Danang. Efforts to recover the pilot were unsuccessful due to the intensity of enemy fire in the area. Finally, 11 Marines were killed when the helicopter in which they were passengers, a CH-46 of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-165, crashed and burned after lift-off from a landing zone five miles southeast of the Khe Sanh combat base. The cause of the accident was attributed to enemy small arms fire.

There was a significant decrease in June in the number of aircraft lost as a direct result of enemy action. Two fixed wing planes (compared to nine during May), both A-4's, were lost as a result of small arms fire. Six helicopters (three CH-46's, two UH-1E's, and one UH-34) were lost, three of them as a result of small arms fire (as opposed to 13 lost in May). No aircraft were lost as a result of enemy rocket or mortar attacks against III MAF bases.

In all, 25 fixed wing aircraft and 71 helicopters were damaged by enemy fire during June. All of the fixed wing and all but two of the helicopters received the damage while airborne. These figures also compare favorably to May, when 77 fixed wing and 245 helicopters were damaged (63 of the fixed wing and 197 helicopters receiving damage from enemy fire while airborne).

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LOGISTICS

During June, III MAF's logistic organizations in northern I CTZ sustained a series of enemy indirect fire attacks. Despite these efforts to disrupt operations, no combat activities were halted or curtailed due to a lack of supply or service support.

In one of the more serious attacks on the installations at Cua Viet and Dong Ha, Camp Kistler, at the mouth of the Cua Viet river, received 61 rounds of NVA artillery fire on 13 June. With one or more rounds impacting in the Force Logistic Support Group Bravo fuel dump, secondary explosions and fires resulted in the loss of sixteen 10,000 gallon bladders, containing 100,000 gallons of petroleum. Seven days later, on the 20th, the ammunition supply point at Dong Ha was hit by enemy fire, resulting in the loss of almost 8,500 tons of assorted munitions. Redistribution of ammunition assets within I CTZ by Force Logistic Command (FLC), and the expeditious shipment of additional supplies from WestPac storage activities, permitted a rapid reconstitution of the loss.

Marine Logistic Organization in I CTZ

Although III MAF's Marine logistic structure remained relatively stable during the first half of 1968, with the major entities continuing operations essentially the same as at end-1967, modifications occurred which underscored the flexibility of the Marine support system, and its ability to sustain the changing tactical situation.

Plans for the establishment of Force Logistic Command facilities at Quang Tri City, in order to allow additional room for expansion, and to move Dong Ha support elements out of the range of enemy artillery located north

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As of 30 June, the Force Logistic Command was operating a bulk fuel farm of 540,000 gallon capacity, and a temporary, 3,500-ton capacity ammunition supply point, at Quang Tri City. The end-month status of projects authorized and funded for the Quang Tri facility included 25 SEA huts (60% complete), and a 9,000-ton ammunition supply point (six percent complete). Construction of seven of the initial increment of 16 Butler buildings (64,000 square feet of covered storage) has begun, and work on the 50,000 square foot open storage area, and a graves registration facility, will begin in July.

The construction resources, provided in the main by Naval construction units, are limited, but with a continuing effort, plus perimeter expansion operations, it is expected that a workable facility for selected supply and maintenance functions will be operational before the onset of the 1968 monsoon.

When Operation PEGASUS/LAM SON 207 was terminated on 15 April, the Logistic Support Area (LSA) at Khe Sanh was phased-out and an LSA was established at Ca Lu (Landing Zone Stud), with Force Logistic Support Group Bravo assuming operational control of the new facility on 20 April. On 30 June, the LSA had the following stockage objectives for the various classes of supply (expressed in days of supply (DOS)):

	<u>Type</u>	<u>DOS</u>
Class I (Rations)	Fresh	1
	Canned, multi-personnel	5
	Canned, individual	10

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	<u>Type</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>DOS*</u>
Class III (Petroleum)	Mogas	20,000	14
	Diesel	20,000	6
	JP-4	50,000	4
	AVGAS	10,000	7
	Packaged Oil	N/A	
	and Grease		10
	Drummed Mogas	N/A	
	and Diesel		5

*Based on Average Daily Issue Rate

Class V (Ammunition) 10

Class II (General Supply) items were not stocked, but were delivered from Force Logistic Support Group Bravo when requirements developed. Class IV (special supply items, including fortification material) was stocked on an "as required basis."

