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*Shut Marine Store, Pacific: Operations of
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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

VIETNAM

MAY 1970

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine Corps forces in Vietnam for the month of May 1970. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through April 1970.

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SUMMARY

In general, the patterns of activity—III MAF and enemy—remained unchanged from those prevailing since the beginning of the year. During May, 1st Marine Division combat operations, spoiling enemy attempts to disrupt pacification and revolutionary development, continued to inflict substantial losses on the NVA and VC throughout eastern Quang Nam province. First Marine Aircraft Wing flights, in addition to supporting the Division with thousands of helicopter and fixed wing sorties, ranged across I CTZ, Laos, North Vietnam, and, for the first time, Cambodia, to reconnoiter or attack enemy base areas and resupply routes and to support Free World forces. Although somewhat increasing attacks-by-fire and ground assaults, the enemy continued to direct most of his attention toward stalling pacification progress rather than attempting major confrontation with III MAF units.

Despite the fact that no major or prolonged battles took place during the month, the NVA and VC lost 742 killed, 87 taken prisoner, and 239 weapons captured during combat with Marines, including those in the Combined Action Force and Combined Unit Pacification Program. Patrols operating as part of the 1st Marine Division counter-rocket program accounted for a portion of the enemy losses. This program, largely coordinated and operated by the 11th Marines, has been highly successful since 1967 in diminishing frequency, intensity, and accuracy of rocket attacks against Danang and its environs.

Enemy activity near the population centers of Quang Nam, denied adequate resupply and support by continuing pacification, is heavily dependent upon materiel from North Vietnamese sources introduced into RVN via a network of interconnected roads and trails. Aerial bombardment of distant routes and base areas, reconnaissance

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operations along intermediate locations, and III MAF maneuver against intra-Quang Nam supply routes have compounded enemy logistic problems, thereby lessening his potential for sustained combat.

A small increase in enemy activity in Quang Nam during April was reflected in pacification progress statistics which declined slightly more than one percent. A significant realignment of combined action platoons, partially designed to strengthen pacification efforts in Quang Nam, took place in early May. A portion of the Marines and Navy corpsmen, from 11 platoons deactivated elsewhere in I CTZ, were assigned with Popular Force elements to form seven new Quang Nam combined action platoons.

In another noteworthy change, the Naval Support Activity Hospital, located near Danang, discontinued operations in May, as the Navy continued a phased reduction of forces in connection with the redeployment program. The hospital had provided excellent medical service to Marines for over four years.



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
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COMBAT OPERATIONS

Combat action rose in Quang Nam during May as the tempo of enemy activity, particularly against territorial force units and installations, increased. Marine counter-guerrilla operations, nevertheless, continued to deny momentum to the enemy offensive and played a major role in province security. Principal actions included a 7th Marines contact near Que Son and a number of Pacificer patrol engagements. While intensifying combat offensive operations to a slight degree, the enemy continues logistic endeavors along lines of communication and in base areas, described in the chapter following.

The map below locates Marine battalions at end-month and displays results of May operations.

MARINE OPERATIONS: MAY 1970





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Counter guerrilla Operations

III MAF infantry units, remaining deployed across the breadth of Quang Nam during May, dominated the battlefield through employment of some 4,800 patrols, 7,300 ambushes, and 220 company-size operations. Enemy activity in the province, although materially restricted by friendly maneuver, was primarily directed at RF/PF units, refugee resettlements, district headquarters, and pacification-associated targets. Generally, attacks-by-fire were the main tactic employed against US forces; however, aggressive, small units engaged the enemy 404 times during the month, accounting for 389 NVA/VC killed, 62 taken prisoner, and 137 weapons captured.

The following graphs compare counter guerrilla operations during May with monthly totals since June 1969.

