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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

VIETNAM

JANUARY 1969



FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine Corps forces in Vietnam for the month of January 1969. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through December 1968.

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SUMMARY

Large unit offensive action centered on the enemy's base and staging areas during the month, as he exhibited little disposition to risk battle in the populated lowlands. Friendly operations made major inroads in January against two of those areas the enemy previously thought secure -- Base Area 112 in western Quang Nam, where III MAF units killed 540 NVA/VC and seized 330 weapons; and Quang Ngai's Batangan peninsula, where Marines of both Special Landing Forces of the Seventh Fleet launched an amphibious assault in conjunction with shore-based Americal Division units, the coordinated action accounting for nearly 600 enemy killed, captured, or surrendered. And, in late January, III MAF mounted a regimental attack into an enemy staging complex in southern Quang Tri -- an offensive aimed at cutting NVA lines of communication into the three northern provinces.

III MAF units operating along the lowland fringe of central and southern I CTZ conducted over 13,000 small unit operations in January, providing an integral contribution to the combat and pacification campaigns. Accounting for 815 enemy killed or captured in almost 1,300 hostile engagements, these III MAF units continued to interdict enemy elements encroaching on the coastal plain, while also maintaining a ready capability to strike developing NVA and VC concentrations. Support to pacification progress was rendered through saturation patrolling and ambushing and, more directly, through tactical commitments to accelerated pacification operations.

Behind this screen of large and small unit operations and ARVN revolutionary development support, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign concluded on 31 January, with substantial progress toward attainment of its goals. As an added benefit of the campaign, by end-month the secure portion of the population had increased by 4.5% to 73.7% -- the highest yet recorded in I CTZ.

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Perceptible advances in III MAF's program to improve I CTZ lines of communication were made during the month with the opening of the Danang to Hue railroad, and completion of a semi-permanent bridge over the Ba Ren river south of Danang. Also in furtherance of the program, US Navy Seabees began construction of an expedient bridge at the old Liberty Bridge site, to provide a fully trafficable route between the An Hoa complex and Danang.

1st Marine Aircraft Wing pilots flew 7,707 fixed wing sorties during January - 6,410 in I CTZ, 1,067 over Laos, and 230 over or off-shore North Vietnam. Wing and SLF helicopter pilots flew 54,688 sorties, transporting 96,708 passengers and 12,580 tons of cargo. Also during the month, eight more OV-10A's were assigned to the 1st Wing. On 5 February, Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron-225 arrived at Danang with 12 A-6A aircraft, thus completing a successful trans-Pacific deployment from CONUS.

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
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LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

Combat in I CTZ was distinguished by the lowest level of action experienced since December 1967, as 14 III MAF and Special Landing Force (SLF) large unit operations accounted for 1,345 NVA/VC killed, 137 taken prisoner, and 735 weapons captured. The enemy, still suffering from the effects of his ill-fated 1968 offensive, avoided major engagements in January, keeping instead to his traditionally secure base areas. Friendly assaults into two of these regions, Base Area 112 and the Batangan peninsula, in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai, respectively, secured significant progress toward further erosion of enemy strength.

The locations of January large unit operations are shown below.

III MAF AND SLF OPERATIONS: JANUARY 1969



* Includes 480 enemy killed and 18 enemy and 281 weapons captured by US Army operations.
US Army casualties: 45 killed and 271 wounded and evacuated.

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Operations in Central and Southern I CTZ

While the bulk of the combat action occurring in I CTZ during January took place in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces, the contact generated by III MAF and SLF large unit operations involved primarily meeting engagements with small enemy units. Despite a force concentration of 30 infantry battalions deployed in the two provinces, the enemy adhered to the offensive pattern he established during late-summer 1968 -- a posture of consistent refusal of large-scale confrontation with friendly forces. He clearly is attempting to reconstitute and conserve his troop assets by holding his formations to relatively secure areas, a tactic made increasingly evident by the marked decline in lucrative targets acquired by III MAF reconnaissance elements during the month.

However, enemy efforts for protracted detachment from decisive action were afforded no respite, as our forces carried the war into areas he once considered safe from attack. Although these actions were not marked by major encounters, they gained substantial success in further eroding the enemy's already weakened troop and logistic strength. Large unit operations achieving the most significant results during January were TAYLOR COMMON, a campaign aimed at destroying enemy forces and logistic and training facilities southwest of Danang in Base Area 112, and BOLD MARINER, an amphibious assault by Marines of the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces against the enemy-dominated Batangan peninsula in Quang Ngai province.

-Operation TAYLOR COMMON

Initiated on 7 December 1968, Operation TAYLOR COMMON continued through January to inflict heavy losses against enemy forces in the area southwest of Danang. Controlled by Marine Task Force Yankee, the coordinated actions of five battalions of Marines, the 1st ARVN Ranger Group, and Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) forces cost the enemy

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more than 1,500 troops killed or captured in the TAYLOR COMMON area during the past two months.

Combat action in TAYLOR COMMON centered on two regions, the An Hoa basin, a scene of constant enemy activity throughout most of 1968, and Base Area 112, the high ground lying to the west and southwest. The latter, a known harboring area for major enemy headquarters, combat, and combat support elements, is characterized by mountainous terrain, covered for the most part by multilayered, 70-80 foot canopy and thick secondary growth -- factors which inhibit both maneuver and observation. Enemy units placed in the base area by current intelligence included the 21st NVA Regiment and major elements of the 368B and 141st NVA Regiments.

The plan of attack for TAYLOR COMMON involved extensive search and clear operations in the An Hoa basin, preparatory for a 15 December penetration of the primary objective, Base Area 112, by four Marine battalions. The assault into the base area featured the establishment of mobile fire support and combat bases to support wide-ranging ground and heliborne maneuver operations to destroy the enemy and his command and logistic facilities within the area. Executing heliborne assaults from the fire support bases (FSB's) into selected landing zones (LZ's), the infantry battalions fanned out in local search and destroy operations, upon successful completion of which the FSB's were displaced sequentially westward, deeper into the base area. As the canopy and dense undergrowth precluded the availability of existing sites for operating bases, expedient methods were employed to clear terrain for FSB's and LZ's. These included combat traps (MK-121 10,000 pound bombs parachute-dropped to cut a swath through the trees and other jungle vegetation), other air-delivered ordnance, and engineer elements equipped with chain-saws, demolitions, and light, helicopter-transportable tractors.

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Since the mid-December assault into the region, the attacking battalions have encountered little determined opposition in Base Area 112. The enemy thus far has advanced no organized defense of the complex, but rather has splintered into small units, attempting to escape detection and subsequent destruction by friendly forces. During January, Marine companies, radiating from widely-dispersed combat bases, developed multiple contacts with evading enemy units of up to platoon-size, resulting in an undramatic, but steady, attrition of enemy troops.

Beyond the scope of generally light ground contact obtaining, however, there was uncovered abundant evidence to confirm substantial enemy strength in Base Area 112. Patrolling units located numerous base camps, supply stores, and weapons and ammunition caches. On 5 January, for example, Company F, 5th Marines unearthed an arms cache containing 166 rifles and three crew-served weapons, eight miles west of An Hoa. And, a logistics complex discovered by elements of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines six miles southwest of Thuong Duc on the 22d yielded twenty-two 122mm rockets, nearly 1,000 82mm mortar rounds, 501 RPG rounds, 25 rifles, 17 cases of small arms ammunition, eleven and one-half tons of rice, and a pen containing 65 live pigs.

The map on the following page portrays the scheme of maneuver in Base Area 112 and the results of Operation TAYLOR COMMON through 31 January.