Other facilities and services available at the Ca Lu site at end-month were:

Maintenance - Performed by contact teams from Force Logistic Support Group Bravo.

Services - Laundry and bath facilities were in operation, and ice was available on a limited basis.

Airfield - A 2,300-foot dirt runway, capable of handling C-123 aircraft, is located at LZ Stud but was temporarily closed to fixed wing operations due to its rough surface.

Landing Zone - A 160,000 square foot landing zone is located at the LSA.

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
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The III MAF Marine logistic organization at end-June is indicated on the map below.

III MAF LOGISTIC FACILITIES - 30 JUNE 1968



Helicopter Logistical Support of Large Unit Operations

The tactical and terrain realities of the June 1968 operational environment in the mountains of northern Quang Tri province provide a good example of the utilization of helicopters in a tactical logistic support role. Faced with the challenge of sustaining a widely dispersed, multi-regimental force in a virtually roadless, 300 square mile

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area of operations, Task Force Hotel (the controlling Marine headquarters) employed helicopters almost exclusively for logistic support of its eight infantry battalions and nine artillery battery equivalents conducting Operation SCOTLAND II from 2 to 19 June.

During the initial phase of the operation, helicopter support of the task force consisted primarily of a limited number of CH-46's and two CH-53's delivering resupply items to the one regiment in the Khe Sanh area, the 1st Marines. Daily, an average of 200,000 pounds of cargo was helilifted, primarily from the Logistic Support Area at Landing Zone Stud, 12 air miles east of Khe Sanh, to troops conducting operations in the mountains five miles southeast of the combat base.

With the introduction of the 4th Marines to the operation on 6 June, however, the logistical requirements correspondingly increased, until the support demands reached the level, during the zenith of the operation, where almost 400,000 pounds of cargo were delivered daily by six to ten CH-46, and one to three CH-53 helicopters. In the course of this peak period, a daily average of 137 resupply helilifts were made from Landing Zone Stud to 14 company/battery and battalion positions in the rugged mountainous terrain.

Four UH-34 helicopters, specifically reserved for casualty evacuation missions, were on an around-the-clock alert during the operation. The majority of the 472 evacuated US casualties generated by the action were flown directly from the scene of combat to medical installations. Although Company D, 3d Medical Battalion, at Dong Ha, was the primary casualty clearing station, the 1st Marines' aid station at Khe Sanh, and the medical facility at Landing Zone Stud, were available for patients requiring emergency stabilization, and to handle overflow loads.

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Special consideration was given to ammunition resupply procedures, since it was anticipated (and later confirmed) that munitions would constitute the bulk of the resupply effort. Prior to the 2 June initiation of the operation, a five day level of ammunition was emplaced at the major hilltop positions, thereby freeing helicopters from subsequent routine resupply operations. Similarly, once the artillery's advanced fire bases had been secured by heliborne infantry, tailored packages of ammunition were positioned at the sites prior to arrival of the artillery weapons, thus allowing uninterrupted fire support and further reducing resupply operations. Subsequent delivery of munitions to the fire bases was conducted on a scheduled, rather than an emergency, basis.

In accomplishing the logistic and tactical support of the two regiments, separated on occasions by more than 12 miles, helicopters of Marine Aircraft Groups 36 and 39 delivered 6,164,374 pounds of rations, water, ammunition, and supplies, and transported over 18,700 personnel.

Motor Transport

The introduction of the first increment of 1,442 new M151A1 1/4-ton vehicles, initiated in May, was completed in June. By the 19th of the month, 1,434 of the vehicles, having passed Force Logistic Command acceptance inspections, had been issued to III MAF units. These vehicles completely replaced the M422 (Mighty Mite) in the active inventory of Marine vehicles in South Vietnam, as well as a portion of the M38A1 1/4-ton fleet. An additional 750 M151's are at the Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, being prepared for shipment to WestPac in the near future. These vehicles, when delivered, will complete the outfitting of all III MAF Marine units with new 1/4-ton trucks.