MARINE SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: JUNE 1969 - MAY 1970-7th Marines Operations

Most of III MAF combat again was centered in Que Son district, through which the enemy reaches out to Quang Nam populated areas. The 7th Marines, op-

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erating out of FSBs Ross, Ryder, and Baldy, executed in excess of 1,900 patrols and ambushes, 207 company operations, and 246 scout/sniper deployments during May, producing more than half the III MAF contacts and NVA/VC killed, 202 and 201 respectively.

The most significant III MAF action of the month occurred during the early morning hours of 6 May when an estimated battalion employing mortar, RPG, M-79, and small arms fire launched a heavy ground attack against Que Son district headquarters, a mile and a half northeast of FSB Ross. At the same time, rocket and mortar fire was directed on Ross in an attempt to keep the Marines pinned down and out of the fighting. However, in less than 30 minutes, a relief force (Headquarters and Service Company, 2d Battalion Marines with two tanks) entered Que Son and bolstered the defense. Shortly afterwards, elements of Company H joined the close-quartered battle. Assault elements of the enemy force withdrew under covering fire from a security element concealed in a treeline on the northern edge of the city. The tank's 90mm guns soon silenced the covering fire, following which friendly elements pursued the NVA and maintained intermittent contact. The following afternoon, a Company G element, three miles west of the district headquarters, directed artillery fire on 32 enemy thought to be part of the retreating force, resulting in eight killed. In all, the Marine counterattack and pursuit netted 40 NVA killed, four prisoners, 13 individual and two crew served weapons, and a quantity of munitions.

Later in the month, a Company M search uncovered and destroyed another enemy medical facility nine miles west of FSB Baldy. A Hoi Chanh working with the Company was instrumental in locating the large hospital complex, which was three levels high with an adjoining cave. Evidence of recent habitation was prevalent as a substantial amount of medical supplies, foodstuffs, and documents was collected.

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Since August 1968, III MAF has learned about 33 enemy medical facilities in Quang Nam from prisoners and captured documents or Marine combat and reconnaissance units. A concentration of the 33 was located in Base Area 112 south of Thuong Duc, an area typical of those selected by the enemy for hospitals, surgical stations, and convalescent camps--in remote areas near major base complexes and close to land and water routes which ease evacuation of sick and wounded.

During the past six months, 26 enemy medical personnel have been captured by 1st Marine Division units and an additional nine have rallied (nine doctors, eight nurses, and 18 medical assistants). The loss of these specialists, enough to staff five 100-bed hospitals or to provide service to three districts, is costly to the enemy. Difficulties in replacing skilled medical personnel impair his already marginal medical support, thus further lowering enemy morale and reducing his casualty return-to-action rate.

-5th Marines Operations

The 5th Marine Regiment maintained its posture in An Hoa basin and the eastern portion of Thuong Duc corridor, with the 1st Battalion still providing Pacifier units and serving as division reserve near Da nang. Action was scattered and relatively light, as the Regiment employed in excess of 3,900 patrols, ambushes, and company-search operations to block favorite enemy approaches to the lowlands. Besides accounting for 146 NVA/VC killed and 50 weapons seized during May, the unit captured 56 prisoners (all but six of the III MAF total).

Most of the fighting was incurred by 1st Battalion Pacifier patrols. At 0800 on the 6th, one heliborne patrol sighted ten enemy moving south, two miles southeast of Liberty Bridge. A Company A element landed and assaulted, killing eight NVA. A week later, similar action took place when another

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
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Company A patrol, reacting to intelligence reports, was inserted by helicopter to sweep an area two miles north of An Hoa. Supported by armed helicopters, the Marines made numerous small contacts, killing 14 NVA and two VC.

First Battalion Pacific elements joined 2d Battalion units on the 8th to thwart the enemy. The action started at 0145 as Company G repulsed a mortar-supported ground probe by an undetermined size force, but continued to receive harassing fire throughout the night. At 0600, Company E was helilifted three miles southeast of the contact site to block the enemy escape; several hours later, a Company A Pacific patrol was landed two miles southwest of Company E. Both units engaged the fleeing enemy with small arms fire and air strikes. All told, enemy losses were 22 NVA and VC killed, one VC taken prisoner, and four weapons captured, while friendly casualties were ten wounded.