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OPERATION TAYLOR COMMON: 1-31 JANUARY 1969



In the An Hoa basin sector of TAYLOR COMMON, operations were marked by occasional skirmishes with small enemy units maneuvering between An Hoa and Go Noi Island, six miles to the northeast. The following examples typify combat action in this region during January.

-During the evening of 5 January, two platoons of Company D engaged an estimated 50-man enemy force along a small river, six miles east-northeast of An Hoa. Reinforced by a platoon from Company D, 7th Marines, which joined the action from the northeast, the Marines cleared the river bank, killing 19 Viet Cong. Friendly casualties in the one-hour firefight were one killed and six wounded and evacuated.

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-At 1800 on 15 January, a Company K, 1st Marines (attached to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines) security element observed approximately 20 enemy, busily engaged in mining a section of Liberty Road, two miles northeast of An Hoa. Artillery and mortar fire claimed 13 Viet Cong.

-During mid-morning on 16 January, a Company C patrol observed an enemy platoon moving through a stream-bed two and one-half miles northeast of the industrial complex. Maneuvering to intercept the enemy column, the patrol then augmented organic weapon fire with artillery, killing 25, while sustaining no friendly casualties. An hour later, an aerial observer, supporting Company A, spotted another enemy platoon less than a mile to the north and utilized an artillery fire mission to kill 17 more.

The most intense action to occur in the TAYLOR COMMON area took place during the night of 29 January in the western sector of Go Noi Island. At 2215, a Company C, 7th Marines squad ambush observed a force of approximately 300 enemy cross to the south bank of the Ky Lam river, four miles west of Dien Ban. The enemy unit, apparently forced south by Marine Operation LINN RIVER and ARVN Operation HUNG QUANG 1-03 to the northwest and northeast, respectively, was taken immediately under artillery fire, while Company C launched a night attack to block the enemy advance toward the southeast. Engaging Company C with automatic weapon and RPG fire, the enemy attempted to escape to the west, but was intercepted by Company D, 5th Marines, maneuvering from the southwest through nearly head-high elephant grass. The battle continued throughout most of the night, with the Marines employing 155mm artillery fire and air strikes in support of the attack. By dawn, the enemy had scattered, his remnants fleeing in small groups. A search of the battle area, however, turned up 72 NVA dead, while numerous drag marks and blood trails evidenced the hurried evacuation of many

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
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enemy casualties. In addition, the dense growth of elephant grass abounding through the area of contact undoubtedly concealed other enemy dead. Friendly casualties resulting from the night's action were seven wounded and evacuated.

The map below illustrates the night action on 29 January.

OPERATION TAYLOR COMMON: 29 JANUARY 1969



Operation TAYLOR COMMON continued into February, with four battalions (1st and 3d Battalions, 3d Marines and 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines) committed in Base Area 112, while 1st Battalion, 5th Marines maintained patrolling activities in the An Hoa basin.

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Though substantial progress toward neutralization of the base area has been realized, a minimum of 30 more days of offensive action is required to purge the region of a serious enemy threat to central ICTZ.

-Operation BOLD MARINER/RUSSELL BEACH

On 13 January, Marines of the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces launched amphibious Operation BOLD MARINER against enemy forces occupying the Batangan peninsula, 12 miles south of Chu Lai in Quang Ngai province. Preceded by a 12 January amphibious demonstration off the coast of Mo Duc (13 miles to the south), BOLD MARINER was the largest amphibious operation yet executed in the war -- both Special Landing Forces Alfa and Bravo (SLF's A and B) were assault-landed. Also committed was a two-battalion, US Army task force in companion Operation RUSSELL BEACH, along with various Vietnamese military and GVN agencies.

BOLD MARINER commenced at 0700, with amphibious assaults by Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) 2/26 and 3/26 to cordon the Batangan peninsula. BLT 2/26 landed on the north by heliborne and surface means, while BLT 3/26 went in by helicopter to the south flank. Concurrently, the US Army task force maneuvered to seal off the extreme southern boundary of the operating area. The subsequent scheme of maneuver was a deliberately executed contraction of the cordon to the south and east, a maneuver calculated to force the enemy toward the sea. Blocking seaward avenues of egress was a screen of US Navy and Coast Guard patrol craft, supported by ships of the US Seventh Fleet.

As resistance to the landings was negligible, the assault forces commenced an immediate tightening of the cordon. Attached to each BLT to assist in population processing and control were a platoon of National Police Field Forces, a Regional Force platoon, and three Armed Propaganda Teams,

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customary and valuable assets in operations supporting the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. All Vietnamese civilians found in the area were delivered to an administrative center where they were fed, housed, provided necessary medical treatment, and screened for possible Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) membership.

Although the Batangan area has long been dominated by the enemy, and is a known operating area for the 38th and 48th VC Battalions (local force), strong opposition to the cordon and search was not encountered. Principal ground contacts were brief clashes with small, evading enemy units during daylight hours, and equally short firefights with Viet Cong forces attempting to break the cordon under cover of darkness. Attacking Marine and Army units made maximum use of the supporting fires of air, artillery, and naval guns to soften enemy resistance, thereby minimizing friendly losses in physical assaults against fortified positions. The majority of friendly casualties sustained by both BOLD MARINER and RUSSELL BEACH forces resulted from mines and booby traps concealed throughout the region.

The entire peninsula was found to be a labyrinth of cleverly concealed tunnels, caves, and trenches; it is quite possible sizable enemy forces used the existing tunnel network as an avenue to exfiltrate the area. The search of this network was laborious and thorough, resulting in the seizure of considerable enemy ammunition, supplies, and training facilities, and the capture of a number of Viet Cong (more than 100 enemy were taken prisoner during the course of Operation BOLD MARINER/RUSSELL BEACH). Once searched, tunnels and caves were then destroyed with demolitions or other engineer equipment.

By 24 January, the contraction of the cordon forced the displacement of BLT 2/26, which was returned to amphibious shipping. On the same date, control of BLT 3/26 was passed to III MAF; thereafter, the actions of both the Marine BLT and

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In retrospect, while the opportunity to meet and destroy in battle a large enemy force did not materialize, the total success of the action ashore far exceeds the enemy battlefield casualties -- both those counted and the many enemy soldiers and hoards of material undoubtedly buried in collapsed or sealed tunnels, bunkers, and caves. A hitherto enemy sanctuary was surrounded without warning, then systematically searched and cleared, thereby once again serving the enemy notice no area is secure from the mobile striking power of the forces of III MAF and the Seventh Fleet. As a result of Operation BOLD MARINER/RUSSELL BEACH, nearly 12,000 Vietnamese were returned to GVN influence after more than two decades of VC control; 256 of them were identified as VCI and taken into custody.

Operations in Northern I CTZ

The DMZ area, the focal battleground of the entire Vietnam war for the better part of two and one-half years, in January, experienced the lowest level of action since the Marines first deployed into the salient in July 1966. From the Laotian border east to the mouth of the Cua Viet, patrolling elements of the 3d Marine Division generated but infrequent contact with small enemy reconnaissance elements - firefights which resulted in a total of 162 NVA killed.

Within the DMZ proper, comprehensive surveillance was continued, by aerial means over both sides of the Ben Hai and by ground reconnaissance teams between the southern DMZ boundary and the south bank of the river. While these activities confirmed and monitored the presence of enemy units and facilities in the zone, little evidence of a magnitude to presage an early recurrence of all-out NVA invasions of northern Quang Tri was uncovered. Sightings south of the Ben Hai were restricted largely to enemy patrols, limited fortification construction, and small caches.

