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# OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

## VIETNAM

### NOVEMBER 1968

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine Corps forces in Vietnam for the month of November 1968. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through October 1968.

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SUMMARY

Continuing a trend which, except for a brief northward shift during September, has obtained since early July, combat during November remained focused in central I CTZ, as III MAF's Operation MEADE RIVER trapped elements of three NVA regiments in a cordon nine miles south of Danang. Initiated on 20 November, in conjunction with the accelerated pacification program, MEADE RIVER attained significant results prior to termination on 9 December, with more than 1,000 NVA/VC killed - 841 by Marines and 176 by ARVN - over 100 captured, and 71 VC infrastructure members identified by a joint US/ARVN interrogation center. Not only was the operation a serious setback to the enemy's combatant strength, but equally devastating to enemy aspirations, it purged a large segment of the hard-to-replace VC infrastructure in this region.

Conversely, in the DMZ area, the center of action throughout most of 1968, combat activity diminished to its lowest point in the past 12 months. The enemy, obviously feeling the pinch of over 15,000 troop losses to III MAF action along the DMZ since November 1967, chose to hold his major maneuver elements across the borders of nearby North Vietnam and Laos.

The accelerated pacification campaign, part of a country-wide program, is designed to improve the security of 141 designated hamlets in I CTZ by end-January 1969. In only one month of campaigning, more than half the selected hamlets already had attained secure status. And, as further indication of the successful progress in this revolutionary development effort, over 300 Viet Cong infrastructure cadre were neutralized during the month.

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Relatively dry November weather provided impetus for movement of enemy rocket units towards possible launch sites within range of III MAF facilities. Danang's deep-water pier, on 17 November, was the target of the initial attack-by-fire, with all but one of eight rockets impacting in the bay. Despite saturation patrolling by Marine and ARVN units, the enemy was able to direct over 90 rockets in 11 separate attacks at I CTZ installations during the month - further manifesting his continued capability to launch limited attacks-by-fire.

Following the 1 November cessation of bombing in North Vietnam, the out-of-country air effort was concentrated in Laos, where Marines directed over 900 combat sorties, more than doubling the January 1967 previous monthly high of 490 sorties against enemy infiltration routes in that area. Taking advantage of improved weather, Wing and Special Landing Force helicopter pilots also flew 60,374 sorties, transporting 112,411 passengers and 12,426 pounds of cargo throughout I CTZ.

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
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LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

There were 18 III MAF and Special Landing Force (SLF) operations in I CTZ during November. With the exception of those conducted in Quang Nam province, the operations encountered the same diminishing level of action characteristic of the past five months. Highlighting the action in Quang Nam was Operation MEADE RIVER, a 20-day 1st Marine Division cordon and search of an enemy staging area nine miles south of Danang--an action achieving spectacular success.

The locations of III MAF and SLF operations in I CTZ during November are portrayed below.

**III MAF AND SLF OPERATIONS - NOVEMBER 1968**

\* Includes 566 enemy killed and 231 enemy and 281 weapons captured by US Army operations. US Army casualties: 33 killed and 231 wounded and evacuated.

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Operation MEADE RIVER

Paramount among III MAF operations in I CTZ was MEADE RIVER, a highly successful, multi-regiment cordon and search of the Dodge City/Thanh Phong complex nine miles south of Danang. Executed in support of the accelerated pacification campaign (described in the Revolutionary Development chapter of this summary), Operation MEADE RIVER involved elements of seven Marine battalions (five organic to III MAF, and both Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces), along with ARVN, GVN, and ROK Marine forces, and, over a 20-day period from 20 November through 9 December, dealt a serious blow to both the enemy combatant strength and infrastructure in Quang Nam province.

The accretion of enemy forces in Quang Nam province (five infantry regiments with 16 battalions, two artillery (rocket) regiments with five battalions, and a host of local guerrilla and sapper units confirmed at end-October), coupled with hard intelligence provided by reconnaissance activities, agent reports, prisoner interrogations, and captured documents, offered conclusive proof of an unabating enemy threat to Danang. A prime factor aggravating this threat is the enemy's abject failure, over a period of more than three years of fighting, to achieve a meaningful penetration of the Marines' viable screen around the city.

In attempting to gather a large force within striking distance of Danang, however, the enemy risks the exposure of sizable combat strength to the hazard of III MAF superior firepower and maneuver counteraction. Consequently, when intelligence indices pointed to increased staging activity south of Danang (enemy strength estimated at 1,300), III MAF moved with a strong force to destroy the buildup. The objective area for Operation MEADE RIVER was centered about nine miles south of Danang in a region (commonly called Dodge City by the Marines) containing numerous hedge-surrounded fortified hamlets and a network of rivers and streams. Heavily mined and featuring a maze of tunnels and trenches, the Dodge City area has long been an enemy staging and assembly point.

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


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Early on 20 November, utilizing maximum deception, III MAF maneuvered elements of six shore-based Marine battalions (1st Battalion, 1st Marines; 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines; 3d Battalion, 26th Marines; 2d Battalion, 26th Marines (BLT 2/26, SLF Alfa); and Companies A and B, 7th Marines) into position by foot, helicopter, and motor march, effectively sealing the area on the north, south, and east. Concurrently, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (BLT 2/7, SLF Bravo) launched heliborne amphibious Operation SWIFT MOVE, closing the trap on the west. Upon landing, BLT 2/7 commenced an immediate attack to seize the berm comprising the old railroad bed, one and one-half miles to the east, a maneuver designed to tighten further the cordon.

The action initiating Operation MEADE RIVER is illustrated below.

### OPERATION MEADE RIVER: 20 NOVEMBER 1968



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November action during MEADE RIVER was distinguished by a deliberate search for tunnels, bunkers, and other fortifications capable of concealing enemy troops, arms, and supplies, and by a deliberate, systematic contraction of the cordon. On 25 November, BLT 2/7 closed on the railroad and consolidated its position, whereupon 2d Battalion, 5th Marines and BLT 2/26 initiated detailed search operations from the vicinity of Route 1 west to the Suoi Co Ca, a river cutting through the center of the operation. By 25 November also, ARVN and other GVN forces had completed the evacuation of over 2,600 civilians from the area; a joint US/ARVN interrogation center was established to screen and otherwise process the local inhabitants in conjunction with the accelerated pacification campaign.

The enemy, realizing he was caught in a vise, resisted stubbornly, employing a wide array of mortar, short-range rocket, and automatic weapon fire in his defense. The Marines were obliged to attack from bunker-to-bunker and hamlet-to-hamlet, with the majority of the fighting occurring at extremely close quarters. Although air and artillery attacks against enemy emplacements were followed by psychological broadcasts in an effort to induce the enemy to surrender, the seizure of most positions required a physical assault. There were occasions, however, of enemy giving up without a fight. On 28 November, for example, Company A, 1st Marines, searching positions on the northern quadrant of the cordon, took nine docile prisoners from one bunker.

Numerous attempts to break the cordon by exfiltration in small units were also made by the entrapped enemy force. The almost shoulder-to-shoulder deployment of the Marine blocking forces (three-man positions 15 meters apart), and the ever-present reconnaissance screen, efficiently discouraged enemy success, as accurate organic weapon and

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
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supporting arms fire took a heavy toll of escape-bent enemy troops. On the night of 28 November, a 20-man enemy force attempted to break out by crossing to the north bank of the Suoi Co Ca. Machine gun and 3.5 inch rocket fire from a Company F, 5th Marines platoon claimed 12 NVA; the remainder fled back toward the center.

By end-November, the operation had gained substantial results. Controlled by the 1st Marine Regiment, the attacking units had compressed the remaining enemy into the north-central sector of the original cordon, accounting for 285 NVA/VC killed and another 35 captured in the process. Additionally, the careful screening of the civilians displaced from the area snared 71 members of the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI)--a severe setback to the enemy's underground control faction.

On 1 December, the situation in Operation MEADE RIVER looked like this:

### OPERATION MEADE RIVER: 20 - 30 NOVEMBER 1968



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The major MEADE RIVER battles were fought in December. Attacking north from Route 4, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines (reinforced by Company A, 7th Marines and Company H, 5th Marines) developed strong resistance from a heavily fortified high ground position, located in a bend in the Suoi Co Ca river. Following an intense two-day air and artillery preparation of the objective, Companies I and K assaulted through the enemy positions at 1200 on the 12th, silencing the last resistance during early afternoon. A search of the destroyed complex netted 75 NVA dead, five prisoners, and 11 weapons. There were no Marine casualties, stark testimony to the effectiveness of the supporting arms fire.

As the battalion pressed the attack northward toward blocking forces deployed along the La Tho river, contact remained constant and periodically intense. During late afternoon on the 7th, Company A engaged an enemy unit, well-entrenched in a fortified hamlet less than a mile south of the river. The ensuing exchange of fire terminated with Company A overrunning the position, killing 22 NVA and seizing seven weapons. Company A losses in the brief, but intense engagement were eight killed and 17 wounded and evacuated. A detailed search of the adjacent terrain on the 8th, however, produced another 47 enemy dead and ten weapons, a facet of the operation which was by now commonplace. Both the attacking and blocking forces, continually tightening the cordon, were finding additional results of earlier firefights in the form of dead NVA and VC troops the enemy was unable to transport from the area.