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As of 30 June, 3,824 of the 5,373 vehicles, currently scheduled as replacements for III MAF Marine vehicles, were in-country. The status of the program is shown below.

III MAF MARINE GROUND VEHICLE REPLACEMENT STATUS 30 JUNE 1968

VEHICLE TYPE	NUMBER REQUESTED	AWAITING SHIPMENT AT USMC INSTALLATIONS	AT CONVOY PORTS OF EMBAZCATION ON GROUND	ARRIVED IN-COUNTRY
Truck, 1/2 Ton M274A2 (Mechanical Mule)	656			656
Truck, 1/2 Ton M151A1 (Replaces Mighty Mite & M38 Jeep)	2,145	750		1,442
Truck, 2 1/2 Ton, 6X6 Multifuel M35A2C	1,049	185		862
Truck, Tanker, 2 1/2 Ton, 6X6 Multifuel M49A2C	114			53
Truck, Tanker, Water, 2 1/2 Ton, Multifuel M50A2	27			21
Truck, Shop Van, 2 1/2 Ton, 6X6 Multifuel M109A3	63			61
Truck, Dump, 5 Ton, Multifuel M51A2	323	75		225
Truck, Tractor, 5 Ton, Multifuel M52A2	216			148
Truck, 5 Ton, 6X6 Multifuel M54A2C	675		415	281
Truck, Wrecker, 5 Ton, Multifuel M54B2A2	88			67
Truck, Telephone Maint, 2 1/2 Ton, V-17	8			7
Truck, Earthbore, 2 1/2 Ton, V-18	9	1		1

June operations of the five Marine motor transport battalions supporting III MAF resulted in the logging of 355,114 vehicle miles, and the movement of 51,791 short tons of cargo and 111,594 personnel. Although the number of Rough Rider convoys decreased (from 28 in May to 23 in June), the number of personnel and tons of cargo transported increased. There were 4,199 personnel and 3,800 tons of cargo carried by these tactical convoys in June, compared to the 4,069 personnel and 3,356 tons of cargo transported in May.

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Maintenance

The results of the maintenance effort in I CTZ during the month were excellent, as reflected in the comparison of the May and June percentages of Marine combat essential equipment deadlined for repair. All major commodity groups showed definite improvement, with the percentages of deadlined equipment for each major group for the two months being:

	<u>COMMUNICATIONS- ELECTRONICS</u>	<u>MOTOR TRANSPORT</u>	<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>ENGINEER</u>
May	3.4	2.5	2.0	9.1
June	2.8	2.2	1.7	8.4

Combat essential equipment in 3d and 4th echelon shops for more than 30 days represented less than four-tenths of one percent of the total density supported. Of interest also is the continued melioration of the artillery deadline rates for equipment undergoing 3d echelon repair; the rate for the Marine artillery weapons of III MAF averaged 1.4 percent in June, as compared to 2.7 percent in May.

With 1,718 multifuel vehicles in the inventory of III MAF Marine units, at the end of the month, gas engine trucks, such as the M35 2 1/2-ton cargo and M51 5-ton dump truck, have been made available to undergo rehabilitation in the shops of Force Logistic Command. The current program for M-35 trucks was completed during the month with the acceptance, by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, of the last six of the 24 trucks renovated, and the overhaul of four M51 dump trucks for the 2d Brigade, Republic of Korea Marine Corps.

Assisting in the establishment of an effective maintenance program for the multifuel vehicles, during June,

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a contact team from 3d Force Service Regiment presented instruction and demonstration on 1st and 2d echelon maintenance of multifuel vehicles to 497 officers and men responsible for the upkeep of the vehicles.

Supply

June provided little change in the supply situation in I CTZ. Supplies generally were adequate, and the losses sustained by enemy attacks were rapidly replaced.