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A number of enemy caches and facilities were discovered also south of the demarcation line. Chief among these were a cache containing fifty 122mm rockets, unearthed two miles west of Lang Vei on 8 January by Company H, 9th Marines, and a recently occupied bunker complex yielding a .50 caliber machine gun and 19,905 rounds, nearly 15,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, seventy-four 82mm mortar shells, and 323 grenades, detected by Company H, 4th Marines on the 28th, five miles northwest of Cam Lo. While exploring this latter fortification system, elements of Company H were hit with a light mortar attack from within the DMZ, the first such incident recorded since 21 December 1968. Two Marines were wounded; countermortar artillery fire silenced the enemy gunners, but no damage assessment was possible.

In southern Quang Tri province, a suspected enemy infiltration and logistic buildup was the target of III MAF Operation DEWEY CANYON, initiated on 22 January. The objective area, bordering Laos and situated between three major enemy base areas (101, 114, and 611), centers on the Da Krong river valley in the extreme southern portion of Quang Tri. Aerial reconnaissance detection of heavy vehicular traffic along Route 548 in the southern sector and major engineering works throughout, coupled with a recent surge in antiaircraft fire, tended to confirm increased NVA use of the region to funnel supplies and equipment into the three northern provinces.

Through end-January, no major contact was encountered by the 9th Marines in DEWEY CANYON; however, the end-month increase in both the frequency and intensity of small unit clashes tends to confirm the presence of a considerable NVA force in the area.

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SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

In January, Marine units committed to the III MAF counterguerrilla campaign deployed over 10,000 patrols, ambushes, and company-size operations across the coastal plains of central I CTZ, again denying the enemy the freedom of action requisite to tactical success in the greater Danang area. This saturation, coordinated with major operations tasked against an enemy repairing from losses incurred while attempting to stage near Danang during December 1968, jeopardized the initiation of hostile thrusts reportedly planned for the February Tet holiday period.

While the month's actions culminated in 536 contacts, costing the enemy at least 162 NVA/VC killed, more significant and damaging effects resulted from losses within his support base. Continual splintering of elements entering the lowland battleground rendered impractical any serious attempt to stage assault forces or materiel. Further, and most disconcerting to the enemy, local support from the guerrilla infrastructure dissolved under the pressure of accelerated pacification operations.


The graphs on the following page portray small unit operations and resultant combat actions since January 1968. The current level of operations, down from early-1968 totals, reflects the commitment of Danang area units to major operations farther afield. This method of employment, proven both flexible and economical, has not, however, reduced the effectiveness of the counterguerrilla effort - combat engagements have been maintained at an average of 550 a month. Enemy losses from these contacts continue to vary in relation to the strength of attempted thrusts against lowland targets.

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MARINE SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS JAN 1968 - JAN 1969



Enemy Activity

Reflecting the low level of activity in I CTZ, enemy-initiated attacks against allied military and government targets during January totaled 29 - nine ground attacks and 20 attacks-by-fire. Quang Nam province remained the focal point for enemy efforts, receiving three ground assaults and nine indirect fire attacks. Elsewhere in I CTZ, enemy attack levels also were consistent with recent monthly totals. Although 700 sightings or incidents of enemy activity were developed within the DMZ, NVA/VC attacks in the two northern provinces were limited to two ground assaults and seven mortar or rocket shellings. In southern I CTZ, Quang Ngai and Quang Tin received a total of four ground assaults and four attacks-by-fire.

The graph on the following page compares enemy-initiated attacks during January with I CTZ totals since January 1968.


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ENEMY ATTACKS IN I CTZ: FEB 68 - JAN 69



The relative calm observed in January was reminiscent of the period preceding the wave of offensive thrusts during the 1968 Tet period. However, the results of ongoing Free World force operations will have a delimiting effect on any attempt for offensive initiative and, as seen by the enemy's failure to commence other heralded offensives in recent months, may delay considerably any plans currently distributed. Such conditions already exist in many enemy units. For example, a document captured in the An Hoa basin, referring to future attack plans, listed "poor discipline, health problems, a reluctance to face danger and hardships, and fear of air strikes" among the soldiers as difficulties confronting execution of future operations.

-Attacks Against Major Installations

In consonance with other enemy-initiated activity, NVA/VC attacks against major military installations in January were limited and generally ineffective. While no ground assaults were recorded, enemy rocketeers did tar-

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get bases for four harassing type (less than 20 rounds of ordnance delivered) attacks, three against the Danang area and one against the 101st Airborne Division base at Camp Eagle, five miles southeast of Hue.

An 11-round volley of 122mm rockets against the Danang vital area, early on the morning of the 2d, impacted at the Marble Mountain Air Facility, producing no casualties and only minor damage. The Camp Eagle incident, from 0155-0230 on the 12th, consisted of eight 122mm rockets, one of which destroyed a storage building. Twice on the 22d, the Danang complex was targeted again. Fourteen rockets hit at dawn, followed by another three shortly after dusk. Although material damage was light, eight US personnel were wounded and evacuated and one Vietnamese civilian was killed.

Danang Area Actions

With Marine large unit operations successfully prohibiting major threats from enemy concentrations south and west of Danang during January, small unit activity remained focused on a low, but constant, level of local enemy activity. An around-the-clock assortment of 10,633 patrols and ambushes obstructed enemy combat and logistical support traffic, and, in coordination with 78 company-size operations executed against recently detected harboring sites, contributed to the successful conclusion of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

- Combat Patrols

Interlacing areas required for enemy movement and staging with 6,645 combat patrols during the month, Marine units, as seen by the following examples, provided Danang area installations and pacification expansion projects continuing security through interdiction of NVA and VC combat elements.

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-Shortly before dark on 6 January, a platoon from Company A, 1st Marines observed two groups of NVA, totaling 150 soldiers, moving into an open rice paddy ten miles south of Danang. Immediately placing artillery and small arms fire on the enemy advance, the patrol forced the disrupted column to withdraw southward, leaving behind eight NVA dead.

-A patrol from CAP 2-5-3 engaged a small VC element on the 17th, just two miles southeast of the Danang airfield, and killed one guerrilla. The significance of the action was realized when documents carried by the Viet Cong were found to include maps of Danang, the airfield, and the 1st Marine Division command post.

-On patrol three miles to the southwest of Dai Loc district headquarters, elements of Company B, 7th Marines detected an enemy mortar squad going into action at dusk on the 23d. Directing their own mortars on the VC, the Marines accounted for six guerrillas killed, thus aborting the hostile mission.

-Night Actions

Of the 10,711 activities conducted by Marine units in the January counter guerrilla campaign, 7,088 were night ambushes or patrols. The continuing effectiveness of these night operations was reflected in 210 contacts established and was credited, in part, to the use of a variety of equipment and tactics.

-Company K, 7th Marines contacts on the night of the 19th exemplified gains attainable from area ambushing. Initial action commenced at 2200 when one of a saturation of ambushes laid along the Yen river, nine miles southwest of Danang, called mortar and artillery fire on suspected enemy movement. Checking the impact area, an element of

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
the ambush found three 140mm rockets. Thirty minutes later, and a mile to the north, other Company K units surprised an estimated 60-man column with small arms and artillery fire, killing at least six of the enemy. Documents found on the scene identified the enemy soldiers as members of the 31st NVA Regiment.

-On the night of 15-16 January, Company B, 26th Marines disrupted an enemy patrol after detecting its movement with an AN/PPS-6 ground surveillance radar. The 34-pound electronic instrument, capable of detecting and locating personnel movement up to a range of 1,500 meters, pinpointed a 20-man enemy patrol crossing a sandy tract near Nam O bridge, eight miles northwest of Danang. Artillery fire delivered on the target resulted in numerous secondary explosions. Later, seven NVA dead were found near the impact area.


