

TOP SECRETHEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVJMC HQ 339a (REV. 7-82)

TR084	FMF SPECAT EXCL IN & OUT OCT68-JAN69	MPAC	01	0000
DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	FILE NUMBER	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.
			CY. NO.	DATE

ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing

OPERATION CODE

- X - ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE
AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A - APPROPRIATE ACTION
B - GUIDANCE
C - SIGNATURE
D - COMMENT
E - RECOMMENDATION
F - CONCURRENCE

- G - INFORMATION
H - RETURN TO
I - INITIAL
J - DISPOSITION
K - DECISION
L - RETENTION
O - (OTHER)

HQSR-3

DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS (COMPLETED BY ACTION OR ROUTING OFFICER AS APPROPRIATE)	
RETENTION PERIOD ESTABLISHED BY ROUTING OFFICER AS:	
_____ MONTHS	_____ INDEFINITE (Historical Value)
_____ UNTIL SUPERSEDED	_____ PERMANENTLY (Record Material)
_____ UNTIL OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AS DETERMINED ON ANNUAL REVIEW	
REQUEST ACTION OFFICER ADVISE RETENTION ABOVE	
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER ESTABLISHING DISPOSITION <i>R. J. [Signature]</i>	SECTION HQSR-3

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ALL PERSONS WHO HANDLE THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT,
SIGN AND DATE IN NUMERICAL ORDER BELOW.

RTG	OPR CODE	ADDRESSEES	DATE		INIT
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		MILITARY SECY TO CMC			
		ASSISTANT COMMANDANT ACMC			
		MILITARY ASST TO CMC			
		CHIEF OF STAFF CS			
		SECY GEN STAFF			
		DIR SPL PROJ SPD			
		DC/S AVN A			
		DC/S I&L L			
		DC/S MPR M			
		DIR PERS MGT DIV MM			
		DIR MPR P&P DIV MP			
		DIR PERS PROC DIV MR			
		DC/S PP&O P			
		DIR PLANS DIV PL			
		DIR OPNS DIV PO			
		MCCC POC			
		GRD CBT REQBR POG			
		DC/S RD&S RD			
		DC/S RESAFF RES			
		DC/S R&P RP			
		DC/S TRNG T			
		FDMC FD			
		IGMC IG			
		MED OFF MED			
		DIR C4 SYS DIV CC			
		C4 SYS P&P BRANCH CCP			
		DIR OF INTEL INT			
		DIR JAD JA			
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DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
701022	M. J. [Signature]	11	
2		12	
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UPON COMPLETION OF ROUTINGDO NOT DETACH—THIS FORM IS A PERMA-
NENT PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH
IT IS ATTACHEDMATERIAL
ATTACHED IS**TOP SECRET**

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC: SPECAT EXCLUSIVES,
OCT 1968 - JAN 1969

1. CMC 020120Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE & LTGEN CUSHMAN from GEN CHAPMAN
MARINE CORPS STRENGTH AND STRUCTURE
2. CMC 020121Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE & LTGEN CUSHMAN from GEN CHAPMAN
EXTRACTS FROM MEMO FOR DEP SECDEF ON MARINE CORPS STRENGTH & STRUCTURE AIRMAILED
YOUR HQ 30 Sep 68
3. CG.. MCB PACIFIC 052123Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN BUSE
POST HOSTILITIES POSTURE
4. CG III MAF 061358Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For CG FMFPAC info CG FIRST MAW
SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS
5. CG FMFPAC 092035Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN info LTGEN CUSHMAN from LTGEN BUSE
SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS
6. CG III MAF 121334Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For CG FMFPAC
OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS
7. CG FMFPAC 122245Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For CG III MAF info CMC & CG FLC
2d BRIGADE, ROKMC COMBAT SUPPORT
8. CG III MAF 131122Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For LGEN BUSE from LGEN CUSHMAN
MONTHLY REPORT -EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR
9. CG III MAF 140300Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from LTGEN CUSHMAN
[READDRESSAL of III MAF 291442Z Jul 68, which was readdressed 080812Z Oct 68]
EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR PERIOD 270600H Jun 68 to 260600H Jul 68
10. ADMINO FMFPAC 172042Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN info LTGEN CUSHMAN from MGEN FONTANA
OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS
11. COMNAVAIRPAC 222312Z Oct 68 (C) Gp-4
For LGEN BUSE info ADM HYLAND & MGEN QUILTER from SHINN
T-53 ENGINE SUPPORT OF MC AVIATION UNITS BY US ARMY
12. COMPHIBPAC 232345Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For ADM HYLAND info VADM BRINGLE & LGEN BUSE from SMITH
ARG/SLF

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13. CMC 241448Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from GEN CHAPMAN info LTGEN CUSHMAN
PROPOSED PROGRAM 6 DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES UNDER ALTERNATIVE 3
14. ADMINO FMFPAC 252132Z Oct 68 (C) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from MAJGEN FONTANA
TEXT OF COMNAVAIRPAC 222312Z Oct 68 (Item 11, above)
15. III MAF 270234Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For LGEN BUSE info MGEN YOUNDALE, MGEN DAVIS & MGEN QUILTER from LTGEN CUSHMAN
AIR CAV CAPABILITIES FOR MARINE DIVISIONS
16. CG FMFPAC 270336Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For ADM HYLAND, VADM BRINGLE & RADM SMITH info MGEN FONTANA from LTGEN BUSE
ARG/SLF
17. COMSEVENTHFLT 270402Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For ADM HYLAND info VADM SMITH & LGEN BUSE from BRINGLE
ARG/SLF
18. CG III MAF 271536Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from LTGEN CUSHMAN
AIRCAV CAPABILITIES FOR MAR DIVISIONS
19. CMC 301721Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For CG FMFPAC info CG FIRST MAW
A6A REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT
20. CG FMFPAC 020137Z Oct 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN BUSE
PROGRAM 6 REALIGNMENT
21. CG FMFPAC 042033Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN BUSE
TEXT OF NMCC 011718Z Nov 68: SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
22. CG FMFPAC 050312Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For BGEN WILLIAMS from LTGEN BUSE
ARG/SLF
23. CG FMFPAC 052239Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN CUSHMAN info GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN BUSE
PROGRAM 6 DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
24. CG FMFPAC 062346Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN CUSHMAN info MGEN QUILTER from LTGEN BUSE
LOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS
25. CG MCB PACIFIC 072239Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For CO MCAS IWAKUNI
JOINT USAGE OF MCAS IWAKUNI

26. CG FMFPAC 082343Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN BUSE
TEXT OF CUMUSMACV 070236Z Nov 68 re NMCC MSG DTG 011718Z Nov 68
27. CG III MAF 090940Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from LTGEN CUSHMAN
LOCATION OF AVN UNITS
28. CG III MAF 100326Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE info MGEN QUILTER from LTGEN CUSHMAN
OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION RESOURCES IN ICTZ
29. CG III MAF 120144Z Nov 68 (C) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN & LTGEN BUSE from LTGEN CUSHMAN
MAJGEN DRAKE'S SUMMARY OF COMMENTS MADE BY MR. R.C. STEADMAN, DEP ASST SECDEF
DURING VISIT TO XXIV CORPS
30. CG FMFPAC 122144Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN CUSHMAN from LTGEN BUSE
AIR CONTROL
31. MCAS IWAKUNI 130746Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
JOINT USAGE OF MCAS IWAKUNI
32. CG FMFPAC 132231Z Nov 68 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN WALT from LTGEN BUSE
T-DAY PLANNING
- 32a. CG FMFPAC 132232Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN WALT from LTGEN BUSE info LTGEN CUSHMAN
RELOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS
33. CG FMFPAC 132234Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN CUSHMAN from LtGEN BUSE
T-DAY PLANNING
34. CMC 140216Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from GEN CHAPMAN
PROGRAM 6 REALIGNMENT
35. CG III MAF 151124Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE info MGEN QUILTER from LTGEN CUSHMAN
PROPOSED CMCM ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT
36. CMC 151952Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from LTGEN WALT
RELOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS
37. CMC 160017 Nov 68 (TS) Gp-3
For LTGEN BUSE info LTGEN CUSHMAN from LTGEN WALT
T-DAY PLANNING

- 38. CINCPACFLT 160321Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For VADM SHINN, VADM SMITH, RADM COMBS, RADM BIRD, RADM FREEMAN ETC,
LTGEN BUSE, RADM GRIMM from BAUMBERGER
FORCE LEVEL MANAGEMENT DURING STANDOWN
- 39. CG FMFPAC 162002Z Nov 68 For MGEN TOMPKINS info LTGEN WALT, BGEN
WILLIAMS, BGEN WEBSTER from LTGEN BUSE (S) Gp-4
REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE
- 40. CG NINTH MAB 180818Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from WILLIAMS
ARG/SLF
- 41. CG III MAF 180956Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE info GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN CUSHMAN
PROGRAM 6 DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
- 42. CG III MAF 210742Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4 [Readdressal of III MAF 210740Z Nov]
For LTGEN BUSE from MGEN TOMPKINS
III MAF PROG 6 FORCE STRUCTURE
- 43. CG FMFPAC 212221Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For MGEN TOMPKINS info LTGEN WALT, BGEN WEBSTER & BGEN WILLIAMS from LTGEN BUSE
REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE
- 44. CG FMFPAC 212222Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN info MGEN TOMPKINS from LTGEN BUSE
PROGRAM 6 REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
- 45. CG FMFPAC 212327Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN WALT info BGEN WEBSTER & BGEN WILLIAMS from LTGEN BUSE
III MAF PROG 6 FORCE STRUCTURE
- 46. CG NINTH MAB 230445Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from WILLIAMS
ARG/SLF EMPLOYMENT
- 47. CMC 231831Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from GEN CHAPMAN info LTGEN CUSHMAN
REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE
- 48. CG FMFPAC 252202Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN CUSHMAN info GEN CHAPMAN, BGEN WEBSTER & BGEN WILLIAMS From LTGEN BUSE
III MAF PROGRAM 6 FORCE STRUCTURE
- 49. CG III MAF 270636Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from LTGEN CUSHMAN
QUOTE OF TWO MSGE RE ARG/SLF OPERATION: COMNAVFORV 230642Z Nov 68 and
CG III MAF 251554Z Nov 68

50. CG FMFPAC 272136Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN CUSHMAN from LTGEN BUSE
III MAF PROGRAM 6 FORCE STRUCTURE
51. CG FMFPAC 280021Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN BUSE
RE CG III MAF 270636Z Nov 68 PASSED TO ME BY BOB CUSHMAN
52. CMC 280231Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE info LTGEN CUSHMAN from GEN CHAPMAN
ARG/SLF OPERATION
53. CG III MAF 290720Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN & LTGEN BUSE from LTGEN CUSHMAN
ARG/SLF OPERATION
54. CG III MAF 290830Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from LTGEN CUSHMAN
III MAF PROGRAM 6 FORCE STRUCTURE
55. CG FMFPAC 30334Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN BUSE
T-DAY PLANNING
56. CG FMFPAC 300335Z Nov 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN BUSE
III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE
57. CG FLC 040026Z Dec 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from BGEN FEELEY
REALIGNMENT OF III MAF STRUCTURE
- 57a. ADMINO FMFPAC 020012Z Dec 68 (S) Gp-4
Wirenote for COL DALBY, Dep G-3, III MAF from COL MCGOUGH, Dep G-3, FMFPAC
III MAF PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE
58. CMC 061228Z Dec 68 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from GEN CHAPMAN
T-DAY PLANNING
59. CG FMFPAC 072215Z Dec 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN info LTGEN CUSHMAN from LTGEN BUSE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION
60. CG III MAF 080122Z Dec 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN and LtGEN BUSE from LTGEN CUSHMAN
QUOTE of BACK-CHANNEL from GEN GOODPASTER: COORDINATION OF SLF OPNS WITH
IN-COUNTRY FORCES
61. CG III MAF 080124Z Dec 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN & LGEN BUSE from LGEN CUSHMAN
QUOTE OF MESSAGES REFERENCED IN GEN GOODPASTER'S PERSONAL (Item 60, above)

62. CG FMFPAC 110131Z Dec 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN BUSE
T-DAY PLANNING
63. CG III MAF 110932Z Dec 68 (C) Gp-4
For LGEN BUSE from LGEN CUSHMAN
JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD
64. CG FMFPAC 112209Z Dec 68 (C) Gp-1
For LTGEN CUSHMAN from LTGEN BUSE
JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD
65. CG FMFPAC 130025Z Dec 68 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN info LTGEN CUSHMAN, BGEN WEBSTER & BGEN WILLIAMS FROM LTGEN BUSE
REALIGNMENT OF III MAF STRUCTURE
66. CG III MAF 191336Z Dec 68 (C) Gp-4
For LGEN BUSE info GEN CHAPMAN from LGEN CUSHMAN
2d ASSISTANT WING COMMANDER
67. CG FMFPAC 212031Z Dec 68 (C) Gp-4
For LTGEN CUSHMAN from LTGEN BUSE
2d ASSISTANT WING COMMANDER
68. CG III MAF 260148Z Dec 68 (S) Gp-4
For LGEN BUSE info MGEN QUILTER from LGEN CUSHMAN
OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION RESOURCES IN ICTZ
69. CG FMFPAC 312131Z Dec 68 (S) Gp-4
For LGEN CUSHMAN info MGEN QUILTER from LGEN BUSE
OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION RESOURCES IN ICTZ
70. CG FMFPAC 082333Z Jan 69 (S) Gp-4
For MGEN OWENS, AC/S G-3 HQMC from BGEN WILSON, C/S FMFPAC
MARCORPS T-DAY PLAN (TENTATIVE)
71. CG III MAF 100732Z Jan 69 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE info MGEN QUILTER from LGEN CUSHMAN
REVIEW OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4
72. CMC 142104Z Jan 69 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from LTGEN THARIN
DEPSECDEF PROPOSAL FOR OSD STUDY GROUP RE JAPAN-OKI BASE REDUCTIONS
73. CMC 150050Z Jan 69 (S) Gp-4
For LGEN BUSE from GEN CHAPMAN info MGEN YOUNDALE
REALIGNMENT OF SEA FORCE STRUCTURE

74. CMC 171614Z Jan 69 (S) Gp-3
For LTGEN BUSE from GEN CHAPMAN info BGEN WILLIAMS
418L RYUKYUS AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
75. CG FMFPAC 182026Z Jan 69 (S) Gp-4
For MAJGEN YOUNGDALE info GEN CHAPMAN from LGEN BUSE
REALIGNMENT OF SEASIA FORCE STRUCTURE
76. AC/S G-4 HQMC (GEN AXTELL) 240016Z Jan 69 (U)
for C/S FMFPAC (BGEN WILSON)
INTERCHANGEABILITY TRANSFERS OF ARMY & MARINE CORPS CLASS V(.) ASSETS
77. CG FMFPAC 252119Z Jan 69 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN BUSE
TEXT OF CINCUSARPAC 240642Z Jan 69: FORCE WITHDRAWALS
78. CG FMFPAC 312014Z Jan 69 (S) Gp-4
For BGEN AXTELL from BGEN WILSON
SUMMARY OF LOGISTIC POSTURE RESULTING FROM GEN BUSE'S MOST RECENT WESTPAC TRIP

Historical

Oct 68

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G-5	<i>[initials]</i>
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VV PAC 46800 RUHHFMA RHMAFA

DE RUEBHOA3723 2752253

ZNY SSSSS

CG FMFPAC -T- CG III MAF

O 020120Z OCT 68

FM CMC

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RHMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN
FROM GENERAL CHAPMAN

MARINE CORPS STRENGTH AND STRUCTURE

THE FOLLOWING IMPACT ASSESSMENT, RE: MARINE CORPS SEA FORCES
WAS SUBMITTED TO DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AS PART OF THE
MEMO TO HIM, SUBJ: MARINE CORPS STRENGTH AND STRUCTURE, COPY
AIRMAILED YOUR HEADQUARTERS 30 SEP 1968. QUOTE

"1. GENERAL

A. THE FORCE REDUCTIONS BEING CONSIDERED IN VIETNAM
ARE IDENTIFIED IN THE ATTACHED TAB. THESE REDUCTIONS WILL
EQUATE TO A LOSS OF TACTICAL OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO III MAF
AND COMUSMACV AND THE DILUTION OF III MAF'S CAPABILITY TO
ACCOMPLISH ITS ASSIGNED MISSIONS.

B. IN REVIEWING THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS AND THE
FORCE ALIGNMENTS WHICH IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR III MAF

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA3723 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
TO ACCOMPLISH IN ORDER TO REMAIN WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS
OF PROGRAM 6 THREE FACTORS ARE SIGNIFICANT:

(1) PROGRAM 6 DOES NOT, IN ALL CASES, AUTHORIZE
SPACES THAT WILL ACCOMMODATE APPROVED MARINE T/O
STRENGTHS FOR UNITS AUTHORIZED IN THE OSD APPROVED
TROOP LIST.

(2) PROGRAM 6 DOES NOT AUTHORIZE SPACES TO
ACCOMMODATE MARINE CORPS APPROVED AUGMENTATIONS TO ITS
STANDARD T/OS WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO SATISFY SUPPORT
FUNCTIONS PECULIAR TO SUSTAINED LAND COMBAT.

(3) MARINE CORPS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL
PROGRAM 6 SPACES TO SATISFY VALID REQUIREMENTS THOUGH
BOTH UNIFIED AND SERVICE CHANNELS HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL.

(A) IN SEPTEMBER 1967 THE JCS IDENTIFIED TO
OSD A REQUIREMENT FOR OVER 6000 DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM SPACES
FOR MARINE CORPS FORCES IN SVN.

(B) DURING THIS SAME PERIOD OF TIME, WHICH
WITNESSED A GROWTH IN THE PROGRAM CEILING FOR SVN OF
57,308, THE MARINE CORPS CEILING HAS INCREASED ONLY
1,462. THIS MINOR INCREASE HAS BEEN LIMITED ALMOST

CMC

O 020120Z/OCT68

ACTN:S/SEC

1-8

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA3723 S E C R E T SPEAT EXCLUSIVE
ENTIRELY TO ADDITIONAL UNITS OR CAPABILITIES.

2. SPECIFIC.

A. WITHDRAWAL OF TWO AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR COMPAINES
(REIN):

- (1) A REDUCTION IN ESSENTIAL ARMOR PROTECTION CURRENTLY EMPLOYED IN THE AREA OF THE DMZ.
- (2) A REDUCTION IN CAPABILITY TO MOVE PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT OVERLAND DURING THE MONSOON SEASON. BECASUE OF TERRAIN AND CLIMATIC CONDITIONS THIS REDUCTION CANNOT BE OFFSET BY THE REMAINING MEANS OF MOBILITY, I.E., HELICOPTERS AND TRUCKS.
- (3) FURTHER REDUCTION OF THE IN-COUNTRY AMTRAC CAPABILITY WILL OCCUR IN THE EVENT OF REQUIREMENTS TO WITHDRAW LVTS FOR SUPPORT OF SF OPERATIONS.
- (4) REDUCES BY 40PERCENT THE AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR CAPABILITY IN WESTPAC THUS LEAVING AVAILABLE SUFFICIENT LIFT FOR THE ASSUALT ELEMENTS OF ONLY ONE OF THE TWO DIVISIONS. IT IS APPARENT THAT THE NVA WOULD BECOME QUICKLY COGNIZANT OF THE FACT THAT A CONSIDERABLE DRAW-DOWN IN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CAPABILITY HAD TRANSPIRED AND

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA3723 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
THEY COULD IN TRUN DEVOTE INCREASED EFFORTS TO AIR DEFENSE (INCLUDING ANTI-HELICOPTER) WITH A COMMENSURATE DECREASE IN THEIR COASTAL DEFENSE EFFORT. EQUALLY IMPROTANT, FUTURE ATTEMPTS TO UTILIZE AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATIONS, FEINTS, ETC., MAY BE FORECAST TO MEET WITH LIMITED SUCCESS.

B. REDEPLOYMENT OF MATCU:

- (1) ELIMINATES 25PERCENT OF THE CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE IFR TRAFFIC CONTROL WHEN MOST URGENTLY NEEDED DURING THE WET MONSOON. THE BASELINE FORCE STRUCTURE AUTHORIZES SIX MATCU'S TO SUPPORT THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT GROUPS PRESENTLY IN SVN. THE PRESENT FOUR MATCU'S ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THIS CAPBILITY ON A CONTINUING BASIS AT FOUR PRIMARY AIRFIELDS (CHU LAI, MARBLE MOUNTAIN, PHU BAI, AND QUANG TRI) AND SUPPORT TWO LANDING ZONES (DONG HA AND VANDERGRIFT) BY TEMPORARY DRAWDOWN FROM TWO PRIMARY AIRFIELDS.
- (2) DENIES AN IFR CAPABILITY AT ONE OF THE PRIMARY AIRFIELDS AND REDUCES THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE LAND-ING ZONES.

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA3723 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
(3) A REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH HIGHER WEATHER MINIMUMS FOR LAUNCH AND RECOVERY THEREBY REDUCING THE ALREADY LIMITED/RESTRICTED HELICOPTER SUPPORT DURING PERIODS OF BAD WEATHER.
(4) A DECREASE IN OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND HELICOPTER RESPONSIVENESS AT A TIME WHEN INCREASED DEMANDS FOR LOGISTIC LIFT WILL OCCUR DUE TO THE CONCURRENT REDUCTION IN AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR ASSETS.
(5) A DEGRADATION IN CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ARMY UNITS IN I CTZ.
C. REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE MARINE ATTACK SQUADRON:
(1) A REDUCTION IN III MAF'S CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SORTIE RATE AND ORDNANCE TONNAGE CAPABILITIES.
(2) A REDUCED CAPABILITY OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT, E.G., SHRIKE, BULLPUP, WALLEYE, GCBS, AND CW.
(3) REDUCTIONS IN THE CAS AND ALL WEATHER BOMBING CAPABILITY WHICH WILL ENGANCE THE ENEMY'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ABILITY TO ACHIEVE TACTICAL SURPRISE AND SUCCESS.

PAGE SIX RUEBHOA3723 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
(4) A DEGRADATION IN CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ARMY UNITS IN I CYZ.
D. REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE AIR SUPPORT RADAR TEAM:
(1) A REDUCTION OF ALL WEATHER BOMBING CAPABILITY DURING INCLEMENT WEATHER, DARKNESS, AND PERIODS OF REDUCED VISIBILITY WHEN OTHER MEANS OF FIRE SUPPORT ARE RESTRICTED BECAUSE OF REDUCED MOBILITY AND VISUAL OBSERVATION.
E. REDEPLOYMENT OF TWO ANTI-TANK AND TWO TANK COMPANIES.
(1) THE LOSS OF TOTAL AT BATTALION ASSETS.
(2) A REDUCTION IN DIRECT ASSAULT FIRES AVAILABLE TO REINFORCE INFANTRY UNITS. THESE ARE PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE IN THE EVENT OF COMBAT IN BUILT-UP AREAS.
(3) A REDUCTION IN ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY IN THE AREA OF HIGHEST ENEMY ARMOR THREAT. IN THE VINCITY OF THE DMZ, THE ENEMY INJOYS THE ADVANTAGE OF A RELATIVE SANCTUARY TO MASS HIS FORCES, INCLUDING ARMOR. HE COULD IF HE CHOSE TO, EMPLOY ARMOR IN AT LEAST BATTALION STRENGTH. REDUCTION OF III MAF'S ARMOR CAPABILITY IN
BT

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HEADQUARTERS
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

SECRET

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN
FROM GENERAL CHAPMAN SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS
THE FACE OF THIS THREAT ACCEPTS AN APPRECIABLE RISK.
F. REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE ARMORED AMPHIBIAN COMPANY
(LESS ONE PLATOON):

- (1) THE LOSS OF TWO THIRDS OF THE CURRENT
ARMORED AMPHIBIAN CAPABILITY WITHIN III MAF.
- (2) A REDUCTION IN ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT
AVAILABLE TO III MAF. MAY REQUIRE REPLACEMENT BY
CONVENTIONAL 105MM HOWITZER UNITS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE
III MAF WITH ADEQUATE FIRE SUPPORT. THE IMPACT OF
THE REDUCTION IN ARMORED AMPHIBIAN ASSETS IS COMPOUNDED
DUE TO THEIR EFFECTIVE MOBILITY DURING THE MONSOON
SEASON.
- (3) A REDUCTION OF III MAF'S CAPABILITY TO

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA3725 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE
FOR THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY
THE ARMORED AMPHIBIAN TO REDUCE ENEMY FIRES AND
FORTIFICATIONS IN THE BEACH ASSAULT.

G. REDEPLOYMENT OF THE WING EQUIPMENT REPAIR
SQUADRON, MINE WING SUPPORT GROUP:

- (1) THE ELIMINATION OF 1ST MAW CAPABILITY TO
PERFORM FOURTH ECHELON MAINTENANCE OF MOTOR TRANSPORT,
ENGINEER AND OTHER EQUIPMENT.

H. REDUCTION IN THE MANNING OF TWO DIVISION
RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION:

- (1) THE ELIMINATION OF ESSENTIAL AUGMENTATION
PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY TO BOTH RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS
THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL FROM THE AT COMPANIES
CADRED IN 1967. THE AUGMENTATION WAS DIRECTED BY A
FACT-OF-LIFE COMBAT REQUIREMENT WHICH HAS NOT DECREASED,
AND , IN FACT HAS INCREASED.
- (2) A REQUIREMENT TO DIVERT THE RESOURCES OF
INFANTRY UNITS TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECONNAISSANCE FUNCTION.
- (3) A DIMINUTION OF THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA3725 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
THE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT.

(4) AN INCREASED OPPORTUNITY FOR THE ENEMY TO
MOVE WITH FREEDOM AND TO GAIN TACTICAL SURPRISE AND
SUCCESS.

I. REDUCTION IN DIVISION BASE SUPPORT PERSONNEL:

(1) THE REDUCTION WITH IN EACH MARINE DIVISION
OF OVER 50PERCENT OF THE ESSENTAIL AUGMENTATION REQUIRED TO
PERFORM NECESSARY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS PECULIAR TO SUSTAINED
COMBAT IN SVN. THESE INCLUDE: POSTAL, BASE SECURITY,
FIREFIGHTING, SALVAGE, POST EXCHANGE, AND RECREATIONAL
SERVICES WHICH THE MARINE DIVISION IS NOT ORGANIZED OF
STAFFED TO PROVIDE TO THE DEGREE REQUIRED IN SVN.
THESE FUNCTIONS ARE PROVIDED BY BASE SUPPORT ORGANIZA-
TIONS IN PEACETIME AND HAVE NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED
IN THE SAME DEGRE BY MARINE UNITS COMMITTED TO COMBAT.

(2) PERSONNEL TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS WILL
BE WITHDRAWN FROM COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS WHICH
ARE ALREADY OVEREXTENDED. THIS WILL RESULT IN REDUCED
COMBAY EFFECTIVENESS WITHIN THE UNITS PROVIDING THE
PERSONNEL.

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA3725 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

J. REDUCTION IN HELICOPTER DOOR GUNNERS:

(1) A REQUIREMENT TO "TWO - HAT" HARD SKILL
AVIATION PERSONNEL, E.G., ORDNANACE TECHNICIANS AND
MECHANICS, TO PERFORM THE DOOR GUNNER FUNCTION.

(2) A REDUCED MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY AS A NATURAL
OUTGROWTH OF THE DIMINISHED EFFECTIVENESS OF PERSONNEL
WHICH WILL ACCRUE AS A RESULT OF THE EXCESSIVE HOURS
THESE PERSONNEL MUST DEVOTE TO EACH FUNCTION. THE
AVERAGE NORM (NOT OPERATIONALLY READY DUE TO MAINTEN-
NANCE) REATE FOR 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING HELICOPTERS
FOR THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD MARCH-AUGUST 1968 WAS 26.3PERCENT.
THE REQUIREMENT TO UTILIZE AVIATION TECHNICIANS AS
HELICOPTER DOOR GUNNERS, THEREBY MAKING THEM UNAVAILALBE
FOR MAINTENANCE FUNCTION, WILL INCREASE THE NORM RATE
PROPORTIONATELY WITH A RESULTANT REDUCTION IN TOTAL LIFT
CAPABILITY.

K. DEDUCTION IN STCENBGTH OF AIRFIELD SECURITY
FORCES:

(1) A REQUIREMENT TO ASSIGN HARD SKILL,
CRITICAL AVIATION TECHNICIANS TO THE SECURITY FORCE

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA3725 S E C R E T SEPCAT EXCLUSIVE
AS AN ADDITIONAL DUTY. THIS PLACES AN ADDED REQUIRE-
MENT ON INDIVIDUALS WHO ALREADY WORK EXCEPTIONALLY
LONG HOURS ON A CONTINUING BASIS AND RESULTS IN
REDUCED ALERTNESS AND EFFICIENCY.

(2) A REDUCED MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
NONAVAILABILITY OF TECHNICIANS WHEN ACTUALLY PERFORM-
ING A SECURITY TASK AND REDUCED EFFECTIVENESS WHEN
AVAILABLE. A PROPORTIONATE INCREASE IN THE NORM RATE
WITH RESULTANT REDUCTION IN TOTAL AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY,
BASED ON THE SAME RATIONALE PRESENTED IN PARAGRAPH J
ABOVE, WILL ENSUE.

(3) A DRAWDOWN ON PERSONNEL ASSETS OF INFANTRY
UNITS TO ASSIST IN THE SECURITY TASKS, WITH A RESULTANT
REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITY OF III MAF.

1. REDUCTION IN STRENGTHS OF LOGISTIC ELEMENTS:

(1) THE DILUTION OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT THROUGH-
OUT III MAF. THE CURRENT RATION OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
TO COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS IN III MAF IS APPROXI-
MATELY 1:6.5. THIS IS THE MOST AUSTERE OF ANY OF THE
SERVICES IN SVN. THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS WILL SIGNIFI-

PAGE SIX RUEBHOA3725 S E C R E T SEPCAT EXCLUSIVE
CANTLY COMPOUND THIS REALITONSHIP. THE NET RESULT WILL
BE DECREASED LOGISTIC RESPONSIVENESS AND FLEXIBILITY IN
RELATION TO THE REQUIREMENT TO SUPPORT WIDELY DISPERSED
MAJOR LOGISTIC BASES AT DANANG, PHU BAI, DONG HA-
QUANG TRI AND TO PROVIDE TASK ORGANIZED LOGISTIC SUPPORT
ELEMENTS TO SIMULTANEOUSLY SUSTAIN NUMEROUS GEOGRAPHI-
CALLY SEPARATED BATTALION AND REGIMENTAL SIZED COMBAT
OPERATIONS. THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS WILL
BE COMPOUNDED BY THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE FLC TO ABSORB
CERTAIN OF THE FUNCTIONS PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED BY THE
MWSG (WERS). IT WILL ALSO RESULT IN THE NEED FOR ADDI-
TIONAL TRANSPORTATION FOR THE MOVEMENT OF EQUIPMENT TO
AND FROM OKINAWA FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF 3D AND 4TH
ECHELON MAINTENANCE. A CONCURRENT REDUCTION OF 3D FSR
IN OKINAWA WILL FURTHER AGGRAVATE THE PROBLEM AT DEPOT
LEVEL.

(2) THE REDUCTION IN LAUNDRY SERVICES, FIRE
PROTECTION, AERIAL DELIVERY, MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT
AND SUPPLIDS, MECHANICAL PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING, ETC.

3. MANPOWER CONSIDERATIONS.

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
GEN CHAPMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON MARINE
CORPS STRENGTH AND STRUCTURE AIRMAILED YOUR HEADQUARTERS
30SEP68. FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM THAT MEMO.

1.(S) YOUR MEMORANDUM OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1968 REQUESTED A DETAILED MARINE CORPS TROOP LIST AND PLAN FOR ATTAINING 89,500 TO / TD STRUCTURE SPACES FOR SEA FORCES. YOU ALSO REQUESTED A LISTING OF FORCES TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM SEA AND RECOMMENDED FOR RETENTION IN THE NON-SEA STRUCTURE OF THE MARINE CORPS, TOGETHER WITH SUPPORTING RATIONALE.

2.(S) A SUMMARIZED TROOP LIST OF MARINE CORPS SEA FORCES WAS PREPARED IN LAND FORCES MANPOWER SUMMARY FORMAT. THIS TROOP LIST AGGREGATES 89,503 STRUCTURE SPACES, INCLUDING A MINIMAL TEMPORARY DUTY ACCOUNT FOR SVN. FOR YOUR INFORMATION

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA3724 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE M C E O
THE SUMMARIZED TROOP LIST COMPARES THE STRUCTURE SPACES WITHIN THIS TOTAL TO THE SEA DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES PROGRAM CEILINGS FOR EACH COUNTRY.

3.(S) CONSISTENT WITH YOUR REQUEST, MARINE CORPS UNITS NECESSARILY WITHDRAWN FROM SEA IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE STIPULATED FORCE LEVEL OF 89,500 STRUCTURE SPACES AND WHICH ARE RECOMMENDED FOR RETENTION IN NON-SEA FORCES WERE IDENTIFIED. THESE UNITS AGGREGATE 3,604 NON-SEA STRUCTURE SPACES REQUIRING A COMMENSURATE INCREASE IN FY69 END STRENGTH. SUPPORTING RATIONALE AND A BRIEF EXPLANATION REGARDING THE ADDITION OF EACH UNIT TO THE NON-SEA FORCES IS INCLUDED. THE DETAILED MARINE CORPS TROOP LIST REFLECTS THE DELETION FROM SEA OF A REQUIREMENT FOR SOME 5,800 SEA STRUCTURE SPACES WHICH THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO THE EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION OF THE MARINE CORPS MISSION IN SEA. THE DELETION OF THESE SPACE WILL RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL CAPABILITY OF MARINE CORPS FORCES COMMITTED TO COMBAT IN SOUTH VIETNAM, NOTABLY IN THE AREAS OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND ALL-WEATHER BOMBING, TANK AND ANTI-TANK OPERATIONS, LOGISTIC SUPPORT

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ACTN. S/SEC 1-3

SECRET ⁽²⁾ MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA3724 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE M C E O
AND MOBILITY, MAINTENANCE AND SERVICE, AND A VARIETY OF AUGMENTATION
REQUIREMENTS. TO SOME EXTENT, THE SUPPORT OF ARMY FORCES IN I
CORPS TACTICAL ZONE WILL ALSO BE REDUCED.

FULL RECOGNITION OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THESE REDUCTIONS,
DICTATES THAT ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION BE CONSIDERED IN
ORDER TO RETAIN THE BALANCED FORCE CAPABILITY OF MARINE
CORPS SEA FORCES. THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES ARE PRESENTED:
ALTERNATIVE NR 1

1. AUTHORIZE 95,300 MARINE CORPS SEA STRUCTURE SPACES FOR
FY69 AND FY70.
 2. CONCURRENTLY INCREASE THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES PROGRAM
CEILINGS BY 5,500 IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 200 IN OKINAWA AND 100 IN JAPAN,
ACCOMMODATING THE PRESENT DISPOSITION OF MARINE CORPS SEA FORCE
STRUCTURE.
 3. APPROVE A FORCE STRUCTURE MANPOWER ALLOWANCE INCREASE OF
4,100 FOR FY69.
 4. APPROVE A FORCE STRUCTURE MANPOWER ALLOWANCE INCREASE OF
5,800 FOR FY70.
- APPROVAL OF THIS ALTERNATIVE WILL PERMIT RETENTION IN SEA OF A
BALANCED MARINE COMBAT FORCE. MOREOVER, THESE FORCES WILL BE

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA3724 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE M C E O
IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE IN THE COMBAT THEATER CAPABLE OF INSTANT
RESPONSE TO THE FULL SPECTRUM OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

HOWEVER, IF IT IS DECIDED THAT MARINE CORPS FORCES MUST BE
WITHDRAWN FROM SVN, IT APPEARS PRUDENT TO FULLY EXPLICIT THE
THREAT POSED TO THE ENEMY BY MAINTAINING THE AMPHIBIOUS
CAPABILITY OF MARINE CORPS FORCES IN A FORWARD POSTURE.
THIS POSTURE CAN BE READILY OBTAINED BY THE RELOCATION OF TWO
BATTALION LANDING TEAMS AND ONE AVIATION ATTACK SQUADRON TO
OKINAWA AND JAPAN, RESPECTIVELY. ALTHOUGH ACCOUNTABLE TO
THE OKINAWA AND JAPAN CEILINGS, THESE UNITS WOULD BE AVAILABLE
FOR EMPLOYMENT IN SVN IN A SPECIAL LANDING FORCE CAPACITY.
IN ADDITION OF THIS CAPABILITY TO QUICKLY REINFORCE SVN FORCES,
SUCH ACTION HAS THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF PROVIDING FOR RECON-
STITUTION OF THE PACOM RESERVE IN OKINAWA AND JAPAN. THE
ALTERNATIVE BELOW WILL PROVIDE THIS POSTURE.

ALTERNATIVE NR 2

1. AUTHORIZE 95,300 MARINE CORPS SEA STRUCTURE SPACES
FOR FY69 AND FY70.
2. CONCURRENTLY INCREASE THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES PRO-
GRAM CEILINGS BY 2,100 IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 3,400 IN OKINAWA AND

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA3724 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE M C E O
300 IN JAPAN TO ACCOMMODATE TWO BATTALION LANDING TEAMS IN
OKINAWA AND ONE MARINE ATTACK SQUADRON IN JAPAN WHILE MAIN-
TAINING THE PRESENT DISPOSITION OF REMAINING MARINE CORPS
SEA FORCE STRUCTURE.

3. APPROVE A FORCE STRUCTURE MANPOWER ALLOWANCE OF 4,100
FOR FY69.

4. APPROVE A FORCE STRUCTURE MANPOWER ALLOWANCE OF 5,800
FOR FY70.

WARM REGARDS

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DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

SECRET SPFCAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN

BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS.

POST HOSTILITIES POSTURE (U)

1 (S) AS SEEN HERE IN HAWAII FROM MY DOUBLEDHATTED
POSITION AS CG FMFPAC AND CG MARCORPS BASES PAC, THE
EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS HAVE WITNESSED SIGNIFICANT
INCREASES IN SERVICE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE USE OF GUAM
AND THE TTPI SUBSEQUENT TO A CESSATION OR REDUCTION OF
HOSTILITIES IN SEASIA. IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE FORESEE-
ABLE BASING PROBLEMS, THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS SUBMITTED
PLANS AND SUPPORTING RATIONALE TO CINCPACFLT WITH
APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATION OF T-DAY PLANNING, PLANNED
POST RVN CHILLINGS, THE U.S. TRUSTEESHIP, GOLD FLOW,
AND THE STRATEGIC FORWARD POSITIONING OF USMC FORCES
WITHIN THE PACOM. THESE PLANS HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY
CINCPACFLT AND FORWARDED TO CINCPAC, WHO BY PAS

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SUBJECT HEADQUARTERS TO
FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC

SECRET

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET ~~SECRET~~/MCEO

EXPERIENCE, HAS REACTED FAVORABLY TO OUR POST HOSTILITIES POSITIONS AND HAS INCORPORATED THEM INTO HIS PLANS AND SUBMISSIONS TO THE JCS.

2.(S) ALTHOUGH THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE FMFPAC POSITION REGARDING POST HOSTILITIES WAS PRESENTED AT THE GENERAL OFFICERS SYMPOSIUM (AND FURTHER LIAISON HAS BEEN MAINTAINED BY OUR STAFFS REGARDING THIS EVER EXPANDING PROBLEM), I BELIEVE WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT WHERE THE MARINE CORPS POSITION SHOULD BE CRYSTALIZED INTO FIRM DECISIONS AND PROGRAMS SO THAT EVERYONE KNOWS WHERE WE ARE GOING AND WHAT OUR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS WILL ENCOMPASS.

3.(S) ~~FMFPAC~~ CINCPAC PROPOSED POST VIETNAM POSTURE FOR FMFPAC PROVIDES FOR 2 MEF'S: 1 MEF IN WESTPAC, AND 1 MEF (-) IN EASTPAC WITH A MEB IN HAWAII. PRESENTLY, BASING IS AVAILABLE FOR THE WESTPAC MEF (-) ON OKINAWA AND JAPAN (CAMP BUTLER, FUTEMA AND IWAKUNI), BUT UNDER CROWDED CONDITIONS; A SHORTFALL WILL STILL EXIST FOR AT LEAST TWO MAGS, THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF AN RLT, AND ONE ARTILLERY REGIMENT.

4.(S) THE DOUBTFUL APPROVAL FOR CONSTRUCTION OF AN AIRFIELD AT KUSHI-WAN ON OKINAWA, PLUS THE DECREASING AVAILABILITY OF LAND ON OKINAWA AND FUJI IN JAPAN, ~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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SUBSEQUENT MARINE FORCES TO

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SECRET SPECAT/MCEO

DEMAND THAT BASING BE LOCATED ELSEWHERE. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTS OF LIFE DICTATE THAT SUCH A LOCATION BE IN ~~SAIPAN~~ THE MARIANAS; ~~HOWEVER, OTHER~~ ^{OTHER} SERVICE AND CIVIL PLANNING FOR GUAM MILITATE AGAINST ITS USE FOR BASING MARINES. CONVERSELY, TINIAN WITH ITS RESIDUAL WWII AIRFIELDS AND PORT FACILITIES IS IDEAL FOR INITIALLY LOCATING A MEB AND EVENTUALLY FOR A FULL MEF WHEN THE RETENTION OF OTHER OVERSEAS BASES BECOME UNTENABLE. ADDITIONALLY, ROTA AND SAIPAN PRESENT AVAILABLE TRAINING AREAS AND STORAGE SITES.

5.(S) WHILE I WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT EVERY OPPORTUNITY AT THIS LEVEL, I AM CONCERNED THAT THE AIR FORCE AND ARMY MAY NOW TAKE PREEMPTIVE ACTION AT HIGHER LEVELS TO DENY THE LOCATION OF USMC FORCES IN THE TTPI. TO COUNTER THESE, THE FOLLOWING ARE REQUIRED:

A. MARINE CORPS BASING RIGHTS MUST BE OBTAINED AT THE EARLIEST FROM THE APPROPRIATE FEDERAL AGENCY. THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED BY TRANSFER OF MILITARY RETENTION LANDS AND ACQUISITION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN.

B. A CLEAR IDENTIFICATION MUST BE MADE FOR MARINE CORPS MID RANGE UTILIZATION OF ALL OF TINIAN AND ROTA, LESS SMALL CIVIL SEGMENTS, AND A BLT SIZE TRAINING AREA ON SAIPAN.

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SECRET SPECIAL/MCEO

C. NECESSARY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND FUNDING
EFFORTS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A MARINE CORPS BASE TO
ACCOMMODATE AN AIRFIELD AND CAMP FOR A MEB ON TINIAN.

6.(S) ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND THAT TWO INITIAL STEPS
BE UNDERTAKEN BY HQMC ^{now} ~~AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.~~

A. IN CONCERT WITH CNO, REQUEST THAT SEC NAV
INITIATE ACTION TO EFFECT THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY
RETENTION LANDS BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF AIR FORCE
AND NAVY AND THE ACQUISITION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN THROUGH
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR IN THE TTPI.

B. THAT PLANS, TO INCLUDE FUNDING, FOR THE LOCA-
TION OF A MEB ON TINIAN BE INSTITUTED.

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SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 5 SECTIONS
SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS (U)

- A. CMC 281233Z SEP 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE MCEO)
B. COMUSMACV 071218Z AUG 68 (S)
C. COMUSMACV 130350Z SEP 68 (S)
D. CG III MAF 291442Z JULY 68 (S)
E. CG III MAR 291416Z AUG 68 (S) - NH
F. CG III MAF 240812Z SEP 68 (S) - NH

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED FMFPAC COMMENTS ON REF B AND C AND OTHER SPECIFIC INFORMATION CONCERNING SINGLE MANAGEMENT. REF B AND C ARE COMUSMACV EVALUATION REPORTS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR THE MONTHS OF JULY AND AUGUST RESPECTIVELY. REF D AND E ARE III MAF EVALUATION REPORTS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR THE MONTHS OF JULY AND AUGUST RESPECTIVELY. REF F PROVIDED COMUSMACV WITH III MAF OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING COORDINATION OF AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0802 SECRET SPECAT (MCEO)

2. (U) PURSUANT TO REF A, REF D AND E HAVE BEEN READDRESSSED TO CMC. REF F HAS ALSO BEEN READDRESSSED.

3. (S) COMMENTS ON APPLICABLE PORTIONS OF REF B ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARAGRAPH 4.D.:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: IT APPEARS THAT WITH MINIMAL EFFORT THE MARINE SPHINX REPORT COULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE DATA REQUIRED BY THE SINGLE MANAGER. THIS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MIGHT BE SUPERFLUOUS TO OTHER RECIPIENTS OF THE SPHINX REPORT, BUT IT IS FELT THAT THIS SINGLE REPORT COULD BE MADE INCLUSIVE ENOUGH TO SATISFY ALL REQUIREMENTS WITHOUT ANY DEGRADATION OF THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE REPORT.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: DO NOT CONCUR, THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT (CMR) REQUIRED BY THE SINGLE MANAGER IS A COMPLETE DUPLICATION OF THE COMBAT ACTIVITIES REPORT (COACT) WITH A SINGLE MINOR OMISSION WHICH COULD EASILY BE ADDED: AN INDICATION AS TO WHETHER A SORTIE WAS PREPLANNED OF IMMEDIATE. THE SINGLE MANAGER IS CURRENTLY ON DISTRIBUTION FOR COACT AND THERE IS NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF THE CMR. THE SPHINX REPORT IS AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY WHICH PROVIDES BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA) FOR EACH MISSION FLOWN. REPLACING THE CMR WITH THE SPHINX REPORT

CG III MAF

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 WOULD RESULT IN THE PRESENT CMR BEING INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE
 SPHINX REPORT WITH NO REDUCTION IN WORKLOAD.

B. PARAGRAPH 5.D.:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THIS IS AN AREA THAT WAS RECOGNIZED IN THE
 LAST EVALUATION AS A COMPLEX PROBLEM THAT REQUIRES EXTENSIVE INVESTI-
 GATION AND THE MOST THOROUGH STAFFING. WHEN THE TERM SUPPORTING
 FIRES IS TAKEN TO INCLUDE MORTAR FIRE AND NAVAL GUNFIRE AS WELL AS
 ARTILLERY FIRE, THE MYRIAD COMPLICATIONS BEGIN TO BECOME APPARENT.
 AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR WHICH INCREASES THE DIFFICULTIES OF COORDINATION,
 IS THE DIVERSITY OF THE FORCES INVOLVED, I.E., MARINE CORPS, ARMY,
 NAVY, RVNAF, ROK FORCES, ETC. TO FULLY COORDINATE AND ASSURE SAFE
 PASSAGE FOR ALL AIRCRAFT FROM ONE DIVISION'S AO THROUGH ANOTHER
 DIVISION'S AO WITHIN ANY GIVEN CTZ REQUIRES THAT ALL TYPES OF
 SUPPORTING FIRES BE KNOWN TO A COMMON CONTROL CENTER AT ALL TIMES.
 THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE DURING PERIODS WHEN LOW CEILINGS DICTATE
 AIRCRAFT STRIKE OPERATIONS BE CONDUCTED BENEATH CLOUD COVER AT LOW
 ALTITUDES. THIS IS AN AREA OF VITAL CONCERN TO MACV WHICH WAS NOT
 SUFFICIENTLY RESOLVED DURING THIS EVALUATION PERIOD. EFFORTS TO
 RESOLVE THE PROBLEM WILL BE ACTIVELY PURSUED. IT IS REITERATED
 THAT THIS PROBLEM IS NOT PECULIAR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT IN ICTZ,

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 BUT RATHER IS A COORDINATION PROBLEM UNDER ANY SYSTEM.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: DO NOT CONCUR. COORDINATION OF
 AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES IS NOT A PROBLEM UNDER THE MARINE AIR
 CONTROL SYSTEM. THE AMERICAL DIVISION HAS ESTABLISHED A SIMILAR AND
 COMPATIBLE SYSTEM. U.S. NAVY, ROKMC, AND ARVN FORCES HAVE DEMONSTRAT-
 ED THE ABILITY TO FUNCTION WITHIN THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. ONLY
 THE RECENTLY JOINED FIRST CAVALRY DIV (AM) AND 101ST AIRBORNE DIV (AM)
 PROFESS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AND CAPABILITY TO CONFORM TO THE PROVEN
 CONCEPTS OF MARINE AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION. SERIOUS
 CONCERN BY COMUSMACV IS NOT EVIDENT. REF F APPLIES.

C. PARAGRAPH 6.D.:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: MACV'S CONTINUED ATTENTION TO THIS PROBLEM
 IS PRODUCING RESULTS TOWARD A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER.
 THIS IS ONE OF THE AREAS IN WHICH KNOWLEDGE AND FAMILIARITY
 WITH THE SYSTEM WILL RESULT IN SMOOTHER FUNCTIONING. BETTER UNDER-
 STANDING OF THIS INHERENT FLEXIBILITY WAS MORE APPARENT DURING THIS
 EVALUATION PERIOD.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY III MAF TO
 ASSURE FULL UTILIZATION OF THE WEEKLY FRAG ARE IN STRICT ACCORDANCE
 WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. COMUSMACV CONCERN HERE IS VAGUE.

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HOWEVER, EXPERIENCE HAS INDICATED THAT LEAD TIME NECESSARY TO CHANGE MISSIONS, TOT'S AND ORDNANCE UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE IN EXCESS OF THAT REQUIRED BY THE MARINE SYSTEM.

D. PARAGRAPH 8C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THE MOVE OF THE US FVMAF PORTION OF I DASC TO III MAF HQ, WHICH SHOULD BE COMPLETED ON OR ABOUT 10 AUGUST 1968, IS EXPECTED TO ASSURE COMPLETE TACAIR RESPONSIVENESS TO III MAF TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: NO LONGER A CONCERN AS HORN DASC IS NOW IN FULL OPERATION LOCATED WITHIN THE III MAF COMPOUND WITH AN ADEQUATE AUGMENTATION OF MARINE PERSONNEL.

E. PARAGRAPH 9C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THIS PROBLEM NOW APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE DIFFERENCES WERE THE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF TERMS AND A DIFFERENCE IN REPORTING PERIODS. THE SPOTLIGHTING OF THESE PROBLEM AREAS BY COMUSMACV COUPLED WITH COORDINATION BETWEEN 7AF AND III MAF, AND INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL APPEAR TO REDUCED THE REPORTING DIFFERENCES TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: NO LONGER A CONCERN AS 7TH AF PERSONNEL

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HAVE BEEN INDOCTRINATED IN THE PROCEDURES AND FORMAT OF SINGLE MANAGER REPORTING.

F. PARAGRAPH 10C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THE INSTITUTION OF A WEEKLY AIR SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE IS APPROPRIATE, AND IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THIS HAS RESULTED IN BETTER PLANNING OF DISTRIBUTION OF TACAIR ASSETS.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: ACCORDING TO JCS PLANNING FACTORS THE U.S. AIR FORCE WAS INITIALLY PROGRAMMED TO PROVIDE AN AVERAGE OF 145 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER DAY FOR THE SUPPORT OF ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ. WITH THE RECENT ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL ARMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS THIS FIGURE HAS INCREASED TO 170 SORTIES PER DAY. USING THESE SAME PLANNING FACTORS DURING JULY, SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED 155 SORTIES A DAY FOR ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ. ACTUALLY PROVIDED ONLY AN AVERAGE OF 109 SORTIES PER DAY. HENCE, 1 CORPS BATTALIONS WERE DEPRIVED OF 46 SORTIES PER DAY. THE FAILURE OF THE AIR FORCE TO PRODUCE THIS NUMBER OF SORTIES FOR ICTZ HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY GROSS SINCE THE INCEPTION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND HAS BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE DEVERSION OF MARINE AIR FROM THE SUPPORT OF MARINE UNITS. IN JULY, MARINE AIR AVERAGED 30 SORTIES PER DAY IN SUPPORT OF U.S. ARMY UNITS. ROKMC RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 2 SORTIES PER DAY WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY ALL THAT WAS REQUESTED. IF U.S. ARMY MANEUVER

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BATTALIONS ARE TO BE SUPPORTED BY AN AVERAGE OF 5 SORTIES PER DAY,
IT IS MANDATORY THAT THE AIR FORCE CONFORM TO SORTIE PRODUCTION
QUOTAS.

G. PARAGRAPH 11C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: UPON COMUSMACV'S IDENTIFICATION OF THE
SPECIFIC PROBLEM AND NOTIFICATION TO CG, III MAF, AND CDR, 7AF,
THIS PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED. ALL MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT REPORTEDLY
NOW CHECK IN WITH EITHER A CRC OR CRP. THIS WAS PRIMARILY A PROBLEM
OF FAMILIARIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: DO NOT CONCUR. DESPITE THE FACT THE THE
FIRST MAW TAOC (VICE SQUAD) POSSESSES FAR SUPERIOR EQUIPMENT
THAN THE AIR FORCE CRC (PANAMA) AND CONSISTENTLY OUTPERFORMS THE
LATER IT HAS BEEN DENIED A MAJOR AREA AIR CONTROL ROLE. MARINE
FLIGHTS UTILIZE VICE SQUAD WHICH IN TURN RELAYS CHECK-IN INFORMATION

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TO PANAMA. THIS SYSTEM IS SATISFACTORY TO AIR FORCE INTEREST. AIE
FORCE FLIGHTS UTILIZE PANAMA.

H. PARAGRAPH 12C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THE SITUATION APPERARS TO HAVE BEEN
IMPROVED BY III MAF ADOPTION OF A PROCEDURE SIMILAR TO THAT
EMPLOYED BY COMUSMACV (TASE).

