

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

904791 #19

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Declassified by the Director of Marine Corps  
History and Museums in accordance with the  
provisions of CNO Ltr Op-9420326 Jcy, Ser:  
10770 P942 of 12 October 1971.

*R. B. Duffey*

Signature/date

3/1/77

FMFPac: Operations of 2d M/2 Marine  
Brigade, Vietnam

Group 2  
EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING BY

ca FMFPac

(Approved Authority)

DOD DIR 5200.11

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

# OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

## VIETNAM

### FEBRUARY 1969

G-3

6-3

19



FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

S 904

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

This is a summary of activities of US Marine Corps forces in Vietnam for the month of February 1969. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through January 1969.

GROUP 2

Exempted from automatic  
downgrading by CG FMFPAC

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**CONTENTS

|  |    |
|--|----|
| <b>SUMMARY</b>                             | 3  |
| LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS                      | 5  |
| SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS     | 20 |
| REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION | 30 |
| AIR OPERATIONS                             | 40 |
| LOGISTICS                                  | 50 |
| <b>CONCLUSIONS</b>                         | 55 |
| STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS                     | 56 |

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~SUMMARY

Tet 1969 ushered in a low-intensity enemy offensive, one which lacked significantly the magnitude attained by the NVA/VC during the previous year's celebration. Unable to commit his major maneuver elements, long since forced to mountain retreats and across the nearby borders, the enemy chose a rash of attacks-by-fire and spasmodic ground efforts against military and GVN facilities to accomplish his ends. III MAF's combination of large and small unit operations countered these enemy attempts to force his presence in I CTZ.

In late February, III MAF counterguerrilla forces along the coastal fringe of southern I CTZ interdicted and defeated the first hostile offensive threat of 1969. Lacking the support of major units immobilized by III MAF operations farther afield, the Tet-associated attacks, although launched on a coordinated schedule, fell piecemeal to a saturation of small unit deployments. Engaging the principal thrust, which was focused against the vital Danang military complex, Marine counterguerrilla units killed over 450 NVA and VC during the last week of February, bringing the enemy losses to those units for the month - 629 killed, 49 captured, and 226 weapons seized - to the highest level since Tet 1968. Combined action units, executing in excess of 10,000 small unit operations, also contributed substantially toward countering the late-month enemy surge, killing or capturing 357 VC or NVA soldiers and collecting 112 of their weapons.

The focus of large unit combat shifted back to Quang Tri province during February. There, III MAF Operation DEWEY CANYON derogated substantially the enemy's combat potential in I CTZ, as the 9th Marines attack through the Da Krong Valley cut his main line of communication into I CTZ, and crippled the organizational apparatus of Base Area 611 astride the Laotian border. The campaign, a com-

~~CLASSIFIED~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

combined-arms success despite marginal weather, caught the enemy off-guard, a factor which cost him tons of munitions, supplies, and equipment -- all staged for distribution to combat units.

The dominant impact of air support during February was seen in Operation DEWEY CANYON. Supported by mobile radar control teams, pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing surmounted persistent monsoon weather conditions to provide tactical mobility and resupply from the air to dependent ground units. In all, 410 fixed wing and 3,401 helicopter sorties were flown to back the three infantry battalions which successfully assaulted across the enemy's prime line of communication into I CTZ.


The GVN, afforded reasonable security behind varied III MAF and ARVN operations, initiated its 1969 Pacification and Development Program. Designed to capitalize on the recently concluded and highly productive Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the 1969 program is guided by the principle of instilling a community spirit into each village. Progress will be determined through the extent of accomplishment of eight objectives established by the government for this year.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED****LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS**

The most significant among III MAF large unit actions during February took place in southern Quang Tri province, where the 3d Marine Division's 9th Regiment drove through and destroyed a major enemy base area complex near the Laotian border, effectively severing the enemy's primary I CTZ line of communication. Elsewhere in I CTZ, large-scale contacts were not common -- despite a late-month flurry of harassing activity, the enemy is yet unprepared to engineer a meaningful offensive.

There were thirteen III MAF and SLF operations during February; their locations are shown below.

**III MAF AND SLF OPERATIONS: FEBRUARY 1969**

\* Includes 331 enemy killed and 10 enemy and 164 weapons captured by US Army operations.  
US Army casualties: 21 killed and 207 wounded and evacuated.

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**Operation DEWEY CANYON

The major blow during February against enemy combat power in I CTZ was delivered in southern Quang Tri province, where the 9th Marines Operation DEWEY CANYON ruined at least temporarily an extensive NVA staging and infiltration complex astride Route 922 overlooking the Da Krong Valley. Initially launched in late January, the offensive melded successfully the elements of surprise and combined-arms firepower to strike the enemy at both a time and place he least expected -- by end-February reducing to disarray the command and control apparatus of enemy Base Area 611.


Situated between three major enemy base areas (101 in Quang Tri, 114 in Thua Thien, and 611 on the Republic of Vietnam/Laos border), the DEWEY CANYON area of operations centered on a suspected enemy logistic and infiltration network capable of feeding war stocks and replacement units into Thua Thien and Quang Nam via Routes 548 and 547 through A Shau Valley to the southeast. With III MAF large unit operations athwart enemy lines of communication in northern and western Quang Tri effectively blocking these former high-use enemy avenues of approach, this Route 922/A Shau artery had assumed a greater magnitude of troop and supply traffic. Late-1968 aerial reconnaissance detection of major engineering works and extensive vehicular traffic, coupled with a marked increase in antiaircraft fire, identified the area as a lucrative target.

The map on the following page portrays the DEWEY CANYON region and its location relative to adjacent enemy base areas and lines of communication.

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

## OPERATION DEWEY CANYON



Initial combat operations in the DEWEY CANYON area encountered little organized resistance, as enemy forces were not deployed for a defense-in-depth. With the vitals of his system abutting the Laotian border, the enemy obviously felt secure from flanking attack. And, relying on a combination of difficult terrain, well-dispersed and entrenched antiaircraft guns, and traditionally long periods of poor weather to check friendly maneuver through the Da Krong Valley, the enemy also considered himself reasonably invulnerable to ground or heliborne frontal assault.

However, he again underestimated the reach of III MAF combat power. Establishing Fire Support Bases (FSB's) Shiloh, Razor, and Riley in the northern sector of the Da Krong, 9th Marines elements began a systematic probing for enemy troop formations and fortifications, displacing sequentially forward

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

to new FSB's along the axis of advance. Early contact was restricted largely to brief clashes with small enemy units. The location, by advancing Marines, of small living areas complete with well-tended garden plots, was not uncommon, evidence the enemy had become domestic to the area. On several occasions, the occupants had abandoned weapons in their haste to retreat.

On 2 February, there occurred the first real harbinger of determined opposition to the campaign, as the enemy fired 40 rounds of 122mm artillery on elements of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines at Fire Support Base Cunningham, six miles north of the Laotian border. Traces of powder smoke, however, compromised the enemy firing position, and counterbattery fire caused three secondary explosions. The enemy artillery attack, the first in I CTZ since 18 November 1968, was fired from within South Vietnam.

On 6 February, with the establishment of FSB Erskine two miles southwest of Cunningham, the 9th Marine Regiment was in position to thrust to the Laotian border, destroying enemy installations and fortifications along the route. With the 1st Battalion in the center, the 3d on the left flank, and the 2d on the right, the assault was to be made primarily overland, both to ensure thorough examination of the objective area and to negate the enemy's anti-aircraft capability.

Poor weather, however, a condition plaguing the conduct of the operation throughout, was a serious impediment to the initial momentum of the assault. Ground fog and heavy overcast impaired the effectiveness of logistical, as well as tactical, air support, slowing the requisite build-up of ammunition and supplies on station to support a broad-based attack. Nevertheless, the attacking forces pushed outward from their FSB's, affording the enemy little opportunity to mount offensive counteraction. Numerous

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

small caches and fortifications were searched and destroyed, evidence of increased enemy presence in the southern sector of the valley. One substantial cache, uncovered by Company H on the 10th, contained 393 RPG rounds, 157 mortar shells, ten cases of ammunition, and 19 rifles.

As the Marine advance neared Route 922 at the southern end of the objective area, enemy resistance stiffened. At 2200 on the 11th, he mounted a probing attack at FSB Erskine, which Company D repulsed, killing 12 NVA. At 1700 on the 12th, after fighting a day-long series of patrol actions, Company M threw back a mortar-supported ground attack by an estimated NVA platoon, two miles west of Erskine, likewise killing 12 and taking eight weapons. On the 13th, the point squad of Company C developed contact with a mortar and machine gun-reinforced enemy platoon, deployed in a line defense on a hilltop, two and one-half miles southeast of Erskine. The ensuing Marine assault forced the enemy from the hill, killing 15 NVA. That night, the Marines employed mortars and artillery to break an enemy effort to retake the hill, claiming an additional 13 NVA during the battle. Company C losses during the day were nine killed and 21 wounded and evacuated.

By mid-month, the overland attack, aided by a break in the weather which enhanced fixed wing and helicopter support, had achieved full momentum -- against increasingly stubborn opposition. Determined to protect his logistic and command and control mechanism, the enemy fought from newly constructed fighting positions and launched probing counterattacks, supported by mortar and artillery fire, against the 9th Marines advance. He also made prolific use of sniper fire to slow the assault, often tying riflemen to tree branches to ensure they did not retreat.

The enemy's resistance availed him little success. Employing a heavy volume of artillery fire (over 81,500

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

**UNCLASSIFIED**

rounds during February in DEWEY CANYON) and air strikes (410 fixed wing sorties despite the marginal weather obtaining throughout the month) in support of resolute ground maneuver, the three battalions advanced steadily southward. Attesting to the performance of III MAF firepower (with an aerial observer calling the missions), two active NVA 122mm guns were destroyed on the 15th -- one by air strikes, the other by artillery fire. Marine scout/sniper teams also contributed measurably to the success of the attack, negating on numerous occasions the effect of their NVA counterparts by shooting them out of trees.