The action reached successful climax on 8 and 9 December. Late afternoon on the 8th saw three Marine companies and a troop of ARVN cavalry develop, almost simultaneously, the positions of a large NVA force, dug-in across a half-mile front, nine miles south of Danang. The friendly combined arms assault, which included supporting fire from air, artillery, mortars, and 106mm recoilless rifles, killed 91 NVA, captured one, and claimed 15 weapons. Friendly losses in the three-hour battle were 15 Marines and five ARVN killed, and 31 Marines wounded.

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
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Advancing through their final objective on 9 December, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines accounted for an additional 160 enemy killed, nine captured, and 58 weapons seized. The majority of the enemy losses counted on the 9th were discovered during a search of positions hit by air and artillery; however, Company K attacked and killed 30 NVA in a midday skirmish at the La Tho river bank, sustaining no casualties in the action. Final results of MEADE RIVER included over 800 NVA killed, and 101 taken prisoner (prisoner totals are in addition to the 71 VCI previously cited). ARVN forces added another 176 killed and 21 captured to the enemy casualty total in the area. Marine losses were not light - 107 killed and 385 wounded and evacuated - a product of close combat in a heavily fortified area.

The MEADE RIVER action from 1-9 December is shown on the map below.

## OPERATION MEADE RIVER: 1-9 DECEMBER 1968



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In sum, the success of Operation MEADE RIVER can be traced to timely exploitation of hard intelligence by swift, undetected commitment of forces sufficient to effectively surround the objective area. The subsequent, deliberate search of the region thus cordoned, executed over a period of time adequate to ensure necessary detail, accounted for 1,210 enemy killed or captured--a total strikingly similar to the original area strength estimate of 1,300 NVA/VC. Elements of three NVA regiments were identified as having been trapped in the cordon, the 38th, 36th, and 68B. The resultant troop and material loss sustained by the enemy in the Dodge City area sharply compromises his plans for early incursions against Danang.

#### Operation DARING ENDEAVOR

Twenty miles south of Danang, Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force Bravo executed a coordinated heliborne/surface amphibious assault against enemy forces on Barrier Island, just south of Hoi An. Mounted on 10 November, amphibious Operation DARING ENDEAVOR involved Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (BLT 2/7) and Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-165 (HMM-165) of the Special Landing Force, with a squadron of Americal Division armored cavalry screening the area on the west and southwest, and ROK Marines similarly operating to the north and northwest. Barrier Island enemy strength included two local force companies (Q-80, Q-81) known to be active in the area, and an unidentified enemy battalion, fixed there by current intelligence.

Launched shortly after first light, the helicopterborne and over-the-beach landed Marines developed light contact, a condition which prevailed throughout the operation. The nine-day action ashore was primarily a systematic search of the objective area, aimed at the destruction of enemy forces, fortifications, and caches, and the weeding-out of long-established Viet Cong infrastructure. Assisting BLT 2/7 in identification of VCI, along with controlling the local populace, and accompanying patrols, were GVN units, comprised of one platoon of National Police Field Forces, a provincial reconnaissance unit, and an armed propaganda team.

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
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The light enemy contact during the operation was marked by brief small unit clashes, occasional mortar and mining incidents, and the capture of a number of VC and NVA soldiers. Viet Cong mining techniques included the booby-trapping of a dead comrade on at least one occasion; the detonation of the surprise-firing device wounded a Company E Marine on 12 November. Significant among the 27 VC and three NVA prisoners were two Viet Cong captured on 12 November, five miles southeast of Hoi An. Identified as tax collectors, they were carrying 20,000 piasters.

Operation DARING ENDEAVOR is portrayed below.

### OPERATION DARING ENDEAVOR: 10-18 NOVEMBER 1968



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Although no sizable enemy forces were engaged during the course of DARING ENDEAVOR (interrogation of local inhabitants revealed the unidentified enemy battalion had departed the area some five days prior to the operation), the value of the amphibious assault force as an instrument of the accelerated pacification campaign was readily apparent. The unique, mobile striking power of the Special Landing Force provides a ready capability to initiate the action or to reinforce or exploit an operation ashore.

#### Operation HENDERSON HILL

Southwest of Danang, Operation HENDERSON HILL, in support of the accelerated pacification campaign since 1 November, continued to inflict considerable damage to enemy forces in the An Hoa basin. With the action dominated by reconnaissance team-directed supporting arms attacks against the flow of constant enemy traffic in the western sector of the basin, and by an area saturation of around-the-clock patrols and ambushes, the 5th Marines killed 469 enemy during November.

The enemy's persistence in attempting to move troops and supplies through the western portion of the An Hoa basin underscores the value he places on southwestern Quang Nam province as a supply staging and troop assembly area, as well as an important link in his overland lines of communication. As a consequence, an objective occupying a high priority in III MAF's announced winter campaign is a multi-battalion attack against the source of the enemy activity, located in Base Area 112 in the heavily canopied mountains southwest of An Hoa. This assault is scheduled for commencement upon completion of Operation MEADE RIVER.

#### Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA

Following the highly successful 1st Marine Division UNION-COCHISE-SWIFT series of operations against the

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2d NVA Division in the Nui Loc Son basin during Spring and Summer 1967, the Americal Division mounted Operation WHEELER to complete the destruction of enemy forces and to ensure pacification progress in this rice-rich, densely populated region (centered 30 miles south of Danang). Initiated on 11 September 1967, the four-battalion Operation WHEELER was joined in the basin during October by Operation WALLOWA, with three 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) battalions. Merging on 11 November to form WHEELER/WALLOWA, the combined operation then continued until 11 November 1968, terminating with major NVA forces, by and large, having been forced from the basin. More than 10,000 enemy were killed during the fourteen-month offensive, but more importantly, the Americal Division and the ARVN, working in close harmony, have established sufficient order in the basin to permit the expansion of GVN influence into an area encompassing nearly three-quarters of a million Vietnamese civilians.

#### Operations in the DMZ Area

Combat along the DMZ in November diminished to the lowest plane experienced in over a year; 191 NVA were killed by III MAF units in that region during the month, the smallest total recorded since November 1967 (157 NVA killed). Increasingly wary of entrapment by mobile 3d Marine Division elements, the enemy steadfastly refused engagement, concentrating his efforts instead toward completing his withdrawal to areas safe from III MAF maneuver and firepower. Our forces, ranging over a wide front from the mouth of the Cua Viet river on the east to the Laotian border in northwestern Quang Tri, encountered little serious opposition on the ground, as enemy action north of Route 9 was limited largely to random, low-intensity mortar attacks.

The factor primarily influencing the decreased action level in northern Quang Tri is abundantly clear. During the

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
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months between November 1967 and November 1968, there occurred along the DMZ some of the most violent combat of the Vietnam war, with III MAF operations successfully repulsing NVA multi-regiment attacks against Khe Sanh and Dong Ha and concurrently, denying the enemy opportunity for similar thrusts in the Camp Carroll/Cam Lo/Con Thien area. The cost of this major enemy drive to invest northern Quang Tri--the equivalent of more than ten regiments of combat troops and a corresponding high loss of equipment and supplies--has caused the enemy to exhibit both a reluctance and a reduced capability for an early resumption of heavy fighting along the DMZ.

The graph below, displaying monthly enemy losses to III MAF operations in the DMZ area, illustrates the thrust of the action there during the period November 1967 through November 1968.

ENEMY KILLED BY III MAF IN DMZ AREA: NOV 1967 - NOV 1968



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However, the current low scale of enemy activity notwithstanding, there is little evidence to reflect any diminishing of enemy intentions relative to continued use of the DMZ for troop and supply staging, infiltration, and, on the north side of the Ben Hai river, sanctuary. Despite the 1 November bombing halt in the DMZ and North Vietnam (described in detail in the Air Operations chapter of this edition), aimed, in part, at restoring the DMZ to a true buffer zone, the enemy has remained active there, occupying positions and launching harassing attacks-by-fire. Correspondingly, a comprehensive US surveillance effort has been maintained over the DMZ area. Supporting arms attacks were targeted against observed enemy activity in the southern portion of the DMZ throughout the month and against enemy offensive actions in the northern sector.

-Operation LANCASTER II

On 25 November, Operation LANCASTER II terminated ten months of action against enemy forces in the west-central sector of the DMZ region. Launched on 21 January 1968, LANCASTER II was centered largely on the area along Route 9 and the Cam Lo river, between Cam Lo and the Rockpile, ten miles to the west. Highlighting Operation LANCASTER II was a successful Marine multi-regiment thrust from the Rockpile northwest to the Ben Hai river in September, an offensive which fragmented an impending attack by the 320th NVA Division, driving major elements of that force back into North Vietnam.

Enemy losses to Operation LANCASTER II were counted at 1,801 killed, 42 captured, and 913 weapons seized; Marine casualties were 353 killed and 1,713 wounded seriously enough to require evacuation.