To minimize the difficulties inherent in screening enemy movement at night, almost 70% of the small unit operations effort has been committed to night activities. And as seen below, these operations prove increasingly effective - during the past three months, over 41% of the combat engagements were developed at night. The following graphs compare small unit day and night activities, and resultant combat engagements, since January 1968.

COMPARISON OF MARINE SMALL UNIT ACTIONS - DAY VS NIGHT JANUARY 1968 - JANUARY 1969

ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED



CONTACTS ESTABLISHED



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Kit Carson Scout (KCS) Program

Under the auspices of the III MAF Kit Carson Scout program, 442 former Viet Cong soldiers were employed by the four III MAF divisions and four combined action groups at end-month. Additionally, 32 newly recruited Hoi Chanh were preparing for future combat assignments with US forces in I CTZ.

Supporting Marine operations during the month, Scouts continued to exhibit a fluent knowledge of enemy habits and methods of operation as they accompanied 730 small unit patrols and ambushes, participated with units driving deep into enemy base areas, and landed with both Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces in amphibious Operation BOLD MARINER. Despite the generally low level of combat encountered in January, the 207 KCS assigned to the two Marine divisions were credited with apprehending 66 known or suspected guerrillas, and detecting 68 mines and booby traps. Using guerrilla experiences for reference, these scouts also conducted 50 VC tactics classes and 36 psyops broadcasts.

Other evidence of the integral employment of Scouts with combat elements was found in the month's KCS losses - five killed and nine wounded. Since the first KCS was killed, while participating in 1st Marine Division Operation STONE during February 1967, 29 Scouts have died and 84 have received wounds in I CTZ combat actions.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION

During January, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) arrived at a successful conclusion, as the GVN, assisted by III MAF, enlarged the program to encompass more than twice as many hamlets as were targeted originally. Combined action units and ARVN revolutionary development support battalions, while not in direct support of the special pacification project, contributed substantially to its success, killing or capturing 650 enemy and seizing 162 weapons. And, the pacification status of the I CTZ populace benefited considerably from the APC, with the secure population increasing from 69.2% to 73.7% during the month.

Accelerated Pacification (LE LOI) Campaign

The Accelerated Pacification (LE LOI) Campaign was expanded further than called for by original directives, as the GVN exploited the earlier successes of November and December. The campaign terminated on 31 January, etching an impressive chronicle of results toward achievement of the campaign's six goals.

-Military Operations

Most successful of the operations conducted in January was BOLD MARINER, a cordon initiated by the two US Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces in the enemy-infested Batangan peninsula. (A complete recapitulation of the operation is recorded in the Large Unit Operations chapter of this report.) As the belt was tightened around the target area, the maneuver battalions accounted for over 300 enemy killed or captured and 65 weapons. More important, however, were the 256 Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) cadre captured -- evidence of significant inroads against an organization once dominant in the area.


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In all, 150 company-size or larger operations were conducted in I CTZ in support of the LE LOI Campaign between 1 November 1968 and 31 January 1969. Particularly noteworthy were the ten III MAF and SLF large unit operations, which, concentrating on elimination of the Viet Cong's infrastructure, as well as its military counterpart, reaped a substantial harvest -- some 2,900 enemy killed or taken prisoner, more than 800 weapons seized, and 370 VCI captured.

-Hamlet Security

At the onset, the campaign called for the accelerated development to secure status of 140 I CTZ hamlets. By mid-December, development had begun in 168 hamlets; and during January, another 34 were incorporated into the campaign. The successful development of these 202 hamlets, populated by nearly 213,000 Vietnamese, is reflected in the comparison of security ratings for the hamlets on 31 October 1968 and 31 January 1969, illustrated by the graph below.



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In addition to the 202 hamlets entered by LE LOI teams, 93 other hamlets profited directly from the campaign. The chart below shows the dramatic increase of security in these hamlets during the three-month program.

	<u>October 1968</u>	<u>January 1969</u>
SECURE	2	73
CONTESTED	82	20
VC CONTROL	9	0

When the campaign began, 60 of the 295 hamlets finally included were considered secure; by end-January, 256 of these hamlets had attained a secure rating. Thus, with the increase of 196 in the number of secure hamlets, the campaign goal of 140 not only was met, but was exceeded significantly.

-Anti-Viet Cong Infrastructure Campaign

One of the primary goals of the LE LOI Campaign in I CTZ was to ferret out at least 560 Viet Cong infrastructure personalities each month - a campaign total of 1,680. By end-December, 1,492 VCI already had been eliminated, and it is estimated the final January tabulations will disclose another 1,000 or more eliminated -- substantially surpassing the objective.

The 722 VCI eliminated in December brought the 1968 total to 4,423, appreciably higher than the goal of 4,000 established for the year.

-Chieu Hoi Returnees

Response to the Chieu Hoi program continued at a relatively high level in I CTZ, as 273 former enemy rallied to the GVN during January. This brings to 808 the number of returnees recorded during the LE LOI Campaign, 56 less than the campaign goal of 864. Despite this six percent

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

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shortfall (probably a result of the general withdrawal of major enemy formations and the reduced level of combat), the monthly average during the campaign (269) was higher than the average of 258 recorded during the ten months prior to LE LOI.

Included in the 273 ralliers in January were 16 NVA defectors, a total second only to the 23 reported in August 1968. The graphs below present the Chieu Hoi returnee and NVA defection rates in I CTZ for the past 12 months.

CHIEU HOI RETURNEES - I CTZ



The appeal of the Chieu Hoi program continued to erode the enemy structure in I CTZ. On the 13th, for example, Combined Action Platoon (CAP) 3-5-1, positioned three miles southeast of Phu Bai, received two significant ralliers. At 1100, the VC finance chief of Loc Bon village, four miles southeast of Phu Bai along Route 1, rallied to the CAP; an hour and a half later, the VC village chief for Loc Bon followed suit. Both returnees surrendered weapons, and information obtained from them led to further dilution of the VC structure in the village.

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- People's Self-Defense Organization

The I CTZ goal of constituting a civilian defense force included organizing 160,000 Vietnamese, training 128,000 of them, and arming 48,000 of those trained. The first phase was surpassed considerably, with over 225,000 civilians enrolled in self-defense units. However, the training program could indoctrinate but 98,000 of the people by end-January, with weapons available for only 30,000. Training programs remain ongoing, and more weapons will be made available as Vietnamese territorial forces are reequipped with M16 rifles; therefore, the goal should be met, albeit belatedly.

- Psychological Operations

Psychological operations in I CTZ were disrupted somewhat during January, as bad weather hampered aerial delivery of leaflets in the two northern provinces. Despite the handicap, III MAF and GVN agencies disseminated over 169 million leaflets, conducted 2,931 hours of aerial and ground broadcasts, and presented 616 visual productions.

As depicted in the graphs on the following page, while the leaflet distribution was low, broadcast and visual presentation efforts were substantially above the monthly averages since February 1968.


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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS - I CTZ



Results of the psyops effort also reflected the quickened pace of the LE LOI Campaign. Besides the continued high rate of enemy defections, there were 886 incidents involving civilians turning in, or reporting the locations of, enemy weapons and munitions. This is 20% higher than the 1968 monthly average.

Another indication of psyops effectiveness occurred on 3 January. During the morning, CAP 1-1-6 boarded US

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Navy swift boats to conduct pro-GVN broadcasts in an area approximately six miles north of Tam Ky. As a result, some 200 Vietnamese voluntarily abandoned their homes in Vinh Giang, a VC-controlled hamlet six miles north of Tam Ky, in hopes of resettling in an area secured by the government. As the refugees were making their way to the CAP position, they were attacked by an enemy force. The CAP adjusted artillery on the enemy, forcing them to withdraw, but not before 15 civilians had been murdered. The enemy's terrorism did not dissuade them, however, as they continued migration to new homes.