Sharp clashes across the entire front marked the action during 16 and 17 February. On the left flank, Company K, moving toward a 16 February objective, was attacked from the front and rear at 0845. Utilizing all available supporting arms to silence enemy mortar and RPG fire, the company killed 17 NVA and seized ten weapons in taking the position, sustaining one killed and 18 wounded in the action. On the 17th, advancing along the right flank, Companies E and G exchanged organic and supporting fire with an enemy company in a day-long, running battle. Forty-five NVA were killed; the friendly cost was four killed and five wounded and evacuated.

Earlier on the 17th, FSB Cunningham was subjected to a pre-dawn sapper attack, aimed from three sides and supported by mortar fire. The sappers, clad only in green shorts and skull caps, carried satchel charges, RPG's, and packs full of grenades. The Marines repulsed the attack before daybreak, killing 37 sappers, 13 inside the perimeter. A police of the battlefield turned up 11 weapons, 12 packs, two radios, numerous hand and rifle grenades, and 253 bamboo-encased explosive devices. Friendly casualties were four killed, eight wounded, and one 105mm howitzer heavily damaged.


**UNCLASSIFIED**

**SECRET**

UNCLASSIFIED

The map below portrays the progress of Operation DEWEY CANYON during 10-17 February.

## OPERATION DEWEY CANYON: 10 - 17 FEBRUARY 1969



~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

in their fighting holes. To the north, Company C seized a hilltop emplacement, killing 32 NVA in a similar engagement on the following morning. Friendly casualties resulting from the two actions were one killed and 12 wounded and evacuated.

Pressing the attack to the south, Company C regained contact during late afternoon on the 20th, engaging a large enemy force deployed in bunkers and trenches. Two hours later, the Marine assault carried the position, killing 71 NVA. Equipment captured included two 122mm, towed howitzers (the first seized in the war), a five-ton, tracked prime mover, and a 12.7mm antiaircraft gun. In a related action less than a mile to the southwest, Company A overran an enemy emplacement, killing 17 NVA and seizing a truck and assorted artillery and antiaircraft ammunition. Friendly losses sustained in the two actions were four killed and 22 wounded in Company C, and one killed and two wounded in Company A.

As the attacking forces neared the Quang Tri/Laos border, protection of the regimental right flank generated the tactical necessity of deploying troops (sanctioned by COMUSMACV) across the international boundary. On 21 February, Company H established an ambush along Route 922, approximately one mile inside Laos. The maneuver paid dividends, as a truck convoy carrying ammunition to the battlefield triggered the ambush at 0240 on the 22d. Results were three trucks and several tons of ammunition destroyed, ten NVA killed, and the road blocked with flaming debris. Throughout the operation, Marine penetration into Laos was restricted to that required for flank protection, and in no instance exceeded 2,000 meters.

The last large-scale battle began during late afternoon on the 22d, when Company A attacked a well-armed, firmly entrenched NVA battalion just north of the border. Reinforced by Company D and the supporting fires of ar-

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

**UNCLASSIFIED**

tillery and fixed wing aircraft, the Marines flanked the complex, then overran it. Results included 105 NVA killed and 25 weapons taken; the dead, clad in new uniforms, included several officers, all of whom were highly decorated veterans of other campaigns. Our casualties, not light, were ten killed and 51 wounded and evacuated.

Meanwhile, on the left flank, although encountering much lighter opposition, the 3d Battalion nevertheless gained substantial results. Attacking generally down the trace of Route 548 (extension of 922 into Quang Tri), elements of the battalion uncovered enemy facilities containing tons of supplies and equipment. On the 18th, Company L located an NVA cemetery composed of 185 marked graves. On the 21st, Company M found a well-camouflaged maintenance facility, complete with six repair pits, a bulldozer, a front-end loader, several disassembled engines, and more than 300 fifty-gallon drums. Pushing southward, the battalion began a detailed search of the Tam Boi mountain area, discovering on the 23d two 122mm howitzers, along with a prime mover and assorted artillery, mortar, and small arms ammunition. Penetration of the Tam Boi complex, which resulted in the ultimate destruction of major enemy headquarters and administrative facilities, featured the detection of an installation composed of 11 immense tunnels carved into the rocks. These 150 to 250-foot tunnels, capable of housing extensive repair, hospital, or storage facilities, could withstand direct hits from air and artillery attacks.


The largest cache, however, was uncovered by the 1st Battalion on the last day of the month, astride Route 922. Requiring more than two days to explore and inventory, the repository yield included 629 rifles, 108 crew-served weapons (60 machine guns, 14 mortars, 15 recoilless rifles, and 19 antiaircraft guns), and well over 100 tons of artillery, mortar, and small arms ammunition, mines, grenades, and explosives.

**UNCLASSIFIED****SECRET**

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

The map below illustrates the action and results of Operation DEWEY CANYON during 18-28 February.

### OPERATION DEWEY CANYON: 18 - 28 FEBRUARY 1969



Through the first week of March, contact in Operation DEWEY CANYON remained sporadic, with our forces continuing to uncover large amounts of supplies, munitions, and additional weapons. By 6 March, the total materiel take included 1,212 individual weapons, 239 crew-served weapons (six 122mm artillery pieces, four 82mm guns, 24 recoilless rifles, 25 mortars, 49 antiaircraft guns, and 131 machine guns), 957 122mm and 140mm rockets, 7,287 122mm shells, one-half million rounds

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

of small arms ammunition, over 60,000 mortar rounds, 66 trucks, 220,000 pounds of rice, and tons of other munitions and equipment. Additionally, at least six artillery weapons and 17 antiaircraft guns were destroyed by friendly supporting arms fire.

In sum, Operation DEWEY CANYON must be ranked among the most significant campaigns of the war -- both in terms of concept and results. Despite marginal weather, an independent regimental operation, projected some 30 air miles from the nearest base, was sustained through a month and a half of heavy combat. Nearly 1,500 NVA regulars were killed during this period, and hundreds of tons of war supplies (the vast majority of which were new, destined for throughput to other battlefields) taken.

The final score of the operation, however, reaches far beyond mere statistical results. III MAF mobile striking power ruptured the organizational apparatus of Base Area 611, effectively blocking the enemy's main I CTZ line of communication. The resultant impact has undoubtedly caused repercussions at both ends -- to the south, the consumer must, for a time, do without certain war materials required to support already planned actions; to the north, the supply lane currently is in disorder all the way to the source.

#### Operations in the DMZ Area

III MAF combat action along the DMZ during most of February paralleled that of the preceding two months. Contact across the entire front was restricted primarily to random patrol meeting engagements and occasional discoveries of small caches of supplies and ammunition. Likewise, within the DMZ proper, little activity to denote a major buildup was detected, as the enemy declined concentrating his forces within range of friendly supporting arms fire. One of the most noteworthy incidents occurred on 15 February, when

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

an airborne spotter for USS NEW JERSEY sighted the construction of a rocket firing site, four miles northeast of Gio Linh. The battlewagon obliterated the position with twenty-four 16-inch shells, causing 25 secondary explosions.

On 25 February, however, the enemy, in coordination with a widespread series of attacks delivered against military installations throughout I CTZ, launched mortar-supported sapper attacks against two Marine fire support bases west and northwest of the Rockpile. At 0120, an unknown size enemy force attacked FSB Neville (ten miles west of the Rockpile), employing mortars, RPG's, automatic weapons, and satchel charges in the assault. The attack was repulsed, with the defenders counting 36 dead NVA on or near the perimeter wire. Friendly losses were 11 killed and 29 wounded and evacuated.

At 0430, FSB Russell (five miles northwest of the Rockpile) was similarly assaulted, with the enemy achieving a limited penetration of the installation. In two and one-half hours of close and heavy fighting, at times degenerating to hand-to-hand combat, the Marines ejected the sappers, restoring the perimeter by 0700. NVA losses were 35 killed; friendly losses were equally heavy, with 19 killed and 50 wounded seriously enough to require evacuation. Reinforcements dispatched in pursuit of the enemy did not make contact; however, 24 weapons and some 90 satchel charges were found abandoned near the two FSB's.

On 28 February, an afternoon battle took place four miles south of the DMZ. At 1540, elements of Troop B, 5th Cavalry (USA) engaged an NVA company, dug-in two miles northwest of Cam Lo. As the engagement developed in intensity, Troop C was committed to reinforce the unit in contact. Simultaneously, Company M, 3d Marines, patrolling south of Con Thien, launched an assault against the enemy flank. Forced to flee at dusk, the enemy left 77 dead on the field;


**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

SECRET  
UNCLASSIFIED

friendly losses were one killed (US Army) and eight wounded and evacuated (four Marines).

The action northwest of Cam Lo is described on the map below.

### THE ACTION NEAR CAM LO: 28 FEBRUARY 1969



### Operation TAYLOR COMMON

In central I CTZ, Operation TAYLOR COMMON continued as the major deterrent to enemy designs on Danang from the south and southwest. Ranging from the western sector of Go Noi Island

SECRET  
UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

westward through the An Hoa basin, a comprehensive series of company-size search and clear operations developed, for the most part, only sporadic contact. To the southwest, the highly successful campaign into Base Area 112 was nearing completion, with a battalion of Marines mopping up the final traces of the enemy's once potent combat support organization there.

A number of supply and ammunition caches were seized in the TAYLOR COMMON area during February, the most significant being a rice store unearthed by Company C, 7th Marines on the 2d. Discovered seven miles northeast of An Hoa, the find yielded 62 tons, neatly stacked in 100-pound bags in a series of covered trenches.