Class I (Rations) - The stock of rations, expressed in days of supply as of 30 June, were as follows:

	<u>A</u> (Fresh Rations)	<u>B</u> (Multi-personnel Canned Rations)	<u>MCI</u> (Individual Canned Rations)
FLSG A (Phu Bai)	6	12	18
FLSG B (Dong Ha)	1	3	8
Supply Bn (Danang)	7	6	2
NSA (Danang)	24	50	50

Class II (General Supply) - A recently completed review of body armor requirements revealed that 750 sets of upper torso armor must be introduced into the III MAF Marine supply system each month in order to replace anticipated monthly combat losses, and to support the rehabilitation program on Okinawa.

Accelerated combat operations during the first six months of 1968, and the February deployment of Regimental Landing Team-27 to Vietnam, resulted in a temporary shortage of jungle clothing. While not acute, the shortage prevented FLC from completing the issue of the increased in-

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dividual allowance (now three sets of jungle utilities and two pairs of jungle boots) authorized by CG, FMFPAC in November 1967. Beginning 10 June, 100,358 coats, 89,755 trousers, 59,073 pairs of boots, 17,093 undershirts, and 18,433 drawers were air shipped to FLC from 3d Force Service Regiment and CONUS sources. Receipt of these shipments is expected to alleviate most of the current shortages.

Class III (Petroleum)- With the exception of the 100,000 gallon loss of petroleum at Cua Viet, supplies were adequate, and presented no resupply problems within III MAF.

Class IV (Special items)- Stocks were adequate to support all operations.

Class V (Ammunition)- Ground munition stock levels were maintained essentially at the established 45-day pipeline levels. A sharp increase in expenditures of certain selected munitions, as shown below, occurred during June.

Item Expenditures

	<u>Hand Grenade</u> <u>(M33)</u>	<u>40mm</u> <u>(M397/386)</u>	<u>105mm</u> <u>(M444)</u>
May	5,491	7,747	2,135
June	9,078	11,226	3,824

The following munitions were destroyed at Dong Ha by enemy artillery fire on 20-21 June:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>S/T</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>S/T</u>
Small Arms	464.2	Pyrotechnic & Chemical	82.4
Mortar	1,148.2	Demolitions & Mines	566.7
Artillery	5,655.2	Fuzes (mortar & arty)	249.9
Grenades	21.7	Miscellaneous types	155.0
Rocket	92.2		

Total tonnage destroyed - 8,435.5 S/T

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Class VA - Air munition stock levels were maintained at the CINCPAC authorized levels, with the exception of the MK82, 500-pound, general purpose bomb, and the MK77 napalm bomb. During brief periods in June, temporary shortages of these bombs were experienced, and other types of aircraft ordnance, primarily rockets, were substituted therefor.

Aviation Logistics

The rehabilitation of 201 items of Aircraft Maintenance Support Equipment (AMSE) was in progress at out-of-country facilities during June. The majority of the work on the AMSE equipment was being accomplished through the Public Works and Aircraft Maintenance Departments, NAS, Atsugi.

A factory rebuilt AN/TPQ-10 radar course directing central, used by Air Support Radar Teams to direct all-weather close air support, was delivered to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during June. This three-ton item, with a unit cost of \$521,220, replaced a similar set evacuated to CONUS from northern I CTZ, also for factory level rework.

At end-June, 52 aircraft were undergoing Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) at aircraft plants in Japan. Thirteen additional aircraft were undergoing repair of battle damage at intermediate maintenance activities or repair facilities in Japan and the Philippines. Aircraft by type undergoing these programs are listed below:

	<u>PAR</u>	<u>REPAIR OF BATTLE DAMAGE</u>
A-4	12	-
F-4	10	1
RF-4	2	-

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	<u>PAR</u>	<u>REPAIR OF BATTLE DAMAGE</u>
C-117	-	1
UH-1	5	1
UH-34	-	1
CH-46	23	7
CH-53	-	<u>2</u>
	52	13

NORS/NORM (not operationally ready due to supply/maintenance) data for selected Marine aircraft in III MAF are displayed on the following page.