-Summary

The LE LOI Campaign acted as a catalyst, binding GVN and III MAF agencies in an intensified effort, and sealing a smooth transition between the 1968 and 1969 RD plans. As cited previously, not all six goals were accomplished; however, sufficient progress was forged in their achievement to warrant an overall appraisal of excellent. Not only did the LE LOI Campaign end on a high note, but the 1968 GVN Revolutionary Development Program terminated satisfactorily, also on 31 January, with all 287 targeted hamlets inspected and approved as having been elevated to the requisite standards. And, the momentum gathered through LE LOI has carried forth into the initiation of the challenging 1969 GVN Pacification and Reconstruction Plan.

Pacification


The pacification of I CTZ, progressing at a moderate pace through early Autumn 1968, registered substantial gains with the added impetus of the LE LOI Campaign. At end-October, 61.2% of the nearly three million civilians living in the five provinces were considered secure. During the campaign, security was expanded to include 73.7% of the I CTZ population -- representing an additional 390,000 Vietnamese residing in pacified areas as of 31 January 1969.

The map on the following page, based on 31 December 1968 data, depicts the security status of the five provinces in I CTZ.

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PACIFICATION STATUS - I CTZ



I CTZ Totals	Secure	VC Control	Total
Population	2,070,146	465,251	2,989,113
Percentage	69.2	15.6	100

Note: Based on end-December 1968 Hamlet Evaluation System data.

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Combined Action Program

As the year began, the Combined Action Program continued to expand, both physically and operationally. During January, two Combined Action Platoons (1-3-10, 12 miles south-southeast of Chu Lai, and 4-2-7, three miles east of Quang Tri City) were activated, bringing the status of the program at end-month to:

UNITS

Combined Action Groups	4
Combined Action Companies	19
Combined Action Platoons	104
Mobile Training Teams	6

PERSONNEL

Marines	1,635
US Navy corpsmen	128
Popular Force soldiers	<u>3,159</u>
Total	4,922

A record 10,398 patrols and ambushes were conducted by combined action units in January, 72% of which were executed at night. As has been the case for the past year, these operations generated considerable contact.

-Shortly after noon on the 3d, a CAP 2-9-2 patrol attacked an enemy force deployed along a tree line 19 miles southwest of Danang. Reinforced by another element of their CAP, the Marines and Popular Force (PF) soldiers overran the objective, killing six, capturing two VC soldiers, and apprehending three VCI cadre. Three Marines and one PF were wounded in the skirmish.

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-On the 22d, CAP's 1-1-6 and 1-1-7, operating in conjunction with six PF platoons, swept an area centered four miles northeast of Tam Ky, netting 24 VC prisoners. Three days later, the two CAP's again maneuvered through the area, killing 11 enemy, capturing one, and seizing five weapons. Two PF received minor wounds during the operation.

-During the morning of 25 January, CAP's 1-3-3, 1-3-4, and 1-3-5 conducted a coordinated operation in an area centered ten miles southeast of Chu Lai. Scattered contacts during the morning resulted in 13 VC killed, while friendly casualties were two Marines and one PF wounded. Artillery fired in support of the CAP's accounted for 13 bunkers destroyed and 13 secondary explosions.

-On the evening of the 30th, CAP 3-3-4 detected personnel moving toward the beach, ten miles east-northeast of Hue. The CAP rapidly dispatched two teams to reconnoiter the situation, and the teams apprehended 31 Vietnamese. Six were detained for further questioning, which determined five of them to be on the GVN blacklist.

In total, combined action unit operations during the month resulted in 171 VC and NVA killed, 81 taken prisoner, and 75 weapons captured. The graphs on the following page present the combined action operations and results for the past 12 months.


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
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COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS


OPERATIONS CONDUCTED




ENEMY KILLED



ENEMY CAPTURED



WEAPONS CAPTURED

ARVN Support of Revolutionary Development

During January, I ARVN Corps battalions conducted 20 operations in support of revolutionary development. These operations, aimed at enhancing the security screen around those areas under development by RD cadre, accounted for 297 enemy killed, 101 captured, and 87 weapons seized. The enemy losses attributed to ARVN RD battalions in January registered a decrease from December, reflecting the reduced tempo of combat prevailing throughout the tactical zone during the month.

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
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Primary among the 20 operations was the 1st ARVN Ranger Group's Operation LE LOI, conducted in the An Hoa basin in conjunction with 1st Marine Division Operation TAYLOR COMMON. During the month, LE LOI resulted in 148 enemy killed, 30 taken prisoner, and 26 weapons captured.


The following graphs portray ARVN RD support operations in I CTZ, and their results, for the past 12 months.

ARVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT OPERATIONS - I CTZ


OPERATIONS CONDUCTED




ENEMY KILLED



ENEMY CAPTURED



WEAPONS CAPTURED



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AIR OPERATIONS

Further evidencing the low level of combat activity throughout I CTZ was the number of fixed wing and helicopter sorties committed in support of ground and interdiction operations during the month. Pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew 7,707 fixed wing sorties over South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the southern Laotian panhandle. Additionally, wing and SLF helicopter pilots sortied 54,688 times in January in support of III MAF, ARVN, US Special Forces, and ROK Marine forces operating in I CTZ.

Fixed Wing Operations-In-Country Operations

Reinforcing the ground effort to keep the enemy off balance and to deny him the opportunity to remarshal his forces, Marine pilots flew 6,410 sorties in I CTZ during the month, 4,960 combat and 1,450 combat support flights.

Supporting 15 large unit operations (12 III MAF, two SLF, and one ROKMC), Marine pilots flew 2,633 sorties, expended 5,819 tons of ordnance, and accounted for 82 enemy soldiers killed. An additional 1,457 sorties were directed against suspected enemy targets contiguous to the Danang rocket belt or in interdiction of enemy infiltration routes south of the DMZ and through A Chau Valley. The remaining 870 in-country combat flights were in support of individual small unit actions.

In sum, more than 9,300 tons of ordnance, 10,870 rockets, and 4,111 napalm bombs were loosed against known and suspected enemy troop concentrations, lines of communication, and supply depots in I CTZ. Significant effects noted were 112 enemy killed and 975 structures, 476 bunkers, seven bridges, five trucks, and 11 weapons positions de-

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
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stroyed. Further, destruction of enemy POL and ammunition storage areas was reflected in the 167 secondary explosions and 224 secondary fires reported.

The following graphs portray the number of combat and combat support sorties flown, and the amount of ordnance delivered, by Marine pilots during the past six months.

IN-COUNTRY FIXED WING SUPPORT BY MARINE AIRCRAFT: AUG 68 - JAN 69



The following examples, taken from offensive operations conducted during January, highlight the results of supporting air firepower provided to tactically engaged ground combat units.

-At 0930 on the 9th, a Marine reconnaissance team observed 27 North Vietnamese Army regulars, carrying packs and rifles and dressed in green utilities, moving along a trail nine miles south of Danang. The team reported the sighting to an airborne observer who in turn called for a tactical air strike against the target. The sequential long-range observation by the reconnaissance team, the direction of the strike by the aerial observer, and the air attack

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by the Marine strike pilots accounted for 22 enemy soldiers killed.

