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*June 63*

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# OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

## VIETNAM

### JUNE 1969

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine Corps forces in Vietnam for the month of June 1969. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through May 1969.

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## SUMMARY

There was little evidence generated during June to signal a quickening in the pace of I CTZ combat. The enemy, concentrating the bulk of his overt activity on random mortar and rocket shellings and sapper attacks, continued to avoid exposing his major formations to III MAF and ARVN elements. Thus, with the year reaching the half-way mark, the enemy has yet to engineer a serious 1969 offensive.


Consequently, III MAF and SLF combat operations remained focused against NVA/VC base and staging areas and infiltration corridors, effectively forestalling enemy attempts at reestablishing a strong presence in the populated coastal regions. Seventeen large unit operations, harrying the enemy in all five provinces, cost him 3,042 killed or captured during the month. Dealing the enemy a heavy blow in central I CTZ was Operation PIPESTONE CANYON, a coordinated infantry and engineer attack to sanitize the Go Noi Island/Dodge City region south of Danang. By end-month, the multibattalion campaign, involving Marine, ARVN, and ROKMC battalions, had killed over 500 NVA/VC, while the Army and Marine engineer land clearing effort had uncovered nearly 5,000 acres.

The Marine counter guerrilla campaign complemented the large unit success in good measure, taking 590 enemy out of action in Quang Nam's lowlands. The majority of the action took place in the Arizona area of the An Hoa basin, where elements of the 5th Marines splintered a persistent enemy effort to push troops toward the greater Danang area from the southwest.

A recapitulation of the enemy's troop losses in I CTZ during the period 1 January-30 June 1969 is shown on the following page.

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**ENEMY LOSSES IN ICTZ:  
JANUARY - JUNE 1969**

- Enemy killed by III MAF, SLF  
**19,566**
- Enemy killed by ARVN, ROKMC, USSF  
**17,418**
- Total enemy captured or defected  
**4,948**

End-June concluded the five-month Phase I of the 1969 GVN Pacification and Development Program. Although all the program's eight goals, designed to expand GVN influence, enhance the security posture, and improve the economy throughout I CTZ, were not accomplished, sufficient progress was recorded to warrant modification of Phase II of the program to a four, vice six, month accelerated pacification campaign. Most significant among Phase I achievements was the spreading of security to include 83.4% of the civilian population -- an increase of almost ten percentage points since 1 February. An aid to this expansion was the elimination during Phase I of nearly 4,000 enemy personnel as a result of Phoenix/Phung Hoang and Chieu Hoi program efforts.

III MAF and other Free World forces received the support of over 61,000 Marine air sorties during the month - 7,026 by fixed wing aircraft and 54,158 by helicopters. A modification of the command and control structure of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was the June activation of the auxiliary headquarters in Quang Tri province. Headed by an Assistant Wing Commander and collocated with the 3d Marine Division

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at Quang Tri, the new headquarters will improve air-ground coordination and helicopter utilization in northern I CTZ.

Departing I CTZ on 13 June, Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 26th Marines (BLT 2/26) deployed to Okinawa to undergo a rehabilitation and training cycle. This refurbishment, the first to be executed on Okinawa in more than two years, was completed successfully during 17-26 June.

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
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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

There were 17 US large unit operations in I CTZ during June - 16 by III MAF and one by Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force (SLF) Alfa. South of Danang, a 1st Marine Division multibattalion operation, in conjunction with a major engineer effort, crushed enemy presence in the Dodge City/Go Noi Island region. In northern I CTZ, operations continued to rebuff NVA attempts at reestablishing former base areas - an enemy effort which has remained costly and unsuccessful. Despite the continuing absence of sustained fighting I CTZ-wide, III MAF large unit operations during June accounted for more than 3,000 enemy killed or captured and the seizure of 1,112 weapons, bringing the totals since January to 13,066 NVA and VC killed, another 385 taken prisoner, and 6,878 weapons seized.

The locations and results of June III MAF and SLF operations are shown below.

## III MAF AND SLF OPERATIONS: JUNE 1969



\* Includes 1,566 enemy killed and 33 enemy and 438 weapons captured by US Army units. US Army casualties: 234 killed and 1,195 wounded and evacuated.

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Operations in Central I CTZ

Large unit action in central I CTZ again was aimed at destroying NVA and VC forces in traditional staging and base areas south and southwest of Danang. Since January, III MAF's continued maneuver throughout the region has forced the enemy to withdraw and reposition his major forces in the more protected but less desirable mountain retreats farther south and west from the rice-rich lowlands. This campaign has been a costly six months for the enemy in central I CTZ, with large unit operations accounting for more than 3,400 NVA and VC killed, another 422 taken prisoner, and over 1,350 weapons seized.

Centered some 12 miles south of Danang, however, the Go Noi Island/Dodge City area has remained the hub of enemy staging and assembly activities in southern Quang Nam province. Relatively close by Danang, the region is both ringed and traversed by an extensive system of rivers and streams and features a labyrinth of tunnels, caves, and trenches. The locale's advantage as a sanctuary is enhanced further by its long infection with Viet Cong and guerrilla units, all well versed in the planting of mines and other surprise firing devices (SFD's), which abound throughout the area. On 26 May, the 1st Marine Division launched PIPESTONE CANYON against yet another hostile buildup within Go Noi/Dodge City.

Previous operations in this Go Noi Island/Dodge City area have produced significant results -- notably ALLEN BROOK and MEADE RIVER. However, the enemy, following an intrinsic characteristic, when forced to withdraw many of his forces during these operations, has redeployed them to their original operating areas once friendly forces were shifted to a new zone of action. Over the past five months, the 1st Marine Division has employed small unit saturation tactics on the fringes of the region with notable success; however, these maneuvers, while effective in curtailing the enemy's free

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passage, lack the scope or magnitude for lasting effects on enemy forces trafficking the area. Therefore, Go Noi Island and Dodge City have been a retreat for the 36th NVA Regiment, together with elements of the D-3d, R-20th, and V-25th Battalions; the 3d and T-89th Sapper Battalions; and the Q-82d Local Force Company - a troop count approximating 2,500 NVA and VC.

Thus, Operation PIPESTONE CANYON was planned not only to destroy enemy forces, but also to purge completely the Dodge City/Go Noi area of his presence, including destruction of his fortifications, base areas, and supply caches. Two significant engineer tasks were planned to coincide with the ground maneuvers. A Marine engineer company was assigned to upgrade and open Route 4 from the railroad crossing nine miles west of Hoi An, to the junction with Route 1 near Dien Ban, four and one-half miles to the east, while a provisional land clearing company (one US Army land clearing platoon and elements of the Marine 1st Engineer Battalion), in direct support of the operation, was assigned to clear and level Go Noi Island. The campaign, a three-phase operation employing from two to four Marine battalions, was coordinated also with the actions of up to four ARVN and two ROKMC battalions and included participation of supporting ground, air, and naval units.

-Phase I

Phase I commenced on 26 May with two battalions conducting preliminary deceptive maneuvers to clear the area west of Dodge City and western Go Noi Island. Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 26th Marines (BLT 1/26), landed during SLF Operation GALLANT LEADER, trucked from Hill 55 to an area just north of Liberty Bridge, then commenced east-northeasterly sweeps toward Dodge City. Meanwhile, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines commenced overland operations from south of Liberty Bridge toward western Go Noi.

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
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The early maneuvers evoked but infrequent small-scale enemy contact, distinguished by harassing night probes and sniper activity; nevertheless, numerous small groups of enemy were forced to surface prematurely and ranged the Dodge City/Go Noi region, unable to anticipate the next stage of the scheme of maneuver. The full spectrum of supporting arms fire was brought to bear against the objective area both day and night, adding to the enemy's confusion while inflicting casualties and softening the area for the full-scale assaults of later phases.

The map below illustrates the Phase I scheme of maneuver and results.

### OPERATION PIPESTONE CANYON: PHASE I 26-31 MAY 1969



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-Phase II

The Phase II scheme of maneuver included participation of nine Free World battalions, three in a blocking/screening role, with six conducting a deliberate search of the Dodge City area. BLT 1/26; 3d Battalion, 5th Marines; and the 2d Battalion, 2d Brigade, ROKMC established the blocking positions to the west and south of the objective area and commenced local screening operations. At 0900 on 31 May, the attack force crossed the lines of departure to complete the hammer-and-anvil tactic against the then-isolated Dodge City area. The ARVN units in companion Operation VU NINH 05 (37th and 39th Ranger Battalions on the west flank and the 1st and 4th Battalions, 51st Regiment on the east) guided on center units, 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Marines, attacking south. Additionally, the ARVN conducted screening operations on the eastern flank and provided security for a civilian holding center, located about three miles northwest of Hoi An.

Phase II operations generated sporadic firefights with small bands of enemy and individual soldiers, either holed up in bunkers and caves or attempting to flee advancing forces, as described in the following examples.

-During the afternoon of the 1st, a 1st Marine Division aerial observer directed two eight-inch naval gunfire missions from USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA-148) against enemy elements fleeing southward across Go Noi, killing 14 NVA.