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
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
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NORS/NORMS RATES - III MAF MARINE AIRCRAFT

A-4 (ATTACK)




F-4 (FIGHTER-ATTACK)




NORS/NORM DATA FOR THE OV-10A,
WHICH ARRIVED IN-COUNTRY 8 JULY,
WILL BE REPORTED NEXT MONTH.


CH-46A (HELO)




UH-340 (HELO)




UH-1E (HELO)



A-6A (ATTACK)



CH-53A (HELO)*



* Readiness Objective not established.

— NORS — NORM — READY

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CONCLUSIONS

-Deactivation of the fixed, major base at Khe Sanh will not diminish the scope or intensity of the on-going Marine offensive in the western region of the DMZ.

-Although the pause in enemy activity during June confirms the extent of the cumulative hurt done his forces thus far in 1968, there is, as yet, no reason to believe his troop losses will preclude substantial further efforts to punish our forces. The basic enemy system for the supply of his formations in north and central I CTZ is effective, and remains fully capable of rendering the combat support required.

-The hard results of combat operations conducted by ARVN forces in northern I CTZ continue to demonstrate the increasing combat proficiency of these units.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS - JUNE 19681. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLEa. I CTZ/DMZ Summary

At the end of the month, the combat strength of the confirmed enemy units in the I CTZ/DMZ region was estimated at 39,080, including 30,275 North Vietnamese and 8,805 Viet Cong. This represents a decrease, since end-May, of 2,145 enemy personnel in the area.

Factors which contributed to the June adjustment in the enemy order of battle were: (1) the acceptance of nine enemy units as confirmed, and the infiltration or recruitment of over 4,000 men, which resulted in a total accretion of more than 12,000 enemy personnel; and (2) the relocation from the area of four enemy units, and the assessment of 3,000 casualties against identified enemy units, resulting in a total attrition of more than 14,000 enemy troops.

The following charts present the specific adjustments confirmed during the month.

ACCRETIONS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>End-month Location</u>
88th Regt, 308th Div.	1,650	DMZ/Quang Tri
102d Regt, 308th Div.	1,425	DMZ/Quang Tri
Hq, 4th Regt.	480	Thua Thien
1st Bn, 4th Regt.	470	Thua Thien
36th Regt, 308th Div.	1,000	Quang Nam
38th Regt, 308th Div.	515	Quang Nam
Hq, 328th Regt.	80	Quang Ngai
2d VC Regt, 3d Div.	1,260	Quang Ngai
22d Regt, 3d Div.	1,230	Quang Ngai
<u>Infiltration and recruitment</u>	<u>4,139</u>	<u>I CTZ/DMZ</u>
Total	12,249	

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ATTRITIONS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
Elements, 304th Div.	1,660	To NVN
Elements, 325C Div.	1,950	To II CTZ
341st Div.	7,400	Deleted (lack of confirmed activity)
4th Bn, 84th Arty Regt.	250	Adjustment in strength
<u>Confirmed Units</u>	<u>3,134</u>	<u>Casualties</u>
Total	14,394	

- Probable Enemy Units

Augmenting the estimated 39,080 personnel who comprise the confirmed enemy units in the I CTZ/DMZ area, there were, at the end of June, 7,665 soldiers classified as belonging to "probable" enemy units within the region. As a result of prisoner or returnee interrogation, and/or captured documents, intelligence agencies have identified these enemy units by unit designation, unit subordination, and unit location. Although this information has been substantiated by other intelligence sources, the evidence is not yet considered conclusive enough to warrant acceptance of the unit as confirmed.

There are 26 enemy units in the probable category in the I CTZ/DMZ area - seven regimental headquarters (four infantry and three combat support) and 19 battalions (ten infantry and nine combat support).


On the following pages are maps depicting the confirmed and probable enemy order of battle in the I CTZ/DMZ area, as of 30 June.

