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Marine Forces, Vietnam

Oct 1969

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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

VIETNAM

OCTOBER 1969

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine Corps forces in Vietnam for the month of October 1969. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through September 1969.

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SUMMARY

Combat action in I CTZ during October declined to the lowest level registered in nearly three years, with the 1,085 enemy killed during III MAF operations being the smallest total counted since the 962 NVA/VC recorded in January 1967. The dearth of serious fighting extended CTZ-wide, as little other than brief, small unit engagements were recorded by US, ARVN, or ROKMC forces in any of the five provinces.

A factor influencing this absence of major unit contact, as well as a sharp decrease in enemy-initiated activity, was the abrupt arrival of the northeast monsoon. Depositing record amounts of rainfall during the first ten days of October, the weather caused major disruption of enemy activities -- inundating his overland lines of communication and lowland supply stores and fortifications, thus forcing him to seek higher ground.

Distinguished by a high measure of success, the GVN 1969 Pacification and Development Plan reached scheduled termination during October. While not all the plan's eight objectives were attained, the level of overall progress was remarkable. Significant achievements among the individual goals included 4,125 Hoi Chanh (exceeding the Chieu Hoi aim by 525 former enemy), the extension of security to over 90% of I CTZ's inhabitants, and a discernible revival of a viable rural economy. The remaining two months of 1969 will be dedicated to fulfilling those goals not reached and preparing for an even more vigorous 1970 plan.

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The III MAF share of the second US troop redeployment proceeded on schedule, with Regimental Landing Team-3, aboard six Seventh Fleet amphibious ships, sailing for CONUS between 2 and 7 October. Month-end found the 4th Marines and appropriate combat and service support elements making ready for November departure, a movement which will signal the end of some four and one-half years of combat for the 3d Marine Division.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED****COMBAT OPERATIONS**


October III MAF large unit and counter-guerrilla maneuver in I CTZ kept the bulk of the enemy forces off-balance and relegated to remote retreats. Preoccupied with foraging for rice and other foodstuffs and hampered by the onset of monsoon rains, the enemy avoided all but small-scale confrontations with allied formations. A change in his strategy has become increasingly apparent, as he continues to shy away from conventional battlefield tactics, favoring instead those of a guerrilla nature. Meanwhile, the redeployment of 3d Marine Division units continued unhampered, with US Army and ARVN elements assuming the watch in Quang Tri to check the enemy cross-border threat.

The map on the following page depicts the locations of III MAF battalions committed to either the eight large unit operations or the Marine counterguerrilla campaign in October.

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III MAF LARGE UNIT/MARINE COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS: OCTOBER 1969



*Includes 470 enemy killed and 21 enemy and 255 weapons captured by US Army units.
US Army casualties: 46 killed and 253 wounded and evacuated.

Small Unit Counterguerrilla Operations

III MAF's counterguerrilla campaign committed 9,199 patrols, ambushes, and company sweeps to deprive freedom of movement to enemy units during October. The onset of heavy rains during 1-9 October dampened enemy designs to wage a concentrated war effort in the lowlands; of the

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
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46.79 inches of rain that fell on Danang during the month, almost 32 inches accumulated in the first nine days, with 9.02 inches recorded on 6 October alone. The rains, restricting enemy movement from mountain retreats to the populated lowlands, provided an opportune time for friendly forces to make an intensified press against Viet Cong infrastructure through a series of short-duration cordon-and-search operations in coordination with National Police Field Forces and other GVN agencies. In 332 contacts (119 less than last month) gained with NVA/VC elements during October, small unit operations accounted for 342 enemy killed.


The following graphs compare October Marine small unit counterguerrilla operations and results with those of the preceding 12 months.

MARINE SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: OCTOBER 1968-OCTOBER 1969

PATROLS, AMBUSHES, AND SEARCH & CLEAR OPERATIONS



CONTACTS/ENEMY KILLED



-Seventh Marine Regiment Actions

Of the four 1st Marine Division regiments committed to the counterguerrilla campaign, the 7th Marines gained 145 contacts with the enemy, nearly half the Division total, accounting for 148 NVA or VC killed. The Regiment's 1st Battalion, con-

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ducting 301 day and 225 night patrols, 291 ambushes, and 196 company sweeps primarily in the northern Nui Loc Son basin in support of rice denial and harvest security operations, significantly disrupted enemy rice-gathering activities. Meanwhile, the 2d and 3d Battalions, employing 1,059 patrols, ambushes, and company sweeps, struck against enemy lines of communication and base areas south of An Hoa in An-tenna Valley and in the Que Son mountains, respectively. The following actions are typical of those developed by the 7th Marines during the month.

-At 1500 on the 9th, elements of Company E observed an estimated 40 to 50 enemy moving east in small groups, three miles southeast of the An Hoa combat base. Directing artillery fire on the hostile bands, the Marines reported 21 enemy killed, while sustaining no friendly casualties.

-At 1500 on the 15th, Company G encountered an enemy element in a bunker complex high atop a ridgeline in the Que Son mountains, about eight miles southeast of An Hoa. Supported by air and artillery, the Marines assaulted through the enemy position, killing eight NVA. Six Marines were wounded and evacuated in this action.


-At 2340 on the 22d, Marines of Company L sighted small lights moving in the direction of their night position, 12 miles southeast of An Hoa. After firing three 106mm recoilless rifle rounds, the Marines searched the area, finding five VC killed. At 0900 the following morning, the company directed artillery preparatory fires into the same area and conducted a more detailed search, discovering eight additional VC dead.

The map on the following page illustrates the 7th Marine Regiment area of operations, maneuver, and end-October results.

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7TH MARINES OPERATIONS: OCTOBER 1969

-An Hoa Basin Activity

October operations in the An Hoa basin, as throughout the rice-producing lowlands of Quang Nam, were oriented predominantly toward security for the ongoing fall rice harvest. The 5th Marines, employing a long-range reconnaissance screen south and west of the basin to maintain a close surveillance of trail networks leading to the area, not only foiled enemy attempts to siphon rice from the area but also dealt a blow to enemy foraging patrols skirting the fringes of the basin, aiming for areas closer to Danang. In all, the 5th Marines engaged in 118 contacts, killing 102 NVA and VC during the month; friendly losses were two killed and 55 wounded and evacuated.

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The bulk of the action generated by Marine ground and air units in the An Hoa basin took place during the final week of October when sporadic small unit contacts resulted in at least 84 enemy killed. In the most significant action, 1st Marine Division reconnaissance patrols, on the afternoon of the 25th, countered enemy traffic with artillery fire, killing 39 eastbound NVA, five miles north of An Hoa.

