

DECLASSIFIED

SECRETHEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (8511)
NAVJG HQ 335b (REV. 3-67)

CONTROL NUMBER

COPY NO.

S901052 COM QTLY CRR-SYM MC3100-4 3D QT, FY69 30 MPAC 001510 1 41169

DOCUMENT
CONTROL
NUMBER

SUBJECT

PRI.

SEC.

NAVY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR

ORIGINATOR
CONTROL NO.

NO. CTS.

REC'D.

INDEXED

CLASS.

NO.

DATE

ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing

OPERATION CODE

X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE
AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE
OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION

F-FOR CONCURRENCE

G-FOR INFORMATION

H-RETURN TO _____

I- _____

J-DISPOSITION _____

DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS

(AGENCY HAVING PRIMARY INTEREST COMPLETE)

REQUEST FOR PERMANENT RETENTION (COPY) (BUCKTAG COPY)

RETAIN _____ MONTHS (Information material w/o historical value)

DESTROY AFTER ROUTING (No record or information value)

RETAIN BUCKTAG COPY PERMANENTLY IN FILE (Will be screened for further disposition
when due for retirement and transferred to Federal Records Center unless otherwise indicated.)DISTRIBUTE EXTRA COPIES TO _____

(If no distribution indicated, extra copies will be destroyed after 30 days.)

RTG.

OPR.
CODE

DATE

IN

OUT

INITIAL

ADDRESSEES

COMMANDANT

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

MILITARY SECY TO CMC

CHIEF OF STAFF

DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)

DC/S (MANPOWER)

DC/S (RD & S)

DC/S (AIR)

DC/S (ADMIN)

SECY OF GEN STAFF

G-1

G-2

G-3

G-4

DIRECTOR ADMIN.

DATA SYSTEMS

MCCC

FISCAL

INFORMATION

INSPECTION

PERSONNEL

POLICY ANALYSIS

RESERVE

SUPPLY

MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP

PROGRAMS

LEGISLATIVE REPORT DESTRUCTION TO HQ CLASSIFIED FILES SECT. (Code AB2)

JOINT PLANNING GROUP

JOINT CONTROL

COUNSEL

WOMEN MARINES

STAFF DENTAL

STAFF MEDICAL

STAFF CHAPLAIN

CLASSIFIED FILES

SECTION

SIGNATURE

ACTION OFFICE:

REMARKS (Entries to be signed and dated. For lengthy comments attach separate page and indicate
"Bucktag Comment Attached." Do not assign separate Control Number to Bucktag Comments.)*Trans. to Historical (HD)
Branch and retain
in definitely.***PERMANENT RETENTION**

Destruction to HQ Classified Files Sect. (Code AB2)

RETURN TO ABQ
UPON COMPLETION OF ROUTINGDO NOT DETACH—THIS FORM IS A PERMANENT
PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT IS
ATTACHEDMATERIAL
ATTACHED IS**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

34 QTY, FY 69 (16 Jan 69)

DECLASSIFIED



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO 96610

SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3/PHG/lsm

001510

JAN 16 1969

SECRET

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3)

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report (Report
Symbol MC 3100-4) for the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year
1969 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

Encl: (1) CG, 1st MarDiv (Rein), FMF ltr 3/AEI/mcg over
3000 Ser: 00353-68 of 12Dec68 (S)
(2) CG, 3d MarDiv (Rein), FMF ltr 3/PDL/dac over
3000 Ser: 003A32668 of 21Nov68 (S)
(3) CG, 5th MarDiv (-) (Rein), FMF ltr 3/CAS/jrf
over 3501 Ser: 00603-68 undtd (S)
(4) CG, 1st MAW, FMFPac ltr 3:ALW:rjs Ser: 03B332-68
of 28Nov68 (C)
(5) CG, 3d MAW, FMFPac ltr 3:JAT:bae over 1500 Ser:
003A33468 of 29Nov68 (S)
(6) CG, FLC, FMF ltr 3/LOC/glp over 3000 Ser: 0548-
68 of 23Nov68 (C)
(7) CG, 9th MAB, FMF ltr 3/cdh over 3000 Ser: 00551-
68 of 6Dec68 (S)
(8) CG, ForTrps, FMFPac ltr 3/RMH/gws over 3500/1
Ser: 0036/68 of 16Dec68 (S)
(9) CO, 3d FSR, FMFPac ltr 3/APS/mas over 3480 of
30Dec68 (U)
(10) CO, 5th FSR (-), FMF ltr 8/FWL/mjk Ser: 077-68
of 30Nov68 (C)
(11) CO, 1st MarBrig, FMF ltr 3/CH/rjm Ser: 0030-68
of 29Nov68 (S)
(12) CO, 1st RadBn (-), FMF ltr 3:LKR:gwn Ser: 00149-68
of 29Nov68 (S)
(13) CO, 1st ANGLICO, FMF ltr PLE/DFB:jtd over 5231/3500
Ser: 580-68 of 22Nov68 (S)

1. (U) In accordance with reference (a), the Commander's
Quarterly Combat Readiness Report for the Third Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1969 is submitted.

2. (s) Overall, the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific continues
to be a highly effective combat force. WestPac commands
are accomplishing their primary missions. Major deficiencies:

63
G-3
SECRET
S901052
No of Copies 12
12 JAN 21 1969
114 Jan 69

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

3/PHG/lsm

SECRET

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

of MidPac and EastPac forces, however, adversely affect their capabilities to fully respond to contingency plans. MidPac and EastPac commands continue to experience shortages in personnel, equipment and supplies. Until such time as sufficient assets are available with which to fulfill the requirements of these commands, as well as the requirements of commands with a greater priority, only gradual improvement can be expected.

3. (U) The self-evaluations of FMFPac commands reporting combat readiness are described in detail in enclosures (1) through (13). Comments on significant items reported in the enclosures follow.

4. (S) WestPac Forces

a. First Marine Division. The First Marine Division is capable of performing its assigned mission and will continue in a high state of readiness for the foreseeable future.

b. Third Marine Division. The Third Marine Division continues to be combat effective and will maintain a high state of readiness in the foreseeable future.

c. First Marine Aircraft Wing. The First Marine Aircraft Wing will continue to be capable of performing its assigned mission although personnel shortages and supply deficiencies will not allow an increase in aircraft readiness. This headquarters is aware of the deficiencies noted in enclosure (4) and every means of assistance is being provided.

d. Force Logistic Command. The Force Logistic Command/1st Force Service Regiment will continue to be capable of performing its mission.

e. Ninth MAB

(1) Communications Support Company. Information available at this headquarters indicates that this unit

SECRET

SECRET
3/PHG/lsm

SECRET

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

possesses its authorized equipment. The provision of equipment and personnel to deployed organizations is consistent with the mission of this unit. A T/E revision is currently under study at this Headquarters.

(2) MACS-8. The computer equipment associated with the MACS-8 MTDS was deployed to MACS-4 in RVN for use while the computer equipment of the latter squadron underwent field modification. This modification was completed during the last week of December 1968, and the equipment drawn from MACS-8 is being returned.

(3) MATCU-66. Authority was granted by COMNAVAIR-SYSCOM to deploy the AN/TPN-14 Tacan sets and associated PU-344 generators to MATCU-67 to support operations at An Hoa airfield in RVN. Replacement equipment will be provided at MATCU-66, when available, by the Director, Naval Electronics System Command, Western Division.

f. Third FSR. This unit will continue to provide the support necessary to ensure sustained logistic support to all FMF WestPac Forces.

5. (S) MidPac Forces

a. First Marine Brigade

(1) The personnel shortages addressed in enclosure (11) are recognized. Personnel input is being effected as rapidly as availability and overriding priorities of combat committed commands permit.

(2) It is anticipated that MAG-24 will become marginally combat ready (C-3) during the forthcoming quarter and BLT 1/27 will be able to accomplish limited reinforcing missions in spite of shortages of personnel and logistical deficiencies. ✓

(3) Logistic deficiencies derive from the priority of other forces on assets which are scarce. Appropriate requisitioning action has been taken to procure those items in which the 1st Marine Brigade is deficient, and the appropriate shortages have been reflected in MARES reports.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

3/PHG/lsm

SECRET

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

b. First ANGLICO. The limitation of the electronic maintenance capability of the 1st ANGLICO has been previously noted. Should the command be deployed in support of a contingency plan without the maintenance and test equipment presently deployed with Sub Unit-1, replacement equipment will be required.

c. First Radio Battalion (-). This command is capable of accomplishing its assigned mission.

6. (S) EastPac Forces

a. Fifth Marine Division. The relatively rapid recovery of the combat capability of RLT-27 units is largely due to the Priority 02 requisitioning authority authorized by CMC 311542Z/AUG68 (S). It is noted that logistic deficiencies specified in the evaluation of 5th Marine Division units are primarily related to equipment whose operation requires high repair parts support; e.g., tracked vehicles and engineer equipment. Requisitioning and MARES reporting actions pertinent to these deficient areas have been accomplished. However, no significant improvement is projected while units committed to combat continue to require the preponderance of available assets in support of their operations. ✓

b. Third Marine Aircraft Wing. No significant overall improvement in the logistic readiness of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing can be expected until it is provided a higher priority for existing assets or until additional assets become available.

c. Force Troops, FMFPac. This headquarters is aware of the shortfalls that exist in Force Troops Pacific capability to respond to contingency situations. Upon notification of alert for implementation of a contingency requirement, this headquarters will effect necessary adjustments or request augmentation from external sources, as appropriate.

d. Fifth FSR. FMFPac is aware of the possible deficiencies in 5th FSR contingency support capabilities in the event implementation of more than one plan is directed. Force adjustments will be directed within FMFPac assets or appropriate

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

3/PHG/lsm

SECRET

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

request for force augmentation will be initiated upon notification of alert for execution of a contingency plan or plans requiring support in excess of existing 5th FSR capabilities.

7. (C) During the forthcoming quarter, emphasis will be directed toward:

a. Continued logistic support, with all means available, to those forces in Vietnam committed to combat.

b. Continued close supervision of newly activated units to ensure that these units attain a combat ready posture.

c. Continued supply and maintenance discipline.

d. Continued evaluation of training to ensure that it reflects experience gained in Vietnam.



Copy to (w/o enclosures):

CG, 1st MarDiv
CG, 3d MarDiv
CG, 5th MarDiv
CG, 1st MAW
CG, 3d MAW
CG, FLC, FMF
CG, 9th MAB
CG, ForTrps, FMFPac
CO, 5th FSR, FMFPac
CO, 3d FSR, FMFPac
CO, 1st MarBrig, FMF
CO, 1st RADBN (-) FMF
CO, 1st ANGLICO

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

59 3058

Blow

3000

Ser:

29 DEC 1968

SECRET - Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence

00242168

**FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1st MarDiv ltr 3/AEL/mcg over 3000 Ser: 00353-68
of 12 Dec 68**

**From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific**

Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report 3d Quarter FY69 (MC 3000-11)

1. Forwarded.

C. W. Hoffman
C.W. HOFFMAN
BY DIRECTION

1st Mar Div

3d Qtr, FY-69

COPY NO 1 OF 12

SECRET

3

SECRET

Encl (1)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

S & C FILES
HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

68 4868/A

Copy 1 of 6 copies

3/ABT/mcg
3000
Ser: 00353-68
12 DEC 1968

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report 3d Quarter FY69 (MC 3000-11)

Ref: (a) MCC P3000.2B

1. In compliance with the instructions contained in reference (a), the subject report is forwarded.

PART I

1. The 1st Marine Division is fully combat ready (C1) within the personnel and training fields, however, the supply and equipment readiness is substantially combat ready (C2) due primarily to repair parts shortage. The 1st Marine Division is providing BLT 2-7 to SLF Bravo under the Command less OPCON of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade. BLT 2-7 is presently OPCON to this Division. The Division combat readiness is further enhanced by having OPCON of Headquarters, 26th Marines, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines and temporary OPCON of BLT 2-26. The Service Battalion of the Division has been absorbed by the Force Logistic Command. This Division has a limited amphibious capability due primarily to the loss of the 1st Service Battalion and the lack of amphibious training. Readiness ratings are based on FORSTAT standings as applied to the Division's present mission.

2. Personnel. This Command currently has more than 90% of the personnel authorized by the M Series Tables of Organization present and physically fit for duty. The personnel readiness rating of this Command is C-1 and, based on present personnel assets and projected gains and losses, the 1st Marine Division is and will remain fully ready to accomplish its assigned mission.

3. Logistics. Barring any unforeseeable supply or maintenance problems the projected logistical level of readiness for the forthcoming quarter is substantially ready (C-2) to support combat operations.

PART II

1. The following units of the 1st Marine Division are considered not combat ready C-4 or marginally combat ready (C-3) based on FORSTAT readiness ratings.

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

a. The 7th Marines are not combat ready (C-4) as a regiment in total due to the loss of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines assigned to SLF Bravo under the Command less OPCON of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade. Upon the return of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, the regiment in total will attain a fully combat ready (C-1) status.

b. The 26th Marines are not combat ready (C-4) as a regiment in total due to the loss of the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines deployed with SLF Alfa under Command less OPCON of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade. It is anticipated that the 26th Marines will not improve in combat readiness due to the continuous rotation of 26th Marines units with the SLF.

c. The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines is considered marginally combat ready (C-3) due to the loss of two batteries deployed with SLF Bravo. Upon the return of these two batteries, a fully combat ready (C-1) status is anticipated.

d. The 1st Armored Amphibian Company is not combat ready (C-4) as a company in total, due primarily to the loss of two platoons. One platoon is deployed and operating with the 2d Brigade, Korean Marine Corps and an additional platoon under the operational control of the 3d Marine Division. Upon the return of both platoons, a fully combat ready (C-1) status is anticipated.

PART III

The 1st Marine Division is not committed or required to provide forces for any contingency plans.

C. A. Youngdale
C. A. YOUNGDALE

Copy to:
G-1, 1st MarDiv
G-4, 1st MarDiv

DECLASSIFIED

68 *B* 384

SECRET

68 *B* 384

3B:dlp
28 NOV 1968

SECRET - Unclassified on removal from basic correspondence 68 29 3568

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 3rd MarDiv ltr 3/FDL/dac 3000 Ser: 003A32668
21 Nov 1968

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter, Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

R. S. Helstrom
R. S. HELSTROM
BY DIRECTION

3d Mar Div

3d Qtr, FY-69

2

COPY 1 OF 11 (3342)
SECRET

SECRET

Encl (2)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3D MARINE DIV SEC FILE
BI#633568

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/PDL/dac
3000
Ser: 003A32668
21 Nov 1968

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3d Qtr, FY69
Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B
(b) For/SA I CorpsO 5213.2

1. In accordance with references (a), and (b) the following report is submitted:

Title. The Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3d Qtr, FY69 is a report prepared and submitted in the last month of 2d Qtr, FY69. The 3d Qtr, FY69 is the reporting period covered in this report.