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ENEMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ/DMZ AREA




**The DMZ area includes that portion of Quang Tri province which lies north of Route 9, the DMZ itself, and the Vinh Linh Special Zone in North Vietnam. NVA units operating in this vicinity are considered DMZ AREA UNITS.

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b. DMZ/Quang Tri Province

At the end of June, the strength of confirmed enemy combat units in the DMZ area and Quang Tri province was estimated at 15,300, or 7,825 less than at end-May. Affecting this decrease was the deletion of the 341st NVA Division (with a strength of 7,400), due to a lack of activity by that unit.

Enemy efforts at rice collection, reorganization, and preparation for a "third phase offensive" continued during the month. An important headquarters in this effort appears to be the "Quang Tri Liberation Front," known also as the 7th Front, which is considered to be a field staff subordinate of the Tri-Thien Military Region. Currently, the front is believed to be operating from Base Area 101, in the Hai Lang forest region west of Quang Tri City.



★ Province capital

* The DMZ area includes that portion of Quang Tri province which lies north of Route 9, the DMZ itself, and the Vinh Linh Special Zone in North Vietnam. NVA units operating in this vicinity are considered DMZ AREA UNITS.


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- Probable Enemy Units

Seventeen of the 26 enemy units in a probable status throughout I CTZ/DMZ are in either the DMZ area or Quang Tri province, and have an estimated personnel strength of 5,195 combat troops. The 270th Regiment, in the Gio Linh area, and the support units of the 320th NVA Division, including the 54th Artillery Regiment, located north of Camp Carroll, are in Quang Tri province. Within the DMZ and the Vinh Linh Special Zone of North Vietnam are positioned the 164th Artillery Regiment, the 27th Regiment, the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment, and one battalion of the 270th Regiment. The 164th Artillery Regiment is believed to be part of the NVA artillery force which fires at friendly installations in north-eastern Quang Tri, while the other units north of the Ben Hai river are suspected of participating in periodic incursions into South Vietnam.




★ Province capital

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c. Thua Thien Province

The enemy order of battle strength in Thua Thien province increased significantly during the month, from 6,270 in May to 8,345 in June. At end-December 1967, there were 4,375 enemy formed into one regional headquarters, one regimental headquarters, and six infantry battalions in the province. In the past six months, this strength has increased by 97%, to 8,345 enemy, organized into one regional headquarters, five regimental headquarters, and 18 infantry battalions.



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
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- Probable Enemy Units

The most significant enemy unit in a probable status within Thua Thien province is the newly organized 5th Regiment, which bolsters the enemy command and control apparatus in the vital Hue area. Subordinate to this headquarters are the 810th and 804th Battalions, which are confirmed, and the K-15 Battalion, presently carried in a probable status. The estimated strength of the four probable enemy units in Thua Thien is 970 combat troops.



★ Province capital


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d. Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces

III MAF and ARVN operations in the central I CTZ coastal plains have obliged the enemy to repair to the mountainous jungle near the Laotian border to reorganize his forces. As a result, enemy initiated activity throughout the two provinces was relatively light during June.


At end-June, the combat strength of the confirmed enemy units in Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces was estimated at 10,430, an increase of 1,060 over the end-May estimation. The confirmation of the 36th and 38th Regiments, 308th NVA Division accounted for an increase of 1,515 men, and replacements added another 105. Combat losses of 560 enemy killed reduced the net increase to 1,060.



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- Probable Enemy Units

In central I CTZ, there were an estimated 1,500 enemy in probable units at the end of June. Paramount among these units is Group 44, a headquarters reportedly created in December 1967 to improve tactical guidance, coordination, and control in Quang Nam province. Other probable units in the area included the 3d Sapper Battalion in the vicinity of Hoi An, the 74th Battalion near Tam Ky, and the 68B Artillery Regiment in western Quang Tin province.




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e. Quang Ngai Province

The confirmation of the 2d VC and the 22d NVA Regiments, 3d NVA Division, with a combined strength of 2,490, increased considerably the enemy strength in Quang Ngai province. Added to the 80 men estimated to be in the newly identified 328th Regimental headquarters, and offset by 25 enemy casualties, the net increase in enemy strength was to 5,005, or 2,545 more than the 2,460 enemy estimated to be in the province at end-May. This marks the first time since August 1967 that the enemy strength in Quang Ngai province was greater than 4,000.