-Coordinated artillery and aerial firepower resulted in 42 enemy killed on the 16th. Shortly before noon, a patrol in Operation TAYLOR COMMON observed 30 to 50 enemy moving along a stream three and one-half miles northeast of An Hoa. Small arms fire, and artillery fire adjusted by the patrol, accounted for 25 enemy killed. Shortly thereafter, an aerial observer spotted another 30 to 40 enemy just one kilometer east of the original contact. Marine air strikes directed by the airborne observer resulted in another 17 enemy killed.

-At 0020 on the 25th, one A-6A from Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron-242, also flying in support of Operation TAYLOR COMMON, unleashed twenty-eight 500-pound bombs against a 20-man enemy troop emplacement 14 miles south of Danang. The pilot was credited with 20 enemy killed.

-Out-of-Country Operations

In January, wing pilots flew 1,297 combat and combat support flights in support of Seventh Fleet and 7th Air Force operations out-of-country.

In the primary out-of-country effort, 1,067 sorties were directed against enemy infiltration routes and staging sites in southern Laos. This effort consisted of 910 strike, 88 combat air patrol, 52 tactical air coordinator (airborne), 12 reconnaissance, and five escort sorties.

The remaining 230 out-of-country flights were flown either over North Vietnam or over its adjacent off-shore waters. Continuing its photo reconnaissance and electronic warfare effort, Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron-1

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
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conducted 43 electronic countermeasure, 29 aerial photography, and two electronic intelligence sorties against North Vietnam. Providing protective coverage to these unarmed photo and electronic aircraft, F-4 pilots of the wing flew 44 fighter escort flights over North Vietnam. Additionally, these F-4 pilots flew 112 combat air patrol sorties over North Vietnam's adjacent off-shore waters, providing protection to the ships of the US Seventh Fleet.

The following graphs depict the out-of-country effort by wing pilots during the past six months.

OUT-OF-COUNTRY FIXED WING SUPPORT BY MARINE AIRCRAFT: AUG 68 - JAN 69



Month	NVN		LAOS	
	Combat	Combat Support	Combat	Combat Support
1968				
AUG	1,430	114	37	—
SEP	951	82	13	—
OCT	1,379	61	73	—
NOV	168	70	308	—
DEC	362	56	140	—
JAN	168	72	99	—

OV-10A Aircraft

During January, the fourth detachment of OV-10A aircraft and accompanying personnel arrived in South Vietnam. The unit, with eight planes, departed CONUS by ship, arriving at Cam Ranh Bay on 23 January. Following debarkation and required depreservation, the aircraft were flight-ferried to Danang, where they were assigned, four

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each, to Marine Observation Squadrons-2 and 6. These eight new aircraft brought to 34 the total number of OV-10A's now assigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

Trans-Pacific Deployment

January also saw the beginning of the successful trans-Pacific deployment of Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron-225 with 12 A-6A aircraft. Departing Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California on the morning of the 26th, and, following stops at Hawaii, Wake Island, Guam, and Cubi Point (with inflight refueling provided on the first two legs by four KC-130F aircraft of Marine Refueler/Transport Squadron-352), the squadron closed RVN at 1020 on 5 February and was assigned to Marine Aircraft Group-11 at Danang. The squadron's arrival increased the wing A-6A inventory to 35 aircraft.

With VMA(AW)-225's arrival, Marine Attack Squadron-121, with its older model A-4C aircraft, terminated combat operations and prepared for its reassignment to the 2d Wing at Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina. The squadron's departure lowered to 69 the number of A-4 aircraft now assigned to the 1st Wing.

Helicopter Operations

Coincident with the relative decline in ground operations was the decrease in the number of Marine helicopter sorties flown during the month. In the 54,688 sorties flown, 96,708 passengers and 12,580 tons of cargo were helilifted to supported units within I CTZ. Reflected within these totals were the 7,482 sorties and the 15,384 passengers and 1,403 tons of cargo lifted by Marine pilots of the Seventh Fleet's two Special Landing Forces.

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
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As in months past, the largest category of helicopter sorties flown was the tactical and logistical transportation of troops and supplies - 20,993 sorties, or 38% of the total effort. The remaining 62% was made up of armed escort, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, command and control, sea/air rescue, tactical air coordinator (airborne), tactical air recovery, and administrative missions.

During September, sorties in support of the ROK Marines (2,841), US Special Forces (491), and ARVN forces (141) accounted for 7.3% of those flown by the wings's helicopter pilots.

The following graphs depict the Marine helicopter effort, by type aircraft, during the past 12 months.

MARINE HELICOPTER SORTIES: FEB 68 - JAN 69



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Crew, Passenger, and Aircraft Losses

In January, eight crew members lost their lives and six others were listed as missing in aircraft incidents attributed to direct enemy action. These mishaps further resulted in strike damage to three fixed wing aircraft (one A-4E, one A-6A, and one F-4B) and six helicopters (four CH-46's and two UH-1E's).

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LOGISTICS

III MAF logistic operations during January were assisted by the unseasonably mild monsoon weather and the noticeable lack of major enemy attempts to interfere with logistic support in I CTZ. The enemy's inability to disrupt the lines of communication contrasted sharply with his campaign of a year ago when, prelude to the 1968 Tet offensive, he attempted to sever the III MAF logistic lifeline.

Engineer Operations

Visible progress in the improvement of I CTZ lines of communication was attained during the month, as exemplified by the following accomplishments.

- Completion of the longest semi-permanent bridge constructed in Vietnam by Marine engineers. The 722-foot, pile-supported, steel stringer bridge spanning the Ba Ren river on Route 1, 16 miles south of Danang, built by the 9th Engineer Battalion, has two lanes and is capable of supporting 60-ton traffic.

- Opening of the Danang to Hue segment of the Vietnamese National Railroad. The first train, carrying 62 tons of materiel, made the trip from Danang to Hue on 30 January. Restoration of this portion of the rail line was started on 15 July 1968 as a combined US and Vietnamese effort.

- Initiation of work by Seabees on an 825-foot expedient bridge at the old Liberty Bridge site, 15 miles southwest of Danang. This timber pile bridge will have precast reinforced concrete decking and a 300-foot rock causeway, retained by interlocking sheet metal piles. By the end of the month, the north abutment was complete and sheet pile driving and rock placement on the south abutment had commenced. This high priority project is scheduled for com-

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pletion by 1 April 1969 and will replace a ferry, currently the only means for vehicular traffic to reach An Hoa.

Motor Transport

During January, the first increment (41) of the new Marginal Terrain Vehicle, the M116, arrived at III MAF. The M116, a replacement for the M76 Otter, is a lightweight, tracked, low-silhouette, cargo and personnel vehicle capable of operation under all seasonal conditions in arctic, temperate, or tropic zones. A full-rated load would include 3,000 pounds of cargo or a maximum of 13 troops. Propulsion and steering, both on land and water, are accomplished by movement of the tracks, enabling the vehicle to negotiate all types of terrain normally associated with extreme climate. The low net weight of the vehicle (7,880 pounds) permits transportation by cargo helicopter or airplane, or drop by parachute. Thirty-five of the initial 41 M116's will be assigned to the 11th Motor Transport Battalion and six will be held in the Force Logistic Command (FLC) maintenance float.

Ninety-nine Rough Rider convoys, employing 1,360 tactical vehicles and carrying 8,665 tons of cargo and 1,139 personnel, were conducted during January. The number of convoys was over three times the 1968 monthly average of 31, an increase largely attributable to resupply operations from Danang to Force Logistic Support Unit-1 at An Hoa.


The graph on the following page compares Rough Rider convoys conducted during January with the monthly totals since January 1968.

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ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS: JAN 68 - JAN 69

Ordinance

-M16 Rifle - Conversion of the final 9,100 M16 rifles to the chromed-chamber assembly was completed by Force Logistic Command during January, and the final production models were in distribution. Over 61,000 M16's have been converted by FLC since the retrofit program began in January 1968.