(2) III MAF COMMENT: NO LONGER A CONCERN. MAJOR GROUND
COMMANDERS MUST POSSESS THE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT THE EMPLOYMENT OF
SORTIES REPORTING TO THEIR SUPPORTING DADC'S ON TARGETS WITHIN
THEIR TAOR'S WHICH IN THEIR OPINION ARE THE MOST CRITICAL TO THE
GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

I. PARAGRAPH 13C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THIS SITUATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
PRECEDING ONE AND APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY THE PROCEDURE
CURRENTLY IN USE BY III MAF.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: NO LONGER A CONCERN. REMARKS IN
PARAGRAPH H. ABOVE APPLY.

J. PARAGRAPH 14C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: COMUSMACV CONCURS WITH CG, III MAF,
THAT THE CHANGE IN NATURE OF FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, HAS NOT
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DECREASED THE REQUIREMENT FOR TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, BUT HAS ONLY CHANGED THE SPECIFICS OF THE REQUIREMENT. WHILE THE EMPHASIS ON INCREASED AIR SUPPORT IN ICTZ IS APPRECIATED, THIS NEED MUST BE BALANCED AGAINST THE NEEDS OF ALL OTHER MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS TO MAKE AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF AIR ASSETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MACV PRIORITIES AND THREAT REQUIREMENTS. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE FACT THAT ICTZ RECEIVES A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF THE TACAIR SUPPORT AVAILABLE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: THAT THE PREPLANNED ALLOCATION OF SORTIES IN ICTZ IS INADEQUATE IS AMPLY EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT DURING THIS PERIOD U.S. ARMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS RECEIVED LESS THAN THEIR PROGRAMMED 5 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY. SORTIE ALLOCATION TO ICTZ MUST BE CAREFULLY MONITORED TO PRECLUDE FURTHER DRAW DOWN ON MARINE SORTIES AT THE EXPENSE OF MARINE MANEUVER BATTALIONS.

K. PARAGRAPH 29B:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT, CG, III MAF DETERMINES THE PROPORTION OF CSS TO FAC MISSIONS TO BE FLOWN WITHIN TACAIR ASSETS PROVIDED. DURING THIS REPORT PERIOD, III MAF RECEIVED A TOTAL DAILY AVERAGE OF 225 SORTIES OF WHICH 35 WERE REQUESTED

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AND EXECUTED AS CSS (21 FOR USMC UNITS, 12 FOR USA UNITS AND 2 FOR ROK UNITS). AN INCREASED REQUIREMENT FROM 21 TO 90 CSS FOR MARINE UNITS IS WELL WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF TPQ/MSQ-77 RADARS AND THE AIR ASSETS PROVIDED. HAD III MAF CHOSEN TO ESTABLISH THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN FULFILLED. HOWEVER, ANY INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF FAC SORTIES AVAILABLE TO III MAF.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: COMBAT SKY SPOT (CSS) MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF MARINE FORCES HAD BEEN REDUCED TO 24 PERCENT OF WHAT WAS RECEIVED PRIOR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT. CG, III MAF COULD HAVE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL CSS SORTIES FROM THE DAILY I CORPS ALLOCATION OF AIR SUPPORT BUT WOULD HAVE THEREBY DIMINISHED THE AVAILABLE NUMBER OF VISUALLY CONTROLLED DAY TIME MISSIONS.

THIS WAS NOT CONSIDERED PRUDENT DUE TO THE SHORTAGE OF PREPLANNED SORTIES ALLOCATED TO I CORPS. AVAILABLE DAY SORTIES ARE CRITICALLY NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER. AN ADDITIONAL ALLOCATION OF SORTIES IS NEEDED TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF TPQ CONTROLLED NIGHT INTERDICTION MISSIONS.

4. (S) COMMENTS ON APPLICABLE PORTIONS OF REF C ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARAGRAPH 4.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: PROCEDURES FOR FLIGHT SAFETY AND COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY FIRES ARE OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13, 24 FEBRUARY 1968, ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DIRECTIVE IS ON AN INCREMENTAL OF ADDITIVE BASIS AND IS TO BE EFFECTED IN A MANNER WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TACTICAL MISSION. EFFECTIVE 1 AUGUST 1968 THE DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTED THE PROCEDURE FOR ALL ARTILLERY FIRE WITHIN ENROUTE AREAS TO BE REPORTED TO THE NEAREST CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER (CRC) WHEN THE MAXIMUM ORDNATE FO FIRE IS 5,000 FEET OF HIGHER AGL. PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1968 THE MAXIMUM ORDNATE REPORTING ALTITUDE WAS 7,000 FEET AGL. THE DIRECTIVE REQUIRES THAT AT THE TIME A COMMUNICATION AND DISSEMINATING CAPABILITY EXISTS OR CAN BE DEVELOPED, THE REPORTING ALTITUDE SHOULD BE PROGRESSIVELY REDUCED TO ACHIEVE THE END OBJECTIVE OF 3,000 FEET AGL. THIS DIRECTIVE IS PRESENTLY UNDER REVIEW TO ENSURE THAT ADEQUATE PROCEDURES ARE ESTABLISHED FOR FLIGHT SAFETY.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: THE ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 WAS ORGANIZED AS AN ADVISORY SERVICE ONLY AND THEREFORE LACKS BOTH THE CAPABILITY AND AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE AIR/ GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES. SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT THE APPLICATION OF

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(1) MACV COMMENT: THIS IS AN ITEM OF CONTINUING INTEREST. ALTHOUGH THE BULK OF REQUESTS FOR MUNITIONS WAS MET SATISFACTORILY, IMPROVEMENT POSSIBILITIES REMAIN.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: ALTHOUGH REQUESTS FOR SPECIFIC ORDNANCE HAVE BEEN HONORED SINCE THE DESIRED ORDNANCE IS USUALLY AVAILABLE FROM ONE OF THE MANY SOURCES, THE TIME REQUIRED TO LOCATE SPECIFIC ORDNANCE REMAINS EXCESSIVE AS DOES THE TIME REQUIRED TO EFFECT CHANGES IN PREPLANNED ORDNANCE. THE REMARKS OF PARAGRAPH B ABOVE APPLY.

D. PARAGRAPH 7.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY ARE PRESCRIBED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11, JOINT AIR/GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM, WHICH IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING REVISION. THE INTERIM PROCEDURE ADOPTED ON 3 JULY, AND REPORTED LAST MONTH, CONTINUES IN EFFECT, 7AF HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO REEVALUATE THE

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FEASIBILITY OF RELOCATING CERTAIN RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTERS.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS SUFFERED SIMILAR PENALTIES IN FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS AS HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED IN TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, TO BE OF BENEFIT TO THE GROUND COMMANDERS, PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE MUST BE HIGHLY RESPONSIVE PRODUCING DESIRED RESULTS IN A MINIMUM TIME FRAME. I CORPS REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE COULD BE SATISFIED BY THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT TO III MAF. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT COMUSMACV'S PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS WILL ALTER THE CURRENT UNDESIRABLE SITUATION.

E. PARAGRAPH 8.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: THE PROPOSED REVISION OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11 JOINT AIR/GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM, INCLUDES A PROCEDURE FOR CHANGING THE PREPLANNED FRAG THROUGH THE IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST NET. THIS PROCEDURE IS CURRENTLY IN USE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: NO LONGER A CONCERN.

F. PARAGRAPH 9.:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: CG III MAF REITERATES HIS DESIRE TO

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HAVE SORTIE DIRECTION OF MARINE AIRCRAFT, LESS OUT-COUNTRY EFFORT, ASSIGNED TO HIM. HE SUPPORTS THIS RECOMMENDATION WITH A SERIES OF ADVANTAGES HE ESTIMATES WILL ACORUE AS A RESULT OF III MAF MISSION DIRECTION. ADOPTION OF HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD ELIMINATE SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND REINSTITUTE THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WHICH WAS INADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF COMUSMACV. AS LONG AS IT IS NECESSARY TO COMMIT U.S. ARMY DIVISIONS IN THE ICTZ WITH MARINE DIVISIONS, AND IT IS NECESSARY TO AUGMENT MARINE AIR ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE TOTAL FORCE, SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR IS DESIRABLE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: DO NOT CONCUR. THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR ASSETS TO III MAF COULD EASILY BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PRESENT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. CURRENTLY, MARINE SORTIES ARE TAKEN FROM III MAF ON A DAILY/WEEKLY BASIS BY COMUSMACV AND ARE CONSISTENTLY RETURNED FOR USE IN ICTZ. SINCE THE INCEPTION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE OCCASION WHEN 1ST MAW DELIVERED AIR SUPPORT TO ANOTHER CORPS AREA. THIS CONSISTED OF ONLY 4 SORTIES. WITH THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF, COMUSMACV WOULD RETAIN OVERALL CONTROL OF THE AIR EFFORT AS WELL AS PREEMPTION AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. THE NET EFFECT OF RETURN OF

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MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF WOULD BE THE SHORTENING OF THE REQUEST CHAIN THEREBY PERMITTING A MORE FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM.

G. PARAGRAPH 10: PARAGRAPH 3.K. ABOVE APPLIES.

H. PARAGRAPH 11C:

(1) MACV COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT (CMR) IS REDUNDANT. IT COULD AND SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. THE FIRST MAW IS NEITHER EQUIPPED NOR STAFFED TO CONFORM TO AIR FORCE COMBAT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND TIME FRAMES. A REASONABLE DELAY IN THE SUBMISSION OF FIRST MAW REPORTS MUST BE ACCEPTED. THE REMARKS OF PARAGRAPH 3.A. ABOVE APPLY.

I. PARAGRAPH 12C:

(1) MACV COMMENT: HORN DASC HAS SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY OVER ALERT SORTIES OF AIR UNITS LOCATED IN ICTZ, AND IS RESPONSIVE TO CG, III MAF REQUIREMENTS. THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOES NOT PRECLUDE ADOPTION OF THE AIRBORNE ALERT PROCEDURE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT:

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(A) THE FIRST MAW AIRBORNE ALERT, OR CAP, HAS BEEN AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS IN PROVIDING GROUND FORCES IN ICTZ WITH VASTLY MORE RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT. DURING AUGUST 1,063 CAP MISSIONS WERE FLOWN WITH AN AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME OF 15.4 MINUTES. THIS RESPONSE TIME IS MEASURED FROM RECEIPT OF REQUEST AT DASC TO FIRST BOMB ON TARGET.

(B) CONTRARY TO THE 7TH AF ALLEGATION WITH RESPECT TO THIS PARA. THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN INFORMAL BRIEFING ON THE RESULTS OF THE MARINE CAP SYSTEM. MARINE CAP'S AND HOT PADS HAVE RARELY GONE DRY AS ALLEGED AND THEN ONLY FOR SHORT DURATION AS THE RESULT OF HEAVY SURGE DEMANDS FOR AIR SUPPORT.

J. PARAGRAPH 13.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: MACV EVALUATION FOR THIS PERIOD INDICATES THE FOLLOWING IMPROVEMENTS OR INNOVATIONS:

(A) HORN DASC BECAME OPERATIONAL ON 10 AUGUST 1968. IT IS THE SENIOR FWF DASC IN ICTZ AND WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN III MAF COMPOUND TO PROVIDE BETTER RESPONSE TO III MAF.

(B) CG, III MAF INITIATED AN EXPERIMENTAL AIRBORNE ALERT POSTURE IN ICTZ ON 5 AUGUST 1968.

(C) AIR SUPPORT MEASURED IN SORTIES PER BATTALION PER

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DAY INCREASED FOR BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES FROM 5.4 TO 6.1 AND 3.1 TO 3.5 RESPECTIVELY.

(D) INCREASED FAMILIARITY WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS RESULTED IN MORE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT TO GROUND COMMANDERS THROUGHOUT VIETNAM.

(E) RESPONSIVENESS TO REQUESTS FOR TOT CHANGES HAS IMPROVED.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: CONCUR.

K. PARAGRAPH 14.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AIR CONTINUES TO MEET THE OBJECTIVE FOR WHICH IT WAS ESTABLISHED. IT APPEARS THAT LITTLE THAT IS NEW IS COMING FROM THESE MONTHLY REPORTS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THEY HAVE SERVED THEIR PURPOSE, AND THEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A REPORT BE RENDERED ONLY WHEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OR DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: DO NOT CONCUR. THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS ESTABLISHED FOR THE EXPRESSED PURPOSE OF PROVIDING GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF TATAL AIR STRIKE RESOURCES, IMPROVING THE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND FORCE COMMANDERS, AND OF SIMPLIFYING PROCEDURES AND REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS. U.S. ARMY FORCES ARE RECEIVING

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IMPROVED SUPPORT; HOWEVER, SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS THUS FAR REDUCED
THE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT, AND HAS
CREATED A COMPLICATED SYSTEM REplete WITH ADMINISTRATIVE HINDER-
ANCES.

5. (S) ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUESTED BY PARAGRAPH 4.
OF REF A IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARAGRAPH 4.A: PROGRAMMED (PRESENT) USMC AND USAF IN-
COUNTRY SORTIES RATES.

(1) ALL MARINE AIRCRAFT ARE PROGRAMMED FOR 1.2 SORTIES RATE.
USAF F-100 AND F-4 AIRCRAFT ARE PROGRAMMED FOR A1.2 AND A-37
AIRCRAFT FOR A 2.0 SORTIE RATE. (7TH AF 30 MAY-26 JUNE EVALUATION)

(2) IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ABOVE, USMC AND ROKMC
MANEUVER BATTALIONS ARE PROGRAMMED FOR 200 SORTIES PER MONTH
AND USA BATTALIONS FOR 150 SORTIES PER MONTH. USMC AND ROKMC

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BATTALIONS ARE INCREASED BY A FACTOR OF 1/3 DUE TO BATTALION
COMPOSITION, REDUCED ORGANIC ARTILLERY SUPPORT AND LACK OF
ARMED HELICOPTER SUPPORT. (APPENDIX C, CINCPAC LTR 3010, SER:
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B. PARAGRAPH 4.B: WHO AT THE SAIGON LEVEL ACTUALLY MAKES
THE DETERMINATION OF THE SPLIT BETWEEN IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-OF-
COUNTRY SORTIES BOTH IN AND OUTSIDE OF THE MACV AREA OF RESPONSIB-
ILITY?

(1) THE PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY COMUSMACV AND COMMANDER
7TH AF TO ESTABLISH THE IN-COUNTRY/OUT-OF-COUNTRY SPLIT OF AIR
EFFORT AND THE PERCENTAGE BREAKOUT BY CORPS WAS EXPLAINED IN 7TH
AF JULY EVALUATION AS FOLLOWS:

(A) ON EACH FRIDAY PRIOR TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
INDICATION BRANCH (CIIB) MEETING THE 7TH AF AIR STAFF CONSOLIDATES
INTELLIGENCE AND AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION. BASED ON THE
PREVIOUS WEEK'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTUAL SORTIES FLOWN A PREVIEW
OF THE EXPECTED AIR ACTIVITY IS DETERMINED. EVALUATION OF THE
ABOVE RESULTS IN A RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION OF AIR FOR IN-COUNTRY,
OUT-OF-COUNTRY AND INDIVIDUAL CORPS AREA USAGE.

(B) AT THE SATURDAY MORNING CIIB MEETING THIS DATA IS
PROVIDED TO COMUSMACV BY COMMANDER 7TH AF FOR HIS APPROVAL/CHANGE.

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(C) THE EVALUATION STATES THAT QUOTE ALTHOUGH THE SYSTEM HAS ONLY BEEN IN EFFECT A FEW WEEKS IT APPEARS TO BE WORKING IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER. IT DOES GUARANTEE A THOROUGH REVIEW AT MAJOR COMMAND STAFF LEVEL AND BY THE TWO MAJOR COMMANDERS CONCERNED UNQUOTE.

(2) FIRST MAW LIAISON OFFICERS TO 7TH AF INDICATE THAT GENERALS ABRAMS DOES IN FACT MAKE THE FINAL DECISION.

C. PARAGRAPH 4.C: WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF THE EVALUATION OF III MAF'S AIRBORNE ALERT REQUESTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC?

(1) THE FOLLOWING DATA WAS PRESENTED AS AN EVALUATION OF III MAF'S AIRBORNE ALERT.

	WITHOUT ALERT 5 JUL-4 AUG	WITH ALERT 5 AUG-4 SEP
SCRAMBLES	1542	1119
ALERTS	0	1063
OTHER ADD-ONS	795	719
TOTAL	2337	7613

(2) FOR ALL SORTIE CLASSES OTHER THAN PREPLANS, THERE WAS AN INCREASE OF 24 PERCENT AND AN OVERALL INCREASE OF 6 PERCENT.

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THIS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE INCREASED GROUND ACTIVITY DURING THIS PERIOD NOR IS IT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE SCRAMBLES OR DIVERTS WHICH WERE NOT REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF HAVING ALERT AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE.

(3) DURING THE WEEK OF 16-22 AUGUST, 294 ALERT SORTIES WERE SCHEDULED. OF THIS NUMBER 38 WERE CANCELLED MAINLY BECAUSE PREVIOUS FLIGHTS HAD REFUELED AND REMAINED ON STATION, 148 WERE UTILIZED FOR TARGETS ANTICIPATED PRIOR TO SCHEDULING, AND 54 WERE DEVERTED TO SECONDARY TARGETS. OTHER CANCELLATIONS WERE THE RESULT OF WEATHER OR AIRCRAFT MALFUNCTION RESULTING IN GROUND ABORT. A FULL 79 PERCENT OF THE AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES WERE UTILIZED ON MISSIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE REQUIRED SCRAMBLES OR PREPLANNED SORTIES AND RESULTED IN VASTLY IMPROVED RESPONSIVENESS. RESPONSE TIME FOR CAP AIRCRAFT AVERAGES 15.4 MINUTES WHEREAS THE NORMAL RESPONSE TIME FOR SCRAMBLES AVERAGES 41.3 MINUTES OR 268 PERCENT OF CAP RESPONSE TIME.

D. PARAGRAPH 4.D.: DOES THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC RESPOND TO ORDERS FROM CG, III MAF?

(1) THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC DOES RESPOND TO ORDERS FROM CG, III MAF.

CG III MAF

P 061358Z/OCT68

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PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 0805 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)

E. PARAGRAPH 4.E.: DO HORN DASC AND VICTOR DASC CONTACT AIRBORNE STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT AND DIVERT OR OTHERWISE CONTROL OR DIRECT THEM?

(1) HORN DASC AND VICTOR DASC DO NOT HAVE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY FOR DIRECT CONTACT WITH AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT. THEY DO, HOWEVER, CONTROL AND DIVERT AIRCRAFT THROUGH THE MARINE TAOC (VICE SQUAD) AND AIR FORCE CRC (PANAMA).

F. PARAGRAPH 4.F.: NUMBER OF MARINE DASC'S CURRENTLY OPERATING AND THEIR LOCATION.

(1) THERE ARE THREE MARINE DASC'S. THESE ARE LOCATED AT DANANG, DONG HA AND VANDERGRIFT.

G. PARAGRAPH 4.G.: CAUSE OF ALLEGED DRY-UP OF FMAW HOT PAD AND CANCELLED SORTIES. (REPORTED BY 7TH AF)

(1) THE IMPLICATION IN THE 7TH AF AUGUST EVALUATION THAT MARINE ALERT PADS HAVE GONE DRY AS A RESULT OF THE AIRBORNE ALERT IS TOTALLY ERRONEOUS. AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES ARE NOT FLOWN BY THE SQUADRONS MAINTAINING THE GROUND ALERT. THE GROUND ALERT SYSTEM REMAINS THE SAME WITH ONE A-4 AND ONE F-4 SQUADRON ON ALERT. AIR CAPS WERE OCCASIONALLY DRY FOR SHORT DURATIONS DURING HEAVY DEMAND FOR AIR SUPPORT.

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 0805 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)

(2) THE MARINE ALERT PAD HAS GONE DRY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FOR SHORT PERIODS AS A RESULT OF INTENSE GROUND ACTIVITY. AS AN EXAMPLE ON 24 SEP IN A ONE HOUR AND 50 MINUTE PERIOD, 7 FLIGHTS (14 SORTIES) FROM THE ALERT PAD AND 2 AIRBORNE ALERT FLIGHTS (4 SORTIES) WERE UTILIZED ON IMMEDIATE MISSIONS FOR TROOPS IN CONTACT. ONE OF THESE FLIGHTS CONSISTING OF 4 SORTIES, WAS UTILIZED IN II CORPS SINCE THE AIR FORCE ALERT PAD WAS ALSO DRY AS INDICATED BY HORN DASC.

(3) DURING THE PERIOD OF 5 AUG-5 SEP, MARINE AIR AVERAGED LESS THAN SIX CANCELLATIONS PER DAY AS A RESULT OF HEAVY DEMANDS FOR AIR SUPPORT DURING CRITICAL PERIODS. DURING THIS PERIOD MARINE AIR AVERAGED 245 STRIKE SORTIES DAILY.

H. PARAGRAPH 4.H.: SPECIFICS OF FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROBLEMS IN ICTZ UNDER SMS?

(1) THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROBLEMS BEING EXPERIENCED IN ICTZ UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE THE DIRECT RESULT OF INHERENT DEFICIENCIES IN THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM HAS BEEN RETAINED INTACT, ITS FULL CAPABILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN EXPLOITED BY THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM. THE MARINE SYSTEM OWES ITS PROVEN SUCCESS TO THE COLOCATION OF AIR AND GROUND

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CG III MAF

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S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 5 SECTIONS
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION AGENCIES AT EACH LEVEL OF COMMAND DOWN
TO THE BATTALION LEVEL WITH THE MEANS, UNDERSTANDING, AND EXPRESSED
RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTROL AND COORDINATE AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES.
THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM IS ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED AND TASKED PRIMARILY
FOR THE CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AND THEREFORE LACKS ABILITY AND MEANS
TO COORDINATE AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES. THIS LACK OF COORDINATION
HAS RESULTED IN GROSS INEFFICIENCIES IN THE APPLICATION OF FIRE SUPPORT
IN ICTZ. ARTILLERY FIRES ARE OF NECESSITY SECURED OVER VAST AREAS
TO PERMIT DELIVERY OF AIR SUPPORT OR REQUEST FOR AIR SUPPORT IS
DENIED. WITH A MEANS TO COORDINATE AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES,
ARTILLERY FIRES COULD BE SHIFTED, NOT SECURED, DURING AIR STRIKES
THEREBY MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY AND PROVIDING FLAK
SUPPRESSION FOR ATTACKING AIRCRAFT. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THE CURRENT
PROBLEM IS ONE OF COORDINATION AND NOT CONTROL. AN EXTENSION OF

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0806 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
THE MARINE TYPE AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM
THROUGHOUT ICTZ WOULD EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE EXISTING PROBLEMS.

I. PARAGRAPH 4.I.: FACTS CONCERNING THE WEEKLY ICTZ AIR
SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE.

(1) RESULTS OF THE BI-MONTHLY TACAIR PLANNING CONFERENCE HAS
PROVEN AND EXCELLENT MEANS OF EDUCATION (TPQ-10, ORDNANCE CAPABILITIES
LIMITATIONS, ETC.) AND A MEDIUM FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN
AIR AND GROUND UNITS LOCATED IN ICTZ ON CURRENT AND PROPOSED OPERATIONS,
AND CRITIQUES OF PAST OPERATIONS, THE CONFERENCE IS PRESIDED OVER
BY III MAF DEPUTY CG FOR AIR WITH THE FOLLOWING IN ATTENDANCE: FIRST
MAW G-2/G-3, III MAF G-3 AIR, XXIV CORPS G-3 AIR, DIRECTOR HORN DASC,
FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV AIR OFFICERS, AND 2ND ROKMC BRIGADE AIR OFFICERS,
ALO'S OF FIRST CAV (AM), 101ST ABN (AM) AND AMERICAL DIV, CO 16TH
CAG AND I CORPS ADV GP G-3 AIR.

J. PARAGRAPH 4.J.: HAVE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITIES IN-
CREASED SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT?

(1) TACTICAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITIES HAVE BEEN
VIRTUALLY UNCHANGED BY SINGLE MANAGEMENT. CONTROL IS PROVIDED
BY THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SQUADRON OR MARINE AIR SUPPORT SQUADRONS
AS REQUIRED BY THE ASSIGNED MISSION. AIR FORCE FLIGHTS UTILIZED AIR

CG III MAF

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 0806 ~~SECRET~~ MARINE FORCES PACAF (MCEO)
FORCE COMBAT REPORTING CENTERS (CRC) AND COMBAT REPORTING POINTS (CRP).

K. PARAGRAPH 4.K: HAS CONTROL OF AIR TRAFFIC BEEN FACILITATED SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT? IF SO HOW?

(1) TACTICAL CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT HAS REMAINED UNCHANGED UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT AS NOTED UNDER PARAGRAPH J.

L. PARAGRAPH 4.L.: YOUR VIEWS ON COMUSMACV'S CLAIM THAT FRAGGING OF IN-COUNTRY MARINE SORTIES BY CG, III MAF WOULD CONSTITUTE "DOUBLE MANAGEMENT".

(1) THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT TO III MAF WOULD CERTAINLY NOT AMOUNT TO DOUBLE MANAGEMENT. SUCH RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT THEREBY PRESERVING COMUSMACV'S OVERALL CONTROL OF THE AIR EFFORT AND PREEMPTION AUTHORITY OVER MARINE SORTIES IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. THE CURRENT PAPER DRILL OF OFFERING MARINE SORTIES TO COMUSMACV ONLY TO HAVE THEM RETURNED FOR USE IN I CORPS INHIBITS THE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM. LARGE DIVIDENDS IN IMPROVED EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE APPLICATION OF "AIR POWER" COULD BE REALIZED BY THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF. SUCH RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 0806 ~~SECRET~~ SPECAT (MCEO)
WOULD IN NO WAY DEROGATE THE IMPROVEMENTS RECENTLY MADE IN THE ARMY/AIR FORCE SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. IN FACT CLOSER EXPOSURE TO THE MARINE SYSTEM COULD BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN EVEN FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS.

M. PARAGRAPH 4.M.: AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF SORTIES THAT ARMY BATTALIONS IN ICTZ HAVE RECEIVED DURING MONTHS OF MAY, JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, AND FROM WHAT SOURCE?

(1) THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS WITH REGARD TO THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED TO ARMY BATTALIONS IN ICTZ WERE PROVIDED BY HORN DASC.

MONTH	USAF	USMC
APR	2035	1838
MAY	2710	1589
JUN	2190	843
JUL	1962	933
AUG	2408	1296
SEP	1741	1173

(2) DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD FROM APR. THROUGH SEP. THE 1ST MAW HAS FLOWN AN AVERAGE OF 42 SORTIES PER-DAY FOR ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ. THE SORTIES FLOWN BY THE USMC IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY IN ICTZ IS

PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 0806 ~~SECRET~~ SPECAT (MCEO)
APPROXIMATELY 37 PERCENT OF ALL SORTIES FLOWN IN THEIR SUPPORT.

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CG III MAF

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SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS (U)

A. CMC 281233Z/SEP68 (S)

B. CG III MAF 061358Z/OCT68 (S) (PNSP)

1. (S) REFERENCE A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON COMUSMACV'S
JULY AND AUGUST EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT
OPERATIONS AND, IN ADDITION, REQUESTED CG III MAF'S
INPUTS TO COMUSMACV FOR HIS EVALUATION DURING THESE
PERIODS BE PROVIDED.

2. (S) BOB HAS READDRESSSED HIS JULY AND AUGUST INPUTS
TO YOU AS REQUESTED. REFERENCE B IS HIS VERY THOROUGH
RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST AND I AM PASSING IT TO YOU

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SEPARATELY. I CONCUR FULLY WITH HIS COMMENTS.

3. (S) THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS, PROVIDED TO REINFORCE HIS VIEWS, ARE KEYED TO THE PARAGRAPHS OF REFERENCE B.

A. SUBPARAGRAPH 3A(2): CONCUR WITH USING THE MODIFIED COMBAT ACTIVITIES REPORT (COACT) TO PROVIDE REQUIRED DATA TO THE SINGLE MANAGER. HOWEVER, A MORE EXPEDIENT METHOD OF DELIVERING THE COACT REPORT TO MACV MUST BE DEVELOPED TO NEGATE HIS OBJECTION TO THE 5-7 DAY DELAY CURRENTLY BEING ENCOUNTERED.

B. SUBPARAGRAPH 3B(2): THE COORDINATION OF AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES IS NOT A PROBLEM UNDER OUR MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. THE ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM INITIATED BY MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 OF 24FEB68 IS, IN FACT, MERELY AN ADVISORY SYSTEM RATHER THAN A COORDINATING SYSTEM. PERHAPS MACV WOULD BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO OUR PROPOSAL IF THE FIRST CAVALRY AND 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION FOLLOWED THE LEAD OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION AND ESTABLISHED AN AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES COORDINATION SYSTEM COMPATIBLE WITH OURS. A UNITED FRONT IN ICTZ WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IGNORE.

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C. SUBPARAGRAPH 3F(2): AVAILABLE DATA SUBSTANTIATES THAT FMAW AIR SUPPORT FOR U.S. ARMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS HAS BEEN REQUIRED DUE TO THE SHORTFALL OF AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE USAF. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS WHO HAVE BEEN HURT THE MOST BY THIS, BUT RATHER THE FMAW WHICH HAS HAD TO MAINTAIN THE HIGH SORTIE RATE TO RECTIFY THIS IMBALANCE OF AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED. DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS, OVER ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL FMAW EFFORT HAS BEEN IN SUPPORT OF UNITS OTHER THAN MARINES. MARINES CONTINUE TO RECEIVE MORE THAN THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF AIR SUPPORT BASED ON THE JCS PLANNING FACTOR OF 6.67 AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER MARINE BATTALION DAILY. FOR EXAMPLE, IN AUGUST MARINE BATTALIONS RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 7.8 SORTIES PER DAY. THEREFORE, I ~~STRONGLY~~ BELIEVE WE STAND TO GAIN THE MOST BY ADDRESSING THE CONTINUAL SURGING REQUIRED OF FMAW. THE RESULTANT HIGH SORTIE RATE OFFERS A BETTER REASON FOR REDUCING AIR SUPPORT TO UNITS OTHER THAN MARINES

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THAN DOES THE INEQUITY OF AIR SUPPORT RECEIVED BY OUR
 GROUND COMMANDERS.

D. SUBPARAGRAPH 3K(2): CONC UR THAT ADDITIONAL
 RADAR CONTROLLED MISSIONS (COMBAT SKY SPOT) ARE
 DESIRABLE AS LONG AS FMAW IS NOT TASKED TO MAKE UP
 THE SHORTFALL OF THE USAF, AND THE PRESENT BALANCE OF
 AVAILABLE DAY SORTIES IS NOT JEOPARDIZED.

E. SUBPARAGRAPH 4F(1): RELATES THAT COMUSMACV
 STATED THE PREVIOUS MARINE SYSTEM WAS INADEQUATE TO
 MEET HIS NEEDS AND THAT WHEN IT BECAME NECESSARY TO
 AUGMENT MARINE AIR ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE ARMY DIVISIONS
 IN ICTZ, SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR WAS DESIRABLE. BOB
 DOES NOT CONCUR, AND I ~~STRONGLY~~ AGREE. THE RETURN
 OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO CG III MAF WOULD
 BENEFIT ICTZ BY SHORTENING THE REQUEST CHAIN, THEREBY
 PERMITTING A MORE FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT
 SYSTEM. HOWEVER, TO ENSURE A RECEPTIVE HEARING, A
 MORE PALATABLE APPROACH WOULD BE TO STRESS THE
 ADVANTAGES ACCRUING OVERALL TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT BY

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ADOPTION OF MISSION DIRECTION BY CG III MAF.

F. SUBPARAGRAPH 4K(2): CONCUR THAT THE MONTHLY EVALUATION MUST CONTINUE, SINCE IT IS BY THIS MEDIUM THAT THE SHORTCOMINGS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT CAN BE BEST ILLUMINATED. THE EVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENTS WHICH RESULT PROVIDE US THE MOST PROMISING VEHICLE TO RETURN THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF WHERE IT RIGHTFULLY BELONGS. WARMEST REGARDS.

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SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

A. CMC 021244Z OCT 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE MCEO)
B. CMC 260142Z SEP 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE MCEO)

1. (U) REF A REQUESTED SUBSTANTIATING INFO REGARDING MARINE AIR SUPPORT TO ARMY BNS IN I CORPS. STATISTICS INDICATED IN FOLLOWING PARAS ARE BASED ON DATA OBTAINED FROM HORN DASC UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

2. (S) DURING JUN, JUL, AND AUG THE ARMY WAS OPERATING WITH 31 MANEUVER BNS IN I CORPS. AT THE PROGRAMMED RATE OF 5 SORTIES PER ARMY MANEUVER BN PER DAY 7AF SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED ARMY BNS 155 SORTIES PER DAY. TABLE I SHOWS THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO I CORPS BY USAF FOR SERVICE INDICATED AND INDICATES THAT ONLY 71 SORTIES PER DAY OR 46 PCT OF THOSE PROGRAMMED WERE ACTUALLY PROVIDED TO THE ARMY.

TABLE I

PAGE TWO RHMAFA1594 SECRET SPECAT MCEO

	USA	USMC	OTHER	TOTAL
JUNE	2190	698	997	3885
JULY	1962	511	859	3332
AUGUST	2408	514	884	3806

3. (S) TABLE II SHOWS THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO ARMY FORCES BY USAF AND USMC. IT INDICATES THAT FIRST MAW FURNISHED THE ARMY 33 SORTIES PER DAY OR 21 PCT OF THOSE PROGRAMMED TO BE PROVIDED BY USAF.

TABLE II

	USAF	USMC	TOTAL	SORT/BN/DAY
JUNE	2190	843	3033	3.26
JULY	1962	933	2895	3.01
AUGUST	2408	1296	3704	3.85

4. (S) THEREFORE THE ARMY RECEIVED DURING THE THREE MONTH PERIOD 104 SORTIES PER DAY OR 67 PCT OF THEIR PROGRAMMED 155 SORTIES PER DAY. THIS REDUCES TO 3.35 SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY IN LIEU OF THE PROGRAMMED 5 SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY.

5. (S) THE NET LOSS OF SORTIES, I.E., MARINE SORTIES TO ARMY MINUS AIR FORCE SORTIES TO MARINE FORCES, ALONG WITH THE NUMBER OF MARINE MANEUVER BNS AND THE AVERAGE NET LOSS PER MARINE MANEUVER BN PER DAY IS SHOWN IN TABLE III FOR MAY THROUGH SEP.

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CG III MAF

P 121334Z/OCT 68

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA1594 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

TABLE III

	SORTIES	MANEUVER BNS	SORT/BN/DAY
MAY	1091	24	1.47
JUN	145	24	0.20
JUL	422	24	0.57
AUG	782	24	1.05
SEP	741	21	1.19

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G-1		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	G-4 <i>FSOI</i>
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2D BRIGADE, ROKMC COMBAT SUPPORT (U)

A. CG, FMFPAC 040418Z/OCT68 (S)

B. CG, III MAF 250944Z/SEP68 (S) NOTAL

1. (S) REF A ADVISED THAT UNDER CURRENT USMC FORCE LEVEL RE-

QUIREMENTS THERE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT LVTP5A1 AND M48 TANK ASSETS

FROM OUT OF COUNTRY TO SUPPORT THE ROKMC REQUIREMENT STATED IN

REF B, AND THAT PROVIDING THESE VEHICLES TO 2D BRIGADE, ROKMC

FROM IN-COUNTRY ASSETS IS CONTINGENT UPON RESULTS OF HQMC RE-

CLAMA TO PROGRAM 6.

2. (S) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IN THE EVENT THAT HQMC RECLAMA TO

PROGRAM 6 IS NOT SUCCESSFUL AND ASSUMING THE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT

WOULD NOT BE RETURNED TO CONUS, IT IS REQUESTED THAT A PLAN BE

DEVELOPED WHICH WILL PROVIDE PROCEDURES FOR TURNING OVER TO THE

2D BRIGADE, ROKMC, THE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO EQUIP ONE LVTP5

COMPANY, ONE LVTH-6 PLATOON AND ONE M48 TANK COMPANY. REQUEST

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THAT COPY OF PLAN BE PROVIDED THIS HQ NLT 15NOV68. PLANNING SHOULD BE BASED ON PREMISE THAT TITLE TO EQUIPMENT WILL BE RETAINED BY THE USMC, AND EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM BY THE ROKMC WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THIS HQ AND COMUSMACV. PLANNING SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

A. EQUIPMENT TO BE TURNED OVER SHOULD INCLUDE, IN ADDITION TO THE MAJOR END ITEMS AND ALL OEM, THAT MATERIEL PECULIAR TO EACH OF THE COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, I.E. (COMBAT VEHICLE CREWMAN HELMETS, TOOLS, TEST EQUIPMENT, ETC).

B. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS TO TRAIN ROKMC PERSONNEL IN OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE.

C. MAINTENANCE SUPPORT CONCEPT.

D. ADDITIONAL FUNDING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MASF PROGRAM TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE.

E. NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL USMC LIAISON PERSONNEL REQUIRED ON INTERIM AND CONTINUING BASIS TO SUPPORT 2D BRIGADE, ROKMC OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, ASSUME ADDITIONAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, IF REQUIRED, WOULD BE PROVIDED FROM WITHIN III MAF RESOURCES.

F. EQUIPPING USMC LVT UNITS REMAINING IN-COUNTRY UNDER PROGRAM 6 WITH FULL T/E ALLOWANCE OF LVTP5A1 TAKES PRECEDENCE.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

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IN-COUNTRY ASSETS OF LVTP5A1 IN EXCESS OF III MAF REQUIREMENTS
MAY DICTATE THAT PLANNING CONSIDERED PROVIDING ONLY A LVTP5
COMPANY (-).

3. (S) THE NATURE OF THIS SUBJECT IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND
PRECLUDES ANY DISCUSSION WITH THE ROKMC.

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P 131122Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC

COPY NR 130CT68 1245Z

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
FOR MARINE CORPS CORPS EYES ONLY
MONTHLY REPORT-EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL
AIR (U)

A. CG III MAF 240812Z SEP 68 (S)
B. CG III MAF 291614Z SEP 68 (S)
C. CG III MAF 291442Z JUL 68 (S)
D. TELCON C/S FMFPAC WITH C/S III MAF 120CT68
1. REFS A, B, AND C READDRESSED AND TRANSMITTED TO CMC ON 8OCT68. IT HAS BEEN THE POLICY OF THIS COMMAND TO READDRESS ALL SINGLE MANAGEMENT MESSAGES TO CG FMFPAC AFTER DISPATCH TO COMUSMACV. AS A RESULT OF REF D, A REVIEW WAS CONDUCTED TO ASCERTAIN WHY REFS A, B, AND C NOT READDRESSED. INVESTIGATION REVEALED MESSAGES WERE NOT READDRESSED TO CG FMFPAC, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED POLICY, DUE TO COMMUNICATION

PAGE TWO RHMAFA1688 SECRET SPECAT MCEO
ERROR. ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
2. REF D DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER WE READDRESSED REF C.
ACCORDINGLY, REF C IS READDRESSED AS WELL AS REPLY
(COMUSMACV 110703Z OCT68-S) TO REF A. REGRET ANY
INCONVENIENCE.
WARM REGARDS.

GR-4
BT

CG III MAF

P 131122Z/OCT68

ACTN: S/SEC

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PP RUHKM
DE RHMAFA 1743 2880300
ZNY SSSSS
P 140300Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION I OF II
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

REF: MY 131122Z OCT 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO)
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REF, FOL MSGS ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR
INFORMATION: QUOTE

P 080812Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
INFO CMC
OP 291442Z JUL 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
CINCPAC
INFO CG FIRST MAW
BT

SECRET

50

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 1743 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR PERIOD 270600H JUN 68
TO 260600H JULY 1968 (U)

REF (A) COMUSMACV 19546 DTG 971036Z JULY 1968 (NOTAL)

(B) COMUSMACV LTR MACCOC 2 OF 15 JULY 1968 (S)

(C) CG, III MAF 300636Z JUNE 1968 (NOTAL)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A) SUBJECT EVALUATION IS SUBMITTED,
INCLUDING COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTIONS ON THE AREAS OF INTEREST
LISTED IN REFERENCE (B).

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN REFERENCE (C) ARE STILL CON-
SIDERED VALID ALTHOUGH ONLY ONE OF NINE RECOMMENDATIONS, ELIMINATION
OF IP FROM WEEKLY FRAG, HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
(SM) PROCEDURES, MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CONTINUES TO BE
IMPROVEMENT OVER ORIGINAL SYSTEM. INCREASED FAMILIARITY WITH
SYSTEM HAS RESULTED IN MORE EFFICIENT OPERATIONS. SOME ADDITIONAL
AREAS HAVE BEEN NOTED WHERE MINOR PROCEDURAL CHANGES WOULD PRO-
DUCE INCREASED RESPONSIVENESS TO CHANGING NEEDS OF GROUND COMMANDERS.

3. COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTION ON AREAS OF INTEREST LISTED
IN REFERENCE (B) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THIS HQ HAS NO BASIS ON WHICH TO CORROBORATE I DASC
LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS. US PORTION OF I DASC IS BEING MOVED
CG III MAF

P 140300Z OCT 68

ACTN: S/SEC

1-5

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
TO III MAF HQ. THIS WILL FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS TO
III MAF TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS. DEPUTY DIRECTOR I DASC
ALSO SERVES AS III MAF LIAISON OFFICER.

B. DIFFERENCES IN 7TH AF STATISTICS OF SORTIES FRAGGED,
FLOWN, AND REPORTED ARE NOT KNOWN TO THIS HQ. ALL SORTIES
FRAGGED, FLOWN AND REPORTED HAVE BEEN WITHIN 7TH AF TACTICAL
AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. SPECIFIC DISCREPANCIES IN STATISTICS HAVE
NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THIS COMMAND. I DASC MAINTAINS RECORD
OF ALL SORTIES BY TYPE FLOWN IN ICTZ. HQ III MAF IS PROVIDED
WEEKLY SUMMARY OF STATISTICS WHICH IN FACT ARE IDENTICAL TO
THOSE REPORTED TO 7TH AF TACC BY I DASC. ONLY STATISTICS ORI-
GINATIONS AT THIS HQ CONCERNING SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE THOSE
REFLECTING AIR SUPPORT REQUEST AND SORTIES ALLOCATION TO III
MAF UNITS.

C. AIR SUPPORT IS REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS BASED
ON THEIR ESTIMATE OF SORTIES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS,
III MAF SUB-ALLOCATIONS ARE IN TURN BASED ON THESE REQUESTS.
IN ADDITION CG III MAF ASSIGNS PRIORITIES BASED ON OVERALL
EVALUATION OF ENEMY SITUATION AND OPERATIONS IN ICTZ. EX-
AMINATION OF REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ REVEALS ARMY AND

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
FWMAF'S ARE IN FACT ALLOCATED A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF REQUESTED
SORTIES THAN MARINE UNITS. SINCE 1 JULY, 2ND ROKMC BDE HAS
BEEN ALLOCATED 94 PCT. OF SORTIES REQUESTED, ARMY UNITS 66 PCT. AND
MARINES UNITS 60 PCT. ARVN UNITS DO NOT REQUEST PREPLANNED SORTIES
FROM III MAF, ARVN IMMEDIATE REQUESTS THROUGH TACS HAVE ALWAYS
BEEN HONORED. A WEEKLY AIR SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE HAS
INITIATED BY THIS HQS 18 JULY WITH ALL MAJOR SUBORDINATE
COMMANDERS REPRESENTED IN ORDER TO ASSURE ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR
AIR SUPPORT ARE FULLY KNOWN AND FAIRLY CONSIDERED. PCV
SUBALLOCATES TO UNITS UNDER PCV OPCON.

D. LULLS IN COMBAT ACTIVITY AND REDUCTION OF ENEMY THREAT
MAY RESULT IN FEWER SORTIES REQUIRED. HOWEVER, AS MINEUVER
BATTALIONS ON OFFENSIVE CONTINUE TO SEEK LOCATION OF ENEMY
UNITS, INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR LZ CONSTRUCTION, PREP AND HELO
ESCORT TEND TO OFFSET REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF TROOPS IN
CONTACT. CONSEQUENTLY GROUND COMMANDERS REQUEST FOR TACAIR
HAVE NOT LESSENED. INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE AT THIS HQ IN-
DICATES AND INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY PARTICULARLY IN QUANG
NAM PROVINCE. PRESENT ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED SORTIES IS
NOT CONSIDERED ADEQUATE.

CG III MAF

P 140300Z OCT 68

2-5

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E. FIVE RHMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
PROCEDURES TOO ASSURE FULL UTILIZATION OF WEEKLY FRAG
ARE IN STRICT ACCORD WITH SM SYSTEM.

F. MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT TIO WITH CRC AND CRP AS DIRECTED
BY FRAG.

G. SUB ALLOCATION OF WEEKLY FRAG BY THIS HQ DOES NOT
INCLUDE ALL SORTIES ALLOCATED TO III MAF. THIS HQ AND HQ
PCV RETAIN SORTIES FOR LOC INTERDICTION AND TO WEIGH EFFORT
AS REQUIRED. SORTIES ARE ALSO SHIFTED BETWEEN DIVISIONS WHEN
REQUIRED. IT MUST BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT PRINCIPLE OF SUB-
ALLOCATING FIXED NUMBER OF SORTIES ON WEEKLY BASIS IS IN
ACCORD WITH MODIFIED SYSTEM OBJECTIVE OF GUARANTEEING BASIC
LEVEL OF SUPPORT.

H. SEE SUB PARA 3G ABOVE.

I. REPRESENTATIVES OF 7TH AF HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY
THAT PREVIOUSLY EXISTING III MAF REPORTS COULD BE UTILIZED TO
MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT. NO REDUC-
TION IN THIS REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO DATE.

J. III MAF HAS MADE CLEAR ITS VIEW THAT SUPPORTING FIRES
SHOULD BE FULLY AND CENTRALLY COORDINATED WITH PROMPT FREE
FLOW OF INFORMATION TO COMBINE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS WITH

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
SAFETY. INFORMALLY, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS IS BEING
SERIOUSLY STUDIED BY THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE BUT NO CONCRETE
PROPOSAL IS KNOWN. AMERICAL DIVISION PROCEDURES ARE INDENTI-
CAL TO MARINE CORPS.

4. DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN OBTAINING PROMPT AERIAL
PHOTOGRAPHY. FOR EXAMPLE, PHOTOGRAPHS OF NEWLY PREPARED
HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE ARE NEEDED WITHIN SIX HOURS TO DETERMINE
WHAT OBSTACLES STILL EXIST AND TO BRIEF PILOTS WHO MUST
LAND BEFORE OBSTACLES CAN BE CLEARED. ALTHOUGH SYMPATHETIC
UNDERSTANDING IS FOUND AT ALL LEVELS, NORMAL REQUEST CHAIN IS
TO LONG TO MEET TIGHT DEADLINE FOR DELIVERY. BELIEVE THE
ANSWER IS TO USE IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS FOR PHOTO
SORTIES WITH III MAF/IDASC HAVING SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY AND AIR
DELIVERY OF PRINTS TO REQUESTING UNIT.

5. ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH SM IS NOT MEETING NEEDS OF GROUND
UNITS IS NUMBER OF TPQ-10 (CSS) SORTIES FRAGGED. PRIOR
TO 20 MARCH, FIRST MAW WAS PROVIDING APPROXIMATELY 94 TPQ-10
(CSS) SORTIES ON DAILY BASIS: 42 FOR 1 ST MARDIV AND 52 FOR
3RD MARDIV. SINCE SM, 1ST MARDIV HAS REQUESTED 37 TPQ-10 (BSS)
SORTIES AND BEEN ALLOCATED AVERAGE OF 9 PER DYY WHILE 3RD
BT

CG III MAF

P 140300Z OCT 68

3-5

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF II
MARDIV REQUESTED 53 AND ALLOCATED 18 PER DAY. MARINE GROUND
COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN REQUESTING ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER AS BE-
FORE BUT HAVE ONLY BEEN ALLOCATED 24 PERCENT OF NUMBER RECEIVED
PRIOR TO SM. TPQ-10 (CSS) OFFERS ACCURATE MEANS OF
HITTING TARGETS WHICH CANNOT BE LOCATED BY AIRBORNE FAC FOR VISUAL
ATTACK AND IN ADDITION CAN BRING WEIGHT OF AIR ATTACK ON ENEMY
WHEN HE LEAST EXPECTS IT. ITS EFFECTIVE USE OVER A 24 HOUR
PERIOD IS ESSENTIAL TO BOTH MARINE AND ARMY UNITS AND SHOULD
BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.

6. IN SUMMARY, SM SYSTEM SAW ONLY MINOR CHANGES DURING PAST
MONTH. CHANGES RECOMMENDED LAST MONTH IN REFERENCE (C) ARE
STILL APPLICABLE AND WOULD IMPROVE SYSTEM. IN PARTICULAR,
RETURN TO THIS HQ SCHEDULING AUTHORITY FOR IN-COUNTRY 1ST
MAW SORTIES TO BE USED AS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF ALL UNITS

PAGE TWO RHMMFA 1744 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
IN ICTZ WOULD INCREASE FLEXIBILITY AND ENHANCE RESPON-
SIVENESS TO NEEDS OF ALL III MAF GROUND COMMANDERS. COMUSMACV
HAS MEANS FOR INFLUENCING ACTION THROUGHOUT RVN BY INCREASING
/DECREASING AIR FORCE SORTIES PROVIDED TO III MAF.

7. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING NEW CHANGES ARE RECOMMENDED:
A. ESTABLISH PROCEDURE SO THAT CHANGES TO PRE-PLANNED FRAG
CAN BE MADE THROUGH IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST CHANNELS.
B. PROVIDE FOR RAPID RESPONSE IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE
THROUGH USE OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS AND
DELIVERY OF PRINTS BY AIR AS REQUIRED TO MEET STATED DEADLINES.
C. INCREASE USE OF CSS TO KEEP ENEMY UNDER ATTACK ON 24
HOUR A DAY BASIS.

GP-4
UNQUOTE
QUOTE

R 110703Z OCT 68
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF
INFO CINCPAC

CG III MAF

P 140300Z OCT 68

4-5

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFICPAGE RHMMAFA 1744 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
BT

S E C R E T 30171

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES (U)

REF: A. CG III MAF MSG 240812Z SEP 68 (S). SUBJ AS ABOVE (NOTAL)

B. DISCUSSIONS WITH BG HOFFMAN, G-3. III MAF, DURING QP OCT 68 VISIT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MACV

1. (S) THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS CAREFULLY REVIEWED YOUR RECOMMENDATION OUTLINED IN REF A TO COMBINE MACV DIR 95-13 AND 525-4 INTO ONE DIRECTIVE AND EXPAND IT TO AN AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM, AND DISCUSSED IT WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCE B. THE PARAGRAPHS WHICH FOLLOW CONFIRM THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN REFERENCE B.

2. (S) MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 WAS WRITTEN PRIMARILY TO PROTECT AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRE WHILE OVER OR NEAR AIRFIELDS AND ON POINT TO POINT FLIGHTS, ALTHOUGH IN ITS PUBLISHED FORM IT BENEFITS ALL AIR CRAFT BY THE ESTABLISHMENT TO ARTILLERY WARNING CONTROL CENTERS THROUGHOUT RVN. IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO SERVE AS A VEHICLE FOR CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES/TACTICAL AIR IN THE BATTLE AREA. THE RVNAF, JGS HAS A SIMILAR DIRECTIVE FOR THEIR FORCES WHICH SERVES THE SAME PURPOSE.

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA 1744 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

3. (C) MACV DIR 525-4, COMBAT OPERATIONS ARTILLERY COORDINATION FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE, WAS WRITTEN FOR SPECIAL ONE-OF-A-KIND SITUATION. IT DOES NOT APPEAR FEASIBLE OR DESIRABLE TO COMBINE IT WITH ANY OTHER DIRECTIVE.

4. (S) INSTRUCTIONS FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES/TACTICAL AIR IN THE BATTLE AREA ARE AVAILABLE IN THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVES: MACV DIR 95-11, AVIATION JOINT AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM; MACV DIR 525-12, COMBAT OPERATIONS, COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER; AND MACV DIR 95-4. US AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN. MACV DIR 525-12 ESTABLISHED POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR INSURING EFFECTIVE AND COORDINATED USE OF ALL AVAILABLE COMBAT SUPPORT THROUGH A STANDARDIZED COMBINED COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER, IT IS BELIEVED THAT MACV DIR 525-1 PROVIDES SUFFICIENT GUIDANCE TO ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN REFERENCE MESSAGE.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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CG III MAF

P 140300Z OCT 68

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← DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN, INFO LTGEN
CUSHMAN FROM MGEN FONTANA. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
A. CMC 021244Z/OCT68 (S)

1. (U) REF A REQUESTED SUBSTANTIATING INFORMATION
REGARDING USMC AIR SUPPORT TO U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS IN
I CTZ. STATISTICS UTILIZED IN FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE
BASED ON DATA OBTAINED FROM HORN DASC BY CG, III MAF.
2. (S) DURING JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, THE U. S. ARMY
WAS OPERATING WITH 31 MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN I CTZ. AT
THE PROGRAMMED RATE OF FIVE SORTIES PER U. S. ARMY
MANEUVER BATTALION PER DAY, THE USAF SHOULD HAVE PRO-
VIDED THE U. S. ARMY 4,650 SORTIES PER MONTH.

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3. TABLE I SHOWS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED TO I CTZ
BY USAF DURING JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST

TABLE I

(USAF AIR SUPPORT IN I CTZ)

	USA	USMC	OTHERS	TOTAL
JUNE	2190	698	997	3885
JULY	1962	511	859	3332
AUGUST	2408	514	884	3806

4. (S) TABLE II REFLECTS THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO U S
ARMY BATTALIONS BY BOTH THE USAF AND THE USMC DURING
THE JUNE-AUGUST PERIOD.