-At 1100 on 7 June, Company I, 5th Marines observed an enemy squad in south-central Go Noi, which, flushed out by supporting arms fire, ran into a preplanned air strike target area, where four 500-pound bombs impacted on the unit, killing ten NVA.

The numerous underground fortifications and tunnels in the area provided but temporary security for the disorganized

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and splintered enemy units. Exemplifying this were actions on 4 and 5 June, when ROKMC units cleared a series of enemy-occupied tunnels and bunkers along the southern bank of the Chiem Son river just south of Go Noi, killing a total of 29 VC and seizing one prisoner and 12 weapons.

The enemy's overt resistance to the offensive took the form of a series of uncoordinated ground probes and indirect attacks-by-fire, initiated primarily during the evening hours, to cover his attempts to exfiltrate the area. Additionally, he made prolific use of mines and surprise firing devices, a tactic which caused the preponderance of friendly casualties.

On 4 June, as assault elements crossed Route 4, Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion commenced the road upgrading operations, working east from the railroad crossing. In addition to repairing the road, the unit was tasked to cut back vegetation and level wide lanes north and south of the road to diminish the enemy's capacity to target future traffic for ambush. Security for the engineer force was provided by the 39th ARVN Ranger Battalion.


By 8 June, the cordon around Dodge City had contracted sufficiently to allow redeployment of BLT 1/26 from the operation for reembarkation aboard Seventh Fleet amphibious shipping. Meanwhile, the remainder of the attack force closed on southern Dodge City in preparation for Phase III maneuvers.

The map on the following page portrays the Phase II scheme of maneuver and results.

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**OPERATION PIPESTONE CANYON : PHASE II 31 MAY - 10 JUN 1969****-Phase III**

The final phase of the operation, scheduled to last at least a month, commenced on 10 June, with the repositioning of attack forces for the assault on eastern Go Noi Island. Early that morning, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved by armored column from Liberty Bridge to the railroad berm, five miles to the east. At the same time, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines and the ROKMC 1st Battalion helicoptered to LZ's on eastern Go Noi Island, while ARVN units established blocking positions in the Dodge City area. The ROKMC 2d Battalion and 3d Battalion, 5th Marines continued

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
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to block and screen south and west of the island, respectively.

Prior to commencing the attack northward on the 11th, an extensive supporting arms preparation was laid on the objective area. In three days, the Marines swept to the northern boundary of their zone of action, with contact again limited to scattered and insignificant firefights. Numerous NVA and VC, killed by artillery and bomb fragments, were found in hastily prepared graves, strewn on the ground, or hidden in bunkers and trenches.

By end-month, the area of operations had been contracted sufficiently to permit withdrawal of some units; however, blocking/screening operations continued along the periphery of Go Noi Island as land clearing continued. The map below reflects the Phase III scheme of maneuver and results as of 30 June.

### OPERATION PIPESTONE CANYON: PHASE III 10-30 JUNE 1969



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In retrospect, although no organized large-size enemy units were engaged, partially attributable to the massive use of supporting arms fires prior to and during each phase of the operation, enemy casualties at end-June, as related above, were noteworthy. Additional success can be measured in the numbers of enemy fortifications found and destroyed, food stuffs seized, and surprise firing devices destroyed.

	<u>Phase I and II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>
Base camps	8	93
Tunnels	58	29
Bunkers	560	937
Trenchline (meters)	560	2,686
Fighting holes	136	133
SFD's	162	142
Rice (tons)	5	54
Corn (pounds)	881	926

Further, clearing and leveling approximately 185 acres per day, the land clearing company by end-June had cleared the major portion of eastern Go Noi, an area encompassing some 3,200 acres. Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion cleared an additional 1,460 acres adjacent to Route 4 and succeeded in upgrading the road between the railroad crossing and Route 1.

#### Operations in Northern I CTZ

Third Marine Division large unit operations again were targeted against areas north of Route 9 along the DMZ and in the western reaches of Quang Tri province south of the highway. The enemy, however, again failed to expose or mass his larger units, continuing to favor sapper and indirect fire attacks, while holding his major forces in out-of-country sanctuaries. Fighting in the northwest corner of the province (Operation HERKIMER MOUNTAIN) continued relatively light; however, heavy contact was established periodically during

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Operations VIRGINIA RIDGE and UTAH MESA in central and southwestern Quang Tri, respectively.

-Operation VIRGINIA RIDGE

During June, the 3d Marine Regiment continued to rout small enemy units in the VIRGINIA RIDGE area of the central DMZ. Concurrently, extensive supporting arms attacks were executed by the 3d Marine Division north of Route 9, between Gio Linh and the Rockpile. Air strikes and artillery fires pounded the mountainous, canopy-shrouded enemy retreats, forcing his elements to seek refuge farther afield. This coordinated air-ground campaign claimed 355 NVA during June.

The month's major ground action took place on 17 June, involving 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, as well as elements of the 9th Marines, the 3d Tank Battalion, and the 2d ARVN Regiment. At 2300 on the 16th, the battalion commenced a search and destroy mission from Gio Linh southwest toward Con Thien. Shortly after 0200, four miles south of Gio Linh, two ARVN battalions repulsed a ground attack against their position by a large-size NVA force, killing 58 of the attackers and capturing six others and 45 weapons. The Marine sweep proceeded without incident until, at 0930, Company M engaged an estimated NVA company dug in along hedge rows, two miles west of Gio Linh. One-half hour later, Company L, a mile to the south, engaged an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions on a small hill. Both firefights raged through the morning until the enemy broke contact and fled southward, leaving behind 20 dead.

At midday, the 3d Battalion command group, with a Company K platoon and a section of 106mm recoilless rifles, displaced from Gio Linh to establish a forward command post. At 1400, while this unit was preparing its position, one mile east of the Company L skirmish, an estimated NVA company

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launched an intense mortar-supported ground attack against the Marines. The command group security element, employing recoilless rifles and other organic weapons, repulsed the numerically superior force, killing 37 NVA and capturing three others and 19 weapons. During the height of the action, a Company L platoon, maneuvering from the west to reinforce the command group, engaged an NVA platoon in a bunker complex along the way. Under the cover of air attacks, the unit closed on the enemy position and assaulted by fire and maneuver, killing eight NVA and seizing 14 weapons.


Throughout the remainder of the afternoon, aerial observers directed air strikes and artillery fires on the withdrawing enemy force. Fixed wing air strikes accounted for 57 NVA killed, while another 13 were attributed to artillery fires. Companies F and G, 9th Marines and Companies A and B, 3d Tank Battalion were committed to the battle area late that afternoon to exploit the contact; however, the enemy force had fled the area, and significant contact was not reestablished. In all, action on the 17th resulted in 193 enemy killed, another nine taken prisoner, and 77 weapons seized. Captured documents identified the enemy as elements of the 270th NVA Regiment.

The action of 17 June is shown on the map on the following page.

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**ACTION NEAR GIO LINH: 17 JUNE 1969**- Actions in Western Quang Tri

The 3d Marine Division's mobile posture, involving continued deployment of maneuver battalions in western Quang Tri since deactivation of Khe Sanh combat base a year ago, has succeeded in reducing the enemy threat from the west. During June, the 9th Marine Regiment continued this effort, concurrently participating in Operations CAMERON FALLS and UTAH MESA. These operations were targeted specifically against elements of the 304th NVA Division, attempting to reestablish a presence south of Route 9.

Operation CAMERON FALLS, commencing on 29 May, shift-

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ed the efforts of 2d and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines from the southern Da Krong (APACHE SNOW) to the northern extremities of the mountainous river valley southeast of Khe Sanh. Action was sporadic; however, two early-month engagements with company-size units of the 57th NVA Regiment accounted for more than half the 119 enemy killed during the three-week operation.

At 0215 on 1 June, an NVA company's assault against the Company G sector of FSB Whisman, nine miles southeast of Khe Sanh, was turned back, killing 14 of the aggressors. Subsequent pursuit and engagement of the fleeing force increased the enemy casualty toll to 29 killed and 17 weapons. Marine losses were three killed and nine wounded and evacuated.

Four days later, Company H initiated a two-day action with another company-size force dug in on a steep slope overlooking the Da Krong river, 11 miles south of Vandegrift combat base. Results of this engagement were 34 NVA killed and 13 weapons captured, with 11 Marines killed and 39 wounded and evacuated.

Farther west, on the Khe Sanh plateau, Operation UTAH MESA was launched on 12 June to counter enemy build-ups endangering vital lines of communication. The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and a battalion-size task force from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), in coordination with elements of the 2d ARVN Regiment, conducted the helicopterborne-infantry-mechanized offensive. Contact with enemy units during the month was concentrated along the mountain slopes four miles south of Khe Sanh, where our assaults ejected enemy forces from a recently constructed base area complex, netting 254 NVA killed, five taken prisoner, and 108 weapons seized.