Toward end-month, commensurate with the rash of enemy shellings and probings of military-oriented facilities throughout central and southern I CTZ, action around the combat base at An Hoa registered an increase. Although the bulk of his overt activity centered on Danang area installations and tactical dispositions, the enemy clearly had selected An Hoa as a focal target. Badly damaged in his staging areas and along his lines of communication by An Hoa-based III MAF units, the enemy hoped to disrupt materially the support capability of the combat base.

The heaviest attack began at 0140 on the 23d, when six rockets and eighty-two 82mm mortar rounds impacted, several of which hit in the fuel and ammunition storage areas. Simultaneously, the enemy mounted a sapper attack at the northeast corner of the base perimeter. Direct fire from 105mm howitzers and 90mm gun-tanks halted the sapper attack; 17 dead Viet Cong were left on the wire. Friendly losses were four Marines and two Popular Force soldiers killed and 20 Marines wounded. Explosions in ammunition and fuel dumps destroyed 15,000 artillery rounds and 40,000 gallons of fuel.

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

Thereafter, through end-February, the enemy continued to launch sporadic rocket and mortar shellings at the combat base, while attempting to maneuver infantry units into position for hit-and-run actions. His efforts had little effect, however, as friendly patrols and ambushes and counterbattery fire prevented his marshaling of other than actions of harassing nature. With the majority of the contacts occurring northwest of An Hoa in the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines sector, our forces accounted for 119 enemy killed during 24-28 February in the TAYLOR COMMON area. Total enemy losses for the month to the operation included 316 killed, one captured, and 117 weapons seized.

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

During early February, Marine small unit operations held steady contact with the first significant emergence of enemy elements in the Danang coastal area since August 1968. This increase in interdiction activity climaxed on the 23d, as enemy rocket and mortar units, surfacing for a round of coordinated attacks-by-fire, were trapped by a maze of patrols and ambushes deployed across the lowland plain.

Forecast by captured documents and prisoner interrogations as a "general offensive", the late-February effort, in fact, was destined to fail for lack of combat power. Pre-emptive actions by Marine units, both in the lowlands and in the mountainous base areas, stripped the hostile threat of the maneuver forces necessary for the conduct of a serious offensive. Nevertheless, Quang Nam enemy leadership, answering demands for offensive measures to counter expanding GVN influence and to provide stronger political leverage, moved with that combat strength available.


Contacted 852 times by the Marine counterguerrilla effort - over 8,500 patrols, ambushes, and company-size operations - the enemy paid heavily for his offensive maneuver -- 629 NVA and VC killed, another 49 captured, and 226 weapons seized. The graphs on the following page compare activities and results of the February counterguerrilla campaign with monthly totals since the 1968 Tet period.

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~


UNCLASSIFIED

## MARINE SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: FEBRUARY 1968 - FEBRUARY 1969

## PATROLS, AMBUSHES, AND SEARCH &amp; CLEAR OPERATIONS



## CONTACTS/ENEMY KILLED

Enemy Activity

During February, enemy units initiated 51 major ground and indirect fire attacks in I CTZ, the highest level of activity since August 1968, when an equal number of attacks was recorded. This increase reflects both the late-month Tet-associated attacks in southern I CTZ and opposition to 9th Marines Operation DEWEY CANYON in Base Area 611.

The largest concentration of enemy-initiated effort occurred in Quang Tri - fifteen ground assaults and six attacks-by-fire. Of these, 16 of the incidents resulted from hostile actions in the DEWEY CANYON area. An increase in action immediately south of the demarcation zone obtained from ground attacks on two fire support bases and two truck convoys. NVA presence within the DMZ during February was noted by 566 sightings or incidents involving enemy activity.

In southern I CTZ, a majority of the 27 attacks during the month accrued as NVA and VC units initiated a series


UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

of coordinated rocket and mortar attacks and scattered ground actions immediately following the Tet holiday. The attacks, with few exceptions, were directed against military headquarters and logistic facilities, and against major province and district level governmental seats. Through his selection of targets, and by delaying the long-heralded attacks until after the major Vietnamese holiday period, the enemy attempted to obtain much-needed psychological gains, while inflicting maximum disruption on military and GVN authority. However, piecemeal commitment of his attack effort cost the enemy heavy troop losses, thereby prohibiting measurable military success or opportunity for psychological advantage.

The following graph compares enemy attacks during February with monthly totals since March 1968.

#### ENEMY ATTACKS IN I CTZ: MARCH 1968 - FEBRUARY 1969



#### -Attacks-by-Fire Against I CTZ Bases

The major enemy indirect fire attacks during February occurred before dawn on the 23d, as over 200 mortar rounds and long-range rockets impacted in the Danang vital

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

area and on the base complexes at An Hoa and Chu Lai. However, the attacks had no lasting effect on III MAF support capabilities, as primary losses were restricted to ammunition and fuel - both readily replaceable.

Attacks against the Danang area commenced with a 25-round 122mm rocket mission aimed at the Deep Water Pier, and continued with sporadic attacks across the vital area until dawn. Principal losses included the explosion of an ARVN ammunition dump near the III MAF headquarters and the destruction of a 450,000-gallon fuel tank near the air base. Marine aircraft damages from the incoming ordnance were limited to light damage sustained by one A-6A and six helicopters.

In addition to attacks on the An Hoa combat base (discussed in the Logistics chapter of this edition), enemy units in southern I CTZ also targeted the Chu Lai complex early on the 23d. Fifty 122mm rockets - the largest rocket mission of the day - were intended for III MAF installations; however, over half the rounds fell into the ocean. Limited damage to the LST ramp and to one empty POL tank resulted from the remaining rounds.


#### Early February Contacts

Small unit activity early in February concentrated on interdiction missions as increasing enemy traffic, following patterns revealed by prisoners and enemy documents, evidenced an attempt to stage in the populous lowland. Although the NVA and VC forces maneuvered in small elements to avoid detection and engagement, Marine patrols and ambushes had tallied over 350 contacts by the 22d, killing or capturing at least 200 enemy. Hostile intentions for late February were discerned as an assortment of rockets and mortars were taken from caches or intercepted troop traffic. The following narratives describe a sampling of activities during early February.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

-Immediate response to locally-obtained intelligence led to heavy troop losses for an NVA unit operating in the Nam O bridge area, eight miles northwest of Danang. At 1030 on the 7th, a patrol from Company D, 26th Marines found an enemy base camp containing military equipment and messing and billeting facilities. Reporting the find, the patrol departed, leaving the site intact. Shortly after dark, however, the company redeployed in a series of ambushes to engage nocturnal residents of the harboring site. The first trap was activated at 2255 as 20 enemy closed on the camp. By 0135, two additional inbound NVA units had been surprised. Enemy losses for the night included 18 killed of the 45 NVA observed, another two captured, and three weapons seized. Two Marines were wounded and evacuated.

Company D Actions: 7-8 February


1. Company D patrol, at 071030, discovers enemy rest site, with miscellaneous military and personal gear.
2. At 072255, 20 enemy trigger Company D ambush; 14 NVA killed, one captured, and three weapons seized.
3. At 080130, Company D ambush engages 15 NVA, killing one and capturing another.
4. At 080135, Company D ambush surprises ten enemy; three NVA are killed.

-Enemy attempts to stage rockets during this period also fell victim to day and night small unit actions. At 1300 on the 8th, Company L, 7th Marines found seven complete 122mm rockets cached in the Yen river, nine miles southwest of Danang. An hour later, and a mile to the west, another 3d Battalion, 7th Marines patrol discovered thirteen 140mm rockets, temporarily stored in a water hole. Shortly before midnight on the 18th, a Company F, 1st Marines ambush, directing artillery on suspected enemy movement three miles south of Marble Mountain, reported 21 secondary explosions.

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

-By mid-month, encounters with larger units along the periphery of the lowland area were not uncommon. Company D, 7th Marines located an NVA platoon occupying a bunker system 14 miles south-southwest of Danang on the 16th. Under a cover of artillery fire, the company assaulted the position, forcing the enemy to withdraw and leave behind 16 dead and nine weapons. An outpost left in the area by the company regained contact at dusk as another enemy platoon attempted to reoccupy the area. Fourteen enemy subsequently were killed by artillery and small arms fires. Earlier in the day, two and one-half miles to the east, the 2d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment engaged an estimated enemy battalion moving north from Go Noi Island. Pinioned against the Suoi Co Ca river by the ARVN attack, the enemy lost 49 killed, eight weapons, and an assortment of ammunition. Blocking the enemy's determined effort to move north, Marine and ARVN units each sustained six men killed, while eight Marines and 19 ARVN were wounded and evacuated.

Marine and ARVN Actions: 16 February

1. At 161430, Company D, 7th Marines assaults enemy fortified position; 16 NVA killed and nine weapons captured.
2. Company D squad outpost ambushes enemy platoon at dusk, killing another 14 NVA.
3. During the afternoon of the 16th, 2d Battalion, 51st ARVN regiment attacks estimated enemy battalion, killing 49 NVA and capturing eight weapons and assorted munitions.

Actions Commencing on 23 February

Despite the lack of strength necessary for a full-scale offensive, enemy units gaining access to assembly positions near Danang were committed to action on the morning of the 23d. As rocket and mortar teams targeted command and logistic installations within the vital area, enemy sapper units attempted to

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

disrupt major infantry command centers, while still other units moved to secure the principal highway approaches to the city. These measures, if accomplished, would allow enemy elements freedom of action inside the vital area complex.

Singularly unsuccessful, the hostile effort proved a repetition of earlier attempts against Danang. Detected and attacked enroute, repulsed from essential targets, and exposed to Marine and ARVN pursuit, the enemy soon developed a new objective -- to avoid total destruction.

-Actions South of Danang

Ground action south of Danang was initiated shortly after midnight on the 23d, as Company K, 1st Marines and Company D, 1st MP Battalion detected enemy approaching the two Cau Do river bridges. Attacking yet unassembled segments of the enemy advance, the companies killed 47 Viet Cong and captured 11, removing any opportunity for closure of the critical choke points. One Marine was wounded and evacuated.