TABLE II

(AIR SUPPORT FOR U S ARMY IN I CTZ)

	USAF	USMC	TOTAL	SORT/BN/DAY
JUNE	2190	843	3033	3.26
JULY	1962	933	2895	3.01
AUGUST	2408	1296	3704	3.85

5. (S) DURING THE THREE MONTH PERIOD, U S. ARMY
BATTALIONS RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 104 SORTIES PER DAY

OR 67 PCT OF THE PROGRAMMED 155 SORTIES PER DAY

THIS EQUATES TO AN AVERAGE OF 3.35 SORTIES PER U S ARMY
BATTALION PER DAY DURING JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST IN LIEU

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OF THE PROGRAMMED FIVE SORTIES PER U. S. ARMY BATTALION
PER DAY.

6. (S) TABLE III INDICATES THE NUMBER OF SORTIES U. S.
ARMY BATTALIONS RECEIVED FROM THE USMC AS COMPARED TO
THE SORTIES THE USMC BATTALIONS RECEIVED FROM THE USAF.
THE NET DIFFERENCE REPRESENTS THE ADDITIONAL USMC AIR
SUPPORT PROVIDED THE U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS COMPARED TO
THAT WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY THE USMC BATTALIONS FROM
THE USAF.

TABLE III

	USMC TO US ARMY	USAF TO USMC	NET DIFFERENCE
JUNE	843	698	145
JULY	933	511	422
AUGUST	1296	514	782

7. (S) THIS NET DIFFERENCE WOULD HAVE PROVIDED EACH
USMC BATTALION 6.0 ADDITIONAL SORTIES IN JUNE, 17.6 IN JULY,
AND 32.6 IN AUGUST. THIS EQUATES TO .20 SORTIES PER USMC
BATTALION PER DAY IN JUNE, .57 IN JULY, AND 1.05 IN AUGUST.

8. (S) THE TREND TOWARD INCREASING UTILIZATION OF USMC
AIR TO SUPPORT U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS IS SIGNIFICANT AND IS

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DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

SECRET/MCEO

CONTINUING. AVAILABLE DATA REVEALS THAT DURING SEPTEMBER, A NET DIFFERENCE OF 741 ADDITIONAL USMC SORTIES EXISTED. THIS EQUATES TO 1.18 SORTIES PER DAY WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO EACH MARINE BATTALION, BASED ON THE 21 USMC BATTALIONS NOW IN I CTZ.

9. (S) IN SUMMARY, THE USMC SORTIES PROVIDED THE U. S. ARMY (WHICH ARE REFLECTED IN THE PRECEDING STATISTICS AS THE NET DIFFERENCE) RESULTED IN A DAILY SORTIES PROVIDED ^{RATE} OF 3.26, 3.01, AND 3.85 PER BATTALION PER DAY DURING THE MONTHS OF JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, 1968, RESPECTIVELY. HAD THESE USMC SORTIES NOT BEEN PROVIDED, THE DAILY SORTIES PROVIDED PER ARMY BATTALION PER DAY WOULD HAVE BEEN ONLY 3.10, 2.60, AND 3.04, FOR THE SAME MONTHS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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FOR LGEN BUSE INFO ADM HYLAND AND MGEN QUILTER FROM SH
T-53 ENGINE SUPPORT OF MARINE CORPS AVIATION UNITS BY
US ARMY (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 110931Z OCT 68

B. YOUR 131903Z OCT 68

C. MY 281749Z AUG 67 NOTAL

1. (C) REF A REQUESTS INFO CONCERNING ARMY SUPPORT OF T-53 ENGINE AND REQUESTS APPROVAL FOR FIRST MAW TO SUBMIT REPAIR PARTS REQMTS FOR T-53 ENGINE SUPPORT DIRECTLY TO ARMY 34TH SUPGRP, IN-COUNTRY. REF B CONCURS WITH THIS REQUEST.

2. (U) REF C AND REFS THERETO SET FORTH POLICY FOR SUPPLY SUPPORT OF UH-1E AIRCRAFT, WHICH INCLUDE T-53 ENGINES. THIS

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POLICY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT AT THE OPERATING LEVEL SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OPERATING SERVICE. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASE OF THE UH-1E, THE POLICY PROVIDES FOR WHOLESALE SUPPLY SUPPORT BY MEANS OF AN ARMY/NAVY WHOLESALE INTER-SERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT AGREEMENT (WISSA) AND ALSO FOR DEPOT INTER-SERVICE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT BY MEANS OF AN ARMY/NAVY DEPOT MAINTENANCE INTER-SERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENT (DMISA).
3. (C) AT THE SQUADRON/WING LEVEL OF OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE, THE ESTABLISHED BY REF C UTILIZES NORMAL NAVAL AVIATION RETAIL SUPPLY SUPPORT CHANNELS FOR THE UH-1E, AND OF COURSE KEEPS ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE IN THE OPERATING SERVICE, I.E., THE MARINE CORPS.

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4. (C) THE REQUEST OF REFS A AND B RAISES IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN NAVAL AVIATION LOGISTICS. THE DESIRE OF AN AIRCRAFT OPERATING ORGANIZATION TO USE WHATEVER SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND SPARE PARTS THAT MAY BE FOUND READILY AT HAND IS EASILY UNDERSTOOD AND WELL APPRECIATED. NEVERTHELESS, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT OTHER-THAN-

PAGE THREE RUWJMUA0450 C O N F I D E N T I A L
NAVAL AVIATION SOURCES OF RETAIL SUPPLY MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE AT OTHER TIMES OR PLACES. MOREOVER, WHENEVER SUPPLY DEMAND IS PLACED UPON AND REGISTERED IN SOME SUPPLY SYSTEM OTHER-THAN-NAVAL AVIATION SUPPLY, THE ABSENCE OF THAT DEMAND FROM NAVAL AVIATION CHANNELS ELIMINATES THAT MUCH OF THE BASE FOR COMPUTING AND JUSTIFYING SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE BUDGETING AND FUNDING BASE FOR SPARES/SPARE PARTS FOR THAT WEAPONS SYSTEM IS CORRESPONDINGLY REDUCED, INsofar AS NAVAL AVIATION IS CONCERNED. OBVIOUSLY, THIS CHAIN OF EVENTS INEVITABLY DECREASES THE CONTINUING ABILITY OF THE NAVAL AVIATION SUPPLY SYSTEM TO SUPPORT ANY ACFT OR WEAPONS SYSTEM WHOSE SUPPLY DEMANDS ARE PLACED UPON OTHER-THAN-NAVAL-AVIATION SUPPLY SOURCES.
5. (U) FROM THE FOREGOING IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PRINCIPLE THAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT IS A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OPERATING SERVICE IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN, AT LEAST THROUGHOUT THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE AND THROUGHOUT RETAIL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES - IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN CONTINUING CAPABILITY FOR SUPPORT OF OUR NAVAL AIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS. WITH

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RESPECT TO WHOLESALE SUPPLY SUPPORT AND DEPOT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT, LOGISTICS STILL SHOULD BE A SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MOST ACFT/WEPS SYSTEMS, BUT THERE ARE CASES WHEN AGREEMENTS FOR INTER-SERVICE WHOLESALE SUPPLY (WISSA) AND DEPOT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT (DMISA) ARE QUITE APPROPRIATE, AND THE UH-1E IS ONE OF THEM.
6. (C) IN GENERAL, THE FOLLOWING POLICIES WITH REGARD TO SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LOGISTICS ARE BELIEVED SOUND AND SHOULD NOT BE ABROGATED WITHOUT CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF LONG-RANGE EFFECT. THEY ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW, TO ASSURE THAT THE CURRENT QUESTION OF UH-1E SUPPLY SUPPORT IS DETERMINED WITHIN THIS CONTEXT:--

A. THE SERVICE THAT ORIGINALLY DESIGNS, DEVELOPS, AND

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INITIALLY PROCURES A WEAPONS SYSTEM SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROCURE THE SYSTEM, PLUS SUPPORTING MATERIAL, NOT ONLY FOR ITSELF BUT ALSO FOR OTHER SERVICES THAT MAY LATER EMPLOY THE SAME WEAPONS SYSTEM. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE VERY REAL ADVANTAGES OF CONTINUING TECHNICAL AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT, THE MAJOR PROCUREMENT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ADMINISTERED BY THE ORIGINAL SERVICE, WITH

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INTER-SERVICE TRANSFER OF FUNDS VIA MILITARY INTER-SERVICE PROCUREMENT REQUEST (MIPR) WHEN ANOTHER SERVICE ENTERS THE PROCUREMENT PATTERN. TECHNICAL SUPPORT MAY AND SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BY LATER PROCURING SERVICES IF THEY ARE EMPLOYING THE WEAPONS SYSTEM IN SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY, BUT THE INITIAL PROCURING SERVICE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ITS OWN TECHNICAL SUPPORT SO LONG AS IT CONTINUES TO OPERATE THE WEAPONS SYSTEM.

B. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND FOR SPARES AND SPARE PARTS NEEDED TO SUCCESSFULLY MAINTAIN AND OPERATE A WEAPONS SYSTEM SHOULD BE COMPUTED, DETERMINED, BUDGETED AND FUNDED SEPARATELY BY EACH SERVICE THAT OPERATES THE SYSTEM. INTER-SERVICING OF REQUIREMENTS COMPUTATION, OR OF BUDGETING AND FUNDING FOR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, FOR ANY ACFT/WEPS SYSTEM SIMPLY DISSOLVES THE ELIMINATED SERVICE'S RESPONSIBILITY/AUTHORITY/CAPABILITY FOR SUPPORT OF THAT WEAPONS SYSTEM - BUT DOES NOT REDUCE ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCCESSFULLY OPERATING THE SYSTEM.

C. IN ORDER THAT EACH OPERATING SERVICE MAY COMPUTE

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AND DETERMINE ITS OWN REQUIREMENTS, IT IS NECESSARY THAT EACH ACCOMPLISH ITS OWN RETAIL LOGISTICS, I.E., THE LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY ACTIONS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT INTERMEDIATE AND ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE, WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES/CAPABILITIES OF ANY SERVICE THAT OPERATES ANY WEAPONS SYSTEM.

D. WITH REGARD TO COMMON ITEMS REQUIRED BY MORE THAN ONE SERVICE TO SUPPORT THE SAME (OR SIMILAR) WEAPONS SYSTEMS OPERATED IN TWO OR MORE SERVICES, IT IS FEASIBLE AND OFTEN MAY BE DESIRABLE TO ARRANGE FOR SINGLE PURCHASE PROCUREMENT OF ANNUAL/PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THESE COMMON REPEAT COMMON SPARES/SPARE PARTS.

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THIS GAINS THE ADVANTAGE OF ONE LARGE BUY IN THE MARKET PLACE, INSTEAD OF SEVERAL SMALLER BUYS. IN FACT, THIS ACHIEVES JUST ABOUT ALL THE ECONOMIES THAT ARE ACHIEVABLE THROUGH INTER-SERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT ACTION. ONCE PURCHASED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS STATED AND FUNDS PROVIDED BY EACH SERVICE, THE SINGLE PURCHASER SHOULD MAKE WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION AS DIRECTED BY EACH OPERATING SERVICE, AND EACH OPERATING SERVICE'S OWN SUPPLY SYSTEM THEN SHOULD MAKE OWN RETAIL DISTRIBUTION. THE ACTIONS IN THIS SUBPARA CAN AND SHOULD BE COVERED BY RWISSA@.

E. DEPOT INTER-SERVICE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AGREEMENTS (DMISA) ARE WARRANTED IN SOME CASES, AND THERE ARE SEVERAL IN OPERATION AT THE PRESENT TIME. HERE, HOWEVER, THE DEPOT OVERHAUL POINTS (DOP) OF EACH SERVICE SHOULD CONDUCT DEPOT MAINTENANCE FOR OWN SERVICE WHENEVER A SERVICE IS OPERATING A WEAPON SYSTEM IN SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO IF COMBAT AIRCRAFT OF COMPLEX CONFIGURATION ARE INVOLVED, IN ORDER THAT EACH SERVICE MAY NOT ONLY BE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS OWN IMPORTANT COMBAT EQUIPMENT BUT ALSO MAY MAINTAIN

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CONFIGURATION CONTROL, IN OWN DOP, FOR OWN SPECIFIC COMBAT OBJECTIVES.

F. COMNAVIAIRPAC DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY INTEREST, WHICH SOME AGENCIES ATTEMPT TO APPLY IN PROCUREMENT AND SUPPORT MATTERS, IS NECESSARILY SOUND, ALTHOUGH IT MAY HAVE VALIDITY IN SOME CASES. FOR AN EXAMPLE QUITE AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM FROM THE UH-1E, THE F-4 WEAPONS SYSTEM IS WORTH CONSIDERING. IT IS ONE WHICH BOTH USAF AND NAVAL AVIATION OPERATE IN LARGE QUANTITIES. IT IS A COMPLEX, VITAL AND MAJOR COMPONENT OF THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF EACH SERVICE. THE F-4 WEAPONS SYSTEM WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND PROCURED BY NAVY; HENCE, IT MAKES BEST SENSE TO CONTINUE NAVY PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION (WITH FUNDS FOR USAF PROCUREMENT TRANSFERRED BY MIPR TO NAVY); BUT IT MAKES BEST SENSE FOR EACH SERVICE TO

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CONDUCT ITS OWN WHOLESALE SUPPLY AND OWN DEPOT MAINTENANCE (REGARDLESS OF WHICH SERVICE MAY HAVE ARITHMETICAL @MAJORITY INTEREST@ AT SOME PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME), BECUASE EACH SERVICE HAS A VERY LARGE

PAGE THREE RUWJMUA0451 C O N F I D E N T I A L
COMMITMENT TO THE F-4 PROGRAM. OF COURSE, EACH SERVICE SHOULD AND DOES CONTINUE ITS OWN ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE AND SHOULD CONDUCT ITS OWN RETAIL SUPPLY. MOREOVER, EACH SERVICE SHOULD DETERMINE ITS OWN MATERIAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATING ITS OWN F-4 INVENTORY. (HOWEVER, THIS PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN BREACHED BY RECENT DECISIONS TO HAVE USAF COMPUTE AND DETERMINE REQTS FOR ABOUT 10,000 COMMON SUPPORT ITEMS, AND ALSO BUDGET, FUND AND PURCHASE THESE ITEMS FOR NAVAL AVIATION). INTER-SERVICE AGREEMENTS FOR F-4 SUPPLY SUPPORT OUGHT TO BE LIMITED TO WISSAS FOR SINGLE PURCHASE AND WHOLESALE DELIVERY, WHERE APPROPRIATE; AND DEPOT INTER-SERVICE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY LIMITED ONLY TO SUCH DEPOT SUPPORT AS MAY BE EFFICIENT AND APPROPRIATE AND IS SOUGHT BY BOTH SERVICES.
7. (C) THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION PREFACES A SPECIFIC REPLY TO THE REQUEST OF REFS A AND B FOR IN-COUNTRY UH-1E SUPPLY SUPPORT BY THE ARMY. THE UH-1E IS, SO TO SPEAK, AT THE OPPOSITE END OF THE SPECTRUM FROM F-4. IT IS NOT A COMPLEX COMBAT-CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT. IT WAS ORIGINALLY

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DESIGNED AND PROCURED BY AND FOR THE ARMY. ITS EMPLOYMENT IN NAVAL AVIATION IS NUMERICALLY A VERY SMALL FRACTION OF ARMY EMPLOYMENT (PERHAPS ONE TWENTIETH). THERE ARE NO UH-1E ACFT IN THE NAVY INVENTORY. HENCE, ARMY HAS FAR AND AWAY THE @MAJORITY INTEREST@ IN THE UH-1E ACFT SYSTEM. THEREFORE, NOT ONLY THE PRINCIPLE OF INITIAL DESIGN AND PROCUREMENT, BUT ALSO THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY INTEREST LEAN TOWARD ARMY SUPPORT OF ALL UH-1E ACFT. WE ALREADY HAVE AN ARMY/NAVY WISSA FOR UH-1E WHOLESALE SUPPLY SUPPORT AND A DMISA FOR UH-1E DEPOT MAINTENANCE. HOWEVER, TO DATE, NAVY (NAVAIRPAC/NAVAIRSYSCOM) HAS ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR RETAIL SUPPLY SUPPORT OF MARINE CORPS UH-1E AT THE OPERATING SITES, AND THE POLICIES OF REF C WERE ESTABLISHED ON THAT BASIS. IT IS NECESSARY THAT THEY BE MAINTAINED, IF WE ARE TO CONTINUE

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NAVY ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS PHASE OF SUPPORT OF USMC UH-1E AIRCRAFT.

8. (C) AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE IS THAT USMC UH-1E EMPLOYMENT IS ALONGSIDE AND QUITE SIMILAR TO ARMY UH-1E EMPLOYMENT, WHICH AS NOTED ABOVE IS IN FAR

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GREATER NUMBERS. IT MAY WELL BE THAT IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE UH-1E ACFT, IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE MARINE CORPS TO TURN ENTIRELY TO THE ARMY FOR ALL FACETS OF SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE, DEPOT OVERHAUL, TECHNICAL AND PUBLICATIONS SUPPORT FOR UH-1E ACFT. IN FACT, THERE IS INFORMAL INFORMATION AT THIS HQ THAT ASD (I&L) WILL SOON DIRECT THAT ARMY TAKE OVER ALL FACETS OF SUPPORT FOR ALL UH-1E ACFT, IN ALL SERVICES.
9. (C) THEREFORE, IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE UH-1E, COMNAVAIRPAC INTERPOSES NO OBJECTION IF THE MARINE CORPS DESIRES TO OBTAIN ALL SUPPORT FOR THE UH-1E AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING THE T-53 ENGINE, FROM THE ARMY INSTEAD OF FROM THE NAVY, EVEN THOUGH THIS STEP MIGHT TEND TO SEPARATE MARINE AVIATION FROM NAVY AVIATION FURTHER THAN HAS OCCURRED TO DATE. IT DOES APPEAR ALMOST INEVITABLE THAT INSOFAR AS THE UH-1E ACFT IS CONCERNED THE INTEGRATED NAVAL AERONAUTICAL ORGANIZATION WILL BE SPLIT FURTHER APART, AND PERHAPS IT HAD BETTER BE DONE NOW, BY ACCEDING TO THE REQUEST OF REFS A AND B AND BY POSITIVE MARINE CORPS ACTIONS, RATHER THAN BY HAVING IT DECREED LATER BY ASD (I&L).

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10. (C) IT SHOULD BE QUITE CLEAR TO ALCON, HOWEVER, THAT, ALTHOUGH COMNAVAIRPAC WITH NASC HELP IS WILLING AND ABLE TO SUPPORT MARINE UH-1E AIRCRAFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICIES ESTABLISHED IN REF C, IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT FEASIBLE TO SPLIT THE RETAIL SUPPLY FOR UH-1E ACFT INTO TWO CHANNELS - PART ARMY AND PART NAVY - AND YET MAINTAIN COMNAVAIRPAC'S CONTINUING ABILITY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR USMC UH-1E ACFT. SUCH A SPLIT OF COURSE WOULD REQUIRE MARINE SQUADRONS/WINGS TO DEAL WITH SUPPORT SYSTEMS OF TWO SERVICES. BUT, AS POINTED OUT ABOVE, THE MOST IMPORTANT EFFECT WOULD BE TO DEGRADE NAVY CAPABILITY TO MANAGE AND OPERATE A SUPPLY SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR USMC UH-1E, AND THIS IS WHAT WOULD MAKE IT INFEASIBLE TO CONTINUE OUR PRESENT SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES. THEREFORE,

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IF THE IN-COUNTRY SUPPLY SUPPORT PROCEDURES REQUESTED IN REFS A AND B ARE ESTABLISHED, THAT SHOULD BE ONLY THE FIRST STEP IN COMPLETE TRANSFER OF SUPPORT FOR USMC UH-1E ACFT FROM NAVY TO ARMY, AND SUCH COMPLETE TRANSFER SHOULD PROCEED PROMPTLY THEREAFTER.

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF THREE

11. (C) IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZED THAT UH-1E ACFT ARE A SPECIAL CASE BECAUSE OF:--

- A. ORIGINAL DESIGN AND PROCUREMENT FOR AND BY ARMY.
- B. COMPLETE QUANTITATIVE DOMINANCE OF THE UH-1E PROGRAM BY ARMY.
- C. NO UH-1E IN NAVY INVENTORY.
- D. ALREADY-ESTABLISHED ARMY WHOLESALE SUPPLY AND DEPOT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT.
- E. LIKELY OSD DIRECTIVE THAT ARMY WILL ASSUME UH-1E SUPPORT FOR ALL SERVICES.

12. (C) THEREFORE, COMNAVAIRPAC WOULD NOT AGREE THAT A SIMILAR TRANSFER OF SUPPORT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN THE CASE OF THE OV-10 (FOR EXAMPLE), BECAUSE (1) THE OV-10 WAS

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ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND PROCURED BY THE NAVY, (2) THERE IS NO CLEAR-CUT QUANTITATIVE DOMINANCE OF ANY SERVICE IN THE PROGRAM NOR IS THERE LIKELY TO BE, AND (3) IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE NAVY WILL BE OPERATING SOME OV-10 ACFT, EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE NO SUCH PLANS DURING THE FIRST FEW YEARS OF THE PROGRAM.

13. (C) IF DESIRED, COMNAVAIRPAC (WITH MUCH NASC/ASO HELP) WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE BEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR MARINE COPRS UH-1E IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY OF REF C. OR, IF CINCPACFLT CONCURS, COMNAVAIRPAC WILL QUITE WILLINGLY TURN OVER ALL USMC UH-1E SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY TO ARMY. BUT IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT FEASIBLE TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS, WITH USMC SEEKING RETAIL SUPPLY SUPPORT IN PART FROM ARMY AND IN PART FROM NAVY.

WARM REGARDS.

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S E C R E T

FOR ADM HYLAND INFO VADM BRINGLE AND LGEN BUSE FROM SMITH
ARG/SLF (U)

A. YOUR 230103Z OCT 1968

B. JCS 3092 152221Z OCT 1968 (NOTAL)

C. CINCPACFLT 092138Z OCT 1968 (NOTAL)

D. COMNAVFORV 230657Z OCT 1968 (PASEP)

1. (U) HERewith MY PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS PRIOR DEPARTING TWO DAYS TAD
DENVER COLO.

2. (S) FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS GOVERN MY THINKING:

A. JUSTIFICATIONS AMPHIB FORCE LEVELS NOW AND FUTURE DEPEND ON
AMPHIB TASKS/REQUIREMENTS (NOT LOGISTICS TASKS, WHICH WE HAVE HAD TO
TAKE ON BUT WHICH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (OSD) RULES OUT).

B. DRAFT PRES MEMO ON AMPHIB FORCES REPUTED TO GIVE PACFLT ASSAULT

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LIFT FOR THREE MEB AND LANT TWO MEB. OUR THIRD TO BE AVAILABLE FOR
DEPLOYMENT TO LANT. THIS SYSTEMS ANALYSIS EFFORT TO REDUCE THE AMPHIB
NAVY - MARINE CORPS TEAM IS A SERIOUS INROAD. IMPROPER UTILIZATION OF
ASSETS IN VIETNAM PROVIDES OSD MORE AMMUNITION.C. USMC HAS GREAT STAKE IN USING THIS READY CAPABILITY AND ALREADY
HAS SOME MEANS AT HAND PLUS SOME POSSIBLE HELP VIA JCS ACTION (REF B
HELD BY CINCPAC).D. MAINTAINING TWO ARGS IN WESTPAC IS VITAL TO JUSTIFICATION FOR
PACFLT ACQUISITION NEW ORLEANS (LPH-11) AS PERMANENT ASSET NOW NEAR
DECISION IN OPNAV.3. (S) PHIBPAC SHIP COB EXPECTED TO BE AT 88 PERCENT UNAUGMENTED
PEACETIME ALLOWANCE END CY 1968, WITH THE MOST CRITICAL SHORTAGES IN
CIC AND RADIO PERSONNEL, BUT MANNING COULD THEREAFTER INCREASE SLOWLY
IF EARLY SPECIAL INCREASED MANNING FOR PHIBPAC SHIPS (REF C) PROVIDED

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I REALIZE THAT WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP TWO FULL SQUADRONS DEPLOYED IN MOST OF CY 69 BUT IT WILL STILL BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE TWO ARG (THOUGH NOT THE MEB ASSAULT LIFT). I VISUALIZE THAT I WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP DEPLOYED TO COMSEVENTHFLT 1 AGC, 1 OR 2 AKA, 2 LPH, 6 LPD/LSD. THIS PROVIDES FOR 2 ARG PLUS 2 WETWELLS AND AKA ASSETS. TO PARTIALLY ALLEVIATE THE DOLLAR AND PERSONNEL SITUATION I NOW PROPOSE THE RETURN

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OF OKANOGAN (APA 220) AND MONTROSE (APA 212) AS SOON AS COMSEVENTHFLT WILL RELEASE.

4. (C) AS TO UTILIZATION OF ARG: IF SECOND ARG NOT PROVIDED A SLF, OUR SHIPS COULD TEMPORARILY PROVIDE MEDICAL SUPPORT ETC. (IN CASE OF LPH) AND WET WELLS CAN BE USED AS ALWAYS.

5. (S) ALTERNATIVELY WE COULD PROFITABLY EMPLOY SECOND ARG TO MOUNT A THIRTY DAY INDIAN OCEAN PRESENCE. THE USSR USES HELICOPTER CARRIER IN THIS MANNER IN MED. THIS PROPOSAL HAS BEEN EXPLORED AND DETAILS WILL BE PRESENTED DURING MY FORTHCOMING WESTPAC TRIP.

6. (C) OBVIOUSLY WE SHOULD SEEK TO REDUCE LOGISTICS TASKS IMPOSED ON PHIBPAC UNITS IN SEASIA PARTICULARLY TO EASE DEPLOYMENTS OF LST AND HELP THEM GET WELL. SPECIFICALLY I WOULD HOPE THE MACV 2-LST LOGSUP REQUIREMENT FOR THREE/FOUR CORPS COULD BE SHIFTED TO ARMY LCU AND INCREASED USE OF KOREAN MANNED MSTs LST. THIS SUBJECT ON SCHED CONFERENCE AGENDA.

7. (S) AS A RELATED ITEM, OPERATION LORDS, AS DISCUSSED REF D SHOULD UNCOVER SOME NEW LUCRATIVE TARGETS FOR ALL OUR FORCES. IF SO, THE ARG COULD BE PROFITABLY EMPLOYED IN IV CORPS UTILIZING WHATEVER GROUND TROOPS ARE AVAILABLE.

8. (C) CURRENTLY I HAVE 3 APA AND 1 AKA IN CONUS NON-DEPLOYING. THIS

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PROPOSAL FOR ADDITIONAL ECONOMY WOULD EVENTUALLY ADD 3 APA AND 3 APD TO NON-DEPLOYING STATUS. HOWEVER, IN AN EMERGENCY WHICH INCLUDES MOBILIZATION ALL BUT TWO SHIPS WOULD BE READY PROMPTLY. TALLADEGA (APA 208) AND SKAGIT (AKA 105) COULD BE READIED IN ABOUT 2 MONTHS.

9. (S) IN SUMMARY I STRONGLY RECOMMEND WE HOLD TO THE TWO ARG COMMITMENT AND PUSH FOR BETTER UTILIZATION WHILE REDUCING DEPLOYMENT AND DRAWING DOWN OTHER AMPHIB SHIPS UNTIL PERS SITUATION IMPROVES. I FURTHER RECOMMEND RETURNING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO A DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE THAT WILL SUPPORT PACOM CONTINGENCY PLANS.

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S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM GEN
CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
(DELIVERY DURING WORKING HOURS)

PROPOSED PROGRAM 6 DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES UNDER
ALTERNATIVE 3 (S)

- A. SECNAV MEMO OF 2 OCT 68 TO SEC DEF NOTAL
B. DEPSECDEF MEMO OF 12 OCT 68 TO SECNAV NOTAL
1. (S) REF A SUBMITTED PROPOSED REALIGNMENT OF MARCORPS
SEA FORCES TO MEET PROGRAM 6 CONSTRAINTS UNDER 89.5
CEILING. IN ADDITION REF A SUBMITTED TWO ALTERNATIVES
TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION AND REQUESTED, IN EFFECT, AN
OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT A THIRD ALTERNATIVE IN THE EVENT
ALTERNATIVES 1 AND 2 WERE DISAPPROVED. ALTHOUGH NO DE-
CISION ON ALTERNATIVES 1 AND 2 HAS BEEN RECEIVED, SUB-
MISSION OF THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE WAS DIRECTED BY REF B.

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA2620 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
FROM GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

2. (S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE YOU
WITH THE FORCE REALIGNMENT AND THE SUPPORTING RATIONALE
PROPOSED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS UNDER ALTERNATIVE 3 AND FOR-
WARDED TO SECNAV FOR SUBMISSION TO SECDEF. INSOFAR AS
POSSIBLE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS WERE INCORPORATED. MODI-
FICATIONS WERE MADE ONLY AS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE A SUB-
STANTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO THE 2100 INCREASE IN SVN PROPOSED
UNDER ALTERNATIVE TWO.

3. (S) THE FOLLOWING REALIGNMENT OF FORCES WAS PROPOSED. (S)
UNIT/AUGMENT SPACES

A. TO SVN	
HELO DOOR GUNNERS	121
DIV BASE SUPT AUG	638
WING AUG AIRFILED SECURITY	297
MATCU	68
ASRT	23
SVN SUBTOTAL	1147
B. TO OKINAWA	
TWO MED TANK COMPANIES	254
ARMED AMPHIB CO(-)	203

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FROM GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

AMTRAC BN (-)	713
DATA ANALYSTS	10
FLC 7TH SEP BULK FUEL CO	370
3RD FSR PERSONNEL	109
1ST AT BN (-)	273
3RD AT BN (-)	273
OKINAWA SUBTOTAL	2205
C. TO JAPAN	
WERS MWSG	251
DET H&MS VF/VA	22
" MABS VF/VA	29
VMA SQUADRON	260
JAPAN SUBTOTAL	562
D. TO CONUS (RETAIN)	
DET 5TH COMM BN	159
FLC	361
H&MS MWSG	32
HQ BTRY 1ST FAG	144
CMR PLT	78
AT CO (REINF)	105

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA2620 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
FROM GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DET FORCE RECON	18
HQBN 1ST & 3RD DIV T/O CHANGES	12
CONUS RETAIN SUBTOTAL	909
E. TO CONUS (DELETE)	
WING AUG COACT	43
WING AUG DISBURSING	12
SNMMS AUG	326
9TH MAB HQ	36
AIR FRT & PASS. TRN AUG	15
POSTAL AUG (AIR)	7
HQ FMFPAC FWD	11
HQ III MAF T/O CHANGES	43
WING AUG DECM	44
FLC PROV T/O	519
CONUS DELETE SUBTOTAL	1056
GRAND TOTAL	5879

4. (S) FOLLOWING SUMARIZES THE RATIONALE PROVIDED TTF
SECNAV FOR SUBMISSION TO SEC DEF:

A. PROPOSED REALIGNMENT OF FORCES UNDER REFERENCE
A FOR 89.5 CEILING REFLECTS BEST POSSIBLE FORCE MIX

CMC

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(13) MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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 ZNY CCCCC 25OCT68 2338Z
 P 252132Z OCT 68 ZFF-1 DRAFTED: C/S
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC RELEASED: C/S
 TO RUAMWC/CG FMFPAC (AM025)

(28)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM MAJGEN FONTANA
 SECT 1 OF 3

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF COMNAVAIRPAC 222312Z/OCT68
 (C) FOR YOU, INFO ADMIRAL HYLAND AND MAJGEN QUILTER,
 FROM VICE ADMIRAL SHINN, TRANSMITTED FOR INFORMATION.
 HAVE REQUESTED CHICK QUILTER TO FURNISH COMMENTS.
 PLAN TO HAVE A PROPOSED REPLY PREPARED UPON YOUR RETURN.

QUOTE:

T-53 ENGINE SUPPORT OF MARINE COPRS AVIATION UNITS BY
 US ARMY (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 110931Z OCT 68

B. YOUR 131903Z OCT 68

C. MY 281749Z AUG 67 NOTAL

1. (C) REF A REQUESTS INFO CONCERNING ARMY SUPPORT OF T-53
 ENGINE AND REQUESTS APPROVAL FOR FIRST MAW TO SUBMIT
 REPAIR PARTS REQMTS FOR T-53 ENGINE SUPPORT DIRECTLY TO

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 2865 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 ARMY 34TH SUPGRP, IN-COUNTRY. REF B CONCURS WITH THIS REQUEST.

2. (U) REF C AND REFS THERETO SET FORTH POLICY FOR SUPPLY
 SUPPORT OF UH-1E AIRCRAFT, WHICH INLCUDE T-53 ENGINES. THIS
 POLICY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT
 AT THE OPERATING LEVEL SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
 THE OPERATING SERVICE. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF SPECIAL
 CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASE OF THE UH-1E, THE POLICY PROVIDES
 FOR WHOLESALE SUPPLY SUPPORT BY MEANS OF AN ARMY/
 NAVY WHOLESALE INTER-SERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT AGREEMENT
 (WISSA) AND ALSO FOR DEPOT INTER-SERVICE MAINTENANCE
 SUPPORT BY MEANS OF AN ARMY/NAVY DEPOT MAINTENANCE
 INTER-SERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENT (DMISA).

3. (C) AT THE SQUADRON/WING LEVEL OF OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE,
 THE ESTABLISHED BY REF C UTILIZES NORMAL NAVAL
 AVIATION RETAIL SUPPLY SUPPORT CHANNELS FOR THE UH-1E, AND
 OF COURSE KEEPS ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE
 IN THE OPERATING SERVICE, I.E., THE MARINE COPRS.

4. (C) THE REQUEST OF REFS A AND B RAISES IMPORTANCE
 QUESTIONS IN NAVAL AVIATION LOGISTICS. THE DESIRE OF AN
 AIRCRAFT OPERATING ORGANIZATION TO USE WHATEVER SOURCES

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OF SUPPLY AND SPARE PARTS THAT MAY BE FOUND READILY AT HAND IS EASILY UNDERSTOOD AND WILL APPRECIATED. NEVERTHELESS, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT OTHER-THAN-NAVAL AVIATION SOURCES OF RETAIL SUPPLY MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE AT OTHER TIMES OR PLACES. MOREOVER, WHENEVER SUPPLY DEMAND IS PLACED UPON AND REGISTERED IN SOME SUPPLY SYSTEM OTHER-THAN-NAVAL AVIATION SUPPLY, THE ABSENCE OF THAT DEMAND FROM NAVAL AVIATION CHANNELS ELIMINATES THAT MUCH OF THE BASE FOR COMPUTING AND JUSTIFYING SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE BUDGETING AND FUNDING BASE FOR SPARES/SPARE PARTS FOR THAT WEAPONS SYSTEM IS CORRESPONDINGLY REDUCED, INSOFAR AS NAVAL AVIATION IS CONCERNED. OBVIOUSLY, THIS CHAIN OF EVENTS INEVITABLY DECREASES THE CONTINUING ABILITY OF THE NAVAL AVIATION SUPPLY SYSTEM TO SUPPORT ANY ACFT OR WEAPONS SYSTEM WHOSE SUPPLY DEMANDS ARE PLACES UPON OTHER-THAN-NAVAL-AVIATION SUPPLY SOURCES.

5. (U) FROM THE FOREGOING IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PRINCIPLE THAT "LOGISTIC SUPPORT IS A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OPERATING SERVICE" IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN, AT LEAST THROUGHOUT THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 2865 C O N F I D E N T I A L
LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE AND THROUGHOUT RETAIL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES - IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN CONTINUING CAPABILITY FOR SUPPORT OF OUR NAVAL AIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS. WITH RESPECT TO WHOLESALE SUPPLY SUPPORT AND DEPOT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT, LOGISTICS STILL SHOULD BE A SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MOST ACFT-WEPS SYSTEMS, BUT THERE ARE CASES WHEN AGREEMENTS FOR INTER-SERVICE WHOLESALE SUPPLY (WISSA) AND DEPOT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT (DMISA) ARE QUITE APPROPRIATE, AND THE UH-1E IS ONE OF THEM.

6. (C) IN GENERAL, THE FOLLOWING POLICIES WITH REGARD TO SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LOGISTICS ARE BELIEVED SOUND AND SHOULD NOT BE ABROGATED WITHOUT CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF LONG-RANGE EFFECT. THEY ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW, TO ASSURE THAT THE CURRENT QUESTION OF UH-1E SUPPLY SUPPORT IS DETERMINED WITHIN THIS CONTEXT:--

A. THE SERVICE THAT ORIGINALLY DESIGNS, DEVELOPS, AND INITIALLY PROCURES A WEAPONS SYSTEM SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROCURE THE SYSTEM, PLUS SUPPORTING MATERIAL, NOT ONLY FOR ITSELF BUT ALSO FOR OTHER SERVICES THAT MAY LATER EMPLOY THE SAME WEAPONS SYSTEM. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN

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THE VERY REAL ADVANTAGES OF CONTINUING TECHNICAL AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT, THE MAJOR PROCUREMENT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ADMINISTERED BY THE ORIGINAL SERVICE, WITH INTER-SERVICE TRANSFER OF FUNDS VIA MILITARY INTER-SERVICE PROCUREMENT REQUEST (MIPR) WHEN ANOTHER SERVICE ENTERS THE PROCUREMENT PATTERN. TECHNICAL SUPPORT MAY AND SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BY LATER PROCURING SERVICES IF THEY ARE EMPLOYING THE WEAPONS SYSTEM IN SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY, BUT THE INITIAL PROCURING SERVICE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ITS OWN TECHNICAL SUPPORT SO LONG AS IT CONTUNUES TO OPERATE THE WEAPONS SYSTEM.

B. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND FOR SPARES AND SPARES PARTS NEEDED TO SUCCESSFULLY MAINTAIN AND OPERATE A WEAPONS SYSTEM SHOULD BE COMPUTED, DETERMINED, BUDGETED AND FUNDED SEPARATELY BY EACH SERVICE THAT OPERATES THE SYSTEM. INTER-SERVICING OF REQUIREMENTS COMPUTATION, OR OF BUDGETING AND FUNDING FOR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, FOR ANY ACFT/WEPS SYSTEM SIMPLY DISSOLVES THE ELIMINATED SERVICE'S RESPONSIBILITY/AUTHORITY/CAPABILITY FOR SUPPORT OF THAT WEAPONS SYSTEM -

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA2865 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BUT DOES NOT REDUCE ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCCESSFULLY OPERATING THE SYSTEM.

C. IN ORDER THAT EACH OPERATING SERVICE MAY COMPUTE AND DETERMINE ITS OWN REQUIREMENTS, IT IS NECESSARY THAT EACH ACCOMPLISH ITS OWN RETAIL LOGISTICS, I.E., THE LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY ACTIONS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT INTERMEDIATE AND ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE, WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES/CAPABILITIES OF ANY SERVICE THAT OPERATES ANY WEAPONS SYSTEM.

D. WITH REGARD TO COMMON ITEMS REQUIRED BY MORE THAN ONE SERVICE TO SUPPORT THE SAME (OR SIMILAR) WEAPONS SYSTEMS OPERATED IN TWO OR MORE SERVICES, IT IS FEASIBLE AND OFTEN MAY BE DESIRABLE TO ARRANGE FOR SINGLE PURCHASE PROCUREMENT OF ANNUAL/PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THESE COMMON REPEAT COMMON SPARES/SPARE PARTS. THIS GAINS THE ADVANTAGE OF ONE LARGE BUY IN THE MARKET PLACE, INSTEAD OF SEVERAL SMALLER BUYS, IN FACT, THIS ACHIEVES JUST ABOUT ALL THE ECONOMIES THAT ARE ACHIEVABLE THROUGH INTER-SERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT ACTION. ONCE PURCHASED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3
REQUIREMENTS STATED AND FUNDS PROVIDED
BY EACH SERVICE,

THE SINGLE PURCHASER SHOULD MAKE WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION AS DIRECTED BY EACH OPERATING SERVICE, AND EACH OPERATING SERVICE'S OWN SUPPLY SYSTEM THEN SHOULD MAKE OWN RETAIL DISTRIBUTION. THE ACTIONS IN THIS SUBPARA CAN AND SHOULD BE COVERED BY "WISSA".

E. DEPOT INTER-SERVICE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AGREEMENTS (DMISA) ARE WARRANTED IN SOME CASES, AND THERE ARE SEVERAL IN OPERATION AT THE PRESENT TIME. HERE, HOWEVER, THE DEPOT OVERHAUL POINTS (DOP) OF EACH SERVICE SHOULD CONDUCT DEPOT MAINTENANCE FOR OWN SERVICE WHENEVER A SERVICE IS OPERATING A WEAPON SYSTEM IN SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY.

THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO IF COMBAT AIRCRAFT OF

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 2867 C O N F I D E N T I A L
COMPLEX CONFIGURATION ARE INVOLVED, IN ORDER THAT EACH SERVICE MAY NOT ONLY BE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS OWN IMPORTANT COMBAT EQUIPMENT BUT ALSO MAY MAINTAIN CONFIGURATION CONTROL, IN OWN DOP, FOR OWN SPECIFIC COMBAT OBJECTIVES.

F. COMNAVIAIRPAC DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF "MAJORITY INTEREST" WHICH SOME AGENCIES ATTEMPT TO APPLY IN PROCUREMENT AND SUPPORT MATTERS, IS NECESSARILY SOUND, ALTHOUGH IT MAY HAVE VALIDITY IN SOME CASES. FOR AN EXAMPLE QUITE AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM FROM THE UH-1E, THE F-4 WEAPONS SYSTEM IS WORTH CONSIDERING. IT IS ONE WHICH BOTH USAF AND NAVAL AVIATION OPERATE IN LARGE QUANTITIES. IT IS A COMPLEX, VITAL AND MAJOR COMPONENT OF THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF EACH SERVICE. THE F-4 WEAPONS SYSTEM WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND PROCURED BY NAVY; HENCE, IT MAKES BEST SENSE TO CONTINUE NAVY PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION (WITH FUNDS FOR USAF PROCUREMENT TRANSFERRED BY MIPR TO NAVY); BUT IT MAKES BEST SENSE FOR EACH SERVICE TO CONDUCT ITS OWN WHOLESALE SUPPLY AND OWN DEPOT

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MAINTENANCE (REGARDLESS OF WHICH SERVICE MAY HAVE ARITHMETICAL "MAJORITY INTEREST" AT SOME PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME), BECAUSE EACH SERVICE HAS A VERY LARGE COMMITMENT TO THE F-4 PROGRAM. OF COURSE, EACH SERVICE SHOULD AND DOES CONTINUE ITS OWN ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE AND SHOULD CONDUCT ITS OWN RETAIL SUPPLY. MOREOVER, EACH SERVICE SHOULD DETERMINE ITS OWN MATERIAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATING ITS OWN F-4 INVENTORY. (HOWEVER, THIS PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN BREACHED BY RECENT DECISIONS TO HAVE USAF COMPUTE AND DETERMINE REQTS FOR ABOUT 10,000 COMMON SUPPORT ITEMS, AND ALSO BUDGET, FUND AND PURCHASE THESE ITEMS FOR NAVAL AVIATION). INTER-SERVICE AGREEMENTS FOR F-4 SUPPLY SUPPORT OUGHT TO BE LIMITED TO WISSAS FOR SINGLE PURCHASE AND WHOLESALE DELIVERY, WHERE APPROPRIATE; AND DEPOT INTER-SERVICE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY LIMITED ONLY TO SUCH DEPOT SUPPORT AS MAY BE EFFICIENT AND APPROPRIATE AND IS SOUGHT BY BOTH SERVICES.
7. (C) THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION PREFACES A SPECIFIC REPLY TO THE REQUEST OF REFS A AND B FOR IN-COUNTRY UH-1E SUPPLY

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA2867 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUPPORT BY THE ARMY. THE UH-1E IS, SO TO SPEAK, AT THE OPPOSITE END OF THE SPECTRUM FROM F-4. IT IS NOT A COMPLEX COMBAT-CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT. IT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND PROCURED BY AND FOR THE ARMY. ITS EMPLOYMENT IN NAVAL AVIATION IS NUMERICALLY A VERY SMALL FRACTION OF ARMY EMPLOYMENT (PERHAPS ONE TWENTIETH). THERE ARE NO UH-1E ACFT IN THE NAVY INVENTORY. HENCE, ARMY HAS FAR AND AWAY THE "MAJORITY INTEREST" IN THE UH-1E ACFT SYSTEM. THEREFORE, NOT ONLY THE PRINCIPLE OF INITIAL DESIGN AND PROCUREMENT, BUT ALSO THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY INTEREST LEAN TOWARD ARMY SUPPORT OF ALL UH-1E ACFT. WE ALREADY HAVE AN ARMY/NAVY WISSA FOR UH-1E WHOLESALE SUPPLY SUPPORT AND A DMISA FOR UH-1E DEPOT MAINTENANCE. HOWEVER, TO DATE, NAVY (NAVAIRPAC/NAVAIRSYSCOM) HAS ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR RETAIL SUPPLY SUPPORT OF MARINE CORPS UH-1E AT THE OPERATING SITES, AND THE POLICIES OF REF C WERE ESTABLISHED ON THAT BASIS. IT IS NECESSARY THAT THEY BE MAINTAINED, IF WE ARE TO CONTINUE NAVY ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS PHASE OF SUPPORT OF USMC UH-1E AIRCRAFT.

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8. (C) AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE IS THAT USMC UH-1E EMPLOYMENT IS ALONGSIDE AND QUITE SIMILAR TO ARMY UH-1E EMPLOYMENT, WHICH AS NOTED ABOVE IS IN FAR GREATER NUMBERS. IT MAY WELL BE THAT IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE UH-1E ACFT, IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE MARINE CORPS TO TURN ENTIRELY TO THE ARMY FOR ALL FACETS OF SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE, DEPOT OVERHAUL, TECHNICAL AND PUBLICATIONS SUPPORT FOR UH-1E ACFT. IN FACT, THERE IS INFORMAL INFORMATION AT THIS HQ THAT ASD (I&L) WILL SOON DIRECT THAT ARMY TAKE OVER ALL FACETS OF SUPPORT FOR ALL UH-1E ACFT, IN ALL SERVICES.

9. (C) THEREFORE, IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE UH-1E, COMNAVAIRPAC INTERPOSES NO OBJECTION IF THE MARINE CORPS DESIRES TO OBTAIN ALL SUPPORT FOR THE UH-1E AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING THE T-53 ENGINE, FROM THE ARMY INSTEAD OF FROM THE NAVY, EVEN THOUGH THIS STEP MIGHT TEND TO SEPARATE MARINE AVIATION FROM NAVY AVIATION FURTHER THAT HAS OCCURRED TO DATE. IT DOES APPEAR ALMOST INEVITABLE THAT INSOFAR AS THE UH-1E ACFT IS CONCERNED THE "INTEGRATED NAVAL AERONAUTICAL ORGANIZATION" WILL BE SPLIT FURTHER APART, AND

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 2867 C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERHAPS IT HAD BETTER BE DONE NOW, BY ACCEDING TO THE REQUEST OF REFS A AND B AND BY POSITIVE MARINE CORPS ACTIONS, RATHER THAN BY HAVING IT DECREED LATER BY ASD (I&L).

10. (C) IT SHOULD BE QUITE CLEAR TO ALCON, HOWEVER, THAT, ALTHOUGH COMNAVAIRPAC WITH NASC HELP IS WILLING AND ABLE TO SUPPORT MARINE UH-1E AIRCRAFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICIES ESTABLISHED IN REF C, IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT FEASIBLE TO SPLIT THE RETAIL SUPPLY FOR UH-1E ACFT INTO TWO CHANNELS - PART ARMY AND PART NAVY - AND YET MAINTAIN COMNAVAIRPAC'S CONTINUING ABILITY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR USMC UH-1E ACFT. SUCH A SPLIT OF COURSE WOULD REQUIRE MARINE SQUADRONS/WINGS TO DEAL WITH SUPPORT SYSTEMS OF TWO SERVICES. BUT, AS POINTED OUT ABOVE, THE MOST IMPORTANT EFFECT WOULD BE TO DEGRADE NAVY CAPABILITY TO MANAGE AND OPERATE A SUPPLY SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR USMC UH-1E, AND THIS IS WHAT WOULD MAKE IT INFEASIBLE TO CONTINUE OUR PRESENT SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES. THEREFORE, IF THE IN-COUNTRY SUPPLY SUPPORT PROCEDURES REQUESTED IN REFS A AND B ARE ESTABLISHED, THAT SHOULD BE ONLY THE FIRST STEP IN COMPLETE TRANSFER OF SUPPORT FOR USMC UH-1E ACFT

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FROM NAVY TO ARMY, AND SUCH COMPLETE TRANSFER SHOULD
PROCEED PROMPTLY THEREAFTER.

11. (C) IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZED THAT UH-1E ACFT ARE A
SPECIAL CASE BECAUSE OF:--

- A. ORIGINAL DESIGN AND PROCUREMENT FOR AND BY ARMY.
- B. COMPLETE QUANTITATIVE DOMINANCE OF THE UH-1E
PROGRAM BY ARMY.
- C. NO UH-1E IN NAVY INVENTORY.
- D. ALREADY-ESTABLISHED ARMY WHOLESALE SUPPLY AND
DEPOT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT.
- E. LIKELY OSD DIRECTIVE THAT ARMY WILL ASSUME UH-1E
SUPPORT FOR ALL SERVICES.

12. (C) THEREFORE, COMNAVAIRPAC WOULD NOT AGREE THAT A
SIMILAR TRANSFER OF SUPPORT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CASE OF THE OV-10 (FOR EXAMPLE), BECAUSE (1) THE OV-10 WAS

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 2868 CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND PROCURED BY THE NAVY, (2) THERE
IS NO CLEAR-CUT QUANTITATIVE DOMINANCE OF ANY SERVICE
IN THE PROGRAM NOR IS THERE LIKELY TO BE, AND (3) IT NOW
APPEARS THAT THE NAVY WILL BE OPERATING SOME OV-10 ACFT, EVEN
THOUGH THERE WERE NO SUCH PLANS DURING THE FIRST FEW
YEARS OF THE PROGRAM.

13. (C) IF DESIRED, COMNAVAIRPAC (WITH MUCH NASC/ASO HELP)
WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE BEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR
MARINE CORPS UH-1E IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY OF
REF C. OR, IF CINCPACFLT CONCURS, COMNAVAIRPAC WILL
QUITE WILLINGLY TURN OVER ALL USMC UH-1E SUPPORT
RESPONSIBILITY TO ARMY. BUT IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT FEASIBLE
TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS, WITH USMC SEEKING RETAIL SUPPLY
SUPPORT IN PART FROM ARMY AND IN PART FROM NAVY.

WARM REGARDS.

UNQUOTE

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PP RUHKM RUMHLA RUMHVP
DE RHMM4FA3195 3010240
ZNY SSSSS
P 270234Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF DNG
TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC HAW
INFO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAW DNG
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S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE, INFO: MGEN YOUNGDALE,
MGEN DAVIS AND MGEN QUILTER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
AIR CAV CAPABILITIES FOR MARINE DIVISIONS (S)

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV 100740Z OCT 68 (PASEP) (S)
- B. CG FIRST MAW 121000Z OCT 68 (PASEP) (S)
- C. CG THIRD MARDIV 060230Z OCT 68 (PASEP) (S)
- D. CG III MAF 221106Z SEPT 68 (S)
- E. CG III MAF 250956Z OCT 68 (S)

1. (S) WORKING CLOSELY ALONGSIDE US ARMY CAV UNITS HAS PROVIDED III MAF
MARINES THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE AIR CAV OPERATIONS FIRST HAND. SEVERAL

ASPECTS OF THEIR OPERATIONS HAVE STIMULATED MARINE INTEREST, PARTICULARLY

THE AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS OF THE AIR CAV TROOP. IN ORDER TO
DETERMINE IF CERTAIN TECHNIQUES MIGHT BE USEFUL TO US, I ASKED THE

PAGE TWO RHMM4FA3195 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
COMMANDING GENERALS OF THE DIVISIONS AND THE FIRST WING TO GIVE ME
THEIR VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT. THEIR RESPONSES ARE REFS A, B, AND C WHICH
GENERALLY REFLECT A CONSENSUS ON THE FOLLOWING:

- A. INCREASED HELO RECON IS A VITAL COMBAT NEED.
- B. WE NEED MORE LIGHT HELOS TO DO THIS NECESSARY RECON JOB.
- C. THERE IS NOTHING FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG WITH OUR TACTICS: THE TWO
DIVISION COMMANDING GENERALS, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE DEDICATED
AIR GROUND RECON PACKAGE.
- D. WE SHOULD TRY THE AIR GROUND RECON PACKAGE ON A TEST
BASIS.

2. (S) I AM IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH THEIR VIEWS THAT INTENSIVE
AND FAR-RANGING HELICOPTER VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE IS A NEED THAT
IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. AND I ALSO AGREE THAT OUR PRESENT
HELICOPTER INVENTORY IS FAR TOO SMALL AND MADE UP OF MARGINAL
TYPES FOR THE OBSERVATION PACKAGE. REFS D AND E DOCUMENT THIS VIEW-
POINT. FURTHER, I CAN BE A VERY SUBSTANTIAL VALUE IN THE CON-
TRIBUTION BEING MADE BY THE AIR CAV RECON PACKAGE. VIEWED IN
THAT CONTEXT, THERE IS ONE CONSIDERATION THAT IS PARTICULARLY
PERTINENT: THE SPECIALLY DEDICATED RECON PACKAGE WORKS WELL
PROVIDING THERE ARE SUFFICIENT AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN

CG III MAF

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 3195 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR THE PACKAGE.

3. (S) BESIDES THE AIR CAV RECON CONCEPT, WE HAVE IN THE PAST EXAMINED U. S. ARMY AVIATION TECHNIQUES FOR MEDAVAC AND RECON TEAMS INSERTION AND EXTRACTION. IN EACH CASE WE CAME BACK TO THE SAME BASIC POINT: A HIGHLY RESPONSIVE SYSTEM, WHICH APPEARED ON THE SURFACE TO BE BASED ON SUPERIOR TECHNIQUES, WAS ACTUALLY MADE POSSIBLE BY HAVING RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE IN A DEDICATED PACKAGE.