Three 5th Marines actions on the 30th accounted for an additional 35 enemy killed. Armed helicopters, covering the insertion of 2d Battalion elements into an area five miles north of An Hoa combat base, attacked several small groups of enemy soldiers with rockets and machine gun fire, killing 20. Company A, 5th Marines, sweeping the area of another armed helicopter strike a mile to the south that morning, located seven enemy killed by air-delivered ordnance and claimed two additional enemy with small arms fire. Contact terminated that afternoon, as Company A engaged an enemy squad and killed six NVA, three miles north of the combat base.

Enemy Activity

Limited-intensity mortar and rocket attacks and sapper probes by up to platoon-size forces characterized enemy activity during October. The extremely low level of enemy-initiated action is attributed in part to his preoccupation with acquiring and stockpiling rice for fall and winter; however, a period of monsoon rains during the first third of the month impeded these efforts. There was no indication of substantial reinforcement nor any recent major withdrawal of enemy units; for the present, he seems committed to maintaining a status quo.

The relative calm existing over I CTZ during October was mirrored by enemy-initiated actions, which totaled 15 attacks-by-fire (20 rounds or more) and 14 ground assaults, compared to September's 33 and 28, respectively. Quang Tri province led in


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hostile indirect attack incidents, registering seven rocket or mortar missions, and received four ground assaults for 38 percent of the total enemy effort; Quang Ngai province received the largest number of ground assaults (nine), along with two indirect fire attacks to account for an additional 38 percent. That the enemy in Quang Nam was more concerned with gathering rice during the month is evidenced in the three attacks-by-fire and one ground assault registered, a considerable drop from the combined total of 23 incursions the previous month.

The graph below compares enemy attacks in October with those since November 1968.

ENEMY ATTACKS IN I CTZ: NOVEMBER 1968 - OCTOBER 1969



The trend of enemy activity experienced during the past several months indicates a breakdown in his plans for taking control of I CTZ -- the cycle of an increasing tempo of terrorist activities, followed by large-scale insurgent operations designed to culminate with victory gained ultimately through conventional tactics, has been stymied by Free World

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operations in I CTZ. The defeating of each attempt to mass against allied formations, installations, and population centers and the consistent fragmenting of his replacement and logistics efforts has forced the enemy to alter his strategy and evolve yet a new set of objectives aimed at countering the friendly firepower and maneuver arrayed against him. Captured documents reveal the enemy high command to be emphasizing small unit sapper attacks in conjunction with stand-off attacks-by-fire as a primary tactic, rather than major unit employment to gain his revamped objectives -- the inflicting of maximum casualties on US forces, while minimizing NVA/VC losses; disrupting of the GVN pacification program; rebuilding his forces; and, most important, gaining the support of the people.

Enemy rationale for this change of attitude is laid to a number of factors, which include increasing shortages of replacement personnel, food, and other supplies; low morale; the inability to develop suitable base areas near vital targets; increased area and population control by the GVN pacification program; and, highly important, a growing need to avoid costly head-on engagements which have caused the major depletion of his forces. However, the structure of Free World operations within I CTZ, deployed to wage an offense-in-depth - an interlocking system of mobile small unit operations close by population centers and logistic and command installations and a series of large unit operations to interdict hinterland lines of communication and base areas - poses not only a deterrent to major enemy offensives but also limits his newly emphasized scheme of maneuver.

Third Marine Division Redeployment

In keeping with the second US troop redeployment, the 3d Marine Regiment sailed from Danang for CONUS during the first week of October. The 1st Battalion of the 3d Marine Division's lone in-country regiment, the 4th Marines, embarked aboard US Seventh

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Fleet ships at Danang and Cua Viet on the 19th for movement to Okinawa. Thus, by end-October, all but two infantry battalions and some combat support elements of the Division had departed RVN after nearly five years of combat.

Since July 1966, 3d Marine Division units have held the line in the DMZ area, successfully turning back a succession of enemy efforts to invest northern I CTZ. Beginning with Operation HASTINGS, the action which repelled an attempt to establish the 324B NVA Division in northern Quang Tri, the 3d Marine Division's combat elements, employing the full spectrum of air, artillery, and naval gunfire support, repulsed six all-out NVA trans-DMZ incursions through September 1967. During this period, heavy fighting was common, ranging from Khe Sanh eastward to Con Thien and the coast.

Early 1968 was marked by some of the most violent combat in the war. From January through March, air and artillery-supported 3d Marine Division units broke a major NVA encirclement at Khe Sanh, then, joined by US Army and ARVN forces, drove the enemy from western Quang Tri. On the eastern flank, during late April and early May, other elements of the Division counterattacked to destroy an NVA thrust at Dong Ha. Thereafter, NVA overtures in the DMZ region have become increasingly smaller in scope, evidencing a serious derogation of enemy combat strength.


The result of the action along the DMZ has been heavy enemy losses, men and materiel he could not readily replace. He has been forced to withdraw to Laos or NVN sanctuaries and has remained wary of major engagements, instead employing reconnaissance and sapper units in a harassing role.

All told, in 40 months of action along the DMZ, the 3d Marine Division accounted for 28,216 NVA killed - the equivalent of nearly three NVA divisions - and captured another 499, roughly the strength of an enemy battalion. The graph on the following page, portraying enemy losses to 3d Ma-

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rine Division units from the 3d Quarter 1966 through the 3d Quarter 1969, illustrates the course of the fighting along the DMZ during that period.



During October, no Marines were committed to III MAF large unit operations in northern I CTZ; however, 4th Marine Regiment units conducted more than 650 patrols, ambushes, and company search operations. At end-month, the 2d Battalion was making preparations for an early-November move to Okinawa, while the 3d Battalion conducted local operations in the vicinity of Dong Ha combat base and north of Cua Viet, anticipating stand down and subsequent redeployment prior to 30 November.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION

October witnessed the conclusion of the 1969 GVN Pacification and Development Plan, a nine-month campaign promoting increased security and revolutionary development throughout I CTZ. Receiving enthusiastic support from both government agencies and Free World military forces, the campaign achieved significant strides toward the return of stable living conditions in the tactical zone. A 1970 plan, even more comprehensive than this year's, is being drafted by the GVN to capitalize on the advancement already made and ensure continuation of revolutionary development in I CTZ.

Military operations performed by ARVN and combined action units in and around the pacification priority areas continued to screen coastal lowland population centers, prohibiting enemy disruption of ongoing GVN nation-building projects. In all, 16 ARVN large unit pacification operations and 10,246 combined action patrols and ambushes killed 414 NVA or VC and captured 58 others.