Attacking generally to the southwest, III MAF units met but token enemy resistance until the 18th, when a major

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action was initiated. At 1030, a Company C, 9th Marines squad, patrolling two miles southeast of Khe Sanh, was engaged by a company-size NVA force, well entrenched in fortified positions. The squad returned fire, knocking out a .50 caliber machine gun position, and called for reinforcement. The enemy maneuvered to outflank the squad; however, the friendly unit, having linked up with a nearby platoon, struck the enemy right flank. The remainder of Company C joined the battle and assaulted the enemy position, driving the NVA unit southward into artillery blocking fires. This eight-hour action and subsequent pursuit operations the next day resulted in 56 NVA killed; friendly casualties during the same period were nine killed and nine wounded and evacuated.

#### Redeployment of US Forces from I CTZ

In consonance with mid-June COMUSMACV direction, III MAF began preparations for redeployment of the 9th Marine Regiment and other ground and air units and detachments -- the Marine portion of the 25,000-man troop redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam. To be completed by 31 August, the Marine redeployment involves the movement of a Regimental Landing Team (RLT) and a helicopter squadron to Okinawa and a fighter/attack squadron to MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan, with the first of three increments scheduled for redeployment during 13-29 July. Consequently, on 23 June, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines "stood down" from offensive operations and moved to Vandegrift combat base to prepare for embarkation, while other units, likewise assigned to the first increment, made similar preparations.

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**SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS**

Marine small unit counter guerrilla activities, combing Quang Nam's coastal lowlands, continued to deny the enemy freedom of movement during June. Deploying in excess of 10,000 patrols, ambushes, and sweep operations, the Marines generated 319 contacts with enemy forces, reaping a total kill of nearly 600 NVA and Viet Cong soldiers, the bulk of the action taking place in the An Hoa basin's Arizona area. Of particular interest, for the past two months in the lowlands, the total enemy kill has exceeded the number of contacts. This favorable kill/contact ratio, 1.8 to 1 as opposed to one of 0.5 to 1 registered during the first third of 1969, has developed chiefly from enemy attempts in May and June to push large-size units into the Danang-Hoi An-An Hoa triangle in search of much needed rice and recruits, or merely as a show of force to enhance his standing among the people.

This triangle, encompassing 123 square miles of densely populated, highly fertile coastal lowlands, has held strategic importance not only to the enemy but also to Free World forces since the inception of the war, as it contains ICTZ's largest city and economic center. As the Marines, commencing in 1965, developed and expanded their sphere of influence over the area and the GVN's pacification program made significant strides, enemy forces gradually were forced to abandon the triangle as a quartering site. Thus, contact within this area has been limited, in the main, to encounters with small enemy infiltration groups, while the main battleground lies on the periphery.

Free World authority over the coastal lowlands of Quang Nam is accomplished largely through the efforts of the 1st Marine Division, operating in coordination with RVNAF units throughout the area and along its extremities. During June, the division conducted 5,199 patrols, 4,673 ambushes, and 155 company-size search and clear operations to counter enemy infiltration attempts. These operations resulted in 581

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
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enemy killed, nine taken prisoner, and 276 weapons captured. All told, the enemy's food gathering, recruiting, and military operations have cost him 2,766 soldiers killed by the Marine small unit campaign since the first of the year -- a high price for his unproductive efforts.

The following chart compares Marine counterguerrilla operations and results during June with those since June 1968.

### MARINE SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: JUNE 1968 - JUNE 1969



### Enemy Activity

Enemy activity, which increased significantly during the previous month, remained at a relatively high level during June, as reflected by the 101 attacks-by-fire and ground assaults initiated by enemy forces against Free World military installations and civilian population centers in I CTZ. However, this increase in tempo was not paralleled by an increase in intensity, as the enemy conducted primarily scattered, low-key attacks during the month. The majority of his 42 ground assaults was conducted by small units employing sapper tactics in attempts to inflict heavy casualties and destruction with a minimum of casualties to themselves. These assaults,


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as did the 59 attacks-by-fire, failed to produce the enemy's desired results, but, instead, contributed substantially to his heavy personnel and equipment loss to Free World operations in ICTZ.

The following graph, depicting the frequency of enemy attacks-by-fire (20 or more rounds) and ground attacks, compares June totals with monthly totals since July 1968.

#### ENEMY ATTACKS IN ICTZ: JULY 1968 - JUNE 1969



The major effort in central ICTZ during the month was initiated by enemy forces conducting terrorist and rocket and mortar attacks against the city of Danang and outlying military installations on 6 and 7 June. Sappers, employing satchel charges and grenades, conducted seven terrorist incidents shortly after dusk on the 6th, primarily in the downtown area, which resulted in the wounding of seven civilians and the destruction of one home; however, later that night, the Danang police apprehended seven of the sappers responsible for the terrorism. Shortly after midnight and continuing un-

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til 0400, enemy forces targeted the city and military bases with three separate rocket and mortar attacks, consisting of 36 rocket and 29 mortar rounds. Cumulative friendly losses from the attacks were four US military personnel and three Vietnamese civilians killed, two US and 14 Vietnamese wounded, and one Army observation aircraft destroyed. Additionally, a Vietnamese tanker received a direct rocket hit, burned, and eventually sank in the harbor.

In northern I CTZ, ARVN units thwarted a major enemy rocket launching effort on the eastern flank of the DMZ. Conducting extensive search operations to locate firing sites, elements of the 2d Regiment discovered four rocket positions in an area centered three miles east-northeast of Gio Linh. These sites, located less than one mile south of the DMZ, contained a total of 113 rockets, in position and prepared for firing. In the past, rockets fired from this vicinity have impacted on Dong Ha, Cua Viet, and allied forces operating in the Gio Linh locality. These finds undoubtedly reduced the intensity of enemy rocket attacks in northern I CTZ intended for 5 and 6 June.

#### Operations in the Arizona Area

During the first week in June, contact with VC/NVA units was limited to extremely small-scale engagements scattered along the outskirts of the greater Danang area, as friendly forces executing PIPESTONE CANYON (described in the Large Unit Operations chapter of this edition) foiled enemy traffic in the Goi Noi/Dodge City complex. Meanwhile, the 5th Marines, maintaining constant surveillance over likely alternate avenues of approach, were in position to counter thrusts from the mountainous region to the west.

Such was the posture of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines patrolling west of the An Hoa combat base in the Arizona area, when the enemy moved down from the mountains to

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launch a series of flanking attacks against friendly positions blocking entrance to the lowlands. Shortly after midnight on the 7th, the 5th Marines command post (CP) at An Hoa received mortar and short-range rocket fire, followed by a probe of the perimeter. Employing organic mortars and artillery, the Marines stopped the enemy at the wire, killing 19 NVA, capturing two, and seizing eight weapons, forcing the remainder into hasty retreat. An hour later, three miles to the west, the 1st Battalion CP, along with Company A, received and repulsed a similar attack. Utilization of artillery and air strikes broke the assault, killing 11 enemy; three NVA were taken prisoner and eight weapons captured. Interrogation of the prisoners revealed the attackers to be elements of the 3d Sapper Battalion, forced from their retreat on Go Noi Island by Operation PIPESTONE CANYON.

At daybreak, 1st Battalion launched search and clear operations to locate and destroy enemy forces remaining in the vicinity. During late afternoon, Company B observed 25 NVA moving north, two miles southwest of the battalion CP. The Marines maneuvered undetected into ambush positions and allowed the enemy to proceed into their killing zone. Catching the enemy completely by surprise with a heavy volume of rifle and machine gun fire, the ambush killed 19 NVA, with no friendly casualties.

Following a predawn skirmish on the 8th, which resulted in ten NVA killed, Company A encountered two enemy companies shortly before noon, occupying fortifications along a ridgeline, two and one-half miles west of An Hoa. Employing air strikes and artillery, Company A assaulted and overran the enemy right flank by late afternoon, and then consolidated new assault positions for first-light continuation of the attack. Tactical air and artillery contained the enemy throughout the night; the ridgeline was seized the following morning with the assault claiming 80 NVA and seven weapons. Friendly

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losses were two killed and 11 wounded and evacuated in the two-day action.

Company C, located four miles northwest of An Hoa, received a probe during late evening on the 8th. Initiating the attack with mortars and short-range rockets, the enemy attempted to breach the company's perimeter; however, the Marines, assisted by artillery, repulsed the attack, killing ten NVA and capturing eight weapons.

At noon on the 9th, Company B, attacking across the southwestern portion of the area of operations toward An Hoa, engaged a large NVA force, four miles west-southwest of the base. The fighting lasted throughout the afternoon as the company, employing the full spectrum of air and artillery in support, forced the enemy to disengage shortly after dark, leaving the battlefield littered with 75 bodies and 53 weapons. Company B lost one killed and eight wounded and evacuated during the skirmish.

Despite his heavy losses, the enemy initiated attacks again on the 11th, 12th, and 17th against the 1st Battalion CP, now situated two and one-half miles west of An Hoa. These forays, attributed to elements of the 9th and 70th Battalions, 90th NVA Regiment, ended in disaster for the enemy, who lost an additional 89 killed, six taken prisoner, and 29 weapons, while Marine casualties were four killed and 34 wounded and evacuated. As a result of these unsuccessful assaults, the 90th Regiment withdrew into the high ground farther west to reman and consolidate its forces.