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

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## SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Forming a veritable maze of combat obstructions across lowland sectors of central and southern I CTZ during November, the III MAF counterguerrilla campaign committed 14,785 patrols, ambushes, and company-size sweeps to deprive freedom of movement to enemy forays in quest of war-required resources and tactical advantage--primary requisites to renewed offensive thrusts and a much needed victory. Results of this pervasive counterguerrilla activity - increasing enemy losses and forcing further reduction in hostile activity - provided continued security for pacification centers and vital military complexes, while contributing early gains to the intensified press against Viet Cong infrastructure and main force units seeking establishment in the lowlands. In 1,046 contacts, small unit operations cost the NVA and VC an equivalent of two battalions--876 enemy killed and 15 captured.

The following graphs compare November activities and enemy losses with monthly totals since May 1968.



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
~~SECRET~~Enemy Activity

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During November, a relative quiet continued in I CTZ as enemy initiated actions totaled 13 attacks-by-fire and 31 ground assaults, as compared to 36 attacks launched in October. Reflecting recent migration to mountainous base areas and out-of-country sanctuaries, the limited enemy efforts nevertheless highlighted capabilities for future combat. In Quang Tri province, hostile attacks were limited to six rocket or mortar missions and one ground assault; however, over 350 sightings of enemy activity within the DMZ mirrored continued operational preparations. And in the Danang area, now the prime I CTZ target, the launching of 38% of the month's attacks, 12 by fire and five on the ground, supported intelligence estimates of a hostile offensive before the February 1969 TET celebration.

A comparison of November enemy attacks with hostile actions since December 1967 is portrayed in the following graph.

ENEMY ATTACKS IN I CTZ: DECEMBER 1967 - NOVEMBER 1968



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During November, the Front 4 headquarters (responsible for coordination of Danang area attacks) and the 2d NVA Division increased Quang Nam troop concentrations to 16 maneuver and five rocket battalions in hopes of launching a new offensive. However, as Marine and ARVN operations continued to splinter hostile advances, visions of victory at Danang, tactical or psychological, commenced to fade.

A document, captured on 23 November by the 1st Marine Division, described the once elite 402d VC Sapper Battalion as no longer combat capable. A participant in many limited attacks in the Danang area since arrival of III MAF forces, the battalion, now beset with low morale, desertions, and malingering, failed in an attack on 21 November when, after the opening minutes of combat, its ranks turned and fled. Unable to muster for an attack again on the 22d, the sappers were ordered to withdraw from combat.

Major injury, to both troop strength and future combat plans, was sustained by the enemy in late November, as elements of the 36th, 38th, and 68B NVA Regiments, cordoned south of Danang, lost over 1,000 soldiers to Marine and ARVN battalions. Of particular significance, the capture of 71 Viet Cong infrastructure personnel dealt a crippling blow to NVA units requiring local support for future operations.

#### Danang Area Operations

In the Danang area, Marine small unit operations during November maintained constant pressure against enemy elements restocking from lowland resources and positioning for more opportune attack conditions. Deploying 11,374 patrols, ambushes, and company-size operations along enemy trails and staging sites, counter guerrilla forces tallied 471 contacts, taking over 150 VC and NVA out of action.

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- 1st Marine Regiment Actions

Intensified efforts to reduce enemy effectiveness in the lowlands around Danang were exemplified by small unit operations in the 1st Marine Regiment sector to the south of the city. To deter hostile traffic attempting to violate the Danang rocket belt, nearby pacification projects, and the city proper, the regiment deployed 2,246 patrols and ambushes, including 1,414 (63%) against enemy night movement. Coordinated with these basic security measures, 1st Regiment employed a series of company-size cordon and search operations which contributed to early successes accrued by the Le Loi accelerated pacification campaign (see the Revolutionary Development chapter of this edition).

1st Marines elements also maneuvered to complement large unit operations targeted against enemy retreats situated south of Danang. In early November, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines established blocking positions to fix the enemy for BLT 2/26 during Operation GARRARD BAY. And, climaxing November efforts against the enemy, the regiment, on the 20th, initiated the seven-battalion Operation MEADE RIVER (see previous chapter) to fix and destroy enemy concentrated in the Dodge City area, long a vicinity for assembly of hostile elements intent on damaging III MAF and GVN progress in Quang Nam.


The map on the following page portrays activities by the 1st Marines during November.

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## ACTIONS BY 1ST MARINE REGIMENT - NOVEMBER 1968

-Reconnaissance Activities

Close surveillance of the trail networks leading from Base Area 112 and other staging points south and west of Danang was ensured during the month, as 101 patrols of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion again dealt severe penalties

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
to enemy elements attempting passage to the coastal lowlands. Assigned to independent STING RAY operations, and in support of Operations HENDERSON HILL, NICOLLET BAY, and MEADE RIVER, the teams directed 161 artillery and air strikes on over 80 sightings of hostile troop activity.

Destructiveness of the covertly adjusted missions was highlighted during November by a team positioned to monitor the western reaches of the An Hoa basin, southwest of Danang. Commencing with missions against a hundred NVA on the 18th, the patrol by end-month had adjusted supporting arms fire on over 15 sightings, killing at least 182 NVA and VC.

Enemy losses attributed to reconnaissance actions in November totaled 417 NVA and VC killed, a tally second only to the April 1968 high of 457 killed. November casualties sustained by the hundred Marine patrols were five killed and eight wounded and evacuated.

The following graphic compares casualties during November with monthly totals since December 1967.

#### RESULTS OF RECONNAISSANCE ACTIONS IN THE DANANG AREA: DEC 67 - NOV 68



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Kit Carson Scouts

The III MAF-initiated Kit Carson Scout (KCS) program, completing its second year of operation during November, continued to provide small unit operations tactical assistance by assigning former Viet Cong guerrillas to the four III MAF divisions, and to the 1st Combined Action Group at Chu Lai. From the 12 Scouts joined by the 1st Marine Division in late 1966, the program had grown to 478 KCS by end-November, with another 28 undergoing recruit training.

First accompanying Marine units in July 1966, the returnees were immediately recognized for their invaluable knowledge of VC operations and habits. A pilot program for employment of Chieu Hoi's was initiated in October of that year with three 2-man teams attached to Marine units. Their contributions to the success of combat operations brought a request from the 1st Division for Scouts to be assigned to each rifle company.

The benefits gained by less than 500 small unit activities each month in early 1967 were enjoyed by 2,525 patrols and ambushes in November 1968. Despite the low level of action in I CTZ during the month, Scouts were directly responsible for 11 enemy killed and 52 suspects apprehended, while numerous III MAF casualties were prevented as KCS located 77 mines, booby traps, and grenades. Disruption of the enemy's local support system also was furthered as these former enemy soldiers pointed out 64 caves, tunnels, and supply caches.

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
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The graphs below depict growth of the Kit Carson Scout program during its two years of operation, and compare selected achievements by the Scouts since November 1967.

### KIT CARSON SCOUT (KCS) PROGRAM



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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION

Initiation of the accelerated pacification (Le Loi) campaign highlighted the month in I CTZ, as special teams set about to improve the security status of 141 hamlets throughout the five provinces. In support of this program, GVN agencies and III MAF committed military forces for security, psychological operations units to propagate the inevitability of Viet Cong defeat, and intelligence teams to identify, and assist in the neutralization of, the enemy's infrastructure. Augmenting the Le Loi campaign, but not specifically connected with it, ARVN battalions in direct support of revolutionary development conducted 28 operations within, or abutting, priority areas, accounting for more than 350 enemy killed or captured.

Combined Action Program

Activation of Combined Action Platoons (CAP's) 3-3-8, five miles north of Hue; 3-1-8, four miles east of Hue; 2-3-6, 11 miles south of Danang; and 2-4-5, three miles east of Hoi An, brought to 102 the number of platoons in the Combined Action Program on 30 November. Also activated during the month was the 19th company headquarters (3-5), 12 miles southeast of Phu Bai. At end-month, 1,690 Marines, 135 US Navy corpsmen, and 3,199 Popular Forces (PF) soldiers were organized in these platoons, company headquarters, four group headquarters, and eight Mobile Training Teams (MTT's).

During November, III MAF combined action units continued a vigorous counter guerrilla campaign, hampering severely enemy units attempting to gain influence in combined action operating areas.

-On the 9th, while conducting a night patrol, CAP 1-3-3 entered Thuong Hoa (2) hamlet, nine miles southeast of Chu Lai, and immediately engaged a group of Viet Cong. The ensuing firefight resulted in 20 VC killed, eight detained, and one weapon captured, with friendly casualties listed as one Marine wounded.

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Subsequent investigation of captured documents and interrogation of detainees revealed the enemy personnel to be small unit guerrilla leaders assembling for a conference.

-Shortly after noon on the 22d, a patrol from CAP 1-3-5 received a heavy volume of small arms fire from Phuoc Thuan (1) hamlet, 12 miles southeast of Chu Lai. The patrol immediately deployed, returning organic weapons fire and directing mortar and artillery missions and fixed wing air strikes against the enemy. A search of the area after the enemy broke contact and fled disclosed 28 dead Viet Cong. No friendly casualties were sustained during the encounter.