4. (S) THE PRESENT SMALL NUMBER OF MARINE HELICOPTERS IN III MAF DOES NOT ALLOW SUCH DEDICATED PACKAGES WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE COMPENSATORY REDUCTIONS IN OTHER ESSENTIAL SUPPORT. IT IS POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE THE DIVISIONS, ON AN AVERAGE, WITH TWO HUEY SLICKS PER DAY AND EIGHT OR NINE HUEY GUNSHIPS. THOSE AIRCRAFT ARE EMPLOYED BY THE DIVISIONS AS THEY DEEM APPROPRIATE AND THE PRIORITIES FOR THEIR USE ARE SENT BY THE DIVISIONS THEMSELVES. IF THEY DESIRE TO USE THEM FOR RECONNAISSANCE THEY ARE FREE TO DO SO, BUT AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER MISSIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT HARDLY A DAY PASSES THAT MISSIONS DO NOT GO UNFULFILLED FOR SHORTAGE OF HELOS; THAT IS, DAILY, UNITS DO NOT RECEIVE RESUPPLY, SCHEDULED TROOP LIFTS ARE NOT MADE, OR RECON

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 3195 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR TEAM INSERTS OR EXTRACTIONS ARE NOT COMPLETED, FOR LACK OF HUEY GUNSHIPS. THUS, UNLESS WE RECEIVE ADDITIONAL NUMBERS OF SLICKS AND GUNSHIPS, DEDICATION OF A SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE PACKAGE WOULD DRAWDOWN ON THE PRESENT DIVISION ALLOCATION TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL. ESTABLISHMENT OF A RECON PACKAGE ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF THE AIR CAV TROOP, WOULD REQUIRE VIRTUALLY ALL THE SLICKS AND GUNSHIPS NOW BEING ALLOCATED DAILY TO BOTH DIVISIONS.

5. (S) ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING THIS IS MY APPRAISAL OF AIR GROUND RECON PACKAGE: THE TYPE RECONNAISSANCE UNDER CONSIDERATION IS ESSENTIAL TO THE COMBAT SITUATION IN RVN, BUT IT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED IN THE MARINE DIVISIONS BY MARINE WING AIRCRAFT BECAUSE OF SHORTAGES OF LIGHT TRANSPORT AND GUNSHIP HELICOPTERS. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND:

(1) IMMEDIATE ACTION BE TAKEN TO PROCURE ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER ASSETS INDICATED REFS D AND E.

(2) THAT THE AIR CAV CONCEPT FOR MARINE DIVISION BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL SUFFICIENT LIGHT TRANSPORT AND GUNSHIPS HELICOPTERS ARE AVAILABLE.

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CG III MAF

P 270234Z OCT 68

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(15)

FOR

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HEADQUARTERS
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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VV YHB662NNQVNVV YJA466VV SYA958
PTTSZYUW RUYJSYA1898 3010336-SSSS--RUYHSYA.
ZNYSSSSS

P 270336Z OCT 68

FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUYHSYB/CINCPACFLT
RUYGSAF/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUKRSYH/COMPHIBPAC

INFO RUYHSYA/ADMINO FMFPAC
BT

S E C R E T

FOR ADM HYLAND, VADM BRINGLE AND RADM SMITH, INFO MAGGEN FONTANA
FROM LTGEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
ARG/SLF (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 230103Z OCT 68 (S)

B. COMNAVFORV 230657Z OCT 68 (S)

1. (S) I HAVE BEEN CONTINUOUSLY AWARE OF AND APPRECIATE THE
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED IN REF ALFA. FROM THE TIME OF ACTIVATION OF
THE 2ND SLF IN APR 67, THROUGH THE PERIOD ENDING IN JAN 68 THE
ARG/SLF'S PROVED THEIR VALUE AS EVIDENCED IN THE ARG/SLF STUDY
CONDUCTED IN FEB 68 AT THE DIRECTION OF CINCPAC. HOWEVER, SINCE
JAN 68 THE TRUE CAPABILITIES OF THE ARG/SLF HAVE LARGELY BEEN
UNEXPLOITED.

PAGE 2 RUYJSYA1898 **S E C R E T**

2. (S) DURING MY VISIT TO SVN, BOB CUSHMAN AND I DISCUSSED THIS
MATTER OVER LUNCH WITH BUSH BRINGLE ABOARD HIS FLAGSHIP ON 21
OCT. WE AGREED THAT THERE IS A PROBLEM: BUT NOT ONE THAT IS IN-
SURMOUNTABLE. AS YOU KNOW, ARG/SLF ALFA IS NOW ENGAGED IN AN
OPERATION SOUTH OF DANANG WHICH IS DESIGNED TO INTERDICT ENEMY
LOC'S INTO THE DANANG AREA. THE PRESENT REDUCED LEVEL OF
OPERATIONS IN ICTZ HOPEFULLY WILL PRECLUDE UNSCHEDULED ASHORE
RETENTION, FOR PROLONGED PERIODS, OF SLF'S AFTER AM-
PHIBIOUS COMMITMENT AND THUS PAVE THE WAY FOR RETURN TO NORMAL
ARG/SLF OPERATIONS. BOB PLANS TO EMPLOY BOTH ARG'S AND BOTH SLF'S
IN SERIES OF OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH NEW PACIFICATION
CAMPAIGN STARTING 1 NOV.

3. (S) IN REF B, WHICH WAS PASSED TO ME BY VICTOR SMITH, BUD
ZUMWALT'S CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT COULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE
APPROPRIATE TARGETS FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. THE EMPLOYMENT OF
ARG/SLF'S IS JUST AS FEASIBLE IN II, III AND IV CORPS AS IN ICTZ
AS LONG AS TARGETS EXIST AND NWP 22B IS FOLLOWED BY MACV AND THE
CORPS COMMANDERS.

4. (S) CONCURRENTLY, THE FLEET RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CONTINGENCY
AREAS SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED. THERE ARE AT LEAST TEN CURRENT

CG FMFPAC

P 270336Z/OCT 68

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VV YHB681YGA441
VCZCSHB517
RTTSZYUW RUYGSAF4014 3010402-SSSS--RUYHSYA.
ZNY SSSSS ZYO RUYGSHH
R 270402Z OCT 68
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO RUYHSYB/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUKRSYH/COMPHIBPAC
RUYHSYA/CG FMFPAC
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FOR ADM HYLAND INFO VADM SMITH & LTGEN BUSE FROM BRINGLE
ARG/SLF (U)

- A. CINCPACFLT 230103Z OCT 68
B. COMPHIBPAC 232345Z OCT 68

1. LIKE YOU, I HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH THE CONTINUED DECLINE IN THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARG/SLF IN A PRODUCTIVE MANNER IN THE WAR IN SVN. IT HAS BEEN, AND STILL IS MY OPINION THAT THE ARG/SLF OFFERS UNIQUE COMBINATION OF FORCE WHICH PRESENTS AN ASSET TO THE IN-COUNTRY COMMANDER WHICH COULD BE USED TO GAIN INITIATIVE, SURPRISE AND LOCAL CONCENTRATION OF MASS. UNFORTUNATELY THIS ASSET HAS NOT BEEN EXPLOITED AND THE TWO BLTS HAVE BECOME LITTLE MORE THAN IN-COUNTRY ASSETS, EMPLOYED ESSENTIALLY AS MANEUVER BATTALIONS.

PAGE TWO RUYGSAF4014 **SECRET**

THE SHIPS OF THE ARG ACT AS LITTLE MORE THAN MAINTENANCE BASES FOR THE HELOS AND LOGISTICS BASES FOR THE SLFS.

2. WHILE JUSTIFICATION OF AMPHIB FORCE LEVELS DEPENDS UPON AMPHIB TASKS AND REQUIREMENTS AS STATED BY VICTOR SMITH, I BELIEVE WE WOULD BE ILL ADVISED TO HANG OUR ARGUMENTS FOR SUCH ON THE MAINTENANCE OF TWO ARG IN WESTPAC UNDER THE PRESENT USAGE.

SUCH AN ARGUMENT COULD EASILY WORK AGAINST US IF THE ACTUAL OPERATIONS OF THE ARG WERE EXPLORED. AN ARG/SLF CREDIBILITY GAP IS A REAL POSSIBILITY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. IN REF B VIC SMITH DISCUSSES THE REDUCTION OF LOGISTICS TYPE TASKS BEING CARRIED BY AMPHIB FORCES IN SEVENTHFLT AND PROPOSED THAT THESE TASKS BE REDUCED IN ORDER TO BETTER SUPPORT THE ARG. THIS IS A WORTHY OBJECTIVE, BUT IT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO REFUSE COMUSMACV REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE PAST AND PROBABLY WILL NOT IN THE FUTURE. ANY SUCH REFUSAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT AN AMPHIB CAPABILITY MUST BE MAINTAINED, IN THE FACE OF A REAL LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS BY MACV WILL OPEN US TO CRITICISM BY MACV AND CINCPAC AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF OPCON OF A PORTION OF OUR FORCES.

4. SUSTAINED OPTIMISM FOR GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT OF THE TWO ARGS

COMSEVENTHFLT

R 270402Z OCT 68

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PAGE THREE RUYGSAF4014 S E C R E T

IN THE FACE OF IMPROPER EMPLOYMENT OF WELL OVER A YEAR IS NOT EASY. THERE IS A SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT NOTED IN THE USAGE OF THE ARG/SLF IN THE PRESENT EAGER HUNTER OPERATION. HOWEVER, THIS IN ITSELF IS NOT SUFFICIENT REASON FOR ASSUMING THAT WE CAN PROPERLY USE TWO DEPLOYED ARGS IN THE YEAR AHEAD.

5. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE DOLLAR SHORTAGE, THE PHIBPAC PERSONNEL SITUATION AND UNLESS SOME POSITIVE INDICATION IS FORTHCOMING AS TO RESTORATION OF THE SEVENTH FLEET MARINE FORCE, I CONSIDER, WITH RELUCTANCE, THAT A REDUCTION OF SEVENTH FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCES TO THE POST-HOSTILITIES CONCEPT OF ONE ARG IN WESTPAC AND TWO IN EASTPAC WOULD BE IN ORDER. REGARDLESS OF HOW THIS IS HANDLED, I PLAN TO DISCUSS THE ARG SEATAIL AT THE FORTHCOMING SKED CONFERENCE WITH A VIEW TOWARD ELIMINATION TO THE SEATAIL OF BOTH GROUPS.

6. BEST REGARDS.

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COMSEVENTHFLT

R 270402Z OCT 68

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P 271536Z OCT 68
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TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION I OF III
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. FOL MSGS ARE REFS A,B,C, RESPECTIVELY, IN
MY 270234Z OCT 68: QUOTE
P 100740Z OCT 68
FM CG FIRST-MARDIV
TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MAW
RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN: INFO MGEN QUILTER AND
MGEN DAVIS FROM MGEN YOUNGDALE
AIRCAV CAPABILITIES FOR MAR DIVISIONS (U)
A. CG III MAF 010652Z OCT68 (SECRET SPECAT)
1. (C) IN ARRIVING AT MY OPINION ON SUBJECT I HAVE CONSIDERED THE

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 3286 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
FOLLOWING FACETS OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
AS A FRAME OF REFERENCE:

A. LARGE SUBORDINATE UNIT AO'S EXTENDING OUT FROM A GENERALLY
FLAT PIEDMONT TO A RUGGED CANOPY MOUNTAINOUS REGION WITH NUMEROUS
VALLEY APPROACHES INTO THE DANANG PLAINS.

B. AN ENEMY WHO USES THE CANOAPY CONCEALMENT FROM WHICH TO
SUSTAIN INFILTRATION OF SMALL UNITS FOR FLEETING HARRASSING GROUND/
MORTAR/ROCKET ATKS AND AVOIDANCE OF MASS EXCEPT AT HIS CHOOSING
FOR DELIBERATE COORDINATED GROUND ATKS SUCH AS TET OR THE ABORTIVE
AUGUST OFFENSIVE.

C. A DIVISION CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO DENY EN
PENETRATION OF A CLOSE IN BELT OF SATURATION COUNTER INFILTRATION/
ROCKET PATROLS WHILE CONCURRENTLY CONDUCTING WIDE RANGING OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS IN THE DEEP APPROACHES TO FIND, FIX AND DESTROY HIM.
THE CONCEPT PLACES A PREMIUM ON THE ABILITY TO FIND AND THEN
RAPIDLY REACT WITH FIRE AND MANEUVER OVER GREAT DISTANCES TO FIX
AND DESTROY THE ENEMY. HELICOPTERS ARE AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT TO
THE SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF THE CONCEPT.

D. AN INADEQUATE AVAILABILITY OF HELICOPTERS AS TO NUMBER AND
TYPE TO EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

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SECRET ACTN: S/SEC 1-7
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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 3286 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

E. LIMITED MANEUVER FORCES WITH WHICH TO EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT THE CONCEPT.

2. (C) DURING THE PERIOD 1-17 AUGUST 68 1ST MARDIV EXERCISED OPCON OF AN AIR CAV TROOP WHICH WAS EMPLOYED PRINCIPALLY IN THE AN HOA BASIN/ARIZONA AREA BY THE 5TH MARINES. THIS HELO SEARCH AND ATTACK PACKAGE WITH ITS ORGANIC INFANTRY/RECON PLATOON AND GUNSHIPS WAS MOST SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYED. SPECIFIC TACTICAL ADVANTAGES IN THIS EMPLOYMENT WERE:

A. IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY/RESPONSIVENESS TO THE INFANTRY REGIMENTAL COMMANDER.

B. ORGANIC AIRBORNE HUNTER/KILLER CAPABILITY OF THE AIR CAV TROOP WHICH PERMITTED TARGET ACQUISITION AND IMMEDIATE REACTION. THIS INCLUDED HELO OBS AND GUNSHIPS FLYING LOW OVER FLAT PIEDMONT IN A FIND AND DESTROY ROLE, AND UH-1E TROOP CARRIERS COMBINED WITH OBS AND GUNSHIPS IN A FIND, FIX AND DESTROY ROLE UTILIZING THE HIGHLY TRAINED INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE UNIT IN HELO INSERTED LIMITED GROUND ASSAULTS SUPPORTED BY GUNSHIPS TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY SMALL GROUPS OF VC/NVA OVER A WIDE AREA. ON 1 AUG BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0700-1400 EMPLOYING THESE TACTICS ALFA TROOP 1/9 ACD OBTAINED 79 VC/NVA KIA.

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 3286 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

C. SIMPLIFIED COMMAND AND CONTROL ARISING FROM THE MARRIAGE OF INFANTRY RECON AND HELO OBSERVATION, ASSAULT TROOP CARRIER AND GUNSHIPS INTO AN ORGANIC SPECIALLY TRAINED TEAM REQUIRING LITTLE OR NO ADVANCE PLANNING OR COORDINATION TO BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED.

3. (S) IN VIEW OF FOREGOING I AM OF OPINION THAT INTRODUCTION OF A CAPABILITY SIMILAR TO THE AIR CAV CONCEPT INTO OUR MARINE FORCES IS DESIREABLE. TO ACHIEVE THIS CAPABILITY WILL REQUIRE A STUDY IN DEPTH OF THE CURRENT HELO MIX TO OBTAIN THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE LIGHT OBS/ASSAULT/GUNSHIP ASSETS REQUIRED. I SEE LITTLE OR NO PROBLEM IN RESOLVING THE APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH OR COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENT FOR SUCH AN ORGANIZATION AS PART OF OUR AIR GROUND CONCEPT. TO DO SO WITHIN EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE LIMITATIONS WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT NECESSARY.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY IT IS MY VIEW THAT:

A. WE ARE OPERATING OVER DISTANCES AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS WHICH REQUIRE MAXIMUM AIR MOBILITY IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE INFANTRY STRENGTH AT THE PROPER PLACE AND TIME.

B. THE ENEMY EMPLOYS A TACTIC OF INFILTRATION/HARRASSEMENT WHICH EXPLOITS THE THIN DISTRIBUTION OF OUR FORCES AND MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO INTERDICT HIM.

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PAGE FIVE RHMMFA 3286 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

C. THE HELICOPTER AFFORDS US THE BEST MEANS TO COMPENSATE FOR OUR DISPERSION AND THE ONLY MEANS TO CONCENTRATE OUR MANEUVER ELEMENTS RAPIDLY AGAINST A FLEBOKNG ENEMY.

D. TECHNIQUES OF EMPLOYMENT COMBINED WITH LIMITED AVAILABILITY AND TYPES OF HELICOPTERS ARE NOW DENYING US THE RESPONSIVENESS REQUIRED TO EFFECTIVELY COUNTER THE PROBLEMS OF DISTANCE AND ENEMY TACTIC.

E. THE AIR CAV ORGANIZATION AND COMCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT IS A LOGICAL, DESIREABLE AND ATTAINABLE SOLUTION TO SOME OF THE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION.

5. (S) I RECOMMEND THAT ON A TRIAL BASIS IN ORDER TO VALIDATE OUR LIMITED EXPERIENCE AND OPINIONS 1ST MAW IN COORDINATION WITH 1ST AND 3D MARDIV ESTABLISH A HELO/RECON/ASSAULT TEAM AND PASS IT TO THE OPCON OF EACH DIV FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF COMBAT EMPLOYMENT I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF OUR LIMITED HELO ASSETS HOWEVER SUCH AN APPROACH IN MY JUDGMENT WOULD BE WORTH SOME SACRFICE.

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QUOTE

PAGE SIX RHMMFA 3286 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

P 121000Z OCT 68

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF

INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN; INFO MAJGEN YOUNGDALE AND MAJGEN DAVIS FM MAJGEN QUILTER

AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS (U)

A. CG III MAF 010652Z OCT 68

B. CG FIRST MAW 130740Z JUL 68

C. CG III MAF 221106Z SEP 68

D. CG III MAF 250038Z MAR 68

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED A RE-EVALUATION OF OUR RECON AND REACTION STRUCTURE AND COMMENTS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF INTRODUCING IN OUR MARINE FORCES AN ORGANIZATION SIMILAR TO AN AIR CAV SQUADRON.

(2). (S) REF B REPORTED ON FIRST MAW PILOTS GROSS TRAINING EXPERIENCES WITH THE FIRST AIR CAV DIV. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE AIR CAV
BT

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION II OF III
SQUADRON WAS AN ORGANIZATION PLACING IN ONE UNIT DEDICATED FORCES
WHICH PERFORM THE SAME BASIC MISSION AS DO THE MARINE CORPS TASK
ORGANIZED SPARROW HAWKS AND BALD EAGLES. THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE
NOTED WAS IN THE LARGE NUMBER OF LIGHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS
AVAILABLE TO THE AIR CAV TROOP. THE READY AVAILABILITY OF LIGHT
OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS PERMITTED THEIR WIDESPREAD UTILIZATION IN
SEARCHING OUT ENEMY FORCES TO A DEGREE NOT POSSIBLE FOR MARINE
CORPS FORCES WITH LIMITED OBSERVATION ASSETS. BASED ON THIS EX-
PERIENCE IT APPEARS THAT WITH SUFFICIENT OBSERVATION ASSETS THE
MARINE CORPS COULD TASK ORGANIZE UNITS ALONG AIR CAV SQUADRON LINES
AS REQUIRED WITHOUT DEDICATING FORCES TO IT WHEN NOT NEEDED.
3. (S) THE INADEQUATE QUANTITY OF MARINE AIR OBSERVATION ASSETS
IN RVN HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY ADDRESSED WITH REF C THE MOST RECENT
STATEMENT OF MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. THE NATURE OF CONFLICT IN RVN

PAGE TWO RHMMFA 3287 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
REQUIRES SUBSTANTIALLY MORE OBSERVATION ASSETS THAN WE HAVE BEEN
ABLE TO JUSTIFY SUFFICIENTLY FOR ACQUISITION TO DATE. A FACTOR IN
OUR PAST FAILURE TO PROCURE ADEQUATE OBSERVATION ASSETS FOR RVN
APPEARS TO BE THE GREAT DISPARITY BETWEEN OUR CURRENT REQUIREMENTS
AND THOSE NORMAL TO OUR INHERENT AMPHIBIOUS MISSION. IN THIS
REGARD, REF C IS STILL RATHER MODEST IN ITS STATEMENT OF OUR RE-
QUIREMENTS AND DOES NOT PROVIDE ASSETS FOR MORE THAN VERY LIMITED
APPLICATION OF THE AIR CAV SQUADRON CONCEPT.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT:

- A. OUR AMPHIBIOUS ORIENTED FORCE STRUCTURE IS BASICALLY SOUND
AND HAS THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY TO TASK ORGANIZE FOR SPECIAL
COMBAT OPERATIONS INCLUDING THOSE PERFORMED BY THE AIR CAV SQUADRON.
- B. WE CONTINUE TO BE CRITICALLY SHORT OF AIR OBSERVATION ASSETS.
- C. THE RATIONALE CONTAINED IN REF D IS STILL VALID.

5. (S) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:

- A. WE VIGOROUSLY PURSUE THE ACQUISITION OF AIR OBSERVATION
ASSETS ADEQUATE FOR EFFICIENT PROSECUTION OF THE TYPE WARFARE IN
WHICH WE ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO
ACCOMPLISH THIS PRIOR TO THE NEXT GOOD WEATHER SEASON COMMENCING IN
APRIL 1969.

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PAGE THREE RHMMFA 3287 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
B. SUCH ASSETS AS ARE NOT NORMALLY REQUIRED FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AND PROCURED AS TEMPORARY FORCE STRUCTURE.
C. SPARROW HAWK/BALD EAGLE OPERATIONS BE CONTINUED. THEY SHOULD BE EXPANDED AS LUCRATIVE TARGETS ARE DEVELOPED WHEN ADDITIONAL VR ASSETS BECOME AVAILABLE.

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O 060230Z OCT 68
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO RHMMFA/CG III MAF
INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

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S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN; INFO MGEN QUILTER
AND MGEN YOUNGDALE FM MGEN DAVIS
AIRCAV CAPABILITIES FOR MARINE DIVISIONS
A. CG III MAF 010650Z OCT68 (SECRET SPECAT)

PAGE FOUR RHMMFA 3287 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
1. I CONSIDER A CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT TO AN AIR CAVALRY TROOP THE MOST URGENT, COMBAT ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT NOW LACKING FOR PROPER SUPPORT OF THIS DIVISION. I PERSONALLY, AND MY ENTIRE STAFF, ARE CONVINCED THAT THE LACK OF SUCH A CAPABILITY HAS RESULTED AND IS CONTINUING TO RESULT IN GREATER PERSONNEL AND HELICOPTER LOSSES THAN NECESSARY WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SERIOUSLY INHIBITING OUR CAPABILITY TO FIND, FIX AND DESTROY THE ENEMY.
A. OUR FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS, OF COURSE, THE UTTER INADEQUACY IN NUMBERS, TYPES AND MODERNITY OF THE LIGHT HELICOPTER/VISUAL RECCE ASSETS AVAILABLE TO FMAW FOR SUPPORT OF THE MARINE DIVISION.
B. DELIBERATLY PLANNED, LOW ALTITUDE HELICOPTER RECONNAISSANCE CAN, BETTER THAN ANY OTHER MEANS, DETECT ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AND NEAR HLZ'S AND THE APPROACHES THERETO. A TROOP OF THE AIRCAV HAS BEEN MOST SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYED IN THIS ROLE SEVERAL TIMES IN SUPPORT OF 3D MARDIV. NO AIRCAV HELICOPTER HAS BEEN LOST DURING THESE OPERATIONS. NO MARINE HELICOPTER HAS YET BEEN LOST ENEMY ACTION IN A ZONE THOROUGHLY RECONNOITERED AT LOW ALTITUDE BY AN AIRCAV TROOP. THE KEY FACTOR APPEARS TO BE AN ADEQUATE DENSITY OF MODERN ARMED AND OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS OVER THE AREA TO BE RECONNOITERED.
C. THERE ARE A VARIETY OF OTHER RECONNAISSANCE TASKS WHICH ARE

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PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 3287 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
ALSO BEST ACCOMPLISHED BY LOW ALTITUDE HELO RECCE, A TECHNIQUE WHICH SELECTIVELY UTILIZED, IS COMPLEMENTARY TO THE RECCE TECHNIQUES CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY THE MARINE CORPS.

D. IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THIS DIVISIONS AO, HELO SEARCH AND ATTACK AGAINST FLEETING PERSONNEL TARGETS IS THE METHOD OF CHOICE FOR INFLECTING ATTRITION ON THE ENEMY'S FORCES.

F. IN THE AIRCAV TROOP, THE CLOSE MARRIAGE OF LIMITED GROUND RECCE/COMBAT CAPABILITIES WITH HELICOPTER RECCE/ATTACK CAPABILITIES OFFERS A FASTER REACTION TIME, REDUCED COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES AND BETTER INTEGRATION OF THE ELEMENTS INVOLVED THAN CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH OUR PRESENT SPARROW HAWK CONCEPT.

2. ACHIEVEMENT OF AN EQUIVALENT (AND IN FACT SUPERIOR) AIR CAVALRY TYPE CAPABILITY REPRESENTS NOTHING MORE THAN AN EXTENSION OF THE OFTEN STATED MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE OF MAXIMUM INTEGRATION AND OPTIMUM UTILIZATION OF AIR AND GROUND RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE COMMON GOALS. THE GROUND ELEMENT CAN BE PROVIDED FROM EXISTING RECON RESOURCES OF THE DIVISION. AIR ASSETS WILL REQUIRE NEW EQUIPMENT WHICH IS URGENTLY NEEDED IN ANY EVENT.

A. AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE I SUGGEST CONSIDERATION OF A LIGHT HELO/OBSERVATION GROUP IN SUPPORT OF EACH MARDIV WITH THREE

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 3287 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
SQUADRONS EQUIPED AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) VMO O-1 AND OV10
- (2) HMAO AH-1 AND OH6/OH 58 (LOH)
- (3) HML UH-1H OR UH1E (TUG CONVERSION)

B. THE AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY WOULD BE TASK ORGANIZED BY PASSING OPCON OF GROUND RECON ASSETS AS REQUIRED TO THE LIGHT HELO GROUP COMMANDER WHO WOULD HAVE OVERALL CONTROL OF THIS EFFORT.

3. MY DIVISION'S EXPERIENCES INDICATE QUITE CLEARLY THAT WE MUST HAVE LOH AND UH-1H TYPE HELICOPTERS. THE OTHER AIRCRAFT TYPES ARE EITHER ON HAND OR ON THE WAY IN AT LEAST MINIMALLY ADEQUATE NUMBERS.

4. CONCERNING COST AND FORCE LEVEL IMPLICATIONS:

A. THE LOH IS EXTREMELY CHEAP TO BUY AND MAINTAIN. THIS DIVISION'S ENTIRE REQUIREMENT WOULD COST LESS THAN ONE CH-53.

B. THE CURRENT UH-1E CANNOT SAFELY PERFORM THE HML MISSION IN THIS AO. IT HAS TO BE REPLACED. THE PRICE OF THE UH1H IS MODERATE. IT'S AVAILABILITY WILL REDUCE DEMANDS ON AND LOSSES TO THE CH-46 WHICH MAY WELL MAKE IT A SELF FUNDING PROPOSITION.

C. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE THE ONLY UNPROGRAMMED ADDITIONAL
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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION III OF III
PILOT REQUIREMENT WOULD BE FOR THE LCH. IT WOULD SEEM THAT A
DRAW DOWN FROM SQUADRONS EXPERIENCING MAINTAINANCE DIFFICULTIES
COULD OVERFILL THE REQUIREMENT.

5. FOR THE LONGER TERM THERE ARE A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE APPROACHES
TO WHATEVER PARTICULAR FORCE LEVEL OR FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
ARE APPLIES; HOWEVER, THE CONTRAL POINT REMAINS THAT WE MUST HAVE
A MODERN LIGHT HELICOPTER MIX AND THE CAPABILITIES (INCLUDING
AIRCAV TYPE OPERATIONS) SUCH A FORCE PROVIDES.

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DE RUEBHOA4401 3041733
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P 301721Z OCT 68
FM CMC
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

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AGA REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT (U)

A. ADMINO FMFPAC 262228Z OCT 68

B. CMC 201835Z SEP 68

C. CG FMFPAC 272101Z SEP 68

D. CG FIRST MAW 080415Z OCT 68

1. (S) CONCUR WITH VIEW THAT AGA AVAILABILITY MUST BE KEPT HIGH DURING MONSOON SEASON. WE WERE MADE AWARE OF SERIOUS ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS IN VMA(AW) 242 ACFT AFTER ALLOCATION CONF OF 1 OCT 68 HAD BEEN HELD. CNO IS SENDING MSG TO COMNAVAIRPAC STATING THAT VA-196 ACFT COMPLETING DEPLOYMENT ABOARD CVA-64 IN JAN 69 SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER TO VMA(AW) 242. THESE 246 SERIES ACFT SHOULD HAVE ACCUMULATED LESS COMBAT SORTIES AND FLIGHT HOURS THAN VMA(AW) 533 ACFT OF SAME SERIES.

2. (C) GAEC PRODUCTION NUMBERS WILL BE ASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS:

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA4401 SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
VMA(AW) 242 ACFT - 422 END OF JUNE 69; 423 THROUGH 428 DURING JUL 69; 429 THROUGH 433 PRIOR TO END OF AUG 69. VMA(AW) 533 ACFT - 434 END OF AUG 69; 435 THROUGH 440 DURING SEP 69; 441 THROUGH 445 PRIOR END OF OCT 69. AFTER ACCEPTANCE THE PROMPTNESS OF DELIVERY TO FIRST MAW WILL DEPEND UPON TRANSPAC ARRANGEMENTS AS DETERMINED BY CG FMFPAC AND COMNAVAIRPAC.

3. (C) OUR RATIONALE AT 1 OCT 68 CONF WAS TO ENSURE 310 SERIES ACFT TO FIRST MAW ASAP WHILE BALANCING COMBAT OPERATIONS WITH SOUNDEST POSSIBLE TRNG BASE. IN MAY 68 NAVAIR DECIDED THAT 200 SERIES ACFT WOULD NEVER BE UPDATED AND THAT 246 SERIES ACFT WOULD BE UPDATED AT FIRST PAR TO 310 SERIES. A6 OP READINESS IN SECOND MAW HAS CONSISTENTLY AVERAGED ABOUT 15 PERCENT. VMA(AW) 225 DEPLOYMENT IN JAN 69 WOULD LEAVE NO 310 SERIES CAPABILITY IN SECOND MAW FOR TRNG TECHNICIANS AND REPLACEMENT FLIGHT CREWS. THIS WOULD OCCUR AT THE TIME FIRST MAW WAS CONVERTING TOTALLY TO THE 310 SERIES. THUS THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CONVERT ONE SECOND MAW A6 SQDN TO 310 SERIES DURING JAN 69 AND ACCEPT ONE MONTH DELAY ON REPLACEMENT ACFT TO 242. THIS SECOND MAW SQDN IS PROGRAMMED TO PROVIDE FINAL PHASE

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P 301721Z OCT 68

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PAGE THREE RUEBH0A4401 S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
TRNG TO ALL REPLACEMENT FLIGHT CREWS AND TECHNICIANS PRIOR TO TRANSFER
TO WESTPAC. SIX 310 ACFT GO TO VMA(AW) 224 DURING JAN69 AND BALANCE
WILL BE RECEIVED IN FALL OF 69. THIS ACTION HAS BEEN INSTRUMENTAL
IN HAVING TWO 310 SERIES WST ASSIGNED SECOND MAW PRIOR TO JUL69.

4. (C) CONSIDER PRESENT ALLOCATION OF A6 ASSETS WITH VA-196
INTERIM SOLUTION TO BE IN BEST INTERESTS OF TOTAL MARINE A6
PROGRAM. AGREE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DESIRABLE TO REPLACE BOTH
242 AND 533 ACFT EARLIER DUE TO THE NUMBER OF COMBAT SORTIES
AND HOURS MARINE ACFT ACCUMULATE COMPARED TO NAVY ACFT

5. (C) CONSIDER IT HIGHLY COMMENDABLE THAT VMA(AW) 242 HAS
AVERAGED APPROX 50 PERCENT OP READINESS SINCE APR68. THEIR RECORD
OF OVER 70PERCENT OP READINESS FOR JUL 68 COUPLED WITH THEIR
PERCENTAGE DEMONSTRATES A "CAN DO" ATTITUDE UNDER EXTREMELY
ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES.

6 (C) UNLESS YOU HAVE OVERRIDING OBJECTIONS THIS HDQS
WILL SUPPORT PLAN INDICATED IN PARA'S 1, 2, AND 4

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BUSE. INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

(DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS).

SUBJ. PROGRAM 6 REALIGNMENT (U)

REF A. CMC 252317Z/OCT68 (S) SPECAT

B. SECNAV MEMO TO DEPSECDEF DTD 2OCT68, SUBJ:
MARINE CORPS STRENGTH AND STRUCTURE (S)

C. CMC 241448Z/OCT68 (S) SPECAT

1. (S) REF A REQUESTED A FORCE LISTING PRESENTING AN
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL FOR REALIGNMENT OF MARINE CORPS
SEASIA FORCES WITH NO INCREASE OF SPACES FOR RVN BUT
AN INCREASE OF 3000 - 3700 SPACES IN OKINAWA/JAPAN.

2. (S) REF B PROVIDED DEPSECDEF WITH A RECOMMENDATION
FOR REALIGNMENT OF MARINE CORPS SEASIA FORCES WITHIN
THE CONSTRAINTS OF PROGRAM 6 CEILINGS AND OFFERED TWO
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS TO PRECLUDE WITHDRAWAL OF

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES SECRET SPECAT

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AIR FRT & PAX TERM TEAM	-	15
SUB TOTAL OKINAWA	-	<u>2598</u>
B. TO JAPAN:		
VMA SQDN	-	260
WERS MWSG	-	251
DET H&MS VF/VA	-	22
DET MABS VF/VA	-	29
WING AUG DECM	-	<u>44</u>
SUB TOTAL JAPAN	-	606
C. TO CONUS (RETAIN):		
DIV BASE SPT AUG	-	638
DET 5TH COMM BN	-	159
FLC	-	361
H&HS MWSG	-	32
AT CO (REINF)	-	105
HQ BN 1ST & 3D DIV T/O CHANGES	-	<u>12</u>
SUB TOTAL CONUS (RETAIN)	-	1307
D. TO CONUS (DELETE):		
HELO DOOR GUNNERS	-	121
WING AUG AIRFIELD SECURITY	-	297
WING AUG COACT	-	43
WING AUG DISBURSING	-	12
SNMMS AUG	-	326

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POSTAL AUG (AIR)	-	7
HQ III MAF T/O CHANGES	-	43
FIC PROV T/O	-	<u>519</u>
SUB TOTAL CONUS (DELETE)	-	1368
E. GRAND TOTAL	-	5879
F. RECAP:		
TO OKINAWA	-	2598
TO JAPAN	-	606
TO CONUS (RETAIN)	-	1307
TO CONUS (DELETE)	-	<u>1368</u>
TOTAL	-	5879

5. (S) WHILE THE ALTERNATIVE REALIGNMENT REFLECTED ABOVE WOULD ACCOMMODATE RETENTION IN WESTPAC OF THE ~~EXISTING~~ ^{SHOULD} AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY, IT ^{SHOULD} NOT BE ACCEPTED AS A DESIRED COURSE OF ACTION IN VIEW OF THE CONCOMITANT REDUCTION IN III MAF COMBAT CAPABILITY. THE ~~CRITICALITY OF REDUCED~~ ^{REDUCED} III MAF CAPABILITY HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY ~~DETERIORATED~~ ^{REDUCED} BY THE RECENT COMUSMACV DECISION TO WITHDRAW ARMY FORCES FROM I CTZ.

WARM REGARDS

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SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM

LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF NMCC 011718Z/NOV66 (S)
FROM LTGEN MEYER TO MAJGEN ALLISON AND MAJGEN
TOWNSEND AND IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE.

QUOTE:

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (U)

REF: JCS MSG 9537/161953Z SEP 68

1. (S) REFERENCE RESCINDS REQUIREMENT FOR MONTHLY EVALUATION
REPORTS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGER ARRANGEMENT
FOR TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT IN SVN BUT REQUESTS THAT ANY
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM BE REPORTED.

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ALSO CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

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2. (S) WE KNOW THAT YOU ARE KEEPING THE SMS UNDER CONTINUING REVIEW AT YOUR END AND WILL CONDUCT SUCH FURTHER TESTS OR MAKE MODIFICATIONS IN THE SYSTEM AS YOU SEE FIT. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT HERE IN THE IMPROVEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE SINCE THE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM; HOWEVER, CERTAIN QUESTIONS CONTINUE TO ARISE AND NEED TO BE ADDRESSED. IT WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE IN REVIEWING THE SMS TO HAVE YOUR ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION AREAS. SUPPORTING DATA WOULD BE PARTICULARLY

HELPFUL:

A. RESPONSIVENESS. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT:

(1) SMS HAS IMPROVED RESPONSIVENESS TO USA UNITS OVER THAT PRIOR TO SMS; HOWEVER SMS IS NOT AS RESPONSIVE TO USMC UNITS AS THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.

(2) TRENDS OF MODIFICATION TO SMS HAVE BEEN TOWARD DECENTRALIZATION SIMILAR TO USMC SYSTEM.

B. ACCEPTABILITY OF THE SYSTEM. THE SMS HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED AS BEING A CONTINUATION OF THE JOINT AIR GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM (JAGOS). THEREFORE, THE ENDORSEMENT OF SMS IN THE II, III, AND IV CORPS REFERS NOT TO SMS, PER SE, BUT TO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE JAGOS.

C. DEGRADATION OF CAPABILITY. AS INITIALLY IMPLEMENTED, THE SMS ALLEGEDLY IMPOSED A SEVERE DEGRADATION ON MARINE AIR SUPPORT RESPONSIVENESS. IT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT THAT MARINE GROUND UNITS HAVE FAR FEWER HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND LESS ARTILLERY THAN USA UNITS, AND THUS MARINE UNITS MUST RELY PRIMARILY ON THE CLOSE INTERGRATION AND RESPONSIVE SCHEDULING OF THEIR ORGANIC CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ASSETS. ANY STATISTICS CITING COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PROVIDED MARINE VIS-A-VIS ARMY BATTALIONS MUST CONSIDER THE DIFFERENTIAL IN ORGANIC SUPPORT MEANS.

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D. MODIFICATION TO SMS. CHANGES MADE SUBSEQUENT TO IMPLEMENTATION OF SMS INDICATE MOVEMENT TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF THE DECENTRALIZED CONCEPT OF THE MARINE SYSTEM. IN SPITE OF CHANGES MADE TO SMS, IT IS CONTENDED THAT AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED TO US GROUND FORCES IN I CTZ IS STILL LESS RESPONSIVE, RELIABLE, AND EFFICIENT THAN IT COULD BE UNDER THE PRE-SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR CONTROL ARRANGEMENT.

E. CG, III MAF RECOMMENDATIONS. CG, III MAF HAS RECOMMENDED THAT, FOLLOWING THE MACV WEEKLY ALLOCATION OF AIR EFFORT, MARINE AIR, EXCEPT THAT ALLOCATED BY MACV OUTSIDE OF THE I CTZ, BE SCHEDULED BY III MAF ON A DAILY BASIS. ADVANTAGES OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT ARE PURPORTED TO BE:

(1) THE OBJECTIVES OF SMS REMAIN INTACT; COMUSMACV STILL WOULD HAVE MEANS FOR INFLUENCING ACTION THROUGHOUT SVN BY INCREASING/DECREASING AIR FORCE AND MARINE CORPS SORTIES PROVIDED TO III MAF AS WELL AS RETAINING OVERALL DIRECTION AND CONTROL MEANS TO CONCENTRATE ALL AIR SUPPORT WHEN AND WHERE NEEDED TO MEET EMERGENCIES;

(2) THIS WOULD CAPITALIZE ON THE UNIQUE AIR MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES OF III MAF; AND

(3) THE RELIABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE PRE-SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR CONTROL ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE OPERATING FOR BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES IN I CTZ.

F. IMPRACTICALITY OF WEEKLY FORECASTING. DAILY SCHEDULE IS VIEWED AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GROUND FORCES PLANNING THAN ATTEMPTING TO FORECAST WEEKLY SCHEDULES, PARTICULARLY DURING NE MONSOON SEASON. THEREFORE, IT HAS

BEEN SUGGESTED THAT THE CG, III MAF RECOMMENDATION DISCUSSED IN PARA 2E ABOVE BE GIVEN 30 DAY TRIAL PERIOD SIMILAR TO THAT GIVEN TO INITIAL AND MODIFIED SMS.

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G. CONTINUATION OF MONTHLY EVALUATION REPORTS. IT HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED THAT THE MONTHLY EVALUATIONS BE CONTINUED IN ORDER TO APPRAISE THE RECOMMENDED TEST AND ANY FUTURE MODIFICATIONS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE SMS.

3. WARM REGARDS.

UNQUOTE.

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DOCTOR HENRY - SETH - C. A.

10-10-68
 CORPS EYES ON

REPORT IN THIS SP

22

1. (S) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARG/SLF EMPLOYMENT HAVE RESULTED IN A SERIES OF EXCLUSIVES^{OF} WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AWARE ~~OF~~ IN PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSIONS AT THE SEVENTHFLT SCHEDULING/PLANNING CONFERENCE AT YOKOSUKA ON 12NOV68.
2. (S) ON 23OCT68, ADM HYLAND, IN A PERSONAL FOR VADM BRINGLE, VADM SMITH AND MYSELF, EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT IN PAST ARG/SLF EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND REQUESTED COMMENTS RELATIVE TO A PROPOSED REDUC-TION IN SELECTED ARG SHIPPING. THOUGH HIS RATIONALE FOR REDUCTION WAS PARTIALLY² BASED ON MONETARY AND PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS, THE REAL FOCUS OF ATTENTION

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WAS DIRECTED AT NON UTILIZATION OF ARG SHIPPING DUE
TO CONTINUAL IN-COUNTRY EMPLOYMENT OF SLF BLT'S.

3. (S) VADM SMITH REPLIED WITH A RECOMMENDATION TO
KEEP THE TWO ARG COMMITMENT AND PUSH FOR BETTER UTILI-
ZATION WHILE DRAWING DOWN OTHER AMPHIB SHIPS UNTIL
THE PERSONNEL SITUATION IMPROVES. HE ALSO MENTIONED
POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARG IN IV CTZ IN SUPPORT
OF A COMNAVFORV PLANNED OPERATION USING WHATEVER
GROUND TROOPS ARE AVAILABLE AND RECOMMENDED RETURNING
SOONEST TO A DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE THAT WILL SUPPORT
PACOM CONTINGENCY PLANS.

4. (S) VADM BRINGLE TOOK A DIFFERENT VIEW. IN THE
ABSENCE OF SOME POSITIVE INDICATION OF RESTORATION
OF THE SEVENTH FLEET MARINE FORCE AND IN LIGHT OF
THE MONETARY/PERSONNEL SITUATION, HE RELUCTANTLY CON-
SIDERED THAT A REDUCTION OF SEVENTH FLEET AMPHIBIOUS
FORCES TO THE POST-HOSTILITIES CONCEPT OF ONE ARG
IN WESTPAC AND TWO IN EASTPAC WOULD BE IN ORDER.

5. (S) I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST CONTINUALLY EXERCISE
OUR AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATING AT EVERY
OPPORTUNITY OUR ABILITY TO PLY OUR TRADE WITH SIGNI-
FICANT CONTRIBUTORY RESULTS TO THE WAR IN ICTZ OR OTHER

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SECRET MCEO

CORPS AREAS SHOULD THIS BE POSSIBLE. IT IS INDEED UNFORTUNATE THAT THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN ICTZ HAS REQUIRED THAT THE BLT'S OF THE SLF BE RETAINED ASHORE LONGER THAN SCHEDULED, RESULTING IN AN UNEXPLOITED AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY. LTGEN CUSHMAN AND I DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH VADM BRINGLE ABOARD HIS FLAGSHIP DURING MY RECENT SVN VISIT. AT THAT TIME GEN CUSHMAN SAID HE PLANNED TO USE BOTH ARG'S AND BOTH SLF'S IN A SERIES OF OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH A NEW PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN ON INOV. OF COURSE, THE MOVEMENT OF THE 1ST CAV DIV (AM) SOUTH TO III CTZ AND THE USE OF ARG ALFA SHIPPING IN SUPPORT THEREOF HAS MODIFIED III MAF PLANS IN THIS REGARD. HOWEVER, RECENTLY WE HAVE HAD EAGER HUNTER AND PLANS NOW CALL FOR BLT 2/7 TO LAND AT THE BATANGAN PENINSULA ON 10NOV68. WE CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THE REDUCED TEMPO NOW PREVAILING IN ICTZ WILL PROVE CONDUCTIVE TO INCREASED EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARG/SLF.

6. (S) MY POSITION IN THIS MATTER IS TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE CONSTITUTION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY AT AN RLT LEVEL IN THE SEVENTH FLEET AND TO RESUME THE INTRA-THEATRE BLT ROTATION PROGRAM. CONCURRENTLY,

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THE FLEET RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CONTINGENCY AREA MUST BE ALWAYS BORNE IN MIND. A REDUCED SHIPPING CAPABILITY COULD WELL SET THE NORM FOR POST-HOSTILITY FORCE LEVELS. EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARG/SLF IN THE OTHER CORPS AREAS WILL BE ENCOURAGED IF AMPHIBIOUS TARGETS ARE AVAILABLE AND NWP 22-B IS FOLLOWED BY COMUSMACV AND THE CORPS COMMANDERS CONCERNED. I WILL REALIZE THAT OUR BARGAINING POSITION WITH THE FLEET ON RETENTION OF PRESENT ARG SHIPPING IS TENUOUS SINCE THE ARG/SLF RECORD HAS BEEN SPOTTY FROM JAN68 ON. HOWEVER, IT IS MOST DESIRABLE THAT III MAF AND MACV, AS APPROPRIATE, CONTINUE TO HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY AFFORDED BY AN AVAILABLE AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY; AND IT IS MOST IMPORTANT FROM A POST-HOSTILITY POSTURE STANDPOINT THAT THE PRESENT CONFIGURATION BE MAINTAINED. WARM REGARDS.

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, INFO

GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE MARINE CORPS EYES
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DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

PROGRAM 6 DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES (U)

A CMC 301157Z/OCT68 (S) SPECAT

1. (S) REF A PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING A SEC NAV

PROPOSAL FOR REALIGNMENT OF MARINE SPASIA FORCES THAT

WOULD MAINTAIN THE CURRENT III MAF STRUCTURE AND MAN

THIS STRUCTURE WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF PROGRAM 6

AUTHORIZATIONS THE SHORTTAIL BETWEEN STRUCTURE

SPACES AND PERSONNEL WOULD BE ABSORBED IN UNITS OTHER

THAN INFANTRY BNS, RECON BNS, FORCE RECON COS, THE

COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM AND TACTICAL SQUADRONS

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

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CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

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FURTHER, REF A REQUESTED ADDRESSAL AS TO HOW THIS
SHORTFALL WOULD BE ABSORBED AND THE IMPACT OF THIS
DRAWDOWN ON III MAF'S COMBAT CAPABILITY.

2. (S) THE IMPRESSION GAINED BY SECNAV DURING HIS RECENT
VISIT TO SVN, I.E., THAT III MAF HAD ADEQUATE MANPOWER
RESOURCES TO ACCOMPLISH ITS ASSIGNED TASKS, IS MOST
UNFORTUNATE IN VIEW OF CMC'S CURRENT EFFORT TO OBTAIN
A CEILING INCREASE IN SVN, BUT UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE
MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN SVN AT THAT TIME HAD BEEN
APPROXIMATELY 2,200 IN EXCESS OF PROGRAM 6 AUTHORIZA-
TIONS.

3. (S) THE SECNAV PROPOSAL, AS CONTAINED IN REF A, HAS,
TO A CERTAIN DEGREE, ALREADY BEEN IMPLEMENTED AS A
RESULT OF PERSONNEL ACTION TAKEN TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO
PROGRAM 6 CEILINGS. PERSONNEL FLOW TO III MAF UNITS,
INCLUDING TWO (2) NINTH MAB SLF'S, IS NOW BEING
REGULATED TO PROVIDE, EXCLUSIVE OF THE 3,500 AUTHORIZED
TO OFFSET OUT-OF-COUNTRY NON-EFFECTIVES, 78,042
(TOTAL 81,542) MARINES TO MAN THE 83,517 BILLETS REQUIRED

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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BY THE CURRENT III MAF STRUCTURE, INCLUDING CURRENT T/O STRENGTH AND HQMC APPROVED AUGMENTATION. THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN NOTIFIED BY HQMC THAT A REVISED FMFPAC MANNING LEVEL AUTHORIZATION HAS BEEN APPROVED AND MAILED. AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICAL DATE REVISED MANNING LEVELS WILL BE PROVIDED. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES A TENTATIVE BREAKDOWN OF THE REVISED AUTHORIZATIONS IS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH FOUR BELOW. DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECNAV PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE THAT 36,864 OF THE MANNING AUTHORIZATION FOR III MAF UNITS, INCLUDING TWO (2) NINTH MAB SLF'S, BE USED TO FULLY MAN THOSE UNITS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH FIVE BELOW. THE REMAINDER OF THE MANNING AUTHORIZATIONS, 41,178, WOULD BE APPLIED AGAINST THE REMAINING 46,653 STRUCTURE BILLETS.

4. (S) TENTATIVE REVISED MANNING LEVELS, LESS 3,500 AUTHORIZED TO OFFSET OUT-OF-COUNTRY NON-EFFECTIVES, ARE:

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A. HQ III MAF	3,361
B. FIRST MARDIV	24,849
C. THIRD MARDIV	21,026
D. FIRST MAW	15,755
E. FLC	8,524
F. NINTH MAB (GRND)	3,897
G. NINTH MAB (AIR)	630
H. TOTAL	78,042

5. (S) UNITS TO BE MANNED AT FULL STRENGTH UNDER
THE SECNAV PROPOSAL ARE:

A. 3 - VMA	780
B. 5 - VMFA	1,925
C. 3 - VMA/AW	1,116
D. 1 - VMCJ	476
E. 2 - HMH	526
F. 8 - HMM	2,160
G. 2 - HML	504
H. 2 - VMO	666
I. 21 - INF BNS	25,053

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J. 2 - RECON BNS	1,460
K. 2 - FOR RECON COS	312
L. COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM	1,886
M. TOTAL	36,864

6. (C) TO ASSIST CMC IN HIS CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH SECNAV CONCERNING MARINE CORPS SEASIA FORCES, REQUEST YOU PROVIDE ASAP:

A. AN ADDRESSAL OF WHAT AUTHORIZED STRUCTURE BILLETS (FUNCTIONAL/OPERATIONAL AREAS) YOU WOULD RECOMMEND NOT BE FILLED UNDER THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE SECNAV PROPOSAL ALONG WITH IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONCOMITANT IMPACT ON III MAF COMBAT CAPABILITY.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMENSURATE CHANGES IN THE TENTATIVE REVISED MANNING LEVELS SET FORTH IN PARA FOUR ABOVE.

7. (S) WHILE THE SECNAV PROPOSAL APPARENTLY ENVISIONS ACROSS-THE-BOARD CUTS IN UNITS OTHER THAN THOSE SPECIFICALLY CITED TO BE FULLY MANNED, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU EXERCISE FULL LATITUDE IN YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS

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TO INCLUDE, IF DESIRED, REDUCING CERTAIN UNITS TO A
CADRE STATUS. WARMEST REGARDS.

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Cmd. Ctr

FROM

CG, FMFPAC

TO

CG, III MAF

INFO

CG, FIRST MAW

062346Z NOV 68

PRECEDENCE

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DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, FROM LTGEN

BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING

HOURS

LOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS (U)

A. CG, FIRST MAW 301050Z/OCT68 (S)

1. (S) CHICK QUILTER'S RECOMMENDATION TO CONSIDER

MOVEMENT OF VMFA-115 TO MAG-15 CONTAINED IN REF A

MERITS SOME SPECIAL CONSIDERATION AT THIS TIME. CURRENT

EVENTS TEND TO INDICATE THAT WE SHOULD AVAIL OURSELVES

OF OPPORTUNITIES WHICH PLACE US IN THE BEST POSSIBLE

POSITION TO FACILITATE ATTAINMENT OF OUR DESIRED POST

SVN POSTURE. ALSO, SINCE MOVEMENT OF A VMFA INSTEAD

OF A VMA WOULD PROVIDE ABOUT 125 ADDITIONAL SPACES FOR

USE IN-COUNTRY, THIS POINT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

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SUB HEADQUARTERS
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED LEFT MARINE FORCE PACIFIC MESSAGE DRAFT

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SECRET/MCEO

*FURTHER, WITH***SECRET**

2. (S) ~~NOW THAT~~ THE 1ST CAV DIV (AM) IS DEPLOYING TO III
CORPS, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PRESENT BOMBING
HALT, ~~AND OUR FUTURE POSTURE~~, IT MIGHT BE OPPORTUNE TO
MOVE A VMFA TO IWAKUNI VICE A VMA AS SOON AS IT COULD BE
ARRANGED. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS. WARM REGARDS.

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JOINT USAGE OF MCAS IWAKUNI (S)

AT CINCPAC DIRECTION,

1. (S) THIS HQ CURRENTLY CONDUCTING A STUDY TO

DETERMINE FEASIBILITY OF JOINT USE OF IWAKUNI BY USN/

USMC/USAF/JSDF UNITS. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THERE

ARE NO KNOWN REQUIREMENTS TO BE LEVIED ON YOUR

COMMAND NOR IS IT ENVISIONED THAT THE STUDY GROUP

WILL FIND IT NECESSARY TO VISIT JAPAN.