5TH MARINES ACTION: 8 MAY 1970



Five days later, another operation (accounting for 21 of the 56 prisoners) was executed in the same vicinity southeast of Liberty Bridge. Acting on a report from PF soldiers, Companies F and H and the PFs established a cordon around the villages of Le Nam (1) and (2) at 0400. Villagers informed the Marines two companies of VC had fled just prior to their arrival; therefore, Company A

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(Pacifier patrol) was landed two miles to the north. Contact was established, and 11 VC were killed and four weapons captured in the short fight. Meanwhile, a thorough search north of the two villages resulted in seizure of 12 VC and nine NVA hiding in spider holes and two enemy killed while resisting capture. Interrogation of the nine NVA revealed they were medical personnel from Front 4 charged with providing medical assistance for NVA and VC in eastern Quang Nam.

Another cordon and search operation in the same area on the 17th foiled a favorite enemy tactic (moving into an area shortly after bombing or search in the belief that allied attention would shift elsewhere) and accounted for 18 more prisoners. This Company H action also netted six VC killed, 21 VC sympathizers, seven weapons, and a field radio. In addition to providing valuable information about their units, the captured men indicated they had occupied the area just ten hours after the search four days earlier.

-1st Marines Operations

Action closer to Danang in the 1st Marines area was light, as more than 5,100 patrols and ambushes brought about 66 contacts, 42 NVA/VC killed, and 16 weapons captured. Most of the Regiment's small unit activities were pointed toward limiting infiltration and deterring mortar or rocket shellings against the Danang complex.

Although not often measurable in terms of contacts and enemy losses, the 1st Marines performs the majority of III MAF maneuver to pre-empt rocket attacks against Danang and its environs. The fire teams, squads, and platoons of the Regiment conduct high-density patrol operations which make it difficult for the enemy to infiltrate with rockets, prepare launching sites, fire, and then withdraw without detection. In addition to the heavy patrol schedule, the 1st Marines man observation posts (OP) which supplement those

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of a sophisticated, closely coordinated, 1st Marine Division counter-rocket system.

Shortly after the onset of enemy rocket attacks against the Danang complex in February 1967--a significant escalation of the enemy effort--a counter-rocket program was started which since has been considerably refined. Success of the program is evidenced by the reduced number of rocket attacks on Danang, virtual elimination of multi-volley attacks, and diminished accuracy of recent rocketings.

The counter-rocket program consists of continuous surveillance, saturation patrolling, harassing and interdiction fires, rapid counter-fire by artillery, and rocket launching site analysis--all within a region designated as the rocket threat area. This area is a semicircular belt of terrain, some 4,000 yards wide, around the landward sides of Danang, which coincides with the effective ranges of the enemy's rockets. It lies almost entirely within the 1st Marines operational area.

Continuous surveillance of the belt, particularly sections especially favorable and/or previously used for rocket launchings, is maintained by a coordinated system of observation posts, sensor devices, patrols, and aerial observation. During daylight, at least three low-level visual reconnaissance flights, dedicated to detecting signs of rocket-firing site preparation, are flown. Ten observation posts, established and manned by the 11th Marines solely for the counter-rocket effort, are located to assure complete surveillance of the threat area and provide instantaneous reports of rocket firings.

Each night, previously used rocket launching sites and sections of the threat area favorable for rocket sites are interdicted, either by 1st Marines patrols or 11th Marines artillery fire--sometimes both at different times of the night.

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When rockets are launched, a rapid sequence of events takes place to neutralize or destroy the launch site. Observation towers report the attack to artillery fire direction centers, where commands are given to open fire on likely rocket-firing sites. Response is quick, as cannon are already aimed at each of these sites unless firing other missions. Then, OPS report azimuths to the easily visible firing site, and an intersection of the directions is plotted to yield its location. Next, usually two to four minutes after the rocket firing, all available artillery fire is brought to bear on the site and likely routes of egress.