At 0215, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines command post, four miles south of Marble Mountain, was attacked by an estimated VC company. Disruption of the battalion control element failed, however, as the enemy was repelled and forced to withdraw, leaving behind 17 VC dead, six others in the hands of Marines, and 18 weapons. Friendly losses totaled eight wounded and evacuated.

Shortly after dawn, a VC element was detected in a factory complex near the Hoa Vang district headquarters, site of heavy fighting during the abortive August 1968 attempt to invest Danang. Marine units forced the enemy into an isolated, bamboo-encircled cemetery after killing six VC, capturing two others, and seizing eight weapons. In a two-hour fight the following day, the 21st ARVN Ranger Battalion assaulted the enemy force, then in the process of withdrawing southward. Plans for enemy action against vital area targets were ended as 57 VC fell to the ARVN attack. Ranger casualties were two killed and two wounded.


**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

After less than 12 hours of fighting, the major enemy strength south of Danang was in retreat. Efforts to seek haven were shattered, however, as elements of the 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment, seven miles south of Da-nang, detected and attacked the withdrawal. Maintaining almost constant contact from 1300 on the 23d until dusk on the 26th, the ARVN killed 139 NVA and VC and captured 38 weapons. Among enemy supplies seized during the three-day fight were 257 rounds of mortar and RPG ammunition and 400 grenades - ordnance unfired due to the abrupt disruption of operations.

The following map depicts major ground action south of Danang during the period 23-26 February.

#### ACTION SOUTH OF DANANG: 23 - 26 FEBRUARY

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**Actions West of Danang

The major enemy thrust from the mountains west of Danang was intercepted by Company M, 7th Marines. Initial contact developed at 0130 as one of the company's ambushes trapped a mortar team seven miles southwest of the air base, killing seven NVA and capturing two 82mm mortars. Sporadic actions with other elements of the NVA column continued until the main body was engaged at 0900. Reinforced by Company K, the Marines attacked, maintaining contact until the enemy withdrew under the cover of darkness. For three days following, 7th Marines patrols found enemy losses sustained in the fight; by the 27th, NVA personnel losses stood at 107 killed and seven captured, while ordnance seized included five mortars, four other crew-served weapons, and 40 individual weapons. Marine casualties, 21 killed and 46 wounded and evacuated, further evidenced the heavy, close-in nature of fighting.

Other pre-dawn activity centered around command post complexes west of Danang. On the northern slope of Hill 327, security elements for headquarters of the 26th Marine Regiment and the 1st Marine Division repulsed night attacks by satchel charge-equipped sappers. Similar actions were fended at the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines compound, although the sapper assault carried into the position's defensive wire. At least 75 enemy were killed or captured in these futile attempts to destroy Marine command and control facilities. Reflecting the intensity of rocket and mortar-supported suicide tactics, Marine defenders sustained 18 killed and 80 wounded and evacuated.

Beginning early on the 23d, and continuing through the end of the month, Marine units operating along the base of the mountains west of Danang fought a series of heavy contacts - first engaging forces attempting to enter the lowland, then elements retiring from actions farther east. To clear this area, small unit operations maintained a satura-


**UNCLASSIFIED**  
~~SECRET~~

SECRET  
UNCLASSIFIED

tion of patrols and ambushes across passages to the highlands, accounting for 105 NVA and VC killed.

The map below portrays major contacts occurring in the areas west of the Danang vital area from 23 to 26 February.

### ACTIONS WEST OF DANANG: 23 - 26 FEBRUARY 1969



Although patrols and ambushes continued to engage remnants of the enemy force through end-February, the attack, in essence, was met and broken on the 23d. As in the past, failure to penetrate Danang proved costly - over 450 enemy were killed or captured from 23 to 28 February. Further, over 110 crew-served and individual weapons were left behind in his hasty and disorderly withdrawal.

SECRET  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION

February marked the countrywide initiation of the 1969 GVN Pacification and Development Plan - a program designed to exploit the highly successful Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) by projecting GVN influence over the entire population. The momentum gathered by the special three-month APC continued to affect the pacification status in I CTZ, as the secure population increased, albeit modestly, despite the series of hostilities triggered by the enemy subsequent to Tet.

The rapid and effective countering of the enemy surge reversed any security deterioration for which the enemy was striving. Since the effort was crippled before enemy elements could maneuver to attack densely populated urban areas, the impact on the civilian population was minimal. During the period 22 February through 1 March, 125 civilians were reported killed and 727 wounded in I CTZ; although grave, this suffering was dwarfed by the 6,400 civilian casualties resulting from the month-long Tet offensive a year ago.

In other areas of pacification interest, combined action units, conducting a record 10,684 counterguerrilla operations, netted more than 350 enemy killed or captured. And, with 265 ralliers, the Chieu Hoi program continued to demonstrate its erosional effects on enemy morale.

1969 Pacification and Development Program

The 1969 GVN Pacification and Development Program commenced on 1 February, exploiting successes accrued since November by the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and orienting toward projection of GVN influence over the entire population. The program has one basic principle -- community spirit -- a concept designed to instill all Vietnamese with a desire to participate in a concerted effort for the betterment of the village, traditionally the basic Vietnamese community. The effort in each village will be guided by a revolutionary development team, which, upon receiving direction from provincial authority, will complete various projects in order of their urgency, and improve security conditions in hamlets according to the following development priorities expounded within the 1969 plan.


~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
30

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**FIRST** - Restoration of security in contested hamlets.  
**SECOND** - Initiation of pacification measures in VC-controlled hamlets.  
**THIRD** - Enhancement of established institutions in secure hamlets.

In order to organize the development of the country in a logical pattern, President THIEU established four criteria for determination of areas where 1969 efforts are to be concentrated. These considerations entail an area's population density and its proximity to lines of communication, political centers, and economic installations. Based on these requirements, national and provincial officials established areas of precedence; the I CTZ areas and their populations are pictured on the following map.

#### **I CTZ AREAS OF PACIFICATION PRECEDENCE: 1969**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

To accomplish the 1969 program, the GVN established eight objectives for the direction of efforts in those fields of endeavor deemed most important. These goals, their relationship to I CTZ development, and a forecast for their fulfillment in I CTZ are discussed below.

- Bring security to 90% of the population and extend GVN sovereignty throughout the tactical zone. As the program commenced, 73.7% of the I CTZ population was considered secure, with 85.7% under GVN sovereignty. The picture no doubt will improve during the year, but fulfillment of this goal will require a dynamic acceleration of effort in the three southern provinces.

- Eliminate 550 VCI per month. During the APC, more than 800 VCI were eliminated each month in I CTZ. As a result, the forecast for successful completion of the 1969 goal is good.

- Involve additional civilians in the People's Self-Defense Groups. A look at the status prior to instigation of the 1969 program, and the end-1969 objective, determines the requirement for a substantial increase in each category.

|                    | <u>ORGANIZED</u> | <u>TRAINED</u> | <u>ARMED</u> |
|--------------------|------------------|----------------|--------------|
| 31 January status  | 225,000          | 98,000         | 30,000       |
| End-1969 objective | 320,000          | 256,000        | 64,000       |
| Required increase  | 42%              | 161%           | 113%         |

Despite the necessity for monumental growth, the goal is possible if training cadre and weapons are available in adequate amounts.

- Establish local government in all villages throughout the tactical zone. Of the 509 villages in I CTZ, 187 elected councils during 1967, 128 are to elect councils in March 1969, and 194 have non-elected committees. Thus, by end-March, all I CTZ villages will have governing bodies, 62% of which will be popularly elected.

- Rally 2,500 Hoi Chanh. During 1968, I CTZ reported 3,118 ralliers; thus far this year, 538 former enemy have taken advantage of the Chieu Hoi program. At this rate - 269 returnees per month - the goal will be met easily.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

-Decrease the number of refugees and resettle, or return to their native homes, as many as possible. I CTZ, with over 690,000 refugees, had approximately 55% of the refugees in all RVN as of end-January. Furthermore, refugees comprise roughly 25% of the I CTZ population. This goal then poses a grave challenge to refugee agencies.

-Increase psychological operations. This is a facet of the total effort which III MAF and I ARVN Corps always have executed vigorously; therefore, a high pace of psyops activity should continue.

-Encourage the rural economy. This goal will be accomplished by improving lines of communication, offering low-interest loans to the rural populace, providing more and better agricultural equipment, and minimizing requirements for permits, taxes, and checkpoints. These measures should stimulate the economy considerably.

In sum, the program is ambitious, but the GVN, with III MAF support in I CTZ, should either realize, or make substantial strides toward, fulfillment of all eight objectives.

#### ARVN Support of Revolutionary Development

One of the prerequisites for a successful RD program is sufficient military security. In 1969, as in the two years previous, the ARVN is assigned the mission of conducting operations within, and on the periphery of, pacification precedence areas. Augmenting this effort are the counterguerrilla operations and local security patrols and ambushes executed by Regional and Popular Force units at the district and village level.

Particularly successful during the month were ARVN operations in the Danang-Hoi An-Dai Loc triangle. In execution of Operations HUNG QUANG 1-03 and 1-05, for example, the 51st ARVN Regiment generated several noteworthy engagements.

-Shortly before noon on 31 January, the 3d and 4th Battalions attacked elements of the 2d Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment, nine miles west of Hoi An. Supported by artillery and

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

armed helicopters, the ARVN pressed the attack until late afternoon on 1 February, accounting for 117 NVA killed, four taken prisoner, and 18 weapons, 50 mortar shells, and 40 RPG rounds captured. ARVN casualties were six killed and 17 wounded.