1969 Pacification and Development Plan

End-October marked the termination of the 1969 GVN Pacification and Development Plan in I CTZ. Commencing on 1 February, the two-phased program was oriented toward the projection of GVN influence over the entire population and the involvement of each citizen in the economic, political, and self-defense growth of his village and hamlet. Following completion of Phase I on 30 June, a review of the plan's eight goals revealed shortfalls in virtually each objective; nevertheless, overall success was sufficient to warrant acceleration of Phase II to a four, vice six, month campaign. Phase II extended the program's momentum, making significant strides toward pacification and nation building in I CTZ. Since not all aims were achieved, the last two months of the year will be used to fulfill these

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goals and prepare for implementation of a 1970 plan, now being formulated to ensure smooth continuation of revolutionary development in I CTZ.

A review of the before and after status of the 1969 GVN Pacification and Development Plan through its eight assigned goals reveals the progress made in returning peaceful and stable conditions to I CTZ.

-Pacification


The 1969 GVN pacification goal, to provide security for 90 percent of I CTZ's population and extend government sovereignty throughout the tactical zone, was partially accomplished. At the plan's onset, 73.7 percent of the populace was considered secure, with 85.7 percent under government sovereignty (secure or contested based on Hamlet Evaluation System data). Each month showed steady progress toward attaining these levels, and, by end-October, 91.5 percent of I CTZ's population was rated secure, thus fulfilling the former portion of the goal. The latter objective, however, reached 95.2 percent, leaving 139,400 persons under VC control.

Thus, while pacification improvement I CTZ-wide was considerable, continued effort is required to achieve total and lasting security, particularly in the three southernmost provinces. The graph on the following page reflects the overall status of pacification in I CTZ at conclusion of the 1969 GVN Pacification and Development Plan, as well as the progress achieved in each province during its course.

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DMZ




Note: Based on end-month 1969 Hamlet Evaluation System data.

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The elimination of VCI, an essential factor in ensuring lasting benefit from pacification and revolutionary development programs, received high priority under the 1969 plan. The original goal, to render ineffective 550 infrastructure personnel per month, was revised downward to a more realistic 400 following US and GVN adoption of more stringent criteria for identification of VCI.



identification of VCI, an action which resulted in communication/liaison, sapper, armed propaganda personnel, and a substantial number of hamlet and village-level cadre functionaries no longer being classed as VCI.

By end-October, 3,234 VCI had been killed, captured, or had rallied to the GVN through Phoenix/Phung Hoang efforts in

I CTZ, and over 650 others were awaiting verification as significant cadre by MACV criteria. The acceptance of but 366 of the latter as VCI will meet the established goal of 3,600; undoubtedly, the 1969 plan will more than surpass its assigned quota. Nevertheless, the current estimate of infrastructure strength in I CTZ remains in excess of 23,000, demanding continued prosecution of Phoenix/Phung Hoang campaigns during the 1970 Pacification Plan.

-Local Government

The campaign to restore elected local government in all I CTZ villages and hamlets began in 1967; however, the 1968 Tet offensive and subsequent recovery period forced a temporary curtailment of the project. Under the 1969 Pacification Plan, the effort was reenergized and a series of elections scheduled to extend representative government to the lowest echelon of the Vietnamese community.

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At the plan's commencement in February, only 36 percent of the villages and 26 percent of the hamlets possessed elected governments; however, the first elections, conducted in March, saw local representation elected in 126 villages and 713 hamlets, with a turnout of greater than 85 percent of the eligible voters. Additional elections were conducted throughout the course of the plan, and the tactical zone's village and hamlet structure was reorganized periodically to compensate for the relocation of civilians from hamlets within combat areas and the merging of sparsely-populated hamlets with others nearby. At end-October, 418 of the 461 villages and 1,776 of the 1,790 hamlets in I CTZ (91 and 99 percent, respectively) were represented by elected government, furthering socio-political solidarity in rural areas. In sum, while the 1969 plan did not complete restoration of popularly-elected local government, marked improvement was made -- engendering strong optimism for the future of the 43 villages and 14 hamlets remaining.

-People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF)

The following chart portrays the status of the PSDF before implementation of the 1969 Pacificification and Development Plan and its goals and growth under the plan.

<u>Date/Period</u>	<u>Organized</u>	<u>Trained</u>	<u>Armed</u>
31 January	225,000	98,000	30,000
Phase I Goal	384,000	225,000	70,000
30 June	297,000	137,000	58,000
Revised Phase II Goal	276,000	207,000	82,000
31 October	479,000	234,000	80,000

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Following unsuccessful attainment of Phase I goals by 30 June, more realistic objectives were adopted. These goals again were revised during Phase II to provide incentive to the program as growth increased rapidly during recent months. Although the number of civilians armed fell just short of its assigned mark, all other goals were surpassed. Gauging the value of the PSDF are the 155 NVA/VC killed and 28 captured through September 1969 by these citizen-soldiers. Friendly losses - 77 killed, 146 wounded, and 23 missing - were high; however, civilian enthusiasm for the program remains substantial, reflecting their determination to assume responsibility for the defense of their hamlets and villages.

The establishment of PSDF not only has provided a local defense network in I CTZ but also has been instrumental in furthering revolutionary development. Civilians involved in their own defense, displaying increased community spirit and loyalty to the GVN, have assisted in the return of refugees to their former residences, provided security for and supported local hamlet and village elections, and rebuilt damaged homes and community buildings, in addition to providing resistance to enemy aggression.

-Chieu Hoi Returnees

A record number of Chieu Hoi returnees - 770 - rallied to the GVN in I CTZ during October, exceeding the highest previous monthly total (set this past July) by more than 200 Hoi Chanh. The 770 October ralliers enabled the 1969 GVN Pacification and Development Plan to surpass easily its assigned goal of 3,600 Hoi Chanh as, during the plan's nine-month run, 4,125 NVA/VC soldiers and non-military supporters forsook their allegiance to the enemy and united instead with the government cause. The following graph illustrates the trend in the monthly Chieu Hoi rate: a slow beginning attributed to the enemy's abortive Tet offensive in February; a steady monthly increase until June, when the announcement of the first US troop redeployment engendered a wait-and-see attitude


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
among rally-oriented enemy; then, when no diminution of Free World combat and pacification operations occurred, an unprecedented flow of enemy soldiers and supporters to the government began in July.

CHIEU HOI RESULTS: 1 FEBRUARY - 31 OCTOBER 1969



The Chieu Hoi campaign met varying degrees of success in the five I CTZ provinces during the plan. The two northern provinces, which started with

the highest level of pacification and now are completely under government sovereignty, yielded slightly over eight percent of the tactical zone's 4,125 Hoi Chanh, reflecting the low level of enemy activity there, the withdrawal of enemy combat units to out-of-country sanctuaries, and the understandable reticence of the NVA to defect in RVN. Conversely, continued prosecution of military and pacification operations in the three



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southernmost provinces has spread government influence and control into areas erstwhile under VC control, while rice-denial programs have increased critical food shortages experienced by NVA/VC main force units in recent months. The establishment of GVN strength in these areas, coupled with the retirement of main force units to border regions nearer more reliable supply channels, has induced further hardships on local guerrillas and non-military supporters, thus precipitating a steady stream of defectors in these provinces.