On some occasions, 1st Marines patrols are too close (500 to 1,000 yards) for the artillery to open fire. In that event, the nearest patrol assaults the position as rapidly as possible. Such was the case on 8 May at 0225, when six 122mm rockets were fired at Danang from five miles east of Hill 55. A Company G patrol reacted and assaulted the location. Due to the quick action, the enemy was forced to hurriedly withdraw and evade, leaving 11 rockets on launchers set for firing.

As soon as practicable after a rocket attack, even when the firing site has only been engaged by artillery fire, infantry elements maneuver to secure the launching site for the 11th Marines Rocket Investigation Team. The team studies the technical aspects of the site to determine information useful in preventing future rocket attacks.

Reconnaissance Activity

The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company and 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, conducting 40 and 979 patrols respectively, continued to account for significant enemy losses in areas otherwise void of friendly coverage. Maintaining their covert status in most instances, the patrols observed more than 1,000 enemy during the month and, by direct engagement or supporting arms attack, killed 186 of them and captured 17 weapons.

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
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Highlighting reconnaissance team action was a contact by PENNY WISE; employing organic weapons and artillery fire, the unit engaged a large enemy force nearly 18 miles west-southwest of An Hoa on the 8th and killed 17 NVA. On the 11th, patrol CHILI PEPPER, reconnoitering 11 miles south of An Hoa, killed 14 enemy in a brief small arms engagement. Four days later, CLAY PIPE accounted for 12 NVA killed in a running fire fight with an estimated 30-man enemy force in a base camp area 11 miles north of Thuong Duc. Three artillery missions directed by reconnaissance teams, on the 13th, 28th, and 31st, killed 29 of 53 enemy sighted.

Enemy Activity

During May, the enemy initiated 34 ground and significant indirect fire attacks in Quang Nam, his highest level of activity this year. In the main, however, he continues to withhold troops from major combat. Guerrilla tactics, concentrating on sabotage, harassment, terrorism, and an accelerated propaganda campaign aimed at pacification disruption, remained as the dominant enemy scheme.



The 21 ground assaults--a marked increase over the four registered last month--were targeted primarily against RVNAF units and installations and were in consonance with overall increases in enemy activity I CTZ-wide. Thirteen attacks-by-fire (20 rounds or more), launched either to support ground maneuver or to inflict casualties in populated areas, rounded out the enemy attack effort during May.

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Most of his energies were directed against Thuong Duc village, nestled at the western end of the Thuong Duc corridor. There, during the first two weeks of May, elements of the 38th and 141st NVA Regiments and the 577th Rocket Artillery Battalion exercised increased pressure, manifested in the form of daily barrages of 60mm and 82mm mortar, 75mm recoilless rifle, and 122mm rocket fire, against a lightly defended garrison. However, the pressure abated somewhat by midmonth, a result of 51st ARVN Regiment multibattalion operations (described in the Revolutionary Development and Pacification chapter).

Sixty-one acts of terrorism were recorded during the month in Quang Nam--the most active I CTZ province for terrorist activity. Highlighting such were attacks on population centers, including refugee camps; however, the enemy also sought out individuals, ranging from laborers to a district chief, as objects of terror and assassination.

A number of combat unit shifts, additions, and deletions have occurred--the most prominent were new holdings near Thuong Duc for the 490th Sapper Battalion, Front 4 (previously deployed in Quang Tin) and an unidentified company from the 577th Rocket Artillery Battalion. The shifting of two 141st Regiment battalions to the west probably was a result of ARVN operations around Thuong Duc.


The map on the following page locates those enemy units in either confirmed or probable status in the province at end-month and includes ten transportation battalions, heretofore unlisted.