Thus, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines effectively countered a major enemy effort to transit the Arizona area during the month of June, denying him access to the vital lowlands. The following map portrays the area of operations and the scheme of maneuver employed by this battalion.

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**ACTION IN THE ARIZONA AREA: 7-17 JUNE**Operations Elsewhere in the Central I CTZ Lowlands

Combat activity throughout the remainder of the Danang-Hoi An-An Hoa triangle during June was characterized by engagements with small enemy elements skirting the coastal region, attempting to avoid the ever-present maze of counter guerrilla operations. Small unit operations, employing diversified tactical formations and specialized personnel, inflicted additional losses on the already hard-pressed enemy.

-Taking advantage of their long-range kill capability, scout/sniper teams often are deployed with both reconnaissance and com-

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bat patrols. The sniper of the team, selected for his demonstrated marksmanship, is equipped with a bolt-action, Model 70 Winchester rifle with variable-powered scope, accurate at ranges greater than 1,000 meters, while the scout serves as the team's observer. A team, operating with a Company B, 5th Marines patrol on 20 June, spotted five evading enemy, two miles northwest of An Hoa. The sniper killed three, forcing the others to take cover, where they subsequently were killed by air strikes. The following day, another team supporting Company G, one and one-half miles south-southwest of Liberty Bridge, observed two enemy elements of 15 men each moving to the northeast. The sniper, firing at ranges in excess of 700 meters, killed nine Viet Cong before they could reach cover.

-The employment of ambushes adjacent to fords of the Vu Gia river often used by the enemy proved effective to the 7th Marines during the latter portion of the month. On the night of the 19th, a Company D ambush observed a platoon of Viet Cong fording the river, six and one-half miles west-northwest of Liberty Bridge. The ambush, waiting until the enemy reached midstream, employed organic weapons and artillery fire, killing 20 Viet Cong, while one Marine was wounded and evacuated. Two and one-half miles farther downstream on the 23d, another Company D ambush surprised ten enemy using a small sampan to haul supplies across the river. The brief engagement terminated with eight enemy killed, one taken prisoner, and 1,000 pounds of tea captured.

#### Reconnaissance Operations

Marine reconnaissance units, operating in northern and central I CTZ, continued observation and monitor missions in support of both the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions during June. Operating for the most part in terrain not encompassed by large unit operations, these patrols possess the capability of employing the full complement of supporting arms - air, artillery, and naval gunfire - against enemy

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troop movement, as well as reporting troop concentrations as targets of opportunity for maneuver units. Although both divisions employ the greater portion of their reconnaissance assets to flank and screen for large unit operations, each conducts specialized patrols within its area of responsibility.

-Third Division reconnaissance teams patrol on a regular basis within the southern sector of the DMZ, forming an advance screen against the enemy's use of the buffer zone as a staging area or assault position for attacks against friendly installations along the northern border of Quang Tri province. Conducting 15 such forays into the DMZ during June, these patrols located and destroyed numerous bunkers and caches and employed supporting arms against enemy troop sightings.

-STING RAY patrols, conducted by the 1st Marine Division, are assigned reconnaissance zones within which the patrols monitor enemy movement. Employed on an average of six patrols at a time, STING RAYS operate mainly in the mountains west and southwest of Danang, acting as an extension of combat operations in the coastal lowlands. STING RAYS engaged or sighted enemy forces on 137 occasions during June, accounting for at least 93 enemy killed, three taken prisoner, and ten weapons seized.

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## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION

The end of June marked the termination of Phase I of the 1969 GVN Pacification and Development Program, which, during its five months, was responsible for a substantial expansion of government influence, an increase in the security status, and improvement of the economic situation throughout I CTZ. Although all the program's goals were not attained, the results were sufficient to warrant the acceleration of Phase II of the 1969 plan to a four, vice six, month campaign.

The increased security posture, a principal reason for the successes accrued thus far through the 1969 program in I CTZ, was enhanced greatly by ARVN and combined action units operating in pacification priority areas along the coastal plain of the tactical zone. During the five-month Phase I, these units accounted for more than 6,000 enemy soldiers killed or captured and in excess of 2,500 weapons seized.

### 1969 Pacification and Development Program

The 1969 GVN Pacification and Development Program, which commenced on 1 February, was designed to continue the successes realized through the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, conducted between 1 November 1968 and 31 January 1969. The primary 1969 goal is to involve each Vietnamese in the development of his community.

This community development goal encompasses three interdependent GVN programs, each of which is a necessary ingredient to a viable social order. The first, the conduct of local elections, involves each citizen in the process of selecting his government. Secondly, the GVN provides schooling for low-echelon officials, concentrating on either administrative or leadership training, dependent upon the individual's billet. And third, the community as a whole selects, plans, and implements self-development projects. This three-pronged program, while constructed to establish

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
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an orderly government and to better economic conditions, is not restricted to these alone; it also is a vehicle by which the people can identify with, and become involved in, their elected government.

To realize this goal, the GVN established a two-phased program, one phase to run from 1 February to 30 June, the other from 1 July to 31 December. As a consequence of the favorable results of Phase I, however, the government modified Phase II to an accelerated four-month pacification campaign to be concluded on 31 October.

Progress toward realization of the 1969 Pacification and Development Program is measured by the advancement toward successful achievement of eight subordinate goals. A discussion of these goals, their status after Phase I, and their prospects for success in Phase II, is presented below.

-Bring security to 90% of the population and extend GVN sovereignty throughout the tactical zone. On 1 February,



ary, 73.7% of the I CTZ civilian population was rated secure, with 85.7% under GVN sovereignty. At the close of Phase I, 83.4% of the population was classified secure, and GVN sovereignty had been expanded to include 92.1% of the people. A continuation of this rate of advancement no doubt will satisfy the goal, if not by 31 October, by end-year at the latest. The end-May pacification status of I CTZ, by province, is pictured on the map on the next page.


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Note: Based on end-May 1969 Hamlet Evaluation System data.


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-Render ineffective 3,600 Viet Cong infrastructure (an average of 400 per month). By end-June, 1,859 VCI had been rendered ineffective through Phoenix/Phung Hoang efforts in I CTZ, and another 502 were pending verification as significant cadre by MACV criteria. With the Phase I goal (2,000) accomplished, the prospects for achieving the Phase II target (1,600) are promising.

-Rally 3,600 Hoi Chanh (the original goal, 2,500 ralliers for all 1969, was upgraded as a result of success enjoyed RVN-wide by the Chieu Hoi program early in the year). By 30 June, 1,786 returnees had been received in



I CTZ, an 11% shortfall from the 2,000 required in Phase I. This is attributable to the sharp decline in enemy defections in northern I CTZ, where but 12% of the ralliers have been recorded since the 1969 program commenced. In contrast, 55% of the returnees during 1968 were reported in the two provinces north of the Hai Van pass. The lack of response to the Chieu Hoi

campaign in the north probably is a result of the large portion of NVA regulars now manning enemy units located there, and the forced withdrawal of major enemy formations from the proximity of GVN centers (ideal for rallying) to remote base areas. Phase II success will be realized only if the GVN is able to expand its influence into the back-country areas in southern I CTZ considered partially under Viet Cong control.

-Establish local government in all communities throughout the tactical zone. The hamlet and village elections in March and June brought popularly elected govern-

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ment to 382 (87.8%) of the villages and 1,621 (90.5%) of the hamlets. Forty of the 54 villages and 85 of the 166 hamlets remaining are scheduled for elections prior to end-October.

-Involve additional civilians in People's Self-Defense Forces. The following chart portrays the status of this program and the plans for the four-month Phase II.

	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>TRAINED</u>	<u>ARMED</u>
31 January status	225,000	98,000	30,000
Phase I goal	384,000	225,000	70,000
Phase I status	297,000	137,000	58,000
Phase II goal	356,000	184,000	70,000

Failure to accomplish the Phase I goal was the product of several factors. First, an expansion of Vietnamese regular and territorial forces generated the necessity for increasing the military draft, thus draining the manpower pool available for incorporation into PSDF units. Second, adequate training cadre and facilities have not been available. And third, weapons have not reached the units in sufficient numbers. The modified Phase II goals are more realistic; however, their attainment again will be predicated upon the availability of training cadre and weapons.

-Decrease the number of refugees. The GVN initially established the objective of reducing the refugee population of I CTZ by some 350,000 during the year; this represents about half the 691,000 refugees on the rolls as of 31 January. By end-June, the number had decreased by 177,000, or better than 50% of the year's goal. However, the GVN modified the original goal so the Phase II objective now is to reduce the refugee population to 55,000, a target which appears very

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difficult to achieve. The greatest obstacle to success will be the construction of adequate residences for the homeless; however, it is envisioned that many of the people will be able to restore their own homes, once the government has wrested their communities from Viet Cong influence and they are able to return in safety.

-Increase psychological operations. This is a continuing effort in the overall III MAF/I ARVN Corps campaign, since psyops are an integral part of routine operations throughout the tactical zone. However, in addition to usual operations (leaflet dissemination, loudspeaker broadcasts, and visual presentations), a greater utilization has been made of mass media, particularly radio and television broadcasts, newspapers, and movies, in an effort to present the GVN program on a much broader scale.