2. (S) SINCE CINCPACAF HAS TASKED FIFTH AF TO PROVIDE

REQUESTED INPUT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PACAF OR FIFTH

AF MAY FIND IT DESIRABLE TO HAVE THEIR REPRESENTATIVES

VISIT IWAKUNI. IF SUCH A REQUEST IS MADE, PLEASE

EXTEND EVERY COURTESY AND ALL ASSISTANCE REQUIRED.

3. (S) BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS MATTER, NO

DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT WILL BE CONDUCTED EXCEPT

ON A "NEED TO KNOW" BASIS. REQUEST ADVISE DETAILS

OF ANY ~~UNWANTED~~ VISITOR QUERY

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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SECRET **MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM

LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMUSMACV 070236Z/NOV68 (S)

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MEYER AND MAJGEN ALLISON

FROM MAJGEN TOWNSAND. PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE.

QUOTE:

REF: NMCC MSG DTG 011718Z NOV 68 (S)

1. (S) THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CONTINUES TO PROVIDE SATISFACTION HERE. THE SYSTEM IS CONSTANTLY UNDER SCRUTINY TO DETECT WEAKNESSES AND WAYS OF IMPROVING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. ADJUSTMENTS AND ADAPTATIONS HAVE BEEN EFFECTED IN THE PAST, AND DULY REPORTED, WHICH RESULTED IN IMPROVED RESPONSIVENESS OF TACAIR TO GROUND COMMANDERS' DEMANDS. EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN EXPENDED TO ADJUST SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES WITHIN THE JOINT AIR GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM (JAGOS) TO ACCOMMODATE III MAF DESIRES WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS HAS BEEN EVOLUTIONARY AND SUBJECT TO TRIAL AND ERROR AND COMPROMISES, BUT THE EVENTUAL RESULT HAS BEEN THAT TACAIR HAS BEEN PROVIDED WHEN, WHERE, AND AS NEEDED, CONSISTENT WITH AIR CONTROL AND AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES, AND WITH TOTAL SORTIE AVAILABLE. IT IS APPARENT THAT NO COMMANDER WHO PURSUES THE ENEMY AGGRESSIVELY AND WHO DEEPS HIM UNDER ATTACK RELENTLESSLY 24 HOURS

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A DAY WILL EVER BE SATISFIED WITH HIS ALLOCATION OF TACAIR. ADDITIONAL TACAIR HAS ALWAYS BEEN AVAILABLE IN THE FORM OF IMMEDIATE AND COMMANDERS HAVE MADE LIBERAL USE OF THIS SOURCE IN AUGMENTING THEIR PREPLANNED TACAIR. BOTH 7TH AF AND THE 1ST MAW HAVE SURGED IN THE PAST TO MEET TACAIR REQUIREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF TACTICAL EMERGENCIES. IN FACT THERE HAS BEEN NO SHORTAGE OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT EVEN THOUGH IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO DIVIDE TACAIR AMONG SEVEN MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRIORITIES AND TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS.

2. (S) ALLEGED NON-RESPONSIVENESS OF SMS TO USMC UNITS - THE AUGUST EVALUATION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) REVEALED BETTER RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT TO GROUND COMMANDERS THROUGHOUT VIETNAM. IN THE EFFORT TO IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS, SPECIFICALLY IN I CTZ, THE FOLLOWING OBTAINS:

A. HORN DASC BECAME OPERATIONAL AND WAS DESIGNATED THE SENIOR FWF DASC IN I CTZ.

B. HORN DASC WAS COLLOCATED WITH HQ III MAF TO PROVIDE BETTER RESPONSE TO CC, III MAF.

C. HORN DASC HAS SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY OVER ALERT SORTIES OF AIR UNITS LOCATED IN I CTZ.

D. THE AIR SUPPORT MEASURED IN SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY INCREASED FOR BOTH MARINES AND ARMY FORCES DURING THE AUGUST EVALUATION PERIOD.

ON EXAMINING COMPLAINTS ABOUT RESPONSIVENESS, IT WAS FOUND DURING A TWO MONTH PERIOD THAT FOR I CTZ 99.73PCT OF REQUESTED TOT CHANGE AND 99.67PCT OF ORDNANCE CHANGES REACHING THE TACC WERE APPROVED. THEREFORE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT IS ADEQUATELY RESPONSIVE TO USER REQUIREMENTS.

E. (S) TRENDS OF MODIFICATION TOWARD DECENTRALIZATION - THE USERS OF AIR SUPPORT MAKE THEIR NEEDS FOR PREPLANNED SUPPORT KNOWN THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. EACH LEVEL OF COMMAND RECEIVES REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT, REVIEWS AND REFINES THE REQUESTS, AND ESTABLISHES PRIORITIES. THE REQUESTS ARE FORWARDED TO THE MACV TASE FROM THE SEVEN GROUND COMMANDERS. THE REQUESTS RECEIVED AT MACV TASE ARE REVIEWED AND ALLOCATIONS OF TACAIR ASSETS ARE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMUSMACV GUIDANCE. THIS PROCEDURE IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE A SHIFT TO THE MARINE CONTROL SYSTEM BUT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT AIR GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM.

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PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY COMUSMACV. EACH COMMANDER MAY USE THESE WEEKLY SORTIES IN ANY MANNER HE CONSIDERS TO SUPPORT HIS TACTICAL PLANS. HE MAY SUBALLOCATE ALL, OR PART, OF THE AVAILABLE SORTIES, AS INDIVIDUAL FLIGHTS OR BLOCKS OF FLIGHTS, TO HIS MAJOR SUBORDINATE UNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS OWN PRIORITIES. SORTIES THAT HE DOES NOT SUBALLOCATE CAN BE USED AS HE DESIRES TO MEET ANY REQUIREMENT THAT MAY ARISE DURING THE COURSE OF EACH DAY'S OPERATION. EVEN THOUGH THE ASSETS ARE ALLOCATED ON A WEEKLY FRAG, REQUEST FOR CHANGES OF TOT AND ORDNANCE CAN BE PROCESSED ON A DAILY BASIS TO PERMIT MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY. INHERENT IN THE SYSTEM IS THE CAPABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE CHANGES AS REQUIRED. THE WEEKLY PRE-PLANNED ALLOCATION OF TACAIR HAS ENHANCED THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

9. (S) PROPOSED CONTINUATION OF MONTHLY EVALUATION REPORTS -

RETURNING MARINE STRIKE ASSETS TO CG, III MAF, FOR A 30 DAY TRIAL PERIOD WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO COMUSMACV AS IT DID NOT REPRESENT A MODIFICATION TO THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, BUT A RETURN TO THE DUAL SYSTEM. THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IS WORKING SO WELL FROM THE MACV POINT OF VIEW THAT EVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENTS IN THE SYSTEM ARE ALL THAT IS NECESSARY, RATHER THAN CONSTANT RE-EVALUATION.

10. (S) WE DO NOT WISH TO APPEAR INTRANSIGENT ABOUT THIS MATTER OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, BUT IS VITAL THAT COMUSMACV RETAIN THE CENTRALIZED CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF TACAIR IN THE HANDS OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL

11. (U) WARM REGARDS.

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S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN RUSE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

SUBJ: LOCATION OF AVN-UNITS-(U) ATT
REF: A. FMFPAC 452345Z NOV 68 (S)

1. (S) IN VIEW OF T-DAY PLANNING NOW UNDERWAY I CONCUR WITH THE
RELOCATION OF VMFA 115 VICE VMA 311 TO MAG 15. IN ADDITION,
THE 125 SPACES WE WOULD ACQUIRE IN-COUNTRY IS A BONUS WE CANNOT
IGNORE.

2. (S) THE REQUIREMENT FOR TAC AIR SUPPORT HAS DECREASED SOME-
WHAT SINCE THE POMPING HALT, HOWEVER, THE TOTAL EFFECT CANNOT
BE MEASURED AT THIS TIME. RECENTLY MACV HAS SHIFTED THE
EMPHASIS OUT-OF-COUNTRY AND TO III CORPS. THEREFORE,
I WOULD NOT OBJECT TO MOVING VMFA 115 AT AN EARLY DATE
IF IT CAN BE ARRANGED. CHICK OUTLIER CONCURS.

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CC III MAF

O 090940Z NOV 68

ACTN: S/SEC

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120144Z NOV 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUHKM/CG FMFAC
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CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FROM GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN BUSE
FROM LGEN CUSHMAN (MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY)

1. I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MEMO FOR THE RECORD
FROM CLIFF DRAKE AND FORWARD IT FOR YOUR INFO.
I HAD OTHER COMMITMENTS WHICH PREVENTED ME MEETING
MR STEADMAN SO CANNOT SEND ANY PERSONAL JUDGMENT ON
THE MATTER.

QUOTE: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. PERSONAL FOR LGEN
CUSHMAN FROM MAJGEN DRAKE. SUBJECT: CONVERSATION
WITH MR. R. C. STEADMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENCE (ISA).

1. MR STEADMAN AND PARTY VISITED XXIV CORPS 2-3 NOV,
SPENDING SATURDAY NIGHT AT XXIV CORPS. FOLLOWING DINNER
LTGEN STILWELL INVITED MR. STEADMAN AND A FEW OTHERS

CG III MAF

R 120144Z/NOV 68

ACTN: S/SEC

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PAGE TWO RHMAFA 1469 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
TO HIS QUARTERS. INCLUDED IN THE GROUP WERE MAJGEN SCHWEITER
C/S XXIV CORPS AND CAPT C. A. KAISER, USN AND COL BENSON USA
BOTH MEMBERS OF MR STEADMAN'S PARTY, PLUS MYSELF.
2. MR STEADMAN WAS DOMINATING THE CONVERSATION WITH A
DISCUSSION OF DOD'S NEED FOR BETTER STATISTICAL DATA
SO AS TO QUANTIFY AND HENCE BETTER EVALUATE TACTICAL
OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM. AT ONE POINT IN THE CONVERSATION,
FOR NO APPARENT REASON THAT I COULD RECALL, MR STEADMAN
TURNED TO ME AND SAID TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONLY
THING THAT IS KEEPING DOD FROM TRANSFERRING THE MARINE
CORPS TO THE ARMY IS THE CONGRESS. HE THEN WENT ON
TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MARINES WERE REALLY NO DIFFERENT
FROM THE ARMY AND THAT WAS WHERE THEY BELONGED. HE
REPEATED AGAIN THAT IF IT WEREN'T FOR CONGRESS THE
MARINES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE ARMY TOMORROW.
MY REPLY TO THIS WAS THAT WHILE I WAS SURE THAT THE
ARMY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE ASSETS REPRESENTED BY THE
MARINE CORPS, I DOUBTED IF THE ARMY WANTED THE MARINE
CORPS PER SE AND I WAS POSITIVE THAT THE MARINE CORPS
HAD NO DESIRE OR INTENTION TO BECOME A DUPLICATIVE

PAGE THREE RHMAFA 1469 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
ELEMENT OF AND WITHIN THE US ARMY. I THEN WENT ON WITH
A DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE AND MISSION OF THE MARINE CORPS,
ITS PART AS AN INTEGRAL ENTITY WITHIN THE US FLEET
STRUCTURE, AND SOME PHILOSOPHY ON SEA POWER.
3. AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE DISCUSSION MR STEADMAN
MADE A SERIOUS ALLEGATION AS TO THE QUALITY OF THE
PRESENT DAY OFFICER CORPS IN THE MARINE CORPS, CHARGING
THAT WE WERE STILL LIVING AND THINKING IN TERMS
OF THE MASSIVE HEAD-ON ASSAULT TYPE TACTICS WHICH
CHARACTERIZED MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN
WW II. HE CHARGED IN EFFECT THAT THE TROUBLE WITH
MARINE CORPS OFFICER LEADERSHIP TODAY IS THAT IT IS
TOO RIGID IN ITS THINKING, STUBBORNLY CLINGING TO THE
PAST AND NOT KEEPING UP ON MODERN DAY TRENDS IN
TACTICS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ONLY REASON THE
MARINE CORPS HAS ENJOYED ANY SUCCESS IN VIETNAM
IS BECAUSE OF ITS ELITE BODY OF ENLISTED MEN. HE SAID
TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MARINE CORPS WAS LIVING OFF
THE FAT OF ITS ELITE ENLISTED TROOPS IMPLYING THAT
THEY WOULD BE BETTER OFF IN THE ARMY. MY REPLY TO

CG III MAF

R 120144Z/NOV 68

CONFIDENTIAL MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 1469 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
THIS WAS THAT WITH REGARD TO THE ELITE TROOPS, WE
WORKED THAT MAGIC AT PARRIS ISLAND AND SAN DIEGO --
BUT THAT I COULD NOT AGREE WITH HIS COMMENTS ABOUT THE
PRESENT DAY MARINE OFFICERS CORPS. I AGREED THAT IN
SOME INDIVIDUAL CASES YOU MIGHT FIND SOME OFFICERS
WHO WERE SLOW TO REACT TO CHANGING TIMES BUT THAT I
DOUBTED VERY STRONGLY THE VALIDITY OF HIS CLAIM THAT
IT APPLIED TO THE GROUP AS A WHOLE. I ADMITTED THAT
WE WERE A DOGGED AND DETERMINED GROUP AND TOOK OUR
RESPONSIBILITIES VERY SERIOUSLY, POINTING OUT TO HIM
THAT THIS DETERMINATION OF PURPOSE ON THE PART OF
MARINE CORPS SENIOR LEADERSHIP LED TO THE MARINE CORPS
BEING THE ONLY SERVICE THAT HAS BEEN ABLE TO MEET EVERY
COMMITMENT PLACED UPON IT SINCE THE INITIAL INTRODUCTION
OF US COMBAT FORCES INTO VIETNAM -- DELIVERING WITHOUT
FA L WHAT WAS WANTED WHEN IT WAS WANTED.

4. AT ANOTHER POINT MR STEADMAN ASKED ME WHY DON'T
THE MARINES GIVE UP THEIR FIGHTERS AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT
AND GO TO ALL HELICOPTERS LIKE THE ARMY. HE SAID
THAT THE NAVY COULD PROVIDE ALL THE FIGHTER AND ATTACK

PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 1469 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SUPPORT WE NEEDED. I REPLIED WITH A BRIEF EXPLANATION
OF THE ROLE OF THE NAVY AND MARINE AIR, POINTING OUT
IN PARTICULAR THAT THE CVA'S COULD NOT BE TIED DOWN
TO PROVIDE CONTINUING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO THE LANDING
FORCE AND HENCE THE NEED FOR OUR SATS SYSTEM ETC SO AS
TO GET FIXED WING ESTABLISHED ASHORE AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. HIS REPLY TO THIS WAS AN OFF-HAND REMARK
TO THE EFFECT THAT THE AIR FORCE COULD OFF STEEL
MATTING JUST AS EASILY AS THE MARINES.

5. ALL THE FOREGOING WAS CONDUCTED IN A FRIENDLY
ATMOSPHERE WITH MR STEADMAN CONCLUDING BY SAYING THAT
SINCE HE HAD BEEN RAISED IN HAWAII DURING WW II HE
HAD ALWAYS BEEN A GREAT ADMIRER OF THE MARINES. HE
ALSO SAID TO THE EFFECT THAT ALL OF THIS WAS JUST
FRIENDLY AFTER DINNER TALK AND HOPED THAT I DIDN'T
TAKE HIM TOO SERIOUSLY.

6. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT MR STEADMAN IS SOMEWHAT
SUPERCILIOUS AND IS NOT A VERY PROFOUND THINKER. ALSO
IT SEEMS RATHER OBVIOUS THAT HE HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY
WORKED UPON BY THOSE WHO DO NOT HAVE THE BEST INTERESTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 1469 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
THE MARINE CORPS AT HFARI. UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

29

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
SUBJ: MARINE FORCES PACIFIC

~~SECRET~~ OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

← DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

SECRET/MCEO

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET

RECENT DOWNWARD TREND OF AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO I CTZ BEFORE SUFFICIENT TIME HAS ELAPSED TO ENABLE US TO PRESENT A STRONG, DOCUMENTED CASE.

2. THE MOVEMENT SOUTH OF THE 1ST CAV DIV (AM) CERTAINLY REDUCES THE ARMY TROOP DENSITY IN I CORPS. HOWEVER, THE MOVE SOUTH COULD BE USED AGAINST US. THE AIR FORCE COULD REITERATE THE OLD MACV PLATITUDE OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AIR EFFORT TO BE APPLIED IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER IN FURTHERANCE OF THE MACV MISSION AND, USING DEVELOPING 1ST CAV REQUIREMENTS IN III CORPS, JUSTIFY DECREASED AIR FORCE SORTIES ALLOCATED TO III MAF.

3. IN SHORT, I AGREE THAT THE RECENT TURN OF EVENTS IN I CTZ MAY IN TIME PROVIDE FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE AIR CONTROL PROBLEM. YET, I'M RELUCTANT NOW TO TIP OUR HAND, AND I FEEL THAT WE NEED TO WATCH THESE NEW DEVELOPMENTS CAREFULLY, CHARTING THE FACTUAL DATA TO BACK OUR CASE IN DETAIL, AND AT THE PROPITIOUS MOMENT, SUBMIT OUR PROPOSAL TO MACV.

GP-4 *WARM REGARDS.*

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SECRET 30
SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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HEADQUARTERS
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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R 130746Z NOV 68
FM MCAS IWAKUNI
TO CG FMFPAC

13NOV68 1755Z

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SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

JOINT USAGE OF MCAS IWAKUNI (SS/NN/FF)

A. COMMARCORBASESPAC 072239Z NOV 68 (S)

1. ON SITE SURVEY TEAM CONSISTING OF COL JOHN L. SUSOTT DEP DIR OF PROGRAMS, DCS/PLANS CINCPACAF; LTCOL D. W. HAMILTON CHIEF POLICY DIVISION, DIRECTOR PLANS, FIFTH AF; CAPT W. E. THOMPSON CIVIL ENGINEERS FIFTH AF VISITED MCAS IWAKUNI 0900-1400 13 NOV 1968.

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A TEAM WAS BRIEFED ON FACILITIES, MILCON PROGRAM, AND ANTICIPATED BASE LOADING IN POST VIETNAM SITUATION (TWO MARAIRGRU, WING HQ., AND POSSIBLE FAW-SIX WITH TWO VP SQDS) AND PRESENT AND FUTURE USE OF SEADROME AND RELATED FACILITIES BY JMSDF RPT JMSDF. PROBLEM AREAS DISCUSSED WERE MAINTENANCE OF OVERAGE PLANT FACILITIES, EXISTING AND FUTURE BACKLOG OF MINOR MAINTENANCE, DEPENDENT HOUSING, SCHOOLS AND REQUIREMENT FOR PARALLEL RUNWAY IF BASE LOADING EXCEEDS TWO MAGS.

3. THE TEAM ADVISED IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUERY ON MAGNITUDE OF POSSIBLE USAF USAGE OF THE AIR STATION THAT TWO USAF WINGS OF APPROXIMATELY 100 F-4A/C AND 1700 PERSONNEL WERE BEING CONSIDERED IN THE PACAF STUDY. THE TEAM COMMENTED THAT REQUIREMENT FOR FACILITIES, RAMP SPACE, BILLETING AND SINGLE RUNWAY LIMITATIONS WOULD TEND TO RULE OUT JOINT OCCUPANCY.

4. WHILE NOT SPECIFICALLY STATED, GENERAL FEELING WAS THAT TEAM BELIEVED MCAS IWAKUNI POSSESSED EXCELLENT POTENTIAL BUT NOT FOR THE AIR FORCE ON A JOINT USAGE BASIS.

GP-4

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MCAS IWAKUNI

R 130746Z/NOV68

ACTN: S/SEC

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET

HQ FMFPAC
DISCLOSURE RECORD

CG FMFPAC

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MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
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TOD 01143Z 13NOV68

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN *LT Gen Walt*

BUSE. INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

T-DAY PLANNING (U)

A. CMC 291610Z/JUN68 (TS) (SPECAT) (NOTAL)

B. CMC 061532Z/JUL68 (TS) (SPECAT) (NOTAL)

C. CNO 151910Z/OCT68 (S) (NOTAL)

D. CNO 082036Z/NOV68 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (S) THROUGHOUT THE VARIOUS STAGES OF PLANNING RELATED TO POST HOSTILITY POSTURE, T-DAY, PROGRAM 6, AND WITHDRAWAL UNDER THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE, CINCPAC GUIDANCE HAS BEEN TO DEVELOP DESIRED POST SVN LOCATIONS BASED ON REQUIREMENTS. FORMULATION OF OUR SUBMISSIONS TO CINCPACFLT HAS FOLLOWED THIS GUIDANCE; CONSEQUENTLY, EACH PROVIDES FOR A MEF IN WESTPAC.

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

COMMUNICATION CENTER
SUBSISTENCE HEADQUARTERS
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/LEFT SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

TOP SECRET/MCEO

TOP SECRET

THESE, IN TURN, HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY CINCPACFLT AND CINCPAC AND WERE INCLUDED IN CINCPAC'S INPUT TO THE JCS. A COPY OF EACH SUBMISSION TO CINCPACFLT HAS BEEN FURNISHED CMC.

2. (TS) FMFPAC/MARCORBASES PAC PLANNING HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION:

- A. CONTINGENCY PLAN REQUIREMENTS.
- B. JSCP, JSOP.
- C. MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH (235K VS 204K).
- D. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION TO INCLUDE IBOP IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA AND RESULTANT PRESSURES ON U. S. BASES.
- E. THE STATUS OF THE TTPI AS RELATED TO THE U. N. CHARTER AND AN EVENTUAL PLEBISCITE.
- F. FACILITIES CURRENTLY AVAILABLE.
- G. SHORTFALLS AND FACILITIES REQUIRED.

3. (U) BECAUSE OF THE MANY UNKNOWNNS THAT WILL HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE FINAL DECISION, E.G., RESULTS OF PARIS NEGOTIATIONS, OUR PLANS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO BUILD IN A FLEXIBILITY THAT WOULD MEET ALMOST ANY SITUATION. WITH MINOR VARIATIONS, MY STAFF HAS BEEN GUIDED BY THE PROVISIONS OF REFS A AND B.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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HEADQUARTERS

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/LEFT SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

TOP SECRET**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

TOP SECRET/MCEO

TOP SECRET

4. (TS) FRANK THARIN ADVISED PAUL FONTANA RECENTLY THAT A CASE II B STUDY NOW BEING CONDUCTED WILL EXAMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF A REDUCED STRUCTURE MEF BEING LOCATED IN OKI/JAPAN. WHILE THIS STUDY WOULD BE USEFUL, I THINK THE TIME ELEMENT MAY PRECLUDE MY USING IT IF THINGS BREAK RAPIDLY IN WESTPAC. FURTHER, REFS C AND D, OBVIOUSLY BASED ON JSCM-531, ARE INCONSISTENT WITH REF A AND CINCPAC'S T-DAY SUBMISSION TO JCS. AT THE PRESENT TIME, BOB CUSHMAN IS APPARENTLY BEING PRESSURED BY COMUSMACV TO PROVIDE PLANNING DATA RELATIVE TO WITHDRAWAL UNDER T-DAY PLANS. BASED ON A REQUEST FROM HIM, I AM GOING TO PROVIDE III MAF A TROOP LIST WITH PROPOSED LOCATIONS FOR A MEF IN WESTPAC, THE POSTURE WHICH I SUPPORT.

5. (S) WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT WHERE IT IS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP AN OBJECTIVE FOR PACOM MARINE FORCES THAT WILL HAVE YOUR APPROVAL, WILL FIRMLY DETERMINE THE STRENGTH AND LOCATION OF EACH UNIT IN PACOM, AND WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR FUTURE PLANS. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE ON THIS MATTER. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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 COMUSMACV
 FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC
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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN
 BUSE. INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
 RELOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS (U)

1. (S) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SEASIA INDICATE THAT IT
 WOULD BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO EFFECT AN EARLY TRANSFER
 OF A VMFA SQUADRON FROM SVN TO JAPAN.
2. (S) THE BOMBING HALT AND MOVEMENT OF THE 1ST AIR
 CAV DIV (AM) TO III CORPS HAS DECREASED I CTZ TACTICAL AIR
 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. FURTHER, COMUSMACV HAS CON-
 CURRED IN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE VMA SQUADRON FROM
 SVN, AS PROPOSED IN CONNECTION WITH REALIGNMENT OF III
 MAF FORCE STRUCTURE WITHIN PROGRAM 6 CONSTRAINTS.
3. (S) I FEEL THAT THE EARLY TRANSFER OF A SQUADRON FROM

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SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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SUBHEADQUARTERS PAGES
HEADQUARTERS
FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC

SECRET

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/LEFT TO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET/MCEO

SECRET

SVN WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN SEVERAL RESPECTS. HOWEVER, THE MOVEMENT OF A VMFA VICE A VMA, IN WHICH BOTH BOB GUSHMAN AND CHICK QUILTER CONCUR, WOULD PROVIDE ABOUT 125 ADDITIONAL SPACES FOR III MAF'S USE, AND WOULD FACILITATE OPTIMUM POSITIONING OF 1ST MAW FIXED WING UNITS AND ENHANCE OUR PRESENT AND POST HOSTILITY POSTURES BY POSITIONING TWO VMFA SQUADRONS AT IWAKUNI. CONCOMITANTLY, T-DAY PLANNING AND EXECUTION REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE REDUCED. FURTHER, SINCE MCAS IWAKUNI IS PRESENTLY UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY, OUR POSITION WOULD BE IMPROVED BY THE INCREASED USAGE THAT WOULD RESULT.

4. (S) IN CONSIDERATION OF THE MANY ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED BY AN EARLY TRANSFER OF A VMFA TO MAG-15, I BELIEVE THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS RESULT COULD BE OBTAINED BY THE INITIATION OF APPROPRIATE ACTION AT YOUR LEVEL.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM

LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER

DURING WORKING HOURS.

T-DAY PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 110720Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT)

B. CG FMFPAC 090343Z/AUG68 (TS) (SPECAT)

C. CG FMFPAC 132234Z/NOV68 (TS) (SPECAT)

1. (U) THERE REMAIN MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS RELATED

TO T-DAY PLANS AND THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE

THAT THIS WON'T BE THE CASE AT LEAST FOR THE IM-

MEDIATE FUTURE. FOR THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS, MY

STAFF HAS BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEM; IT

HAS BEEN MY DESIRE TO INVOLVE YOU AS LITTLE AS

POSSIBLE FOR OBVIOUS REASONS.

2. (S) TO SATISFY THE MACV REQUIREMENT AS NOTED IN

REF A, I WILL SHORTLY PROVIDE YOU WITH A TROOP LIST

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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SECRET

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/LEFT SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

SECRET/MCEO

INDICATING LOCATIONS, FOR A MEF IN WESTPAC. IT WILL BE IN CONSONANCE WITH PREVIOUS FMFPAC SUBMISSIONS TO CINCPACFLT AND WILL FOLLOW THE PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE I GAVE YOU IN REF B. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE TROOP LIST PURPOSELY DOES NOT INDICATE A SPECIFIC UNIT; THIS IS TO PROVIDE US WITH MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY AT THE CRITICAL TIME OF WITHDRAWAL. AS SOON AS THE LOGISTIC IMPLICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THIS POSTURE ARE DETERMINED, I WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE.

3. (U) I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS GUIDANCE MAY REQUIRE REVISION, DEPENDING ON THE REPLY TO REF C AND THE MANY INTANGIBLES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SUBJECT. WARM
REGARDS.
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET

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SECRET/MCEO
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM GEN CHAPMAN MARINE

CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

SUBJ/ PROGRAM 6 REALIGNMENT

A. CMC 241448Z/OCT 68 SPECAT

B. CG III MAF 090526Z NOV 68

1. (S) REF A PROVIDED FORCE REALIGNMENT UNDER ALTERNATIVE NR 3 THIS WAS FORWARDED BY SECNAV TO SEDDEF ON 4 NOV 68.
2. (S) REF B ADVISED THAT CG III MAF'S MEASURES TO BRING ON-BOARD SVN STRENGTH WITHIN THE CURRENT CEILING HAVE RESULTED IN A SHORTAGE OF EXPERIENCED OFFICERS IN BOTH DIVISIONS AND DECLINING ON-BOARD FOXHOLE STRENGTH IN REFLE COMPANIES.
3. (S) THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT OSD MAY DELAY INDEFINITELY A DECISION ON THE PROGRAM 6 REALIGNMENT OF FORCES. THE EFFECT WOULD BE THE APPLICATION OF THE PROGRAM 6 CEILING AS A MANNING LEVEL RATHER THAN DEPLOYING FROM SVN THE UNITS WE HAVE PROPOSED UNDER THE ALTERNATIVES TO DATE.

4. (S) IN ORDER TO SURFACE THIS ISSUE WITH THE JCS, IT IS DESIRED THAT

CG III MAF INITIATE A REQUEST TO COMUSMACV TO COMMENCE REDEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA OF THOSE UNITS LISTED IN PARA 3 B OF REF A. THE

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA0216 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM GEN CHAPMAN MCEO (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
DEFICIENCIES CITED IN REF B SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THIS REQUEST AND REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITS SHOULD BE PROPOSED IN THE SEQUENCE AND AT THE RATE CG III MAF DEEMS NECESSARY TO IMPROVE TACTICAL UNIT M/L STRENGTH.

GP-4

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CMC

R 140216Z/NOV68

SECRET

ACTN: S/SEC

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC**STAFF SECTIONS NOT
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VV AAF011
 PP RUHDM RUSVDF
 DE RHMAF 1883 3201124
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 151124Z NOV 68 1513Z 15NOV68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHDM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUSVDF/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

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SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE, INFO MAJGEN QUILTER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

PROPOSED CMCM ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT (S)A. YOUR NOTE OF 5NOV68

1. AS YOU REQUESTED IN REF A, I HAVE STUDIED THE TWO PROPOSED CMCM'S THAT THE COMMANDANT IS CONSIDERING TABLING WITH THE JCS FOR RECORD PURPOSES.

2. I PREFER THE MORE TO THE POINT BRIEF VERSION OF THE CMCM, WITH ATTACHMENTS TO LAY OUT THE DETAIL. THIS IS A BETTER MODE OF PRESENTATION IN THAT THE BASIC ISSUE IS SET OUT QUITE CLEARLY AT THE ONSET AND BACKED UP IN THE DETAIL REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OUR CASE.

3. THE STATISTICAL MATERIAL AND CHRONOLOGY PRESENTED

PAGE TWO RHMAF 1883 SECRET SPECAT (MCEO)
 IN BOTH VERSIONS ARE ACCURATE AND SUPPORTABLE BY RECORDS ON FILE AT FIRST MAW HEADQUARTERS. THE RATIONAL AND ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING OUR CASE APPEAR TO BE SOUND.

4. I WISH TO NOTE THAT SINCE 6NOV68 THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY 26 USAF SORTIES FRAGGED INTO ICTZ, WHILE 137 ADD-ON OR IMMEDIATE SORTIES HAVE BEEN ACTUALLY FLOWN. THIS INDICATES THE SMALL AMOUNT OF USAF AIR NOW BEING EMPLOYED IN ICTZ. IT AMOUNTS TO LESS THAN 4 FRAGGED SORTIES PER DAY WITH A TOTAL FLOWN OF LESS THAN 18 SORTIES PERDAY COUNTING ALL DIVERTS AND SCRAMBLES. IN COMPARISON, THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF SORTIES FLOWN BY THE FIRST MAW IN ICTZ DURING THE SAME PERIOD IS 176 PER DAY.

THE REDUCTION IN AIR FORCE SORTIES IN ICTZ IS A RESULT OF A COMUSMACV DECISION TO WEIGHT THE EFFORT IN LAOS AND III CORPS. HOWEVER, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE PREPONDERANCE OF IAC AIR IN MY AREA IS FLOWN BY THE 1ST MAW. THIS MIGHT STRENGTHEN OUR ARGUMENT FOR DIRECT MANAGEMENT.

WARM REGARDS.

P-4
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35

CG III MAF

151124Z/NOV68

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PP RUHHFMA
DE RUEBHOA 1022 3202008
P 151952Z NOV 68
FM CMC
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUST FROM LTGEN WALT
RELOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS (U)

- A. CMC 140216Z NOV 68 SPECAT
D. CG FMFPAC 132232Z NOV 68 SPECAT
C. CMC 241448Z OCT 68 SPECAT
D. CG III MAG 131000Z OCT 68

1. (S) REF (A) PROVIDED NECESSARY RATIONALE AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INITIATING A UNIT REDEPLOYMENT REQUEST TO COMUSMACV. REF (B), APPARENTLY CROSSING IN TRANSMISSION WITH REF (A), RECOMMENDED REDEPLOYMENT OF A VMFA VICE VMA SQUADRON FROM SVN TO IWAKUNI. ADDITIONALLY, REF (B) RECOMMENDED THAT CMC INITIATE THE APPROPRIATE REDEPLOYMENT ACTION. REF (C) CONTAINED CMC'S THIRD PROGRAM 6 REALIGNMENT ALTERNATIVE. REF (D) PROVIDED COMUSMACV A RECOMMENDED PROGRAM 6 FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE.
2. (S) I CONCUR IN YOUR PROPOSAL TO REDEPLOY A VMFA VICE VMA SQUADRON FROM SVN. I BELIEVE THAT A MORE EXPEDITIOUS RESULT WILL BE ACHIEVED IF THIS REDEPLOYMENT PROPOSAL ORIGINATES FROM THE OPERATIONAL THEATER COMMANDER. THERE-

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA 1022 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GENBUS FROM

LTGEN WALT

FOR, IT IS REQUESTED THAT BOB CUSHMAN INCLUDE THIS PROPOSAL WITHIN THE REDEPLOYMENT REQUEST TO COMUSMACV WHICH IS REQUIRED BY PAR 4 OF REF (A).

3. (S) OUR THIRD ALTERNATIVE, SET FORTH IN REF (C), IS A MATTER OF RECORD WITH DOD. THEREFORE BOB CUSHMAN'S REQUEST FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITS TO OKINAWA/JAPAN SHOULD BE LIMITED AT THIS TIME TO THOSE UNITS LISTED IN PAR 3B OF REF (C) PLUS THE VMFA, AND THE H&MS AND MABS DETS LISTED IN PAR 3C OF REF (C).

4. (S) AS A SEPARATE BUT RELATED MATTER, IT IS NOTED THAT THE SUBSTITUTION OF A VMFA FOR A VMA SQUADRON WILL ALTER THE TROOP LIST PROVIDED TO MACV BY REF (D) AND CG III MAF WILL NEED TO CORRECT THAT TROOP LIST TO ACCOUNT FOR THE 125 SPACES GAINED.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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P 151952Z/NOV68

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HQ FMFPAC
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11/15	OK Richard Wilson CG HAS SEEN Engle Loper J. Holchels J. H. Tallman G. S. S. S. S. S. S. S.			9/5					
11/16				4 J. H. Engle T. H. Engle E. H. S.					

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DE RUEFHMA1286 3202253
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RUEFHMA T-PHMMAPA
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FM CMC

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TO RUEFHMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RHMMAPA/CG III MAF
RI

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN WALT
INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

1-DAY PLANNING (U)

- A. CGFMFPAC 132231Z NOV 68 (SPECAT)
- B. CG FMFPAC LTR SER 00049-67 OF 14 JAN 67 (NOTAL)
- C. CINCPAC LTR SER 000147 OF 20 MAR 68 (NOTAL)
- D. CMC LTR 007J19367 OF 31 AUG 67 (NOTAL)
- E. CMC 101439Z MAY 68 (SPECAT) JKNOTAL
- F. CG FMFPAC 032059Z JUL 68 (SPECAT) (NOTAL)
- G. CMC 061532Z JUL 68 (SPECAT) (NOTAL)
- H. CINCPAC LTR SEP 000362 OF 14 AUG 68 (NOTAL)
- I. JCSN 531-68 (ENCLOSURE A TO JCS 2472/170-9) (NOTAL)
- J. CMC 151910Z OCT 68 (NOTAL)
- K. CMC 082036Z OCT 68 (NOTAL)

PAGE RUEFHMA1286 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
FROM LTGEN WALT INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN MCEO. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

L. CMC 291610Z JUN 68 (SPECAT) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED GUIDANCE RELATIVE TO POST HOSTILITIES
STRENGTH AND LOCATION OF FMFPAC UNITS FOR POSTHOSTILITIES
PLANNING PURPOSES. THE BASIC PROBLEM APPEARS TO BE WHETHER
YOUR PLANS SHOULD ADDRESS A FULL MEF OR ONLY TWO THIRDS MEF
IN WESTPAC.

2. (TS) THERE ARE CURRENTLY TWO PARALLEL BUT DISTINCT SERIES OF
PLANNING EFFORTS UNDERWAY DEALING WITH THE POSTHOSTILITIES
CRA:

A. ONE SERIES DEALS WITH REQUIREMENTS IN THE JSOP/PRO-
GRAM OBJECTIVES SENSE AND ADDRESSES THOSE FORCE STRENGTHS
AND LOCATIONS WHICH THE MILITARY COMMUNITY BELIEVES ARE RE-
QUIRED TO EXECUTE JCS STRATEGY. IN THIS CATEGORY ARE THE
FMFPAC POSTHOSTILITIES STUDY (REF B), THE CINCPAC POSTHOSTILITIES
STUDY (REF C), AND THE HQMC POST HOSTILITIES STUDY CASE 1A
(REF D), WHICH HAVE ALL INDICATED A REQUIREMENT FOR A FULL
MEF IN WESTPAC.

B. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS A PLANNING SERIES DIRECTED
BY OSD ON 25 JULY 1968, I. E. T-DAY PLANNING, WHICH IS RESTRICTED
TO ADDRESSAL OF THE SECRET APPROVED FORCE STRUCTURE AND END

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R 160017Z/NOV68

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PAGE THREE RUEBHQA1286 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN WALT INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN MCEO. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

STRENGTHS AS REFLECTED IN THE FYDP. THIS PLANNING IS DIRECTED TOWARD HAVING ON THE SHELF A SET OF CAPABILITIES/CONTINGENCY PLANS WHICH PROVIDE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM RVN UNDER VARIOUS CONDITION AND FOR THE PHASEDOWN OF THE PRESENT TEMPORARY LEVEL OF FORCES TO THE APPROVED BASELINE FORCE. IN ANTICIPATION OF THIS REQUIREMENT, THE HQMC POST HOSTILITIES STUDY PROVIDED FOR AN ANALYSIS (CASE IIA) TO DETERMINE DESIRED POSTURE UNDER FYDP RESTRICTIONS. CASE IIA HAS JUST BEEN REVISED TO REFLECT LATEST FYDP FIGURES AND T/O CHANGES AND WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. (TS) AS WAS POINTED OUT IN REF E AND RECOGNIZED IN REF F, THE MARINE CORPS CANNOT SUPPORT A FULL MEF IN WESTPAC UNLESS THE JSOP/PO ACTIVE END STRENGTH OF ABOUT 235,00 IS ATTAINED, AND THIS CAPABILITY WOULD BE MARGINAL AT BEST. WITHIN THE FYDP END STRENGTH OF ABOUT 203,600 UPON WHICH 5-DAY PLANNING MUST BE BASED, A FULL MEF IN WESTPAC CANNOT BE SUPPORTED. FURTHER WE EXPECT MANY PROBLEMS IN ENEN SUPPORTING 2/3 MEF AT APPROPRIATE MANNING LEVELS IN VIEW OF T/O INCREASES SINCE 1964. FOR THIS REASON, WHILE IT REMAINS OUR POLICY TO SUPPORT A FULL MEF IN ALL REQUIREMENTS STUDIES AS NOTED IN REF G, WE

PAGE FOUR RUEBHQA1286 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN WALT INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN MCEO. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

CAN NEVERTHELESS INCLUDE ONLY 2/3 MEF IN WESTPAC IN THE T-DAY PLANNING EFFORTS. WHEN THE CINCPAC T-DAY RESPONSE (REF H) WAS SUBMITTED REFLECTING A FULL MEF IN WESTPAC, IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY FOR JCS TO REDUCE THIS TO 2/3 MEF, AS REFLECTED IN REFS I, J, AND K. YOU WILL ALSO NOTE IN REF I FOR EXAMPLE THAT UNDER ALTERNATIVES A AND B THE ARMY DOES NOT RETAIN AN AIRMOBILE DIV IN WESTPAC/ASIA AREA AS IS REFLECTED IN REF C.

4. (TS) RELATIVE TO UNIT LOCATIONS WITHIN WESTPC, REF L PROVIDES, FOR ALL PLANNING, THE COMMANDANTS PREFERRED DISPOSITIONS AND THE RATIONALE FOR THEM. LOCATIONS ARE INDICATED SEPARATELY FOR EACH LEVEL-A FULL MEF AND 2/3 MEF. WITH RESPECT TO THE TTPI, WE ARE PUSHING FOR BASE LOCATIONS THERE. THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE MOST LIKELY WILL BE THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS; I. E. THE PLEBISCITE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT AUTHORITY FOR MAJOR EXPENDITURES IN THE TTPI WILL BE APPROVED UNTIL THE POLITICAL ISSUES ARE SETTLED. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT OUR CASE IIA, DEALS WITH ONLY APPROVED BASE LOCATIONS. WHILE ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR THE TTPI, IT PROVIDES TROOP LISTS FOR ONLY OKINAWA/JAPAN. NEVERTHELESS WE ARE CURRENTLY RESTRUCTURING THE CASE IIA WESTPAC TROOP LIST TO DETERMINE PRECISELY WHAT

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA1286 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN
BUSE FROM LTGEN WALT INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN MCEO. DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS.

UNITS SHOULD GO TO THE TTPI IF AUTHORIZED AND WHAT THE
COSTS WOULD BE. THIS SHOULD BE DONE BY 1 DEC 68 AND WILL BE
LABELED CASE IIB. THIS WILL ALSO BE WORKED INTO THE T-DAY
PLANS.

5. (TS) IN SUMMARY, T-DAY PLANNING FOR MARINE CORPS FORCES MUST
BE PREDICATED ON APPROVED FYDP FORCE LEVELS AND CAN THEREFORE
ONLY ADDRESS 2/3 MEF IN WESTPAC.

6. (TS) FOR YOUR INFORMATION, PLANNING IS ALSO UNDERWAY HERE ON
A POSSIBLE DEESCALATION STEP NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE FORE-
GOING PLANNING. THIS ESSENTIALLY INVOLVES THE WITHDRAWAL OF
A MARINE DIVISION AND WING ELEMENTS PRIOR TO T-DAY TO A LO-
CATION (OKINAWA/JAPAN) FROM WHICH THEY COULD BE RAPIDLY RE-
INTRODUCED INTO RVN IF REQUIRED. PLANNING ON THIS IS IN A
VERY PRELIMINARY STAGE AN NO OFFICIAL REQUIREMENT HAS YET
BEEN LEVIED FOR IT. YOU WILL BE KEPT INFORMED AS THE SITUATION
DEVELOPS.

GP-3

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R 160017Z/NOV68

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P 160321Z NOV 68

FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUWJAIA/COMCRUDESPAC

RUWJNUA/COMINEPAC

RUWJMUA/CONAVAIRPAC

RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC

RUHHADA/COMSUBPAC

ZEN/COMSERVPAC

INFO RUADLBA/COMFIRSTFLT

RUHGSFA/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHHASA/COMASWFORPAC

RUHHMA/CG FMFPAC

RUWJNRA/COMTRAPAC

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S E C R E T

FOR VADM SHINN, VADM SMITH, RADM COMBS, RADM BIRD, RADM FREEMAN,
RADM SMALL, INFO VADM BINGLEY, VADM ROEDER, VADM BOWEN, LGEN BUSE
RADM GRIMM FROM BAUMBERGER

FORCE LEVEL MANAGEMENT DURING STANDOWN (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 210331Z SEP 68

1. (S) DECISIONS NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY MAY
CAUSE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN FORCE LEVELS IN FY 70, REDUCTIONS OF

PAGE TWO RUHHBRA4692 S E C R E T

COMBATANT SHIP COMMITMENTS IN SEASIA, AND EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
PERSONNEL/MATERIAL READINESS THROUGH PERSONNEL AND SHIP SCHEDULIN
MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS.

2. (U) REQUEST ANY THOUGHTS YOU MAY HAVE DEVELOPED IN CONSIDERING
YOUR REPLY TO REF A WHICH BEAR UPON COMMITMENTS, DEPLOYMENT
SCHEDULES, MONEY/PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, FORCE LEVEL CHANGES OR ANY
OTHER PERTINENT FACTOR BEARING UPON FORCE LEVEL MANAGEMENT. INFO
DESIRED DUE FORTHCOMING TRIP TO WASHINGTON.

3. (U) REPLIES, AS APPROPRIATE, REQUESTED NLT 191800Z. REGRET
SHORT FUSE, BUT THIS IS A FAST BREAKING ITEM

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

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CINCPACFLT

P 160321Z NOV 68

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← DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN TOMPKINS FROM
LTGEN BUSE. INFO GEN CHITMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES

ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

- A. CG III MAF 131000Z/OCT68 (S) (NOTAL)
- B. CG III MAF 090526Z/NOV68 (S) (NOTAL)
- C. JCS 132348Z/NOV68 (S) (PASEP) (NOTAL)
- D. CG III MAF 131002Z/OCT68 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (S) BY REF A, CG III MAF SUBMITTED PROPOSALS FOR
REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE TO ENSURE
ADHERENCE TO PROGRAM 6 AUTHORIZATIONS, WHICH INCLUDED
WITHDRAWAL OF VARIOUS III MAF UNITS FROM SVN.

2. (S) PERSONNEL ACTIONS ALREADY IMPLEMENTED
TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO PROGRAM 6 CEILINGS HAVE RE-
SULTED IN A III MAF REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN ITS
CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE AT REDUCED MANNING LEVELS.

THE RESULTANT DELETERIOUS IMPACT ON III MAF COMBAT

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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SECRET/MCEO

CAPABILITY WAS NOTED IN REF B.

3. (S) IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE PROBLEMS CONCOMITANT TO THE REDUCED III MAF MANNING LEVELS, COMMENCEMENT OF REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITS PROPOSED FOR DELETION FROM THE III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE BY REF A IS NOW A NECESSITY. REDEPLOYMENT OF THESE UNITS WILL ALLOW THE REALIGNED III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE TO BE MANNED AT LEVELS THAT WILL NOT UNACCEPTABLY DEGRADE COMBAT CAPABILITY UNDER THE CURRENT TEMPO OF OPERATIONS.

4. (S) THE FOLLOWING UNITS ARE ^{DESIGNATED} FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRUCTURE SPACES</u>	<u>REDEPLOYMENT LOCATION</u>
VMFA	393	JAPAN
DET H&MS/MABS	51	JAPAN
AT BN (-)	273	OKINAWA
AT BN (-)	273	OKINAWA
ARMD AMPHIB CO (-)	203	OKINAWA
AMTRAC BN (-)	711	OKINAWA
MED TK CO (REIN)	127	OKINAWA
MED TK CO (REIN)	127	OKINAWA
WERS (MWSG)	251	JAPAN
TOTAL STRENGTH	2409	

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SECRET/MCEO

SUB TOTAL OKINAWA 1853

SUB TOTAL JAPAN 556

5. (S) ACCORDINGLY, PLEASE INITIATE THE NECESSARY ACTION ON A PRIORITY BASIS TO COMUSMACV REQUESTING AUTHORITY BE OBTAINED TO COMMENCE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE UNITS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE. THE SEQUENCE AND RATE OF THE PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENTS IS LEFT TO YOUR DISCRETION EXCEPT FOR THE INITIAL STEP. THE REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE VMFA SQUADRON WITH ASSOCIATED H&MS AND MABS PERSONNEL TO JAPAN SHOULD HAVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. THE REDEPLOYMENT OF A VMFA SQUADRON IN LIEU OF THE VMA SQUADRON PROPOSED IN REF A IS MORE RESPONSIVE TO III MAF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, ^{AND} IS IN CONSONANCE WITH BASE LOADING OF FMAW AIRCRAFT AND WITH ^{IN WHICH THIS HQ SUPPORTED ALTERNATIVE THREE,} REF C, ~~AND WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TRADE-OFF SPACES.~~

6. (S) IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT REDEPLOYMENT OF A VMFA IN LIEU OF THE VMA ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY REF A WILL GENERATE 133 ADDITIONAL PROGRAM 6 SPACES, WHICH CAN BE USED TO SATISFY PART OF III MAF TOP PRIORITY ADDITIONAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS, AS CONTAINED IN REF D. CG III MAF IS REQUESTED TO MODIFY REF A TO REFLECT WITHDRAWAL OF A VMFA IN LIEU OF THE VMA PROPOSED AND TO REFLECT PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT OF THE TRADE-OFF

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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SECRET/MCEO

SPACES GENERATED. WARM REGARDS.

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BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM WILLIAMS
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
A. CG FMFPAC 050312Z NOV 68 (SPECAT) PLANNING VISIT (S)
1. (S) PARA THREE OF REF A TAKES NOTE OF POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT
OF ARG/SLF IN IV CTZ IN SUPPORT OF A COMNAVFORV PLANNED
OPERATION. RECENT INITIATIVES BY VADM ZUMWALT IN EXCLUSIVE CHANNELS
TO VADM BRINGLE ADDRESS DESIRABILITY OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ON
PHU QUOC ISLAND TO DESTROY 250-300 MAN VC FORCE REPORTEDLY LOCATED
BY SEAL OPERATIONS. THIS ASSAULT CONCEIVED CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING
"DECISIVE MILITARY VICTORY" BY EXPLOITING VULNERABILITY OF
VC TO "SURPRISE HELO BORNE ATTACKS".
2. (S) ON BASIS THOSE INITIATIVES COMSEVENTHFLT
HAS TASKED ME TO GO TO SAIGON WITH SMALL PLANNING GROUP
(INCL REPS OF CTF 76) TO DISCUSS DETAILS WITH COMNAVFORV.
OBVIOUSLY, TALKS WILL BE LIMITED TO DEVELOPMENT OF MORE INFO AND TO
INFORMAL ASSESSMENT OF FEASIBILITY, AND WILL INVOLVE NO COMMITMENT.
3. (S) UNODIR WILL PROCEED TO SAIGON 210900Z NOVEMBER AND RETURN
TO THIS HQS BY LATE AFTERNOON 22 NOV.

GP-4

BT

CG NINTH MAB

P 180818Z/NOV 68

ACTN: S/SEC

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OO RUHKM
DE RHMMAF 2266 3230956
ZNY SSSSS
O 180956Z NOV 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUHKM/CMC
BT

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN.
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PROGRAM 6 DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 052239Z NOV68 (S) SPECAT

1. (S) THIS MSG RESPONDS TO REF A. IT ADDRESSES AUTHORIZED
STRUCTURE BILLETS WHICH III MAF WOULD RECOMMEND NOT BE FILLED
UNDER CONSTRAINTS OF SECNAV PROPOSAL AND IDENTIFIES THE
CONCOMITANT IMPACT ON III MAF COMBAT CAPABILITY. IT FURTHER
PROVIDES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMENSURATE CHANGES IN FMFPAC
TENTATIVE REVISED MANNING LEVELS.

2 (S) III MAF ASSUMPTIONS:

A. THE QUOTE CURRENT III MAF STRUCTURE UNQUOTE AS DEFINED
IN REF A INCLUDES III MAF UNITS NOW IN SVN AND III MAF UNITS

PAGE TWO RHMMAF 2266 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEC).
IDENTIFIED IN ALTERNATIVE ONE TO USMC SVN 82.2 PLAN AS UNITS
REQUIRING USMC SVN PROGRAM SIX SPACE INCREASE OF 5.8K TO CMC
PROPOSED USMC SVN CEILING OF 88K.

B. USMC MPS END FY69 IS BEST AVAILABLE SOURCE
DOCUMENT FOR T/O AND AUTH STR OF UNITS IN USMC 89.5
PLAN.

C. MAJOR ELEMENTS IN CURRENT HQMC APPROVED
AUGMENT INCLUDE:

EA DIV - 638 DIV BASE SUPPORT
259 RECON BN AUGMENT

FLC - 406 HQMC AUGMENT

MAW - 228 ORD PERS

3. (S) BASED ON FOREGOING ASSUMPTIONS, III MAF CURRENT
TOTAL STRUCTURE BILLETS ARE 83,482. THIS TOTAL MAY
SUBSEQUENTLY REQUIRE FURTHER REFINEMENT. BASED ON
THIS TOTAL, SHORTFALL IS 5440. THESE FIGURES ARE
BASIS OF SUBSEQUENT COMPUTATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
IN THIS MSG.

4. (S) THE TOTAL AUTHORIZED STRUCTURE BILLETS IN
EACH III MAF ADCON GROUP AND THOSE AUTHORIZED STRUC-

CG III MAF

O 180956Z NOV 68

S/SEC

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PAGE THREE PHMMAF 2266 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
THREE BILLETS WHICH III MAF WOULD RECOMMEND NOT BE
FILLED UNDER THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE SECNAV PROPOSAL
ARE:

ADCON GROUP	TOTAL BILLETS	UNFILLED BILLETS
A. HQ III MAF ADCON	3,557	NONE
B. FIRST MARDIV ADCON	24,792	1,493
C. THIRD MARDIV ADCON	22,192	911
D. FIRST MAW ADCON	16,753	1,212
E. FLC ADCON	9,660	735
F. 9TH MAB EPD ADCON	5,876	1,068
G. 9TH MAB AJR ADCON	652	21
TOTAL III MAF	83,482	5,440

5. (S) THE CONCOMITANT IMPACT ON III MAF COMBAT
CAPABILITY WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE IMPACT OF THE
USMC SVN 82.2 PLAN. THERE WOULD BE THE ADDITIONAL
PROBLEM OF CADRING CERTAIN UNITS IN CTY. CADRING,
ALTHOUGH UNDESIRABLE, APPEARS TO BE A BETTER
SOLUTION THAN ACROSS-THE-BOARD CUTS. IMPACT IS
IDENTIFIED FOR AFFECTED UNITS AS FOLLOWS:

A. FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV. IMPACT WOULD BE

PAGE FOUR PHMMAF 2266 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
SIGNIFICANT. CADRE STATUS FOR THE FOLLOWING UNITS
MIGHT BE NECESSARY: TWO TANK COS, TWO AMPAC COS,
TWO AT COS, HQ BATPY FAC, ARMD AMPHIB CO(-), AND
ONE COMM SUPPORT CO. BILLETS WOULD REMAIN UNFILLED
FOR A LARGE PORTION OF CMR PLAT. CURRENT BASE
SUPPORT AUGMENTATION WOULD BE REDUCED ABOUT 50PERCENT IN
EACH DIVISION

B. FIRST MAW. IT APPEARS THAT BILLETS FOR ONE
ASPT, ONE MATCU, 121 HELO GUNNERS AND 297 AIRFIELD
SECURITY PERSONNEL COULD NOT BE FILLED. CADRING OF
WFPs MAY BE REQUIRED. CERTAIN OTHER ELEMENTS SUCH AS
COMM, SHOEHORN, AND COACT COULD NOT BE EMPLOYED.
DIVERSION OF AIRCREWS AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TO
AIRFIELD SECURITY DUTIES WOULD LOWER THEIR EFFICIENCY
THUS DECREASING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. HELO OPS
WOULD BE RESTRICTED SEVERELY OR MADE MORE HAZARDOUS
IN VIEW SHORTAGE OF HELO GUNNERS.