Part I. This command is Combat Ready. Daily combat operations against the enemy maintain a finely honed edge on the combat skills and techniques that make the division a superb fighting machine.

Part II. The 3d Marine Division anticipates that all subordinate units will be capable of accomplishing their combat missions during the 3d Quarter, FY69.

R4
R. G. DAVIS

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

Copy 1 of 11 Copies
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



HEADQUARTERS
5th MARINE DIVISION (-)(Rein), FMF
CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA 92055

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3/CAS/jrf

3501

Ser:

0060

SECRET (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

68 564

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 3d Quarter, Fiscal Year 69 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

(b) CG, FMFPac ltr 3P/ado, Ser: 0001085-67 of 20 Nov 1967

Encl: (1) Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 3d Quarter, Fiscal Year 69

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.

M. W. Schmidt
M. W. SCHMIDT
Chief of Staff

5th Marine Div.

3d Qtr, FY-69

SECRET

SECRET (Unclassified upon
removal of enclosure (1))

COPY 1 OF 13 COPIES

Encl(3)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECRET

COMMANDER'S COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 3D QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 69

Part I. EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND1. Personnela. Existing Status

(1) Officer Personnel. Shortages exist in the Administrative, Infantry (Company Grade), Artillery, Engineer, Supply and Motor Transport fields. The 27th Marines (-) is currently at 59% officer strength with their total shortages being in the Company Grade Officer ranks. In accordance with the criteria contained in MCO 1300.11E, 28% of the on-board officer strength is deployable.

(2) Enlisted Personnel. A shortage of enlisted supervisory personnel exists in the senior ranks of Sergeants Major and First Sergeant together with Staff NCO ranks in the area of Administrative, Logistics, Communications and Supply. In the ranks of Sergeants and below, significant shortages exist in the Administrative, Ordnance Repair, Communications, Electronics, Maintenance, Supply and Food Services areas. In accordance with the criteria contained in MCO 1300.11E, 22% of the on-board enlisted strength is deployable.

b. Predicted Status

(1) Officer Personnel. Predictions are that the present officer strength will remain the same through 31 March 1969 with the present shortages continuing to exist.

(2) Enlisted Personnel. In the staff NCO ranks it is anticipated that the current shortages will continue to exist and that the losses in those ranks, will in all probability, exceed the input during the quarter. Known gains and losses projected through the end of the quarter indicate that the enlisted strength in ranks of Lance Corporal and below will exceed the Table of Organization except in the Administrative, Logistics, Communications and Food Services fields.

2. Training

a. Existing Status. Individual and small unit training readiness within this command continues at an acceptable level although subject to fluctuations due to a continuing personnel turnover, input of untrained personnel, a lack of officers and critical MOS shortages. Training readiness is a function of personnel readiness. Experience during the past quarters indicate that training readiness will lag approximately one month in equalling personnel readiness.

b. Predicted Status. With the receipt of T/E items presently in short supply and the input of ITR personnel from the Training Regiments at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton, training readiness throughout the Division will show a marked improvement during the quarter.

SECRET
SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

3. Logistics

a. Existing Status. Supply and equipment readiness downgraded to C-3 due to high deadline rate and shortages of existing operating stocks and mount-out spare parts as a result of redeployment of RLT-27. High deadline rate of M-48 and M-103 tanks severely reduces armored support.

b. Predicted Status. Expedited supply action on requisitions related to RLT-27 should result in upgrading of logistic readiness to C-2 by the end of the quarter.

Part II. EVALUATION OF UNITS

27th Marines (-). This regiment is in readiness category C-4 based upon 59% officer and 66% enlisted authorized present, 33% of operating stocks and 38% of mount-out stocks on hand, and 90% equipment undergoing maintenance/repair. A rapid build-up of personnel is currently underway which coupled with a programmed, phased training and exercise schedule provides for a projected C-2 training readiness status in the month of April.

13th Marines (-). The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment is in readiness category C-4 and is currently undergoing reorganization resulting from its recent return in a cadre status from WestPac. This category is based on shortages of company grade officers and certain critical MOS's and the need for rehabilitation of major items of equipment, scheduled for completion during January 1969.

5th Anti-Tank Battalion (-). This battalion is in readiness category C-4 although 82% personnel authorized are present. Due to a high turnover rate of personnel, only 33% of assigned Ontos crewmen are fully trained. In addition, 15-25% of Ontos are on deadline at any given time. Because of the lack of fully trained crews and the high deadline rate for their main armament, B and C companies are not considered operationally ready.

5th Motor Transport Battalion (-). This battalion is in readiness category C-3, and is composed of H&S Company and C Company with 11 of 13 officers, and 139 of 140 enlisted present of that authorized by manning level. Approximately 85% of the Battalion (10 officers and 119 enlisted) were just received from Staging and must complete training.

5th Medical Battalion (-). This battalion is in readiness category C-4 due to shortages of key medical personnel (medical officers and operating room technicians) plus a high deadline rate of combat essential equipment. B Company has a clearing platoon and 1/3 of a collecting platoon deployed with BLT 1/27. D Company has a clearing platoon and 1/3 of a collecting platoon deployed with 9th MEB.

SECRET
SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

5th Reconnaissance Battalion (-). This battalion is in readiness category C-3. Headquarters and Service Company, C Company, and D Company are capable of accomplishing their mission, however B Company, recently returned from RVN, is incapable of performing its mission due to personnel shortages and a requirement for additional training.

5th Shore Party Battalion (-). This battalion is in readiness category C-4. Although 94% personnel authorized are present, only 73% MOS 1381 (Shore Party Man) are on board. This battalion consists of Headquarters and Service Company, B Company, and C Company. B Company has no operational capability and is currently in a cadre status. The capability of the remaining two companies is limited due to the deadline of engineer equipment including 2 of 6 2N Koehring cranes, and 1 of 2 MRS-100 tractors.

5th Service Battalion (-). This command is in readiness category C-3 due to critical shortages of certain military occupational specialties, primarily in occupational fields 21 and 30. The capability to accomplish its mission and support the Division is reduced in the areas of 3rd echelon maintenance, supply, and data processing support due to a shortage of personnel in occupational field 40.

5th Tank Battalion (-). This battalion consisting of Headquarters and Service Company, and B, C and D companies is in readiness category C-4 due to certain critical MOS shortages. Residual combat capability is 55% that of a fully combat ready tank battalion. 6 of 19 M48A3 90mm gun tanks are projected as deadlined during reporting period, and 5 M103A2 Range Finders have been at MCSC Albany for repair for over one year. In addition, 16 M48A3 gun tubes and 12 M103A2 gun tubes have less than 50% life remaining, and will require replacement after the next major firing exercise. 4 M48A3 and 6 M103A2 tubes are currently on order. Operational effectiveness is further reduced due to a shortage of replacement track sections and spare parts.

13th Engr Battalion (-). This battalion is considered to be 65% effective and in readiness category C-4 due to certain officer shortages and training status of recent joiners. C company is in a cadre status with 2 officers and 43 enlisted. Training readiness is reduced due to shortages and turnover of personnel.

13th Motor Transport Battalion. This battalion is in readiness category C-3. Although 91% personnel authorized are present, a rapid turnover of personnel keeps training readiness at a marginal level.

1st Civil Affairs Group. This unit is in readiness category C-4, currently having 63% of authorized personnel present. Predictions are that 4 of 7 authorized functional teams and 3 of 6 authorized civil affairs platoons will be in existence during this reporting period. The lack of officer and enlisted personnel with proper ranks and MOS will reduce the effectiveness of those units. Lack of personnel precludes activation of the remaining 6 units.

SECRET
SECRET

SECRET
SECRET

5th Military Police Battalion (-). A shortage of officers and personnel turnover reduces the combat capability of this unit to readiness category C-3. 60% of the battalion's personnel are considered trained military policemen. D Company is in a cadre status. The battalion has no scout/sentry dog capability.

5th Force Reconnaissance Company (-). This unit is 60% combat ready with 3 of 5 T/O reconnaissance platoons manned and is in category readiness C-3. 32 of 45 Marines are scuba qualified and 31 of 45 Marines are parachute qualified in the operational platoons. 88% of equipment and 90% of supply items are on hand.

9th Separate Bulk Fuel Company. This company is in readiness category C-4. Based upon MOS shortages and lack of formal and informal training the residual combat capability is 60%. The capability exists to deploy 2 of 4 combat ready bulk fuel platoons reinforced with an engineer equipment and packaged fuel section. 4 scooploaders are on administrative deadline pending receipt of initial issue repair parts.

5th Bridge Company. This unit is in readiness category C-4 due to certain personnel shortages and the training status of recent joiners. The shortage of one bridge erection boat, and complete lack of spare parts to support on hand bridge erection boats and 5 KW floodlight units materially affects the command. 1 of 3 bridge platoons is currently in a cadre status due to critical MOS shortages.

5th Hospital Company. This unit is in readiness category C-4 due to a shortage of medical officer specialists, Navy enlisted technicians, insufficient generator power to support the entire company and lack of a laundry unit to support the laundry section.

13th Counterintelligence Team. This team is in readiness category C-3, although 86% authorized personnel are present. 1 officer and 3 NCO's have just completed basic training and require additional OJT.

19th Counterintelligence Team. This team is in readiness category C-3 due to T/E shortages of 5 AN/GRC-125.

21st Interpreter Team. This team is in readiness category C-4 due to only 50% of authorized personnel present.

19th Interrogation Translator Team. This team is in readiness category C-4 due to 64% personnel authorized present.

13th Interpreter Team. This team is in readiness category C-4 due to 33% personnel authorized present.

21st Interrogation Translator Team. This unit is in readiness category C-4 due to T/E shortage of three of three AT trucks, M38A1 and three of three trailers M-100.

SECRET
SECRET

SECRET

17th Interpreter Team. This unit is in readiness category C-4 due to 33% personnel authorized present.

23rd Interrogation Translator Team. This unit is in readiness category C-4 due to T/E shortages of three of three 4T trucks M38A1, three of three trailers M-100 and one motor generator PU-143 CU.

19th Interpreter Team. This team is in readiness category C-4 due to 33% personnel authorized present.

25th Interrogation Translation Team. This team is in readiness category C-4, due to shortage of three of three 4T trucks M38A1 and three of three trailers M-100.

PART III. EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

1. Reference (b) provides information which directly affects the status of contingency planning and the ability to evaluate the combat readiness of this command to provide forces for the accomplishment of specific missions. In addition, for each plan listed below, the 5th Marine Division has been tentatively tasked to provide supporting, versus primary, forces on order (enclosure (1), reference (b)). Accordingly, only a general narrative evaluation is included at this time.

2. List of current contingency plans for which this Command may provide forces:

- a. CINCPACFLT/FMFPAC General War Plans
- b. ALCANUS-ADP-66.
- c. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25
- d. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 27
- e. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 33
 - (1) COMUSMACTHAI OPLAN 32 Phase II
 - (2) COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 32, Phase II/IV
- f. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 37
- g. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 39
- h. COMUSTAFF OPLAN 1/66
- i. SEATO FIELD FORCES OPLAN 6 AND CENTRAL REGION SFF OPLAN 4
- j. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 81

SECRET

SECRET

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

k. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 82

- (1) USCINCSO OPLAN 6300
- (2) COMFIRSTFLT OPLAN 82-68
- (3) V MEF OPLAN 82-(YR)

3. Narrative Evaluation. The above plans call for force requirements at levels ranging from a BLT to a MEF. 5th Marine Division OPLAN 303-68 is a readiness mount out plan for BLT(s) and a RLT headquarters for movement by airlift, and BLT, RLT or Division (-) by sealift. Change number 1 to this OPLAN satisfies the requirement set forth in V MEF 82-(YR) for the ground element of a MEB. Utilizing the total resources of the Division, without applying deployment restriction, it is considered that up to one RLT by sea or airlift could be deployed.

4. DEPLOYABLE CONSIDERATION. Utilizing the maximum criteria for permanent deployment as outlined in Marine Corps Order 1300.11E, the following is the status of the 5th Marine Division:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
a. T/O	906	14,744
b. T/O deficit of total chargeable strength	232	1,559
c. Non-deployable IAW above criteria	490	10,212
d. Deployable	184	2,973
e. Total personnel required for authorized strength (T/O less T/O deficiencies in sub-para b above and non-deployables in sub-para c above).	722	11,771
f. On board available in 72 hours with no deployment criteria imposed.	651	12,325

SECRET
SECRET

Enclosure (1)

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

68-032
3:dlp
Ser:

5 DEC 1968

0232868


CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1st MAW, FMFPac ltr 3:ALW:rjs Ser 03B332-68
of 28Nov68

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3d Quarter, FY 69 (U)

1. Forwarded.



E. E. ANDERSON
CHIEF OF STAFF

1st MAW

3d Qtr, FY-69

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Enc 0(4)

14

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

3:ALW:rjs
Ser: 03B332-68
28 November 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3d Quarter, FY69 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) the following report is submitted.

PART I

This command has continued to provide support for III Marine Amphibious Force throughout the past months and this level of operations is predicted to continue for the 3d Quarter Fiscal Year 1969. Adverse weather during the monsoon season may somewhat derogate daily operations. Operational reports reflect a slight decrease in sorties flown throughout I Corps during October and November for this reason. Although support provided both Marine and Army units will continue at a high rate, certain limitations exist which degrade the overall performance of this command. These limitations are highlighted herein and shall continue throughout the reporting period. The overall readiness categories relative to personnel, aircraft availability and training status are covered by readiness reports such as FORSTAT, MAREB etc.

a. Personnel. In the area of officer strength requirements, significant shortages exist. Detailed reporting by this command concerning this subject has been submitted. Overall, 1st MAF is above established Manning Level. However, specific skill shortages exist. The paucity of time precludes adequate retraining to derive useful talent from total personnel available. At present the T/O for Naval Aviators is 1220, and assigned strength is 1007. This total, minus 33 Naval Aviators assigned on a continuing basis to FAC quotas, reduces effective strength to 79 percent of T/O. This equates to C3 in personnel readiness. Also 11 Naval Flight Officers are assigned continually to ALO quotas reducing total NFO strengths to 84 percent. To further affect officer skills the following MOS's are degraded: 0202 (13 percent of Manning Level), 0402 (7 percent of Manning Level) and 5702 (25 percent of Manning Level).