-Encourage the rural economy. A continuous engineer effort to upgrade lines of communication in I CTZ has enhanced greatly the economic intercourse between crop-producing regions and densely populated market areas. Moreover, since 1 February, more than 17,300 acres of IR-8 rice (a high-yield variety) have been planted; improved breeds of livestock and poultry have been introduced; and III MAF units have purchased locally grown produce on an ever-expanding basis. These factors, combined with other, long-range programs, point to a continuous, albeit moderate, stimulation of the economic life of I CTZ.

In sum, Phase I of the 1969 Pacification and Development Program was ambitious. Its goals were useful measurement tools, but often were too extravagant. As a result, the accomplishments did not reach the objectives in each case; nevertheless, the overall effort reflected determination at every echelon of government. The Phase II goals also are ambitious, but, with a continuation of the enthusiasm evidenced by the Phase I performance, the Vietnamese, with III MAF assistance, should make substantial strides toward reaching them.

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
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ARVN Support of Pacification

Increased security in the pacification priority areas was a major factor in the success accrued Phase I of the 1969

**PACIFICATION PRIORITY AREAS IN I CTZ**

program, and here, the ARVN made a significant contribution. Conducting 82 large unit operations in these areas during the past five months, I ARVN Corps battalions accounted for 3,844 enemy killed, 855 captured, and 2,010 weapons seized. In June alone, the ARVN executed 12 operations, which resulted in 796 enemy killed, 57 taken prisoner, and 205 weapons captured.

These operations have allowed GVN agencies to prosecute the 1969 Pacification and Development Program with harassment from the enemy greatly reduced.

Particularly noteworthy during June were operations in Quang Tri and Quang Ngai provinces.

-LAM SON 277, a 2d ARVN Regiment operation in the area north and west of Quang Tri City, accounted for 164 Viet Cong and NVA killed and 51 weapons captured during the month. Since the operation's initiation on 25 April, more than 500 enemy soldiers have been killed or captured.

-LIEN KET 67, which commenced on 19 April, is a 6th ARVN Regiment maneuver centered four miles northwest of Quang Ngai City. During June, the 6th ARVN netted 98 enemy killed and 36 weapons captured, bringing the total results of the operation to over 350 VC/NVA killed or taken prisoner.

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
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Combined Action Program

III MAF's Combined Action Program also plays an important role in providing security for pacification and development. At end-June, the program included four group and 20 company headquarters, 111 platoons, and five training teams - all situated within 1969 pacification priority areas. These units, manned by 1,833 Marines, 109 US Navy corpsmen, and 3,042 Popular Force soldiers, conducted 3,355 daylight patrols and 8,626 night patrols and ambushes during the month, accounting for 104 enemy killed, 15 taken prisoner, and 48 weapons captured.

The following graphs portray Combined Action Program operations and results since July 1968.

**COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS**

Besides providing training for PF platoons assigned to the program, CAP's conduct many operations in conjunction with RVNAF units. During June, CAP's conducted several such maneuvers, three of which were particularly successful.

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-Early on the morning of 5 June, CAP 1-1-7 moved into Tam Thai hamlet, four miles north of Tam Ky, to provide a block for a PF sweep from the north. At 0930, two Viet Cong squads, fleeing the PF unit, were engaged by the CAP. Caught by surprise, the enemy was forced to withdraw to the northeast, leaving 12 dead VC and three weapons on the field.

-At about noon on the 10th, CAP 2-3-4, conducting a sweep with Regional Force and ARVN elements through an area three miles west of Hoi An, directed 81mm mortar fire against a small enemy force attempting to elude the friendly advance. A subsequent search of the target area revealed nine dead VC and one weapon.

-During a 25 June operation centered four miles southwest of Tam Ky, CAP's 1-1-1 and 1-1-4, in conjunction with two PF platoons from the district headquarters, encountered NVA and VC units of up to platoon-size on three occasions throughout the day. The resultant skirmishes cost the enemy six NVA and four VC killed, one VC taken prisoner, and four weapons captured. One Marine was wounded and evacuated.

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
## AIR OPERATIONS

In June, Marine aircraft squadrons, maintaining the heliborne mobility and aerial reconnaissance and firepower requisite to successful combat operations in I CTZ, flew 54,158 helicopter and 7,026 fixed wing sorties. Further, 1,560 reconnaissance and attack sorties were flown out-of-country -- 1,108 in support of interdiction operations in southern Laos and 452 surveillance and combat air patrol sorties over North Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin.

Continuing the 1969 pattern of air support priorities, 50% of the total Marine air effort was in direct support of large unit operations blanketing RVN's five northernmost provinces. Providing support for all of the 16 III MAF, one SLF, and two ROK Marine major operations in progress during the month, fixed wing pilots conducted over 4,000 sorties, delivering in excess of 8,700 tons of ordnance and accomplishing a variety of combat support functions. The helilift of troops and cargo and completion of other helicopter missions for ten III MAF and ROKMC large unit operations required 26,433 sorties.

The following graph compares helicopter and fixed wing operations during June with monthly totals since June 1968.

MARINE AIR OPERATIONS: JUNE 1968 - JUNE 1969



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First Marine Aircraft Wing Auxiliary Headquarters

The activation of an auxiliary headquarters in northern I CTZ during June evolved from modifications recently implemented to improve the command and control structure of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Headed by an Assistant Wing Commander, with delegated command authority over all 1st Wing aviation and air base assets north of Hue, the new headquarters was formed primarily to improve air-ground coordination and helicopter utilization in northern I CTZ.

Collocation of the new command element and the 3d Marine Division headquarters at Quang Tri combat base, enhancing the close coordination inherent in the Marine division/wing concept (and approximating the arrangement of the Danang-based 1st Marine Division and 1st Wing headquarters), will facilitate planning and execution of air support operations. Thus, ground commanders are ensured more responsive air support, while more effective utilization of air assets, particularly helicopters, is permitted.

The new organization also provides a reduction of the span of control necessary to command the eight air bases and landing fields operated by the 1st Wing. Air base assets at Quang Tri, Vandegrift combat base, and Dong Ha will be under operational control of the auxiliary headquarters, while facilities at Phu Bai, Danang, Marble Mountain, An Hoa, and Chu Lai will remain under operational control of the wing headquarters at Danang.

In-Country Fixed Wing Operations

During June, Marine fixed wing pilots conducted 5,372 attack sorties in support of major III MAF, ARVN, and ROKMC search operations extending from the DMZ south to Duc Pho, as well as the continuing counter guerrilla effort along the coastal region of I CTZ. Although the enemy was reluctant to commit himself to large-scale engagements, the

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ubiquity of friendly maneuver continued to expose targets for air attack -- principally, his screening elements and isolated fortified positions among hinterland base complexes, as well as limited hostile forays into the lowlands.

Examples of the immediate effect of the strikes -- which delivered over 10,300 tons of high explosives, 13,800 air-to-ground rockets, and 5,300 napalm bombs during the month -- are depicted in the following narratives.

-On 5 June, Marine attack sorties in southern I CTZ accounted for 38 enemy killed -- 14 in 1st Marine Regiment Operation PIPESTONE CANYON, and 14 and ten in US Army Operations FREDRICK HILL and GENEVA PARK, respectively.

-After striking a base complex 14 miles west-northwest of Dong Ha on the morning of the 16th, six pilots from Marine Aircraft Groups-12 and 13 reported a total of 19 bunkers destroyed and 35 secondary explosions among enemy ordnance stores.

-Responding to an immediate request on the 17th, two F-4's from MAG-13 caught enemy troops in the open, six miles north-northwest of Dong Ha, killing 18 of them.

-On the 19th, a patrol from CAP 1-1-6 sighted 30 VC four miles northwest of Tam Ky. Directed on target by an aerial observer supporting the CAP, fixed wing strikes claimed ten of the enemy and destroyed two bunkers.

By end-month, battle damage assessments had credited Marine pilots with 219 NVA and VC killed; 2,382 structures, bunkers, and weapons positions destroyed; and 503 secondary fires and explosions. However, the capability of III MAF units to maintain, uninterrupted, a viable scheme of ground maneuver continued to be the chief product of the air campaign.



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Similarly important to ground commanders were the various airborne reconnaissance tasks performed by the 1st Wing. A total of 1,654 visual, electronic, and photographic sorties over the III MAF battle zone provided coverage to monitor enemy movement, detect his tactical positions and base complexes, and analyze anticipated areas of operation. The bulk of the effort fell to the OV-10A's of Marine Observation Squadrons-2 and 6; these multipurpose aircraft accrued 1,165 sorties during June, half of which were in a visual reconnaissance role, while the others provided airborne control for air strikes, artillery missions, and naval gunfire.

In-country fixed wing support for the first half of 1969 is depicted on the following graphs.

#### IN-COUNTRY FIXED WING SUPPORT BY MARINE AIRCRAFT: JANUARY-JUNE 1969



#### Out-of-Country Operations

During the month, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing pilots conducted 1,560 sorties in support of interdiction, combat air patrol, and reconnaissance programs over Laos and North Vietnam. The majority of the effort - 1,108 sorties - continued to be along established North Vietnamese resupply networks in the Laotian

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panhandle, while the remainder accomplished combat air patrol and support missions over North Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin.