There were no enemy units carried in a "probable" category in Quang Ngai province as of end-June.



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2. ENEMY LOSSES IN I CTZ

<u>Enemy losses to III MAF/SLF</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
By Marines	2,154	65	726
By US Army	1,799	221	1,680
Monthly Total	3,953	286	2,406
1968 Total	38,815	1,329	14,744

Enemy losses to other forces

By ROKMC	160	3	36
By RVNAF	1,389	337	766
By Special Forces/CIDG	61	1	40
Monthly Total	1,610	341	842
I CTZ Monthly Total	5,563	627	3,248
1968 Total	57,916	3,012	21,133

3. III MAF/SLF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>By US Army</u>	<u>By Marines</u>		<u>1968 Total</u>
1,321	8,132	Patrols	82,479
1,109	4,296	Ambushes	35,398
55	20	Company Operations	1,861
-	240	Sniper posts	1,973
3	1	Battalion operations	16*
4	8	Regimental or larger operations	29*
-	7,689	Combat/combat support sorties	44,936
163,329	70,494	Helicopter sorties	1,040,632

*Since monthly figures include operations continued from previous months, they are not used to compute cumulative totals.

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4. MAJOR CHANGES IN III MAF/SLF UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>From/To</u>
HMM-362 (SLF Alpha)	2Jun	Phu Bai/LPH-5
BLT-3/1 (SLF Bravo)	3Jun	Ca Lu/LPH-8
3dBn, 3d Marines	5Jun	Cam Lo/Cua Viet
BLT-2/4 (SLF Alpha)	5Jun	Cua Viet/Khe Sanh
2dBn, 9th Marines	5Jun	Vinh Quan/Ca Lu (LZ Stud)
BLT-3/1 (SLF Bravo)	8Jun	LPH-8/Danang
4th Marines	9Jun	Camp Carroll/Lang Kat (LZ Robin)
2dBn, 5th Marines	14Jun	Hai Van/Phu Bai
BLT-2/7 (SLF Bravo)	14Jun	Danang/LPH-8
HMM-265 (SLF Bravo)	14Jun	Marble Mt/LPH-8
MASS-3A	16Jun	Danang/Okinawa
HMM-164 (SLF Bravo)	16Jun	LPH-8/Marble Mt
4th Marines	19Jun	Lang Kat (LZ Robin)/Ca Lu

5. UNITS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL LANDING FORCESSLF Alpha (TG 79.4)

Battalion Landing Team - 2/4
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron - 362

SLF Bravo (TG-79.5)

Battalion Landing Team - 3/1 (1-8 June)
 Battalion Landing Team - 2/7 (8 June - continuing)
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron - 164 (1-16 June)
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron - 265 (16 June-
 continuing)

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6. III MAF CIVIC ACTION

<u>By US Army</u>	<u>By Marines</u>		<u>Cumulative III MAF total</u>
30,077	104,509	Persons given medical treatment	3,267,236
116	4,861	Persons given dental treatment	84,372
66	60	Persons given medical or dental training	3,003
72,871	38,600	Pounds of food distributed	6,787,484
6,604	10,760	Pounds of soap distributed	270,698
3,086	13,484	Pounds of clothing distributed	330,220
103	208	Critically ill civilians evacuated	11,245
58	646	English language classes conducted	7,665
\$86	\$295	Cash donations	\$60,729
146,302	77,400	Persons fed	12,298,664
-	600	Students supported	76,923
9	82	Construction projects	2,885

7. III MAF STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Danang	2,408	33,208	166	1,057	227	1,844
Chu Lai	444	5,962	23	112	1,086	12,838
Duc Pho	-	-	-	-	321	4,930
Phu Bai	678	10,963	141	898	1,643	18,057
Quang Tri	633	7,659	58	378	1,746	18,421
DMZ Area	1,023	20,429	63	702	289	4,293
Totals	5,186	78,221	451	3,147	5,312	60,383