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QUANG NAM ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE: MAY 1970



TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT/SUPPORT UNITS		ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT PERSONNEL	GUERRILLAS	TROOPS IN PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE UNITS
NVA	VC			
5,200	2,300	350	3,900	500

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ENEMY LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

Although skillful tactics and firepower are necessary for success on the battlefield, they would be to no avail without adequate logistic support. At one time, NVA and VC forces could rely to a large degree on in-country sources for many logistic needs. As the NVA enlarged their effort in the south and Free World force operations, coupled with GVN pacification programs, increasingly choked off support from RVN citizens, greater reliance on out-of-country resupply and manpower replacement was forced on the enemy. The NVA, therefore, developed a complex network of roads, trails, rivers, and streams to transport huge tonnages of supplies required to wage war.

A significant portion of III MAF effort has been expended to interrupt the flow of goods and people along enemy lines of communication (LOC). In addition to large and small-scale ground operations throughout Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and, most recently, Quang Nam provinces to disrupt enemy logistic operations, a strong interdiction campaign has been carried out by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as a necessary adjunct to its close air support mission. During the past six months, an average of over 700 sorties per month were flown to either strike out-of-country LOCs or support those operations. Additionally, a considerable number of sorties have been devoted to stifling enemy logistic work in base camps and along LOCs in-country.

Presently, 70 percent of enemy supplies needed in I CTZ are imported to RVN. Included in that figure are over 90 percent of his arms and ammunition, approximately one-third of his food, and some 25 percent of his clothing and other equipment.

Supplies reach RVN via a complicated, out-of-country infiltration system originating in NVN, flowing through Laos over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and transferring into an in-country system at several locales on the Laos/I CTZ border. Cargo leaving NVN is hauled to Laotian base areas, many of which are collocated with points of entry into RVN. Shuttling supplies requires frequent off-loading, temporary storage, and laborious rehandling along the way. The Ho Chi Minh Trail forms the backbone of the enemy's logistic line of communication (LOC); Route 92, a series of parallel roads and interconnecting by-passes,

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
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is the primary north-south stem of the trail. Supplies move eastward from Route 92 to I CTZ on three main branches: Routes 926/616, Routes 922/9222, and Routes 165/969. While materiel transported over each of these major east-west roads sustains units along them, the main purpose of the roads is restockage of in-country base areas. The Base Area 112/126/127 complex in Quang Nam (the largest enemy concentration in I CTZ) receives most of the goods. The shortest and preferred link is along Routes 922/9222, through Base Area 611, onto Route 548, south through A Shau valley to Base Area 607, and then into Quang Nam.

The map below locates major base areas and the LOCs for Quang Nam resupply operations.

LOGISTIC ROUTES INTO QUANG NAM



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A Shau valley, roughly paralleling some 25 miles of the Laotian border in Thua Thien, is a natural avenue through a sparsely settled region remote from government controlled sections of I CTZ. Topographical considerations bring into sharper focus the value of the A Shau to the enemy. The valley cuts through the highest mountains in I CTZ and eastern Laos, where peaks reach more than 6,000 feet and lesser mountains continue south along the Laos/I CTZ border. It is advantageous to use A Shau to by-pass the severe, mountainous terrain. In recent years, the enemy has built an interlocking network of roads, trails, depots, and command posts in the A Shau to support operations in Thua Thien and southern I CTZ. These logistic efforts are, in effect, an extension of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system, to the extent that a separate transportation authority consisting of several thousand men is headquartered there. Free World force operations have periodically restricted enemy use of A Shau. Presently, USMC efforts in the valley and its approaches are limited to air interdiction and suppression, accounting for a portion of the incountry interdiction program which has taken 22 percent of Marine fixed wing sorties in the last six months.

Numerous NVA units are required to transport materiel and maintain the LOCs, most of which is accomplished at night. The 559th Transportation Group trucks cargo from NVN to Laos/I CTZ border base areas. The 220th Transportation Regiment and 70C Rear Service Section, Front 4 (both based in Quang Nam) pick up the imported goods and porter them to Base Areas 112, 126, and 127. The 220th has a strength of approximately 3,300 personnel, most of them female, and is composed of six battalions: the 221st through the 226th. The 70C Rear Service Section totals about 1,200 men assigned to four battalions: the 130th, 140th, 150th, and 160th. During periods of heightened activity, civilian labor is often recruited or impressed from VC-controlled territory to supplement the work force.