C. PRINCIPAL IMPACT ON FLC WOULD BE TO REDUCE
FLEXIBILITY OF LOGIS OPS SUPPORT OPERATIONS. CADRING
ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT IN FLC IN VIEW UNIQUE FUNCTION

CG III MAF

O 183956Z NOV 68

2 - 3

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PAGE FIVE RHOMAF 2266 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE (MOFO)
EACH UNIT. IMPACT ON COMBAT CAPABILITY OF 9TH MAF
UNITS SHOULD NOT PROVE DISABLING.

6. (S) III MAF'S INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES
IN FMFPAC TENTATIVE REVISED MANNING LEVELS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

ADCON GROUP	FMFPAC M/L	CHANGE
A. HQ III MAF ADCON	3,361	ADD 196
B. FIRST MARDIV ADCON	24,849	REDUCE 1559
C. THIRD MARDIV ADCON	21,026	ADD 255
D. FIRST MAW ADCON	15,755	REDUCE 214
E. FLC ADCON	8,524	ADD 481
F. 9TH MAF CPD ADCON	3,897	ADD 911
G. 9TH MAF AIR ADCON	637	ADD 1
TOTAL M/L	79,042	TOTAL CHG-6

GP-1
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CG III MAF

O 180950Z NOV 68

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DE RUMMAFA 2595 3201135
/NY SSSSS
P 210742Z NOV 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FLETPAC

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BT
THE C R E I SPLCAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LGTY BUSE FROM MGEN TOMPKINS
FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, DISPATCHED TO COMUS TODAY, IS
QUOTED FOR INFO:

QUOTE
O 210740Z NOV 68 ZFF-1
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV SGN
BT

SECRET

III MAF PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. COMUSMACV 32923 DTG 230130Z NOV 68 (S)

1. (C) THIS HQ GREATLY APPRECIATED THE PAINSTAKING REVIEW OF III MAF'S
PROPOSED REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE BY THE MACV STAFF AND THE
RESULTING COMUSMACV CONCURRENCE WHICH WAS EXPRESSED TO CINCPAC IN REF A.

2. (U) PURPOSE OF THIS MSG IS TO ADVISE CURRENT STATUS OF FORCE
STRUCTURE SITUATION IN III MAF AND REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE AS A MATTER
OF HIGH PRIORITY IN RESOLVING SEVERE FORCE STRUCTURE PROBLEM
CONFRONTING THIS HQ.

3. (S) THE PROBLEM HAS TWO SEPRATE BUT RELATED ASPECTS. FIRST ASPECT
CONCERNS THE URGENT NEED TO DELETE ONE VMFA SQDN FM III MAF'S REALIGNED
PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE IN THE REALIGNED STRUC-
TURE THE VMFA SQDN NOW IN SVN. SECOND ASPECT CONCENTRATES EQUALLY URGENT NEED
TO RAPIDLY AND ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL FM SVN OF III MAF UNITS WHICH CANNOT BE

ACCOMMODATED, I. E., INCLUDED IN THE REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE.
CG III MAF

P 210742Z NOV 68

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PAGE TWO RHMMAF2672 S E C R E T

A. NEED FOR THE VMA SQUADRON VICE VMFA SODN ARISES FM THE PRESENT REORIENTATION OF AIR EFFORT AS RESULT OF NVA BOMBING HALT AND III MAF'S ESTIMATE OF FOCUS OF AIR EFFORT IN COMING MONTHS. FM III MAF POINT OF VIEW, AIR EFFORT WILL FOCUS MORE AND MORE TOWARD DIRECT SUPPORT GROUND COMBAT OPS IN JCIZ AND SVN WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. REQUIREMENT FOR GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY OF VMA SODN WILL INCREASE AS COMPARED TO REQUIREMENT FOR FIGHTER/ATTACK CAPABILITY OF VMFA SODN.

B. NEED FOR EARLY AND ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF III MAF UNITS FM SVN ARISES FROM FACT THAT, ALTHOUGH ACTUAL III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE REMAINS SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER THAN EITHER PRESENT PROG SIX STRUCTURE OR PROPOSED PROG SIX REALIGNED STRUCTURE, PERSONNEL MANNING LEVELS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DRastically REDUCED TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO PROG SIX CEILING CONSTRAINTS. THUS, ACTUAL III MAF STRUCTURE REMAINS AT ABOUT 83.5 K BILLETS (SPACES) AND CURRENT AND FUTURE MANNING LEVELS CAN MAKE ONLY 78.4 K MARINES AVAILABLE TO MAN THIS LARGE STRUCTURE.

4. (S) III MAF CONCEPT FOR ALLEVIATING PROBLEM AT EARLY DATE AND RESOLVING PROBLEM COMPLETELY DURING COMINT MONTHS IS AS FOLLOWS. CONCEPT IS EXPRESSED AS SERIES OF III MAF ACTIONS:

PAGE THREE RHMMAF2672 S E C R E T

A. ACTION NR 1. ADVISE COMUSMACV OF PROBLEM (THIS MSC CONSTITUTES ACTION NR 1)

B. ACTION NR 2. DEVELOP AND SUBMIT ASAP TO COMUSMACV III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE REQUEST 2-53. THIS CHANGE REQUEST WILL PROVIDE FOR DELETION OF ONE VMFA SODN FM III MAF'S PROPOSED REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE, INCLUSION OF THE VMA SODN NOW IS SVN, AND USE OF RESULTING USMC TRADE-OFF SPACES TO ACCOMMODATE PORTION OF III MAF HIGHEST PRIORITY FORCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE REALIGNED STRUCTURE.

C. ACTION NR 3. INITIATE WITHDRAWAL FM SVN AND REDEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN THESE UNITS IN INDICATED SEQUENCE AND RATE. READ IN FOUR COLUMNS:

UNIT	SEQUENCE	DATE	DESTINATION
(1) VMFA SODN	1	ASAP AND WLT 15 DEC	JAPAN
(2) H&MS/MARS DEI	1	ASAP AND WLT 15 DEC	JAPAN
(3) AI BN (-)	2	WLT 1 JAN	OKINAWA
(4) AT BN (-)	2	WLT 1 JAN	OKINAWA
(5) AMTRAC BN	3	WLT 15 JAN	OKINAWA
(6) ARMC AMPHIB CG (-)	4	WLT 1 FEB	OKINAWA
(7) MFD TK CO REIN	5	WLT 15 FEB	OKINAWA

CG III MAF

P 210742Z NOV 68

2-2

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G-2	CMC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/>	G-1
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G-4	CG FMFPAC (FWD)	<input type="checkbox"/> MAIL <input type="checkbox"/>	RELEASE SIGN
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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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LTGEN WALT, BGEN WEBSTER AND BGEN WILLIAMS FROM LTGEN

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REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 162002Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT)

B. TELCON G-3 HQMC, to G-3 FMFPAC, 18 NOV 68

1. (S) REF A REQUESTED CG III MAF INITIATE ACTION

THROUGH COMUSMACV TO OBTAIN AUTHORITY TO COMMENCE

REDEPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN UNITS TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN,

INCLUDING A VMFA SQUADRON. REF B ADVISED DESIRABILITY

OF RETAINING F4J VERSUS F4B TYPE ACFT IN SVN.

2. (S) REQUEST THAT REF A BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT A

VMFA SQUADRON (F4B AIRCRAFT) WITH 385 STRUCTURE SPACES

IN LIEU OF VMFA SQUADRON (F4J AIRCRAFT) DESIGNATED

FOR REDEPLOYMENT. PAR 4 OF REF A IS MODIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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ACCORDINGLY. REVISED SPACES DESIGNATED FOR REDEPLOY-
MENT TO OKINAWA/JAPAN TOTAL 2403 (1716 OKINAWA AND
687 JAPAN). WARM REGARDS.

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MAJGEN TOMPKINS FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS

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PROGRAM 6 REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES (U)

- A. CMC 301157Z/OCT68 (S) (SPECAT)
B. CG FMFPAC 052239Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT)
C. CG III MAF 180956Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT)
D. TELECON ^{MAJGEN OWENS} AC/S G-3, HQMC WITH ^{LTGEN WILSON} AC/S, FMFPAC
OF 6 NOV 68.

E. CG FMFPAC 162002Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT)

1. (S) REF A PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING A SECNAV
PROPOSAL FOR MAINTAINING THE CURRENT III MAF FORCE
STRUCTURE AND MANNING THIS STRUCTURE WITHIN THE
CONSTRAINTS OF PROGRAM 6 CEILINGS. FURTHER, ADDRESSAL
WAS REQUESTED AS TO HOW THE SHORTFALL BETWEEN STRUC-

2 TURE) SPACES AND MANNING LEVELS WOULD BE ABSORBED AND

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THE IMPACT OF THIS ABSORPTION ON III MAF COMBAT CAPABILITY.

2. (S) REF B PROVIDED CG III MAF WITH GUIDANCE CONCERNING REF A AND REQUESTED COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS.
3. (S) REF C CONTAINED CG III MAF COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO REF B.
4. (S) REF D REQUESTED COMMENTS ON ACCOMMODATING III MAF TOP PRIORITY ADDITIONAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS BY ROTATIONAL ASSIGNMENT OF RIFLE COMPANIES TO PERFORM THE DUTIES REQUIRED.
5. (S) REF E REQUESTED CG III MAF TO INITIATE ACTION THROUGH COMUSMACV TO OBTAIN AUTHORITY TO COMMENCE REDEPLOYMENT OF SELECTED UNITS TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN.
6. (S) CG III MAF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ABSORPTION OF PROJECTED SHORTFALL AND COMMENTS ON IMPACT, AS CONTAINED IN REF C, ARE CONCURRED IN. ABSORPTION OF THE SHORTFALL BY A HORIZONTAL REDUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY TWELVE PERCENT IN UNITS OTHER THAN THOSE DESIGNATED TO BE MANNED AT T/O STRENGTH IS UNACCEPTABLE. (S) SINCE IT RESULTS IN AN ACROSS THE BOARD REDUCTION IN III MAF COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CAPABILITY. A SELECTED VERTICAL REDUCTION, AS PROPOSED BY CG III MAF, REPRESENTS A MORE REALISTIC

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APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM BY ALLOWING SELECTION OF
SPECIFIC AREAS FOR REDUCTION IN CAPABILITY.

7. (S) IN RESPONSE TO REF D, THE ROTATIONAL ASSIGN-
MENT OF RIFLE COMPANIES TO ACCOMMODATE III MAF'S TOP
PRIORITY ADDITIONAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS OFFERS
NEITHER A COMPLETE NOR A DESIRABLE SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, RIFLE COMPANIES DO
NOT POSSESS MANY OF THE SKILLS REQUIRED (I.E., FOR
THE ASRT, THE MATCU AND CERTAIN OF THE DIVISION AND
WING AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS, WHICH INCLUDE SUCH
SKILLS AS RADAR TECHNICIANS, DATA PROCESSING AND
DISBURSING PERSONNEL). SECONDLY, EMPLOYMENT OF
RIFLE COMPANIES, AS PROPOSED, SERVES ONLY TO FURTHER
REDUCE III MAF'S COMBAT RESPONSIVENESS, SINCE THE
RIFLE COMPANIES REQUIRED FOR THESE TASKS WOULD NOT
BE AVAILABLE IN THEIR NORMAL ROLE. WITH THE DECREASE

4 IN ARMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN I CTZ AND FUTURE
PLANS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE SLF'S, ANY FURTHER
DECREASE IN III MAF GROUND COMBAT CAPABILITY IS
UNDESIRABLE. WARM REGARDS.

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SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT, INFO BGEN WEBSTER AND BGEN WILLIAMS FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CMC 151952Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT) NOTAL

B. CG FMFPAC 162002Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT/MCEO)

C. CG III MAF 210740Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT/MCEO)

- Chd*
1. AS REQUESTED IN REF A, ~~BOB CUSHMAN~~ *Tommy Tomphais, in Bob's absence,* WAS ADVISED BY REF B TO INITIATE ACTION THROUGH COMUSMACV TO OBTAIN AUTHORITY FOR EFFECTING WITHDRAWAL OF SELECTED UNITS FROM SVN TO OKI/JAPAN.
2. THE ACTION TAKEN BY III MAF TO ACCOMPLISH THE INITIAL MOVE IS CONTAINED IN REF C AND IS QUOTED BELOW. I CONCUR IN THE CONTENTS.

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QUOTE:

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, DISPATCHED TO COMUS TODAY, IS QUOTED FOR INFO:

QUOTE

O 210740Z NOV 68 ZFF-1
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV SGN
BT

SECRET

III MAF PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. COMUSMACV 32920 DTG 030100Z NOV 68 (S)

1. (C) THIS HQ GREATLY APPRECIATED THE PAINSTAKING REVIEW OF III MAF'S PROPOSED REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE BY THE MACV STAFF AND THE RESULTING COMUSMACV CONCURRENCE WHICH WAS EXPRESSED TO CINCPAC IN REF A.

2. (U) PURPOSE OF THIS MSG IS TO ADVISE CURRENT STATUS OF FORCE STRUCTURE SITUATION IN III MAF AND REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE AS A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY IN RESOLVING SEVERE FORCE STRUCTURE PROBLEM CONFRONTING THIS HQ.

3. (S) THE PROBLEM HAS TWO SEPARATE BUT RELATED ASPECTS. FIRST ASPECT CONCERNS THE URGENT NEED TO DELETE ONE VMFA SQDN FM III MAF'S REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE IN THE REALIGNED STRUCTURE THE VMA SQDN NOW IN SVN. SECOND ASPECT CONCERNS EQUALLY URGENT NEED FOR EARLY AND ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL FM SVN OF III MAF UNITS WHICH CANNOT BE

ACCOMMODATED, I. E., INCLUDED IN THE REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE.

A. NEED FOR THE VMA SQUADRON VICE VMFA SQDN ARISES FROM THE RECENT REORIENTATION OF AIR EFFORT AS RESULT OF NVN BOMBING HALT AND III MAF'S ESTIMATE OF FOCUS OF AIR EFFORT IN COMING MONTHS. FM III MAF POINT OF VIEW, AIR EFFORT WILL FOCUS MORE AND MORE TOWARD DIRECT SUPPORT GROUND COMBAT OPS IN ICTZ AND SVN WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. REQUIREMENT FOR GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY OF VMA SQDN WILL INCREASE AS COMPARED TO REQUIREMENT FOR FIGHTER/ATTACK CAPABILITY OF VMFA SQDN.

B. NEED FOR EARLY AND ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF III MAF UNITS. FM SVN ARISES FROM FACT THAT, ALTHOUGH ACTUAL III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE REMAINS SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER THAN EITHER PRESENT PROG SIX STRUCTURE OR PROPOSED PROG SIX REALIGNED STRUCTURE, PERSONNEL

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← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

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SECRET/MCEO

MANNING LEVELS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DRSTICALLY REDUCED TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO PROG SIX CEILING CONSTRAINTS. THUS, ACTUAL III MAF STRUCTURE REMAINS AT ABOUT 83.5 K BILLETS (SPACES) AND CURRENT AND FUTURE MANNING LEVELS CAN MAKE ONLY 78.0 K MARINES AVAILABLE TO MAN THIS LARGE STRUCTURE.

4. (S) III MAF CONCEPT FOR ALLEVIATING PROBLEM AT EARLY DATE AND RESOLVING PROBLEM COMPLETELY DURING COMINT MONTHS IN AS FOLLOWS. CONCEPT IS EXPRESSED AS SERIES OF III MAF ACTIONS:

A. ACTION NR 1. ADVISE COMUSMACV OF PROBLEM (THIS MSG CO STITUTES ACTION NR 1)

B. ACTION NR 2. DEVELOP AND SUBMIT ASAP TO COMUSMACV III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE REQUEST 2-68. THIS CHANGE REQUEST WILL PROVIDE FOR DELETION OF ONE VMFA SQDN FM III MAF'S PROPOSED REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE, INCLUSION OF THE VMA SQDN NOW IS SVN, AND USE OF RESULTING USMC TRADE-OFF SPACES TO ACCOMMODATE PORTION OF III MAF HIGHEST PRIORITY FORCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE REALIGNED STRUCTURE.

C. ACTION NR 3. INITIATE WITHDRAWAL FM SVN AND REDEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN THESE UNITS IAW INDICATED SQUENCE AND RATE. READ IN FOUR COLUMNS:

UNIT	SEQUENCE	RATE	DESTINATION
(1) VMFA SQDN	1	31 ASAP AND NLT 15 DEC	54 JAPAN
(2) H&MS/MABS DET	1	ASAP AND NLT 15 DEC	JAPAN
(3) AT BN (-)	2	NLT 1 JAN	OKINAWA
(4) AT BN (-)	2	NLT 1 JAN	OKINAWA
(5) AMTRACT BN	3	NLT 15 JAN	OKINAWA
(6) ARMD AMPHIB CO (-)	4	NLT 1 FEB	OKINAWA
(7) MED TK CO REIN	5	NLT 15 FEB	OKINAWA
(8) MED TK CO REIN	5	NLT 15 FEB	OKINAWA
(9) WERS (MWSG)	6	NLT 1 MARCH	JAPAN

5. (S) DEVELOPMENT OF FOREGOING CONCEPT INTO VIABLE PLAN DEPENDS HEAVILY ON OBTAINING AUTHORITY EARLIEST FOR WITHDRAWAL OF VMFA SQDN FM SVN. PLANNING FOR ACTION NR 2 NOW IN ADVANCED STAGE. FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE REQUEST 2-68 CAN BE SUBMITTED TO YOUR HQ NLT 25 NOV FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HOWEVER, IT WOULD APPEAR DESIABLE TO FIRST OBTAIN REQUISITE APPROVAL FOR SUBSTITUTION OF VMA SQDN VICE VMFA SQDN IN REALIGNED STRUCTURE AND WITHDRAWL OF VMFA SQDN AS INDICATED IN CONCEPT.

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PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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HEADQUARTERS
SUBSECTORY PAGES TO
FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

SECRET

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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6. (U) IT IS REQUESTED THAT COMUSMACV ASSIST III MAF AS FEASIBLE IN ALLEVIATING THIS FORCE STRUCTURE PROBLEM AND RESOLVING IT AS INDICATED IN III MAF CONCEPT.

GP-4

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UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS

UNQUOTE.

3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET/MCEO

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19

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23 NOV 68

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P 230445Z NOV 68
FM CG 9TH MAB
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM WILLIAMS (SPECAT)
ARG/SLF EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 120945Z NOV 68 (NOTAL)

1. (S) DISCUSSIONS WITH VADM ZUMWALT AND HIS STAFF TOOK FORM OF BRIEFING BY THEM ON RECENT SEA CORDS OPERATIONS IN CANALS AND WATERWAYS OF IVCTZ AS PRECAUTION TO DRY-SEASON CAMPAIGN (1 DECEMBER-1 JUNE) ADVOCATED BY SA THAT

1. IN ADDITION TO PHU QUOC ISLAND, 5 OTHER CANDIDATE TARGETS FOR POSSIBLE ARG/SLF ATTACK IN IVCTZ WERE PROPOSED BY COMNAVFORV.
2. (S) WITH RESPECT TO PHU QUOC,

A. NO SIGNIFICANT INFO WAS ADVANCED BEYOND THAT ALREADY RELATED IN REF A AND RELATED MESSAGES. MY APPRAISAL, FROM THE LF POINT OF VIEW, IS THAT AN OPERATION SUCH AS ENVISIONED BY COMNAVFORV WOULD BE FEASIBLE FOR A SINGLE ARG/SLF, PROVIDED THAT,
(1) SLF OPERATIONS ARE CONFINED TO THE TWO NORTHERN AREAS OF VC CONCENTRATION
(2) VC POSITIONS CAN BE MORE PRECISELY DETERMINED AND
(3) SUITABLE HELO LZ'S FOR CORDON TYPE OPERATIONS ARE AVAILABLE.

B. CONCUR THAT OPERATION COULD BE INITIATED WITHOUT PRE-ASSAULT OPERATIONS, BUT DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EVEN UNDER OPTIMUM CIRCUMSTANCES A "DECISIVE MILITARY VICTORY COULD BE GAINED" AS SUGGESTED BY REF A.

3. (S) WITH RESPECT TO OTHER FIVE CANDIDATE TARGETS, MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT NONE IS SUITABLE FOR ARG/SLF ASSAULT OR RAID BECAUSE,

A. IN EACH CASE DISTANCE FROM LPH OPERATING AREA TO LZ'S (GENERALLY 30-35 MILES) WOULD PRECLUDE RAPID BUILD-UP ASHORE REQUIRED TO FIX ENEMY FORCES:.

B. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF ENEMY TROOPS, INSTALLATIONS, AND ACTIVITIES IN THE TARGET AREAS INDICATES THAT INSIGNIFICANT RESULTS WOULD ACCRUE IN RELATION TO FRIENDLY FORCE INVESTMENT.

4. (S) FOREGOING VIEWS WERE PRESENTED ORALLY TO VADM ZUMWALT IN PRESENCE OF RADM LACY. IN VIEW OF FORMER'S APPRECIATION OF COOPERATION FOR ARG/SLF RESOURCES, I DOUBT THAT AT THIS TIME HE WILL PROPOSE EVEN THE PHU QUOC EMPLOYMENT TO MACV.

5. (U) COMMENTS ABOVE HAVE BEEN SENT TO VADM BRINGLE.

GP-4
BT

CG 9TH MAB

P 230445Z NOV 68

ACTN: S/SEC

SECRET

46

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SECRET

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VV CMC696
PP RUHHFMA RHMMFA
DE RUEBHOA4440 3281831
ZNY SSSSS
PAC -I- CG III MAF
P 231831Z NOV68
FM CMC
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RHMMFA/CG III MAF

76

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

23NOV68 1935Z

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BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM GEN CHAPMAN
INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS)

REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

- A. CG FMFPAC 212221Z NOV68 (S)
B. CG III MAF 180956Z NOV68 (S)
C. CG FMFPAC 212222Z NOV68 (S)
D. CG III MAF 210740Z NOV68 (S)

1. (S) AT A MEETING ON 21 NOVEMBER DEPSECDEF DENIED US
ANY INCREASES IN SEA PROGRAM SIX AND FURTHER STATED THAT
NO UNITS WOULD BE REDEPLOYED FROM SVN IN VIEW OF IMPLICATIONS
SUCH REDEPLOYMENTS WOULD HAVE ON PARIS TALKS. THIS DECISION
INCLUDES VMFA SQDN ADDRESSED IN REF A.
2. (S) IMPACT OF THIS DECISION WAS CLEARLY EXPLAINED INCLUDING
THE NECESSITY TO CADRE CERTAIN UNITS; PROBABILITY OF

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA4440 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
FROM GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN M C E O
REDUCTIONS IN FOXHOLE STRENGTH; AND POSSIBILITY OF REAL
SHORTAGES IF INTENSITY AND SCOPE OF COMBAT INCREASES. IN
EXPLANATION THE DEPSECDEF STATED THAT UNDER CURRENT SITUATION
NO OTHER DECISION COULD BE MADE AND THAT COMMANDER WOULD
HAVE TO USE HIS AUTHORIZED MANPOWER AND SHIFT THEM AS
NECESSARY TO FIT THE MILITARY SITUATION.

3. (S) CONCUR WITH REFS (B) AND (C) THAT PLACING CERTAIN
UNITS IN A CADRE/LOW MANNING LEVEL STATUS IS PREFERABLE TO
ACROSS-THE-BOARD CUTS. FURTHER I RECOGNIZE THAT CERTAIN
FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY AUGMENTATION PERSONNEL MUST CONTINUE.
HOWEVER WE MUST PROTECT PERMANENT STRUCTURE AND T/O'S,
THEREFORE DESIRE THAT ALL AUGMENTATION FUNCTIONS BE ABSORBED
FROM WITHIN AUTHORIZED T/O'S. ACCORDINGLY THIS HQS IS PREPARED
TO ACCOMMODATE SITUATION BY MANNING ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET YOUR
NEEDS BY PROVIDING THE REQUISITE GRADES/MOS WITHIN THE
89.5 CEILING.

4. (S) CG FMFPAC IS AUTHORIZED TO ADJUST PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS
AND MANNING LEVELS, INCLUDING THE CADRE OF UNITS, IN A MANNER
THAT WILL BEST MEET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE 89.5 K
CEILING. REQUEST YOU SUBMIT YOUR PLANS EARLIEST.

CMC

P 231831Z NOV 68

S/SEC

1-2

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

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HEADQUARTERS
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUEBHQA4440 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
FROM GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN M C E O

5. (S) THIS HQS PLANS COMMENCE DEVELOPMENT OF 3D/4TH QUARTER
FY 69 MANNING LEVEL DURING EARLY DEC. IT IS REQUESTED
THAT G-1 REPS FROM YOUR HQS AND III MAF IF YOU DESIRE BE
PREPARED TO ASSIST THIS HQS IN INITIAL PREPARATION OF M/L.
SUCH REPS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO FURNISH GRADE/MOS INPUT BY
UNIT IN SUPPORT OF THE MANNING REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT
THE DEPSECDEF DECISION. DATE OF PLANNING CONFERENCE WILL BE
SET UPON RECEIPT YOUR PLAN.

6. (S) CONTINUE TO PLAN FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF IN-COUNTRY UNITS
IN THE EVENT PARIS NEGOTIATIONS LEAD TO A REQUIREMENT FOR
SUCH EVENTUALITY.

7. (S) AS RELATED MATTER, REF (D) NOW OBE BUT SERVES AS AUDIT
TRAIL, THEREFORE DO NOT RECOMMEND CANCELLATION.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

GMC

P 231831Z NOV 68

2-2

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TOD: 25 NOV 68 2320Z

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DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS PER LINE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, INFO
~~GEN CHAPMAN,~~
~~LTGEN WALT,~~ BGEN WEBSTER AND BGEN WILLIAMS FROM
LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS.

III MAF PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. CG III MAF 131000Z/OCT68 (S) (NOTAL)

B. CMC 231831Z/NOV68 (S) SPECAT (NOTAL)

C. CG III MAF 180956Z/NOV68 (S) SPECAT (NOTAL)

1. (S) REF A SUBMITTED TO COMUSMACV A PROPOSED
REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE TO ADHERE
TO THE CONSTRAINTS OF PROGRAM SIX CEILINGS. THIS
PROPOSAL INCLUDED THE DELETION OF CERTAIN UNITS
FROM THE III MAF TROOP LIST.

2. (S) BY REF B, CMC INDICATED THAT DEPSECDEF
DECISION ON REALIGNMENT DENIES US ANY INCREASE IN
SEA PROGRAM SIX, AND RULES OUT WITHDRAWAL OF

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48**SECRET**

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FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC

SECRET

ORIGINALS CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT MCEO

FROM SUN. ^{FURTHER,} CMC REQUESTED RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING

SECRET

IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DECISION, IN TERMS OF STRUCTURE AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS.

3. (S) BY REF C, CG III MAF SUBMITTED RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING A SECNAV PROPOSAL THAT CURRENT III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE BE MAINTAINED AND MANNE^D WITHIN CONSTRAINTS OF PROGRAM SIX CEILINGS WITH SELECTED COMBAT UNITS MANNED AT FULL T/O STRENGTH. III MAF RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSED PRIMARILY VERTICAL REDUCTIONS IN STRUCTURE SPACES IN ORDER TO ABSORB THE SHORTFALL BETWEEN STRUCTURE BILLETTS AND MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS THAT WOULD EXIST UNDER THIS PROPOSAL.

4. (S) THE DEPSECDEF DECISION ON REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE AND THE SECNAV PROPOSAL, COMMENTED ON BY CG III MAF IN REF C, ARE ALMOST IDENTICAL. IN CONSIDERATION OF THIS, IT APPEARS THAT THE DEPSECDEF DECISION CAN BEST BE ACCOMMODATED BY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REF C. REQUEST YOU REVIEW THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REF C AND PROVIDE BY 23 NOV 68 THE FOLLOWING:

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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FLEET MARINE FORCE PAGES 10

SECRET

OUTCOME CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET SPECAT MCEO

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE REALIGNMENT PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REF A IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B. IN THIS REGARD, ANY UNIT DESIGNATED FOR REDUCTION TO CADRE STATUS SHOULD BE PROVIDED ADEQUATE PERSONNEL TO MAINTAIN THE FLAG AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT, SINCE IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT EQUIPMENT OF UNITS CADRED WILL REMAIN IN SVN.

B. REVISED GRADE AND MOS SUMMARIES OF ALL PROPOSED CADRES AND ALL HORIZONTAL REDUCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE RECOMMENDED REALIGNMENT, BASED ON THE STRUCTURE RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO PAR 4A ABOVE. 5. (S) BY REF B, CMC HAS REQUESTED G-1 REPS FROM THIS HQ ASSIST IN INITIAL PREPARATION OF 3D/4TH QUARTER FY-69 MANNING LEVEL AT HQMC IN EARLY DEC 1968. CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE THAT YOU ALSO SEND REPS TO HQMC TO ADDRESS GRADE/MOS STRUCTURE BY UNIT IN SUPPORT OF MANNING REDUCTIONS REQUIRED ATTENDANT TO DEPSECDEF DECISION. WILL ADVISE DATE OF HQMC CONFERENCE WHEN KNOWN. WARM REGARDS

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VV AAF075
PP RUHKM
DE RHMAF 3410 3320636
ZNY SSSSS
P 270636Z NOV 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

27NOV68 1307Z

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G-5	✓
Comp	✓
Cmd. Ctr	✓

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION 10F2
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. THE FOL TWO MSGS ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO:

A. QUOTE

P 230642Z NOV 68
FM COMNAVFORV
TO COMUSACV
INFO CG III MAF
SA IV CTZ
COMSERVENTHFLT
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
FIRST SEALORDS
BT

we hold the 1st msg already.

SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS
ARG/SLF OPERATION (U)

PAGE TWO RHMAF 3410 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

A. COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE 525-23 OF 1 FEB 68

1. (SNF) PHU QUOC ISLAND IS NOMINATED FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS (SPECOPS) BY THE ARG/SLF, RECENT SEAL OPERATIONS ON THAT ISLAND SUPPORT THE ESTIMATE OF 250-300 ARMED VC, THE PRESENT POSTURE OF THESE VC IS DEFENSIVE AND THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE IS TO EXTORT SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF MONEY FROM THE ISLANDERS, THEY COMPLETELY DOMINATE THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE ISLAND AND CONTROL THE ROAD LEADING FROM AN THOI TO DUONG DONG, THEY OFFER A CADRE WHICH, IF REINFORCED, COULD QUICKLY ASSUME AN OFFENSIVE POSTURE, AND MOUNT AN ATTACK AGAINST THE GVN POW CAMP ON THE SOUTHERN END OF THE ISLAND, A SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO RELEASE THESE PRISONERS COULD HAVE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS ON GVN CONTROL OF PHU QUOC, VC INFLUENCE ON THE ISLAND WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY IMPAIRED BY NEUTRALIZING THEIR HEADQUARTERS AND KILLING THE PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH IT, ATTACKS INTO OTHER VC OPERATION AREAS COULD ELIMINATE STILL MORE VC CADRE, AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT, LAUNCHED WITHOUT WARNING, COULD SET THE STATE FOR POSITIVE, CONTINUING GVN CONTROL, RELOCATION OF RF FORCES INTO POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND TO RETAIN THIS CONTROL WOULD BE AN

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CG III MAF

P 270636Z/NOV 68

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMAF 3410 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
ESSENTIAL FOLLOW-UP TO AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. SA IV CTZ
STATES THAT THE HIGHEST PRIORITY WILL BE GIVEN TO TAKING
FULL CIVIC ADVANTAGE OF THE EFFECTS OF SLF SUCCESSES.

2. (SNF) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IAW REF A:

A. PROPOSED MISSION, CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
AGAINST THE VC ON PHU QUOC ISLAND TO DESTROY HIS FORCES,
NEUTRALIZE HIS HEADQUARTERS, AND PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF GVN CONTROL OVER THE ISLAND.

B. PROPOSED DATES, BEGINNING 10 DEC FOR A PERIOD OF
ABOUT SIX DAYS.

C. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, ENEMY SITUATION AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRAIN AND HYDROGRAPHY.

1. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, THE VC HAVE ABOUT
250-300 ARMS-CARRYING MEN WHO RANGE IN AGE FROM 18 TO 35
YEARS. THEY ARE DIVIDED IN THREE LOCATIONS:

(A) THE VC ISLAND HEADQUARTERS AT US 8636
WITH SECURITY FORCES OF ABOUT 75 MEN, ONE SMALL UNIT
OPERATES VIC US 8434/US 8433.

(B) THE NORTHERN PLATOON/COMPANY OF ABOUT 60
MEN WHICH OPERATES IN THE GENERAL AREA OF US 8141.

PAGE FOUR RHMAF 3410 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

(C) THE "GOVERNMENT KILLER" PLATOON OF 60 MEN
OPERATING IN THE AREA US 9020.

(D) THE BALANCE OF THE VC OPERATE AS HAMLET
SQUADS AND IN SMALL GROUPS.

2. ENEMY SITUATION. THERE HAS BEEN INCREASED
ACTIVITY NEAR THE PRISON CAMP, FROM JAN-AUG 68 THERE WAS
ONE ENEMY INITIATED ACTION. SINCE AUGUST, 14 SIGNIFICANT
CONTACTS HAVE OCCURRED INCLUDING SEVERAL EXTENDED
FIREFIGHTS BETWEEN VC AND RF TROOPS IN THE SWAMP NORTH OF
THE PRISON CAMP, THE VC HAVE NOT BEEN CHALLENGED IN
THEIR HEADQUARTERS OF NORTHERN AREA EXCEPT BY SEALS IN
OCT-NOV 68. KNOWN VC ARMAMENT INCLUDES THE USUAL ARRAY
OF SMALL ARMS, A LIMITED NUMBER OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS,
2 TO 5 RPG-2 ROCKET LAUNCHERS AND AN UNKNOWN BUT LIMITED
NUMBER OF CHICOM 60MM MORTARS.

3. TERRAIN AND HYDROGRAPHY

(A) THE TERRAIN RANGES FROM HILLY TO
MOUNTAINOUS WITH DENSE VEGETATION, CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENT
COMDITIONS ARE GENERALLY FAIR TO POOR FOR FOOT AND
VEHICULAR MOVEMENT IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. COASTAL

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CG III MAP

P 270636Z/NOV 68

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PAGE FIVE RHMAF 3410 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
LOWLANDS ARE SANDY, COVERED WITH SCRUB AND GRASS AND OFFER
GOOD LATERAL MOVEMENT, HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES, THOUGH
NOT EXTENSIVE IN SIZE, ARE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT LANDINGS
AROUND THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE AREAS. DISTANCES FROM THE SIX
FATHOM CURVE TO PROSPECTIVE LANDING ZONES RANGE FROM 2 TO
6 MILES.

(B) THREE MAJOR LANDING BEACHES ARE LOCATED
ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE ISLAND (NIS 80, 81 AND 82),
DISTANCES FROM THE SIX FATHOM CURVE TO THESE BEACHES
RANGE FROM LESS THAN A MILE TO 2.5 MILES.

D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND RECOMMENDED AOA:

1. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ON D-DAY ONE SLF
CONDUCTS A SUPRISE HELICOPTERBORNE AND SURFACE ASSAULT ON PHU
QUOC ISLAND TO DESTROY VC FORCES IN THE HEADQUARTERS AREA,
CENTER-OF-MASS US 870 370, AND TO NEUTRALIZE THE VC
HEADQUARTERS. FOLLOW UP ATTACKES TO BE CONDUCTED INTO VC
OPERATING AREAS, CENTER-OF-MASS US 895 205 AND US 805 405.
COMMITMENT OF ALL FOUR RIFLE COMPANIES WOULD BE FEASIBLE
SINCE THE VC HAVE NO SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE.
THERE WILL BE NO PRE H-HOUR FIRES, THE APPROACH TO THE

PAGE SIX RHMAF 3410 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
OBJECTIVE AREA MUST BE MADE UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS AND
THE ASSAULT LAUNCHED AT FIRST LIGHT IN ORDER TO PREVENT
THE VC FROM EXCAPING INTO THE MOUNTAINS/JUNGLES, THE
NATURE OF LOCAL FRIENDLY OPERATIONS IS SUCH THAT THIS
LANDING COULD BE LAUNCHED WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF ANY PERSONS
ON PHU QUOC EXCEPT THE SENIOR ADVISOR AND DISTRICT CHIEF.
THIS INFORMATION COULD BE WITHHELD FROM THOSE TWO OFFICIALS
UNTIL THE PREVIOUS DAY, SUCH EXTREME SECURITY PRECAUTIONS
ARE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL, SA IV CORPS CONCURS SELECTION OF
HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED CLANDESTINELY BY
THE LOCAL NAVAL INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICER AND NAVFORV AMPHIB OPS
OFFICER.

2. RECOMMENDED AOA, AN ARC OF TEN NAUTICAL
MILES INLAND AND 25 NAUTICAL MILES SEAWARD FROM US 862 290,
WITH NO FIRE ZONES AROUND DUONG DONG (US 8629) AND CUA
CON (US 8137).

E. IN-COUNTRY FORCES TO BE EMPLOYED:

1. TATICAL AIR AND FAC'S ARE REQUIRED ON D-DAY
FOLLOWING H-HOUR. AFTER D-DAY ORGAINIC SLF SUPPORTING
ARMS WOULD BE EMPLOYED WITHOUT FURTHER IN-COUNTRY FORCE
BT

SECRET

CG III MAF

P 270636Z/NOV 68

3-6

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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SECRET

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 2 ASSISTANCE.

2. PHU QUOC RF AND PG UNITS TO ATTACK THE SOUTHERN VC OPERATING AREA. IN ORDER TO INSURE SECRECY, THEIR COMMITMENT WOULD BE ARRANGED AFTER H-HOUR.

F. TITLE AND LOCATION OF IN-COUNTRY COMMANDER. NOT APPLICABLE. OPERATION WOULD REMAIN UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF).

G. COMMUNICATIONS DETAILS, TO BE RESOLVED AT INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE.

3. (SNF) CG, III MAF HAS INDICATED HE COULD NOT CONCUR IN ANY OPERATION WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE SLF FROM I CORPS AND IS THEREFORE REQUESTED TO COMMENT DIRECTLY TO COMUSMACV CONCERNING THIS RECOMMENDATION.

4. SA IV CORPS CONCURS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

B. QUOTE

PAGE TWO RHMAF 3419 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

O 251554Z NOV 68

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

INFO COMNAVFORV

CONSEVENTHFLT

CTF SEVEN SIX

CTF SEVEN NINE

SA IV CTZ

BT

S E C R E T

ARG/SLF OPERATION (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 230642Z NOV 68

B. ADMINO III MAF 170712Z NOV 68

C. ADMINO III MAF 170920Z NOV 68

D. MACVCOC ABRAMS SENDS 241018Z NOV 68

1. (S) IN REF A COMNAVFORV PROPOSES TO EMPLOY AN ARG/SLF IN AN OPERATION TO ASSIST IN THE REESTABLISHMENT OF GVN CONTROL ON PHU QUOC ISLAND. THE PROPOSAL POINTS OUT THAT THE BAND OF 250-300 VC ON THE ISLAND CONSTITUTES A CADRE WHICH, IF REINFORCED, COULD QUICKLY ASSUME AN OFFENSIVE POSTURE AND ATTACK THE POW CAMP. THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS

CG III MAF

P 270636Z/NOV 68

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PAGE THREE RHMAF 3419 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
TO THE REQUEST IN REF A THAT CG III MAF COMMENT DIRECTLY TO COMUS-
MACV ON THE COMNAVFORV PROPOSAL.

2. (S) I CONSIDER THE USE OF THE UNIQUE AMPHIBIOUS
CAPABILITY OF THE ARG/SLF TO BE AVAILABLE AGAINST THIS SMALL
GUERRILLA BAND ON PHU QUOC. AS IT WOULD ALMOST BE ANY PLACE
IN THE COASTAL OR PIEDMONT REGION OF VIETNAM. A DECISION, HOWEVER,
TO DIVERT THE SLF'S FROM THEIR PRESENT AND FUTURE COMBAT
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM IN ICTZ SHOULD TAKE INTO CAREFUL ACCOUNT
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE ENEMY TARGETS AND THE RELATIVE
CONTRIBUTION OF OPERATIONS IN EITHER AREA.

4. (S) THE TARGET FOR THE PROPOSED RAID IS A BAND OF ARMED
GUERRILLAS ESTIMATED TO BE 250 TO 300 IN NUMBER. THE TOTAL
CIVILIAN POPULATION OF PHU QUOC IS 11,190 CIVILIANS, 15,000
PRISONERS AND OVER 3000 GVN MILITARY. ON THE OTHER HAND ICTZ
NOW CONTAINS AN ESTIMATED TOTAL 60,000 VC MAIN FORCE OR NVA
REGULAR TROOPS, AND AN ESTIMATED 23,000 GUERRILLAS.
ABOUT 2 AND A HALF MILLION CIVILIANS LIVE IN ICTZ,
90 PCT OF WHOM ARE IN THE NARROW COASTAL PLAIN.

5. (S) THE CURRENT TREND IN ENEMY EFFORT IN ICTZ HAS A DIRECT
BEARING ON THE LOCATION OF ARG/SLF EMPLOYMENT. IT IS APPARENT

PAGE FOUR RHMAF 3419 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
THAT A CHANGE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY AND DEPLOYMENT IS TAKING PLACE
AND THAT HE IS NOW SHIFTING HIS EMPHASIS FROM THE MILITARY
TO THE POLITICAL. REF D DISCUSSES THIS SHIFT IN SOME DETAIL
AND REITERATES THE NEED TO PRESS THE APC ON EVERY FRONT.
POINTING OUT THAT MANY OF THE VILLAGES AND HAMLETS SINGLED OUT
BY THE ENEMY ARE IN ICTZ BETWEEN DANANG AND DUC PHO.

6. (S) WE NOW HAVE IN ICTZ A STRUCTURE CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING
AND SEEKING OUT VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND OTHER KEY ENEMY LEADERS
MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN EVER BEFORE. THE ADVANCED CORDS OR-
GANIZATION AND THE EXCELLENT RAPPORT BETWEEN US AND VIETNAMESE
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS AT ALL LEVELS HAVE BEEN LARGELY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS. A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS, HOWEVER,
IS THE ENEMY MILITARY UNITS WHICH PREVENT THE PF/RF/NPFF/
CORDS TEAMS DOING THEIR JOBS IN A NUMBER OF CRITICAL AREAS.
ELIMINATION OF THOSE ENEMY UNITS AND SEALING OFF CONTESTED
AREAS ARE JOBS THAT MUST BE DONE BY REGULAR MILITARY FORCES.
THE UNIQUE CAPABILITY OF THE ARG/SLF TO RANGE THE COAST AND
STRIKE WITH SURPRISE ARE INVALUABLE CHARACTERISTICS IN THIS R
REGARD, AND THE GREAT COMBAT POWER OF THE ARG/SLF GIVES IT
THE ABILITY TO TAKE ON THE ENEMY REGULARS AND GUERRILLAS WHO

CG III MAF

P 270636Z/NOV 68

SECRET CORPS EYES ONLY

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMAF 3419 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
ARE IMPEDING THE APC.

7. (S) THE PROGRAM DESCRIBED IN REFS B AND C UTILIZES THE ARG/SLF IN A SERIES OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS IN THE HARD CORE AREAS BETWEEN DANANG AND DUC PHO, WHERE MORE THAN A MILLION AND HALF VIETNAMESE LIVE. BOTH ARG/SLF ALPHA AND BRAVO ARE AT THIS MOMENT ENGAGED IN AN IMPORTANT COMBAT OPERATION NEAR DIEN BAN, WHICH IS THE HEART OF THAT CRITICAL REGION, NOW IN ITS SIXTH DAY. THE OPN OWES A LARGE SHARE OF ITS SUCCESS TO THE ARG/SLF'S.

IT WAS SRUCIAL ON D-DAY TO ESTABLISH A CORDON AROUND A LARGE POPULATED AREA AND DO THIS SO RAPIDLY THAT THE ENEMY INSIDE COULD NOT ESCAPE. MESHING WITH SHORE BASED UNITS WHICH WERE CONVERGING ON THE AREAS RAPIDLY BY SURFACE TRANSPORT ANJXHELO ASSAULT, THE SLF'S ASSAULTED DIRECTLY FROM THE ARG INTO DEY ZONES OF THE CORDON. THE SPEED AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS ARE HIGHLIGHTED. BY THE HEAVY CONTACT THAT BLT 2/7 HAS ENCOUNTERED WITH ENEMY TROOPS INSIDE THE CORDON. THE CORDON IS NOW BEING TIGHTENED ABOUT THE AREA, WHILE GVN CONTINUE TO WEED OUT THE VC AND OTHER ENEMY INSIDE. THE PROGRAM OF OPERATIONS OF THIS TYPE COMPRISE AN ESSENTIAL

PAGE SIX RHMAF 3419 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
PART OF THE TOTAL EFFORT IN THE ICTZ. WHEN COMPLETED IT WILL TAKE US A GIANT STEP FORWARD IN THE NATIONWIDE CAMPAIGN.

8. (S) IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THAT THE ARG/SLF COULD BE HELPFUL TO THE SITUATION ON PHU QUOC ISLAND, HOWEVER, A LARGE SHARE OF THE NATIONWIDE ENEMY EFFORT IS NOW FOCUSED ON THE ICTZ COASTAL PLAIN, WHICH OFFERS IDEAL AMPHIBIOUS TARGETS. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK IN ICTZ, AND ITS ESSENTIAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE US/GVN EFFORT THROUGHOUT RVN CONVINCE ME THAT THE ARG'S/SLF'S SHOULD CONTINUE THE PROGRAM IN ICTZ UPON WHICH THEY ARE NOW EMBARKED. THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO, SINCE WE HAVE RECENTLY LOST THE HELICOPTER AND GROUND CAPABILITIES OF AN ENTIRE AIRMOBILE DIVISION TO III CORPS, IN LIGHT OF PLANNED OPERATIONS INTO BA 112 AND AGAINST THE 2D AND 3D NVA DIVISIONS, REQUIRE ALL RESOURCES PRESENTLY IN III MAF, INCLUDING BOTH ARG'S/SLF'S.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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CG III MAF

P 270636Z/NOV 68

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS.

III MAF PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. COMUSMACV 260935Z/NOV68 (S)

B. CMC 231831Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT)

1. (S) BILL VAN RYZIN HAS BEEN ADVISED OF REF A WHICH CONCURRED IN YOUR APPROACH TO THE FORCE STRUCTURE PROBLEM. THE COMMANDANT HAS INDICATED HIS DESIRE TO GET THIS SUBJECT INTO THE JCS ARENA EARLIEST.

2. (S) SINCE DEPSECDEF DECISION, STATED REF B, HAS APPARENTLY NOT YET COMPLETELY FILTERED DOWN TO THE JOINT STAFF, YOUR EARLIEST SUBMISSION OF ACTIONS NUMBER TWO AND THREE MAY *Plan us in a favorable* *"first out" position.* *W* *50*

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→
SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN
BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS PASSED TO ME BY
BOB CUSHMAN IN HIS 270636Z NOV68 (S) (SPECAT) AND
IS QUOTED BELOW FOR YOUR INFORMATION. COMNAVFORV
230642Z NOV68 (S), TO WHICH BOB REFERS ~~TO~~ IN HIS
MESSAGE BELOW, WAS PASSED SEPARATELY TO YOU EARLIER.
ADDITIONALLY, I AM PASSING SEPARATELY COMSEVENTHFLT
260752Z NOV68 (S) WHICH CONTAINS BRINGLE'S THOUGHTS
ON THE PROPOSED PHU QUOC OPERATION.
QUOTE

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO
FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/LEFT SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

SECRET**SECRET**

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET/MCEO

O 251554Z NOV 68

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

INFO COMNAVFORV

2. CONSEVENTHFLT

CTF SEVEN SIX

CTF SEVEN NINE

SA IV CTZ

BT

S E C R E T

ARG/SLF OPERATION (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 230642Z NOV 68

B. ADMINO III MAF 170712Z NOV 68

C. ADMINO III MAF 170920Z NOV 68

D. MACVOC ABRAMS SENDS 241018Z NOV 68

(S) IN REF A COMNAVFORV PROPOSES TO EMPLOY AN ARG/SLF IN AN OPERATION TO ASSIST IN THE REESTABLISHMENT OF GVN CONTROL ON PHU QUOC ISLAND. THE PROPOSAL POINTS OUT THAT THE BAND OF 250-300 VC ON THE ISLAND CONSTITUTES A CADRE WHICH, IF REINFORCED, COULD QUICKLY ASSUME AN OFFENSIVE POSTURE AND ATTACK THE POW CAMP. THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS

TO THE REQUEST IN REF A THAT CG III MAF COMMENT DIRECTLY TO COMUSMACV ON THE COMNAVFORV PROPOSAL.

2. (S) I CONSIDER THE USE OF THE UNIQUE AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY OF THE ARG/SLF TO BE AVAILABLE AGAINST THIS SMALL GUERRILLA BAND ON PHU QUOC. AS IT WOULD ALMOST BE ANY PLACE IN THE COASTAL OR PIEDMONT REGION OF VIETNAM. A DECISION, HOWEVER, TO DIVERT THE SLF'S FROM THEIR PRESENT AND FUTURE COMBAT EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM IN ICTZ SHOULD TAKE INTO CAREFUL ACCOUNT THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE ENEMY TARGETS AND THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF OPERATIONS IN EITHER AREA.

4. (S) THE TARGET FOR THE PROPOSED RAID IS A BAND OF ARMED GUERRILLAS ESTIMATED TO BE 250 TO 300 IN NUMBER. THE TOTAL CIVILIAN POPULATION OF PHU QUOC IS 11,190 CIVILIANS, 15,000 PRISONERS AND OVER 3000 GVN MILITARY. ON THE OTHER HAND ICTZ NOW CONTAINS AN ESTIMATED TOTAL 60,000 VC MAIN FORCE OR NVA REGULAR TROOPS, AND AN ESTIMATED 23,000 GUERRILLAS. ABOUT 2 AND A HALF MILLION CIVILIANS LIVE IN ICTZ, 90 PCT OF WHOM ARE IN THE NARROW COASTAL PLAIN.

5. (S) THE CURRENT TREND IN ENEMY EFFORT IN ICTZ HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON THE LOCATION OF ARG/SLF EMPLOYMENT. IT IS APPARENT

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PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET/MCEO MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

SECRET**SECRET**

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET/MCEO

THAT A CHANGE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY AND DEPLOYMENT IS TAKING PLACE AND THAT HE IS NOW SHIFTING HIS EMPHASIS FROM THE MILITARY TO THE POLITICAL. REF D DISCUSSES THIS SHIFT IN SOME DETAIL AND REITERATES THE NEED TO PRESS THE APC ON EVERY FRONT.

POINTING OUT THAT MANY OF THE VILLAGES AND HAMLETS SINGLED OUT BY THE ENEMY ARE IN ICTZ BETWEEN DANANG AND DUC PHO.

6. (S) WE NOW HAVE IN ICTZ A STRUCTURE CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING AND SEEKING OUT VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND OTHER KEY ENEMY LEADERS MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN EVER BEFOR. THE ADVANCED CORDS ORGANIZATION AND THE EXCELLENT RAPPORT BETWEEN US AND VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS AT ALL LEVELS HAVE BEEN LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS. A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS, HOWEVER, IS THE ENEMY MILITARY UNITS WHICH PREVENT THE PF/RF/NPFF/ CORDS TEAMS DOING THEIR JOBS IN A NUMBER OF CRITICAL AREAS. ELIMINATION OF THOSE ENEMY UNITS AND SEALING OFF CONTESTED AREAS ARE JOBS THAT MUST BE DONE BY REGULAR MILITARY FORCES. THE UNIQUE CAPABILITY OF THE ARG/SLF TO RANGE THE COAST AND STRIKE WITH SUPRISE ARE INVALUABLE CHARACTERISTICS IN THIS REGARD, AND THE GREAT COMBAT POWER OF THE ARG/SLF GIVES IT THE ABILITY TO TAKE ON THE ENEMY REGULARS AND GUERILLAS WHO ARE IMPEDING THE APC.

7. (S) THE PROGRAM DESCRIBED IN REFS B AND C UTILIZES THE ARG/SLF IN A SERIES OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS IN THE HARD CORE AREAS BETWEEN DANANG AND DUC PHO, WHERE MORE THAN A MILLION AND HALF VIETNAMESE LIVE. BOTH ARG/SLF ALPHA AND BRAVO ARE AT THIS MOMENT ENGAGED IN AN IMPORTANT COMBAT OPERATION NEAR DIEN BAN, WHICH IS THE HEART OF THAT CRITICAL REGION, NOW IN ITS SIXTH DAY. THE OPN OWES A LARGE SHARE OF ITS SUCCESS TO THE ARG/SLF'S.