-During an eight-hour battle on the 16th, the 2d Battalion, supported by fixed wing air strikes, assaulted an estimated enemy battalion, eight miles west of Hoi An. Enemy losses during the encounter were 49 killed, three captured, and eight weapons, 105 mortar and antitank rounds, and 76 grenades seized.

-And, as noted in the Small Unit Counterguerrilla chapter of this report, between 23 and 26 February, elements of the 51st engaged the enemy on several occasions, killing 139 and capturing 38 weapons and assorted ammunition. The regiment's casualties for the four days were ten killed and 42 wounded.

Also significant was a series of 4th ARVN Regiment actions fought in an area five miles west of Quang Ngai City against major enemy formations threatening the provincial capital. Maintaining almost continuous contact during the period 24 to 26 February, the ARVN killed 191 enemy, captured 36, and seized 71 weapons. Friendly casualties were high as well, however, with 66 ARVN killed and 86 wounded.

#### Pacification

At end-February, 74.3% of the I CTZ civilian populace resided in hamlets rated secure by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). This represents an increase over January of 0.6 percentage points and is an abrupt reversal of the condition which prevailed a year ago, when the HES ratings reflected a 7.1 point drop in the secure population following the Tet hostilities. It thus is apparent the enemy's end-February surge did not leave its mark on the people, as the GVN continued to enlarge its sphere of influence across the countryside.


The map on the following page, based on January 1969 province-level HES data, presents the pacification status in I CTZ.

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

## PACIFICATION STATUS - I CTZ



| I CTZ Totals | Secure    | Contested | VC Control | Total     |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| Population   | 2,079,342 | 389,521   | 403,296    | 2,822,179 |
| Percentage   | 73.7      | 13.9      | 14.3       | 100       |

Note: Based on end-January 1969 Hamlet Evaluation System data.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**Combined Action Program

Combined action units, continuing through the month to pressure enemy formations in their operating areas, were credited with several noteworthy actions, particularly the battles waged south of Danang during the last week of the month. Between 23 and 28 February, combined action platoons operating within, and south of, the rocket belt encircling the complex generated 17 casualty-producing contacts. These engagements, ranging from brief skirmishes to day-long fire fights, cost the enemy 86 killed, three captured, and 35 weapons seized (including two 12.7mm and one caliber .30 antiaircraft machine guns and two rocket launchers).

Several incidents resulted from information received from Vietnamese civilian sources. For example, about dawn on the 23d, members of a Peoples' Self-Defense Force informed CAP 2-1-6 of an enemy presence near Phu Ha hamlet, six miles west of Danang. Sweeping the suspect area, a CAP patrol killed five NVA and captured three rifles. The next morning, civilians in Hoa Ninh village directed the same CAP to six antivehicular box mines seeded along Route 5, five miles southwest of the air base.

Other combined action units throughout the tactical zone turned in outstanding performances as well, examples of which are chronicled below.

-Shortly after dawn on the 23d, CAP 1-1-4 engaged a 60-man Viet Cong force, four miles southwest of Tam Ky. The Marines and Popular Force (PF) soldiers killed six VC and captured one; later, the prisoner was identified as a VC Major.

-Around noon on the 24th, CAP's 4-3-2 and 4-3-7, sweeping an area six miles north of Quang Tri City, captured one enemy soldier with a rifle and uncovered a 60mm and an 82mm mortar.


**UNCLASSIFIED**  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**


As displayed in the following graphs, combined action units, conducting 3,325 daylight patrols and 7,359 night patrols and ambushes, accounted for 279 NVA and VC killed, 78 taken prisoner, and 112 weapons captured during the month. The total enemy personnel loss (357) was the highest attributed to combined action units since last February.

### COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS


#### OPERATIONS CONDUCTED




#### ENEMY KILLED



#### ENEMY CAPTURED



#### WEAPONS CAPTURED

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~


The Combined Action Program also was active administratively, with the activation of Combined Action Company 1-4 (two miles north of Quang Ngai City) and nine Combined Action Platoons (three in 1st Combined Action Group (CAG), one in 3d CAG, and five in 4th CAG). Four platoons were deactivated during the month in order better to employ their Marine contingents elsewhere in the program. Thus, at end-month, the program, which included four group and 20 company headquarters, 109 platoons, and five mobile training teams, had a manning strength of 1,760 Marines, 123 US Navy corpsmen, and 2,938 Popular Force soldiers.

#### Chieu Hoi Returnees

Disillusioned enemy personnel continued to respond to the Chieu Hoi program at a relatively high rate - 265 ralliers were recorded in I CTZ during February. This is considerably higher than the 86 returnees of last February, despite the enemy's abortive attempt to repeat his 1968 Tet offensive. The February response was attributable, in part, to the psychological operations urging enemy personnel to rally during Tet, a period traditionally reserved for reunion of family.

The graph below presents the monthly Chieu Hoi returnee rate since March 1968.

CHIEU HOI RETURNEES - I CTZ



1969  
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET~~

**UNCLASSIFIED**

The Chieu Hoi program has proven a persistent impairment to the enemy -- since III MAF entry into the war in March 1965, more than 8,850 Hoi Chanh have been welcomed in I CTZ alone. In an attempt to counter the effectiveness of this program, the enemy has trained certain politically reliable individuals (ranging from guerrillas to company-level cadre) as false ralliers, with the assigned objectives of disrupting the Chieu Hoi program and collecting intelligence. However, due to their lack of training in withstanding comprehensive interrogation, potential penetrators, in the main, have been culled out during the screening phase of returnee indoctrination. Nevertheless, attempts at infiltration no doubt will continue, if not increase, since a successful penetration would be invaluable to the enemy.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**AIR OPERATIONS

Continuing responsive combat support to large unit and counterguerrilla operations throughout I CTZ, as well as supporting interdiction and surveillance programs out-of-country, pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in February flew 7,424 fixed wing sorties. Helicopter pilots of the 1st Wing and the Special Landing Forces (SLF's), complementing the air support effort, tallied 48,228 sorties while transporting 67,240 combat troops and passengers and 9,769 tons of cargo.

Air Support of Large Unit Operations

In February, the major combat air effort was exerted in support of large unit operations penetrating enemy hinterland base area complexes in northern and central I CTZ. Three Marine operations - DEWEY CANYON in the Da Krong Valley, SCOTLAND II in the mountains of the western DMZ region, and TAYLOR COMMON in Base Area 112 - received 37% of the in-country fixed wing combat sorties and 51% of the helicopter missions flown by Marine squadrons during the month.

Conducted in mountainous terrain not readily accessible by ground transport and beyond the range of established artillery positions, these operations, by necessity, incorporated heavy requirements for constant air support. Despite delimiting effects of monsoon weather common to the mountain region, helicopter and fixed wing pilots maintained the level of airborne combat mobility, fire power, and logistic support requisite to successful prosecution of the operations. Documenting the effectiveness of these coordinated air/ground efforts were the discovery and destruction of major enemy command and logistic complexes, and the heavy loss of enemy combat troops -- over 1,500 killed or captured.

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**-Fixed Wing Support

The primary fixed wing contribution to Operations DEWEY CANYON, SCOTLAND II, and TAYLOR COMMON was the 1,600 attack sorties flown against active enemy defenses and suspected enemy locations jeopardizing planned infantry advances. Delivering over 4,000 tons of high explosives, 1st MAW squadrons assisted ground maneuver by killing 59 enemy and razing 319 bunkers and structures. Measuring the devastation from strikes against enemy support areas, airborne observers and infantry units in DEWEY CANYON reported five 122mm guns and 31 trucks destroyed.

Although less tangible, hard results of the strike missions were realized in the ability of ground units to reduce rapidly and effectively enemy strongpoints and to secure operational objectives. Whether trapping the enemy in fortifications or driving him into the open, the air strikes softened considerably his resistance to Marine ground attacks. And the psychological value of air support was evident as further degradation of enemy morale and increases in defections frequently were attributed to fear of air strikes.

-Helicopter Support

Commencing with late-January heliborne assaults into the Da Krong Valley, Operation DEWEY CANYON has served as an excellent example of helicopter-dependent operations. Thus far, elements of the 9th Marines have employed over 10,000 helicopter sorties to obtain the tactical and logistical mobility necessary to continue operations in the isolated, mountain terrain.

Although the infantry scheme of maneuver called for units to advance overland to the major objectives, helicopter troop and equipment lifts were integral to the tactical plan. As the line of advance out-distanced initial FSB's, helicopters

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

displaced artillery and mortar units to new positions, closer to the action. Combined with the transfer of personnel in and out of the operating area, these missions lifted an average of 365 troops a day during the month.

Equally important was the requirement for logistic support. Continuous action along the route of advance and a heavy rate of supporting arms expenditure necessitated a steady replenishment of ammunition, while routine resupply of food and equipment further lengthened cargo schedules. In all, 2,187 tons of cargo were lifted into DEWEY CANYON combat positions during the month.

The ability of helicopters to perform these acute tactical and logistical tasks was seriously challenged as north-east monsoon weather conditions prevailed in the mountain regions. In addition to sporadic thunderstorm activity, pilots encountered persistent low cloud coverage and valley fog which obscured hazardous terrain features and the small jungle clearings serving as landing zones. To maintain continuity in logistic support during these conditions, helicopter traffic was controlled by air support radar teams (ASRT's), employing procedures routinely used for fixed wing low-visibility ordnance delivery missions.

-Radar-Controlled Flight Operations

Although instrument-flight weather conditions existed at northern I CTZ logistic centers and over the DEWEY CANYON area, helicopter missions were possible, providing unrestricted flight conditions existed at cruise altitude. For a typical mission from Quang Tri or Dong Ha, the pilot, after an instrument-assisted departure to climb above the clouds, would request flight clearance and ASRT assignment from the Vandegrift Direct Air Support Center (DASC). The assigned ASRT then tracked the helicopter with the all-weather AN/TPQ-10 radar, providing the pilot enroute navigational guidance via an air/ground voice radio link. Arriving over the destination,

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~


~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

the pilot, taking advantage of openings in the cloud cover, would make his final approach to the LZ. During the period 1 February to 7 March, ASRT-controlled helicopters conducted 1,552 sorties, delivering 2,113 tons of supplies and executing medical evacuation, command and control, and other support missions.