-At 0800 on 25 November, CAP 2-1-2, in conjunction with a local Regional Force company, conducted a search of An Tan hamlet, six miles southwest of Danang. Midway through the sweep, the maneuver element contacted a well-entrenched NVA force. Marines, PF's, and RF's, precluded from extensive employment of supporting arms because of the close combat, drove the enemy from his bunkers. A subsequent police of the battlefield produced nine dead NVA, seven AK-47 assault rifles, and grenades and mines. Friendly casualties were one Marine killed and three Marines and one RF wounded. On the next day, the platoon returned to An Tan and captured four NVA soldiers. Subsequent interrogation revealed the group was composed of two company officers and two noncommissioned officers, all from 2d Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment.

In all, combined action units conducted a record 9,108 patrols and ambushes during the month, 70% of which were at night. The following graphs display these activities, which resulted in 216 enemy killed, 71 captured, and 64 weapons secured, in relation to combined action operations since November 1967.


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## COMBINED ACTION UNIT ACTIVITY


Accelerated Pacification (Le Loi) Campaign

On 1 November, the GVN, with US assistance, initiated a country-wide accelerated pacification (Le Loi) campaign, designed to drive the enemy from populated areas and lend added emphasis to the 1968 Revolutionary Development Program. In all, 1,000 hamlets were targeted throughout RVN, 141 of them in I CTZ. Their locations, populations, and relationship to RD priority areas in I CTZ are shown on the map on the following page.

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## LE LOI CAMPAIGN HAMLETS - I CTZ



Scheduled to continue until 31 January 1969, the Le Loi campaign is intended to provide extra momentum to the RD effort, by organizing governmental functions, initiating self-help projects, bolstering local security, and eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure in selected hamlets. In order to give the necessary impetus requisite for success, Commanding General, III MAF and Commanding General, I Corps have coordinated efforts of all organizations involved in the Le Loi pacification campaign. The preponderance of the campaign goals will be accomplished by teams comprised

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of RD cadre and either RF or PF soldiers. Presently, 21 RF companies and 143 PF platoons are committed to the campaign, with additional support available, if required, from III MAF, ARVN, Combined Action Program, and RD units.

Particular emphasis was stressed on aggressive prosecution of the Phoenix-Phung Hoang anti-VCI campaign. III MAF's Operation MEADE RIVER, a 20-day cordon and search of the enemy-infested Dodge City area south of Danang, proved most successful in responding to this challenge. During the operation (conducted in support of the Le Loi pacification campaign), Marine maneuver battalions accounted for 71 VCI cadre captured (recorded in detail in the Large Unit Operations chapter of this report). In all, Le Loi-associated operations resulted in a reported 333 enemy infrastructure neutralizations during the month.

The enthusiasm generated among provincial agencies is best indicated by the success the campaign achieved in its first month. By 13 November, the teams had entered all targeted hamlets in I CTZ and begun their programs. At end-month, the pacification status of the 141 selected hamlets reflected noteworthy improvement, as pictured by the following chart.

LE LOI CAMPAIGN PROGRESS - NOVEMBER		
	1 NOVEMBER*	30 NOVEMBER
SECURE HAMLETS	37	74
CONTESTED HAMLETS	48	50
VIET CONG CONTROLLED HAMLETS	45	17

\* On 1 November, only 130 of the 141 hamlets had been entered by Le Loi pacification teams.

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
Psychological Operations

III MAF and the GVN continued their psychological operations in I CTZ, distributing 223 million leaflets, conducting 155 ground and 2,589 aerial broadcasts, and presenting 625 visual productions during the month. The high level of leaflet dissemination and aerial broadcasts reflects the improved weather conditions during November, enabling a greater utilization of aircraft in the execution of the psyops effort.


As displayed in the following graphs, leaflet distribution for the month was 10%, broadcasts were 81%, and visual presentations were 22% higher than the monthly averages since November 1967.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS - I CTZ**


LEAFLETS DISTRIBUTED



BROADCASTS CONDUCTED



VISUAL PRESENTATIONS



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Much of the psyops effort during November was programmed to support the Le Loi campaign. For example, in conjunction with Operation MEADE RIVER, III MAF distributed nearly two million leaflets and conducted 194 hours of broadcasts during the last 11 days of the month. Besides targeting the enemy's vulnerabilities and encouraging defections, the Le Loi-associated effort exploited III MAF civic action and emphasized benefits of life with the GVN as opposed to existence under VC domination. The results of this operation by end-November were encouraging -- 700 of the 2,700 civilians screened requested asylum in GVN-controlled areas.

#### Chieu Hoi Returnees

The Chieu Hoi returnee rate in I CTZ decreased somewhat during the month, with 248 former enemy rallying to the GVN. Paramount among the reasons for this reduction (99 less than October) were the general withdrawal of enemy combat units in northern I CTZ and the lull in enemy initiated activity throughout the rest of the tactical zone. Nonetheless, the November defections brought the 1968 total to 2,831 -- 11% greater than the 2,539 returnees for all 1967.

Also during the month, 12 NVA soldiers defected in I CTZ, bringing to 111 the NVA defections this year. The 1968 total at end-November is more than five times greater than the 22 NVA defections in I CTZ all last year.

The following graphs display the Chieu Hoi returnee and NVA defection rates in I CTZ since November 1967.

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
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
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## CHIEU HOI RETURNEES - I CTZ

CHIEU HOI RETURNEES



NVA DEFECTIONS



One reason for the continued high level of defections is low enemy morale, which, according to returnee interrogations, is produced by shortages of foodstuffs and medical supplies, and constant pressure by III MAF and ARVN operations. Nguyen Van Kim, an NVA soldier who defected to the GVN from the 36th Regiment in Quang Nam, said his battalion lost at least 20 men to artillery fires and air strikes between 28 October and 3 November.

Enemy commanders, realizing low morale leads to desertion, counter, with threats of death, defection tendencies smoldered by US/GVN psychological appeals. Than Cong Que, a 14-year-old guerrilla who rallied in Quang Tri, stated members of his platoon had been threatened with decapitation if they were caught with Chieu Hoi literature. Thirteen-year-old rallier Vo Duc, also a former Quang Tri guerrilla, said some of his comrades desired to rally but their activities were scrutinized too closely.

#### ARVN Support for Revolutionary Development

ARVN revolutionary development support operations in I CTZ were concentrated during the month in Quang Nam province. One operation in particular (HUNG QUANG 12-5) contributed substantially to the progress of the campaign.

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
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Conducted by the 51st Regiment in the rice-producing lowlands ten miles south of Danang (in the same area as 1st Marine Division Operation MEADE RIVER), HUNG QUANG 12-5 by end-month had accounted for 240 enemy killed, 24 taken prisoner, and 43 weapons captured.


In total, ARVN units conducted 28 RD support operations, netting 291 enemy killed, 42 prisoners, and 72 weapons. November operations and results are displayed in relation to those since November 1967 in the following graphs.

### ACHIEVEMENTS OF ARVN UNITS IN SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT


OPERATIONS CONDUCTED




ENEMY KILLED



ENEMY CAPTURED



WEAPONS CAPTURED



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Pacification

During the month, more than 7,000 Vietnamese civilians were added to the secure population in III MAF pacification areas. This brought to a record 846,869 the number of Vietnamese residing in the 93 villages rated 60% secure or higher on the III MAF scale. This increase is in consonance with the progress in the pacification program which, since mid-Summer, has been reflecting gradual improvement. Since June, some 60,000 people have been included in the III MAF secure category -- an increase in excess of seven percent.

On the following pages are maps of the five III MAF pacification areas, displaying the security status of the nearly 1.4 million Vietnamese civilians residing in the 217 villages included in established III MAF regions.