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Ground operations, concerted air interdiction, and extension of GVN control have all but eliminated the use of enemy military vehicles in I CTZ. Movement by truck is still attempted in A Shau, but with limited success, as the valley is closely watched and interdicted. Therefore, the in-country logistic system relies on slower and more primitive, yet less vulnerable modes of transportation--porters, bicycles, carts, and sampans; portage of 75-pound, individual loads is the most prevalent form. Bicycles, reinforced to carry 500 pounds and rigged to be pushed by one or two men, are frequently used to transport materiel over unimproved roads and well-used trails.

No road system is maintained in Quang Nam as unimproved roads or simple jungle trails suffice. In some instances, however, where canopy provides concealment, trails are corduroyed with bamboo rods to create a crude, but effective all-weather surface. Bridging of streams is also accomplished with bamboo construction.

Not all supplies needed by the enemy in Quang Nam come from the north; currently, 30 percent is procured within the province. Some munitions, predominantly booby traps and other antipersonnel ordnance, are produced locally by the VC. Other goods and food are either purchased on the open market or extorted from the population. Locally procured goods are transported to interior base areas for storage and later issue, as the following prisoner of war account reveals.


During interrogation of Senior Sergeant Le Cong TY, Quartermaster Sub-section, Rear Services Section, 38th NVA Regiment (captured by 1st Battalion, 7th Marines on 25 April), he described a major regimental supply route from the lowlands of southeastern Quang Nam to Base Area 112 (shown on the following map). TY related that every four or five days local force elements cached approximately 500 pounds of locally grown rice in a thickly vegetated area south of the Ba Ren river, seven miles southwest of Hoi An. From there, elements of the 21st Transportation Company, 38th Regiment porter the rice to the base area.

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38TH NVA REGIMENT SUPPLY ROUTE

From the base areas, the enemy distributes his supplies and ammunition to an intricate system of depots and caches, relatively close to his forces--a logistic practice unique to guerrillas. Whereas conventional forces have a logistic tail which follows combat elements, the NVA/VC position their logistic needs ahead of combat units. There are many reasons for using this method; however, the need to stockpile during the dry season for rainy periods and the slowness of resupply capability are paramount. Caches range in size from a few mortar rounds to the tons of arms, munitions, and food found during Operation DEWEY CANYON in February 1969. Although an average cache consists of 70 percent food, 25 percent ammunition, and five percent weapons, single category caches often are found. Nevertheless, with persistent Free World operations continuing to uncover and destroy significant amounts of enemy assets, both the number and size of caches have dropped, accounting in part for the general reduction in enemy-initiated action, while increasing the workload of his logistic apparatus.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION

The pacification level of Quang Nam province decreased slightly during April--88.1 to 87.0 percent--mostly as a result of increased enemy activity against population centers and related pacification targets. To counter this resurgent threat, the Combined Action Force shifted Marines from northern I CTZ to Quang Nam during early May and increased both day and night operations. At the same time, Combined Unit Pacification elements increased patrol and ambush actions, giving these two pacification support programs their most successful month in 1970, as nearly 200 NVA/VC were killed or captured.

ARVN and territorial forces also continued to screen the populous lowlands. The former deployed two battalions to stop enemy attacks against the people in Thuong Duc village, while the latter provided security in and around Quang Nam villages and connecting roads and rivers.

Combined Action Force


An important organizational realignment took place within the Combined Action Force (CAF) during May, altering the composition of the four Combined Action Groups (CAG). During the first week of the month, Marines from five platoons in 3d CAG and two in 4th CAG were relocated to Quang Nam and formed seven new 2d CAG platoons. Also, four CAPs in 1st CAG were deactivated, the first reduction in platoons since December 1967 when one was deactivated. Although additional CAPs were needed in Quang Nam, relocation and deactivation of CAPs from other provinces were made only after organic PF platoons were able to stand alone; GVN influence was solidly entrenched in each area; and the district chief concurred in the change.