1st MAF SAC No.	Copy No.
4285-68	1

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Enlisted personnel breakdown into individual MOS's indicates that this command currently has strength ratios which are 70 percent or less in 39 MOS's. These shortages are further aggravated by SNCO shortages. Shown below are MOS's which are down to 56 percent of the Manning Level or less. 1121, 1141, 1316, 1341, 2157, 2816, 2861, 3052, 3372, 3381, 3441, 4099, 5977, 5978, 6214, 6234, 6244, 6272, 6379 and 6711. The following MOS's represent an overall enlisted strength of 70 percent of the Manning Level or less except those preceded by an asterisk (*) which indicates 50 percent of Manning Level or less. 0111, *0161, 0221, 0441, *1142, 1161, 1341, 1345, *2157, *2576, 2812, 2841, 2843, *2861, *3052, 3081, 3095, 3241, 3261, *3381, *4013, 4099, 5917, *5942, *5977, 6214, 6219, 6227, 6236, *6239, 6271, 6316, 6379, 6761 and 7041. Input information is not sufficiently adequate to forecast a status for the forthcoming quarter.

While the overall total strength of the 1st MAW is good, the specific skill shortages are detrimental to readiness and below the minimum standards for C2.

b. Logistics

(1) This command anticipates the arrival of ten new model 550 road graders, thirty-nine PU-657 generators and ten PU-658 generators, thirty-six 6000 pound RT forklifts, twenty Fordson Tow Tractors and thirty-four MC-2 Floodlight units. The PU-657 generators, tow tractors and floodlight units were scheduled for 2nd Quarter Fiscal Year 1969 delivery and have slipped until 3d Quarter. If the forklift delivery date for 3d Quarter slips an already critical problem of old equipment will be further compounded. Present equipment will require an excessive amount of maintenance versus operating hours.

(2) PU-648/608 generators are slated for an accelerated rebuild program and slippage of this rebuild shall seriously curtail operations. This is a continuing problem, as noted by paragraph d. of this report.

c. Supply. Supply support continues to be adequate to support operations but some critical areas exist which may limit overall readiness.

(1) The aircraft NORS rate is within expected tolerance for the tempo and theater of operations. In addition to normal supply system response to NORS requirements, COMFAIRWESTPAC is providing excellent procurement/expediting assistance upon request. In addition, lateral support from USA and USAF activities in RVN and Thailand has been very good in providing NORS requirements for F-4, OV-10, O-1, UH-1E and CH-53 aircraft and some common ground support equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Readiness of MAG supply departments is being adversely affected in three main areas which relate to each other, e.g., BPN 08 funding, adequate numbers/skills of personnel, and material management policies. The funding problem is caused primarily at this time by the migration of material from APA to NSA. Sales generated procurement authority does not allow for rapid response to an adjustment of requisitioning objectives. Personnel numbers/skills for 3M operation are still required. The reduction of the requirement for AVGAL insurance items would materially aid the capability of management in the funding and personnel areas.

(3) Supply support of the Radio Set AN/TRC-97 continues to improve. Factory turn around time has shown very little improvement. One set remains on permanent deadline with all repair part deficiencies related to that set. Expected receipt of three sets from the Repair and Evacuation program (R&E 69) has not materialized, arrival is anticipated during the last of the 2nd Quarter or early in the 3rd Quarter FY-69.

(4) Slow factory turn around time also continues to be a problem with the Radar Course Direction Control AN/TPQ-10. The receipt of seven (7) air conditioners eliminates the previously reported problems in this area.

(5) Serious problems anticipated within the MTDS system have not developed as of this time. Considering the age and operational usage, problems could develop at anytime. Module repair and replacement are hindered by the need to return many of the items to CONUS. Blower motors for the TYA-11 have become critical, eleven (11) radio sets are inoperative due to this item. Requisitions for blower motors have been submitted, GA cards have been submitted and message traffic follow-ups are in process.

d. Communications/Electronics. It is estimated that the Communications/Electronics system throughout the 1st MAW will continue to be marginally satisfactory throughout the 3d Quarter Fiscal Year 1969. Specific functional areas are:

(1) Telephone systems will remain in a degraded state until installation of AN/TTC-28 or the change over to Danang Air Base DCO.

The presently used equipment is limited due to extensive use without replacement and worn out condition. It is anticipated that forthcoming dial system installation will alleviate this problem to some degree.

(2) Long lead time for procurement of repair parts for low density radar will continue as a problem area. No output from the R&E Program for AN/TPQ-10 or AN/UPS-1 is expected soon.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Replacement of the 60 and 400 HZ generators will be curtailed until modification kits become available for new equipment. Both 60 and 400 HZ generators will continue to be used to the maximum capability.

(4) Radio Relay Communications are expected to improve upon receipt of AN/TRC-97 radio relay equipment. Radio set AN/TYA-11 parts availability and component replacements continue as problem areas.

(5) Increased card traffic via AUTODIN is expected to relieve somewhat the fixed plant teletype assets which are fully utilized.

g. Aircraft Availability. The lack of adequate maintenance skills indicated in paragraph a. coupled with the paucity of spare parts have reduced the aircraft readiness of this command to 49 percent. Considering full system aircraft by readiness standards the overall tactical availability is 48 percent.

PART II

All units of this command are considered effective for combat and capable of performing assigned missions.

C. J. Quilter
C. J. QUILTER

Copy to:
CG FMFPac 12
CG III MAF 2
S&C Files 2
G-3 1

CONFIDENTIAL

680306
 HEADQUARTERS
 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac
 MCAS, El Toro, Santa Ana, California 92709

SECRET

SECRET

3:JAT:bae
 1500
 003A33468
 29 Nov 1968

From: Commanding General
 To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for Third Quarter
 Fiscal Year 1969 (U) (RS MC 3000-11)
 Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

1. In compliance with reference (a) the following report is submitted:

PART I

The overall readiness of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing is estimated to be 65%. This percentile is expected to improve somewhat throughout the reporting period. Factors which presently influence reduced readiness are shortages of Naval Aviators, Aviation Ground Officers and qualified Staff Non-Commissioned Officers in certain critical MOS's. Aircraft shortages, lack of combat essential equipment and qualified maintenance personnel are additional factors affecting Wing readiness.

PART II

a. H&HS-38: Unit short 28 pieces major support equipment, including 16 trucks and 3 generator sets. Critical qualified personnel shortages exist in 6 MOS's. Anticipate C-2 late in quarter.

b. SU MACS-1 (NBCWS): Unit C-4 in TE, QM6 and COSAL items. Only support maintenance facility available this unit is manufacturer. Chemical mission is not operationally ready due to lack of spare parts and non-existence of a formal school for mix and fill training. Improvement anticipated by end of this period.

c. MACS-7: Shortage of operable major equipment critically affects this unit's readiness and training capabilities. Anticipate C-2 in 4th Quarter FY 69.

3d MAW S & C FILES

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 10 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

4072-8	
Copy No. 1	of 120

SECRET

SECRET
 (Encl 15)

SECRET
003A33468

d. MASS-5: Shortage of 2 AN/TPQ-10 radars, critical support equipment and repair parts restrict this unit's capabilities. Anticipate C2 1st Quarter FY 70.

e. 2d LAAM: Critical shortage of qualified personnel due to recent retrograde. Estimate C3 early in 4th Quarter FY 69.

f. 5th LAAM: Unit C4 due to shortages in equipment and material. Unit scheduled to deactivate during this period.

g. VMCJ-3: Unit C4 due to shortage of combat ready aircrews and continuous input of untrained aircrews. Unit has 4 EF-10B's vice 9 authorized and is critically short of repair parts for both EF-10B and RF-4B aircraft. Unit also critically short of Staff NCO's in 11 MOS's.

h. VMFA-232: Critical personnel shortage exists in 8 MOS's. Ground test equipment is limited. Anticipate C-1 prior to 3rd Quarter WestPac deployment.

i. VMFA-531: Unit has insufficient crews combat ready due to critical shortages in all categories. Unit has 60% of IMRL on hand, 38% of maintenance SNCO's on hand. Un-scheduled maintenance is high due to condition of A/C transferred from WestPac. Forecast C4/C3 through 4th Quarter FY 69.

j. VMA-214: Shortage of qualified personnel in 10 MOS's plus projected transfers of qualified pilots and technical personnel to WestPac will maintain this unit C4 throughout period.

k. VMGR-352: Unit readiness C3 due to critical shortage of pilots and high maintenance requirements on aircraft transferred from WestPac. Anticipate C-2 near end of period.

l. H&MS-56: Unit C3 primarily due to incomplete allowances (71% IMRL, 65% TBA). Training is adversely affected by rapid turnover of personnel and lack of qualified personnel. Anticipate C-2 late in period.

m. MABS-56: Critical shortage of enlisted personnel and support equipment are primary causes of C4 readiness. Anticipate C2 near end of period.

SECRET

003A33468

n. MATCU-74: Shipment of equipment to WestPac holds this unit C-3 until late in quarter. Anticipate C-2 upon resumption of training in 4th Quarter.

o. HMM-163: Unit recently returned from WestPac in a zero personnel/aircraft/equipment status. Expect C-3 midway through period.

p. HML-267: Unit C-3 primarily due to shortage of UH-1E pilots/instructors. Training also affected by personnel shortages plus support equipment shortage. Estimate C-2 4th Quarter FY 69.

PART III

a. CINCPACFLT GWP-1 (YR) - Third Marine Aircraft Wing tasked to support V MEF and deploy on order. No specific units are designated.

b. ALCANUS EDP - (YR) - Third Marine Aircraft Wing tasked under V MEF, no specific units designated.

c. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25 - Fifth Marine Expeditionary Force tasked to provide back up support for this plan. Wing assets (3 VMF/VMFA) are not on hand to provide all units as specified under V MEF requirements, but are available as specified for CG, 3d MAW support (1 VMF/VMFA).

d. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 27 - Resources available (1 VMA/VMFA) to support this plan if needed.


e. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32 (PHASE II) - Third Marine Aircraft Wing tasked to provide one VMCF detachment which is available at present.

f. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 37-65 - Third Marine Aircraft Wing (-) tasked under V MEF to mount out full strength units as required.

g. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 71 - Third Marine Aircraft Wing is tasked to provide 12 KC-130F aircraft for refueling services. This capability does not exist since 3d MAW has an average on-hand of only 10 aircraft. Although authorized 16 aircraft, par schedule averages 4 aircraft, 1 aircraft is configured with FMFPac Command module and 1 aircraft continuously down due to parts shortages.

SECRET
003A33468

- h. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 81 SUPPORTS CINCLANT OPLAN 303, 304, 313, & 315 - This plan calls for 2 VMA, detachment VMCJ, and detachment VMGR. Presently only one VMA (VMA-214) in 3d MAW.
- i. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 82 SUPPORTS USCINCSO 6300 PLANS - Fifth Marine Expeditionary Force Oplan 82 supports these plans and tasks 3d MAW with a Landing Force (Brigade) Aviation Element. Present assets preclude providing HMH support. No fixed wing units are carrier qualified as required for support of these plans.
- j. SEATO FIELD FORCE (SFF OPLAN 6 AND CENTRAL REGION SFF OPLAN 4) - Third Marine Aircraft Wing tasked under Fifth Marine Expeditionary Force for mount out in support of these plans. No individual units specified.
- k. FMFLant OPLAN 2303 (YR) - Third Marine Aircraft Wing is tasked to provide one VMCJ (ECM) detachment of 9 aircraft. Present EF-10B assets are 4 aircraft assigned.



A.H. ADAMS

DECLASSIFIED

648370

CONFIDENTIAL

33:gg

28 NOV 1968

CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified on removal from basic correspondence

0229468

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on ForLogComd ltr 3/LCC/glp Ser: 0548-68 dtd
23 Nov 68.

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter, Fiscal Year
1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

R. S. Helstrom

K. S. HELSTROM
BY DIRECTOR

FLC

3d Qtr, FY 69

COPIES 1 OF 8 COMED

2

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl (6)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS

Force Logistic Command
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/LOC/glp
3000
Ser No: 0548-68
23 Nov 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report for Third Quarter FY 1969

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B
(b) CG, FMFPac msg 280602Z Feb 1967


1. The following report submitted pursuant to instructions contained in references (a) and (b), constitutes an evaluation of the combat readiness of the Force Logistic Command/1st Force Service Regiment.

a. Part I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND. The Force Logistic Command/1st Force Service Regiment is capable of performing its mission of providing essential supply, maintenance and service support to the III Marine Amphibious Force. However, if the tactical situation changes, the Force Logistic Command/1st Force Service Regiment has a limited capability to furnish two fully ready Force Logistic Support Groups to support III Marine Amphibious Forces.

b. Part II - EVALUATION OF UNITS.

(1) Force Logistic Support Group Alpha is capable of performing its currently reduced mission.

(2) All other units are capable of fulfilling their assigned missions.


D. B. POND, JR.
Chief of Staff

Copy 1 of 11 Copies

UNCLASSIFIED TWO YEARS
AFTER TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

0015115

3/edh
3000
Ser: 00551-68
6 December 1968

SECRET


From: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, Third Quarter FY 69
(Report Symbol MC 3000-11)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2B

Encl: (1) Part I - Evaluation of the Command
(2) Part II - Evaluation of Units
(3) Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

1. In accordance with reference (a) the subject report is hereby submitted.


JOHN E. WILLIAMS

Copy to
CG FMFPAC(FWD)

COPY 1 OF 20 COPIES

SECRET
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Encl (7)

SECRET

SECRET

PART I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

During the Third Quarter, FY 69, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade will be marginally combat ready (C-3) to perform assigned missions due to the deployment of its major combat elements, (air and ground). Non deployed elements of the Brigade will retain the capability to:

- (1) Train replacement personnel for 9th MAB units committed to combat in RVN as required.
- (2) Conduct contingency planning.
- (3) Plan and execute BLT rehabilitation in conjunction with other Okinawan based Marine Corps activities.
- (4) Command and control MEB level operations provided operational control of an Infantry Regiment Headquarters and an Artillery Battalion Headquarters is returned to 9th MAB and the SLF's are not otherwise committed.

During the quarter the Brigade is expected to restore its capability to perform 3rd and limited 4th echelon maintenance for 9th MAB units (ground). The achievement of this capability is contingent upon restoring the equipment returned with the PSB sub unit to a serviceable condition.

SECRET

SECRET

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

PART II - EVALUATION OF UNITS

RLT-26 (Rear) - This unit retains the capability of performing the assigned unit mission of training replacement personnel for deployed 9th MAB units as required and locally assigned missions such as support of civil disturbance plans. RLT-26 (Rear) is considered to be C-2 for its assigned mission. However, it is not capable of performing the normal mission of an RLT Headquarters, due to deployment of Headquarters, 26th Marines and Headquarters 1st Battalion, 13th Marines to RVN. It is anticipated that its readiness category (C-2) will remain valid throughout the quarter.

Provisional Service Battalion - At the present time the battalion remains not combat ready. The return of Sub Unit #1 from RVN has greatly enhanced the capabilities of the battalion in terms of personnel readiness. However, equipment returned with Sub Unit #1 is currently undergoing inspection, checkout, and rehabilitation and is in a generally poor condition. The overall operational readiness condition is expected to improve to a C-2 combat readiness category early in the 3rd Quarter FY 1969.