-Refugees

I CTZ was faced with a critical refugee problem at the onset of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan - the 691,000 refugees in the five provinces comprised approximately 55 percent of the RVN total and roughly 25 percent of I CTZ's population. The original goal called for reduction of the refugee population by 350,000 at end-year; on 30 June, 177,000 refugees, or around 50 percent of the goal, had been deleted from the rolls. The GVN then modified the objective, striving to reduce I CTZ's refugee population to 55,000 during Phase II -- a lofty aim indeed. The refugee population has continued to diminish monthly; nevertheless, 239,000 refugees remained in 196 I CTZ camps upon termination of the 1969 plan. And, while the refugee population was reduced by over 450,000, nearly two-thirds of its pre-plan total, many refugees have not yet obtained self-sufficiency; they merely have received their refugee allocation, but are not settled, productive citizens. Therefore, although moderate progress is apparent in I CTZ, the refugee problem still exists, and additional emphasis must be placed on resettlement and return-to-village programs before the situation can be cured.

-Rural Economy

The rural economic revival - one of the 1969 pacification program highlights - has been largely

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attributable to GVN and Free World agricultural and livestock programs, expanded security, and opening lines of communication necessary for the farmer to market his wares. For example, the IR-8 rice and military vegetable procurement programs have been boons to economic conditions. During 1969, IR-8 rice (a high-yield strain accounting for five percent of I CTZ rice cultivation acreage) produced ten percent of the crop. Both the spring and fall harvests were hampered by severe weather conditions; however, the harvests produced almost 20,000 metric tons. Expanded use of IR-8 rice should hasten the day when I CTZ can exhibit self-sufficiency in rice production.

Other programs, such as distribution of poultry and livestock, return of land to the farmer, logging operations, and supply of seed, fertilizers, and pesticides, have bettered economic conditions to a lesser degree. Extensive improvement of both coastal and inland fishing, the most important undeveloped resource in I CTZ, is planned for 1970.

The economy of I CTZ regained a degree of stability in I CTZ during the year. Although the cost of living rose slightly, no critical shortages of essential commodities developed, and expenditures for luxury items increased.

-Psychological Operations

The increase of psychological operations, another of the 1969 plan goals, was accomplished through joint effort by III MAF, ARVN, and government agencies in I CTZ. The objectives of these operations were providing the civilian population information concerning government plans and policies and military progress toward pacification and the degradation of enemy morale through exploitation of his losses and inevitable defeat.

--Government Programs - As directed by the GVN, a central theme explaining the Pacification and De-

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Development Plan was drafted and publicized monthly from province level. Other campaigns conducted during the year involved the placement of Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) cadre in over 70 percent of I CTZ's villages and the conducting of political seminars in all of the villages, both programs opening a direct line of communication between the people and the government.

--Military Activities - III MAF and I ARVN Corps vigorously executed psychological operations throughout the tactical zone, expounding ARVN, territorial force, PSDF, and GVN civilian agency capabilities, the effect of US troop redeployment, enemy attacks against civilians and population centers, and government programs, as well as the separate campaign aimed at propagandizing enemy forces. Thus far in 1969, military forces have distributed 1,805,000,000 leaflets, conducted 17,737 hours of loudspeaker broadcast (aerial and ground), and delivered 4,764 visual presentations in support of the psychological campaign in I CTZ.

Two particularly successful psychological-oriented operations have been rice denial and Nguyen Trai II (Chieu Hoi). During the fall harvest, an urgent directive from the Commander, 3d NVA Division to all subordinate units in southern Quang Ngai reduced the daily individual rice ration from 700 to 600 grams as of 15 October. The directive, applicable to all units, main force as well as local, provided hard evidence of food distribution problems and critically short rice supplies. Other intelligence reveals this situation to prevail throughout I CTZ.

The Nguyen Trai II campaign, an extensive psychological operation designed to encourage enemy defection at all levels, was conducted from 16 June through 15 October. GVN and III MAF psychological operation agencies distributed 56 million Chieu Hoi leaflets and delivered 471 hours of aerial and ground broadcast supporting the campaign, which claimed

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2,088 defections, 618 over the assigned goal for the specific period.



Combined Action Program

Experiencing but light enemy resistance in each of I CTZ's five provinces, Combined Action Platoons (CAP's) nevertheless were credited with 83 NVA or VC killed, 19 others captured, and 39 weapons seized during October. The CAP's, maintaining their mobile posture, conducted over 10,000 combat operations - 3,131 day and 1,966 night patrols and 5,149 night ambushes - exerting 69 percent of their effort during the hours of darkness when threat of enemy activity is at its greatest. In addition to providing security for the villages in their operating areas, CAP Marines devote many hours to the military training of Popular Force members of their platoon and the furtherance of revolutionary development through military civic action programs.

No change was made during the month in the organization of the Combined Action Program, which remained at its currently authorized strength of four group headquarters, 20 companies, and 114 platoons. These units were manned by 1,785 Marines, 124 US Navy corpsmen, and 3,115 Popular Force soldiers. US representation decreased slightly during the month with a corresponding increase in the number of PF soldiers assigned, and, continuing a practice started last month, 94 Regional Force soldiers actively participated with five CAP's, as a temporary expedient in pacification priority areas where no PF is organized. The RF soldiers will be replaced as soon as local PF's can be recruited, trained, and made available to CAP's.

The graphs on the following page portray Combined Action Program operations and results during the past twelve months.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED****COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS****OPERATIONS CONDUCTED****ENEMY LOSSES**ARVN Support of Pacification

During October, ARVN units conducted 16 military operations in direct support of pacification programs in I CTZ's heavily-populated coastal lowlands. These operations resulted in 331 enemy killed, 39 prisoners, and 180 weapons captured - the lowest monthly enemy kill by ARVN pacification efforts since last January - another indication of waning enemy activity in pacification priority areas in recent months.


The improvement of ARVN forces in I CTZ, long apparent to III MAF, also has made impact on enemy forces, based on statements of prisoners and Hoi Chanh. The commanding officer of the Q-84th Company (local force), who recently rallied near An Hoa in Quang Nam province, stated his company had faced increasing difficulties in actions with ARVN forces, which, equipped with new weapons, have become more efficient in employment of supporting arms and increasingly aggressive in offensive operations. The Hoi Chanh further stated his company strength had been reduced from 70 to 45 men during September, primarily through engagements with ARVN forces.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED****AIR OPERATIONS**

During October, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew 35,016 fixed wing and helicopter sorties to maintain responsive support for combat forces in I CTZ, as well as air campaigns in adjacent out-of-country regions. This level of operations, the lowest since early 1966, mirrors not only the diminution of commitments attendant to the low intensity of current combat activity, but also the redeployment of three Marine aircraft squadrons during the month. Despite the reduction of assets, 1st Wing credits to Free World forces included 2,062 strike missions (delivering over 4,000 tons of ordnance), 706 combat support flights, and 30,995 helicopter sorties (transporting over 66,000 troops and 6,000 tons of cargo). Additionally, interdiction programs over Laos were supported by 1,000 sorties, while another 253 reinforced reconnaissance and combat air patrol operations north of the DMZ.