In support of around-the-clock interdiction operations against the enemy's Laotian traffic, 1st Wing A-4 and F-4 aircraft conducted 682 strike missions, while A-6A's added 232, of which 86% were conducted at night. Although the thick jungle canopy often precluded precise battle damage assessments, evidence of the toll levied against NVA traffic continued to mount. As an example, during the last four days of the month, Marine pilots reported at least 25 secondary explosions and fires resulting from attacks against convoys and supply staging points. Utilizing all-weather target acquisition radar and moving target indicator systems, A-6A pilots, harrying enemy night activity, identified over 50 moving and 300 stationary targets, striking them with a total of 1,232 tons of ordnance.

Over North Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin, Marine pilots flew 452 sorties in support of a variety of airborne missions. Two-thirds of the flights were combat support sorties conducted by Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ)-1, while the remaining 151 were F-4 combat air patrols, primarily in support of the Seventh Fleet barrier combat air patrol mission.

The VMCJ-1 combat support effort in June included 253 electronic warfare (EW) sorties by EF-10B and EA-6A aircraft and 48 missions by RF-4B photographic reconnaissance planes. Support for Free World aircraft operating over northern I CTZ required the majority of the EW effort, over 200 sorties. Need for such protection again was evidenced by sporadic enemy radar activity north of the DMZ, indicating at least one FANSONG missile control radar positioned in this region and reflecting minor realignments in the enemy's antiaircraft artillery control radar posture. Over the Gulf of Tonkin, Marine EW aircraft supported 29 US

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
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Navy reconnaissance missions in the Vinh area and 22 US Air Force drone reconnaissance flights in the upper Route Packages of North Vietnam.

The following graph compares Marine air support over Laos and North Vietnam since July 1968.



### Trans-Pacific Deployment

During June, four Marine A-6A's, the first increment of 24 new-production aircraft, completed a successful trans-Pacific deployment to join the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as replacements for A-6A's due for progressive aircraft rework in CONUS. Departing Naval Air Station (NAS), Whidbey Island, Washington at 1400 on the 5th; and making enroute stops at NAS, Barber's Point (Hawaii); Johnston Island; Wake Island; NAS, Agana (Guam); and NAS, Cubi Point (Philippines); the A-6A contingent arrived Danang at 1020 on 13 June.

Assigned to Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron-242, the new-production aircraft will provide increased dependability and efficiency for all-weather combat operations.

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
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Helicopter Operations

Continuing the high level of heliborne support necessary for combat operations in I CTZ, pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the Special Landing Forces conducted 54,158 helicopter sorties in June. This effort not only provided 21,000 troop and cargo lifts for ten large unit operations and the counter-guerrilla campaign, but also accounted for 13,000 suppressive fire, medical evacuation, and reconnaissance sorties.

Helicopter support in June brought the Marine sortie total for the first half of 1969 to 323,258 flights, with helilift figures rising to 470,114 troops and passengers and 69,480 tons of cargo. A comparison of these figures with totals for the first half of 1968 underscores the expanded lift capability currently available in the 1st Wing. While the sortie total for 1969 increased by only 9.2% over the figure for the similar period of 1968, troop and tonnage credits rose by 21% and 52%, respectively. These increases, made possible by the replacement of UH-34 squadrons with significantly higher-performance CH-46 and CH-53 transport squadrons, are portrayed on the following graph.



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In northern I CTZ, 3d Marine Division units continued a series of helicopter-dependent combat operations along the southern trace of the DMZ and athwart enemy lines of communication branching from Laotian resupply networks. Utilizing procedures highly refined during previous mountain operations, Marine battalions conducted heliborne assaults to establish, or reopen, fire support bases required for subsequent systematic search operations throughout the rugged jungle region. (A detailed discussion of the establishment of fire support bases is contained in the Logistics Chapter of this edition.) Exemplifying the helicopter requirements for such operations was HERKIMER MOUNTAIN. Targeted against enemy troops and dispositions in the mountains northeast of Khe Sanh, the operation was supported by 8,988 helicopter flights in June -- an effort which culminated in the lift of 12,600 troops and 4,539 tons of cargo during the month.

Similarly heavy helicopter schedules were required for Operation PIPESTONE CANYON, conducted south of Danang against the enemy staging areas on Go Noi Island and in the Dodge City area. Although the availability of artillery support from existing bases in the Danang-Hoi An-An Hoa triangle obviated the establishment of new fire support installations, mobility and resupply needs for the concentration of Marine, ARVN, and ROKMC forces, nevertheless, created significant lift requirements. Over 5,000 helicopter sorties were committed to the operation in June, providing an average daily lift of 213 troops and 42 tons of cargo.


The graphs on the following page depict support provided by Marine helicopters in I CTZ since July 1968.

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## MARINE HELICOPTER SORTIES: JULY 1968 - JUNE 1969

-AH-1G Helicopter

An increasing portion of the armed helicopter role was assumed by AH-1G's during June as three additional aircraft were added to the 1st Wing inventory. Assigned a total of ten aircraft at end-month, the AH-1G contingent compiled over 2,000 sorties in June, while conducting helicopter escort and suppressive fire support missions.

Design characteristics of the AH-1G have provided several advantages over armed helicopter support available with the UH-1E. A 45% faster cruise airspeed allows the AH-1G to maintain the pace of CH-46 and CH-53 troop carriers and lead them into combat landing zones. And, possessing a 3.4 hour endurance, it can then re-

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main on station longer to provide required fire suppression. A stability augmentation system, incorporated with the aircraft's gunsight, gives the AH-1G added stability as a weapons platform. The resultant increase in accuracy permits steeper attack angles, thus reducing aircraft exposure time at low altitudes. Armed with a 7.62mm mini-gun and a 40mm grenade launcher, housed in a chin turret, and external stores of rocket or mini-gun pods, the helicopter provides a flexible weapons system with significantly increased firepower.

#### Aircraft Losses

Resistance to air operations was maintained at a high level in June, as noted by 733 anti-aircraft incidents reported in ICTZ. Marine losses directly attributable to this enemy effort included one F-4B aircraft and seven CH-46 helicopters. Further, one A-4E and 13 CH-46's received varying degrees of battle damage while conducting air operations. Damage received at air facilities was limited to one A-6A, which sustained minor damage during an enemy rocket attack against Danang Air Base on the 7th.

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## LOGISTICS


The tempo of logistic operations in I CTZ during June, not impeded by weather or significant enemy activity, maintained a steady, if unspectacular, pace. III MAF logistic assets were adequate throughout the month to support all combat operations. And, the restoration of facilities damaged by end-April's Ammunition Supply Point-1 fire and explosions remained on schedule.

Embarkation and Transportation

Port operations in I CTZ were highlighted during June by the retrograde of 25,431 measurement tons (M/T) of cargo by surface and 261 short tons (S/T) by air. This represents a monthly tonnage record for cargo retrograded by surface lift from III MAF. The previous monthly high was achieved in July 1968 when 19,374 M/T were lifted from I CTZ.

A comparison of retrograde cargo movement during the past 12 months is given below.

## III MAF RETROGRADE CARGO: JULY 1968 - JUNE 1969



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On 15 June, USS IREDELL COUNTY (LST-839) departed RVN with the first increment of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion's equipment (the battalion was placed in cadre status during May 1969), along with a nucleus of maintenance and headquarters personnel. The shipment, which included 14 LVTP-5's and three forklifts, arrived and unloaded at Okinawa on 22 June. This initial lift was followed on the 21st and 22d by USS PARK COUNTY (LST-1076) and USS LITCHFIELD COUNTY (LST-901), respectively, with another 28 LVT's and associated equipment. Transportment of the battalion's equipment to Okinawa (to be completed during July) also provides for a secure storage area and more adequate maintenance facilities than were available to the unit in-country.

#### BLT Rehabilitaion on Okinawa

On 13 June, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/26 of Special Landing Force (SLF) Bravo departed the Republic of Vietnam aboard Seventh Fleet amphibious shipping, bound for rehabilitation (rehab) at Okinawa, marking the first time since April 1967 a BLT's rehabilitation and training cycle would be effected there. The tempo of the war had until now precluded the movement of SLF BLT's to Okinawa, the most desirable location for refurbishing due to the presence of the 3d Force Service Regiment (FSR).

This also was the first out-of-country rehab since BLT 2/7 was refurbished at Subic Bay during June 1968. In the intervening period, three BLT's were rehabilitated at Danang: 2/26 in August 1968, 3/26 in January 1969, and 1/26 in April 1969. While the Subic Bay and in-country rehabs all were accomplished successfully, such factors as crowded port and maintenance facilities, lack of suitable training areas, and longer supply lines combined to render the program less effective than under the original concept calling

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for deployment to Okinawa.