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PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET/MCEO**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

SECRET**SECRET**

← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET/MCEO

PART OF THE TOTAL EFFORT IN THE ICTZ. WHEN COMPLETED IT WILL
TAKE US A GIANT STEP FORWARD IN THE NATIONWIDE CAMPAIGN.

8. (S) IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THAT THE ARG/SLF COULD BE HELPFUL
TO THE SITUATION ON PHU QUOC ISLAND, HOWEVER, A LARGE SHARE OF THE
NATIONWIDE ENEMY EFFORT IS NOW FOCUSED ON THE ICTZ COASTAL PLAIN,
WHICH OFFERS IDEAL AMPHIBIOUS TARGETS. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK
IN ICTZ, AND ITS ESSENTIAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE US/GVN EFFORT
THROUGHOUT RVN CONVINCE ME THAT THE ARG'S/SLF'S SHOULD CONTINUE
THE PROGRAM IN ICTZ UPON WHICH THEY ARE NOW EMBARKED. THIS
IS ESPECIALLY SO, SINCE WE HAVE RECENTLY LOST THE
HELICOPTER AND GROUND CAPABILITIES OF AN ENTIRE AIRMOBILE DIVISION
TO III CORPS, IN LIGHT OF PLANNED OPERATIONS INTO BA 112 AND
AGAINST THE 2D AND 3D NVA DIVISIONS, REQUIRE ALL RESOURCES
PRESENTLY IN III MAF, INCLUDING BOTH ARG'S/SLF'S.

UNQUOTE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
BTS E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE, INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN
FROM GEN CHAPMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVERY DURING WORKING
HOURSARG/SLF OPERATION (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 230642Z NOV 68

1. (S) IN REF A, COMNAVFORV RECOMMENDED TO COMUSMACV THAT THE
ARG/SLF CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ON PHU QUOC ISLAND ABOUT
10 DECEMBER 1968. COMNAVFORV FURTHER STATED THAT CG III MAF
HAS INDICATED HE COULD NOT CONCUR IN ANY OPERATION WHICH WOULD
REMOVE THE SLF FROM I CORPS.2. (C) AS YOU KNOW, THE SLF'S HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED ONLY IN I CTZ
SINCE JAN 67. BEFORE THAT TIME, ON NINE OCCASIONS, SLF OPERATIONS
WERE CONDUCTED IN SVN OUTSIDE I CTZ.3. (C) UNDOUBTEDLY YOU ARE AWARE OF SOME DISSATISFACTION IN THE
NAVY OVER THE UTILIZATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING AS BASES FORPAGE TWO RUEBHOA6552 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE,
INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN. M C E O . DELIVERY DURING
WORKING HOURSLOCALIZED OPERATIONS IN WHICH THE SLF'S ARE AHORE IN I CTZ
MOST OF THE TIME. SLF OPERATIONS OF THE TYPE RECOMMENDED IN
REF A COULD SERVE TO EASE THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM.4. (S) ON A BROADER SCALE, SECDEF, IN A NEW DPM ENTITLED ASIA
STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE, HAS ATTACKED THE NEED FOR LARGE
FORWARD DEPLOYED AMPHIBIOUS FORCES. IN THE FUTURE, AS IT
ALWAYS HAS BEEN, A RECORD OF SUCCESSES WHICH EMPHASIZE THE
CAPABILITIES OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES WILL PROVE USEFUL.5. (S) FOR THESE REASONS IT WOULD APPEAR FROM HERE TO BE
DESIRABLE TO EXPLOIT THE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES OF THE ARG/SLF
ANYWHERE IN SVN INsofar AS THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT UNDULY
JEOPARDIZING THE FORCES OF III MAF. THE DECISION AS TO WHAT
IS RECOMMENDED TO COMUSMACV REMAINS, OF COURSE, WITH YOU AND
BOB CUSHMAN. WARM REGARDS.

GV-4

BT

CMC

R 280231Z NOV 68

S/SEC

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S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN CUSHMAN
FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

REF: A. CMC 280231Z NOV 68

B. COMNAVFORV 230642Z NOV 68 (NOTAL)

C. COMUSMACV 260948Z NOV 68

1. IN ICTZ THE CURRENT METHOD OF SLF/ARG OPERATION IS
REPEATED AND FREQUENT LANDINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE APC
(ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN). THERE WAS AN
INTERRUPTION CAUSED BY SOME SHIPS BEING USED TO MOVE THE
1ST CAV DIV (AM) AND SOME SHIPS GOING TO SUBIC FOR UPKEEP, BUT
WE ARE BACK IN THE GAME AGAIN NOW.

2. I HAVE SIX (6) ENEMY REGIMENTS IN DANANG AREA ALONE
AND ABOUT SEVEN (7) ENEMY DIV EQUIVALENTS IN I CORPS, AS
YOU KNOW. ON THE OTHER HAND, PHU QUOC ISLAND HAS 250-300

PAGE TWO RHMAF 3663 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
VC ON IT, BUT ALSO HAS 3,000 FRIENDLY FORCES (RF/PF). IN VIEW OF
THE FACT THAT WE ARE BACK IN THE AMPHIBIOUS ROLE AGAIN, I
SIMPLY CANNOT SEE ANY RATIONALE FOR TAKING A SORELY NEEDED
SLF/ARG FROM THIS AREA TO MOVE AGAINST THE PIDDLING TARGET
OF PHU QUOC REQUESTED BY REF B, AND SO RECOMMENDED TO COMUSMACV.
BY REF C COMUSMACV CONCURRED IN THE REQUIREMENT FOR BOTH
ARG'S/SLF'S IN ICTZ FOR PRESENT AND NEAR FUTURE.

3. WHAT HAS REALLY HAPPENED IS AN ATTACK OF "KELLY
TURNERITIS", PRINCIPAL SYMPTOM OF WHICH IS A BURNING
DESIRE TO PLAY FIELD MARSHAL.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

CG III MAF

O 290720Z/NOV 68

ACTN 64656

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(53)

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ZNY SSSSS
O 290830Z NOV 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC HAW
BT

29NOV68 1320Z

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS
III MAF PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. CG III MAF 290656Z NOV 68
B. CG FMFPAC 272136Z NOV 68

1. (S) REF A RESPONDS TO REF B WHICH POINTS OUT THAT EARLY
SUBMISSION OF ACTIONS NR 2 AND 3 IS DESIRABLE.
2. (S) ACTION 2, WHICH RELATES TO III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE
CHANGE REQUEST 2-68 IS INITIATED IN REF A. ACTION 3,
HOWEVER, REQUIRES APPROVAL BEFORE ACTUAL TROOP MOVEMENT
CAN BEGIN. THAT APPROVAL IS REQUESTED IN REF A.

GP-4
BT

CG III MAF

O 290830Z/NOV 68

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~~DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→~~

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN
BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING NORMAL
WORKING HOURS

T-DAY PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 3003317(TS)

B. CMC 160017Z/NOV68 (S)(SPECAT)

1. (S) IN ORDER TO PROVIDE BOB CUSHMAN AS MUCH ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE IN T-DAY PLANNING, I HAVE PREPARED A TROOP LIST (REF A) WHICH INDICATES III MAF UNIT REDEPLOYMENT LOCATIONS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, SHOULD THIS BECOME A REALITY. THE DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA ARE BASED ON 2/3'S OF A MEF IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA PER THE GUIDANCE LEW WALT SENT ME IN REF B.

2. (S) IN DEVELOPING A TROOP LIST, WE HAVE USED THE HQMC STUDY, POST VIETNAM POSTURE OF THE MARINE CORPS, CASE II A OF OCT 1968. ² ~~ALTHOUGH~~ ^{IT} ~~THIS~~ ^{IS} ~~THE~~ ^{THE} ~~ONLY~~ ^{ONLY} ~~REFERENCE~~ ^{REFERENCE} ~~HELD~~ ^{HELD}

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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SECRET/MCEO

THAT SETS FORTH A TROOP LIST BASED UPON A POST-VIETNAM POSTURE OF 2/3'S OF A MEF ON JAPAN AND OKINAWA. THERE ARE TWO MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CASE II A STUDY AND THE TROOP LIST WE ARE PREPARING AT THIS HQ: COLLOCATING THE WING AND DIVISION HQ ON OKINAWA AND BASING TWO FIXED WING MAGS AT IWAKUNI.

3. (S) IN PREPARING THIS TROOP LIST, I HAVE SET AS AN ATTAINABLE OBJECTIVE THE COLLOCATION OF THE 1ST MAW WITH THE DIVISION ON OKINAWA. I HAVE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED THIS GOAL WITH PAUL FONTANA, WHO COMMANDED THE 1ST WING IN 1965, AND WE AGREE THAT CONTINGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS IN THE FUTURE WILL BE EVEN GREATER THAN HAS BEEN IN THE PAST AND THAT THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE STAFFS OF THE DIVISION/WING, IF THEY CONTINUE TO BE LOCATED IN OKINAWA AND JAPAN, IS TOO GREAT FOR THE DETAILED PLANNING REQUIRED. IT MAY BE, OF COURSE, THAT WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR REDEPLOYMENT IN THE POST HOSTILITIES PERIOD, THIS GOAL MAY NOT BE PRACTICAL; HOWEVER, I THINK WE SHOULD PLAN IN THIS DIRECTION.

4. (S) OUR RATIONALE FOR BASING TWO FIXED WING MAGS AT IWAKUNI IS BASED UPON THE QUESTIONABLE RETENTION OF ATSUGI DUE TO INCREASING PROBLEMS OF CIVILIAN

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
SECRET/MCEO

ENCROACHMENT AND NOISE ABATEMENT.

5. WARM REGARDS

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← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →
SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN

SECRET

BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING NORMAL
WORKING HOURS.

III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE

A. CMC 231831Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT)

1. (S) QUOTED BELOW IS THE III MAF SUBMISSION TO MACV
RELATING TO THE FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE REQUEST.

WHILE IT MAY APPEAR THAT ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO
EFFECT CERTAIN WITHDRAWALS SUCH, OF COURSE, IS NOT
THE CASE. BOB CUSHMAN IS FULLY AWARE OF THE
DEPSECDEF DECISION CONTAINED IN REF A AND IS PLAYING
THE GAME ACCORDINGLY. QUOTE

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT SECRET

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET MCEO

O P 290656Z NOV 68 ZFF-1
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACVSGN
INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG
RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB OKI
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III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. CG III MAF 131000Z OCT 68 (S)

B. CG III MAF 210740Z NOV 68 (S)

C. COMUSMACV 38064 DTG 260935Z NOV 68 (S)

1. (S) THIS IS CG III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE REQUEST
2-68. THIS REQUEST MODIFIES AND SUPERSEDES APPROPRIATE PORTIONS
OF CHANGE REQUEST 1-68 SUBMITTED IN REF A. THIS CONSTITUTES
ACTION NR 2 AS SET FORTH IN PARA 4B OF REF B. REF C EXPRESSED
CONCURRENCE IN REF B.

2. (S) ACCORDINGLY REQUEST REF A. BE MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

A. CHANGE FRN M01200 TO READ:

NEW

AUTH

INCREASE/

PAGE TWO RHMMFA3656 SECRET

FRN	UNIT	STR	STR	DECREASE	REMARKS
M01200	VMA	SQ 260	259	INCR 1	NOTE A

B. ADD:

K07100	VMFA	0	385	DECR 385	NOTE E.
--------	------	---	-----	----------	---------

3. (S) EMPLOYMENT OF USMC TRADE-OFF SPACES TO ACCOMMODATE
PORTION OF III MAF HIGHEST PRIORITY FORCE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE
SUBJECTS OF SEPERATE MESSAGE.

4. (S) REGARDING ACTION NR 3 OF REF B, WE ARE NOW TAKING
INITIAL STEPS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM SVN OF UNITS LISTED PARAGRAPH
4C OF REF B. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT YET HAVE REQUISITE APPROAL
TO BEGIN ACTUAL TROOP MOVEMENT. THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO MOVE
AHEAD ON ACTION NR, 3HREQUEST YOU GRANT THAT ALLROVAL EARLIEST.

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET MCEO

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

Historical
Dec 68

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P 040026Z DEC 68

FM CG FORLOGCOMD DNG RVN

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC HAW (L001)

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM BGEN FEELEY
(DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

- A. CG III MAF 131000Z/OCT68
- B. CG III MAF 020530Z/DEC68 SPECAT
- C. CG III MAF 110720Z/NOV68
- D. CG FMFPAC 262036Z/NOV68

1. REF A SETFORTH A POTENTIAL REALIGNMENT OF THE III MAF
STRUCTURE WITH PROPOSED REDUCTIONS AND FORCE ALIGNMENTS
WHICH RESULTED IN A REDUCTION OF 731 SPACES FROM FLC.
THIS REALIGNMENT PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TOTALS:

1ST FSR (-NOP) 4127
1ST SERVBN 1088
3D SERVBN 1088
AUGMENT T/O 41

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA0443 **SECRET**

6344

2. REF B, A COPY OF WHICH WAS PROVIDED TO THIS HQ BY III
MAF, PROPOSED A FURTHER REDUCTION OF 165 SPACES IN FLC-6344 TO
6179.

3. REF C PROVIDES T-DAY PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL
AND ULTIMATE ALIGNMENT OF MARINE FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA
FOLLOWING CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN RVN TASKS FLC WITH THE
FOLLOWING:

- A. RECONSTITUTION OF 1ST FSR AND 1ST AND 3D SERVZ.
- B. PROVISION OF NECESSARY REAR ECHELON TO CLOSE FACILITIES,
TRANSFER STOCKS AND TO ACT AS LOGISTIC CLOSEOUT UNIT.
- 4. REF D CONCURRED IN PART WITH REF C BUT STATED THAT
RECONSTITUTION OF THE SERVICE BN'S/FSR MUST TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ROLL-UP TASK FACED BY FLC AND
THAT FLC REAR ECHELON MUST BE ADEQUATE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS
TASK AT THE RISK OF DELAYING FULL RECONSTITUTION OF SERV BNS
AND FSR.

5. WHEN QUERIED BY THE III MAF STAFF ON THE IMPACT OF
STRENGTH REDUCTION OF THE 731 SPACES SETFORTH IN PARA 1 ABOVE,
I ADVISED THAT IT WOULD RESULT IN THE REDUCTION OF FLSC ALPHA

CG FLC DNG RVN

P 040026Z/DEC68

ACTN:S/SEC

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PAGE THREE RUMLMPA0443 S E C R E T

(3D SERVEN) TO A CADRE ORGANIZATION BUT THAT AS LONG AS THE PRESENT TACTICAL SITUATION AND FLC ASSIGNED MISSION DOES NOT CHANGE, WE COULD LIVE WITH IT. HOWEVER, IF THE TEMPO OF OPERATIONS INCREASED, OR IF A NEW MISSION WAS ASSIGNED TO FLSG ALPHA, RESPONSIVENESS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DEGRADED.

6. THE IMPACT OF THE FURTHER REDUCTION PROPOSED IN REF B WOULD NATURALLY CONTRIBUTE, -- AND TO A MATERIAL DEGREE -- TO OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND. ADDITIONALLY, THE ADVENT OF T-DAY, WITH THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ROLL-UP TASKS ENVISIONED, IS OF PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CONCERN WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE TOTAL PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF ABOUT 900 PERSONNEL WHICH CAN ONLY BE LEVIED AGAINST THE 1ST FSR AND SERVICE BATTALION STRUCTURES. THE REDUCTIONS ARE BEING LEIVED AT A TIME WHEN THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO ARRIVE AT A TRUE EXCESS POSITION WITHIN FLC. THIS IS A TASK OF CONSIDERABLE ENORMITY WHICH REQUIRES PERSONNEL IN ADDITION TO THOSE NEEDED TO CARRY ON THE DAY TO DAY BUSINESS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE STRENGTH OF 6179 SPACES AS SHOWN IN PARA TWO WOULD PROVIDE FOR ONLY THE FOLLOWING SKELETAL WOULD PROVIDE FOR ONLY THE FOLLOWING SKELETAL ORGANIZATION, BUT AS IS APPARENT IT WOULD NOT CONTAIN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS FOR THE FLC STAFF, EXCEPT AT THE EXPENSE OF

PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA0443 S E C R E T

THE FSR OR SERVICE BATTALIONS:

FSR (-)	4012
1ST SERVEN (-)	1063
3D SERVEN (-)	1063
AUGMENT (STAFF)	41
	6179

7. IN SUMMARY, WHILE I RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTIES IN ARRIVING AT THE DECISIONS AS TO WHERE THE CUTS MUST COME TO ARRIVE AT PROGRAM 6 CEILINGS, I BELIEVE THAT A CAREFUL EVALUATION MUST BE MADE OF THE TASKS THAT CONFRONT FLC NOW AND POSSIBLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE AS RELATED RPTHE PERSONNEL CUTS WHICH HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED BY III MAF. IN THIS CONNECTION, I HAVE APPRISED III MAF OF MY POSITION AS CONTAINED IN THE PRECEEDING PARAGRAPHS.

8. MY PERSONAL REGARDS. BRIGGEN J.A. FEELEY, JR.

GP-4

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CG FLC DNG RVN

P 040026Z/DEC68

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY, WIRENOTE

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FOR COL DALBY, DEP G-3, III MAF
 FROM COL MC GOUGH, DEP G-3, FMFPAC
III MAF PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. CG III MAF 011710Z/DEC68 (SPECAT) (S)

B. CG III MAF 131000Z/OCT68 (S)

1. REF A HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND IS GENERALLY CON-
 CURRED IN SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTED CHANGES:

A REF A PROPOSES PLACING SIX TANK CO'S IN
 A CADRE STATUS WHILE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED IS TO
 PROVIDE SPACES FOR CADRE PERSONNEL FOR TWO TANK
 CO'S, ONE EACH TANK BN (REF BAREFERS: FRN KO16A
 PROVIDES 549 SPACES WHICH ARE ADEQUATE TO STAFF
 KO16A, KO16B AND KO16C. TOTAL SPACES WERE LUMPED
 UNDER KO16A FOR EASE OF REFERENCE. SAME APPLIES
 TO KO17A,B AND C.) RECOMMEND THAT THE REQUIRED

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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SECRET MCEO

SPACES BE PROVIDED BY INCREASING FRN'S K017A00 AND K018A00 TWENTY-FOUR SPACES EACH. THIS WILL ALLOW SPACE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR EACH TANK BN TO BE SHOWN BY ONLY ONE FRN. THIS CHANGE WOULD RESULT IN A DECREASE OF NINETY-SIX IN THE SPACES ^{LISTED REFA} REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE CADRING AND RETENTION OF UNITS IN THE III MAF STRUCTURE THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PROPOSED FOR DELETION ^{BY REF B.}

B. REF A PROPOSES THAT FRN M01200 AUTHORIZE TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE SPACES FOR A VMA SQDN RECOMMEND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SPACES BE AUTHORIZED IN CONSONANCE WITH THE AUTHORIZATION FOR OTHER VMA SQDNS UNDER THE REALIGNMENT PROPOSAL.

C. IT IS NOTED THAT WHILE THE REALIGNMENT PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REF B PROPOSED SIGNIFICANT STRENGTH REDUCTIONS FOR FRNS K01500 (COMM BN FMF) AND K05500 (MWSG) TO ACCOMMODATE DELETION OF A COMM SUPPORT CO AND THE WERS RESPECTIVELY, NO SPACES WERE PROVIDED FOR CADRES FOR THESE UNITS ^{IN REFA.} IF YOUR INTENTION IS TO RETAIN THESE UNITS IN THE STRUCTURE AT A REDUCED STRENGTH IN LIEU OF A CADRE STATUS, THEN THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REF A IS SATISFACTORY.

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HOWEVER, THOSE SKILLS BEING REDUCED IN COMM BN AND
MWSG SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED TO FACILITATE DEVELOP-
MENT OF RESPONSIVE MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS.

D. THE PROPOSED COMPENSATORY ADJUSTMENTS IN
PAR 3C OF REF A SHOULD BE MODIFIED IN CONSONANCE

WITH ANY CHANGES YOU ^{NEED TO} ~~MAKE~~ MAKE IN PAR 3A OF REF A.

2. FOR USE IN DEVELOPING MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS, WE
NEED THE PROPOSED CADRE COMPOSITION FOR H&S BTRY
AND ONE MISSILE BTRY OF THE LAAM BN (FRN 05300) IN
ADDITION ^{TO} CADRE COMPOSITIONS PRESENTLY SHOWN IN YOUR
PROPOSED MSG. ALSO, REQUEST GRADE AND MOS SUMMARY
OF SPACES PROPOSED FOR DELETION FROM FORLOGCMD
(FRN KO3300) BE PROVIDED.

3. FROM ALL INDICATIONS IT APPEARS THAT OUR
PROGRAM SIX PLANNING IS BACK ON TRACK.

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES **SECRET** MCEO

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S F C P I T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM GEN CHAPMAN
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVERY DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS)
1-DAY PLANNING (U)

A. YOUR 300334Z NOV68 (3) (SPECAT)

1. (S) ASK A REFERENCE TO THE TWO BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CASE IIA
AND YOUR PROPOSED TROOP LIST: (1) COLLOCATING WING/DIV HQ ON OJL-
NANA AND, (2) BASING TWO FIXED WING GROUPS AT IWAKUNI.

2. (S) I CONCUR THAT WE SHOULD PLAN TO ACHIEVE COLLOCATION OF THE
DIVIZING HQ AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE POST HOSTILITIES PERIOD. CASE
IIA (NOT BEING DRAFTED) WILL ADDRESS THIS, HOWEVER, ADEQUATE
FACILITIES AVAILABLE ON OKINAWA TO HOUSE THE WING HQ IN THE IN-
TERIM POST HOSTILITIES PERIOD WILL BE A PROBLEM. DEFENDING SECURED
LEGISLATION ON THIS POINT, 1-DAY PLANNING WILL CONTINUE TO
REFLECT LOCATION OF THE WING HQ AT IWAKUNI.

3. (S) I FURTHER AGREE THAT WHEN THE TIME ARRIVES FOR REDEPLOY-
MENT THE COLLOCATION OF TWO FIXED WING GROUPS AT IWAKUNI MAY NOT

P OF TWO RUEBHOA 9268 S F C R E I SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN BUSE
FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O

BE FEASIBLE AND THAT UTILIZATION OF BOTH IWAKUNI AND ATSUBI
DESPITE ATSUBI'S OPERATIONAL SHORTCOMINGS, IS EVENTUALLY MORE
DESIRABLE THAN COLLOCATION AT IWAKUNI WITH ITS PRESENT
FACILITIES. ALTHOUGH CASE IIA IMPLICITS USE OF BOTH BASES, IT
DOES NOT PRECLUDE OTHER WESTPAC LOCATIONS. CASE IIB WILL SUB-
STITUTE A TERT BASED FIXED WING GROUP FOR THE FIXED WING GROUP
AT ATSUBI.

1. (U) MARK REGARDS

(P-2)

BT

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CMC

P 061228Z/011062

ACTN'S/SEC

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D ← DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE → CG D

SECRET **MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION

(U)

A. CMC 071306Z/NOV68 (S)(MCED)(NOTAL)

1. (S) REF A PROVIDED INFORMATION ON PLANNED INCREASES IN ARTILLERY CAPABILITIES TO BE EFFECTED DURING PHASE I OF THE RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PLAN; REQUESTED JUSTIFICATION/RATIONALE FOR MAINTAINING OR CHANGING CURRENT 105MM HE AND 155MM HOWITZER HE AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE RATES, AND FURTHER REQUESTED COMMENTS CONCERNING AN INCREASE OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS IN RVN WITH NO INCREASE IN THE TOTAL QUANTITY OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION FOR CONSUMPTION.

2. (S) THE ADEQUACY OF CURRENT AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURE RATES FOR 105MM HE AND 155MM HOWITZER HE AMMUNITION HAS BEEN REVIEWED

IN THE LIGHT OF THE III MAF LEVEL OF OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD SEP-NOV 68, AND CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE ANTICIPATED

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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FUTURE LEVEL OF OPERATIONS IN THE ICTZ. CONSIDERATION HAS ALSO BEEN GIVEN TO THE EFFECT OF THE COMUSMACV 5x5 AMMO SAVINGS PLAN ON RECENT MUNITION EXPENDITURES.

3. (S) FLC AVERAGE MONTHLY ISSUES FOR THE PERIOD SEP-NOV 68 HAVE EQUATED TO 53.4 RDS/WPN/DAY FOR 105MM HE, AND 25.2 RDS/WPN/DAY FOR 155MM HOWITZER HE. THESE RATES REFLECT A DECREASE IN USAGE FROM THE PREVIOUS THREE-MONTH PERIOD, WHICH IS CONSIDERED THE RESULT OF THE DECREASE IN LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY AND, TO SOME EXTENT, THE EFFECT OF THE COMUSMACV 5X5 AMMO SAVINGS PLAN. THE LEVEL OF OPERATIONS WITHIN III MAF DURING SEP-NOV 68 HAS REMAINED FAIRLY CONSTANT, AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THIS LEVEL WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. BASED ON THIS PREMISE, SOME REDUCTION IN THE CURRENT AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURE RATES OF 62.0 RDS/WPN/DAY FOR 105MM HE AND 30.0 RDS/WPN/DAY FOR 155MM HOWITZER HE IS CONSIDERED FEASIBLE AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, A REDUCTION TO THE ACTUAL ISSUE RATES FOR THE PAST THREE MONTHS IS NOT CONSIDERED ADVISABLE, SINCE SUCH A REDUCTION WOULD ELIMINATE ANY RESERVE IN THE EVENT OF AN UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY. THE ASR'S ESTABLISHED BY CG III MAF IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COMUSMACV 5X5 PLAN ARE CONSIDERED TO REPRESENT A MORE REALISTIC REQUIREMENT. ACCORDINGLY, A REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURE RATES TO 58.5 RDS/WPN/DAY FOR 105MM HE AND 28.0 RDS/

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WPN/DAY FOR 155MM HOWITZER HE IS ACCEPABLE AT THIS TIME.

4. (S) COMMENTS OF THIS HQ CONCERNING AN INCREASE OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS IN RVN, WITH NO ATTENDANT INCREASE IN THE TOTAL QUANTITY OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION FOR CONSUMPTION, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ACCEPTABLE REDUCED EXPENDITURE RATES CITED IN PARA 3 ABOVE ARE CONSIDERED MERELY AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF EXPRESSING THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE FIRING OF 262,440 RDS OF 105MM HOWITZER HE AND 60,480 RDS OF 155MM HOWITZER HE AMMUNITION PER MONTH IN SUPPORT OF PROJECTED USMC/ROKMC OPERATIONS IN THE ICTZ.

B. FROM AN ARTILLERY SUPPORT VIEWPOINT, AND WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS, THE ABOVE MONTHLY AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS CAN BE CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT OF THE EXACT NUMBER OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS ON HAND, AND TO BE VARIABLE ONLY AS A RESULT OF CHANGES IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:

(1) THE NUMBER OF TACTICAL UNITS/INSTALLATIONS REQUIRING ARTILLERY SUPPORT.

P-4 (2) THE LEVEL/NATURE OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(3) THE NUMBER AND/OR SIZE OF THE TACTICAL AREA(S) OF OPERATIONS REQUIRING ARTILLERY SUPPORT.

C. ACCORDINGLY, BASED UPON THE PREMISE THAT NO CHANGE IN THE FACTOR^S LISTED IN PARA 4^{B ABOVE} WILL OCCUR IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY RVNAF ARTILLERY WEAPONS INTO THE ICTZ WILL MERELY RESULT IN A GREATER NUMBER OF

PAGE 3 OF 4

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WEAPONS FIRING APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TOTAL NUMBER OF ROUNDS

PER MONTH BUT AT SOME REDUCED NUMBER OF RDS/TUBE/DAY.

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P 080122Z DEC 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

8DEC68 0632Z

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. FOL BACK CHANNEL FROM GENERAL GOODPASTER IS QUOTED FOR
YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

SUBJ: COORDINATION OF SLF OPNS WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES

REF: A. CG III MAF 010356Z DEC 68 (S)

B. CG III MAF 170712Z NOV 68 (S)

I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS IN REF A WHICH I HAVE DISCUSSED
WITH CORDS. IT APPEARS THAT YOUR CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF
THE SLF IN THE APC REF B HAS CONSIDERABLE MERIT AS WAS
BORNE-OUT IN THE RECENT SUCCESS OF OPN MEADE RIVER. I
AM PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTAB-
LISHING A FULL CORDON, AND DOING IT SWIFTLY, AS WAS DONE
IN MEADE RIVER, WITH THE VALUABLE RESULTS WITH LIMITED

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0973 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
FRIENDLY CASUALTIES, AND OF TAKING ALL THE TIME REQUIRED
TO DO A DELIBERATE, COMPLETE JOB. WE ARE ALL LOOKING
FORWARD TO CONTINUED SUCCESS IN THESE EFFORTS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

2. REFS A AND B OF QUOTED MSG PASEP BY MCEO, DTG
CG III MAF 080124Z DEC 68.

GP-4

BT

0973

CG III MAF

P 080122Z/DEC 68

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DE RHMMFA 0974 3430125
ZNY SSSSS
P 080124Z DEC 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

8DEC68 0629Z

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN BUSE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
1. FOL MSGS ARE REF A AND B RESPECTIVELY TO GEN GOODPASTER'S
PERSONAL, QUOTED IN MY 080122Z DEC 68:

A. QUOTE

P 010356Z DEC 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV

BT

SECRET

COORDINATION OF SLF OPNS WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES (U)
FOR GEN GOODPASTER FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

1. (S) DURING YOUR VISIT TO III MAF HQ ON 2 NOVEMBER, YOU EXPRESSED
INTEREST IN TECHNIQUES OF COORDINATING SLF OPNS WITH INDIGENOUS IN-
COUNTRY FORCES. THIS MSG IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFO ON THE
SUBJECT.

(A) COORDINATION WITH PROVINCE/DISTRICT OFFICIALS IS GENERALLY CON-
DUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE IN-COUNTRY HOST UNIT. AT THIS TIME THE SLF
REP AND HOST UNIT REP ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A BLANKET AUTHORIZATION FOR THE
ENTIRE AOA LESS THOSE PORTIONS DECLARED NO FIRE AREAS BY THE LOCAL
OFFICIALS. SCHEME OF MANEUVER, DATES AND TIMES ARE USUALLY NOT DISCUSSED
AT THIS TIME.

(B) COORDINATION WITH RF/PF/NPFF HAS BEEN CONDUCTED BOTH BEFORE AND
AFTER THE ACTUAL LANDING WITH THE LATTER TIME PREFERRED. ATTEMPT IS MADE
TO DELIVER THESE LOCAL FORCES TO THE BLT CP AREA ASHORE AS SOON AFTER-H-
HOUR AS IS PRACTICABLE. IT HAS BEEN PROVEN THAT THESE FORCES REQUIRE

CG III MAF

P 080124Z/DEC 68

ACTN: S/S

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PAGE TWO RUSVDB S E C R E T

A MINIMUM TIME TO RESPOND TO A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE.

(C) COORDINATION OF ALL SUPPORTING ARMS IS ACCOMPLISHED THRU THE EXCHANGE OF LIAISON PERSONNEL.

THE SLF LNO USUALLY SETS UP AT A DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS AND THE RVN LNO FUNCTIONS IN SACC ABOARD THE LPH. A NET IS ESTABLISHED SO THAT EXPEDITIOUS CLEARANCE OF ALL TYPES OF MISSIONS CAN BE RECEIVED FROM APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES.

(D) COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE WITH RVN FORCES IS GENERALLY CONDUCTED AFTER H-HOUR AND HAS BEEN RESTRICTED THUS FAR TO USE OF INTERPRETERS AND INFORMATION GATHERING AGENCIES WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE BLT ASHORE.

2. IT IS DESIRABLE TO INSERT LOCAL FORCES INTO VILLAGES IMMEDIATELY AFTER SEIZURE TO ACT AS THE RVN AUTHORITY UPON WITHDRAWAL OR CONTINUATION OF OPERATION BY THE LANDING FORCE. COORDINATION WITH DISTRICT CHIEF TO THIS END HAS PROVED SUCCESSFUL.

GP-4.

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UNQUOTE

B. QUOTE

P 170712Z NOV 68 ZFF-1
FM ADMNO III MAF DNG
TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV SGN
INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUHGSFA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL
RUYPWDB/CTF SEVEN SIX
RUYJSYB/CTF SEVEN NINE

BT

S E C R E T

CONCEPT OF FUTURE ARG/SLF EMPLOYMENT (U)

1. (S) IN SEEKING WAYS TO CONCENTRATE MORE OF OUR III MAF COMBAT POWER ON THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN (APC), I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE ARGAE/SLF CAN BE PARTICULARLY VALUABLE IN THAT REGARD. FURTHER, I BELIEVE THAT A SPECIFIC PROGRAM OF ARG/SLF SUPPORT FOR THE APC CAN BE IMPLEMENTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENHANCE CONSIDERABLY THE READINESS OF THE ARG/SLF'S AS A PACOM RESERVE.

CG III MAF

P 080124Z/DEC 68

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PAGE TWO RHMAFA2136 S E C R E T

2. (S) PROLONGED PERIODS ASHORE SUCH AS THE PAST FEW MONTHS ARE ADMITTEDLY NOT GOOD FOR THE OVERALL AMPHIBIOUS READINESS OF THE SLF AND SUCH EMPLOYMENT FAILS TO EXPLOIT THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RATE AT WHICH THE ENEMY WAS WILLING AND ABLE TO EXPEND HIS PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OVER THE PAST MONTHS, GAVE HIM A TREMENDOUS COMBAT CAPABILITY WHICH IN-COUNTRY FORCES WERE AT TIMES HARD PUT TO CONTAIN. I BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF THE SLF'S IN-COUNTRY WAS FREQUENTLY THE FACTOR WHICH WEIGHTED THE SCALE ON OUR SIDE.

3. (S) THERE IS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE RECENT LISSENING OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN ICTZ ONLY, IS DUE IN LARGE PART TO THE CRIPPLING LOSSES HE HAS SUFFERED SINCE JANUARY 1968, A GOOD SHARE OF WHICH WERE INDICTED BY SLF'S. BUT WE HAVE SEEN THESE LULLS BEFORE. IN FACT THE PATTERN OF HIS ACTIVITY IS A CYCLICAL ONE OF MAJOR EFFORTS, FOLLOWED BY PAUSES WHILE HE REFURBISHES AND MOUNTS ANOTHER EFFORT. IF THAT IS WHAT HE IS DOING NOW, WE MUST BE SURE WE DO NOT RELAX THE HEAVY PRESSURE WE ARE HOLDING ON HIM; IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, HE NO LONGER IS ABLE TO MARSHAL THE RESOURCES FOR ANOTHER MAJOR MILITARY OFFENSIVE, THEN WE CAN BE SURE HE WILL INTENSIFY AS MUCH AS HE CAN. HIS EFFORTS

PAGE THREE RHMAFA2136 S E C R E T

TO DESTROY GVN PACIFICATION ENDEAVORS, UNDERMINE THE GOVERNMENTAL APPARATUS AND EXPAND HIS INFRASTRUCTURE. INDEED HE HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO ACCELERATE THOSE EFFORTS. THIS MEANS THAT WE MUST KEEP AFTER HIS INFRASTRUCTURE WHILE MAINTAINING THE HEAVY PRESSURE ON HIS REGULAR AND MAIN FORCE UNITS. IDEALLY WE WOULD DO BOTH THOSE THINGS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RESTORING A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF READINESS TO THE PACFLT AMPHIBIOUS RESERVE. I BELIEVE THIS IS POSSIBLE THROUGH A MODERATE REORIENTATION OF OUR SLF EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES, KEYED TO THE NEW ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN, WHICH BEGAN ON 1 NOVEMBER 1968.

4. (S) THE V-RING OF THE APC TARGET IS THE LOCAL LIBERATION COMMITTEE AND THE HAMLET VCI. CORDS HAS A VIGOROUS PROGRAM, INCLUDING LISTS OF NAMES, FOR ROOTING OUT THOSE IMPORTANT ENEMY LEADERS. IN THE PAST, HOWEVER, THE MILITARY FORCES WERE NOT ALWAYS SUFFICIENT TO COVER RF/PF/CORDS OPERATIONS. WITH THE APC WE ARE SWINGING FAR MORE OF THE EMPHASIS IN THAT DIRECTION. THE SLF'S IN PARTICULAR FIT IDEALLY INTO THIS VITAL NEW CAMPAIGN.

5. (S) SLF SUPPORT OF THE APC WILL BE APPLIED GENERALLY AGAINST PRIORITY TARGETS FOR WHICH PROVINCIAL FORCES ARE INADEQUATE TO PENETRATE THE AREA BUT ARE SUFFICIENT TO EXPLOIT PHOENIX

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CG III MAF

P 080124Z/DEC 68

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PAGE FOUR RHMAFA2136 S E C R E T

BLACK LISTS. SLF COMBAT OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED TO CLEAR SELECTED AREAS AND PROVIDE CORDONS WITHIN WHICH ARVN, RF/PF, NPFF AND PRU'S CAN CONDUCT THE REQUIRED DETAILED SEARCH AND DESTRUCTION OF THE VCI. THE OPERATIONS WILL BE TOTALLY INTEGRATED INTO THE APC AND COMBINED WITH THE GVN EFFORT. THE EFFORT WILL BE APPLIED BASICALLY ALONG THESE LINES:

A. TARGETS WILL BE DEVELOPED BY III MAF FROM THE COMBINED INPUTS OF CORDS AND INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. HAMLETS SLATED FOR UPGRADING UNDER THE APC WILL BE GIVEN PRIORITY CONSIDERATION, ALTHOUGH THIS WILL NOT RESTRICT THE COMMITMENT OF THE ARG/SLF TO SUPPORT OTHER LUCRATIVE VCI TARGETS.

B. A SERIES OF SHORT-TERM OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED DURING ANY GIVEN ARG AVAILABILITY PERIOD WITH EACH CORDON OPN OCCUPYING SLF ATTENTION LONG ENOUGH TO ROOT OUT THOSE ON BLACK LISTS.

6. (S) THIS CONCEPT WAS SCHEDULED TO BE TESTED IN THE EASTERN SECTION OF DIEN BAN DISTRICT ON 18 NOV; HOWEVER, IN ANALYZING THE HARD INTELLIGENCE ON THE VCI IN THE ENTIRE AREA, I HAVE ELECTED TO COMMIT A SIX BN FORCE TO AN OPERATION THERE INSTEAD. MEANWHILE, USING THIS CONCEPT I WILL PLAN AN ARG/SLF EMPLOYMENT (CTG 76.5/79.5), O/A 30NOV IN ANOTHER AREA CRITICAL TO THE

PAGE FIVE RHMAFA2136 S E C R E T

APC.

7. (S) IN SUM, I BELIEVE THAT A SEQUENCE OF SHORT DURATION AMPHIBIOUS OPNS BY THE SLF'S CLOSELY INTERGRATED WITH CORDS PROGRAMS, BOTH MERGING TO SUPPORT THE APC, OFFERS SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES. FIRST, IT REPRESENTS A PROGRAM OF OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPNS DEVOTED SPECIFICALLY TO THE PRINCIPAL CURRENT US/GVN EFFORT, THE APC. IT PROVIDES THE TACTICAL SURPRISE AND RAPID CONCENTRATION OF FORCE WHICH ARE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THIS TYPE OPERATION. FURTHER, IT ALLOWS FREQUENT RECYCLE THROUGH THE ARG, HELPING TO MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS BY ALL CONCERNED.

GP-4

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UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

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DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 80 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN
BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING
NORMAL WORKING HOURS.

Spec T-DAY PLANNING (0)

Spec REF: A. CMC 061228Z/DEC68 (S) (SPECAT)

B. CG FMFPAC 300331Z/NOV68 (TS)

C. CMC 160017Z/NOV68 (TS) (SPECAT)

D. COMMARCORBASESPAC 052123Z/OCT68 (S) (SPECAT)

E. CMC LTR AO3B1A OF 2 DEC 68

1. (S) I HAVE LONG RECOGNIZED AND APPRECIATED THE
FACT THAT INADEQUATE FACILITIES EXIST ON OKINAWA
TO HOUSE NOT ONLY THE WING HEADQUARTERS NOTED IN REF
A, BUT ALSO THE SHORTFALLS FOR OTHER GROUND AND
AVIATION UNITS IN BOTH OKINAWA/JAPAN IN THE IMMEDIATE
POST HOSTILITY PERIOD.

2. (S) THE TROOP LIST WITH LOCATIONS CONTAINED IN
REF B TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE PROVISIONS OF REF C.

SECRET (62)
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET/MCEO

SECRET NOFORN

IT PROVIDES FOR THE OPTIMUM POSTURE OF 2/3'S MEF IN WESTPAC AND IS A REASONABLE OBJECTIVE IF WE ARE WILLING TO DEVOTE OUR ENERGIES AND PERSEVERE TO ATTAIN IT. AT ONE TIME, ^{APPROXIMATELY 100} THE FMAW HAD ~~25~~ AIRCRAFT ~~ALSO, THE JASDF HAD 25 F86s.~~ AT IWAKUNI. [^] THE MAJOR SHORTFALLS IN BASING TWO MAG'S AT IWAKUNI NOW ARE INADEQUATE PARKING AREAS, HANGARS AND BILLETING. IF FUNDING COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE AND CONSTRUCTION COMMENCED EARLIEST, EVEN THESE SHORTFALLS CAN BE OVERCOME; IF NOT, IT WOULD BE WORTH LIVING UNDER CROWDED CONDITIONS FOR A TIME. THE ENCROACHMENT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULACE AND RELATED NOISE PROBLEM, THE INCREASING SATURATION OF AIR SPACE, THE FACT THAT NO LIVE ORDNANCE CAN BE CARRIED AND THE CONSTRAINTS ON NIGHT FLYING AT NAS ATSUGI MITIGATE AGAINST LOCATION OF A MAG AT THAT STATION.

3. (S) I ~~WILL SHORTLY BE~~ ^{have} FORWARDING ^{ed} THE STUDY THAT PAUL FONTANA HAS COMPLETED ON THE FEASIBILITY OF JOINT USAGE OF IWAKUNI. DURING THE COURSE OF THE STUDY, IT BECAME READILY APPARENT THAT BASING TWO MAGS AT IWAKUNI IS A NECESSARY PLANNING OBJECTIVE SIMPLY TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN THE FUTURE.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY, I AM OF THE OPINION THAT IN ORDER

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES SECRET/MCEO

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TO ATTAIN AN OPTIMUM POSTURE IN WESTPAC AND TO
PRECLUDE PREEMPTIVE ACTIONS BY THE OTHER SERVICES,
WE SHOULD STRIVE TO ACHIEVE THE LOCATIONS FOR THE
UNITS AS SHOWN IN REF B, TO INCLUDE THE WING HQS
AT FUTEMA, EVEN THOUGH WE MAY LATER HAVE TO SETTLE FOR
SOMETHING LESS. IN THIS REGARD, I ALSO REITERATE
MY RECOMMENDED ACTION RELATIVE TO THE TTPI CONTAINED
IN REF D. IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO THE T-DAY PLAN, REF E,
AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THIS SUBJECT IS REQUESTED. WARM
REGARDS.

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CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LGEN BUSE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD (U)

1. (C) TEXT OF SPECAT FR COMUSMACV RECEIVED THIS DATE QUOTED IN FULL AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE

1. (C) INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT RECOMMENDATION HAS BEEN MADE BY THE DEPUTY SECDEF THAT A JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD HEADED BY A 4 STAR OFFICER CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE LOGISTIC EFFORT RELATED TO THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ITS RESULTANT WORLDWIDE IMPACT.

2. (C) JCS AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT A REVIEW OF LOGISTIC LESSONS LEARNED IN SUPPORTING COMBAT FORCES IN SEA WOULD BE WORTHWHILE. JCS HAVE CONCURRED WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT LOGISTICS REVIEW GROUP TO "REVIEW THE VIETNAM WAR FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LOGISTICS READINESS AND SUPPORT.....REVIEW THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS SUPPORT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF COMBAT OPERATIONS

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 1483 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCFO AND ASSESS THE ABILITY TO MEET CHANGING SITUATIONS AND EMERGENCIES, THE EFFECT ON WORLDWIDE READINESS, AND THE EFFICIENCY OF SUPPORT IN LIGHT OF THE RELATED SITUATION, POLICIES, AND CONTROLS AS THEY DEVELOPED". JCS RECOMMENDED THAT THIS GROUP SUBMIT FINAL REPORT TO THEM BY 31 DEC 1969 AND THEN BE DISSOLVED.

3. (C) THE CURRENT OSD PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, REFLECTS A BROADER SCOPE FOR THIS STUDY: ALSO, THE BOARD WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE SECDEF AND CJCS, AND WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONCLUDE ITS WORK BY END DEC 1969. THE REVISED TERMS OF REFERENCE PRESCRIBE: "THE JLRB WILL REVIEW WORLDWIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE US GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES DURING THE 'VIETNAM ERA' (AUGUST 1, 1965 TO DATE) TO IDENTIFY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 'LOGISTIC SYSTEMS' (I.E., POLICIES, PROCEDURES, ORGANIZATION, MANPOWER, AND CONTROLS) IN ORDER TO MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES THAT WILL IMPROVE THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE SYSTEMS. THE BOARD WILL GIVE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE EFFECTIVENESS AND ECONOMY OF CURRENT AND PLANNED LOGISTIC SYSTEMS UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS AND THE QUICK REACTION CAPABILITIES OF THESE SYSTEMS TO MEET CHANGING SITUATIONS AND EMERGENCIES. THE BOARD WILL EXAMINE THE LOGISTIC POSTURE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE BUILD-UP, AND

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PAGE THREE RHMMFA 1483 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEC
THE FACTORS THAT AFFECTED (1) THE RESPONSIVENESS OF LOGISTIC
SUPPORT TO COMBAT FORCES IN VIETNAM, AND (2) THE ADEQUACY OF WORLD-
WIDE READINESS. THE BOARD WILL IDENTIFY LOGISTIC LESSONS LEARNED,
INCLUDING THOSE OF A PLANNING NATURE, WHICH MAY HAVE A
SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON READINESS FOR AND SUPPORT OF FUTURE COMBAT
OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF A JOINT NATURE."

4. (U) REQUEST YOUR VIEWS ON OSD PROPOSAL BY 1200, 13 DEC.
COMMENTS DESIRED ON FEASIBILITY, DESIRABILITY, MAJOR PROBLEMS
FORESEEN, AND ANY OTHER SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS. BT GP-4 END QUOTE
2. (U) REQUEST PROVIDE ASAP COMMENTS DESIRED TO BE INCLUDED IN
III MAF'S RESPONSE.

GP-4
BT
1483

CG III MAF

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O 110932Z/DEC 68

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN RUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

(DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD (U)
A. CG III MAF 110932Z/DEC68(C) (MCEO)

1. (C) IT IS UNDERSTOOD FROM HQMC THAT THE OSD STUDY
ADDRESSED IN REF A IS AN ARMY INITIATED PROPOSAL. ALL OTHER
SERVICES ARE OPPOSED TO IT.

2. (C) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, SUGGEST REPLY ALONG THE
FOLLOWING LINE:

"ORGANIZATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT
FOR MARINE CORPS UNITS IN PACOM IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
CG FMFPAC; THEREFORE, IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO PROVIDE
COMMENTS ON THIS MATTER". *Warm* REGARDS.

GP-L

BT

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR

GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN, BGEN WEBSTER AND

BGEN WILLIAMS FROM LTGEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING NORMAL

WORKING HOURS.

REALIGNMENT OF III MAF STRUCTURE (U)

A. CMC 231831Z/NOV68 (S)(SPECAT)(NOTAL)

B. CG III MAF 021420Z/DEC68 (S)(SPECAT)

C. CG III MAF 131000Z/OCT68 (S)(NOTAL)

D. CG III MAF 100300Z/DEC68 (S)(SPECAT)

1. (S) REF A ADVISED OF DEPSECDEF DECISION THAT NO

ADDITIONAL SEASIA PROGRAM SIX SPACES WOULD BE

AUTHORIZED AND NO UNITS WOULD BE REDEPLOYED FROM SVN

AT THIS TIME. FURTHER, IT REQUESTED THAT A PLAN

BE SUBMITTED TO BEST MEET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF PROGRAM SIX CEILINGS AND

THE DEPSECDEF DECISION.

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/LEFT TO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

SECRET

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

2. (S) BY REF B, CG III MAF SUBMITTED A REALIGNMENT PROPOSAL WITHIN THE PARAMETERS ESTABLISHED BY REF A, WHICH PROVIDED FOR PLACING CERTAIN UNITS IN CADRE STATUS, RETAINING CERTAIN UNITS AT T/O STRENGTH THAT HAD BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR DELETION IN THE REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE PROPOSED BY REF C, AND REDUCING SPACES AUTHORIZED THE FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND AND REMAINING LAAM BN TO ACCOMMODATE THE REALIGNMENT.
3. (S) BY REF D, CG III MAF MODIFIED THE REALIGNMENT PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REF B TO AVOID PLACING PORTIONS OF THE REMAINING LAAM BN IN A CADRE STATUS AND TO PROVIDE SPACES TO ACCOMMODATE RETENTION OF WERS (MWSG), WHICH WAS PROPOSED FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA BY REF C.
4. (S) THE REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE PROPOSED IN REF B, AS MODIFIED BY REF D, IS CONCURRED IN WITH THE MINOR EXCEPTION THAT REDUCTION OF SPACES FOR HQ BNS/MAR DIVS (FRNS K002A00 AND K003A00) IS APPROVED AT 33 FOR EACH AND THE REDUCTION OF SPACES FOR FLC (FRN003300) IS DECREASED TO 164. A RECAPITULATION OF THIS PLAN FOR REALIGNMENT OF THE

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III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A

FOLLOWS (NOTE: CHANGES INDICATED REFER TO THE
REALIGNMENT PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY REF C):D
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K002A00	HQ BN/MAR DIV	1283	- 33	NOTE # 1
K002B00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE # 1
K002F00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE # 1
K002J00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE # 1
K002N00	HQBTRY/ARTYREGT	278	- 16	NOTE # 1
K002T00	AT BN	19	+ 19	NOTE # 2
K003A00	HQ BN/MAR DIV	128	- 33	NOTE # 1
K003B00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE # 1
K003F00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE # 1
K003J00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE # 1
K003N00	HQBTRY/ARTYREGT	278	- 16	NOTE # 1
K003T00	AT BN	19	+ 19	NOTE # 2
K016A00	TK BN	573	+ 24	NOTE # 2
K017A00	TK BN	573	+ 24	NOTE # 2
K019 00	AMTRAC BN	137	+137	NOTE # 2
K022A00	MP BN	600	- 50	NOTE # 3
K023 00	MP BN	600	- 50	NOTE # 3
K026 00	HQ BTRY PAG	21	+ 21	NOTE # 2
K033 00	PLC	6180	-164	NOTE # 3

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K052 00	MACG	886	- 64	NOTE # 4
K055 00	MWSG	826	+221	NOTE # 5
K060 00	MABS VF/VA	483	- 9	NOTE # 6
K061 00	MABS VF/VA	483	- 9	NOTE # 6
K062 00	MABS VF/VA	483	- 9	NOTE # 6
K076 00	H/MS MAG VH	314	- 19	NOTE # 6
K077 00	H/MS MAG VH	314	- 19	NOTE # 6
K078 00	MABS MAG VH	561	- 78	NOTE # 6
K079 00	MABS MAG VH	561	- 78	NOTE # 6
M012 00	VMA SQDN	260	+260	NOTE # 5

NOTES: # 1 - REDUCTION IN DIVISION AUGMENTATION

2 - CADRE TO MAINTAIN FLAG AND EQUIPMENT
FOR UNIT PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED FOR
DELETION FROM III MAF STRUCTURE

3 - REDUCTION OF SPACES AUTHORIZED UNIT NCT
IN PERMANENT MARINE CORPS STRUCTURE

4 - REDUCTION OF SPACES AUTHORIZED ~~A~~ UNIT
INCLUDED IN PERMANENT MARINE CORPS
STRUCTURE

5 - PROVIDES SPACES TO RETAIN AT T/O STRENGTH
UNITS PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED FOR DELETION
FROM III MAF STRUCTURE

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SECRET/MCF 9-13

6 - REDUCTION IN WING AUGMENTATION

5. (U) GRADE AND MOS SUMMARIES OF PROPOSED REDUCTIONS, EXCEPT FOR REDUCTIONS IN DIVISION AND WING AUGMENTATION, ARE CONTAINED IN REFS A AND C. FMFPAC G-1 MANPOWER REPS CURRENTLY AT HQMC IN CONNECTION WITH PREPARATION OF REVISED 3D AND 4TH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 1969 MANPOWER ALLOCATION ARE AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE GRADE AND MOS SUMMARIES FOR PROPOSED REDUCTIONS IN DIVISION AND WING AUGMENTATIONS.