Communication Support Company - This unit has had considerable delay in obtaining end items, component parts, and equipment accessory items to replace shortages. Deployment of combat essential items to the SLF's, and deadlined equipment, limits this unit's ability to perform its mission. Its combat readiness category will remain C-3 during the 3rd Quarter FY 1969.

Marine Aircraft Group-15 - The overall readiness of this unit will remain C-2 through the 3rd Quarter, FY 1969. Problem areas are:

1. VMGR-152 with 13 KC-130 aircraft remains under operational control of CG, FMFPAC (FWD). Six KC-130 aircraft have been deployed in RVN to provide continuous in-country support of III MAF. The return of these aircraft is required for VMGR-152 to attain a substantially combat ready posture.

2. MACS-8 is operational without an MTDS capability. The loss of MTDS is due to the transfer of operational computer equipment to MACS-4 in RVN. The squadrons present capability is limited to manual mode only. Improvement from a C-4 status is dependent upon replacement of this computer equipment.

3. VMFA-122 - This squadron will attain a C-2 combat status during the Third Quarter FY 1969. However, if VMFA-122 is rotated as a unit to III MAF during the quarter scheduled, the VMFA capability of the air group will then be commensurate with readiness of the replacement squadron received from III MAF.

SECRET

SECRET

Enclosure (2)

SECRET**SECRET**

4. The following unit will be ineffective if the air group is deployed to a site that would require the full use of all expeditionary equipment:

A. MATCU-66. This unit has 4 officers and 56 enlisted personnel assigned of its T/O strength of 7 and 59. 1 officer and 13 enlisted personnel have been supporting MCAF Futema and the equipment has been administratively deadlined. Improvement in readiness could occur now that personnel have been stabilized and administratively deadlined equipment is exercised during the 3rd Quarter FY 1969. However, the unit is short two TACANS and two generators assigned MATCU-67.

SECRET**SECRET**
Excluded (2)

SECRET**SECRET**PART III - EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

The Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade is required to provide forces for the contingency plans listed below. The ability of the Brigade to provide the required forces for each plan is evaluated based upon forces OPCON to 9th MAB or the command whose plan is to be supported.

<u>PLAN</u>	<u>FORCE REQUIREMENT AND EVALUATION</u>
COMSEVENTHFLT General War Plan (GWP)	<u>Force:</u> MAB <u>Evaluation:</u> Not currently available to 9th MAB or to COMSEVENTHFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 23	<u>Force:</u> SLF <u>Evaluation:</u> Available to COMSEVENTHFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 25	<u>Force:</u> MAG - (one to three fighter squadrons, if available with supporting aviation units) <u>Evaluation:</u> Only one fighter squadron is avail- able.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 27	<u>Force:</u> MAG - (one to three fighter squadrons, if available with supporting aviation units) <u>Evaluation:</u> Only one fighter squadron is avail- able.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 32 PHASE II	<u>Force:</u> MAB <u>Evaluation:</u> Not currently available to 9th MAB or to COMSEVENTHFLT.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 60	<u>Force:</u> SLF <u>Evaluation:</u> Available to COMSEVENTHFLT.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 101	<u>Force:</u> SLF <u>Evaluation:</u> Available.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 120	<u>Force:</u> SLF to full Brigade <u>Evaluation:</u> Forces in excess of the two SLF's OPCON to COMSEVENTHFLT are not available.

SECRET

SECRET
Enclosure (3)

SECRET

SECRET

COMSEVENTHFLT
OPLAN 105

Force: MAB (less fixed wing aircraft)
Evaluation: Not available to 9th MAB or to
COMSEVENTHFLT.

COMUSTAFF
OPLAN 1/66

Force: MAB augmented by a fourth BLT.
Evaluation: Not currently available to 9th MAB
or to COMSEVENTHFLT.

FMFPAC
OPLAN 100

Force: Provisional Battalion or less depending
on 9th MAB assets on Okinawa.
Evaluation: Available.

FMFPAC
OPLAN 100B

Force: Security force (approximately 400
Marines) for security of Northern Okinawa insta-
lations.
Evaluation: Available.

The following operations plans have been overtaken by events or are
waiting revision by higher authority.

1. COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 37
2. COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 39
3. COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 32
PHASE III/IV

SECRETSECRET
Enclosure (3)

DECLASSIFIED



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FORCE TROOPS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA 92278

68/887

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3/RMH/gws

3500/1

Ser: 0036/68

DEC 16 1968

SECRET

SECRET

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report for 3rd Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

(b) CG FMFPac ltr 3P/ado Ser: 0001085-67 of 20 Nov 67 (TS)

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted:

a. Part I Evaluation of the Command. The ability of this Command to perform its assigned mission will be limited during the forthcoming quarter because of the circumstances set forth herein.

b. Part II Evaluation of Units

(1) The Fifth Dental Company (-) is not capable of performing its assigned combat service support mission in view of the personnel limitations imposed by the NAVY MANPOWER Authorization (NAVPERS 576/OPNAV 1000). This unit has a T/O of 18 officers and 30 enlisted. The current on board strength is 7 officers and 9 enlisted. The current allowance of personnel is sufficient to handle the dental needs of Force Troops and Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms, personnel while in garrison. However, if committed to combat it would be necessary to bring the Fifth Dental Company to full T/O strength in order to accomplish its assigned mission.

(2) The Ninth Communication Battalion (-) is operating minus its Communication Support Company. The pool of communication assets to support the MEF Headquarters echelonment

0036/68

F.T. S&C FILES B.T. NO. 1
F.T. S&C FILES COPY NO. 1 OF 2 COPIES

SECRET

SECRET

Encl (8)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRETSECRET

capability, normally provided by Communication Support Company, is unavailable. This organization's capability to support a MEF is further diminished due to a lack of 50% of the authorized VHF radio relay assets of the battalion. This equipment has been deployed to WestPac. This organization has 77% of its authorized personnel on board. Of this total, 33% are deployable based on the criteria contained in reference (a). This criteria, with the Vietnam returnee requirements reduced to twelve months in CONUS, reveals that 60% of its personnel are deployable. Critical personnel deficiencies include personnel in communication technical and operator MOS's and administration.

(3) The Fifth Field Artillery Group, consisting of a Headquarters Battery, Fifth 8" Howitzer Battery (SP)(-) and Seventh 155mm Gun Battery (SP) is currently manned at 82% of its authorized strength. Critical personnel shortages within the Group are field artillery batteryman (MOS 0811), supply (MOS 3041 and 3051), and motor transport (MOS 3531). The continued shortage of these MOS skills and the insufficient time to train the large number of newly joined personnel precludes the attainment of full combat potential at this time. Of the on board strength of the Group, only 19% are deployable based on the criteria contained in reference (a). This criteria, with the Vietnam returnee requirement reduced to twelve months in CONUS, reveals that 42% of its personnel are deployable.

(4) Company D (Rein), 13th Engineer Battalion, consisting of 3 Engineer Platoons and 1 Equipment Platoon, is currently manned at 79% of its authorized strength. Shortages of combat engineers (MOS 1371) and motor vehicle operators (MOS 3531) preclude Company D (Rein) from being fully combat ready. This unit is manned primarily by Vietnam returnees and its deployment capability based on the criteria contained in reference (a) is negligible.

c. Part III Evaluation of Operational Commitments

(1) This command supports the Fifth Marine Division's 303-68 Plan by providing a detachment with equipment from the Ninth Communication Battalion (-).

SECRET
SECRET

SECRETSECRET

(2) Reference (b) assigns this command as a contributing command in support of the V MEF 82-(YR) plans. The V MEF 82-(YR) plans require the following forces from Force Troops, FMFPac:

260 Man Support Co from 9th Comm Bn (-)

1 155mm Gun Battery (SP)

1 Platoon of 8" Howitzers (SP)

Additionally, Force Troops, FMFPac will be required to provide officer and enlisted personnel to the MEB Headquarters Staff and, when directed, provide the MEB Commander/CTF 19. The total number of personnel to be provided is unknown. This support can be provided; however, sustained operations would greatly reduce combat effectiveness.

(3) It is emphasized that if the total manpower assets of the command are called upon to support these plans, this support would be severely limited based on the criteria for deployment of personnel contained in reference (a). Of the total Force Troops personnel on board (1353), only 31% can be deployed. Using this criteria, with the Vietnam returnee requirement reduced to twelve months in CONUS, 61% of this command's personnel would be deployable. Percentages deployable are based on total officer and enlisted personnel.



REGAN FULLER

SECRET**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Force Service Regiment
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/APS/mas
3480
30 December 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Combat Readiness Report, 3d Quarter FY-69

Ref: (a) NCO P3000.2B
(b) CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC 4D/CWL Ser: 0109766 of Oct 66

1. The report required by reference (a) is hereby submitted:

PART I: In accordance with reference (b), Third Force Service Regiment is currently carrying out its assigned mission in support of operations in RVN and is combat ready.

PART II: In accordance with reference (b), subordinate units of this command are carrying out assigned tasks in support of Third Force Service Regiment mission and are considered combat ready.

PART III: Third Force Service Regiment provides forces and Logistical Support for Fleet Marine Forces Pacific Operation Plans 10-68, 62-68, 100-68, 100A-68, 100B-68, 101-68, and 201-(YR). Implementation of contingency forces under any of these Operation Plans will seriously curtail ability to continue T/O combat mission of PART I above.

W. Padalino

0000950

Encl (9)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

68 6357

Headquarters
5TH FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT (-), FMF
Camp Pendleton, California 92055

8/FWL/mjk
Ser No. 077-68

CONFIDENTIAL

30 NOV 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (U)

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

Encl: (1) Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 3rd. QTR FY69

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is forwarded.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

J. R. Jones
J. R. JONES

GP-4

S&C FILES - 5th FSR

Control No.	68-451
Copy No.	1
of	11
Copies	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Encl (10)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMANDER'S COMBAT READINESS REPORT 3RD, QTR, FY69

THE QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 3RD QTR, FY69 IS A REPORT PREPARED AND SUBMITTED IN THE LAST MONTH OF THE 2ND QTR, FY69. THE 3RD QTR, FY69 IS THE REPORTING PERIOD COVERED IN THIS REPORT.

PART I. EVALUATION OF COMMAND

5th Force Service Regiment (-) is capable of deploying and performing its assigned mission with the limitations discussed in Part II. The significant factor contributing to these limitations is shortages of personnel. However, this command is capable of supporting a single Logistic Support Group for sustained operations.

While in garrison this unit can perform its assigned mission with minor limitations. Training readiness will improve as critical technical billets are filled.

PART II. EVALUATION OF UNITS

It is anticipated that the operational effectiveness of the following units will be limited during this reporting period:

Headquarters and Service Battalion. Shortages in Military Occupational Specialties 1141, 1341, 3111 and 3051 reduce the capability of the Support Company to fully perform its assigned mission.

Motor Transport capability is reduced due to the shortage of six (6) water tank trucks, M50A2. Critical shortage of personnel in MOS's 3516 and 3531 has contributed to the administrative deadlining of 143 pieces of equipment and does effect our ability to respond to contingency plans.

The capability of the Communication Company is somewhat reduced by the shortage of qualified personnel in occupational field 2800.

Supply Battalion. The battalion is presently operating on 55% enlisted personnel strength and 70% officer strength with respect to the latest manning levels.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Maintenance Battalion. Shortages of personnel in occupational fields 3516, 2111, 1341, and 2861 constitute the significant factor for this units inability to fully perform its assigned mission.

PART III. EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

5th Force Service Regiment (-) has the capability to support contingency plans set forth in Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Plan 201-(YR), Commanding General, 5th Marine Division 303-68 and Commanding General, V MEF Plan 82-(YR) providing not more than one plan is executed during one given period. Fifth Force Service Regiment (-) has the additional capability of supporting several Civil Disturbance Plans; including Commanding General, 5th Marine Division Plan 100-69, and providing a Provisional Civil Disturbance Rifle Company for a Provisional Civil Disturbance Battalion. The Rifle Company is composed of one platoon from each battalion in the Regiment and the Headquarters for the company is from Headquarters and Service Battalion; 5th Force Service Regiment is also tasked with and prepared to provide logistic support for civil disturbance units when they are deployed to trouble areas.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS

8371 1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
 PFO, San Francisco 96602

SECRET

3/CH/rjm
 Ser: 0030-68
 29 Nov 1968

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter, Fiscal Year
 1969 (U)

Ref: (a) ACO 3000.2B
 (b) CG, FMFPac ltr 3/RJR over 3121 of 28 May 1968

1. (U) In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

Part I - (U) Evaluation of Command

a. (C) The contingency plans requiring Brigade support/involvement are of a nature that requires evaluation of individual unit readiness rather than evaluation of the Brigade as an entity.

Part II - (U) Evaluation of Units

a. (S) Marine Aircraft Group-24 is not combat ready (C-4) due to not receiving Aircraft Weapons Systems programmed personnel, supply support and maintenance/ground support equipment. It is anticipated that MAG-24 will become marginally combat ready (C-3) during this quarter.

b. (S) H&MS-24 is not considered combat ready (C-4) due to shortages of trained personnel in essential ranks and MOS's, intermediate maintenance supply/support equipment and trained maintenance personnel for F4J and TA4F aircraft. Present shortages of qualified helicopter mechanics will restrict this unit's ability to fulfill helicopter commitments. It is anticipated that the unit will become marginally combat ready (C-3) during this quarter.

c. (S) MABS-24 is marginally combat ready (C-3) with major deficiencies in supply and equipment. This command is capable of deployment for only a short period of time and in support of very limited operations. With continued inputs of these items, MABS-24 will attain a (C-2) status in the 3rd Qtr FY-69.

GROUP - 4
 Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years.

COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Encl(11)

1st mar brig

34 Qtr, FY-69

SECRET
 570471jm
 Ser: 0030-68

SECRET

d. (S) MATCU-70 is considered not to be combat ready (C-4) due to major equipment shortages. Much of said major equipment is expected to arrive shortly, but since it is returning from Viet Nam deployment a large part of it is expected to be inoperable. However, it is anticipated that the unit will attain a (C-3) status in the 3rd Qtr FY-69.

e. (S) VMFA-212 is considered not to be combat ready (C-4) due to a lack of aviators and NFO's. The shortage of authorized T/O aircrews and the ability to practice Flight Operations in Phase II Missile Intercept Syllabus Training will cause training percentage to remain low until this squadron is in receipt of the AWG-10 Airborne Radar. It is anticipated that (C-3) will be reached during the next quarter even though this squadron is not scheduled to receive the AWG-10 Airborne Radar and its associated test equipment.

f. (S) VMFA-235 is not considered to be combat ready (C-4) although the unit possesses an adequate instructor base consisting of nineteen (19) combat experienced Naval aviators and Naval Flight Officers. Fifteen (15) aircraft arrived this command on 15 and 16 November 1968 and are now undergoing acceptance checks. Syllabus phase training will commence as aircraft are placed in an up status. A lack of operational ready F4J aircraft, supply/support shortages, and personnel shortages in rank/MOS constitute the reason for an overall readiness rating of (C-4). It is anticipated a (C-3) status will be reached during the 3rd Qtr FY-69.

g. (S) MACS-2 is not combat ready (C-4) due to the critical shortage of repair parts. During this period the unit may achieve the capability of performing its mission as defined by E/O M-8630 and JTF OPLAN 1-68. Unit Combat Readiness is expected to be upgraded to (C-2) status during the 3rd Qtr FY-69 if certain training, support, and equipment factors are favorably resolved.

h. (C) 1st Battalion (Rein), 27th Marines, will not be able to accomplish any assigned missions due to shortages of personnel and logistical deficiencies caused by the Command's recent redeployment from Viet Nam.

i. (C) Headquarters and Service Company, 1st Marine Brigade, is not considered combat ready (C-4) due to the lack of any Field communication capabilities. In accordance with reference (b), H&S Company has no embarkation plan, or the proper equipment (mount out boxes, etc.) for embarkation.

Part III - (U) Evaluation of Operational Commitments

SECRET

SECRET

3/CH/rjm

Ser: 0030-68

SECRET

a. (S) MCP (FMFPac)

(1) Subject to the limitations stated in Part II above, this Command can provide the forces required.

b. (S) JTF OPLAN 1-68

(1) This CINPAC (JTF) Plan provides for all Navy/Marine units with an air defense capability to assist in the air defense of the Hawaiian area. This plan states that MACS-2 will augment the 326th Air Division's Radar Surveillance and Weapons Control capability.

(2) MACS-2 will participate in this OPLAN and will have a Weapons Control capability to augment the 169th Air Control and Warning Squadron.

c. (S) COMSTAFF 1-66

(1) As reflected in Part II above, this command would be unable to provide the required forces for this plan.

d. (S) 326th Air Division OPLAN 5-68

(1) This OPLAN supports PACAF OPLAN 1-68 and provides for the defense of the land areas of the Pacific Islands Air Defense Region. MACS-2 is listed within this plan as an augmentation unit. The procedures listed in this plan are compatible with JTF OPLAN 1-68.

(2) MACS-2, during scheduled exercises, will perform those air defense functions of detecting, recording and reporting as an Augmentation Air Control Facility in support of the 169th Air Control and Warning Squadron.



W. C. MCGRAW, JR

SECRET

FIRST RADIO BATTALION (-)
Fleet Marine Force, FPO
San Francisco 96602

68B 347

3:LKR:gwn
Ser: 00149-68
29 November 1968

SECRET
SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol 3100.4)
Ref: (a) Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Order 3000.4A

1. This report is submitted in compliance with reference (a). The period covered is for the Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 1969.

Part I - Evaluation of the Command

a. This command is considered combat ready for the execution of its assigned mission.

(1) First Radio Battalion (-) has transferred most of its organic equipment and supplies to Sub Unit One in order to support III MAF Combat Operations. First Radio Battalion (-) has sufficient personnel and equipment to adequately perform that portion of its mission that pertains to Direct Support of a MEB/MAB.

(2) The generator/power problem previously reported in the February, May, and August 1968 Commanders Combat Readiness Reports has not been resolved. The Criticom Communications Centrals, AN/MSQ-43 and Electronic Intercept Facilities, AN/TSQ-46, remain deadlined due to a lack of power.

Part II - Evaluation of Units

a. This command has 25 officers and 350 enlisted deployed with Sub Unit One, First Radio Battalion in the Republic of Vietnam who are Combat Ready and performing this Battalion's mission.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

Plan

CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32

Readiness

This command is not considered prepared to support the maximum requirements of Phase III/IV of this plan because of the draw down of personnel and equipment stated in Part I

SECRET
SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

Encl (12)

1st Radio Bn

3rd Qtr, FY-69

SECRET
SECRET

CINCPACFLT GWP 1-(YR)
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 27
CINCPACFLT OPLAN 39
SFF OPLAN 6
CRSFF OPLAN 4

This command is not prepared to support the maximum requirements of these plans due to the draw down of personnel and equipment stated in Part I.

L. K. Russell
L. K. RUSSELL
By direction

2

COPY 1 OF 11 COPIES

SECRET
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

1ST AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY
Fleet Marine Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

PLE/DFB:jtd
5231/3500
Ser: 580-68
22 Nov 1968

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

68/237

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 3rd Quarter, FY 69 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2B
(b) Rev. No. 2 to T/O M-4852

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

2. Part I - Evaluation of the Command

a. Considering the combined assets of 1st ANGLICO, MCAS Kaneohe and Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, Republic of Vietnam, it is my judgement that 1st ANGLICO could accomplish its combat mission as assigned in reference (b), upon the unification of these units in one geographical area. Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, is presently OPCON COMUSMACV.

3. Part II - Evaluation of Units

a. 1st ANGLICO, MCAS Kaneohe, consists of a reduced Headquarters section, a reduced Division Air/Naval Gunfire Platoon, and a reduced Brigade Air/Naval Gunfire Platoon. These elements are capable of providing the personnel and communications package for control and coordination of air and naval gunfire at a division headquarters, and within one of its brigades. This Command is required to maintain third echelon electronic maintenance capability. The equipment is deployed with Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, along with other combat essential test equipment. In the event another contingency plan is executed, 1st ANGLICO's electronic material readiness will be critically limited. This capability is presently maintained through 1st Marine Brigade Field Maintenance.

4. Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. Current Contingency Plan Commitments

(1) CINCPACFLT GWP - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.

(2) CINCPACFLT 27 - Support available as noted in paragraph 3a above.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

1st ANGLICO

3d Qtr, FY 69

(Encl 1/12)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

PLE/DFB:jtd
Ser: 580-68

- (3) CINCPACFLT 32 - Additional support limited as noted in paragraph 3a above.
- (4) CINCPACFLT 37 - Additional support limited as noted in paragraph 3a above.
- (5) CINCPACFLT 39 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (6) CINCPACFLT 41 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (7) CINCPACFLT 42 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (8) CINCPACFLT 60 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (9) CINCPACFLT 81 - Support available as noted in paragraph 3a above.
- (10) CINCPACFLT 82 - Support available as noted in paragraph 3a above.
- (11) SFF OPLAN 5 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (12) SFF OPLAN 7 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (13) SFF OPLAN 6 & CRSFF OPLAN 4 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (14) SFF OPLAN 99 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (15) COMUSMACV 1/66 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (16) COMSEVENTHFLT 104 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.

P. L. ELLIOTT

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRETHEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335b (REV. 3-67)

CONTROL NUMBER

COPY NO.

8904793 CMDR QT CRR, RS MC3100-4-4TH QT, FIS YR69 30 MPAC 001801 1 43289

DOCUMENT
CONTROL
NUMBER

SUBJECT

PRI.

SEC.

ORIGINATOR

ORIGINATOR
CONTROL NO.

NO. CTS

REC'D

MUSLIM

CIS

MO

DA

VR

DATE

ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing

OPERATION CODE

X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE
AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE
OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATIONF-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS

(AGENCY HAVING PRIMARY INTEREST COMPLETE)

REQUEST FOR PERMANENT RETENTION (COPY) (BUCKTAG COPY)

RETAIN _____ MONTHS (Information material w/o historical value)

DESTROY AFTER ROUTING (No record or information value)

RETAIN BUCKTAG COPY PERMANENTLY IN FILE (Will be screened for further disposition
when due for retirement and transferred to Federal Records Center unless otherwise indicated.)

DISTRIBUTE EXTRA COPIES TO

(If no distribution indicated, extra copies will be destroyed after 30 days.)

RTG.

OPR.
CODE

DATE

IN

OUT

INITIAL

ADDRESSEES

COMMANDANT
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
MILITARY SECY TO CMC
CHIEF OF STAFF
DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
DC/S (MANPOWER)
DC/S (RD & S)
DC/S (AIR)
DC/S (ADMIN)
SECY OF GEN STAFF
G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4
DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
DATA SYSTEMS
MCCC
FISCAL
INFORMATION
INSPECTION
PERSONNEL
POLICY ANALYSIS
RESERVE
SUPPLY
MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
PROGRAMS
LEGISLATIVE
JOINT PLANNING GROUP
JOINT CONTROL
COUNSEL
WOMEN MARINES
STAFF DENTAL
STAFF MEDICAL
STAFF CHAPLAIN
CLASSIFIED FILES

SECTION

SIGNATURE

ACTION OFFICE:

REMARKS (Entries to be signed and dated. For lengthy comments attach separate page and indicate
"Bucktag Comments Attached." Do not assign separate Control Number to Bucktag Comments.)*Trans. to Historical (H4)
Branch and retain
indefinitely.*

FMFAC

*Also Contact Radincoo Rpt
4th Quarter, FY-69**(28 Mar 69)***G-3**RETURN TO ABQ
UPON COMPLETION OF ROUTINGDO NOT DETACH—THIS FORM IS A PERMANENT
PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT IS
ATTACHEDMATERIAL
ATTACHED IS**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO 96610

SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3/WMY/lsm

001801

MAR 28 1969

SECRET

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03)

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report
(Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for the Fourth Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

- Encl: (1) ✓ CG, 1st MarDiv (Rein) ltr 3/AEI/dpb over 3000
Ser: 0040-69 of 24Feb69 (S)
(2) ✓ CG, 3d MarDiv (Rein) ltr 3/FLB/lrb over 3100
Ser: 003A05169 of 20Feb69 (S)
(3) ✓ CG, 5th MarDiv (-)(Rein) ltr 3/CAS/jeg over
3501 Ser: 00598-69 of 26Feb69 (S)
(4) ✓ CG, 1st MAW ltr 3:ALW:wlf Ser: 03C6169 of
2Mar69 (C)
(5) ✓ CG, 3d MAW ltr 3:JAT:bae over 1500 Ser:
003A05969 of 28Feb69 (S)
(6) ✓ CG, FLC ltr 3/LOC/1st over 3000 Ser: 06169
of 21Feb69 (C)
(7) ✓ CG, 9th MAB ltr 3/cdh over 3500 Ser: 00142-69
of 27Feb69 (S)
(8) ✓ CG, ForTrpsPac ltr 3/RMH/ccn over 3500/1
Ser: 004/69 of 19Feb69 (S)
(9) ✓ CO, 3d FSR ltr 3/APS/mas over 3480 of 18Feb69 (U)
(10) ✓ CO, 5th FSR(-) ltr 8/PGM/mjk Ser: 010-69 of
27Feb69 (C)
(11) ✓ CO, 1st MarBrig ltr 3/CH/drt Ser: 006-69 of
28Feb69 (S)
(12) ✓ CO, 1st ANGLICO ltr PLE/DFB:jtd over 5231/3500
Ser: 012-69 of 13Feb69 (S)
(13) ✓ OIC, SubUnit 2, 1st RadBn ltr 3:BDL:gwn over
3000/1 Ser: 00410-69 of 1Mar69 (S)

1. (U) In accordance with reference (a), the Commander's
Quarterly Combat Readiness Report for the Fourth Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1969 is submitted.

2. (S) The Fleet Marine Force, Pacific continues to be a
highly effective combat force. In certain units there are
shortages of personnel and equipment and deficiencies in
training which could adversely affect a full response to

Action TO G3
Info TO
PR To
File No 38
No of Copies 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

G-3

Orig MPAC

5304793

SECRET

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

3/WMY/lsm

SECRET

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report
(Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for the Fourth Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

contingency plans. This headquarters is aware of the deficiencies and every means of assistance is being provided. All WestPac units will continue to be capable of performing their primary mission.

3. (S) The self-evaluations of FMFPac commands reporting combat readiness are described in detail in enclosures (1) through (13). Comments on significant items reported in the enclosures follow:

a. 9th MAB

(1) Requisitioning action has been taken to procure the supply deficiencies noted and personnel are being provided on a "fair share" basis from assets made available to satisfy current manning authorizations. Adequate forces to support contingency requirements can be made available to 9th MAB by the return of operational control of its major combat elements and through other FMFPac sources.

(2) The location for rehabilitation of BLT 1/26 scheduled for Subic Bay has been changed to Danang, however, the period of reduced effectiveness of Provisional Service Battalion remains unchanged.

b. 1st Marine Brigade. The personnel and logistical problems associated with the marginal readiness of the 1st Marine Brigade are recognized. Appropriate requisitioning and MARES reporting actions have been accomplished for logistics deficiencies. Personnel input is being effected by HQMC as rapidly as availability and overriding priorities of combat committed commands permit.

c. 5th Marine Division

(1) The overall logistic readiness posture of the 5th Marine Division is expected to improve even though shortages of replacement parts will continue for several low density combat essential equipments. Due to the lower priority assigned the 5th Marine Division as opposed to combat deployed

SECRET

SECRET

3/WMY/lsm

SECRET

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report
(Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for the Fourth Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

forces, the availability of replacement parts is expected to be poor for such items as the TD-15 and Eimco Tractors, Bridge Erection Boats and Koehring 2N Crane. The substitution of the PU-239 (20KW) Generator for the PU-482 (30KW) Generator which is an inadequate power source for the 5th Medical Battalion and the 17th Dental Company is a situation which can be improved with provisioning of the standard T/E item by supply sources.

(2) The shortage of Medical Officers, Dental Officers and Operating Room Technicians addressed will have a deleterious effect on medical/dental training. It is the policy of the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery not to fully staff medical battalions and dental companies until their deployment is imminent. This policy permits better utilization of highly trained medical and dental personnel and avoids their stagnation in a training environment which taxes only a small portion of their abilities. The shortage, therefore, is a planned one.

d. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. No improvement in the logistic readiness posture of the 3d MAW can be expected until sufficient assets are provided in response to outstanding requisitions or a higher priority is assigned for procurement of aeronautical materiel.

e. Force Troops, FMFPac. It is noted that communications support for V MEF 82-(YR) plans can be accomplished on a non-sustaining basis even though the 9th Communication Battalion is operating minus its Communication Support Company. However, such support is contingent upon the capability of Force Troops to effectively consolidate its available assets to overcome the imposed deficit.

4. (C) During the forthcoming quarter, emphasis will be directed toward:

a. Continued logistic support, with all means available, to those forces in Vietnam committed to combat.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

3/WMY/lsm


SECRET

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report
(Report Symbol MC 3100-4) for the Fourth Quarter,
Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

b. Continued close supervision of newly activated units to ensure that these units attain a combat ready posture.

c. Continued supply and maintenance discipline.

d. Continued evaluation of training to ensure that it reflects experience gained in Vietnam.