The following charts compare monthly air operation totals since November 1968.

MARINE AIR OPERATIONS: NOVEMBER 1968 - OCTOBER 1969**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~In-Country Fixed Wing Operations

During the month, Marine A-4, A-6, and F-4 aircrews conducted 2,062 attack sorties in support of III MAF, ARVN, and ROKMC units and against the enemy's hinterland staging complexes. Although the supported ground units found but scattered resistance during their wide-ranging operations, the value of attack missions was apparent, as further disruption of enemy activity (repeatedly told by both Hoi Chanh and prisoners) continued to be created in his highland base areas and along his resupply routes. Here, the interdiction strikes caused additional personnel losses and destroyed foodstuffs and equipment, already in short supply. In all, the month's attack effort was responsible for delivering over 4,500 tons of high explosives, 1,100 napalm bombs, and 5,800 air-to-ground rockets.

Exampling the actions supported during October are the following narratives.

-On the 3d, two F-4B's from MAG-11 were tasked to assist an ARVN element in contact 13 miles west-southwest of Quang Tri City. Strikes against the entrenched force resulted in five enemy killed.

-Just south of the DMZ, two A-4's from MAG-12 attacked a 12.7mm machine gun position on 15 October. The mission left four bunkers destroyed and accounted for ten secondary explosions.

-MAG-13 pilots, attacking two suspected enemy positions on the 21st and 22d, reported four bunkers destroyed and ten secondary fires and explosions.

-A-6A Attack Aircraft

Providing a significant measure of versatility to the 1st Wing in-country attack effort is the A-6A. The all-weather capability of the aircraft - provided by automated navigational and attack problem-solving systems - is complemented by its varied radar modes for acquiring hostile targets. Using

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
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the aircraft's automatic moving target indicator, the aircrew can direct strikes against moving vehicles, armor, or other rolling stock, while the search radar will locate radar-significant targets, such as structures constructed of dense material. Development of a radar beacon system has expanded further the capabilities of the A-6A, allowing it to provide all-weather coverage against targets - whether or not radar significant - while under control of a ground observer. A beacon-equipped forward air controller relays to the aircraft enemy target locations, relative to the beacon location; with the beacon as a reference point, the A-6A aircrew then uses an offset bombing technique to destroy the target.

While the early-October redeployment of Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron (VMA(AW))-533 left but two such squadrons in I CTZ, A-6A aircrews accounted for 17.4 percent of the Wing's in-country attack sorties. However, the exceptional bomb-carrying capacity of the aircraft, up to twenty-eight 500-pound bombs, allowed the A-6A's to deliver 45 percent (2,051 tons) of the total high explosives dropped in-country by the 1st Wing.

--Distribution of Attack Effort

The October in-country attack effort of 2,062 sorties (less than half the 1969 monthly sortie average) reflects both the redeployment from RVN of additional Marine units and the continuing reduced level of combat activity in I CTZ. Receiving an average of 2,890 attack sorties during the first eight months of 1969, Marine units in October accumulated but 862 attack flights; two-thirds of these supported Quang Nam-deployed 1st Marine Division units, while the balance went to 3d Division units remaining in Quang Tri. Although elements

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
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of the US Army 101st Airborne (assuming larger areas of responsibility) and Americal Divisions engaged in seven large unit operations during the month, their requirements tasked to the 1st Wing were again low, 1,036 sorties. The remaining 164 sorties supported ARVN and ROKMC units.

Out-of-Country Operations

Marine commitments to the air interdiction program against enemy supply points and lines of communication in Laos continued during October, as 1st Wing airmen conducted 696 strike and armed reconnaissance sorties and 304 combat support missions. Maintaining an around-the-clock contribution to the campaign, Marine A-4 and F-4 airmen flew 375 sorties, primarily during daylight hours, while 86 percent of the 321 A-6A sorties were flown at night, thus permitting maximum usage of the aircraft's moving target indicator and target acquisition radar systems.

Tasked to perform visual reconnaissance and tactical air control missions, TA-4F airmen flew 209 sorties over Laos, while RF-4B's and EA-6A's from VMCJ-1 accounted for 95 reconnaissance flights.



US Navy barrier combat air patrol and escort sorties which accompanied EW and photo reconnaissance aircraft.

Helicopter Operations

During October, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters conducted 30,995 sorties in response to vertical lift requirements posed by combat units in I CTZ. The majority

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
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of the support (82 percent) went to Marines, with the remainder committed to ROKMC (2,335), ARVN (246), Special Forces (221), US Army (198), and 7th Air Force (34).

The helilift of troops and cargo accounted for one-third the total effort, as CH-46 and CH-53 aircraft transported 66,440 troops and 6,447 tons of cargo. Reflecting the climbing cargo movement capacity, the average payload for a cargo lift sortie rose to 2,720 pounds, exceeding the September record of 2,680 pounds. Response to other missions included over 5,000 armed helicopter, 5,800 command and control, and 1,200 medical evacuation sorties.

The following graph compares, by type aircraft, monthly helicopter operations since November 1968.



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Redeployment of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Units

The movement of Marine air units designated as a portion of the second US troop redeployment was initiated in early October. Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron (VMA(AW))-533, standing down from combat operations on 29 September, departed Chu Lai on 5 October, enroute to Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan for duty with Marine Aircraft Group-15.

Two additional aircraft squadrons, Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-6 and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH)-462, departed RVN on the 12th and 20th, respectively, for assignments at Marine Corps Air Facility, Futema, Okinawa. The UH-1E's of VMO-6 and the CH-53's of HMH-462 were embarked on amphibious shipping, while VMO-6's OV-10A aircraft were flight-ferried to Okinawa, via the Philippines and Taiwan.

Trans-Pacific Deployment KEY QUOIT

The 1st Wing received another increment of new-production A-6A and EA-6A aircraft on 20 October, with the completion of trans-Pacific deployment KEY QUOIT VIII. Five planes (three A-6A all-weather attack and two EA-6A EW aircraft) were flight-ferried from Naval Air Station (NAS), Whidbey Island, Washington to Danang, with intermediate stops at NAS, Barber's Point (Hawaii); Johnston Island; Wake Island; NAS, Agana (Guam); and NAS, Cubi Point (Philippines). The KEY QUOIT series of deployments has completed the trans-Pac of the scheduled 24 A-6A's and, thus far, has delivered nine of the 11 new EW aircraft due the 1st Wing.