Execution of the BLT 2/26 rehab followed the pattern tested and proven through early 1967. A team from the Okinawa-based 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) conducted limited technical inspections of all BLT organic equipment prior to embarkation, thereby allowing sufficient lead-time for the requisitioning of repair parts and other supplies incident to the program. Thus, upon debarkation at Okinawa on 17 June, the BLT had available all the on-island organic assets of 9th MAB, plus higher echelon maintenance support from 3d FSR. A major contribution to the success of the rehab cycle is the "BLT layette", which, made up and held by 3d FSR, contains a cross-section of items forecast to be required for the BLT. The layette package, based on usage data collected during previous rehabs, was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 2/26.

Departing Okinawa on 26 June, BLT 2/26 rejoined Amphibious Ready Group Bravo, fully capable of projecting its considerable combat power in amphibious assault as directed by Commander, Seventh Fleet.

#### Medical

A technological advancement which has become an integral part of the medical service provided III MAF units is the medical unit, self-contained, transportable (MUST). The MUST is an inflatable/expandable, field medical treatment facility which provides for a contamination-free and controlled-environment shelter, complete with generator-powered air conditioning units. Further, the facility can be assembled and disassembled readily, thus permitting III MAF medical units to respond to the demands of a fluid combat situation, regardless of geographical area.

In January 1966, based on the results of late-1965 field

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tests conducted at MCB, Twentynine Palms, California by the 1st Hospital Company, Fleet Marine Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps requested the Department of the Navy provide two 40-bed MUST units to III Marine Amphibious Force. The units were purchased for delivery during March 1967, and the first was outfitted and shipped from San Diego, California on 5 May 1967. Off-loaded in Danang on 30 May, the unit was assigned to the 1st Marine Division for use by the 1st Hospital Company at Chu Lai. The second was formed and outfitted at Camp Pendleton during May and June 1967 and arrived in-country on 23 July for subsequent assignment to the 3d Medical Battalion at Phu Bai. Since deployment to Vietnam both units have gradually expanded from their original 40-bed capacity to 100 beds per unit.

#### Class III (POL) Consumption

Since the introduction of Marine units in I CTZ in March 1965, the III MAF POL resupply system has expanded to support two reinforced divisions, an aircraft wing, and a logistic command. Demands placed on the system by the many fuel consuming vehicles and aircraft required to support the highly mobile I CTZ combat campaign has provided a tested and responsive fuel resupply system. The magnitude of the Class III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) resupply effort required in I CTZ is reflected below by the listing of average 30-day consumption of selected fuels and lubricants by III MAF Marine organizations.

	<u>III MAF 30-Day Consumption</u>
MOGAS	1,034,000 Gals
AVGAS	600,000 Gals
JP (ALL GRADES)	13,700,000 Gals
DIESEL	1,470,000 Gals
KEROSENE	11,000 Gals
SOLVENT	5,000 Gals
ENGINE OIL	88,000 Gals
GEAR OIL	9,650 Gals
GREASE	52,150 Lbs

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Most of the high volume fuels (mogas, avgas, JP, and diesel) are moved and stored in bulk. Tankers deliver these fuels to selected receiving points along the I CTZ coast where they are discharged into bulk-storage facilities ashore. A system of pipelines, barges, and trucks then is used for further distribution to logistic support areas and combat bases. The bulk fuel companies organic to FLC and the tactical airfield fuel dispensing system (TAFDS) of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing are equipped to store these unpackaged fuels and dispense them to vehicles and aircraft, respectively.

#### Motor Transport

During June, 140 Rough Rider convoys were conducted by III MAF, transporting 9,531 short tons of cargo and 377 personnel. An average of 14 tactical vehicles was involved in each of these convoys. These commitments and other June operations of the five in-country motor transport battalions and the Truck Company, FLC are depicted below:


<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MILEAGE</u>	<u>PERSONNEL TRANSPORTED</u>	<u>TOTAL TONNAGE</u>
1st MTBn	73,333	50,617	7,752
3d MTBn	71,723	50,231	3,344
7th MTBn	154,394	4,158	41,394
9th MTBn	105,523	36,823	10,878
11th MTBn	123,872	33,404	16,392
TrkCo, FLC	<u>108,897</u>	<u>61,250</u>	<u>18,505</u>
TOTAL	637,742	236,483	98,265

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During the first six months of 1969, the average vehicular movement of III MAF's cargo and personnel along I CTZ roads showed an increase over that of 1968 as depicted in the following graph.



### Fire Support Bases

A product of III MAF's highly mobile, wide-ranging offensive maneuvers, aimed at destruction of enemy hinterland base and staging complexes, has been the refinement of the fire support base (FSB) concept. As the target areas normally are located within rugged, mountainous terrain far removed from major logistic support bases (the 9th Marines Operation DEWEY CANYON was projected some 30 air miles distant from the nearest base), it has become necessary to establish expedient positions in these regions to sustain extended combat operations.

A typical FSB is designed to accomplish the support

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of an infantry battalion maneuvering within the range of an artillery battery located on the position. Based on the possibility of inclement weather impeding scheduled resupply operations, a five-day operational level and a three-day emergency level of Class I (rations) and V (ammunition) supplies are prescribed as the optimum logistic posture for an operational FSB. While the FSB normally will contain a direct support artillery battery and a logistic support area, one or more of the following often are a part of the complex.

- Command post location for one or more tactical units.
- Communications relay station, in those situations where distance or topographic factors require radio relay.
- Air support radar team location to extend an air control capability into remote areas.
- Medical aid station or clearing station for routine medical and emergency life saving services.
- Tactical fuel dispensing system installation to reduce helicopter turnaround time.
- Helicopter landing zone.

The actual opening or construction of an FSB is a major engineering task, requiring first a detailed reconnaissance and then the formation of a task-organized engineer unit. Engineer equipment and troop requirements will vary considerably according to the nature of the terrain and the amount of clearing necessary after supporting arms preparations. The usual sequence of engineer buildup in the zone starts with a small reconnaissance team accompanying the LZ security force and helicopter support team; the force grows quickly as the engineer commander calls in the remainder of his unit, as needed. Hand and power tools, along with demolitions, are used by the initial work force, to carve out a landing zone cap-

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able of receiving heavy equipment, such as tractors and back-hoes, for construction of gun positions, ammunition storage sites, a helicopter pad, a fire direction center, defensive positions, and other tasks as required.

An item of engineer equipment which has proven invaluable in the operation has been the Case 450 bulldozer, a commercial, helicopter-transportable tractor procured for this specific task. Delivered to the site in two lifts (the 8,500-pound tractor in one, followed by the blade and fuel at 1,400 pounds in the second), the small dozer is assembled and placed in operation after arrival. The tractor has been an unqualified success in reducing both manual labor and time requirements for FSB development; an additional bonus has been its employment in the rapid unearthing of caches.

#### Ordnance

Ground munition (Class V(W)) stock levels generally were below the established 45-day level, due to the loss of available storage space within the Force Logistic Command's Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)-1, which remains the object of a comprehensive restoration effort following the destructive April fire. However, there were no critical Class V(W) shortages and available assets were adequate to support III MAF operations. Moreover, increased use of amphibious shipping between western Pacific munition storage activities and the Republic of Vietnam has resulted in greater frequency of delivery to the FLC facilities, thus permitting FLC to maintain a reduced stock level pending restoration of ASP-1.

#### Aviation Logistics

The chart on the following page reflects the number of aircraft by type assigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in RVN as of 30 June. In addition, those aircraft undergoing periodic aircraft rework (PAR) and battle damage repair (BDR) are included.

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MODEL AIRCRAFT	TOTAL ASSIGNED	PAR	BDR	OTHER	TOTAL IN- COUNTRY
A-4	71	13	4	2	52
TA-4	12	4	-	4	4
A-6	41	6	1	-	34
EA-6	6	1	1	-	4
F-4	84	10	7	-	67
RF-4	10	1	1	-	8
EF-10	9	-	1	-	8
C-1	3	-	-	-	3
C-117	8	1	1	-	6
US-2	3	-	-	-	3
O-1	10	-	1	-	9
OV-10	40	-	2	-	38
AH-1	10	1	-	-	9
UH-1	73	12	3	-	58
UH-34	52	4	-	22	26
CH-46	136	34	8	1	93
CH-53	46	18	3	-	25
	614	105	33	29	447

NORS/NORM/OR

The operational readiness status of the wing's aircraft remained essentially at May levels. The NORS/NORM and OR (not operationally ready due to supply/maintenance and operationally ready) data for selected Marine aircraft in III MAF are displayed on the next page.


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
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## NORS/NORM RATES - III MAF MARINE AIRCRAFT


A-4 (ATTACK)




F-4 (FIGHTER-ATTACK)




A-6A (ATTACK)



OV-10A (RECONNAISSANCE)




AH-1G (HELO) \*




\* Readiness Objective not established.


UH-1E (HELO)



CH-46 (HELO)



CH-53 (HELO)



NORS — NORM — READY —

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## CONCLUSIONS

-The loss of thousands of tons of arms, supplies, and equipment to III MAF and ARVN operations through the first six months of 1969 has placed a strain on the enemy's logistics apparatus. Thus, despite his attempts to conserve strength by holding major formations out of combat, the enemy's capacity to sustain a large-scale offensive in I CTZ has been derogated substantially.