P. J. FONTANA
Deputy

SECRET

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET38:glm
3000Ser: 032769
10 MAR 1969**SECRET- Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence****FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1st Marine Division ltr 3/AB1/dph over 3000
Ser: 0040-69 of 24 Feb 1969****From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific****Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter FY69 (PC 3000-11)****1. Forwarded.**MARION C. DALBY
BY DIRECTION

COPY NO 10 OF 13 COPIES

3

SECRET

Encl (1)

ENCL (1)

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
08 0708
San Francisco, California

SECRET
3/AEI/apb
3000
Ser: 0040-69
24 FEB 1969

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter FY69 (MC 3000-11)

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

1. (U) In compliance with reference (a), the subject report is forwarded.

PART I

1. (S) The 1st Marine Division is prepared to accomplish its missions in combat.
2. (S) The 1st Marine Division is fully combat ready (C1) within the personnel and training fields, however, the supply and equipment readiness is substantially combat ready (C2). The division combat readiness is further enhanced by having OPCON of Headquarters, 26th Marines, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines and BLT 5/26. Readiness ratings are based on FORSTAT criteria as applied to the division's present mission.
3. (S) Personnel. This Command currently has more than 90% of the personnel authorized by the M Series Tables of Organization. The personnel readiness rating of the command is C1 and, based on present personnel assets and projected gains and losses, the 1st Division is and will remain fully combat ready to accomplish its assigned mission.
4. (S) Logistics. Barring any unforeseeable supply or maintenance problems, the projected logistical level of readiness for the forthcoming quarter is substantially ready (C2) to support combat operations.

PART II

1. (S) The following units of the 1st Marine Division are considered not combat ready (C4) based on FORSTAT readiness ratings.

a. The 26th Marines are not combat ready (C4) as a regiment due to the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines and the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines being deployed with SLFs under the command, less OPCON, of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade. It is anticipated that the 26th Marines will not improve in combat readiness due to the continuous rotation of 26th Marines' units with the SLFs.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOW DIR 5200.70

SECRET

SECRET

b. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines is not combat ready (C1) as a battalion due primarily to deployment of three batteries with the BLTs assigned to SLFs. It is anticipated that the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines will not improve in combat readiness due to the continuous rotation of batteries with the BLTs assigned to the SLFs.

c. The 1st Armored Amphibian Company is not combat ready as a company due primarily to the deployment of one platoon to the 2d Korean Marine Corps Brigade and one platoon to the 3d Marine Division. Upon the return of both platoons, a fully combat ready (C1) status is anticipated.

PART III

1. (S) The 1st Marine Division is not committed or required to provide forces for any contingency plans.


ORMOND R. SIMPSON

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

3B:glm

3100

Ser:

032869

10 MAR 1969

SECRET - Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 3d Marine Division ltr 3/FLB/lrb over 3100
Ser: 003A05169 of 20 Feb 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter, FY69 (MC 3000-11)

1. Forwarded.

MARION C. DALBY
BY DIRECTION

COPY NO 11 OF 12 COPIES

SECRET

ENCL (2)

SECRET
Encl (2)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMT
FPO San Francisco 96602

HTG 42-69

3/FLB/lrb
3100

Ser: 003A05169
20 Feb 1969

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam

Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th quarter, FY69

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B
(b) FOR/SA I Corps O 5213.2

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

Title. The Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th Qtr FY69 is a report prepared and submitted in the second month of the 3d Qtr, FY69. The 4th Qtr, FY69 is the reporting period covered in this report.

Part I. This command is Combat Ready. The variety and scope of operations, from multi-battalion operations against conventional forces to fire teams integrated with Regional Forces/Popular Forces participating in the pacification program, provide a broad scope of knowledge and experience at all levels of Staff and Command. This provides a high degree of skill and flexibility in meeting the varying combat demands placed upon the Division.

Part II. It is anticipated that all subordinate units' capabilities to accomplish their combat missions will be enhanced and increased. This is due to the experience gained from operating under the varied type of combat situations existing in the Division AO.

R. G. Davis
R. G. DAVIS

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

Copy 11 of 15 Copies
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

5th Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF
Camp Pendleton, California 92055

69-2144
3/CAS/jeg

3501

Ser 00590-01
26 FEB 1969

SECRET

SECRET (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

(b) CG, FMFPac ltr 3P/ado, Ser: 0001085-67 of 20 Nov 1967

Encl: (1) Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1969

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.

Leo J. Dulacki
LEO J. DULACKI

5th Marine Div

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

475 Q26, FY-69

SECRET

Page 1 of 1 Page

SECRET (Unclassified upon
removal of enclosure (1))

9

COPY 9 OF 13 COPIES

S903247

ENCL(3)

Encl(3)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

COMMANDER'S COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 4TH QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 1969

PART I. EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND

Certain basic factors continue to adversely affect the 5th Marine Division's ability to accomplish its combat mission.

Although over manning level in personnel strength, certain critical shortages in personnel continue. More significant is the continued personnel turbulence which has, in fact, been aggravated by the flow of personnel who have completed pre-deployment training with Staging Battalion and are assigned to the 5th Marine Division in a temporary hold status awaiting direct deployment to West Pac; implementation of the Phase II, accelerated release from active duty program for March through June 1969 will further aggravate this situation during the next quarter and may result in below-manning-level strength.

In the area of logistics, deficiencies in combat essential equipment and supplies continue due to greater priorities assigned to combat-deployed forces. Although this situation will improve due to increased availability of parts and supplies, certain equipment will continue to be characterized by high deadline rates, e.g., the HIMO Forklift, and TD-15 Tractor. Current phase-out plans for the M422 "Mighty Mite", M38A1 1/2 Ton Truck, M50A1 "Ontos", generators PU 348 and PE 197, scooploader TL-16, and HIMO Tractor may result in increased deadline rates in this equipment. Nevertheless, except for the above specific areas, the logistic readiness of the Division is excellent as demonstrated by the projected C-1 status of RLT-27 units for the next quarter.

Due to the turbulence in personnel, emphasis continues on individual training. Nevertheless, minimum requirements for large unit exercises are being fulfilled. The transfer of CD responsibilities to the 27th Marines during the next quarter will improve the technical training readiness of combat support units previously assigned this mission. An overall training readiness category of C-2 will be achieved during the next quarter.

Despite the above adverse factors, a stabilization in the personnel situation, priority supply actions, and a short period of intensive unit-integrated training, would insure the Division's achieving a readiness posture capable of carrying-out its combat mission.

PART II. EVALUATION OF UNITS

5th Medical Battalion (-). Current capabilities are limited due to a serious shortage of Medical Officers and enlisted Operating Room Technicians which drastically limits unit medical training. The logistics state of readiness is reduced by the substitution of PU-239 Generators for PU-482 Generators. No appreciable improvement in the status of this unit is anticipated during the quarter.

SECRET

5th Shore Party Battalion (-). The current capability of the command is limited due to the low percentage of MOS 1381 (Shore Party man) on board and the deadline of critical items of engineer equipment. Two (2) of six (6) Koehring 2N Crane Shovels, two (2) of three (3) TD-15 Tractors, and one (1) of six (6) RPK-60 Forklifts are deadlined. Limited improvement is anticipated in the area of deadlined equipment toward the latter part of the reporting period.

1st Civil Affairs Group. Current capabilities are limited due to the serious deficiency of both officer and enlisted ranks on board. A critical MOS shortage in both officer and enlisted ranks also adversely contributes to the current personnel readiness status. Training readiness is reduced and any attempt toward improvement is directly related to personnel shortages. The readiness category for supply and equipment is satisfactory with no decline anticipated. A very limited improvement in overall readiness is expected during the quarter based upon anticipated personnel input.

5th Bridge Company. Current capabilities are limited by certain MOS and personnel shortages. Existing training status plus the shortage of one (1) bridge erection boat and complete lack of spare parts to support three (3) bridge erection boats and four (4) 5 KW Floodlight units on hand contributes to current readiness status. One (1) of three (3) bridge platoons is currently in a cadre status due to critical MOS shortages. No improvement in the readiness status of this unit is anticipated through the reporting period.

5th Tank Battalion (-). Current capabilities are limited due to shortages in qualified personnel, insufficiently trained tank crewmen and equipment deadline rate. Nine (9) of thirty-five (35) M48A3 Tanks are projected for combat deadline during the reporting period. In addition twelve (12) M48A3 and six (6) M103A2 gun tubes have less than 50% of tube life remaining. Replacement gun tubes are currently on order. A shortage of fifteen (15) M37 .30 Caliber machine guns exists; however, receipt is expected in the near future. The anticipated receipt of spare parts and reduction in deadline rate should result in improvement in training and logistic readiness categories during the quarter.

5th Hospital Company. Current capabilities are limited due to a shortage of Medical Officer specialists, Navy enlisted technicians and corpsmen, lack of a laundry unit, and insufficient generator power to support the entire company. No improvement in the status of this unit is anticipated during the quarter.

9th Separate Bulk Fuel Company. Current capabilities are adversely affected by a shortage in technically trained personnel. Personnel shortages contribute to a deficiency in training, thus reducing the residual combat strength of the unit. The unit is capable of deploying two (2) of four (4) combat ready bulk fuel platoons, reinforced with an engineer equipment and packaged fuel section. A gradual improvement in combat readiness capability is anticipated during the quarter.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

15th Dental Company. Current capabilities are limited due to a critical shortage of Dental Officers. No improvement is anticipated during the quarter.

17th Dental Company. Current capabilities are limited due to a shortage of Dental Officers and insufficient generator power produced by PU-239 generators currently utilized as a substitute item for PU-482 generators. No improvement is anticipated during the quarter.

PART III. EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

1. Reference (b) provides information which directly affects the status of contingency planning and the ability to evaluate the combat readiness of this command to provide forces for the accomplishment of specific missions. In addition, for each plan listed below, the 5th Marine Division has been tentatively tasked to provide supporting, versus primary, forces on order (enclosure (1), reference (b)). Accordingly, only a general narrative evaluation is included at this time.

2. List of current contingency plans for which this Command may provide forces:

- a. CINCPACFLT/FMFPAC General War Plans
- b. ALCANUS-ADP-66
- c. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25
- d. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 27
- e. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 33
 - (1) COMUSMACTHAI OPLAN 32, Phase II
 - (2) COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 32, Phase II/IV
- f. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 37
- g. CONCPACFLT OPLAN 39
- h. COMUSTAFF OPLAN 1/66
- i. SEATO FIELD FORCES OPLAN 6 AND CENTRAL REGION SFF OPLAN 4
- j. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 81
- k. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 82
 - (1) USCINCSO OPLAN 6300
 - (2) COMFIRSTFLT OPLAN 82-68
 - (3) V MEF OPLAN 82-(YR)

SECRET

3. Narrative Evaluation. The above plans call for force requirements at levels ranging from a BLT to a MEF. 5th Marine Division OPLAN 303-68 is a readiness mount-out plan for BLT(s) and a RLT headquarters for movement by airlift, and BLT, RLT or Division (-) by sealift. Change number 1 to this OPLAN satisfies the requirement set forth in V MEF 82-(YR) for the ground element of a MEB. Utilizing the total resources of the Division, it is considered that up to one RLT by sea or airlift could be deployed.

4. Deployability Considerations. Utilizing the criteria for deployment outlined in Marine Corps Order 1300.11E, the following is the deployability status of the 5th Marine Division as of 17 February:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
a. T/O	<u>906</u>	<u>14,744</u>
b. T/O deficit of total chargeable strength	<u>35</u>	<u>0 (574 overage)</u>
c. Non-deployable in accordance with above criteria.	<u>564</u>	<u>10,728</u>
d. Deployable	<u>307</u>	<u>4,590</u>
e. Total additional personnel required to deploy at T/O strength in accordance with above criteria.	<u>599</u>	<u>10,154</u>
f. Available for deployment with no criteria applied.	<u>871</u>	<u>15,318</u>

5. Civil Disturbance Contingency. The 5th Marine Division has been tasked to provide two (2) Civil Disturbance Regiments to support CONARC's Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot). 5th Marine Division Oplan 100-69 sets forth the task organization and provides instructions to meet this requirement. Two (2) Civil Disturbance Regiments are available at T/O strength and are fully trained (Readiness Status CD-1). No deployment criteria are applied to Civil Disturbance personnel.

DECLASSIFIED

pac
CONFIDENTIAL

Serial
Date:
10 MAR 1969

013569

CONFIDENTIAL- Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence

FIRST REPORT on CG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing for 1/15/69 Ser:
OCS169 of 1 March 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, Fourth Quarter
1968 (MC 2000-11)

1. Forwarded.

MARION C. DALBY
BY DIRECTION

1st MAW

4th MAW

COPY NO 11 OF 13 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCL (4)

Encl (4)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

--HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

3:ALW:wlf
Ser: 0306169
2 March 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commander's Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, Fourth Quarter
Fiscal Year 1969 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B
(b) FMFPacBul 3000 of 16 Dec 68

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in references (a)
and (b) the following report is herewith submitted:

PART I

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing will continue to provide adequate support throughout the Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 1969 for III Marine Amphibious Force ground units. As in past reporting periods, the 7th Air Force out-of-country efforts (Steel Tiger and Commando Hunt programs) will also be supported with fighter/attack aircraft.

It must be noted that certain limitations do exist which degrade the overall performance of this command and it is predicted that these limitations will continue throughout the reporting period. These deficiencies have been reported by means of the operational reporting system such as MARES/FORSTAT Reports, and are highlighted herein:

a. Personnel: This Command is above established manning level strength overall but specific shortages exist in enlisted and officer skills. These deficiencies are detrimental to the readiness of specific units.

b. Aircraft Availability: The lack of specific maintenance skills indicated in paragraph a., coupled with the paucity of repair parts and support equipment have reduced aircraft availability for this command.

1st MAW S&C No.	Copy No.
765-69	11

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

3:ALW:wlf
Ser:

PART II

All units of this command are considered effective for combat and are capable of performing assigned missions throughout the Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 1969 although critical personnel shortages and support equipment and supply deficiencies will not allow for an increase in readiness categories.

E H Finlayson
E. H. FINLAYSON
By direction

Copy to:
FMFPac (orig plus (11))
G-3, Reports (1)
File (1)

FORCE S & C FILE
CAMP H. M. SMITH

17 MAR 69 10 06

RECEIVED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac
MCAS, El Toro, Santa Ana, California 92709

3d MAW S & C FILES
9 0730
Copy No. 10 of 12

3:JAT:bae
1500
003A05969
28 Feb 1969

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commanders Combat Readiness Report for Fourth Quarter
Fiscal Year 1969 (U) (RS MC 3000-11)
Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

1. In compliance with reference (a) the following report is submitted:

PART I

The overall combat readiness of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing is approximately 65%. This percentile is expected to remain the same throughout the reporting period. This Command is limited in its ability to perform its assigned mission on a sustained basis due to shortages of personnel, supply and equipment.