-175mm Gun M107 - The culmination of six months of planning was achieved on 3 January, when twenty-one 175mm guns, self-propelled (SP), M107 arrived at III MAF as replacements for the 155mm guns, SP, M53. Based on the availability of repair parts and ammunition, a tentative schedule has been established to phase six weapons into each of the 155mm gun-equipped batteries, with one battery receiving the weapons during February, another during March, and the third in April. The remaining three guns will be assigned to the FLC maintenance float.

Concurrent with planning for the weapon phase-in, action to establish an ammunition pipeline was initiated, with

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stock levels established at the Force Logistic Command, the Naval Ordnance Facility, Sasebo, Japan, and the Naval Magazine, Subic Bay, Philippines. Initial stocks have been received at the Force Logistic Command, and it is anticipated the required 45 days of ammunition will be available at FLC by 1 February.

Technical training is being conducted with the assistance of the Army's 1st Logistics Command in preparation for placing the first battery in service. Maintenance support will be provided by the Army Logistics Command thru an Inter-Service Support Agreement being completed by Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Department of the Army.

The 175mm gun will provide III MAF with a significant increase in operational capabilities and a reduction in maintenance support requirements. Its maximum range of 32,000 meters is an increase of 9,000 meters over the maximum range of the 155mm gun, previously the longest-range artillery weapon in the Marine Corps inventory. With the exception of the 175mm tube, the M107 is identical to the Eight-inch howitzer, SP, M110, permitting interchange of vehicular and mount components.

New Supply Classes of Materiel

The first supply class structure was initiated by the US Army during World War I, when it was recognized that for planning and management it was both necessary and desirable to aggregate the many different supply items into generic groups. A four-class structure was developed in 1917 and was used until immediately prior to the US entry into World War II, when a separate class was established for ammunition. With the exception of minor modifications, the five-class system of identifying supplies has, until recently, remained the basic tool of Marine logisticians. Technical advances in development of weapons systems,

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communication-electronic equipment, transportation, aircraft, and organizational and individual items have increased substantially the number of items in the Department of Defense inventory since World War II. As a result of a joint service and Defense Supply Agency review, a new ten-class supply structure, allowing more definitive guidance in logistical planning and operations, was approved. The new structure became effective for Marine units on 1 January 1968, and full implementation of the ten-class system was completed by III MAF on 1 January 1969. The major classifications of the new structure are listed below.

- Class I - Rations.
- Class II - Clothing, individual equipment and weapons, tentage, organizational tools and tool kits, administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment.
- Class III - Petroleum fuels and lubricants.
- Class IV - Construction materials, including installed equipment, and all fortification/barrier materials.
- Class V - Ammunition.
- Class VI - Personal demand items (PX supplies).
- Class VII - Major end items; airplanes, missile launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, vehicles, etc.
- Class VIII - Medical material, including medical-peculiar repair parts.
- Class IX - All repair parts and components, including kits (less medical-peculiar repair parts).

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
Class X - Material to support non-military programs (agricultural and economic development, for example), not included in Classes I through IX.

Maintenance

January production of 48 items of equipment by the FMFPac Repair/Rebuild Program reflected a 30% increase over the 37 items completed during December 1968. This increase resulted from an improved parts availability and an accelerated input of repairable equipment into the program during November and December 1968 when 59 and 117 items, respectively, were inducted. The December induction represented a 344% increase over the average of the previous five months, and with the introduction of 131 more items during January, an optimistic appraisal is projected for production during the first half of 1969.

The graph below provides a comparison of the induction of equipment for rebuild versus the number of items repaired.

FMF PAC REBUILD PROGRAM: JAN 68 - JAN 69



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CONCLUSION

-The enemy, his strength now generally concentrated in central and southern I CTZ, retains a dual option of stand-off attacks-by-fire against bases and urban areas or massing for ground attack -- the latter only at prohibitive cost.

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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS: JANUARY 19691. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLEa. I CTZ/DMZ Summary

The enemy focused his activity during the month primarily in Quang Nam province, as he apparently continued his attempted buildup in the Danang area. As has been the case since November, major enemy formations in northern I CTZ remained in hinterland or cross-border lodgments, reconstructing their ranks after their 1968 defeats. In southern I CTZ, enemy units continued to avoid significant battle with friendly forces in the coastal plain, retiring instead to base areas farther inland.

At end-January, enemy strength in I CTZ, the DMZ area, and contiguous Laotian border regions was estimated at 89,300, some 3,600 more than reckoned a month previously. Included in the January estimate were 49,200 troops in confirmed combat units (42,700 NVA and 6,500 VC), 2,000 NVA in administrative units, 23,500 guerrillas, and 14,600 troops in probable or possible units.


The map on the following page pictures the general locations of the 89 enemy infantry battalions positioned in I CTZ or the DMZ area. The four maps on the pages following illustrate more specific locations of enemy units, battalion-size and larger, throughout the five provinces.

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ENEMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ AND DMZ AREA: JANUARY 1969




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b. DMZ/Quang Tri Province

The enemy's principal effort was aimed at interdiction of the Cua Viet river, with mining incidents, presumably initiated by the 126th NVA Naval Sapper Regiment, causing damage to two US Navy boats. On 31 January, the enemy strength in the DMZ/Quang Tri region was an estimated 36,800, approximately 2,500 more than at end-December. More than half (19,500) were in confirmed combat units.



★ Province capital

* The DMZ area includes that portion of Quang Tri province which lies north of Route 9, the DMZ itself, and the Vinh Linh Special Zone in North Vietnam. NVA units operating in this vicinity, or under the control of the B-5 Front headquarters, are considered DMZ AREA UNITS.


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c. Thua Thien Province

Enemy activity in Thua Thien was limited to minor attacks-by-fire, but evidence of his presence continued to be uncovered in the form of caches. The end-month estimated strength of enemy units in the province was 15,200 troops, 11,300 of whom were in confirmed combat units. The January strength represents about a 25% increase since December.



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
Abstract

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d. Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces

Intelligence sources continued to report enemy plans to attack Danang, with persistent contact substantiating the presence of significant enemy forces. The strength of enemy units in Quang Nam and Quang Tin was estimated at 23,700 on 31 January, approximately the same as at end-1968. Of these troops, some 11,500 were in confirmed combat units.



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
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e. Quang Ngai Province

Enemy units in Quang Ngai concentrated on acts of terrorism, avoiding combat with III MAF elements whenever possible. At end-January, there were an estimated 13,600 enemy troops in the province, 6,900 of whom were in confirmed combat units.