At end-May, the CAF consisted of four CAGs, 19 companies, and 110 CAPs located throughout I CTZ as shown on the following map.

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COMBINED ACTION FORCE: 31 MAY 1970

The strength of the CAF hinges on many well-documented military precepts, of which economy of force and mobility are salient. Although the 2,000 Marines and US Navy corpsmen in the CAF would almost make up two USMC battalions (24 rifle platoons), 110 CAPs have been formed. Thus, in terms of US personnel required to secure populated areas, the CAP system is quite economical.

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CAP mobile operations amplify economies accruing from the program; rather than being tied down to a defensive position which the enemy can avoid, these platoons deny the enemy freedom of movement through mobility, which also allows coverage of more terrain. Security of villages and hamlets continues to be a rewarding asset of the CAF.

During May, CAPs conducted 14,930 patrols and ambushes to prevent enemy infiltration into Quang Nam hamlets and villages. These tactics resulted in 130 contacts, 133 NVA/VC killed, 21 others taken prisoner, and 80 weapons captured. Additionally, CAPs received 28 Hoi Chanh and detained 77 VC suspects for further interrogation and classification.

Because CAPs are melded with the Vietnamese citizenry and are, therefore, tangible evidence of US support of the GVN pacification program, they rank high on the NVA/VC target list. A highlight of CAP combat activity during May was an attack on the CAP 1-3-2 patrol base, three and one-half miles southeast of Binh Son. At 0200 on the 8th, mixed 82mm and 60mm mortar and RPG fire hit the base, followed by a ground attack from an estimated reinforced company of the 21st NVA Regiment and 95B Sapper Battalion. In addition to rifle, machine gun, and grenade fire, CAP 1-3-2 employed artillery, armed helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft to break the assault. At daybreak, the CAP, with an Americal Division platoon and the 30th RF Company, swept the battlefield, disclosing 16 NVA and 12 VC dead, three AK-47 rifles, two RPG launchers, and numerous satchel charges and Chicom grenades.



The following graphs compare May CAF activities and results with those since June 1969.

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COMBINED ACTION ACTIVITIES: JUNE 1969 - MAY 1970**OPERATIONS CONDUCTED****ENEMY LOSSES**Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP)

A shift in the operational relationship between Marines and RF/PF soldiers of CUPP units progressed during May. Since April, RF/PF platoon commanders, supervised by district officials, have assumed greater responsibility for operations planning, while Marines increasingly serve in an advisory capacity. The number of CUPP patrols, ambushes, and searches has risen as territorial forces gain experience and conduct activities independent of Marine participation.

A reflection of increased operations was the 34 enemy killed in May--the highest monthly CUPP total since the program began in late November 1969. Of even greater significance, two CUPP-protected hamlets achieved a secure pacification rating and another was upgraded one level from VC-controlled to contested status.

Because of their association with territorial forces and connection with the GVN pacification program, CUPP units, like CAPs, often have been subjected to enemy attacks similar to the following May assault. At 0310 on the 10th, a Company A, 7th Marines CUPP team, positioned with the 146th PF Platoon two miles northwest of FSB Baldy, received 50

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
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rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. At the same time, two miles to the south, another Company A team and the 145th PF Platoon were attacked by a 60-man sapper force. Supported by mortars, the VC breached the perimeter and heavily damaged the compound, but were repelled by Marine and PF firepower. Twelve enemy were killed, while friendly casualties from the assault and both attacks-by-fire were one PF and one civilian killed and 20 PF soldiers and one civilian wounded.

The following graphs depict monthly CUPP combat results since December 1969.