PART II

a. H&HS-38: This unit's ability to perform sustained logistical support functions for the Marine Air Control Group is limited by shortages in the supply and equipment areas.

b. SU-MACS-1 (NBCWS): This unit is effective with exception of its ability to perform the chemical portion of its mission due to a shortage of supplies and equipment.

c. MACS-7: This unit is unable to provide sustained air surveillance and control of aircraft and surface-to-air missiles for anti-air warfare because of a shortage of equipment and spare parts that has precluded adequate training of personnel.

d. MASS-5: The ability of this unit to provide required control of CAS or DAS aircraft is limited by shortages of trained personnel, equipment and spare parts.

e. 2D LAAM BN: This battalion's effectiveness in either an integrated air defense system or as an independent battalion is critically limited due to recent relocations and activation of Detachment Alfa at MCAS, Yuma. Anticipate upgrade next reporting period.

SECRET

ENCL (5)

Encl (5)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

f. H&MS-33: This squadron is limited in its ability to supply logistical support for units of the Marine Aircraft Group due to shortages and instability of personnel.

g. VMCJ-3: This unit is limited in its ability to accomplish its mission due to severe shortages in all areas.

h. VMA-214: This squadron is limited in its ability to perform its mission on a sustained basis due to shortages and instability of personnel.

i. VMFA-531: This squadron is unable to perform its mission as a result of critical shortages in all areas.

j. VMFA-323: This unit will relocate to this Command from WestPac early in the reporting period and will be in an ineffective combat status throughout the period while reorganizing.

k. VMGR-352: This squadron is capable of performing its assigned mission for a limited period of time. Sustained operations will be curtailed by a shortage of qualified aircrews. Limited augmentation is available within MWSG-37 assets to enhance the squadron readiness in order to maintain continued operations.

l. H&MS-56: This squadron's ability to provide logistical support for units attached to the Marine Aircraft Group is limited due to shortages of trained personnel.

m. MABS-56: Initial outfitting deficiencies continue to restrict this unit's ability to provide air base facilities and services.

n. MATCU-74: This unit is combat ineffective as it is reequipping. Prime shortages exist in all areas.

o. MATCU-75: Due to recent activation this unit will remain ineffective throughout the period. Major shortages exist in all areas.

p. HMM-163: This unit is still in the process of reforming and reequipping and effectiveness will continue to remain constant throughout this period.

q. HMH-363: This unit reformed with zero personnel/equipment status, and will be ineffective throughout the period.

r. HML-267: This squadron should attain a combat effective status by the end of this reporting period. Its prime deficiencies are personnel and aircraft shortages.

SECRET

PART III

a. CINCPACFLT GWP-1 (YR) - Third Marine Aircraft Wing tasked to support V MEF and deploy on order. No specific units are designated.

b. ALCANUS EDP - (YR) - Third Marine Aircraft Wing tasked under V MEF, no specific units designated.

c. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 25 - Fifth Marine Expeditionary Force tasked to provide back up support for this plan. Wing assets (3 VMF/VMFA) are not on hand to provide all units as specified under V MEF requirements, but are available as specified for CG, 3d MAW support (1 VMFA). VMFA-531 assigned as on call squadron for this plan.

d. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 27 - Resources available (1 VMFA) to support this plan if needed. VMFA-531 assigned as on call squadron.

e. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 32 (PHASE II) - Third Marine Aircraft Wing tasked to provide one VMCJ detachment which is available at present.

f. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 37-65 - Third Marine Aircraft Wing (-) tasked under V MEF to mount out full strength units as required.

g. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 71 - Third Marine Aircraft Wing is tasked to provide 12 KC-130F aircraft for refueling services. This capability does not exist since 3d MAW has an average on-hand of only 10 aircraft. Although authorized 16 aircraft, par schedule averages 4 aircraft, 1 aircraft is configured with FMFPac Command module and 1 aircraft continuously down due to parts shortages.

h. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 81 SUPPORTS CINCLANT OPLAN 303, 304 313, & 315 - This plan calls for 2 VMA, detachment VMCJ, and detachment VMGR. Presently only one VMA (VMA-214) in 3d MAW.

i. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 82 SUPPORTS USCINCSO 6300 PLANS - Fifth Marine Expeditionary Force Oplan 82 supports these plans and tasks 3d MAW with a Landing Force (Brigade) Aviation Element. Present assets do not include a VMA(AW). No fixed wing units are carrier qualified as required for support of these plans.

SECRET

j. SEATO FIELD FORCE (SFF OPLAN 6 AND CENTRAL REGION SFF OPLAN 4) - Third Marine Aircraft Wing tasked under Fifth Marine Expeditionary Force for mount out in support of these plans. No individual units specified.

k. FMFLANT OPLAN 2303 (YR) - Third Marine Aircraft Wing is tasked to provide one VMCJ (ECM) detachment of 9 aircraft. Present EF-10B assets are 4 aircraft assigned.

A. H. Adams
A. H. ADAMS

DECLASSIFIED

#2
CONFIDENTIAL

10 MAR 1969
082069

1000

1000

10 MAR 1969

CONFIDENTIAL- Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence

FIRST SUPPLEMENT on CG, Force Logistic Command ltr 1/LSC/1st ser 1000
Ser: 00100 of 21 Feb 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

To: Commanding General, First Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report for Fourth quarter FY 1969
(NO 300-11)

1. Forwarded.

MARION C. DALBY
BY DIRECTION

COPY NO 11 OF 13 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCL (6)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Force Logistic Command
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
APO San Francisco, 96300

3/LOC/1st
3000
Ser No:
21 Feb 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report for Fourth Quarter FY 1969

Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B
(b) CG, FMFRac msg 280600Z Feb 1967


1. The following report, submitted pursuant to instructions contained in references (a) and (b), constitutes an evaluation of the combat readiness of the Force Logistic Command/1st Force Service Regiment.

a. Part I - EVALUATION OF THE COMMAND. The Force Logistic Command/1st Force Service Regiment is capable of performing its mission of providing essential supply, maintenance and service support to the III Marine Amphibious Force. However, if the tactical situation changes, the Force Logistic Command/1st Force Service Regiment has a limited capability to furnish two fully ready Force Logistic Support Groups to support III Marine Amphibious Forces.

b. Part II - EVALUATION OF UNITS.

(1) Force Logistic Support Group Alpha is capable of performing its currently reduced mission. Because of personnel limitations Force Logistic Support Group Alpha could not, at the present time, perform as a Service Battalion in support of a Marine Division.

(2) All other units are capable of fulfilling their assigned missions.


D. F. PONCE, JR.
Major General

Copy 1 of 11 copies

DECLASSIFIED TWO YEARS AFTER
TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

PAGE 11 OF 11 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl(6)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

9thMAB S&C
0015730

69-2139
3/edh
3500
27 Feb 1969
See# 00142-64

SECRET

SECRET

From: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, Fourth Quarter FY69
(Report Symbol MC 3000-11)

Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2B

Encl: (1) Part I - Evaluation of Command
Part II - Evaluation of Units
Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

1. In accordance with reference (a) the subject report is hereby submitted.

JOHN E. WILLIAMS

Copy to: CG, FMFPac (PMD)

Copy 8 of 10 Copies
9thMAB S&C

SECRET

SECRET

ENCL (7)

(encl(7))

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECRET

Part I Evaluation of the Command

During the Fourth Quarter, FY69, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade will be marginally combat ready (C-3) to perform assigned missions due to the deployment of its major combat elements. (Air and Ground).

Non-deployed elements of the Brigade will retain the capability to:

- (1) Train replacement personnel for 9th MAB units committed to combat in RVN as required.
- (2) Conduct contingency planning.
- (3) Plan and execute BMT rehabilitation in conjunction with other Okinawa based Marine Corps activities.
- (4) Command and Control MEB level operations, provided operational control of the assigned Infantry Regiment Headquarters and the assigned Artillery Battery Headquarters, i.e. Headquarters RLT-26 and Headquarters 1/19, currently under operational control of CG III MAF, are returned to 9th MAB.

Recent realignment of all units of the 9th MAB/5th Division lineage, under command less CPCON of the 9th MAB has enhanced the capabilities of the Brigade to be task organized as required to meet contingency commitments.

During the last quarter the Brigade restored a limited capability to perform 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance for 9th MAB ground units. It is expected that this capability will increase during the 4th quarter, contingent on receipt of repair parts for major items of equipment and component parts of shop vans belonging to FSB, and assignment of sufficient supervisory personnel of appropriate Military Occupational Specialties.

Part II Evaluation of Units

RLT-26 (Rear) - This unit continues to retain the capability of training replacement personnel for deployed 9th MAB units and for locally assigned missions as required. Some shortages of personnel have been experienced in key billets and it is not anticipated that this problem will be alleviated during this quarter. RLT-26 (Rear) remains in a C-2 overall combat readiness category and this rating should remain valid throughout the fourth quarter FY69.

SECRET
Enclosure (1)
SECRET

SECRET**SECRET**

Provisional Service Battalion - At the present time this Battalion cannot perform the maintenance and support mission assigned. Personnel shortages and deadlined equipment dictate an operational readiness condition of C-4, even though limited third and fourth echelon capabilities have been obtained. An acute shortage of experienced supervisory personnel, lack of spare parts, and shop vans missing critical components, seriously reduce the capability of this unit. Increased combat effectiveness will be contingent upon personnel input and further restoration of equipment.

This command is currently planning to send a 300 man Sub-Unit to Subic Bay, Philippines, during March 1969 to rehabilitate the First Battalion, Twenty Sixth Marines. The Maintenance Company will provide the largest input of personnel and equipment, with assistance from 3rd Force Service Regiment. This sub unit will be able to perform its maintenance and support mission. However, during the period of rehabilitation the Provisional Service Battalion will not be able to perform all the missions for which it has been organized and designed.

Communication Support Company - This unit has experienced considerable delay in obtaining commonly used parts, and items, component parts and equipment accessory items to replace shortages. As a result, this unit's ability to conduct sustained operations, in some sections has been reduced. Further, deadlined equipment and continued deployment of combat essential items to the 3LF's, limit its unit's ability to perform its mission. A combat readiness category rating of C-3 will continue during this 4th quarter FY69.

Marine Aircraft Group-15 (Main) - Overall combat readiness for this unit is considered to be substantial and will remain C-2, although two units of the Group are below minimum readiness ratings this quarter. Units in the Group do have critical shortages in qualified personnel and equipment. With the exception of shortages experienced in MACS-8, other units do not derogate the capability of the Group to perform any mission assigned commensurate with the units presently assigned to the group.

1. MACS-8: During this quarter, this unit's readiness rating should improve substantially due to command emphasis on personnel augmentation and by improvements in their equipment posture. To date, this unit is considered to have a limited capability because of critical shortages in the areas of equipment and qualified technical personnel.

2. MATCS-66: Continues to be relatively ineffective and has been relegated to an almost cadre status. Due to a dearth of air-traffic and controlled air space, this unit is unable to set up or operate any organic equipment. Controllers do receive training on the permanent control facilities located at Futema, Naha and Kadana. This does not, however, prepare them to operate their own expeditionary equipment. This unit would

SECRET
Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET**SECRET**

experience grave difficulties in attempting to carry out its assigned mission, should the group be deployed to a site that would require full use of all expeditionary equipment.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

The Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade is required to provide forces for the contingency plans listed below. The ability of the Brigade to provide the required forces for each plan is to be evaluated based upon forces OPCON to 9th MAB or the command whose plan is to be supported.

<u>Plan</u>	<u>Force Requirement and Evaluation</u>
COMSEVENTHFLT General War Plan (GWP)	<u>Force:</u> MAB <u>Evaluation:</u> Not currently available to 9th MAB or to COMSEVENTHFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 23	<u>Force:</u> SLF <u>Evaluation:</u> Available to COMSEVENTHFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 25	<u>Force:</u> MAG - (one of three fighter squadrons, if available with supporting aviation units) <u>Evaluation:</u> Only one fighter squadron is available.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 27	<u>Force:</u> MAG - (one to three fighter squadrons, if available with supporting aviation units) <u>Evaluation:</u> Only one fighter squadron is available.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 32 PHASE II	<u>Force:</u> MAB <u>Evaluation:</u> Not currently available to 9th MAB or to COMSEVENTHFLT.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 60	<u>Force:</u> SLF <u>Evaluation:</u> Available to COMSEVENTHFLT.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 101	<u>Force:</u> SLF <u>Evaluation:</u> Available.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 120	<u>Force:</u> SLF to full Brigade <u>Evaluation:</u> Forces in excess of the two SLF's OPCON to COMSEVENTHFLT are not available.

SECRET
Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET**SECRET****COMNAVTHFLT
OPLAN 105**

Force: MAB (less fixed wing aircraft)
Evaluation: Not available to 9th MAB or to
COMNAVTHFLT

**COMSTAFF
OPLAN 1/66**

Force: MAB augmented by a fourth NLT.
Evaluation: Not currently available to 9th MAB
or to COMNAVTHFLT.

**FMFPAC
OPLAN 100**

Force: Provisional Battalion or less depending
on 9th MAB assets on Okinawa.
Evaluation: Available.

**FMFPAC
OPLAN 100B**

Force: Security force (approximately 400 Marines)
for security of Northern Okinawa installations.
Evaluation: Available.

The following operations plans have been overtaken by events or are
waiting revision by higher authority.

1. COMNAVTHFLT OPLAN 37
2. COMNAVTHFLT OPLAN 39
3. COMNAVTHFLT OPLAN 32
PHASE III/IV

CAMP H. W. SMITH
FORCE 2 & C EIGE

1 MAY 68 11 55

RECEIVED

SECRET

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FORCE TROOPS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA 92278

691908

SECRET

SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3/RMH/ccn

3500/1

Ser 004/69

FEB 19 1969

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report for 4th Quarter, Fiscal
Year 1969 (U)
Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B
(b) CG FMFPac ltr 3P/ado Ser: 0001085-67 of 20 Nov 67 (TS)

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted:

a. Part I Evaluation of the Command. This Command will be capable of performing its assigned mission during the forthcoming quarter with the exceptions noted in subparagraph b.

b. Part II Evaluation of Units.

(1) The Fifth Dental Company (-) remains incapable of performing its assigned combat service support mission in view of the personnel limitations imposed by the NAVY MANPOWER Authorization (NAVPER 576/OPNAV 1000). If committed to combat it would be necessary to bring the Fifth Dental Company (-) to full T/O strength in order to accomplish its assigned mission.