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2. ENEMY LOSSES IN I CTZ

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
<u>Enemy losses to III MAF/SLF</u>			
By Marines	917	68	489
Monthly III MAF/SLF	2,029	142	892
Total			
<u>Enemy losses to other forces</u>			
By ROKMC	235	2	97
By RVNAF	1,210	440	963
By Special Forces/CIDG	80	10	372
Monthly Total	1,525	452	1,432
<u>I CTZ Monthly Total</u>	3,554	594	2,324

3. MARINE III MAF/SLF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>USMC</u>		<u>CAP</u>
7,231	Patrols	6,027
3,988	Ambushes	4,379
78	Company operations	
409	Sniper posts	
2	Battalion operations	
7	Regimental or larger operations	
7,707	Fixed wing sorties	
54,688	Helicopter sorties	


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4. US AIRCRAFT BASED AT MAJOR I CTZ AIRFIELDS: JANUARY 1969

		
USMC AIRCRAFT * QUANG TRI 2 HELO SQDNS (41 CH-46) 1 OBS SQDN (14 OV-10, 10 O-1, 14 UH-1) PHU BAI 5 HELO SQDNS (16 CH-53, 43 CH-46, 25 UH-34, 17 UH-1) 1 ACFT MAINT SQDN (1 C-117, 4 CH-46, 21 UH-34) DANANG 1 FTR/ATK SQDN (19 F-4) 2 ALL-WEATHER ATK SQDNS (22 A-6A) 1 PHOTO/ECM SQDN (5 EA-6A, 9 RF-4B, 10 EF-10B) 2 ACFT MAINT SQDNS (6 TA-4F, 2 C-1, 3 C-117, 4 US-2) MARBLE MTN 4 HELO SQDNS (18 CH-53, 36 CH-46, 22 UH-1) 1 OBS SQDN (20 OV-10, 11 UH-1) 1 ACFT MAINT SQDN (1 C-117, 16 UH-34) CHU LAI 3 ATK SQDNS (60 A-4) 4 FTR/ATK SQDNS (60 F-4) 1 ALL-WEATHER ATK SQDN (12 A-6A) 2 ACFT MAINT SQDNS (4 TA-4F, 2 C-117) FIXED WING - 264 HELICOPTER - 284 TOTAL USMC A/C PRESENT - 548	USN AIRCRAFT DANANG 2 DETS FLT AIR REC SQDN (5 EA-3B, 2 EC-121M) CHU LAI 1 DET FLT AIR REC SQDN (1 EC-121K, 2 WC-121N) TOTAL USN A/C PRESENT - 10 USAF AIRCRAFT DANANG 1 TACT AIR SPT SQDN (15 O-1, 53 O-2) 3 TACT FTR SQDNS (56 F-4) 1 DET FTR/INTERCEPT SQDN (6 F-102) 1 AIR RES SQDN (3 HH-43) FIXED WING - 130 HELICOPTERS - 3 TOTAL USAF A/C PRESENT - 133 USA AIRCRAFT DONG HA MISC (4 UH-1, 10 OH-6) CAMP EAGLE 1 ABN DIV ASSETS: 1 AVN GRP (66 UH-1, 12 AH-1, 12 OH-6, 2 U-6) 1 MED BN (11 UH-1) 1 CAV SQDN (13 UH-1, 9 AH-1, 9 OH-6) DIV ARTY (19 UH-1, 12 OH-6) MISC (17 UH-1, 25 OH-6) FIXED WING - 121 HELICOPTER - 532 TOTAL USA A/C PRESENT - 653	USA AIRCRAFT (CONT) PHU BAI 3 AVN COS (8 UH-1, 2 OH-6, 31 O-1, 18 OV-1, 2 U-6, 2 U-21) ABN DIV SPT (49 CH-47, 2 OH-6) MARBLE MTN 1 HQ AVN BDE (1 UH-1, 2 U-6, 1 U-21) 2 AVN COS (28 UH-1, 17 OV-1, 1 U-6) 1 COURIER PLT (3 U-1) DANANG 1 AVN CO (1 U-6, 13 U-8) ABN DIV SPT (7 CH-54) CHU LAI 1 INF DIV ASSETS: 2 AVN BNS (32 CH-47, 85 UH-1, 6 AH-1, 4 OH-6, 2 U-6) 1 CAV SQDN (8 UH-1, 9 AH-1, 8 OH-6) DIV ARTY (6 OH-6, 6 OH-23, 1 U-6) 1 RECON CO (23 O-1, 1 U-6) MISC (6 UH-1, 13 OH-6, 4 OH-23, 1 U-1) DUC PHO 1 AVN CO (29 UH-1) FIXED WING - 121 HELICOPTER - 532 TOTAL USA A/C PRESENT - 653

* USMC data as of 5 February 1969.

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5. MARINE CIVIC ACTION

Persons given medical treatment	143,133
Persons given dental treatment	3,035
Persons given medical or dental training	621
Pounds of food distributed	43,270
Pounds of soap distributed	15,637
Pounds of clothing distributed	14,763
Critically ill civilians evacuated	1,098
English language classes conducted	1,192
Cash donations	\$7,154
Persons fed	65,630
Students supported	3,337
Construction projects	156

6. III MAF STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Danang	3,137	44,469	258	1,812	192	810
Chu Lai	507	5,339	24	110	1,970	18,541
Duc Pho	-	-	-	-	250	3,987
Phu Bai	307	2,699	6	65	2,147	21,354
Quang Tri	576	5,515	91	538	390	5,341
DMZ area	794	16,501	54	420	301	4,120
Totals	5,321	74,523	433	2,945	5,250	54,153

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(1000 of rations/days of supply)

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Dong Ha and Quang Tri</u>
MCI rations	377/7	760/15
B rations	273/6	663/15
A rations	511/1	60/1

Class III and IIIA (Bulk) (Marine Corps Owned)

(1000 gals/days of supply)

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
JP-4	-	80/4	62/10
AVGAS	-	44/11	30/30
MOGAS	103/10	-	-
DIESEL	104/7	-	-

<u>Class V and VA</u>	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>
Ground Ammunition (days of supply)	45	45	45	45

Aviation Ordnance - Stocks maintained within CINCPAC allocations.

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b. Class II Supply Requisitions

	<u>FLC</u>	<u>3dFSR</u>
Processed	56,016	31,727
Fill Rate	50%	39%
Obligations on hand at end-month	80,170	39,944

c. Resupply Status(1) Surface Shipping Status (all I CTZ) 39,063 M/T

Received from CONUS (21,741 M/T)

Received from intra-WestPac (17,322 M/T)

(2) Air Shipping Status 1,155 S/T

Received from CONUS (628 S/T)

Received from intra-WestPac (527 S/T)

d. Resupply Status Within RVN(1) Surface Shipping Status 117,781 S/T

Danang to Chu Lai (40,643 S/T)

Danang to Hue/Phu Bai (38,618 S/T)

Danang to Dong Ha/Cua Viet (38,520 S/T)

(2) Fixed Wing Shipping Status (USMC and PACAF) 3,509 S/T

Danang to Chu Lai (342 S/T)

Danang to Phu Bai (164 S/T)

Danang to Dong Ha (473 S/T)

Danang to An Hoa (1,996 S/T)

Other intra-I CTZ APOE's (534 S/T)

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e. Cargo Shipped From RVN(1) Surface 17,107 M/T

MSTS conventional vessels (14,154 M/T)

Roll On/Roll Off vessels (2,953 M/T)

(2) Air 227 S/T

USMC (77 S/T)

MAC (128 S/T)

PACAF (22 S/T)

f. Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN to 3dFSR 1,944

Items repaired at 3dFSR 94

Items returned to CONUS from 3dFSR 228

or disposed of on Okinawa

g. Construction ProjectsRoads -88.9 miles were being upgraded.Bridges -Three Class 60, one Class 50, and two Class 50/55 bridges were constructed; one Class 80/65, six Class 60, three Class 50, three Class 50/55, two Class 30/35, and one Class 25 bridges were repaired; three Class 50 bridges were under construction; and two Class 60 bridges were removed.Rafts -Four rafts (one in the Chu Lai area and three in the Danang area) were in operation.

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h. Medical and Dental Services(1) Medical

Patients admitted to III MAF facilities	1,368
Battle injury (389)	
Non-battle injury (183)	
Disease (796)	
Evacuated out-of-country	406
Deaths in III MAF facilities	1
Returned to duty	867
Hospitalized as of 31 January	307

(2) Dental

Total procedures	45,348
Operative, crown, and bridge	20,320
Prosthetics	647
Oral surgery	4,178
Preventive dentistry	10,250
Number of sittings	16,600

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