Phase-out of the EF-10B

Incorporated in the receipt of the new-production EA-6A's is the phase-out of the 1st Wing's other electronic warfare (EW) type aircraft, the EF-10B. Utilized to counter hostile AAA/missile control and surveillance radars, the EF-10B's of

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Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ)-1 arrived in-country during the second quarter of 1965 and served as the Wing's only EW aircraft until the first detachment of EA-6A's arrived in late 1966. In over four and one-half years of action in Vietnam, EF-10B's have flown over 9,600 sorties, satisfying both in and out-of-country EW requirements. Following departure from RVN, the aircraft will be reasigned to the 3d Wing at Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California.

Aircraft Losses

Despite the overall low level of combat activity in I CTZ, hostile reaction to Free World air operations remained high during October. In all, 224 incidents of enemy ground fire were reported by III MAF, ARVN, and ROKMC aircrews. Marine aircraft losses to enemy fire dropped to the lowest level since February 1967, with the loss of one UH-1E helicopter recorded. Other enemy actions caused minor damage to an F-4B during a close support mission on the 5th, and a similar level of damage was sustained by two CH-46D's during a mortar attack against Marble Mountain Air Facility on the morning of the 21st.

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~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED****LOGISTICS**

The ominous weather buildup of the first week in October announced the arrival of the northeast monsoon and its attendant effect on III MAF logistic operations. Heavy rains, followed by surface runoff, interdicted highway lines of communication by eroding roadbeds and washing-out bridges. Route 9 was closed temporarily from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh, with Route 1 partially under water between Camp Evans and Hue. South of Danang, Liberty Bridge was under water but not damaged; however, along Route 1, at least four bridges were washed-out between Phu Loc and Quang Ngai City. All told, the first nine days of October saw more rainfall than normally is received during the entire month, with the Hue/Phu Bai region leading the list with 59.49 inches.

However, the coming of the northeast monsoon did not interrupt the first major Marine redeployment of KEYSTONE CARDINAL. During the period 2-7 October, Regimental Landing Team (RLT)-3 embarked aboard six amphibious assault ships of the Seventh Fleet. Departing after more than four years of Vietnam service (having arrived in-country on 7 April 1965), the first RLT-3 units (aboard USS WASHBURN (LKA-108)), arrived at San Diego, California on 26 October and were followed on the 27th by USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) and USS BEXAR (LPA-237). Three days later saw the arrival in CONUS of the remaining elements of RLT-3 aboard USS COMSTOCK (LSD-19), USS COLONIAL (LSD-18), and USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27). Included also in the CONUS redeployment was Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM)-265.

Concurrent with the initial embarkation and movement of KEYSTONE CARDINAL Embarkation Unit-1 (RLT-3) to CONUS, Embarkation Unit-1 Alfa (air elements) commenced departure preparations on 5 October. On the 5th, eight A-6A aircraft from VMA(AW)-533 were flight-ferried from Chu Lai to Iwakuni, Japan, while the main body and rear echelon of the squadron were

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airlifted in seven C-130's to Iwakuni on 7 and 8 October. The surface elements of the attack squadron and a headquarters and maintenance detachment departed aboard USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY (LST-1167), arriving at Iwakuni on 15 October.

Embarkation Unit-2 and 2 Alfa commenced redeployment on 10 October, when 16 OV-10A aircraft of VMO-6 departed Chu Lai for Marine Corps Air Station, Futema (Okinawa) via Naval Air Station, Cubi Point. During 10-13 October, advance parties from 1st Battalion, 4th Marines; VMO-6; and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing departed RVN for Futema and Iwakuni via PACOM airlift (two C-130) and VMGR-152 (two KC-130) aircraft. From 20 to 23 October, the surface elements of Embarkation Unit-2 and 2 Alfa departed the ports of Cua Viet, Tan My, and Danang for Okinawa via 13 amphibious assault ships of the Seventh Fleet.

Retrograde Cargo


Movement of retrograde cargo during October decreased to its lowest 1969 level. Only a slight decline was recorded for aerial shipments - some 100 short tons (S/T) - but the dedication of transportation assets to KEYSTONE CARDINAL operations lowered surface retrograde to 4,914 measurement tons (M/T), less than half of the past year's monthly average of 12,371 M/T.

A comparison of retrograde cargo movement during the past 12 months is portrayed in the graph on the following page.

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III MAF RETROGRADE CARGO: NOV 1968 - OCT 1969Motor Transport Operations

III MAF Marine motor transport units conducted 147 Rough Rider convoys in I CTZ during October, hauling the highest monthly cargo tonnage total thus far in 1969 - some 2,000 S/T above the 10,094 S/T average. The first decrease in Marine motor transport assets in III MAF was realized during October as the 3d Motor Transport Battalion, having landed with the first Marine elements ashore at Danang in early 1965, redeployed with its parent 3d Marine Division. Nevertheless, as illustrated in the graph on the following page, results of the month's commitments of the remaining four motor transport battalions and the Truck Company, FLC reflected little change in III MAF overland transportation requirements.

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MARINE MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS: OCTOBER 1969

Unit	Mileage	Personnel Transported	Tonnage
1st MTBn	70,140	44,075	5,363
3d MTBn		REDEPLOYED WITH THE 3D MARINE DIVISION	
7th MTBn	150,036	4,888	22,900
8th MTBn	83,637	28,009	10,836
11th MTBn	78,921	19,025	16,496
Trk Co, FLC	97,507	56,536	20,511
TOTAL	480,241	152,533	76,106

Ordnance

Class V(W) munition stocks were maintained at the levels established by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and were adequate to support all Marine operations. Class V(A) assets generally exceeded the CINCPAC allocations as a result of the continued decreased expenditures of aviation ordnance; expenditures during October were approximately 9,200 short tons, compared with the January through July monthly average of approximately 16,500 short tons. To preclude unnecessary stock buildup, MK-82 (500-pound) bombs have been deleted temporarily from the PUSH system (a practice whereby selected ordnance items are shipped to RVN direct from the manufacturer). The MK-82 now is stored in various western Pacific storage facilities and released only after requisitioning by in-country units.

Explosive ordnance disposal clearing operations at Danang's Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)-1 were near completion at the end of October, and a reopening of all storage facilities is anticipated by 30 November. Mobile Ammunition Evaluation and Renovation Unit (MAERU)-2 recommenced renovation and surveillance operations at the partially refurbished ASP-1 facilities on 27 October. The current strength of the unit consists of nine civilian and 17 FLC ammunition technicians.