On several occasions when severe weather conditions prohibited helicopter approaches to the mountain landing zones, resupply tasks were accomplished by parachute deliveries from CH-46 helicopters and KC-130F refueler/transport aircraft. Using Marine Corps-developed CH-46 paratroop ballistics data, created for use with the TPQ-10 radar, an ASRT vectored the helicopter to an appropriate release point. Accuracy of the February parachute deliveries, totaling 17 tons of supplies, was attributed to the low air-delivery speed possible with helicopters, and to the availability of previously developed ballistics information. Also using TPQ-10 control guidance, KC-130F drops accounted for 96 tons of air-delivered cargo. Success of the fixed wing deliveries improved during the month with onsite development of a broader paratroop ballistics data base for use with the KC-130F.

The graphic below depicts procedures and control units associated with ASRT-controlled helicopter flights and paratroop resupply missions.

### RADAR CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

An example of ASRT-controlled missions is illustrated by air support provided Company G, 9th Marines following a 2 February DEWEY CANYON engagement. Remaining in the area of contact when monsoon weather prohibited the extraction of six litter-case casualties, the company was resupplied for five days by radar-controlled paratrops. On the 7th, two CH-46's of Medium Helicopter Squadron-161, accompanied by two UH-1E gunships of Marine Light Helicopter Squadron-167, maneuvered their way through the rain and fog to the company and evacuated 18 Marines.

- Airborne Reconnaissance Operations

Assisting III MAF operational planners in the selection of target areas for large unit operations, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in February flew almost 1,000 fixed wing sorties, conducting various types of airborne reconnaissance missions to identify enemy troop concentrations and movement. Techniques commonly used to obtain surface intelligence included visual surveillance and photographic and radar surveys. Although visual reconnaissance provides the commander detailed and real-time information, various types of photographic and radar reconnaissance methods produce film records which reveal camouflaged positions, depict terrain and activity during the hours of darkness, and locate radar-significant targets. However, these intelligence collection methods often lack the capability to detect the presence of enemy formations concealed by heavy jungle canopy covering mountain base areas.

To provide a system for detection of enemy units under the canopy, the airborne personnel detector (APD) was recently added to the III MAF intelligence collection effort. Currently used aboard 1st Wing UH-1E helicopters, the APD was designed to determine the presence of personnel by detecting the ammonia effluence of people, or the combustion products associated with human activity, such as fires and vehicle engine exhaust. As the pilot flies at tree-top level, the 65-pound device, monitoring

**UNCLASSIFIED****SECRET**

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

air rising from beneath the jungle canopy, registers indications of human activity. Normally employed along likely foot traffic routes (trail networks, ridgelines, stream beds), the APD is able to cover 100 square kilometers an hour.

Success of the APD in developing canopy-covered jungle targets is shown in the following examples.

-An APD mission flown on 24 October 1968, preceding an operation immediately south of the DMZ, resulted in heavy readings in the proposed target region. The subsequent four-day operation resulted in over 200 enemy killed.

-On 30 November 1968, an APD mission registered heavy readings 16 miles west-northwest of Dong Ha. Following heliborne assaults into the area, III MAF units killed 63 enemy during the ensuing ten-day operation.

-A 19 January APD mission, preceding Operation DEWEY CANYON, produced heavy readings around the later-developed FSB Cunningham, while lighter readings, obtained during sweeps across the intended operational area, evidenced widespread troop deployments. In DEWEY CANYON, over 1,100 enemy had been killed by 28 February.

#### Fixed Wing Operations

##### -In-Country Operations

In February, 80% of the Marine fixed wing effort was flown within the confines of I CTZ, providing III MAF, ARVN, and ROK Marine forces a total of 4,312 combat and 1,623 combat support missions. Ten large unit operations (nine III MAF and one ROKMC), various small unit counterguerrilla operations, and the special in-country interdiction programs

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

received attack sorties which delivered over 8,800 tons of high explosive bombs, 2,400 napalm bombs, and 11,600 rockets. Significant enemy losses attributed to these strikes included 144 enemy killed, more than 1,400 structures and fortifications reduced, and over 30 vehicles destroyed. Damage to enemy POL and ammunition storage complexes was reflected in 105 secondary explosions and 178 secondary fires reported.


The following graphs portray the number of in-country sorties flown and the amount of ordnance delivered during the past six months.

#### IN-COUNTRY FIXED WING SUPPORT BY MARINE AIRCRAFT: SEP 68 - FEB 69

SORTIES FLOWN



ORDNANCE DELIVERED



#### Out-of-Country Operations

During the month, 1,489 combat support missions were flown out-of-country by Marine pilots. The majority of flights - 1,061 - again were directed against enemy targets in southern Laos. Of that number, 941 strike sorties targeted enemy troop concentrations, lines of communication, and storage areas. Supporting the effort over Laos were an additional 64 reconnaissance and 56 combat air patrol missions.


~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

In North Vietnam, the Marine air endeavor was focused primarily on electronic warfare. During the month, 319 electronic countermeasure flights were recorded by pilots flying the EA-6A's and EF-10B's of Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron-1 (VMCJ-1), while the squadron's RF-4B aircraft flew 35 aerial photographic flights. The wing F-4's were utilized in flying 55 combat air patrol missions over and off-shore North Vietnam, primarily in support of the US Seventh Fleet. An additional 19 escort missions, supporting the unarmed aircraft of VMCJ-1, were flown by the F-4 fighter-bomber.

The following graph depicts out-of-country combat and combat support missions flown by Marine pilots during the past six months.

#### OUT-OF-COUNTRY FIXED WING SUPPORT BY MARINE AIRCRAFT: SEP 68 - FEB 69



#### Helicopter Operations

Helicopter pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces flew 48,228 sorties during February, helilifting 67,240 passengers and 9,769 tons of cargo. Support flown by wing and SLF pilots included tactical and logistical lifts of troops and equipment, command

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
~~SECRET~~

**UNCLASSIFIED**

and control missions, and sea/air rescue, reconnaissance, tactical air coordinator (airborne), and tactical aircraft recovery flights.

During the month, nearly 7,200 combatant and non-combatant personnel were lifted by medical evacuation flights from field positions to more tenable areas. Illustrating the tenacity of helicopter crews flying these important missions was a flight to evacuate wounded Marines from an isolated hilltop fire support base in the vicinity of Vandegrift combat base. Although repeated attempts to reach the 3,800-foot peak had previously been thwarted because of extremely hazardous monsoon flying conditions, a UH-34 crew from Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron-36 volunteered on the 22d to attempt the mission. The pilot orbited near the cloud-covered peak until a flare was fired to establish the exact LZ location. Thus oriented, he descended to the base of the mountain and then began a slow climb along the hillside and again into the mist. A radio operator in the LZ provided course of flight information based on engine noises, while crew members watched for trees and other obstacles. Despite zero visibility created by the cloud bank, the pilot was able to land safely, embark the wounded, and proceed under instrument conditions to Quang Tri, some 30 miles distant.


Helicopter support provided to other than Marine units in February was 10.2% of the total monthly 1st Wing effort. These tactical and logistical flights were realized by ROKMC units (3,225 sorties), US Special Forces (1,304 - a record monthly high), the 7th Air Force (90), and ARVN forces (12).

The graph on the following page compares monthly helicopter sortie totals, by aircraft type, since March 1968.

**UNCLASSIFIED****SECRET**

UNCLASSIFIED

## MARINE HELICOPTER SORTIES: MARCH 68 - FEBRUARY 69

Crew, Passenger, and Aircraft Losses

In February, three 1st Wing aircraft and 11 crew members were lost in actions attributable to direct enemy action. All losses (one F-4J, one UH-1E, and one CH-46) resulted from enemy ground fire. Additionally, three fixed wing aircraft and five helicopters received minor to substantial damage as a result of other enemy activity.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LOGISTICS

Repairs of bridges and culverts damaged by a brief flurry of enemy road interdiction efforts during the last week of the month highlighted logistic operations in February. Although twenty-seven interdictions occurred during 23-26 February, all damage was repaired within 36 hours. This rapid restoration of the roads permitted motor transport operations to continue with only minor interruption.

Approximately 15,000 rounds of artillery ammunition and 40,000 gallons of fuel were destroyed at An Hoa on the morning of the 23d, when rockets and mortar fire hit the Logistic Support Unit-1 supply areas. At Danang, damage to Force Logistic Command installations was restricted to six refrigeration compressors receiving moderate damage from rocket fragments. ARVN and Naval Support Activity, Danang facilities sustained a greater degree of destruction, but this damage had no residual effects on III MAF logistic commitments.

Engineer Operations

Engineer operations through the first three weeks of the month were concentrated on recurring tasks (cantonment construction and maintenance, potable water production, maintenance of lines of communication (LOC), and combat support of tactical units); however, there was a reallocation of engineer effort the last week of February to effect repair of road damage in central and southern I CTZ.

The late-February attacks on the LOC's were of shorter duration and lesser intensity than those of the 1968 Tet offensive, with relatively minor damage inflicted. Twenty interdictions occurred during the 42-hour period ending at 1800 on 24 February; repairs were effected within 36 hours. Damage caused by seven additional attacks against

UNCLASSIFIED


~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

the LOC's on the 25th and 26th was repaired by noon of the 27th. Particular emphasis was placed by the enemy on two sections of Route 1 - the 27-mile segment linking Dien Ban and Tam Ky and the 38 miles between Binh Son and Duc Pho. The map below portrays the February 1969 interdictions, compared with the attacks on the LOC's during the 1968 Tet offensive.