(2) The Ninth Communication Battalion (-) is operating minus its Communication Support Company. The pool of communication assets to support a MEF Headquarters echelonment capability, normally provided by this company, is unavailable. The lack of the Communication Support Company coupled with T/O deficiencies within the battalion will make it difficult for the Ninth Communication Battalion to accomplish its primary mission for a sustained period. The Ninth Communication Battalion has 73% of its authorized personnel on board. Of this total, 36% are deployable based on the criteria contained in reference (a). This criteria, with the Vietnam returnee requirements reduced to twelve months in CONUS, reveals that 42% of its personnel are deployable.

(3) Company D (Rein), 13th Engineer Battalion, consisting of 3 Engineer Platoons and 1 Equipment Platoon, is currently manned at 82% of its authorized strength. Deficiencies as reported in accordance with reference (a) preclude this unit from being fully combat ready. This unit is manned primarily by Vietnam returnees and its deployment capability, based on the criteria contained in reference (a), is negligible.

004/69

F.T. S&C FILES B.T. NO.

F.T. S&C FILES COPY NO. 6 OF 13 COPIES

SECRET

SECRET

ENCL (8)

DECLASSIFIED

File Troops, FMFPac

4th Qtr, FY-69

SECRETSECRET

(4) The 17th CI Team has equipment shortages, as reported in accordance with reference (a), which would make it difficult for the team to accomplish its primary mission in a combat environment.

c. Part III Evaluation of Operational Commitments


(1) This command supports the Fifth Marine Division's 303-68 Plan by providing a detachment with equipment from the Ninth Communication Battalion(-). This plan can be supported.

(2) Reference (b) assigns this command as a contributing command in support of the V MEF 82-(YR) plans. The V MEF 82-(YR) plans require the following forces from Force Troops, FMFPac:

270-man Communication Support Company from 9th Comm Bn(-)
1 155mm Gun Battery (SP)
1 8" Howitzer Platoon (SP)

Additionally, Force Troops, FMFPac will be required to provide 7 officers and 13 enlisted personnel to the MEB Headquarters Staff and, when directed, provide the MEB Commander/CTF 19. This support can be provided; however, sustained operations would greatly reduce combat effectiveness.

(3) It is emphasized that if the total manpower assets of the command were to be called upon to support these plans, this support would be severely limited based on the criteria for deployment of personnel contained in reference (a). Of the total Force Troops personnel on board (1381), only 43% can be deployed. Using this criteria, with the Vietnam returnee requirement reduced to twelve months in CONUS, 54% of this command's personnel would be deployable. Percentages deployable are based on total officer and enlisted personnel.


REGAN FULLER

SECRET**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

**HEADQUARTERS
3d Force Service Regiment
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO, San Francisco, 96602**

**3/APS/mas
3480
18 Feb 69**

**From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific**

Subj: Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter FY-69

**Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B
(b) CG, FMFPac msg P132239Z Feb 69
(c) CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC 4D/CNL Ser: 0109766 of Oct 66**

1. The report required by reference (a) and (b) is hereby submitted:

PART I: In accordance with reference (c), Third Force Service Regiment is currently carrying out its assigned mission in support of operations in RVN and is combat ready.

PART II: In accordance with reference (c), subordinate units of this command are carrying out assigned tasks in support of Third Force Service Regiment mission and are considered combat ready.

PART III: Third Force Service Regiment provides forces and Logistical Support for Fleet Marine Forces Pacific Operation Plans 10-68, 62-68, 100-68, 100A-68, 100B-68, 101-68, and 201-(YR). Implementation of contingency forces under any of these Operation Plans will seriously curtail ability to continue T/O combat mission of PART I above.

M. J. PADALINO

ENCL(9)

Encl(9)

DECLASSIFIED

3d FSR

4th Qtr, FY-69

CONFIDENTIAL

Headquarters
5TH FORN SERVICE REGIMENT (-), FMF
Camp Pendleton, California 92035

682021 000000

H 2

S/PCN/mjk
Ser: 010-69

FEB 27 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (C)

Ref: (a) MCO F1000.2B

Encl: (1) Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 4th QTR F169

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is forwarded.
2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

J. A. JONES

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

GP-4

S&C FILES - 5th FSR

Control No.

69-082

Copy No.

10

of _____ Copies

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCL (10)

Encl (10)

5th FSR

4th QTR, FY-69

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMANDER'S COMBAT READINESS REPORT 4TH QTR, FY69

THE QUARTERLY COMBAT READINESS REPORT, 4TH QTR, FY69 IS A REPORT PREPARED AND SUBMITTED IN THE LAST MONTH OF THE 3RD QTR, FY69. THE 4TH QTR, FY69 IS THE REPORTING PERIOD COVERED IN THIS REPORT.

PART I. EVALUATION OF COMMAND

5th Force Service Regiment (-) is capable of deploying and performing its assigned mission within the limitations discussed in Part II. The significant factor contributing to these limitations is availability of personnel resources. This command is capable of supporting a single Logistic Support Group for sustained operations.

While in garrison this unit can perform its assigned mission with minor limitations. Training readiness will improve as critical technical billets are filled.

PART II. EVALUATION OF UNITS

The operational effectiveness of the following units will be limited during the reporting period in the functional areas indicated.

Headquarters and Service Battalion: Graves Registration, Aviation Support Forward and Salvage capability as none are authorized in the manning level. Longshoreman capability due to manning level not being activated.

Supply Battalion: Capable of providing functional supply support from only one LSG in support of a MEB(RLT)/MAG.

Maintenance Battalion: Capable of providing only limited maintenance repair for radio relay equipment.

PART III. EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

5th Force Service Regiment (-) has the capability to support contingency plans set forth in Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Plan 201-(YR), Commanding General, 5th Marine Division 303-68 and Commanding General, V MEF Plan 82-(YR) providing not more than one plan is executed during one given period. 5th Force Service Regiment (-) also has the capability

21

Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

of providing a Provisional Civil Disturbance Rifle Company as part of the Provisional Civil Disturbance Battalion tasked to the Commanding General, MCRD, San Diego and providing EOD support to the Commanding General, 5th Marine Division Civil Disturbance Plan 100-69. 5th Force Service Regiment is also tasked with and prepared to provide logistic support of civil disturbance units if deployed.

2

Enclosure (1)

COMM H W 2 WITH
FORCE 2 & C E I E

CONFIDENTIAL

4 APR 88 08 05

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED

691987

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/CH/drt
Ser:006-69
28 FEB 1969

SECRET

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 1969 (U)
Ref: (a) MCO P3000.2B

1. (U) In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

PART I - (C) Evaluation of Command

a. The contingency plans requiring Brigade support/involvement are of a nature that require evaluation of individual unit readiness rather than evaluation of the Brigade as an entity.

PART II - (S) Evaluation of Units

a. 1st Battalion (Rein), 27th Marines, is not considered combat ready at this time due to the phased activation of subordinate units and the resultant variation in the units' training readiness. Shortages of 2nd and 3rd echelon repair parts and qualified personnel continue to keep combat essential equipment deadlined.

b. Marine Aircraft Group-24 is not considered combat ready due to non-receipt of aircraft weapons systems, programmed personnel, supply support and maintenance/ground support equipment. It is anticipated that MAG-24 will be marginally combat ready (C-3) during the 4th Qtr FY-69.

c. H&MS-24 is not considered combat ready due to shortages of trained personnel in essential ranks and MOS's, intermediate maintenance supply/support equipment and trained maintenance personnel for F-4J and TA-4F aircraft. Present shortages of qualified helicopter mechanics will restrict this unit's ability to fulfill helicopter commitments.

d. MABS-24 is marginally combat ready (C-3) with major deficiencies in supply and equipment. This command is capable of deployment for only a short period of time and in support of limited operations. With continued inputs of supplies and equipment, MABS-24 will attain a (C-2) status in the 4th Qtr FY-69.

e. MATCU-70 is not considered combat ready due to the repair status and spare parts shortage of major equipment components recently received. Such equipment being inoperable renders the unit's air traffic control

COPY NO. 1 OF 2 COPIES

SECRET

ENCL (11)

Encl(11)

~~SECRET~~3/CH/drt
Ser: 006-69

capability ineffective. However, it is anticipated that the unit will attain a (C-3) status in the 4th Qtr FY-69.

f. VMFA-212 is not considered combat ready due to the lack of aviators and NFO's. The shortage of authorized T/O aircrews and the inability to practice Flight Operations in Phase II Missile Intercept Syllabus training will cause the training percentage to remain at a low level until the squadron is in receipt of the AWG-10 Airborne Radar. It is anticipated that a (C-3) status will be reached during the 4th Qtr FY-69 even though this squadron is not scheduled to receive the AWG-10 Radar and its associated test equipment during the quarter.

g. VMFA-235 is not considered combat ready due to assigned aircraft being limited to an air-to-ground capability until the AWG-10 Airborne Radar Systems are installed and operational. Shortages of fully trained personnel in rank and MOS's are being remedied with maximum utilization of formal schools and OJT. It is anticipated a (C-3) status will be reached during the 4th Qtr FY-69.

h. MACS-2 is not considered to be combat ready due to critical shortages of repair parts. During this period this unit will not be capable of carrying out the assigned mission as established by T/O M-8630 and JTF OPLAN 1-68. Unit combat readiness is expected to remain (C-4) until such time as the repair parts shortage is alleviated.

PART III - (S) Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. MCP (FMFPAC)

(1) Subject to the limitations stated in Part II above, this command can comply with the provisions of MCP (FMFPAC).

b. JTF OPLAN 1-68

(1) This CINCPAC (JTF) Plan provides for all Navy/Marine units with an air defense capability to assist in the air defense of the Hawaiian Area. This plan states that MACS-2 will augment the 326th Air Division's radar surveillance and weapons control capability.

(2) MACS-2 will participate in this OPLAN only to the extent of performing those air defense functions of detecting, recording, and reporting as an augmentation air control facility in support of the 326th Air Division. The non-availability of the height finding radar and IFF/SIF equipment precludes a weapons control capability.

(3) VMFA-212 and VMFA-235 are required to participate in this OPLAN when directed. However, these units possess no air-to-air capability at this time due to non-availability of AWG-10 radar and AERO

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~3/CH/drt
Ser: 006-69

3-A and LAU 7-A missile adapters.

c. 326th Air Division OPLAN 5-68

(1) This OPLAN supports PACAF OPLAN 1-68 and provides for the defense of the land areas of the Pacific Islands Air Defense Region. MACS-2 is listed within this plan as an augmentation unit. The procedures listed in this plan are compatible with JTF OPLAN 1-68.

(2) MACS-2 is capable of operating in this OPLAN with the same capabilities as listed above for participation in JTF OPLAN 1-68.

(3) VMFA-212 and VMFA-235 are required to participate in this OPLAN when directed. However, the comments of the JTF OPLAN 1-68 participation by these units are applicable.

d. COMUSSTAFF 2-68

(1) As reflected in Part II above, this command would be unable to provide the required forces for this plan.

W. C. Mc Graw, Jr.
W. C. MC GRAW, JR.

COPIES OF OPLAN
FORWARDED TO
3/10/68

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

691640

1ST AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY
Fleet Marine Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

SECRET

PLE/DFB:jtd
5231/3500
Ser: 012-69
13 Feb 1969

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Quarterly Combat Readiness Report, 4th Quarter, FY 69 (U)
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2B
(b) Rev. No. 2 to T/O M-4852

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

2. Part I - Evaluation of the Command

a. Considering the combined assets of 1st ANGLICO, MCAS Kaneohe and Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, Republic of Vietnam, it is my judgement that 1st ANGLICO could accomplish its combat mission as assigned in reference (b), upon the unification of these units in one geographical area. Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO is presently OPCON COMUSMACV.

3. Part II - Evaluation of Units

a. 1st ANGLICO, MCAS Kaneohe, consists of a reduced Headquarters section, a reduced Division Air/Naval Gunfire Platoon, and a reduced Brigade Air/Naval Gunfire Platoon. These elements are capable of providing the personnel and communications package for control and coordination of air and naval gunfire at a division headquarters, and within one of its brigades. This Command is required to maintain third echelon electronic maintenance capability. The equipment is deployed with Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, along with other combat essential test equipment. In the event another contingency plan is executed, 1st ANGLICO's electronic material readiness will be critically limited. This capability is presently maintained through 1st Marine Brigade Field Maintenance.

4. Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

a. Current Contingency Plan Commitments

- (1) CINCPACFLT GWP - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (2) CINCPACFLT 27 - Support available as noted in paragraph 3a above.

SECRET

ENCL (12)

Encl (12)

1st ANGLICO

4th Qtr, FY-69

PLE/DFB:jtd
Ser: 012-69**SECRET**

- (3) CINCPACFLT 32 - Additional support limited as noted in paragraph 3a above.
- (4) CINCPACFLT 37 - Additional support limited as noted in paragraph 3a above.
- (5) CINCPACFLT 39 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (6) CINCPACFLT 41 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (7) CINCPACFLT 42 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (8) CINCPACFLT 60 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (9) CINCPACFLT 81 - Support available as noted in paragraph 3a above.
- (10) CINCPACFLT 82 - Support available as noted in paragraph 3a above.
- (11) SFF OPLAN 5 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (12) SFF OPLAN 7 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (13) SFF OPLAN 6 & CRSFF OPLAN 4 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (14) SFF OPLAN 99 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (15) COMUSTAFF 1/66 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.
- (16) COMSEVENTHFLT 104 - Support available as noted in paragraphs 2a and 3a above.

PHILIP L. ELLIOTT

SECRET

681981

SUB UNIT 2, FIRST RADIO BATTALION
Fleet Marine Force, FPO
San Francisco 96602

3:BDL:gm
3000/1
SSO: 00410-69
1 March 1969

SECRET
SECRET

From: Officer-in-Charge
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Commander's Combat Readiness Report (Report Symbol 3100.4)
Ref: (a) FMFPAC 3000.4A
(b) MCO F3000.2B

1. This report is submitted in compliance with references (a) and (b).
The period covered is for the fourth quarter, Fiscal Year 1969.

Part I - Evaluation of the Command

This command is considered marginally ready to accomplish its assigned mission. Redesignated Sub Unit 2, First Radio Battalion on 1 March 1969, this unit provides SIGINT support to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and is capable of providing direct support to a MEB/MAB.

Part II - Evaluation of Units

This command has no detached units.

Part III - Evaluation of Operational Commitments

Since this unit's redesignation on 1 March 1969, it has not been tasked to support any specific CINCPACFLT OPLANs. Due to the limited number of personnel and equipment assigned, this unit can provide only a small SIGINT support unit to a MEB/MAB in the initial execution phase of the following OPLANs.

OPLAN-27
OPLAN-82

CAMP H. M. SMITH
FORCE SIG OFFICE
By direction

3 MAR 69 08 11

RECEIVED

SECRET
SECRET

ENCL (13)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
DATE 10/1/99

COPY 10 of 11 Copies

(encl (13))

Sub Unit 2, 1st Radio BN

4th Qtr, FY-69