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End-month saw preparations being made for Marine ammunition storage facilities in northern I CTZ to be turned over to US Army ordnance units in consonance with the 3d Marine Division redeployment. With the exception of certain high-usage items shifted to Marine ammunition supply points at Danang, all common ordnance assets in northern I CTZ were transferred on-site to the US Army's 1st Logistics Command, with replacement in-kind to be furnished to the Marines at Danang's ASP-2 within a period of 60 days. A significant aspect of this action was the freeing of much-needed motor transport assets from the task of hauling an enormous tonnage (some 9,000 short tons) at a time when transportation assets were vital to redeployment requirements.

Engineer Operations

Engineer effort during October was tasked to near-maximum limits in order to repair and maintain LOC's damaged by monsoon flooding, while construction continued on other projects. New construction projects were centered in the Danang area, with the largest being additional facilities at Marble Mountain for the helicopter squadrons relocating from northern I CTZ. This high priority project includes some 8,000 square feet of operations facilities, 30,000 square feet of troop housing, 5,000 square feet of administrative facilities, a 104-man BOQ, a helicopter pad, open and covered storage areas, and associated utilities.

PAR/BDR

The chart on the following page depicts the number of aircraft, by type, assigned to the Wing in RVN as of 31 October. Those aircraft undergoing periodic aircraft rework (PAR) and battle damage repair (BDR) also are included.

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




~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED****STATUS OF III MAF MARINE AIRCRAFT: OCTOBER 1969**

Aircraft Model	Total Assigned	PAR	BDR	Other	Total In-Country
A-4	72	9	1	6	56
TA-4	12	3	0	1	8
A-6	25	0	1	0	24
EA-6	9	1	0	0	8
F-4	74	20	2	1	51
RF-4	10	1	0	0	9
EF-10	6	0	0	2	4
C-1	2	0	0	0	2
C-117	7	0	0	0	7
US-2	3	0	0	0	3
O-1	7	0	0	0	7
UH-34	5	4	0	0	1
OV-10	19	0	0	0	19
AH-1	17	0	1	0	16
UH-1	55	4	1	0	50
CH-46	123	25	7	3	88
CH-53	42	6	0	0	36
TOTAL	488	73	13	13	389




NORS/NORM/OR

The operational readiness of Wing aircraft showed a marked rise during the month with the status of F-4, A-6A, UH-1, and CH-46 aircraft each increasing some ten percent. Of the eight most numerous aircraft in the III MAF Marine inventory, four (A-6A, OV-10, UH-1, and CH-46) now exceed readiness objectives established by the Chief of Naval Operations. The NORS/NORM and OR (not operationally ready due to supply/maintenance and operationally ready) data for selected in-country Marine aircraft are displayed on the next page.

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~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~**NORS/NORM RATES - III MAF MARINE AIRCRAFT****A-4 (ATTACK)****F-4 (FIGHTER-ATTACK)****A-6A (ATTACK)****OV-10A (RECONNAISSANCE)****AH-1G (HELO) ***

* Readiness Objective not established.


UH-1E (HELO)**CH-46 (HELO)****CH-53 (HELO)**

NORS — NORM — READY —

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
At end-October, enemy strength in I CTZ was an estimated 78,600 troops, a total which included 51,500 soldiers in confirmed combat units (45,600 NVA and 5,900 VC), 2,200 administrative personnel, 12,600 guerrillas, and 12,300 soldiers in units carried in probable or possible status in order-of-battle listings. The map below portrays the general locations of enemy battalions in I CTZ, while the four following provide, by province, more detailed information.

ENEMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ AND DMZ AREA: OCTOBER 1969**UNCLASSIFIED**

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DMZ/QUANG TRI PROVINCE



ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH

TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT UNITS		ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT PERSONNEL	GUERRILLAS	TROOPS IN PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE UNITS
NVA	VC			
32,300	150	400	900	9,300

* The DMZ area includes that portion of Quang Tri province which lies north of Route 9, the DMZ itself, and the Vinh Linh Special Zone in North Vietnam. NVA units operating in this vicinity, or under the control of the B-5 Front headquarters, are considered DMZ AREA UNITS.


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THUA THIEN PROVINCE



★ Province capital

ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH


TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT UNITS		ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT PERSONNEL	GUERRILLAS	TROOPS IN PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE UNITS
NVA	VC			
3,400	250	900	1,300	NONE

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QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN PROVINCES



★ Province capital

ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH


TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT UNITS		ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT PERSONNEL	GUERRILLAS	TROOPS IN PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE UNITS
NVA	VC			
6,600	3,000	1,000	7,300	2,400

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE



★ Province capital

ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH

TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT UNITS		ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT PERSONNEL	GUERRILLAS	TROOPS IN PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE UNITS
NVA	VC			
4,100	2,500	NONE	3,100	600

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2. ENEMY LOSSES IN I CTZ

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
<u>Enemy losses to III MAF/SLF</u>			
Marines	588	25	103
Monthly III MAF/SLF			
Total	1,085	46	351
1969 III MAF/SLF			
Total	28,208	827	11,507
<u>Enemy losses to other forces</u>			
ROKMC	30	11	20
RVNAF	528	59	275
Special Forces/CIDG	75	7	19
Monthly Total	633	77	314
I CTZ Monthly Total	1,718	123	665
1969 Total	52,107	4,435	30,763

3. MARINE/SLF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

<u>USMC</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>	<u>1969 Total</u>
4,181	5,097	Patrols	124,074
4,646	5,149	Ambushes	97,152
372		Company operations	1,821
293		Sniper posts	4,407
1		Battalion operations	14*
0		Regimental or larger	21*
		operations	
4,021		Fixed wing sorties	72,920
30,995		Helicopter sorties	491,585

*Since monthly figures include operations continued from previous months, they are not used to compute cumulative totals.