-The aims of Phase II of the 1969 Pacification and Development Program are high; however, the enthusiasm and dedication displayed by the Vietnamese during Phase I promotes strong optimism.

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## STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

Enemy order of battle strength figures for I CTZ and the DMZ area decreased by about 11,500 during June, primarily the result of deleting the 320th NVA Division (with 5,800 confirmed combat troops and 3,400 soldiers in subordinate units classified as probable or possible), the 83d Engineer Regiment (with 2,300 troops in a probable status), and the 4th Battalion, 27th Independent NVA Regiment (with 400 men in a possible category) from our OOB holdings for the DMZ area. The remaining enemy units were relatively unchanged, and at end-month, the enemy strength in the I CTZ/DMZ region was estimated at 85,500, including 44,800 soldiers (38,300 NVA and 6,500 Main and Local Force Viet Cong) in confirmed combat units, 2,300 NVA administrative personnel, 14,900 guerrillas, and 23,500 men in probable or possible units.

By and large, the enemy continued in June to reserve his major formations from large-scale combat. On occasion, however, sizable enemy units did sally forth, but, when engaged by III MAF and ARVN elements, they elected to withdraw rather than press the contact. His effort instead was directed toward stepped up harassing indirect fire attacks, particularly against positions in the eastern DMZ region.

Enemy Caches

The enemy's refusal to do battle was not a self-imposed restriction. Rather, his choice has been precipitated by his loss of vast amounts of weapons, ammunition, food-stuffs, and other supplies to III MAF and ARVN operations which have penetrated base areas erewhile considered by the enemy to be secure. Since the first of the year, Free World forces have uncovered more than 4,600 tons of enemy war materials cached in I CTZ, a particularly noteworthy achieve-


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ment when compared with the 3,478.4 tons captured during all 1968.

The graph below presents a comparison of monthly averages of materials captured from the enemy in 1968 and thus far in 1969.



This substantial increase accrues primarily from large finds along the Laotian border by Marine and US Army units operating in the Da Krong and A Shau Valleys. Throughout I CTZ, a preponderance of the caches were discovered farther afield during 1969 than during 1968, a situation brought about by III MAF's mobile pursuit of enemy units into hinterland base areas.

The following five maps present the enemy disposition in the I CTZ/DMZ area at end-June; the first pictures the general location of the 83 infantry battalions throughout the region,

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
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while the subsequent four display more detailed information.

### ENEMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ AND DMZ AREA: JUNE 1969




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## DMZ/QUANG TRI PROVINCE



★ Province capital

## ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH

TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT UNITS		ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT PERSONNEL	GUERRILLAS	TROOPS IN PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE UNITS
NVA	VC			
15,900	200	400	1,200	19,700

\* The DMZ area includes that portion of Quang Tri province which lies north of Route 9, the DMZ itself, and the Vinh Linh Special Zone in North Vietnam. NVA units operating in this vicinity, or under the control of the B-5 Front headquarters, are considered DMZ AREA UNITS.


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## THUA THIEN PROVINCE



★ Province capital


## ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH

TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT UNITS		ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT PERSONNEL	GUERRILLAS	TROOPS IN PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE UNITS
NVA	VC			
9,500	400	900	1,400	1,800

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## QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN PROVINCES



## ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH


TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT UNITS		ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT PERSONNEL	GUERRILLAS	TROOPS IN PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE UNITS
NVA	VC			
8,500	3,000	1,000	8,400	1,700

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## QUANG NGAI PROVINCE



★ Province capital

## ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH

TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT UNITS		ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT PERSONNEL	GUERRILLAS	TROOPS IN PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE UNITS
NVA	VC			
<b>4,400</b>	<b>2,900</b>	<b>NONE</b>	<b>3,900</b>	<b>300</b>

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2. ENEMY LOSSES IN I CTZ

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
<u>Enemy losses to III MAF/SLF</u>			
Marines	2,272	51	846
Monthly III MAF/SLF			
Total	3,836	82	1,252
1969 III MAF/SLF			
Total	19,566	578	8,614
<u>Enemy losses to other forces</u>			
ROKMC	288	9	192
RVNAF	4,218	353	1,812
Special Forces/CIDG	59	8	20
Monthly Total	4,565	370	2,024
I CTZ Monthly Total	8,401	452	3,276
1969 Total	36,984	2,902	16,356

3. MARINE/SLF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>USMC</u>	<u>CAP</u>		<u>Cumulative 1969 Total</u>
5,199	6,080	Patrols	82,365
4,673	5,901	Ambushes	55,993
155		Company operations	809
680		Sniper posts	2,919
2		Battalion operations	9*
4		Regimental or larger operations	17*
8,586		Fixed wing sorties	48,900
54,158		Helicopter sorties	323,258


\*Since monthly figures include operations continued from previous months, they are not used to compute cumulative totals.

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## 4. US AIRCRAFT BASED AT MAJOR I CTZ AIRFIELDS: JUNE 1969



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5. MARINE CIVIC ACTION

<u>June 1969</u>		<u>Cumulative 1969 Total</u>
130,352	Persons given medical treatment	761,145
3,914	Persons given dental treatment	18,370
704	Persons given medical or dental training	3,338
200,731	Pounds of food distributed	653,898
5,419	Pounds of soap distributed	53,917
3,025	Pounds of clothing distributed	43,179
717	Critically ill civilians evacuated	5,472
494	English language classes conducted	6,094
\$12,717	Cash donations	\$56,492
17,276	Persons fed	303,218
2,550	Students supported	27,031
210	Construction projects	1,232

6. III MAF STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>USA</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
DMZ area	934	19,087	68	519	309	3,967
Quang Tri	490	4,797	83	523	391	5,560
Phu Bai	245	2,234	5	56	2,596	21,941
Danang	2,990	40,929	238	1,497	181	806
Chu Lai	587	5,516	23	111	1,860	19,935
Duc Pho	-	-	-	-	276	4,489
Totals	5,246	72,563	417	2,706	5,613	56,698

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7. LOGISTICSa. SupplyClass I

(1000 rations/days of supply)

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Dong Ha and Quang Tri</u>
MCI	235/5	1,175/25
B rations	219/5	536/11
A rations	209/4	126/3

Class II

(supply requisitions)

	<u>FLC</u>	<u>3d FSR</u>
Processed	48,426	27,167
Fill rate	58%	37%

Class III and III(A) (bulk) (Marine Corps owned)  
 (1000 gallons/days of supply)

	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>AVGAS</u>	<u>MOGAS</u>	<u>DIESEL</u>
Vandegrift	116/6	6/6	-	-
Quang Tri	87/3	18/18	-	-
Phu Bai	88/4	28/4	-	-
Danang	-	-	97/10	104/9
An Hoa	67/22	8/16	-	-

Class V and V (A) - adequate to support operational commitments.~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED  
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~~SECRET~~b. Resupply Status to RVN

UNCLASSIFIED

(1) Surface Shipping Status

31,953 M/T

Received from CONUS (15,223 M/T)

Received from intra-WestPac (16,730 M/T)

(2) Air Shipping Status

1,109 S/T

Received from CONUS (549 S/T)

Received from intra-WestPac (560 S/T)

c. Resupply Status within RVN(1) Surface Shipping Status

109,826 S/T

Danang to Dong Ha/Cua Viet (32,482 S/T)

Danang to Hue/Tan My (28,802 S/T)

Danang to Chu Lai (48,542 S/T)

(2) Air Shipping Status (USMC and PACAF)

1,796 S/T

Danang to Dong Ha (884 S/T)

Danang to Phu Bai (165 S/T)

Danang to Chu Lai (261 S/T)

Other intra-ICTZ APOE's (486 S/T)

d. Retrograde Cargo from RVN(1) Surface

25,431 M/T

MSTS conventional vessels (24,545 M/T)

Roll On/Roll Off vessels (886 M/T)

(2) Air

261 S/T

USMC (56 S/T)

PACAF (159 S/T)

MAC (46 S/T)

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

Maintenance

Items evacuated from RVN to 3dFSR	5,592
Items repaired at 3dFSR	2,474
Items returned to CONUS from 3dFSR or disposed of on Okinawa	6

f. Medical and Dental Services(1) Medical

Patients admitted to III MAF facilities	5,014
Battle injury (1,122)	
Non-battle injury (536)	
Disease (3,356)	
Evacuated out-of-country	1,566
Deaths in III MAF	108
Returned to duty	2,749
Hospitalized as of 30 June	1,560

(2) Dental

Total procedures	47,119
Operative, crown, and bridge	21,779
Prosthetics	609
Oral surgery	4,097
Preventive dentistry	9,534
Number of sittings	16,841

g. Construction Projects

<u>Roads</u>	-114.5 miles were upgraded and maintained.
<u>Bridges</u>	-One Class 50/55 bridge and three Class 60 bridges were constructed; one Class 60 bridge was under construction; three Class 60 bridges were under repair; one Class 50/55 and six Class 60 bridges were removed.
<u>Rafts</u>	-One raft was in operation in the Danang area.

UNCLASSIFIED

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