### MAJOR I CTZ ROAD INTERDICTIONS

1 January - 9 February 1968/1 - 28 February 1969

0 15 30  
Miles

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

III MAF's continuing LOC upgrading program included the systematic replacement of tactical bridging with permanent or semi-permanent spans, thereby increasing the availability of tactical bridging for emergency repair. This permitted the damaged or destroyed bridges to be repaired, replaced, or bypassed, quickly reopening Route 1. Four bridges, ranging in size from a 40-foot, fixed-span, Bailey Bridge to a 240-foot floating bridge, were emplaced by III MAF engineers. The engineers were also instrumental in repairing or constructing bypasses at nine other bridges. Additionally, they replaced or repaired 14 culverts.



#### Motor Transport Operations

As a result of the road restoration projects, Marine motor transport units were able to improve the high level of operations recorded in January. III MAF Marine motor transport units (five battalions and a truck company) logged 612,313 miles in February, carrying 246,314 personnel and 65,779 tons of material, an increase in all categories over the January total of 602,048 miles, 219,863 personnel, and 65,397 tons of cargo.

Of particular significance were the 102 Rough Rider convoys conducted during the month. Averaging over three convoys per day, the Rough Riders transited the LOC's every day except on the 23d, the first day of enemy road interdiction. The convoys carried a daily average of 331 S/T of cargo prior to the 23d. For the last five days of the month the average rose to 539 S/T a day, reflecting the replenishment of increased ammunition expenditures and the partial replacement of the ammunition destroyed at An Hoa.

The graphs on the following page depict the number of Rough Rider convoys per month from 1 February 1968 through 28 February 1969, and the daily amount of cargo carried by the convoys in February 1969.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED****ROUGH RIDER OPERATIONS****CONVOYS: FEB 68 - FEB 69****CARGO CARRIED: 1-28 FEB 69**

February 1969 Rough Riders varied in size from five to 71 vehicles, and in distance traveled from the 16 miles on the Danang to Hoi An run to the 96 miles from Danang to Dong Ha. As in January, the plurality of the convoys were from Danang to Logistic Support Unit-1 at An Hoa. Below are the Rough Rider convoys for February.

| <u>No. of<br/>Convoys</u> | <u>From</u> | <u>To</u> | <u>Vehicles</u> | <u>Passengers</u> | <u>Cargo<br/>(S/T)</u> |
|---------------------------|-------------|-----------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| 24                        | Danang      | An Hoa    | 408             | 108               | 4,191                  |
| 21                        | An Hoa      | Danang    | 250             | 65                | 315                    |
| 17                        | Danang      | Hoi An    | 177             | 69                | 2,352                  |
| 17                        | Hoi An      | Danang    | 178             | 55                | 0                      |
| 6                         | Danang      | Dong Ha   | 170             | 47                | 1,264                  |
| 6                         | Dong Ha     | Danang    | 95              | 15                | 888                    |
| 1                         | Danang      | Quang Tri | 14              | 5                 | 234                    |
| 5                         | Danang      | Phu Bai   | 27              | 5                 | 364                    |
| 5                         | Phu Bai     | Danang    | 27              | 11                | 372                    |
| <b>102</b>                |             |           | <b>1,346</b>    | <b>380</b>        | <b>9,980</b>           |

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**Ordnance- 155mm Howitzer

Replacement of older models of the self-propelled (SP), M-109 155mm howitzer by late-production models, a project initiated last November, was completed in February. Not only have the weapons in Marine general support batteries been replaced, but the maintenance float at Force Logistic Command also has been supplied with the new howitzers. This program provides Marine units a more refined version of the 155mm howitzer, and negates the requirement for a rebuild program for the older-model M-109.

- 175mm Gun


During the month, an interservice support agreement calling for US Army units to provide maintenance support of the 175mm gun, SP, M-107, soon to be used by in-country Marine units, was completed by Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Department of the Army. Subsequently, the provisions of this agreement were effected by the Force Logistic Command and the US Army's 1st Logistics Command, with 1 March now established as a tentative in-service date for the Marines' first battery of 175mm guns.

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

  
**UNCLASSIFIED****CONCLUSIONS**

-Despite a late-month surge of coordinated attacks-by-fire and limited ground forays, the enemy still lacks the stamina to initiate a serious offensive.

-Prospects for successful execution of the GVN 1969 Pacification and Development plan are good -- as evidenced by the enemy's failure to check the momentum already generated by the III MAF and ARVN-supported Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

  
**UNCLASSIFIED****SECRET**

[REDACTED]

STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS: FEBRUARY 1969

1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLEa. I CTZ/DMZ Summary

In consonance with the trend apparent since late last summer, the enemy in northern I CTZ withheld his major formations from combat, marshaling them instead in base areas within North Vietnam and Laos. This disposition was static throughout the month, even in the wake of the abortive, understrength offensive launched in southern I CTZ on the 23d.

The enemy's efforts south of the Hai Van pass were concentrated predominantly on preparation for, and execution of, his surge of activity during the last week of the month. This was characterized by attacks-by-fire, targeting primarily Free World military installations and Vietnamese government centers. As discussed in both the Large Unit and Counterguerrilla chapters of this report, enemy ground forces were committed piecemeal, if at all, as a result of their neutralization by III MAF and ARVN operations interlacing enemy base areas and interdicting avenues approaching population centers along the seaboard.

The estimated enemy strength in I CTZ and the DMZ area on 28 February was 81,000, some 8,300 less than the end-January estimate. This decrease reflects a III MAF reevaluation of the I CTZ guerrilla strength from nearly 24,000 to approximately 14,000. Included in the remaining 67,000 at end-February were about 50,000 troops in confirmed combat units (43,000 North Vietnamese and 7,000 Viet Cong), 2,000 NVA administrative personnel, and 15,000 soldiers in units listed in a probable or possible category.


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

Pictured on the following map is the general disposition of enemy infantry battalions in the I CTZ/DMZ region as of end-February. The four succeeding maps display more specific information concerning the enemy order of battle.

## ENEMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ AND DMZ AREA: FEBRUARY 1969




UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED


b. DMZ / Quang Tri Province

A buildup of enemy logistical strength was detected in southern Quang Tri during the month, as 9th Marines unearthed caches containing well in excess of 100 tons of ordnance items. The end-month enemy strength in the DMZ/Quang Tri province zone was estimated at 34,000 (including approximately 19,500 confirmed combat soldiers), some 2,800 less than last month.



~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~c. Thua Thien Province

Major enemy units continued their forced withdrawal into base areas deep within the jungles of western Thua Thien and adjacent Laos, with little evidence of a hostile presence detected along the coast. The 28 February estimate of enemy strength was 14,000 troops, 80% of whom were enrolled in confirmed combat outfits.



★ Province capital


~~UNCLASSIFIED~~~~SECRET~~

SCHLESINGER

**UNCLASSIFIED**

d. Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces

Again the enemy posed his greatest threat in the Danang area, with 19 infantry and five rocket battalions remaining poised in the eastern half of Quang Nam; also, the 2d NVA Division redeployed its five support battalions from Quang Tin to southern Quang Nam. The end-February enemy strength in these two provinces was an estimated 23,000 soldiers, with over 16,000 in Quang Nam.




### ★ Province capital

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**e. Quang Ngai Province

Except for engagement in a brief period of fierce combat west of Quang Ngai City between the 24th and 26th, the enemy chose to avoid encounter with major III MAF or ARVN units operating in the southern-most I CTZ province. The end-month estimated enemy strength (10,000) reflected a 3,600 decrease since January, due primarily to the III MAF reevaluation of guerrilla strength.



★ Province capital

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~2. ENEMY LOSSES IN I CTZ

|                                     | <u>Killed</u> | <u>Captured</u> | <u>Weapons</u> |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>Enemy losses to III MAF /SLF</u> |               |                 |                |
| Marines                             | 2,462         | 140             | 1,075          |
| Monthly III MAF /SLF                | 3,953         | 157             | 1,497          |
| Total                               |               |                 |                |
| 1969 III MAF /SLF                   | 5,982         | 299             | 2,389          |
| Total                               |               |                 |                |
| <u>Enemy losses to other forces</u> |               |                 |                |
| ROKMC                               | 211           | 3               | 92             |
| RVNAF                               | 2,881         | 298             | 856            |
| Special Forces/CIDG                 | 80            | 5               | 20             |
| Monthly Total                       | 3,172         | 306             | 978            |
| I CTZ Monthly Total                 | 7,125         | 463             | 2,475          |
| 1969 Total                          | 10,679        | 1,057           | 4,799          |

3. MARINE/SLF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

| <u>USMC</u> | <u>CAP</u> |                                    | <u>Cumulative</u> |
|-------------|------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|
|             |            |                                    | <u>1969 Total</u> |
| 6,006       | 6,527      | Patrols                            | 25,791            |
| 3,185       | 4,157      | Ambushes                           | 15,709            |
| 94          |            | Company Operations                 | 172               |
| 339         |            | Sniper posts                       | 748               |
| 1           |            | Battalion operations               | 3*                |
| 7           |            | Regimental or larger<br>operations | 7*                |
| 7,424       |            | Fixed wing sorties                 | 15,131            |
| 48,228      |            | Helicopter sorties                 | 102,916           |

\*Since monthly figures include operations continued from previous months, they are not used to compute cumulative totals.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