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## PACIFICATION STATUS - NORTHERN I CTZ



★ Province capital

PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68
Under 20%	48	144	95	2,643	24,179	2,643	2	15	8
20%	—	38	38	—	3,741	3,741	—	2	2
40%	66	27	29	27,926	13,908	17,230	9	3	4
60%	92	32	29	21,669	14,263	20,292	9	4	4
80%	56	34	29	22,035	24,708	32,404	4	2	3
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	282	275	220	74,273	80,799	76,310	24	26	21


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# PACIFICATION STATUS - PHU BAI AREA



★ Province capital


PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68
Under 20%	35	35	—	11,199	11,199	—	11	11	—
20%	17	17	17	2,879	2,879	2,879	1	1	1
40%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
60%	80	54	90	39,615	33,756	61,260	5	5	7
80%	30	56	136	18,504	23,873	38,219	5	5	7
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	162	162	243	72,197	71,707	102,358	22	22	15

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# PACIFICATION STATUS - DANANG AREA



★ Province capital

PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68
Under 20%	638	665	201	189,748	204,680	166,159	43	45	34
20%	71	73	60	65,762	70,634	54,584	14	15	11
40%	40	58	57	35,416	48,987	45,068	9	12	11
60%	105	104	154	105,556	109,524	149,548	19	19	28
80%	194	148	123	426,722	391,920	382,942	27	21	18
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	1,048	1,048	595	823,204	825,745	798,301	112	112	102

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
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PACIFICATION STATUS - CHU LAI AREA



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
PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68
Under 20%	206	248	257	79,171	87,386	76,784	20	23	21
20%	46	55	94	25,675	39,226	49,518	5	6	10
40%	111	133	104	68,280	74,441	57,927	10	11	9
60%	57	100	101	51,565	74,312	82,722	11	15	16
80%	126	12	9	57,348	11,058	6,178	11	2	1
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	548	548	565	282,039	286,423	273,129	57	57	57

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## PACIFICATION STATUS - DUC PHO AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68	NOV 67	MAY 68	NOV 68
Under 20%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20%	31	23	31	21,250	28,810	15,835	5	4	4
40%	58	45	63	45,023	29,246	57,377	7	6	9
60%	63	77	77	32,996	40,404	54,697	5	6	6
80%	10	17	17	24,705	16,183	18,607	2	3	3
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	162	162	188	123,974	114,643	146,516	19	19	22

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BASE DEFENSE

During November, III MAF's base defense system proved successful in thwarting enemy attempts to launch sustained rocket attacks against major I CTZ bases. With NVA and main force units denied the capability of mounting large scale ground attacks, and with the freedom to conduct sustained rocket or mortar attacks blocked by III MAF's intensive counterrocket and small unit operations, enemy efforts directed against I CTZ bases were largely restricted to harassing, long-range attacks-by-fire. Despite the relatively light damage caused III MAF installations by these rocket attacks, some measure of propaganda return is accrued by the enemy among both the urban and rural populace. In order to maintain these propaganda returns, and in hope of inflicting serious damage to III MAF's support apparatus, the enemy has committed considerable amounts of men and materiel in pursuit of a more effective rocket capability.

Committed to the base attack effort in Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces are the 368B and 68B Artillery (Rocket) Regiments. The former, with three battalions, and the latter with two, constitute a combined total of almost 2,000 enemy soldiers dedicated to the task of periodically attempting penetration of major I CTZ base areas. Of the two regiments, the 368B has been the most active since its arrival in Quang Nam and is thought to be responsible for most, if not all, of the rocket attacks against the Danang complex. Formed in January 1966, the regiment, except for the 1st Battalion, which infiltrated South Vietnam in early September 1966, underwent intensive training during the remainder of the year.

Concurrent with the establishment of the 368B Regiment was the formation of D. 99, a 140mm rocket battalion. This unit, ordered to infiltrate South Vietnam on 22 May 1966, arrived at a predesignated assembly area in Quang Nam province during September. Little was heard of D. 99 until 27 February 1967, when it launched the first rocket attack of the war against the Danang Air Base, apparently signaling

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
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departure of the 2d and 3d Battalions and the headquarters element of the 368B Regiment from their staging area in the north; on 1 March they commenced moving into South Vietnam. Armed with 36 122mm rocket launchers and 180 122mm rocket rounds, the regiment arrived in late May at a preselected assembly area near Happy Valley, west of Danang. At this time, the D. 99 Battalion was absorbed into the 368B Regiment, and assumed the 1st Battalion designation.

The 68B Artillery Regiment, believed to have operated primarily in Quang Tin province, commenced infiltration south in April 1967 with two battalions, the 1st and 3d, arriving in an area west of Hiep Duc in August. Since its arrival in Quang Tin province, this regiment remained relatively inactive compared with the 368B Regiment; however, it has been credited with rocket attacks against the Chu Lai Air Base. The 3d Battalion has recently moved north, into Quang Nam province.

Since February 1967, a total of 99 rocket attacks, varying in intensity from two to 66 rounds, have been credited to 368B and 68B rocket units. The graph below depicts the number of such attacks and the rounds fired against major I CTZ bases since February 1967.

### ENEMY ROCKET ATTACKS AGAINST MAJOR I CTZ BASES FEB 1967 - NOV 1968



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According to NVA Lieutenant Haynh Bon (a former supply officer of the 222d Battalion, 220th Transportation Regiment who defected to the GVN on 27 November), the 368B Regiment, along with other Front 4 (Group 44) organizations, is provided eight to ten tons of supplies daily by the 559th Transportation Group through an intricate network of roads, trails, and way-stations from North Vietnam, through Laos and A Shau, with ultimate destinations at cache sites in western Quang Nam. After the supplies have been moved by truck to the roadhead some 15 miles southeast of A Shau, transportation to distribution points is then effected by Lieutenant Bon's former unit through various modes, including bicycles, elephants, sampans, and civilian laborers. To ensure the security of these supplies and their routes, the enemy has developed a unique system, whereby civilian laborers are conscripted from the local populace, and employed along only a small segment of each route. This ensures that the origin and ultimate destination, as well as the route used, is known only to enemy cadre.

The probable supply routes traversed by Group 559 (discussed in the September edition of this publication) and the locations of using rocket elements in Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces, are shown on the following page.

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The map illustrates the operational area of the 368th and 688th Rocket Regiments in North Vietnam. Key features include:

- Geographical Context:** The map shows the borders of North Vietnam (NVN) to the north, Laos to the west, and the provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin.
- Supply and Movement:** Solid arrows indicate probable supply routes from NVN, while dashed arrows show rocket movements towards Danang. Shaded areas represent probable storage or distribution points.
- Units and Locations:**
  - 368th Rocket Regiment:** Includes the 3d Bn 368B, 1st Bn 368B, and 2d Bn 368B, located near Thua Thien and Quang Nam.
  - 688th Rocket Regiment:** Includes the 3d Bn 688B, 688B Rkt Regt, and 1st Bn 688B, located near Quang Nam and Quang Tin.
  - Cities and Towns:** Ashau, Hue, Danang, Thua Thien, Thua Duc, Hoi An, Kham Duc, and Tam Ky are marked.
- Range Data:**
  - Range of 122mm rocket: 12,000 yds (near Danang).
  - Range of 140mm rocket: 9,700 yds (near Danang).
- Scale and Legend:** A scale bar indicates distances in kilometers (0, 10, 20). The legend defines the symbols for supply routes, rocket movements, and storage points.

In order to move their weapons within range of Danang, enemy rocketeers are forced to run a gauntlet of reconnaissance units screening the hinterlands, and larger Marine units ringing the Danang area, as well as the close-in small units operating within the rocket belt itself. Consequently, the movement of rockets and launchers has proved to be both an arduous and costly task for the enemy. For example, during November alone, Marine reconnaissance teams, positioned to monitor and interdict enemy movement in the hinterlands, killed over 400 enemy, while Marine small unit operations interlacing the rocket belt accounted for 140 more. Interwoven throughout all elements of base defense activities was the extensive use of supporting arms; in the Danang area, for example, almost 800 tons of ordnance were delivered against 366 likely rocket positions in the rocket belt by more than 300 Marine fixed wing attack sorties.

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The first enemy move against the I CTZ bases in November occurred at 0110 on the morning of the 17th, when, after three weeks of relatively dry weather in which to deploy, the enemy fired eight 122mm rockets at the deep water pier at Da-nang. Although all but one of the rockets missed the pier and impacted in the bay, casualties were substantial, with five civilian stevedores killed and 16 wounded.

A summary of the other enemy efforts against III MAF installations in November is displayed in the chart below.

### ENEMY EFFORTS AGAINST III MAF BASES: NOVEMBER 1968

DATE	TIME	INSTALLATION	TYPE ATTACK	CASUALTIES	MATERIAL DAMAGE
<b>DANANG</b>					
17 Nov	0110	NSA Deep Water Pier	8-122mm rkts	1 U. S. Merchant Marine, 2 Korean laborers, 2 VN civ KIA; 2 USN, 3 US civ, 6 Korean laborers, 5 VN civ WIA	None
17 Nov	0455	Air Base	3-140mm rkts	None	None
17 Nov	0500	Air Base	6-122mm rkts	None	None
19 Nov	2305	FLC	13-122mm rkts	1 USMC KIA, 1 WIA	Post Office building damaged, 4 vehicles damaged
20 Nov	0020	III MAF Storage Dump	6-122mm rkts	None	Minor damage
20 Nov	0025	ARVN Ammo Dump	6-122mm rkts	None	1 small fire, minor damage
20 Nov	0035	China Beach Road	12-122mm rkts	None	None
20 Nov	0050	NSA Hospital	3 rds 82mm mtr	None	None
21 Nov	0728	1st MarDiv HQ	10-140mm rkts	2 USA KIA, 1 USA and 4 USMC WIA	1 helicopter and 2 vehicles destroyed, 1 helicopter damaged
22 Nov	0245	1st MAW HQ	3 unk type rkts	None	None
24 Nov	2320	Air Base	10-122mm rkts	2 VN RF WIA	ARVN helicopter pad cratered
30 Nov	0050	FLC	5-122mm rkts	None	None
30 Nov	0330	FLC	4-122mm rkts	None	None
<b>MARBLE MOUNTAIN</b>					
20 Nov	0045	MAG-16	20 rds 82mm mtr	2 USMC WIA	11 CH-46, 2 UH-1E, 2 UH-34 damaged (limited)
25 Nov	0115	MAG-16	8-122mm rkts	None	5 OV-10A damaged (1 substantial, 4 limited), 3 UH-1 damaged (limited)
25 Nov	0115	Special Forces Camp	2-122mm rkts	1 CIDG WIA	1 guardhouse destroyed
<b>CHU LAI</b>					
25 Nov	0248	Air Base	3-122mm rkts	None	None
<b>DONG HA/CUA VIET</b>					
1 Nov	1130	Dong Ha Combat Base	62-130mm Arty	1 USMC, 1 ARVN, 2 VN civ WIA	10 vehicles, 2 forklifts, 1 messhall damaged; 1 electronics maintenance shop destroyed
1 Nov	0800	Cua Viet Combat Base	10-130mm Arty	None	None

Note: In general, substantial damage to an aircraft necessitates repair beyond local capability, while limited damage is repairable by organic maintenance personnel.