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4. US AIRCRAFT BASED AT MAJOR I CTZ AIRFIELDS: OCTOBER 1969

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USMC AIRCRAFT	USN AIRCRAFT	USA AIRCRAFT (CONT)
<p>PHU BAI</p> <p>3 HELO SQDNS (24 UH-1, 4 CH-46)</p> <p>1 ACFT MAINT SQDN (1 C-117, 1 UH-34)</p>	<p>DANANG</p> <p>1 HVY PHOTO SQDN (2 RA-3B) 1 DET FLT AIR RECON SQDN (3EA-3B, 2 EC-121M)</p>	<p>CAMP EAGLE</p> <p>1 ABN DIV ASSETS:</p> <p>1 AVN GP (64 UH-1, 11 AH-1, 13 OH-6, 2 U-6, 47 CH-47, 6 CH-54)</p>
<p>DANANG</p> <p>1 FTR/ATK SQDN (14 F-4) 2 ALL-WEATHER ATK SQDNS (25 A-6A)</p> <p>1 PHOTO/ECM SQDN (9 RF-4B, 8 EA-6A, 6 EF-10B)</p> <p>2 ACFT MAINT SQDNS (4 C-117, 9 TA-4F, 2 C-13, 1 US-2, 7 O-1)</p>	<p>TOTAL USN A/C PRESENT - 7</p>	<p>1 MED BN (12 UH-1)</p> <p>1 TRANS BN (3 UH-1, 1 OH-6)</p> <p>1 CAV SQDN (32 UH-1, 26 AH-1, 27 OH-6)</p> <p>DIV ARTY (6 UH-1, 33 AH-1, 14 OH-6)</p> <p>MISC (39 UH-1)</p>
<p>MARBLE MTN</p> <p>5 HELO SQDNS (43 CH-46, 36 CH-53, 27 UH-1)</p> <p>1 OBS SQDN (17 AH-1, 19 OV-10)</p> <p>1 ACFT MAINT SQDN (19 CH-46)</p>	<p>USAF AIRCRAFT</p> <p>DANANG</p> <p>1 TAC AIR SPT SQDN (70 O-2, 36 OV-10)</p> <p>3 TAC FTR SQDNS (51 F-4) 2 DETS AIR RES/RCVY SQDNS (3 HH-43, 13 HH-3)</p> <p>1 DET FTR/INTERCEPT SQDN (6 F-102)</p> <p>FIXED WING - 163</p> <p>HELICOPTER - 16</p>	<p>MARBLE MTN</p> <p>HQ AVN BDE (2 UH-1, 3 U-6) 2 AVN COS (27 UH-1, 18 OV-1)</p>
<p>CHU LAI</p> <p>3 FTR/ATK SQDNS (40 F-4) 3 ATK SQDNS (63 A-4) 2 ACFT MAINT SQDNS (2 C-117)</p>	<p>TOTAL USAF A/C PRESENT - 179</p>	<p>DANANG</p> <p>1 AVN CO (15 U-8, 1 U-21) TAC ARTY SPT (5 OH-6, 4 OH-23)</p>
<p>FIXED WING - 229</p> <p>HELICOPTER - 194</p>	<p>USA AIRCRAFT</p> <p>DONG HA</p> <p>TAC ARTY SPT (4 UH-1, 4 OH-6)</p>	<p>CHU LAI</p> <p>1 INFANTRY DIV ASSETS:</p> <p>2 AVN BNS (32 CH-47, 122 UH-1, 6 AH-1, 10 OH-6, 2 U-6)</p> <p>2 CAV SQDNS (12 UH-1, 18 AH-1, 16 OH-6)</p> <p>DIV ARTY (8 OH-6, 1 U-6)</p> <p>MISC (12 OH-6, 1 U-1, 2 UH-1)</p> <p>1 RECON CO (19 O-1)</p>
<p>TOTAL USMC A/C PRESENT - 423</p>	<p>CAMP EVANS</p> <p>1 AVN BN (55 UH-1, 11 AH-1, 2 OH-6)</p>	<p>FIXED WING - 86</p> <p>HELICOPTER - 732</p>
	<p>PHU BAI</p> <p>3 AVN COS (10 UH-1, 36 OH-6, 20 OV-1, 1 U-6, 3 U-21)</p>	<p>TOTAL USA A/C PRESENT - 818</p>

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1969 Total

76,897	Persons given medical treatment	1,157,696
1,974	Persons given dental treatment	32,753
530	Persons given medical or dental training	5,477
45,600	Pounds of food distributed	1,005,879
2,531	Pounds of soap distributed	72,866
3,221	Pounds of clothing distributed	56,689
480	Critically ill civilians evacuated	8,673
442	English language classes conducted	7,702
\$6,400	Cash donations	\$75,822
17,860	Persons fed	390,988
1,877	Students supported	41,748
300	Construction projects	2,563

6. III MAF/SLF STRENGTH

	USMC		USN		USA	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
DMZ area	260	4,131	28	104	298	3,860
Quang Tri	367	4,796	79	447	384	5,648
Phu Bai	211	2,136	5	61	2,820	21,816
Danang	3,033	43,898	246	1,729	118	768
Chu Lai	415	4,655	13	109	1,738	18,241
Duc Pho	-	-	-	-	288	4,462
Total	4,286	59,616	371	2,450	5,646	54,795

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(1000 rations/days of supply)

	<u>Danang</u>	<u>Dong Ha and Quang Tri</u>
MCI	144/3	848/31
B rations	318/7	548/20
A rations	351/8	156/7

Class II

(supply requisitions)

	<u>FLC</u>	<u>3d FSR</u>
Processed	40,378	28,905
Fill rate	58%	40%

Class III and III(A) (bulk) (Marine Corps owned)

(1000 gallons/days of supply)

	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>AVGAS</u>	<u>MOGAS</u>	<u>DIESEL</u>
Quang Tri	14/1	11/11	-	-
Phu Bai	93/4	28/9	-	-
Danang	115/3	4/13	84/13	102/11
An Hoa	61/15	5/125	-	-

Class V and V(A) - Adequate to support operational commitments.b. Resupply Status to RVN(1) Surface Shipping Status 22,574 M/T

Received from CONUS (12,848 M/T)

Received from intra-WestPac (9,726 M/T)

(2) Air Shipping Status 738 S/T

Received from CONUS (136 S/T)

Received from intra-WestPac (602 S/T)

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c. Resupply Status within RVN(1) Surface Shipping Status 59,728 S/T

Danang to Dong Ha/Cua Viet (11,308 S/T)
 Danang to Hue/Tan My (18,938 S/T)
 Danang to Chu Lai (29,482 S/T)

(2) Air Shipping Status (USMC and PACAF) 1,900 S/T

Danang to An Hoa (920 S/T)
 Danang to Dong Ha (31 S/T)
 Danang to Phu Bai (97 S/T)
 Danang to Chu Lai (205 S/T)
 Other intra-I CTZ APOE's (647 S/T)

d. Retrograde Cargo from RVN(1) Surface 5,270 S/T

MSTS conventional vessels (4,084 M/T)
 Roll On/Roll Off vessels (1,186 M/T)

(2) Air 263 S/T

USMC (118 S/T)
 MAC (63 S/T)
 PACAF (82 S/T)

e. Medical and Dental Services(1) Medical

Patients admitted to III MAF facilities	1,390
Battle injury (144)	
Non-battle injury (272)	
Disease (974)	
Evacuated out-of-country	293
Deaths in III MAF facilities	5
Returned to duty	784
Hospitalized as of 31 October	275

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Total procedures	40,929
Operative, crown, and bridge	18,542
Prosthetics	407
Oral surgery	3,900
Preventive dentistry	6,984
Number of sittings	14,142

f. Construction Projects

Roads -190.3 miles were upgraded and maintained.

Bridges -Five Class 60 and one Class 30 bridges were constructed; two Class 60 bridges were under construction; two Class 60 and one Class 30 bridges were repaired.

Rafts -One raft was in operation in the Danang area.

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