## 4. US AIRCRAFT BASED AT MAJOR I CTZ AIRFIELDS: FEBRUARY 1968

| USMC AIRCRAFT   | USN AIRCRAFT  | USA AIRCRAFT (CONT)  |
|---|---|--|
| QUANG TRI<br>2 HELO SQDNS (38 CH-46)<br>1 OBS SQDN (11 O-1, 14 OV-10,<br>15 UH-1)   | DANANG<br>2 DETS FLT AIR REC SQDN<br>(9 EA-3B, 4 EC-121M)<br>1 DET PHOTO SQDN (3 RA-3B)   | CAMP EAGLE<br>1 ABN DIV ASSETS:<br>1 AVN GRP (67 UH-1, 12 AH-1,<br>12 OH-6, 2 U-6)<br>1 MED BN (11 UH-1)<br>1 CAV SQDN (14 UH-1, 9 AH-1,<br>8 OH-6)<br>DIV ARTY (16 UH-1, 12 AH-1,<br>14 OH-6)<br>MISC (17 UH-1, 25 OH-6)      |
| PHU BAI<br>4 HELO SQDNS (16 CH-53,<br>41 CH-46, 18 UH-1)<br>1 ACFT MAINT SQDN (1 C-117,<br>3 CH-46, 19 UH-34)   | TOTAL USN<br>A/C PRESENT - 16   | MARBLE MTN<br>1 HQ AVN BDE (2 UH-1, 2 U-6,<br>1 U-21)<br>2 AVN COS (28 UH-1, 15 OV-1)<br>1 COURIER PLT (4 U-1)   |
| DANANG<br>1 FTR/ATK SQDN (16 F-4)<br>2 ALL-WEATHER ATK SQDNS<br>(22 A-6A)<br>1 PHOTO/ECM SQDN (5 EA-6A,<br>9 RF-4B, 10 EF-10B)<br>1 ACFT MAINT SQDN (8 TA-4F,<br>1 C-117) | USAF AIRCRAFT<br>DANANG<br>1 TAC AIR SPT SQDN (15 O-1,<br>53 O-2, 5 OV-10)<br>3 TAC FTR SQDNS (52 F-4)<br>1 DET FTR/INTERCEPT SQDN<br>(6 F-102)<br>1 AIR RES/RCVY SQDN (3 HH-43)  | DANANG<br>1 AVN CO (15 U-8)<br>TAC SPT (6 OH-6)<br>ABN DIV SPT (7 CH-54)   |
| MARBLE MTN<br>4 HELO SQDNS (16 CH-53,<br>34 CH-46, 20 UH-1)<br>1 OBS SQDN (20 OV-10, 11 UH-1)<br>1 ACFT MAINT SQDN (1 C-117,<br>2 CH-46, 16 UH-34)                        | FIXED WING - 131<br>HELICOPTER - 3  | CHU LAI<br>1 INF DIV ASSETS:<br>2 AVN BNS (33 CH-47,<br>96 UH-1, 6 AH-1, 6 OH-6,<br>1 U-6)<br>1 CAV SQDN (8 UH-1, 8 AH-1,<br>9 OH-6)<br>DIV ARTY (9 OH-6, 1 U-6)<br>1 RECON CO (23 O-1, 1 U-6)<br>MISC (15 OH-6, 1 U-1, 1 U-6) |
| CHU LAI<br>4 FTR/ATK SQDNS (62 F-4)<br>3 ATK SQDNS (59 A-4)<br>1 ALL-WEATHER ATK SQDN<br>(12 A-6A)<br>2 ACFT MAINT SQDNS (2 TA-4F,<br>2 C-117)                            | TOTAL USAF<br>A/C PRESENT - 134   | DUC PHO<br>1 AVN CO (31 UH-1)  |
| FIXED WING - 255<br>HELICOPTER - 249  | USA AIRCRAFT<br>QUANG TRI<br>MECH DIY SPT (4 UH-1, 4 OH-6)<br>CAMP EVANS<br>1 AVN BN (40 UH-1, 2 OH-6)<br>PHU BAI<br>3 AVN COS (8 UH-1, 2 OH-6,<br>32 O-1, 20 OV-1, 2 U-6,<br>2 U-21)<br>ABN DIV SPT (47 CH-47, 2 OH-6) | FIXED WING - 123<br>HELICOPTER - 590   |
| TOTAL USMC<br>A/C PRESENT - 504   | TOTAL USA<br>A/C PRESENT - 713  |  |

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

5. MARINE CIVIC ACTIONFebruary 1969Cumulative  
1969 Total

|          |  |          |
|----------|--|----------|
| 108,705  | Persons given<br>medical treatment             | 251,838  |
| 2,434    | Persons given<br>dental treatment              | 5,469    |
| 460      | Persons given<br>medical or dental<br>training | 1,081    |
| 48,783   | Pounds of food<br>distributed                  | 92,053   |
| 6,052    | Pounds of soap<br>distributed                  | 21,689   |
| 5,897    | Pounds of clothing<br>distributed              | 20,660   |
| 1,525    | Critically ill civil-<br>ians evacuated        | 2,623    |
| 780      | English language<br>classes conducted          | 1,972    |
| \$10,054 | Cash donations                                 | \$17,208 |
| 97,556   | Persons fed                                    | 163,186  |
| 3,267    | Students supported                             | 6,604    |
| 253      | Construction pro-<br>jects                     | 409      |

6. III MAF STRENGTH

|           | <u>USMC</u> |            | <u>USN</u> |            | <u>USA</u> |            |
|-----------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
|           | <u>Off</u>  | <u>Enl</u> | <u>Off</u> | <u>Enl</u> | <u>Off</u> | <u>Enl</u> |
| DMZ area  | 895         | 19,008     | 65         | 532        | 298        | 4,075      |
| Quang Tri | 569         | 5,201      | 90         | 535        | 398        | 5,397      |
| Phu Bai   | 250         | 2,475      | 4          | 61         | 2,178      | 21,370     |
| Danang    | 3,031       | 41,347     | 253        | 1,577      | 185        | 784        |
| Chu Lai   | 508         | 5,236      | 25         | 107        | 1,941      | 18,556     |
| Duc Pho   | -           | -          | -          | -          | 254        | 3,988      |
| Totals    | 5,253       | 73,267     | 437        | 2,812      | 5,254      | 54,170     |

**UNCLASSIFIED**~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED7. LOGISTICSa. SupplyClass I

(1000 rations/days of supply)

|           | <u>Danang</u> | <u>Dong Ha and Quang Tri</u> |
|-----------|---------------|------------------------------|
| MCI       | 354/7         | 881/16                       |
| B rations | 167/3         | 484/10                       |
| A rations | 577/13        | 80/1                         |

Class II

(supply requisitions)

|           | <u>FLC</u> | <u>3dFSR</u> |
|-----------|------------|--------------|
| Processed | 53, 282    | 25, 170      |
| Fill rate | 48%        | 41%          |

Class III and IIIA (bulk) (Marine Corps owned)

(1000 gallons/days of supply)

|            | <u>JP-4</u> | <u>AVGAS</u> | <u>MOGAS</u> | <u>Diesel</u> |
|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| Vandegrift | 43/1        | 8/8          | -            | -             |
| Quang Tri  | 70/3        | 21/21        | -            | -             |
| Phu Bai    | 87/4        | 41/13        | -            | -             |
| Danang     | -           | -            | 104/8        | 109/8         |
| An Hoa     | 76/6        | 4/40         | -            | -             |

Class V and VA

|                         | <u>Danang</u> | <u>Chu Lai</u> | <u>Phu Bai</u> | <u>Dong Ha</u> |
|-------------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Ground (days of supply) | 45            | 45             | 45             | 45             |

Aviation - maintained within CINCPAC allocations.

[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED[REDACTED]  
SECRET

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~b. Resupply Status to RVN(1) Surface Shipping Status

24, 121 M/T

Received from CONUS (11, 351 M/T)

Received from intra-WestPac (12, 770 M/T)

(2) Air Shipping Status

616 S/T

Received from CONUS (281 S/T)

Received from intra-WestPac (335 S/T)

c. Resupply Status within RVN(1) Surface Shipping Status

96, 392 S/T

Danang to Dong Ha/Cua Viet (31, 693 S/T)

Danang to Hue/Tan My (23, 858 S/T)

Danang to Chu Lai (40, 841 S/T)

(2) Air Shipping Status (USMC and PACAF)

2, 788 S/T

Danang to Dong Ha (490 S/T)

Danang to Phu Bai (87 S/T)

Danang to Chu Lai (316 S/T)

Danang to An Hoa (1, 502 S/T)

Other intra-I CTZ APOE's (393 S/T)

d. Cargo Shipped from RVN(1) Surface

12, 556 M/T

MSTS conventional vessels (11, 652 M/T)

Roll On/Roll Off vessels (904 M/T)

(2) Air

321 S/T

USMC (112 S/T)

MAC (186 S/T)

PACAF (23 S/T)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~e. Maintenance

|   |       |
|---|-------|
| Items evacuated from RVN to 3dFSR                               | 4,138 |
| Items repaired at 3dFSR   | 338   |
| Items returned to CONUS from 3dFSR<br>or disposed of on Okinawa | 512   |

f. Medical and Dental Services(1) Medical

|   |       |
|---|-------|
| Patients admitted to III MAF facilities | 1,576 |
| Battle injury (704)                     |       |
| Non-battle injury (165)                 |       |
| Disease (707)                           |       |
| Evacuated out-of-country                | 534   |
| Deaths in III MAF facilities            | 10    |
| Returned to duty                        | 651   |
| Hospitalized as of 28 February 1969     | 310   |

(2) Dental

|                              |        |
|------------------------------|--------|
| Total procedures             | 44,600 |
| Operative, crown, and bridge | 19,699 |
| Prosthetics                  | 577    |
| Oral surgery                 | 3,980  |
| Number of sittings           | 16,353 |

g. Construction Projects

Roads - 142.7 miles were being upgraded.

Bridges - Two Class 50/55 and two Class 50 bridges were constructed; two Class 60 bridges were under construction; five Class 60 and one Class 50/55 bridges were repaired; one Class 60 bridge was under repair; and two Class 60, two Class 50/55, one Class 50, and two Class 30/35 bridges were removed.

Rafts - Two rafts were in operation in the Danang area.

~~SECRET~~