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Among the more significant results emanating from III MAF's counterrocket activities were:

-Elements of the 7th Marines, patrolling the area six and one-half miles southwest of Danang, found twenty 140mm rockets at 1045 on the 17th. Fifteen of the rockets were emplaced on launching ramps constructed of mud and bamboo, while the other five were found buried nearby. Almost simultaneously, a rocket inspection team from the 11th Marines uncovered another launch site 300 meters to the southeast. This site consisted of 48 mud ramps, positioned in six groups of eight ramps each, as well as another twenty 140mm rockets.

-Shortly after daylight on the 21st, an observation post at the 7th Marines Regimental headquarters reported enemy rockets being launched from a position along the Tuy Loan river, eight miles west-southwest of Danang. Within two minutes after the rockets were launched, Marine artillery batteries in the area had commenced counterrocket fire on the site. A short time later, a platoon of Company K, 7th Marines, moving to the area by helicopter, captured two wounded NVA gunners and found another six killed by artillery fire. A search of the area disclosed 20 mud ramps, an assortment of firing devices, and two rifles, left by the enemy in their haste to escape the counterbattery fire.

In sum, the enemy has committed approximately 16% of his total combat strength in central I CTZ in an attempt to achieve an effective rocket capability. With his freedom to deploy these forces curtailed by III MAF's continuous patrolling, and faced with immediate massed counter-rocket fire, the enemy has met with only limited success in his rocket endeavors. He does, however, retain the capability of launching harassing attacks of relatively short duration.

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AIR OPERATIONS

Fixed wing pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during November flew 7,207 combat and combat support sorties in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Laos. Of this total, 6,060 were flown over South Vietnam, 909 over Laos, and 238 over or off-shore North Vietnam. Additionally, Marine helicopter pilots of the wing and the two Special Landing Forces flew 60,374 sorties and transported 112,411 passengers and 12,426 tons of cargo in support of III MAF, ARVN, ROK Marine, and US Special Forces operating within I CTZ.

Halting of Offensive Operations in North Vietnam

At 2100H (Saigon time) on 1 November, American forces discontinued all air strikes, artillery fire, and naval bombardment of North Vietnam (including the DMZ) and the NVN-claimed 12 miles of territorial waters off its coast. Though operations in South Vietnam and Laos were not affected, overflight of North Vietnam and the DMZ by strike forces enroute to and from Laotian targets was prohibited.

This cessation of operations against North Vietnam required modification of the existing rules of engagement. Basically, entry into North Vietnam's air space or its contiguous territorial seas, by American forces, was authorized in response to hostile acts and in pursuit of any vessel or aircraft whose actions indicated with reasonable certainty that it was operating in support of the VC/NVA insurgency in South Vietnam. Further, counteractions against enemy forces attacking across the DMZ were authorized, as were those actions by ground, air, or naval forces necessary to silence enemy small arms, artillery, mortar, rocket, SAM, or anti-aircraft fire from within or north of the DMZ. On 29 November, authority was granted to destroy SAM and anti-aircraft artillery weapons, installations, and immediate supporting facilities in North Vietnam, south of the 19th parallel, which fire at our aircraft over Laos.

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Fixed Wing Operations-In-Country Operations

The 1 November bombing halt had virtually no effect on the total number of sorties flown in support of I CTZ-based friendly forces, as US Navy, Marine, and Air Force strike aircraft flew 7,372 sorties in I CTZ during the month -- just 22 more than the 7,350 flown in October.

Marine aviators, due partly to the bombing halt in the North but mostly to the improved weather prevailing in the area, increased their support of III MAF, ARVN, and ROK Marines operating in I CTZ to 6,060 sorties, a 13% rise over the 5,349 flown in October. Of these 6,060 sorties, 4,778 were combat sorties; the remaining 1,282 were classified as combat support.

Concurrently with this increased Marine air activity, aircraft of the US Seventh Fleet, their operations in North Vietnam now restricted, directed 654 sorties against targets in I CTZ -- a significant increase over the 72 provided during October. Off-setting this increased Navy and Marine effort, however, Air Force support in I CTZ decreased to 658 sorties during the month as compared to the 1,929 flown in October.


The graph on the following page portrays the I CTZ support provided by Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft over the past three months.

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## AIR SUPPORT IN I CTZ: SEP - NOV 68



While conducting the 4,778 combat sorties in close and direct support of tactically engaged units on the ground, and in interdiction of enemy lines of communication in I CTZ, Marine pilots delivered 7,340 tons of bombs, 14,245 rockets, and 2,448 napalm canisters against enemy targets throughout I CTZ. The placement of this aerial firepower resulted in more than 140 confirmed enemy killed, 1,002 structures, 486 bunkers, 21 weapons positions, and six bridges destroyed, and 179 secondary explosions and 145 secondary fires.

#### - Close Air Support

A portion of the damage assessment cited above is highlighted in the following examples of the fixed wing support provided to large unit and counter guerrilla operations, and interdiction of enemy activity within the DMZ.

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-Shortly after noon on 11 November, two A-4C's of Marine Attack Squadron-121 were directed to the support of ARVN elements attacking a numerically superior insurgent force about six miles northeast of Quang Ngai City. The Marine pilots, flying in close support of the ARVN unit, delivered nine 500-pound bombs against the enemy positions, accounting for 15 killed, 14 structures and two bunkers destroyed, and one secondary fire. On the 12th, just one mile north of this action, two F-4B pilots of Marine Aircraft Group-13, again flying in close support of friendly elements, accounted for an additional ten VC killed and four structures destroyed.

-Examplifying the effects of supporting arms fire against sightings of enemy activity in the DMZ (authorized by the supplementary rules of engagement) were results of a Marine air and artillery attack against an enemy target five miles northeast of Con Thien on 16 November. An aerial observer directed coordinated strikes against the enemy complex, resulting in 21 NVA killed, 16 bunkers destroyed, and six secondary explosions.


-At 1535 on 19 November, two A-4E's of Marine Attack Squadron-311 flew a mission in close support of Marines operating in the Dai Loc corridor. Expending sixteen 250-pound bombs and four napalm canisters against the enemy positions, located ten miles south-southeast of Danang, the Marine pilots destroyed four structures and forced the surrender of 30 Viet Cong to the friendly ground forces.

The following graphs depict the in-country combat and combat support sorties flown, and the amount of ordnance delivered, by Marine pilots since June 1968.

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## IN-COUNTRY FIXED WING SUPPORT BY MARINE AIRCRAFT: JUN-NOV 68

-Out-of-Country Operations

With the 1 November cessation of air strikes over North Vietnam, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's out-of-country effort was focused, and commensurately increased, against enemy sanctuaries and lines of communication in the Laotian panhandle. By end-month, Marine pilots had registered 1,147 combat and combat support sorties in North Vietnam or Laos as opposed to 1,513 flown in October. Of this total, 909 sorties were flown in Laos, nearly doubling the previous monthly high of 490 recorded in January 1967. The remaining 238 sorties were flown over the southern portion of North Vietnam or its adjacent waters. All of the strike sorties - 62 - against North Vietnam targets were flown on 1 November prior to the bombing halt. The balance of these sorties were combat air patrol flights in support of the Seventh Fleet.

Helicopter Operations

There was a slight decrease in the number of helicopter sorties flown by pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Special Landing Forces Alfa and Bravo - 60,374 in November as compared to 61,259 in October. Very minor declines were also noted in the number of passengers and cargo ton-

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
nage helilifted in November - 112,411 and 12,426 respectively. Included in these monthly figures were the 5,344 sorties flown and the 12,714 passengers and 657 tons of cargo hauled by the pilots assigned to the two SLF's.

Again, as in October, a plurality of the helicopter missions flown was for the helilift of troops and supplies to tactical units in the field (23,469 sorties). Casualty evacuation, command and control, reconnaissance, tactical air recovery, and tactical air coordinator (airborne) missions were also included in the type of flights by wing and SLF pilots.

Of the 55,030 helicopter sorties flown by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing pilots, 3,196 (5.8%) were in direct support of other than Marine forces (ROKMC - 2,618; US Special Forces - 293; US Army - 181; ARVN - 104).