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8. LOGISTICSa. Supply levels at end of period

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
<u>Class I</u>			
(1000 of rations/ days of supply)			
MCI rations	71/2	578/18	442/8
B rations	227/6	390/12	450/3
A rations	266/7	197/6	77/1

Class III and IIIA (Bulk) (Marine Corps Owned)(1000 gals/days
of supply)

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
JP-4	-	80/4	7/1
AVGAS	-	34/5	9/2
MOGAS	91/5	79/6	-
DIESEL	72/6	103/4	-

<u>Class V and VA</u>	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
Ground Ammunition (days of supply)	45	45	45	45

Aviation Ordnance - Stocks maintained within CINCPAC allocations.

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b. Class II Supply Requisitions

	<u>FLC</u>	<u>3dFSR</u>
Processed	59,577	44,029
Fill Rate	63%	41%
Obligations on hand at end-month	82,329	28,678

c. RED BALL* Summary

Items at beginning of period	882
Items added	270
Items removed	155
Items remaining at end of period	997

*RED BALL items are urgently
needed combat essential items
which require expeditious pro-
cessing of requisitions and pri-
ority shipment to the user.

d. Resupply Status

(1) <u>Surface Shipping Status (all I CTZ)</u>	49,585 M/T
Received from CONUS (5,684 M/T)	
Received from intra-WestPac (43,901 M/T)	
(2) <u>Air Shipping Status</u>	4,654 S/T
Received from CONUS (2,078 S/T)	
Received from intra-WestPac (2,576 S/T)	

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e. Resupply Status Within RVN(1) Surface Shipping Status 102,765 S/T

Danang to Chu Lai (33,500 S/T)
 Danang to Hue/Phu Bai (33,015 S/T)
 Danang to Dong Ha/Cua Viet (30,412 S/T)
 Danang to Thon My Thuy (5,838 S/T)

(2) Fixed Wing Shipping Status (USMC and PACAF) 7,119 S/T

Danang to Chu Lai (325 S/T)
 Danang to Phu Bai (347 S/T)
 Danang to Dong Ha (1,205 S/T)
 Other intra-I Corps APOE's (5,242 S/T)

(3) Helicopter Shipping Status (USMC)-CH-53 3,991 S/Tf. Cargo Shipped out of RVN(1) Surface 14,089 M/T

MSTS Conventional Vessels (13,199 M/T)
 Roll On/Roll Off Vessels (890 M/T)

(2) Air 297 S/T

USMC (185 S/T)
 MAC (112 S/T)

g. Maintenance

Items repaired at 3dFSR 4,894
 Items returned to CONUS from 3dFSR 69
 or disposed of on Okinawa

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h. Construction Projects

Roads

-183.3 miles were either under construction or being upgraded, and 127.5 miles were being maintained.

Bridges

-Eight Class 60, one Class 55, two Class 50, and one Class 30 bridges were completed; four Class 60 bridges were under construction; and one Class 55 and two Class 50 bridges were repaired.

Rafts and Ferries

-Eight rafts (five in the Chu Lai area and three in the Danang area) were in operation.

Bunkers

-64 bunkers were completed, and 33 others were under construction.

Airfield

(Percentage of completion)

-Danang: Avionics van complex (95%). Chu Lai: 1stMAW tactical crew quarters (81%) and 2d LAAM Battalion warehouse (38%).

i. Medical and Dental Services

(1) Medical

Patients admitted to III MAF facilities	2,245
Battle injury (680)	
Non-battle injury (201)	
Disease (1,364)	
Evacuated out-of-country	498
Deaths in III MAF facilities	7
Returned to duty	1,026
Hospitalized as of 30 June	349

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(2) Dental

Total Procedures	39,224
Operative, Crown, and Bridge	16,558
Prosthetics	358
Oral Surgery	3,120
Preventive Dentistry	1,840
Number of Sitzings	10,424

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