6. (S) UNDER THE ESTABLISHED PARAMETERS, THIS PROPOSAL ATTAINS A REASONABLE BALANCE BETWEEN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT THE VALIDITY OF MARINE CORPS T/O'S. WHILE IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE PARAMETERS ARE NOT OF THE MARINE CORPS CHOOSING, EVERY EFFORT TO EASE PROGRAM 6 CONSTRAINTS WILL BE APPRECIATED IN THE FUTURE, AS ARE THOSE EFFORTS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE IN THE PAST. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT MCEO
EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
SUBJ: 2D ASSISTANT WING COMMANDER

1. THE EMERGENCY OF THE TET OFFENSIVE HEIGHTENED TEMPO OF OPERATIONS AND INCREASED FORCES IN I CORPS. THESE CONDITIONS RESULTED IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF A 2ND AWC AND ADC'S IN JANUARY 1968. HOWEVER, CONDITIONS HAVE CHANGED SUFFICIENTLY IN I CORPS TO WARRANT REVIEW 2ND AWC ASSIGNMENT.
2. IN MARCH 1968, DECISION WAS MADE TO EMPLOY THE 2ND AWC TO COORDINATE 1ST MAW AIR BASE FUNCTIONS THROUGHOUT I CORPS. IT WAS THEN DETERMINED THAT WITHOUT SEPARATE COMMAND AUTHORITY OR ADDED PERSONNEL, IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TO CONTROL AIR BASE MATTERS WITHIN THE EXISTING 1ST MAW STAFF. CONSEQUENTLY, FLOW OF AIRBASES PROBLEMS AND INFORMATION WAS

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 2575 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT MCEO
CONTINUED THROUGH THE CHIEF OF STAFF 1ST MAW VIA 2ND AWC TO COMMANDING GENERAL FOR DECISION. AFTER AIR BASE FUNCTIONS WERE SURVEYED AND REORGANIZED, WORKLOAD INVOLVED IN MONITORING BASES WAS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT FULL TIME ASSIGNMENT OF A GENERAL OFFICER.

3. THE 2ND AWC WAS ALSO EMPLOYED TO SURVEY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL MATTERS AND MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH AIR COMMANDS OUTSIDE III MAF. PROBLEMS EXAMINED INCLUDED SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS AND COORDINATION WITH NAVY AERONAUTICAL ESTABLISHMENT. WHILE THESE ACTIVITIES AND MONITORING OF AIR BASE FUNCTIONS ARE NECESSARY, THEY ARE INSUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE CONTINUED SERVICES OF AN ADDITIONAL GENERAL OFFICER IN THE 1ST MAW.
4. ADDITIONALLY, WITH TWO ADC'S IN EACH DIVISION, THE SEPARATE COMMAND OPPORTUNITIES FOR A 2ND AWC ARE MINIMAL. INTENSE ACTIVITY OF MARINE AIR AND GROUND FORCES DURING 1968 DID NOT PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AN AWC TO COMMAND A TASK FORCE, AND POSSIBILITIES ARE EVEN LESS UNDER PRESENT OPERATIONAL TEMPO.

5. IN VIEW OF EXISTING AND FORESEEABLE SITUATION IN III MAF, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT 2ND AWC BILLET IN THE 1ST MAW NOT BE FILLED
PAGE THREE RHMAFA 2575 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT MCEO
UPON TRANSFER OF THE INCUMBENT.

6. CG 1ST MAW CONCURS.
7. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4.

BT

H2575

CG III MAF

P 191336Z/DEC68

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← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

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CONFIDENTIAL. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN

FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

2D ASSISTANT WING COMMANDER (U)

A. CG III MAF 191336Z/DEC68 (C) (MCEO)

1. I CONCURRED IN YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED
IN REF A.2. CMC DOES NOT INTEND TO PROVIDE A REPLACEMENT
UPON TRANSFER OF INCUMBENT. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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S E C R E T SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO MAJGEN QUILTER FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLYOPCON OF III MAF AVAIAATION RESOURCES IN ICTZ (U)

A. CG III MAF 090300Z SEP 68 (S)

1. FOLLOWING DINNER FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN LAST EVENING, HE ASKED FOR A PRIVATE DISCUSSION ON SEVERAL MATTERS, INCLUDING SINGLE MANAGEMENT. I POINTED OUT SEVERAL OF THE SHORT-COMINGS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND INDICATED THAT I INTENDED PRESENTING YOU WITH A PROPOSED MSG TO COMUSMACV WHICH WOULD AGAIN REQUEST A THIRTY-DAY TRIAL PERIOD OF OUR SYSTEM. WITHOUT ENDORSING THIS APPROACH, ADMIRAL MCCAIN APPEARED SYMPATHETIC TO OUR VIEWPOINT. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, THE FOLLOWING IS A REWORK OF MY SPECAT 100326Z NOV 68. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AS TO CONTENT OF MSG AND PROPRIETY OF DIS-

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 3338 S E C R E T SPECAT
PATCHING AT THIS TIME.

2. TEXT: QUOTE

1. PRESENT CONDITIONS IN I CORPS ARE RADICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE THAT LED TO THE IMPOSITION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. CHANGES ARE:

A. THE CESSATION OF AIR COMBAT OPERATIONS OVER NVN AND THE INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF NAVY AND AIR FORCE SORTIES TO SUPPORT LAOTIAN AND IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS.

B. THE DECREASE OF FORCES IN I CORPS WITH THE MOVEMENT OF THE 1ST CAV DIVISION (AM).

C. THE GRATLY DECREASED TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN I CORPS BROUGHT BY THE REDUCTION OF ENEMY INITIATED LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME MAIN FORCE NVA UNITS.

D. THE LOW PROPORTION OF AIR FORCE SORTIES FLOWN IN I CORPS DURING NOVEMBER AS SHOWN BY THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

	FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES FOR NOVEMBER 1968
SERVICE	SORTIES SORTIES SORTIES PROVIDED

CG III MAF

P 260148Z/DEC68

ACTN: S/SEC

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

PAGE THREE RHMAFA 3338 S E C R E T SPECAT

SUPPORTED	REQ	FRAGGED	USMC	USAF
USMC	4356	1678	3054	110
USA	2925	1516	1496	272
ROK	90	90	187	0
ARVN	----	153	78	0
USN (BARCAP)	----	----	91	---
USAF (ESCORT)	----	----	25	---
USAF	----	----	881	---

2. WHILE THE AMOUNT OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT TO MARINE GROUND FORCES HAS DECLINED UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT ITS FULL IMPACT ON THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF MARINE ORGANIC TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT CAN BEST BE SEEN BY CONTRASTING RECENT AIR OPERATIONS IN I CORPS WITH THE YEAR PRIOR TO THE IMPOSITION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. DURING THE PERIOD FROM MARCH 1967 TO MARCH 1968 MARINE AIR IN I CORPS FLEW AN AVERAGE OF 248 PREPLANNED SORTIES PER MARINE MANEUVER BN PER MONTH. RECENTLY IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1968, MARINE AIRCRAFT WERE FRAGGED FOR ONLY 78 PREPLANNED SORTIES PER BN PER MONTH, OR ONLY 31 PERCENT OF THE

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 3338 S E C R E T SPECAT

PREPLANNED SORTIES PROVIDED TO MARINE FORCES PRIOR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT. FURTHER, SINGLE MANAGEMENT FRAGGED ONLY 43 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SORTIES MARINE UNITS REQUESTED IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER. THIS DRASTICALLY REDUCED LEVEL OF ORGANIC MARINE FIRE SUPPORT DISRUPTS THE COMBAT BALANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM. IN ADDITION, SCHEDULING OF THE SORTIE EFFORT OF MARINE FORCES BY SINGLE MANAGEMENT PRODUCES INEFFICIENCY BY:

- A. FORCING MARINE JKR TO OVERFLY THE PLANNED SORTIE RATE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO MARINE UNITS.
- B. PRODUCING A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL EFFORT IN THE EMERGENCY OF UNPLANNED CATEGORY: FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE YEAR PRIOR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT MARINES FLEW FOJE MARINES 83 PERCENT PREPLANNED AND 12 PERCENT UNPLANNED SORTIES, WHILE IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1968 THE CORRESPONDING PERCENTAGES WERE PREPLANNED 49 PERCENT AND UNPLANNED 51 PERCENT.
- C. REDUCING RESPONSIVENESS BY INCREASED DELAY BETWEEN THE REQUEST AND PROVISION OF SUPPORT IN THE

CG 111 MAF

P 260148Z/DEC68

2-3

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PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 3338 S E C R E T SPECAT
NORMAL SYSTEM, THEREBY FORCING THE EMPLOYMENT OF
AIRBORNE ALERT AIRCRAFT TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DELAY.
D. DECREASING THE FLEXIBILITY AND AMOUNT OF PRE-
PLANNED AIR AVAILABLE TO THE GROUND UNITS.
3. THE CESSATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
IN I CORPS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT THE REMAIN-
ING CORPS AREAS. MARINE AIR CONTROL PROCEDURES
INCORPORATED IN THE JAGOS AS A RESULT OF SINGLE
MANAGEMENT COULD BE RETAINED FOR ARMY UNITS.
REFERENCE (A) RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES THAT WOULD
ALLOW THE BENEFITS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT TO CONTINUE
FOR ARMY UNITS WHILE REMOVING THE FEATURES THAT
DEGRADE THE OPTIMUM USE OF ORGANIC MARINE AIR ASSETS
TO SUPPORT ALL GROUND FORCES IN I CORPS. NEITHER
WOULD DISCONTINUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT IN
I CORPS NECESSARILY REDUCE THE OVERALL ALLOCATION
AND CONTROL OF AIR ASSETS BY COMUSMACV. THIS CONTROL
COULD BE CONTINUED EITHER UNDER THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OF REFERENCE (A) OR UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
MACVO - 95-4.

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 3338 S E C R E T SPECAT
4. IN VIEW OF CHANGED CONDITIONS AND THE CONTINUING
COST IN EFFICIENCY AND RESPONSIVENESS IMPOSED ON
ORGANIC MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIR ASSETS,
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT BE TEMPORARILY
DISCONTINUED IN I CORPS AND THAT A THIRTY-DAY TRIAL
PERIOD BE INSTITUTED FOR THE SYSTEM III MAF PREVIOUSLY
RECOMMENDED IN REF (A). THE RESULTS OF THIS TRIAL
PERIOD WOULD FORM THE BASIS OF A RECOMMENDATION FOR
FURTHER MODIFICATIONS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM OR
PERMANENT DISCONTINUANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPSECDEF
MEMO OF 15MAY68.

UNQUOTE

3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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CG III MAF

P 260148Z/DEC68

3-3

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← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

SECRET SPECAT

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN INFO MGEN QUILTER FROM

LTGEN BUSE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG III MAP 260148Z/DEC68 (S) MCEO

B. CG FMFPAC 040312Z/OCT68 (S) MCEO

1. (S) I BELIEVE THAT THE TIME MAY NOW BE PROPITIOUS TO RECOMMEND AGAIN THAT MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS BE RETURNED TO YOUR CONTROL AS PROPOSED IN REF A. AS TO WHETHER THE TIME IS RIGHT WITH RESPECT TO OUR OWN SERVICE INTERESTS OF PRESERVING AND PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF THE AIR GROUND TEAM, YOU ARE THE BEST JUDGE AT THIS POINT. HOWEVER, I WOULD POINT OUT THAT IF THE PRESENT TEMPO OF COMBAT PERSISTS, CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE A WISE MOVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, ASSUMING YOUR PROPOSAL IS APPROVED AND A MAJOR THRUST BY THE ENEMY OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TET OFFENSIVE DICTATES A REVERSION TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT, THEN THE AIR FORCE UNQUESTIONABLY

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ONLY SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATION CENTER HEADQUARTERS
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED ITEMS SHOULD BE MESSAGE DRAFT

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

SECRET MCEO

SECRET

gt ~~MAY~~ WOULD GAIN LONG YARDAGE TOWARD THEIR AVOWED GOAL OF ALWAYS CONTROLLING ALL AIR. MY INCLINATION IS TO SUPPORT FULLY YOUR PROPOSAL, SUBJECT TO THE COMMENTS BELOW, WITH FULL CONFIDENCE THAT OUR REINSTITUTED MARINE SYSTEM COULD MANAGE THE AIR EFFORT IN I CTZ REGARDLESS OF THE INTENSITY OF COMBAT. I WOULD ADD ONLY ONE MORE RESERVATION AND THAT RELATES TO OUR PRE-SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES. AS STATED IN REF B, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO STREAMLINE THESE PROCEDURES TO AVOID ANY SEMBLANCE OF THE PREMATURE IMPLEMENTATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

2. (S) THE DIMINISHING AIR FORCE EFFORT IN I CTZ, PARTICULARLY DURING NOVEMBER, PROVIDES SOUND JUSTIFICATION TO REQUEST A RETURN TO YOUR CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS IN I CTZ. HOWEVER, FROM OUR DISTANT OVERVIEW, THE STATISTICS IN REF A APPEAR TO HAVE SOME OMISSIONS WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO REVIEW. ACCORDING TO THE 7TH AF OPREP FIVE REPORTS FOR NOVEMBER, THE AIR FORCE PROVIDED 658 ATTACK SORTIES IN I CTZ DURING THE MONTH VIS-A-VIS

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

(69)

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET MCEO

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

SECRET MCEO

SECRET

THE 382 SHOWN IN YOUR MESSAGE. ADDITIONALLY, OF THOSE
NAVY SORTIES MADE AVAILABLE TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE BY THE
US 7TH FLEET, 654 WERE FRAGGED INTO 1 CTZ. THUS, TO

P-3 COUNTER YOUR STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, THE 7TH AF COULD
AVER THAT THEY ACTUALLY PROVIDED SOME 1300 SORTIES TO
1 CTZ.

3. (S) BEFORE CITING YOUR HIGH SORTIE RATE AS AN
INEFFICIENCY OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, IT MIGHT BE **PRUDENT** *Am!*
TO COMPUTE COMPARATIVE SORTIE RATES FOR 1967 AND 1968
TO DETERMINE PRECISELY WHAT EFFECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT
HAS IN FACT HAD ON SORTIE RATES.

4. (S) THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN AIRBORNE ALERT AS A REMEDY
FOR DELAYED RESPONSIVENESS UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT
APPEARS TO BE A RATHER TENUOUS CHALLENGE UNLESS
SUBSTANTIATING DATA IS AVAILABLE WHICH SHOWS AN
UNACCEPTABLE DELAY IN RESPONSE TIME. BY AND LARGE, AS
UNDERSTOOD HERE, IMMEDIATE REQUESTS ARE PROCESSED
THROUGH THE MARINE SYSTEM AND EVEN WHEN PROCESSED
THROUGH AIR FORCE DASC'S, RESPONSE TIME IS NOT EXCESSIVE.

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET (65)**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**SECRET MCEO **MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET MCEO

SECRET

AGAIN, YOU ARE CLOSER TO THE ACTUAL SITUATION, AND I WISH ONLY TO POINT UP THAT A GENERALITY ON A MATTER OF THIS IMPORT COULD BE SELF DEFEATING IF IT LACKS A SOUND FOUNDATION.

P-4 5. (S) WHILE THE AMOUNT OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED TO MARINE GROUND UNITS MAY HAVE DECLINED SOMEWHAT SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN ANY DIMINUTION IN QUALITY AS STATED IN PAR 2 OF YOUR PROPOSED MESSAGE.

6. (S) RECOGNIZING THAT ANY STATISTICAL COMPARISON NECESSARY TO MAKE A TELLING POINT NEED BE BASED ON COMMON SOURCE FIGURES, ~~THE STATISTICS USED IN REF A, WHICH I UNDERSTAND ARE FROM 7TH AIR FORCE HORN DASC RECORDS, SHOULD SERVE YOUR NEED. HOWEVER, A COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE DURING 1968 WITH 1967, BASED ON RECORDS AVAILABLE HERE, REVEALS STATISTICS WHICH ARE NOT ENTIRELY COMPATIBLE WITH REF A. FOR YOUR EXAMINATION THEY ARE PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS:~~

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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SECRET MCEO

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	TOTAL USMC ATTACK SORTIES IN I CTZ	MARINE SHARE	USA SHARE	ARVN SHARE
1967	51,864	48,835	1,107	1,242
1968 (THRU NOVEMBER)	59,954	50,292	7,600	479
	ROK SHARE	USMC SHARE		
	601	79		
	1,132	451		

BASED ON AN AVERAGE OF 20 MANEUVER BATTALIONS DURING 1967, MARINE BATTALIONS WOULD HAVE RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 203 SORTIES PER MONTH. WITH AN AVERAGE OF 23 BATTALIONS AVAILABLE DURING 1968, SORTIES DROP TO 198 PER MONTH.

7. (S) IN SUM, I BELIEVE THE RATIONALE SET FORTH IN YOUR PROPOSED MESSAGE TO BE SOUND, AND URGE ONLY THAT ANY STATISTICS USED TO PROVE YOUR POINTS BE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING CLOSE SCRUTINY BY BOTH COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**SECRET****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

Historical

JAN 69

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN OWENS, AC/S G-3
HQMC, FROM BGEN WILSON, C/S, FMFPAC. MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS.
MARCORPS T-DAY PLAN (TENTATIVE)

REF: A. TELCON BETWEEN MGEN OWENS, HQMC AND BGEN
WILSON, FMFPAC OF 7JAN69.

- (S) SUBSEQUENT TO OUR TELCON, I REVIEWED THE
TENTATIVE HQMC T-DAY PLAN AS IT RELATES TO THE
STRUCTURE OF A MEB LOCATED IN THE TTPI.
- (S) WE RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT THE ONE BLT MEB
STRENGTH OF 5970 PROPOSED IN THE PLAN EASES, TO A
DEGREE, THE FACILITY/BILLETING SHORTFALLS ON OKINAWA.
HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT PLACE OUR WESTPAC FORCES IN
THE MOST DESIRABLE (AND ATTAINABLE) ^{FUTURE} POSTURE NOR DOES
IT TAKE ^{SUFFICIENT} ~~FULL~~ AND TIMELY ADVANTAGE OF GROUND USE IN
THE TTPI.

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SECRET (70)

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SECRET

SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET/MCEO

3. (S) FMFPAC PLANNING HAS ENVISIONED THE TIMED PHASING OF A MEB INTO THE TTPI OVER A REASONABLE PERIOD, PERHAPS THREE YEARS, WITHOUT OPENING MARINE CORPS FACILITIES ON OKINAWA TO THE ARMY/AIR FORCE. THE RATIONALE FOR SUCH PLANNING WAS BASED ON SEVERAL FACTORS AMONG WHICH WERE:

A. EVENTUAL POSTURING OF A VIABLE FORCE IN THE TTPI, CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ASSIGNED CONTINGENCY MISSIONS IN PACOM, FROM AN ACCEPTABLE LOCATION BASED ON THE PROBABLE LOSS OF OKI/JAPAN AT SOME TIME DURING THE MID-RANGE PERIOD.

B. CONSIDERATION OF U.S. ARMY AND AIR FORCE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS ^{AS} SO FAR AS COULD BE DETERMINED. A RECENT ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEER STUDY, FOR EXAMPLE, INDICATES ARMY DESIRE ^{NGW} TO PROVIDE STORAGE FACILITIES FOR A 6½ DIVISION FORCE (PREPOSITION CONCEPT) AND A 6,000 MAN CONTINGENCY FORCE (173RD ABN BDE/SPEC FORCE GP) IN THE MARIANAS.

C. AN URGENT REQUIREMENT TO DEVELOP MASTER PLANNING FOR THE TTPI IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NAVY. CINCPACFLT IS CURRENTLY HOSTING A PACFLTTCOM CONFERENCE TO THIS END.

4. (S) IN ADDITION TO THE BASIC REQUIREMENT FOR A

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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SUBJECT: MARINE FORCES IN THE

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SECRET/MCEO.

THREE BLT MEB FROM A PURE MILITARY VIEWPOINT, THERE IS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION NOW AVAILABLE TO INDICATE THAT COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND PLANNED USES BY THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE IN THE TTPI MAY PREEMPT LONG RANGE NAVY/MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT IN THE MARIANAS.

5. (U) AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF EACH FACTOR INVOLVED, THERE APPEARS TO BE A DEFINITE REQUIREMENT FOR HQMC TO SUPPORT THE FULLY STRUCTURED MEB IN THE TTPI *ON A TIME PHASE BASIS,* AS A PART OF THE TWO-THIRDS MEB IN WESTPAC.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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MARINE CORPS SECRET ONLY

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SECRET/MCEO

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO MGEN QUILTER FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
SUBJ: REVIEW OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4

REF: A. MY 070508Z JAN 69

1. (S) AS STATED IN REFERENCE A THE PROPOSED REVISION TO MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 WOULD MAKE SINGLE MANAGEMENT A PERMANENT FIXTURE. RATHER THAN A LINE-BY-LINE REVIEW OF THE DOCUMENT I PROPOSE TO OBJECT IN PRINCIPLE AND ATTACK THE CONCEPT UNDER WHICH WE ARE NOW FORCED TO OPERATE. SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE I INTEND TO SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO COMUSMACV.

QUOTE. 1. THE REFERENCED LETTER FORWARDED A PROPOSED DRAFT OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 TO THIS COMMAND FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT. IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED: A. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 DATED 28 JUNE 1966 CONTAINS BASIC AGREEMENTS FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION OF U.S. MILITARY AIR

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 1155 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
OPERATIONS IN RVN. THESE AGREEMENTS ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF) AND OTHER BASIC AGREEMENTS BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THE REVISED DRAFT, 95-4 CONTRAVENES A BASIC PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 30213.B, UNAAF RELATING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF "PRESERVING THE UNI-SERVICE INTEGRITY OF FORCES." APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED DRAFT WOULD ENDORSE PERMANENT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE ORGANIC, INTEGRAL PARTS TO THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM. B. THE PRESENT 95-4 CONTAINS THE BASIC PROVISION THAT, DURING A MAJOR EMERGENCY OR DISASTER, COMUSMACV MAY DIRECT COMMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE, TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER CERTAIN U.S. AIR RESOURCES. I CONCUR AND SUPPORT THE TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL UNDER SUCH SITUATIONS. HOWEVER, THE PROPOSED REVISION OF 95-4, IF PUBLISHED, WOULD FORMALIZE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS RESOURCES BY DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR DURING NORMAL SITUATIONS AND WOULD, IN EFFECT, MAKE SUCH OPERATIONAL CONTROL PERMANENT IN NATURE. WHILE THE PROPOSED REVISION REFERS TO THIS AUTHORITY AS "OPERATIONAL DIRECTION", I CANNOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN "OPERATIONAL CONTROL", AS DEFINED IN UNAAF, AND "OPERATIONAL DIRECTION", AS DEFINED IN THE PROPOSED REVISION. C. THE

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ACTN:S/SEC 1-2

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 1155 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IN ANNOUNCING APPROVAL OF THE SINGLE
MANAGEMENT CONCEPT ON 15 MAY 1968, STATED: "I AM IN AGREEMENT
WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THAT THE UNIFIED COMBAT COMMANDER ON THE SCENE SHOULD BE PRESUMED
TO BE THE BEST JUDGE OF HOW THE COMBAT FORCES ASSIGNED TO HIM
ARE TO ORGANIZED, COMMANDED, AND EMPLOYED TO MEET THE THREAT
FACING HIM....FURTHERMORE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ASSIGNMENT
OF MARINE AIR UNITS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPUTY
COMUSMACV FOR AIR SHOULD CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED
CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS UNDER OTHER COMBAT CONDITIONS, OR
NEED POSE A THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND
TEAM. I NOTE IN APPENDIX D TO (JCSM 237-68 OF 19 APRIL 1968)
THE ASSURANCES MADE BY COMUSMACV TO THE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT THE SINGLE-MANAGER
ARRANGEMENT OVER TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL
NOT BE CONTINUED BEYOND THAT NECESSARY TO MEET THE SPECIFIC
COMBAT SITUATION FOR WHICH IT WAS DEvised. ACCORDINGLY,
COMUSMACV SHOULD REVERT TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENT FOR THE
III MAF WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS." I SUBMIT THE
THESIS THAT THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION WHICH PROMPTED THE

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 1155 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
TEMPORARY CENTRALIZING CONTROL OVER AIR ASSETS NO LONGER EXISTS.
BUT EVEN GRANTING THAT IT DOES EXIST TO SOME EXTENT, IT SEEMS
APPARENT THAT, AT SOME POINT IN TIME, THE SITUATION WILL CHANGE,
PERMITTING ORDERLY REVERSION TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. IT
IS DESIRABLE TO PRESERVE THAT OPTION. 2. SINCE THE REVISED
DRAFT OF 95-4 WOULD CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED CON-
TROL OF AIR RESOURCES UNDER ANY AND ALL COMBAT CONDITIONS, AND
SINCE IT WOULD MAKE PERMANENT THAT WHICH WAS RECOGNIZED BY
SECDEF AS TEMPORARY, I CANNOT CONCUR IN THE REVISED DRAFT OF
95-4, AS WRITTEN. 3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I RECOMMEND THE
FOLLOWING: A. THE PRESENT MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REWRITTEN
TO AGREE WITH THE PHILOSOPHY AND ENCOMPASS THE RECOMMENDATIONS
IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY 090300Z SEP 68. IN ANY EVENT, ANY REVISION
SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE AND REFLECT
THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE DEPSECDEF. I WILL PROVIDE ANY
ASSISTANCE IN THE PREPARATION OF A REVISED DIRECTIVE THAT YOU
MAY DESIRE AND REQUEST SUCH REPRESENTATION UNQUOTE.

2. (S) I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONCURRENCE/COMMENTS AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. MACV HAS ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS BY 15 JANUARY;
HOWEVER, I AM SURE WE CAN GET AN EXTENSION, IF REQUIRED.

PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 1155 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

3. (S) GEN CHAPMAN ARRIVED YESTERDAY. I HAVE DISCUSSED THESE
COMMENTS WITH HIM. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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CG III MAF

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S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN THARIN
1. (S) FOR YOUR INFO JCS HAS ASKED CINCPAC FOR COMMENTS
ON PROPOSALS BY DEPSECDEF FOR AN OSD STUDY GROUP TO
VISIT JAPAN & OKI FOR EITHER OF TWO PERIODS, 13-26 JANUARY
OR 20 FEBRUARY - 8 MARCH. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY GROUP TO
CONDUCT A TECHNICAL ON-THE-GROUND EVALUATION FOR OSD
PROPOSALS FOR JAPAN-OKI BASE REDUCTIONS. AMBASSADOR
JOHNSON REPORTEDLY HAS AGREED TO THIS TRIP IF SECURITY AND
LOW VISIBILITY PRECAUTIONS ARE TAKEN. WARM REGARDS.

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM GEN CHAPMAN
INFO MAJGEN YOUNGDALE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS)

REALIGNMENT OF SEA FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. CMC SECRET LTR A01E-5A-JMI OF 30 OCT 1968

B. CMC 231831Z NOV 68 SPECAT

C. CG FMYAC 130025Z DEC 68 SPECAT

D. CMC SECRET LTR AC3B21-CRJ SER S807481 OF 27 NOV 68

1. (S) BY REFERENCE (A) YOU WERE ADVISED OF ACTIONS TO BE
TAKEN TO EFFECT EMERGENCY REDUCTIONS TO WESTPAC MANNING LEVELS
TO PROVIDE FOR SPACE COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE 89.5 SEA PROGRAM
SIX STRUCTURE SPACES AND MANNING AUTHORIZATIONS. REFERENCE (B)
INFORMED YOU OF RESULTS OF 21 NOVEMBER DEPSECDEF DECISION DENY-
ING US ANY INCREASES IN SEA PROGRAM SIX; AUTHORIZED YOU TO
ADJUST PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS AND MANNING LEVELS, INCLUDING
CADRL OF UNITS; AND REQUESTED THAT YOU SUBMIT YOUR PLANS FOR

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA4581 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
ACHIEVING THE REQUISITE REALIGNMENT.

2. (S) BOB CUSHMAN'S PLAN SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO REF B,
WHICH YOU CONFIRMED IN REF C, PLUS THE CONFERENCE AT THIS HQ
WITH YOUR RLPS CONCERNING 3RD/4TH QIR M/L'S. PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR
DETERMINATION OF CADRE STATUS AND M/L'S AS FOLLOWS:

A. UNITS TO BE PLACED IN CADRE:

UNIT	CADRE STRENGTH		REDUCTION FROM T/O
	OFF	ENL	
AT CO (REINF)	1	18	108
AT CO (REINF)	1	18	108
MED TK CO	1	23	86
MED TK CO	1	23	86
3D AMTRAC BN	10	127	576
PROV HQ BTRY FAG	5	63	201
ARMED AMPHIB CO	1	41	203
		TOTAL	1368

B. UNITS TO BE MANNED AT LESS THAN 100 PERCENT:

SVN UNITS	MANNING LEVEL		REDUCTION FROM T/O
	OFF	ENL	
5TH COMM BN	35	552	158
CMD			

73
SECRET
ACT: MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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PAGE THREE RUEBH0A4581 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

MP BN	36	560	50
MP BN	36	560	50
MWHG 1	41	501	63
FLC	279	5901	895
MABS (VF/(VA)	20	434	9
MABS (VF/VA)	20	434	9
MABS (VF/VA)	20	434	9
H&MS (HELO)	39	291	3
H&MS (HELO)	39	291	3
TOTAL			1249

NOTE 1 REFLECTS REDUCTION OF 13 ENL. IN H&MS AND
50 ENLISTED IN MWFS FOR A TOTAL REDUCTION
OF 63 SPACES FROM T/O.

JAPAN UNITS			
H&MS MAG VF/VA	32	248	17
MABS MAG VF/VA	13	334	50
TOTAL			67

3. (S) A QUARTERLY UPDATE OF THE USMC DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
LISTING PROMULGATED AS ENCLOSURE TO REFERENCE D WILL BE

PAGE FOUR RUEBH0A4581 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FORTHCOMING IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AMONG OTHER THINGS THIS
LISTING WILL DEPICT T/O STRENGTHS AND HQMC AUTHORIZED MANNING
LEVEL STRENGTHS FOR ALL SEA UNITS. THIS LISTING WILL RE-
FLECT THE INPUT WHICH YOUR REPS TO HQMC PROVIDED IN DECEMBER.

4. (S) AS A RELATED MATTER, THE JCS AT MY SUGGESTION ARE CON-
SIDERING REQUESTING CLARIFICATION OF THE DEPSECRETORAL
DECISION OF 21 NOVEMBER IN A MEMORANDUM TO SECDEF. YOU
RECALL THAT THIS IS THE DECISION WHICH PRESCRIBED ADHERENCE
TO THE PROGRAM SIX CEILING AND PROHIBITED WITHDRAWAL OF USMC
UNITS FROM SVN. THE JCS MEMO WOULD POINT OUT THAT THIS
DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THE DEPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT SYSTEM,
AND THAT CEILING INCREASES SHOULD BE GRANTED IN OKINAWA/
JAPAN FOR RELOCATION OF SOME OF III MAF UNITS. HOWEVER, WE
DO NOT EXPECT THIS JCS ACTION TO RESULT IN A DECISION IN THE
NEAR FUTURE.

5. I CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF SECDEF CHANGING HIS 21
NOVEMBER DECISION TO BE UNLIKELY. THEREFORE REQUEST YOU
ADVISE CG III MAF TO INITIATE SUCH ACTION ON EFFECTING THE
FORGOING CADRES/M/L REDUCTIONS AS HE DEEMS PRACTICABLE, AND
TO NOTIFY MACV OF THE UNITS CONCERNED. IN THIS RESPECT, A FORTH-

GMC

R 150050Z/JAN69

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHQ/4581 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 COMING 3RD/4TH QTR PLANNING LEVEL WILL REFLECT THE REDUCTIONS
 LISTED IN PAR 2 IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THE 89.5 SEA CEILING.
 TO BOLSTER THE STRENGTH OF BOB CUSHMAN'S INFANTRY UNITS THIS
 HQS IS DEPLOYING TO SVN SOME 3,000 OF 03 PERSONNEL THIS MONTH.
 SUBSEQUENTLY, THE 3D/4TH QTR M/L WILL PROVIDE MANPOWER RESOURCES
 CONSISTENT WITH CURRENTLY RECOGNIZED SEA FORCE STRUCTURE, AS
 MODIFIED BY PAR 2. IN ADDITION TO M/L AUTHORIZATIONS AND THE
 3.5 ALLOWANCE FOR OCNE THIS HQS HAS COMMENCED PROVISION OF A
 1,400PATIENT ALLOWANCE FOR SEA. THIS ALLOWANCE CONTAINS
 GRADES/MOS FOR 1,000 OF 03. THE NET RESULT OF 3D/4TH QTR M/L
 ACTIONS AND THE NEW SEA PATIENT ALLOWANCE WILL COLLECTIVELY
 PROVIDE AN OF 03 INCREASE OF APPROXIMATELY 2,000 ABOVE ADJUSTED
 1ST/2D QUARTER M/LS.

GP-4

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4581

CMC

R 150050Z/JAN69

3-3 **SECRET** 73
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SECRET

RR RUHHFMA RUABQL
DE RUEBHOA5739 0171716
ZNY SSSSS
RUEBNNA-T-RUABQL
R 171614Z JAN69
FM CMC
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB
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COPY NR 1 OF 2
17 JAN 69 1949Z

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SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM GEN CHAPMAN: INFO BGEM WILLIAMS
418L RYUKYUS AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM(U)

1. (S) THE FOL DEP SECDEF MEMO TO SEC OF THE USR FORCE DTD 11 JAN 69 RECEIVED THIS HQ THRU NAVY CHANNELS:
QUOTE: SUBJ 418L RYUYKUS AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR MEMORANDUM OF MAY 20, 1968, I HAVE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED COMMENTS FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REGARDING THE CONTINUES REQUIREMENT FOR AN IMPROVED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IN OKINAWA. THE COMMENTS OF THE CHAIRMAN

OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INDICATE THAT WE SHOULD EXAMINE THE FEASIBILITY AND COST OF AUTOMATING THE OKINAWA AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. THERE IS CURRENTLY A MARINE TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM (MTDS) UNIT IN OKINAWA FOR CONTINGENCY BACKUP FOR THE SEA SYSTEM. IN ORDER TO MEET THE OKINAWA AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA5739 SECRET MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE WITHOUT EXPANDING THE CURRENT 418L SYSTEM, WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO INVESTIGATE THE FEASIBILITY OF USING (1) THE MARINE TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM (MTDS) OR (2) EXCESS BUIC II (BACKUP INTERCEPTOR CONTROL SYSTEM) ASSETS TO REPLACE AND/OR AUGMENT THE PRESENT 418L SYSTEM. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE ALTERNATIVE OF USING THE MTDS IS DESIRABLE SINCE THIS UNIT IS MOBILE, COMPATIBLE WITH OTHER TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS IN THE AREA, AND WILL OBVIATE THE NEED TO SPEND ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO AUTOMATE THE 418L SYSTEM. YOUR REVIEW IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE JCS AND THE NAVY SHOULD INCLUDE A PRIORITY EVALUATION OF THE CONTINGENCY BACKUP MTDS UNIT NOW IN OKINAWA, THE MTDS UNITS IN PRODUCTION, AND CONUS LOCATED MTDS UNITS IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE IMPLICATIONS OF USING THIS ONE UNIT FOR AIR DEFENSE ROLE IN OKINAWA. INCLUDE ESTIMATES OF COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES. /S/ PAUL H NITZE. END QUOTE.

2. (S) THIS MEMO IS PROVIDED TO ALERT YOU TO REQUIREMENT LAID ON AIR FORCE AND PROBABLE IMPACT ON MACS-3. WE HAVE NOT BEEN APPROACHED BY AIR FORCE TO DATE BUT ANTICIPATE CONTACT. THIS HQ AWARE OF STATUS OF MACS-3 AS REPORTED BY MARES/ FORSTAT. ACTIONS BEING TAKEN TO CORRECT REPORTED DEFICIENCIES WITHIN

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R 171614Z/JAN69

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

SECRET

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PAGE THREE RUEBHQA5739 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE

CAPABILITY OF THIS HQ. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO RETURN UNIT TO A MINIMUM READINESS OF C-2. RECOMMEND YOU TAKE SIMILAR ACTIONS TO AVOID EMBARRASMENT OF MARINE CORPS.

3. (S) TENTATIVE POLICY HERE WILL BE TO COOPERATE AND COORDINATE WITH AIR FORCE FULLY. MACS-3 WILL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS POSSIBLE TEMPORARY AUGMENTATION TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY OF WESTPAC FORCES. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

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SECRET

Pr: CO		FROM CG FMFPAC	DTG 182026Z JAN69	DRAFTED 16 JAN 69
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DCG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<div style="border: 2px solid black; border-radius: 50%; width: 50px; height: 50px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; margin: 10px;">42</div>	<input type="checkbox"/> FLASH <input type="checkbox"/>	PHONE 39-535
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DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACE PER LINE
SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN YOUNGDALE, INFO
GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
REALIGNMENT OF SEASIA FORCE STRUCTURE (U)
A. CMC 150050Z/JAN69 (S) SPECAT
B. CG FMFPAC 130025Z/DEC68 (S) SPECAT
C. CMC LTR AOLE-5A-JML OF 30 OCT 68 (S) NOTAL
1. (S) REF A PROVIDES CMC DECISION ON ADJUSTMENTS IN
PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS AND MANNING LEVELS, INCLUDING
CADRE OF UNITS, TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO PROGRAM SIX
CELLINGS. THIS DECISION, WHILE IN CONSONANCE WITH
THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY REF B, REFLECTS ADDITIONAL
CHANGES IN SPACE ALLOCATIONS DEVELOPED DURING PREPAR-
ATION OF HQMC 3D AND 4TH QTR FY69 MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS.
FURTHER, IT REQUESTS THAT CG III MAF BE ADVISED TO
INITIATE SUCH ACTION ON EFFECTING APPROVED CADRES/

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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SECRET/MCFO

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MANNING LEVEL REDUCTIONS AS DEEMED PRACTICABLE AND TO NOTIFY MACV OF THE UNITS CONCERNED.

2. (S) FMFPAC WESTPAC MANNING LEVELS WILL NOT BE REVISED UNTIL RECEIPT OF HQMC 3D AND 4TH QTR FY69 MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL FOR III MAF TO INITIATE ACTION NOW TO ADJUST ITS PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS AND MANNING LEVELS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, SINCE THIS COULD EASE THE IMPACT OF EMERGENCY REDUCTIONS IN WESTPAC MANNING LEVELS DIRECTED BY REF C.

3. (S) SINCE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF A DOES NOT PROVIDE THE COMPLETE REALIGNED PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE LISTING REQUIRED TO ALLOW PREPARATION OF A DETAILED FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE REQUEST, NOTIFYING MACV OF THE UNITS INVOLVED IN THE DECISIONS CONTAINED IN REF A DOES NOT APPEAR PRACTICABLE AT THIS TIME.

4. (S) GUIDANCE IN CONNECTION WITH EQUIPMENT ITEMS OF UNITS DESIGNATED FOR CADRE STATUS BY REF A WILL BE PROVIDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

5. (S) ^{ACCORDINGLY,} REQUEST CG III MAF TAKE REF A FOR SUCH ACTION ^{NOW} AS DEEMED PRACTICABLE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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CMC 821 ZDK

PP RUHHFMA
DE RUEBHOA8000 0232318
ZNR UUUUU
P 240016ZTJAN 69
FM AC/S G-4 HQMC (BGEN AXTELL)
TO RUHHFMA/C/S FMFPAC (BGEN WILSON)
BT

UNCLAS
CLASS V (W) ASSETS

1. REPRESENTATIVES FROM FIRST LOGCMD, USA, ATTENDED A MUNITIONS CONFERENCE AT CINCUSARPAC, HQAII, DURING THE WEEK OF 20JAN69. DURING THIS CONFERENCE, IT WAS REVEALED THAT AN INFORMAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN FORLOGCMD AND FIRST LOGCMD GENERALLY PERTAINING TO INTERDHANGEABILITY/ TRANSFERS OF ARMY AND MARINE CORPS CLASS V(.) ASSETS.

2. SPECIFICALLY, AN EXAMPLE WAS GIVEN WHEREIN THE ARMY HAD ACQUIRED AN AMMO DUMP FROM THE MARINE CORPS, RETAINED THE ASSETS STORED IN THE DUMP AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED THE AMMO TO MARINE UNITS UNTIL STOCKS WERE DEPLETED. HOWEVER, IN ERROR, THE ARMY REPORTED THE ISSUES TO THE MARINE CORPS IN THEIR MONTHLY EXPENDITURE REPORTS. INFORMATION IS THAT SUBSEQUENT REPORTS WILL CORRECT THE ERROR.

PAGETWO RUEBHOA8000 UNCLAS

3. THE FOREGOING IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO INFORMAL AGREEMENTS OF THIS NATURE. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ACCURATE RECORDS BE MAINTAINED. IT WOULD NO BE DESIRABLE TO RECEIVE BILLS IN THE FUTURE, UNEXPECTEDLY, FROM THE ARMY FOR PAYMENT OF AMMUNITION RESULTING FROM SUCH AN AGREEMENT. FOR THIS REASON YOU MIGHT WANT TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER.

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AC/S G-4 HQMC (BGEN AXTELL)

P 240016Z/JAN69

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COMBAT SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN

BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CINCUSARPAC 240642Z/JAN 69 (S)

TO CINCPAC, INFO DA. PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE.

QUOTE.

SUBJ: FORCE WITHDRAWALS (U)

REF: A. CINCPAC OPLAN 69-69 (DRAFT).

B. CINCPAC OPLAN 67 39.

1. (S) THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF TROOPS MAY BE WITHDRAWN FROM RVN ON A PIECEMEAL BASIS NOT IN ACCORD WITH FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY T-DAY PLAN. WITHDRAWAL MAY NOT NECESSARILY BE IN CONSONANCE WITH THE SEQUENCE OR TIME PHASING PRESCRIBED IN T-DAY PLANNING.

2. (S) CURRENT T-DAY AND POST-HOSTILITIES PLANNING RECOGNIZES THE NECESSITY OF EARLY WITHDRAWAL AND POSITIONING OF 25TH INF DIV AND 173D ABN BDE, SINCE THESE UNITS, AS THE PACOM STRATEGIC RESERVE, MUST ATTAIN RAPIDLY A READINESS CONDITION WHICH WILL PERMIT THEIR RECOMMITMENT SHOULD CONDITIONS DEMAND.

3. (S) THIS STRATEGIC CONSIDERATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE RECOGNIZED AS THE PRIMARY CRITERION IN DETERMINING THE WITHDRAWAL SEQUENCE FROM RVN IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE 173D ABN BDE AND THE 25TH INF DIV ARE THE FIRST UNITS WITHDRAWN TO PERMIT THE EARLY POSITIONING OF A STRONG RESERVE AND TO ESTABLISH A RAPID REENTRY CAPABILITY

UNQUOTE.

GP-4

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN AXTELL FROM BGEN WILSON.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1(S) AS DISCUSSED DURING OUR RECENT ^{visit I am sending} ~~PHONECON~~ I HAVE PREPARED A

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE LOGISTIC POSTURE RESULTING FROM GENERAL

BUSE'S MOST RECENT WESTPAC TRIP.

2(S) THE VISIT TO OKINAWA WAS A SHORT ONE. THE OVERALL
SITUATION IS SATISFACTORY. THE FUTURE OF MOTOBU WAS DISCUSSED
AND WE MUST SOON REACH A FINAL DECISION AS TO ITS FUTURE

VALUE AND REQUIREMENT FOR RETENTION. WE'LL BE IN SOON WITH A
RECOMMENDATION. MACS-8 WAS DISCUSSED THOROUGHLY. BRIEFLY,

HERE IS THAT SITUATION, THE SPECIAL SUPPLY SUPPORT PROGRAM
ESTABLISHED BY YOUR STAFF TO EXPEDITE HANDLING BY MCSA, PHILA
OF MACRON-8 REQUISITIONS IS BELIEVED TO BE ADEQUATE TO SOLVE
THE PROBLEM. WE WILL CONTINUE TO CLOSELY MONITOR THE STATUS
OF MACRON-8'S READINESS AND IF OTHER PROBLEMS DEVELOP WE'LL

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TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION HERE OR REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IF IT
 IS REQUIRED.

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3(S) THE IN-COUNTRY SITUATION IS ALSO SATISFACTORY. BOTH
 GENERALS SIMPSON AND DAVIS PERSONALLY BRIEFED GEN BUSE THAT
 THEY WERE IN AN OVERALL EXCELLENT LOGISTIC AND PERSONNEL POSTURE.
 III MAF IS NOW ANALYZING THE TRACTOR SITUATION. WHEN THE 75
 TD-18 DELIVERY IS COMPLETE AND THE CURRENT ASSETS OF TD 15'S
 ARE REDISTRIBUTED, THE SITUATION WILL BE IMPROVED. TO DATE
 53 TD-18'S HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO DANANG AND 22 MORE ARE ABOARD
 SHIP ENROUTE. UPON RECEIPT OF THESE ASSETS III MAF WILL ADVISE
 US OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND ANY ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
 FLC PRESENTED A THOROUGH AND AGGRESSIVE BRIEFING. WHILE MANY
 PROBLEMS STILL EXIST, PARTICULARLY IN THE QUESTIONABLE ACCURACY
 OF COMPUTER LOADED ASSET AND DEMAND DATA, OVERALL PROGRESS IS
 CONTINUING TO BE MADE THROUGHOUT THAT COMMAND. PARTICULARLY
 NOTEWORTHY IS THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THE SANDPIT; AN
 AGGRESSIVE PROGRAM IS UNDERWAY TO CLEAN UP THIS LONG STANDING
 PROBLEM. WE ARE ASKING FOR A MONTHLY SITREP ON THIS PROGRAM
 AND WILL PASS THIS ALONG TO YOU.
 4(S) AND OF MAJOR CONCERN TO US ALL, IS THE WITHDRAWAL AND THE
 RECONSTITUTION OF MOUNT-OUT. LET ME SUMMARIZE BELOW THE
 CURRENT SITUATION AS I SEE IT FROM BOTH A PLANNING STANDPOINT

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SECRET MCEC**SECRET****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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SECRET

AND WHAT WE CAN DO RIGHT NOW:

A. PLANS FOR COMPUTING MOUNT-OUT UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF T-DAY CRITERIA ARE PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY. WE ARE DEVELOPING A MACHINE PROGRAM WHEREBY, UPON DEVELOPMENT OF A FIRM T-DAY TROOP LIST WE CAN PRODUCE A 360 TAPE CONTAINING CLASS II, IV AND VII REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH T/E UNIT AND A 360 TAPE CONTAINING CLASS VII EQUIPMENT DENSITY REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH T/E UNIT. THE EQUIPMENT DENSITY TAPE WILL BE SENT TO 3D FSR FOR COMPUTATION OF CLASS IX REQUIREMENTS AND THE II, IV AND VII TAPES WILL BE SENT TO FLC. THE CLASS VII TAPE WILL BE RUN BY 3D FSR AND RESULTANT CLASS IX MO REQUIREMENTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO FLC IN THE FORM OF MILSTRIP REQUISITIONS. THE FLC TAPE WILL BE RUN AND MILSTRIP REQUISITIONS WILL BE THE RESULT. BOTH TAPES WILL BE RUN AGAINST FLC ON HAND ASSETS AND THE REQUISITIONS WILL BE USED TO FORCE FEED THE NECESSARY ASSETS TO THE APPROPRIATE UNITS WHEN RECONSTITUTION OF MO IS AUTHORIZED. THIS PROGRAM IS EXPECTED TO BE OPERATIONAL DURING MAY 1969. NO USING UNITS WILL BE INVOLVED IN THIS PROCESS.

B. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE FLUID POLITICAL SITUATION WHICH MAY COMPRESS PLANNING TIME AND/OR DICTATE EARLY REDUCTION OF III MAF FORCES, A PROGRAM FOR RECONSTITUTION OF MOUNT-OUT ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS IS REQUIRED. THE PROGRAM WE

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SECRET
SECRET MCEO

PROPOSE IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THE ONE ABOVE EXCEPT THAT USING UNITS CONTAINED IN A FIRM TROOP LIST OF DEPLOYING FORCES MUST ENTER THE PROCESS. THIS INVOLVEMENT PROVIDES FOR THE USING UNIT TO USE LISTINGS OF EQUIPMENT DENSITY FURNISHED BY FLC TO PREPARE HEADER CARDS LISTING ID NUMBER, QUANTITY, AND ECHELON OF MAINTENANCE FOR EACH MAJOR END ITEM IN THE UNIT'S T/E. THE UNITS WILL RETURN THOSE CARDS TO FLC WHO WILL THEN FORWARD THEM TO 3D FSR FOR COMPUTATION OF CLASS IX REPAIR PARTS. FLC WILL COMPUTE AND PREPARE REQUISITIONS FOR CLASS II, IV AND VII FOR ALL USING UNITS. WE MAY HAVE TO AUGMENT FLC WITH ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO ASSIST IN PREPARATION OF THESE REQUISITIONS AS FLC WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO TAKE ON THIS JOB UNDER PRESENT MANNING. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR THE USING UNIT TO PREPARE THEIR OWN REQUISITIONS. IF ALL GOES WELL COMPUTATION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED AND REQUISITIONS CAN BE PREPARED BY LATE MARCH OR EARLY APRIL 1969. IN THIS REGARD, ^{FNFA} ~~2~~ _h HAVE AN OFFICER AT 3D FSR NOW MODIFYING THE EXISTING FACTOR DECK PROGRAM THERE SO THAT EVEN IN THIS INTERIM PLAN CLASS IX REQUIREMENTS WILL COME OUT OF THE MACHINE IN THE FORM OF MILSTRIP REQUISITIONS.

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SECRET MCEO

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ONLY
SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO
HEADQUARTERS
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE DRAFT
LET MARINE FORM 9010

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET

C. BOTH THE FOREGOING PROCESSES ARE VALUABLE ONLY UP TO THE POINT WHERE ACTUAL LOCATION, PULLING, PACKING AND DELIVERING OF THE MO SUPPLIES BEGINS. UNTIL WE RECEIVE CMC AUTHORITY TO PROTECT THE REQUIRED MO STOCKS, THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE THEM WHEN RECONSTITUTION IS AUTHORIZED WILL VARY FROM DAY TO DAY AND WITH THE TEMPO OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT IT WILL TAKE 45-60 DAYS TO PULL, PACK AND DELIVER THESE SUPPLIES TO THE USING UNITS OR TO DOCKSIDE FOR PICK UP WHEN EMBARKATION BEGINS UNDER EITHER THE T-DAY OR INTERIM PROGRAM.

D. BOTH THE NEW 360 COMPUTERIZED PROGRAM AND THE INTERIM PROGRAM MENTIONED ABOVE DEAL ONLY WITH MACHINE COMPUTATION OF CLASS II, IV, VII AND IX ITEMS. DETERMINATION OF MOUNT-OUT REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASSES I, III AND V WOULD BE A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MARDIV/MAW BEING REDEPLOYED IAW EXISTING/SUPPLEMENTARY DIRECTIVES. BASIC ALLOWANCE OF CLASS VIII MEDICAL SUPPLIES WOULD BE EMBARKED WITH THE USING UNITS; SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL MO BLOCKS WOULD BE REDISTRIBUTED FROM IN-COUNTRY/OKINAWA AS DIRECTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

* E. IF A PRE-T-DAY REDUCTION OF IN-COUNTRY FORCES DOES OCCUR, AND IF THE REDEPLOYING FORCE IS AN RLT, THE MOUNT-OUT SITUATION IS GOOD. CG NINTH MAB HOLDS A RLT

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SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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SECRET

BLOCK CONTAINING MO AND MOA IN OKINAWA. IT WOULD REQUIRE LITTLE EFFORT TO BRING THESE BLOCKS UP TO A NEAR 100 PERCENT LEVEL. AS TWO BLTS ARE ALREADY AFLOAT AS SLFS ONLY ONE BLT WOULD REQUIRE REDEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA AND NO MOUNT-OUT WOULD BE NECESSARY, ALTHOUGH *I would be desirable* ~~WOULD LIKE~~ TO GET ANOTHER BLT MO BLOCK OUT OF COUNTRY.

F. IN ANY CASE, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN RECONSTITUTING MOUNT-OUT FOR FORCES IN-COUNTRY IS TO PREPARE A REPRESENTATIVE MOUNT-OUT ^{TR00P} LIST IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE, IN SO FAR AS PRACTICAL, TACTICAL UNITS HAVING TO MAKE THE LONG AND INTRICATE COMPUTATIONS. ALSO, A STANDARD UNIT PACKAGE OF MOUNT-OUT SUPPLIES WILL ENHANCE DEPLOYMENT TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE.

G. KEY TO ANY WITHDRAWAL PLAN IS EARLY WARNING. WE ALL WANT TO BE PREPARED TO ACCOMPLISH ANY REDEPLOYMENT IN AN ORDERLY FASHION. YOU NOW KNOW WHAT OUR ESTIMATES ARE FOR COMPUTING AND PREPARING MOUNT-OUT SUPPLIES. IF WE ARE ALLOWED THIS TIME WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE ENTIRE PROGRAM WILL PROCEED SMOOTHLY.

* H. NOW, AS TO WHAT WE CAN DO RIGHT NOW. BY DIVERTING MAXIMUM FLC EFFORT AND UTILIZING THE PP&P MATERIELS NOW ON HAND FOR DAILY OPERATIONS, WE COULD PREPARE AND STAGE A REPRESENTATIVE RL T MOUNT-OUT AND MOUNT-OUT AUGMENTATION BLOCK

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SECRET

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

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SECRET MGO

IN 15-20 DAYS. IT WOULD BE SHORT CERTAIN ITEMS WHICH ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN OPERATING STOCKS OF COURSE, BUT IT WOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR THE PURPOSE. THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT WOULD DEGRADE DAILY FLC OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF III MAF SOMEWHAT, BUT NOT SERIOUSLY.

I. THE FOREGOING NOT WITHSTANDING, THE IDEAL WAY TO REDEPLOY WOULD BE TO RECONSTITUTE MOUNT-OUT NOW AND HAVE IT BOXED AND READY TO EMBARK WHEN REDEPLOYMENT BEGINS. BUT WE ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO CANNOT DO THIS ^{we} CAN PROCEED ONLY TO THE POINT WHERE REQUISITIONS ARE PREPARED. HOWEVER, WHEN ^{exp} ~~our~~ PROGRAM DISCUSSED IN 4.B. ABOVE IS COMPLETED WE ARE ~~GOING~~ TO REQUEST AUTHORITY TO RECONSTITUTE MOUNT-OUT FOR WHATEVER SIZE FORCE ^{it is ESTIMATED} ~~WE BELIEVE~~ ^{at that time} WILL COME OUT PRIOR TO T-DAY.

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