The following graph depicts the total monthly support provided by Marine helicopters during the past 12 months.

MARINE HELICOPTER SORTIES: DEC 67 - NOV 68



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Crew, Passenger, and Aircraft Losses

In November, seven Marine aircraft were lost in combat operations in I CTZ. The mishaps, involving three fixed wing aircraft (two F-4's and one A-4) and four helicopters (two CH-46's, one UH-1E, and one UH-34) claimed the lives of six crew members and three passengers. The loss of all seven was attributed to enemy ground fire.

In addition to those aircraft lost, three OV-10A's and four helicopters received substantial to minor damage from enemy fire during the month.

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LOGISTICS

For the first month since August, the weather had little effect on logistic operations in I CTZ. While the monsoon was still in evidence during November, rainfall was measured in tenths of inches rather than the inches and feet recorded in September and October. The tempo of enemy activity against logistic facilities and lines of communication was moderate, and logistic functions were maintained at a steady pace.

Logistic Support at Vandegrift Combat Base

A new concept in Logistic Support Area (LSA) control procedures is being implemented at Vandegrift combat base to support tactical units operating in the western sector of the 3d Marine Division area of operations. The approach, new for inland logistic support operations, involves the presence at the LSA landing zone of a Logistics Operations Bunker (operating in the same manner as a Tactical Logistic Group during an amphibious operation) to ensure effective coordination of logistic support for tactical operations. The efforts of the logistic center are coordinated by Task Force Hotel, in conjunction with logistic representatives of supported battalions and regiments. One important aspect of this technique is the establishment of landing zone control procedures for the orderly assembly and delivery of a daily average of several hundred thousand pounds of cargo, primarily by helicopter, to the Marine units operating in the mountainous, jungle terrain in northwestern Quang Tri province.

Construction of III MAF Transient Facility

Construction progressed rapidly during November on the III MAF Transient Facility, located on Freedom Hill (Hill 327), two and one-half miles west of the Danang Air Base. This project, a joint effort by civilian contractor and naval construction forces, will provide 85,000 square feet of berthing, messing, and processing facilities for personnel reporting to and departing from III MAF, and awaiting and returning from Rest and Recreation (R&R) flights. Contractor effort includes site preparation for all structures, installation of utilities, and construction of a mess hall and two terminal buildings, each consisting of three 40 X 100 feet Butler buildings. Seabees will erect 30 Southeast

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


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Asia huts and eight 2-story, 130-man, wood frame barracks. Work on the project was initiated in early October, with completion of the R&R portion of the installation projected by 1 January 1969, and the transient terminal and mess hall scheduled for completion shortly thereafter.

The III MAF Transient Facility processes approximately 20,000 personnel per month, and often, administrative demands and transportation availability require a small number of personnel to remain overnight in Danang. The new installation will improve facilities for personnel in this status, as well as providing a reception and staging center for R&R personnel. During the first ten months of this year, 107,121 R&R-bound personnel from all services in I CTZ were administered by the III MAF R&R processing center. The out-of-country R&R centers and the number of personnel from I CTZ visiting them during the first ten months of 1968 are depicted on the map below.

#### LOCATION OF OUT-OF-COUNTRY R&R CENTERS



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Communication Equipment

On 25 November, approval was granted by the Commandant of the Marine Corps for the establishment of a fourth echelon (depot level) maintenance facility for the AN/TRC-97 multi-channel radio at the Force Logistic Command. This is of particular importance, since sixteen 24 channel and twelve 12 channel AN/TRC-97's were delivered to III MAF during October. Used to provide point-to-point communication between III MAF major subordinate commands, there are now 56 AN/TRC-97's in the III MAF inventory. It is estimated that the establishment of this facility will immediately reduce, by approximately 50%, the number of modules presently requiring evacuation to CONUS for fourth echelon repair at the factory and, as the maintenance capability matures, the necessity for fourth echelon evacuation will be removed.

Another program to improve the maintenance posture of communications equipment was instituted in November, with the receipt of 18 Model 28 teletype components, provided by Headquarters, FMFPac with the assistance of Naval Communication Station, Honolulu. The Model 28 is the primary teletype used by the major III MAF communication centers and, with the newly received items, sufficient assets are available to effect an on-the-spot exchange of serviceable equipment for components requiring maintenance, thus eliminating lengthy out-of-service delays.

155mm Howitzer, M-109

Initial shipments of eight late-production models of the self-propelled, tracked, M-109 155mm Howitzer arrived at Danang during November, as partial replacement for an earlier version of the same weapon, currently fired by III MAF units. The new model of this highly mobile, general support weapon incorporates modifications and refinements developed since placing the M-109 Howitzer into service, and receipt of scheduled replacements will make it unnecessary to establish a rebuild program for the older models. Twelve additional replacement M-109's have been shipped from CONUS,

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two of which have arrived at the 3d Force Service Regiment, Okinawa for further shipment to Danang. The remaining ten are scheduled to arrive in Danang during the first week of December. These 20 weapons, plus one already in RVN, will replace the older models in the 12th Marines and in the Force Logistic Command's maintenance float. Twenty-four more howitzers, required for exchange of the other M-109's in the III MAF Marine inventory, are scheduled for shipment from CONUS during December. Currently, it is planned that the replacement of the M-109 Howitzers will be completed during January 1969.

#### Motor Transport

The capability of motor transport support for logistic operations in northern I CTZ was enhanced by the repositioning of certain motor transport units during the month. The 7th Motor Transport Battalion was reassigned from Danang to Force Logistic Support Group, Bravo (FLSG-B) at Dong Ha/Quang Tri, and Truck Company Bravo of the Force Logistic Command was relocated from FLSG-B to FLC, Danang. The arrival in northern I CTZ of the 7th Motor Transport Battalion and its 98 M54 5-ton trucks and 30 M52 5-ton tractors and trailers raised to 352 the total number of Marine vehicles available in the three motor transport battalions in support of III MAF units north of the Hai Van pass.

The location, in I CTZ, of the III MAF Marine motor transport battalions and their major items of rolling stock are shown on the map on the following page.


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## III MAF MARINE MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALIONS - 30 NOV 1968

Aviation Logistics

The current SHOEHORN (installation of defensive electronic countermeasures) modification program was terminated on 5 November when work on the last F-4 scheduled for modification was completed at Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan. Currently, there are 45 F-4B's in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) with SHOEHORN equipment installed. Consummation of a proposed exchange of aircraft with carrier-based Navy squadrons in late January 1969, and deployment of a Marine F-4J squadron from CONUS during April 1969, will further improve the defensive electronic countermeasure status in 1st MAW squadrons, as the replacement aircraft will be SHOEHORN-equipped.

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-Mk H-7 Ejection Seat

Still in progress at NAS, Atsugi is a program to replace ejection seats in all Marine F-4B aircraft with the new Mk H-7 ejection seat. Initiated in June as part of the Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) cycle, this project requires 300 man-hours per aircraft and is expected to take 18 months to complete. At end-month, approximately one-third of the 95 Marine F-4B's in WestPac had been modified. Advantages provided by the new rocket-launched seat over the cartridge-catapulted model being replaced include the capability of ejection and successful recovery from ground level and zero air speed (as compared to the 135 knots forward air speed necessary for the old type) and lower G-force on ejection, designed to reduce back injuries associated with previous seats. Concurrent with the installation of the new seat, a command sequence mode is being incorporated, whereby the pilot may eject the radar operator. Due to the configuration of the F-4B, the visibility of the radar operator is somewhat restricted and, in cases requiring a split-second decision, the pilot can initiate the ejection, eliminating the verbal order previously necessary. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing crew members have thus far on two occasions ejected from F-4 aircraft equipped with the Mk H-7 ejection seat; the pilot and radar operator from each aircraft were successfully recovered.

At the end of November, 70 aircraft were undergoing Progressive Aircraft Rework at aircraft plants in Japan. Sixteen other aircraft were undergoing repair of battle damage at intermediate maintenance activities or repair facilities in Japan and the Philippines. The aircraft in these programs are listed on the next page.

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<u>ACFT</u>	<u>PAR</u>	<u>REPAIR OF BATTLE DAMAGE</u>
A-4	11	-
A-6A	-	1
F-4	10	6
RF-4B	2	-
C-1	-	1
US-2	1	-
O-1	1	1
UH-1	11	2
UH-34	4	2
CH-46	24	-
CH-53	$\frac{6}{70}$	$\frac{3}{16}$

NORS/NORM (not operationally ready due to supply/maintenance) data for selected Marine aircraft in III MAF are displayed on the following page.

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
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
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# NORS/NORM RATES - III MAF MARINE AIRCRAFT


A-4 (ATTACK)




F-4 (FIGHTER-ATTACK)




A-6A (ATTACK)




OV-10A (RECONNAISSANCE)\*




UH-34 (HELO)




UH-1E (HELO)



CH-46 (HELO)



CH-53A (HELO)\*



\*Readiness Objective not established.

— NORS — NORM — READY

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CONCLUSIONS

-The accelerated pacification campaign, carefully integrating the energy of both the US and GVN military and civilian resources in I CTZ, shows early promise of furthering the effectiveness of the Revolutionary Development program.

-Assiduously avoiding large-scale engagements since early summer, and now largely withdrawn to cross-border sanctuaries, the enemy can be expected to concentrate on harassing attacks-by-fire and intimidation of the civilian populace, while retaining a capability to augment his in-country forces in a matter of days.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS - NOVEMBER 19681. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLEa. DMZ/I CTZ Summary

On 30 November, the enemy strength in the DMZ/I CTZ region was estimated at approximately 86,000, some 5,000 less than at end-October. Included in this estimate were some 45,300 confirmed combat troops (38,500 NVA and 6,800 VC), nearly 2,000 confirmed NVA administrative personnel, almost 24,000 confirmed guerrillas, and over 14,700 troops in probable or possible units. The most significant new unit confirmation during the month was the 141st NVA Regiment (with its three battalions) in the Thuong Duc area southwest of Danang.

The enemy's disposition in the two northern provinces and the DMZ was altered considerably during the month, as most of his combat units relocated to base areas in the border regions and sanctuaries in North Vietnam and Laos. Although the number of frontline enemy infantry battalions within northern I CTZ has been reduced substantially (from 41 in October to 21 in November), there still remain at least 30 infantry battalions, supported by as many as 13 artillery battalions, just cross-border from Quang Tri and Thua Thien, capable of augmenting the in-country force in a matter of days.


In Quang Nam, Front 4 (formerly designated Group 44) continued to maneuver its combat elements in anticipation of a future assault against Danang -- a target yet to be penetrated. Farther south, in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai, enemy forces concentrated on harassing attacks, mining of LOC's, and intimidation of the civilian population; contact with large combat units was limited to scattered engagements.

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General locations of enemy infantry battalions in the DMZ/I CTZ region, as of 30 November, are displayed on the map below. The four maps following depict the deployment of confirmed enemy units in the five provinces and the DMZ area.

### ENEMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ/DMZ AREA - NOVEMBER 1968




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## b. DMZ/Quang Tri Province

Despite the enemy's general withdrawal, the threat of coordinated and well-supported attacks against III MAF and ARVN installations persists, with nearly 34,000 enemy troops estimated either within, or on the periphery of, I CTZ's northern province. Of these, approximately 16,700 are confirmed combat troops, some 500 less than on 31 October.



★ Province capital

\* The DMZ area includes that portion of Quang Tri province which lies north of Route 9, the DMZ itself, and the Vinh Linh Special Zone in North Vietnam. NVA units operating in this vicinity, or under the control of the B-5 Front headquarters, are considered DMZ AREA UNITS.

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
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c. Thua Thien Province

Friendly operations in Thua Thien, although meeting negligible resistance, continued to uncover large caches of food, ordnance, and medical supplies from repositories in the hinterlands. As the month closed, the strength of confirmed combat units in the province was estimated at about 9,000 (1,400 less than on 31 October); however, with the inclusion of personnel in administrative, guerrilla, and probable or possible units, the end-month strength rose to approximately 11,800.



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
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d. Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces

The enemy again concentrated near Danang, with Front 4 attempting to mass an assault force in the lowlands south of the city. The effort was rendered ineffective, however, by Operation MEADE RIVER, which entrapped elements of three NVA regiments during the last half of the month. Contact with the enemy in Quang Tin was characterized by sporadic small unit engagements. At end-month, the enemy strength estimate in central I CTZ was nearly 24,000, over half (about 12,300) of which were in confirmed combat units.



★ Province capital

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
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e. Quang Ngai Province

Contact with the enemy in Quang Ngai was sporadic, limited to fleeting engagements with small units. Enemy activity was characterized by guerrilla tactics, directed primarily against GVN facilities and the local citizenry. The end-month estimate of enemy strength in confirmed Quang Ngai units was roughly 16,300, including approximately 7,300 combat troops, 600 administrative personnel, and 8,400 guerrillas.



★ Province capital

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2. ENEMY LOSSES IN I CTZ

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
<u>Enemy losses to III MAF/SLF</u>			
By Marines	1,042	144	234
Monthly III MAF/SLF	2,436	377	592
Total			
1968 III MAF/SLF	56,449	2,620	21,059
Total			

Enemy losses to other forces

By ROKMC	224	8	85
By RVNAF	1,543	391	739
By Special Forces/CIDG	49	6	12
Monthly Total	1,816	405	836
I CTZ Monthly Total	4,252	782	1,428
1968 Total	85,185	6,399	31,734

3. MARINE/SLF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>November 1968</u>		<u>Cumulative 1968 Total</u>
8,282	Patrols	122,366
3,649	Ambushes	52,633
88	Company operations	1,017
521	Sniper posts	3,792
4	Battalion operations	23*
7	Regimental or larger operations	25*
7,207	Combat/combat support sorties	83,584
60,374	Helicopter sorties	610,150


\*Since monthly figures include operations continued from previous months, they are not used to compute cumulative totals.

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## 4. US AIRCRAFT BASED AT MAJOR I CTZ AIRFIELDS AS OF 30 NOV 1968



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5. MARINE CIVIC ACTION

<u>November 1968</u>		<u>Cumulative 1968 Total</u>
133,038	Persons given medical treatment	1,081,691
1,486	Persons given dental treatment	36,679
485	Persons given medical or dental training	2,484
266,057	Pounds of food distributed	1,419,347
6,946	Pounds of soap distributed	83,224
2,965	Pounds of clothing distributed	81,807
354	Critically ill civilians evacuated	4,947
1,019	English language classes conducted	6,370
\$23,095	Cash donations	\$96,046
532,114	Persons fed	2,836,508
1,062	Students supported	13,210
94	Construction projects	989

6. III MAF STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Danang	2,920	42,182	255	1,838	284	1,896
Chu Lai	481	5,196	21	104	1,602	18,026
Duc Pho	-	-	-	-	223	4,317
Phu Bai	370	3,275	10	72	1,918	19,260
Quang Tri	613	5,828	90	569	386	5,396
DMZ area	827	18,604	66	554	313	3,994
Totals	5,211	75,085	442	3,137	4,726	52,889

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7. LOGISTICSa. Supply levels at end of periodClass I(1000 of rations/  
days of supply)

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Dong Ha/Quang Tri</u>
MCI rations	214/5	818/18
B rations	198/5	762/23
A rations	155/4	66/2

Class III and IIIA (Bulk) (Marine Corps Owned)(1000 gals/days  
of supply)

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
JP-4	-	98/5	44/6
AVGAS	-	31/10	30/30
MOGAS	75/7	-	-
DIESEL	75/4	-	-

<u>Class V and VA</u>	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
Ground Ammunition (days of supply)	45	45	45	45

Aviation Ordnance - Stocks maintained within CINCPAC allocations.

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b. Class II Supply Requisitions

	<u>FLC</u>	<u>3dFSR</u>
Processed	48,285	30,553
Fill Rate	49%	41%
Obligations on hand at end-month	84,175	29,576

c. Resupply Status(1) Surface Shipping Status (all I CTZ) 39,599 M/T

Received from CONUS (15,865 M/T)

Received from intra-WestPac (23,734 M/T)

(2) Air Shipping Status 816 S/T

Received from CONUS (253 S/T)

Received from intra-WestPac (563 S/T)

d. Resupply Status Within RVN(1) Surface Shipping Status 112,294 S/T

Danang to Chu Lai (40,535 S/T)

Danang to Hue/Phu Bai (31,584 S/T)

Danang to Dong Ha/Cua Viet (40,175 S/T)

(2) Fixed Wing Shipping Status (USMC and PACAF) 3,623 S/T

Danang to Chu Lai (287 S/T)

Danang to Phu Bai (147 S/T)

Danang to Dong Ha (1,336 S/T)

Other intra-I CTZ APOE's (1,853 S/T)

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e. Cargo Shipped out of RVN(1) Surface

13,404 M/T

MSTS Conventional Vessels (12,429 M/T)

Roll On/Roll Off Vessels (975 M/T)

(2) Air

246 S/T

USMC (137 S/T)

MAC (28 S/T)

PACAF (81 S/T)

f. Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN to 3dFSR 1,746

Items repaired at 3dFSR 153

Items returned to CONUS from 3dFSR 1,421  
or disposed of on Okinawag. Construction ProjectsRoads-123.1 miles were being  
upgraded.Bridges-Ten Class 60 bridges were  
repaired and ten Class 60  
bridges were under con-  
struction.Rafts and Ferries-Six rafts (one in the Chu  
Lai area, three in the  
Danang area, one in Dong  
Ha, and one in Hue) were  
in operation.

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h. Medical and Dental Services(1) Medical

Patients admitted to III MAF facilities	1,486
Battle injury (317)	
Non-battle injury (239)	
Disease (930)	
Evacuated out-of-country	304
Deaths in III MAF facilities	4
Returned to duty	675
Hospitalized as of 30 November	278

(2) Dental

Total Procedures	52,000
Operative, Crown, and Bridge	26,000
Prosthetics	640
Oral Surgery	4,800
Preventive Dentistry	12,400
Number of Sitzings	19,400

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