MARINE CUPP RESULTS: DECEMBER 1969 - MAY 1970



Pacification

The percentage of secure population in Quang Nam at end-April reflected a decrease for the first time since adoption of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) on 1 January 1969 (except for the statistical drop caused by the more stringent HES 70 criteria). Although the population considered secure decreased 1.1 percent to 87.0, the VC-controlled population

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picture improved--showing a reduction of 0.3 points to 1.1. The decrease substantiates the value of HES 70 as an indicator of relative pacification, since the rating appears to have been sensitive to increased enemy activity directed primarily against populated areas during April. HES 70 figures for contested and non-rated populations increased 1.1 and 0.3 percent, respectively.

A nationwide slowing of the sweeping progress achieved by pacification in 1969 has become evident in recent months. Waning of enthusiasm generated by the novelty and excitement of expansion into new territory, coupled with increased emphasis by communists against the pacification program, is a contributory factor. During early 1969, the enemy viewed pacification with little concern but, by mid-year, realized the significance of this threat to his long-term interests. Direct steps taken to counter pacification were slow in developing; not until the end of the first quarter of 1970 was any substantial degree of impact felt from increased NVA/VC disruption attempts.

Reaffirming the importance of continued progress, the GVN has slated a Special Pacification and Development Plan for 1 July through 31 October. Particular emphasis is to be placed on economic and social development. The peoples' information program; better coordinated activity and mutual support by ARVN, RF, PF, PSDF, and National Police; rapid trial of VCI; and early judgement of VC suspects will also receive increased attention. Effective promotion of this plan conjunctively with the 1970 campaign is designed to serve as a catalyst for accelerated pacification advancement.


The chart on the following page depicts the pacification posture of each Quang Nam district, with province totals, at end-April.

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QUANG NAM PACIFICATION STATUS

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POPULATION STATISTICS

DISTRICT	SECURE	VC-CONTROL	NOT RATED	TOTAL
DANANG	379,958	0	12,207	392,165
HOA VANG	171,732	4,933	0	177,876
HIEU DUC	16,716	0	0	16,716
DIEN BAN	46,920	15,485	0	63,394
DAI LOC	42,477	3,679	0	46,156
THUONG DUC	13,764	0	24,003	37,767
DUC DUC	30,716	7,085	0	37,801
QUE SON	33,376	16,271	0	58,119
DUY XUYEN	33,727	10,924	0	44,651
HIEU NHON	78,184	15,718	6,000	99,902
QUANG NAM PROVINCE	847,570	10,672	42,210	974,547
PERCENTAGE	87.0%	1.1%	4.3%	100%

BASED ON END-APRIL HES 70 DATA.

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
ARVN Support of Pacification

Combat activity in ARVN pacification support operations in Quang Nam province decreased somewhat during May. In all, the 51st Regiment and the 1st Armored Brigade conducted five large operations (three initiated and terminated during the month, one continuing since April, and one started in late May) in direct support of the GVN pacification campaign. These operations resulted in 106 NVA and VC killed, 16 prisoners, and 42 weapons captured.

Operation DUONG SON 3/70, developing only light, scattered resistance this month, ended on 26 May, closing the most significant Quang Nam pacification operation of 1970. Since 3/70's commencement on 11 February, the 37th and 39th Ranger Battalions and 3d Troop, 17th Armored Cavalry Assault Squadron denied the enemy a rice-rich haven along the coast south of Hoi An, killed 684 NVA/VC, caught 205 others, and captured 192 weapons. These units have since been committed to Danang security and local search operations near An Hoa and Hoi An.

The 51st Regiment continued Operation HUNG QUANG 1/33 with the 2d and 3d Battalions in the vicinity of Hill 55, Camp Muir, throughout May.

Because Thuong Duc corridor is a direct avenue of approach to the Muir area, the 1st and 4th Battalions deployed to the western highground bordering the valley in mid-April to relieve enemy pressure against Thuong Duc village and refugee center. Initiating HUNG QUANG 1/32 on 15 April and 1/32A on 14 May, the 1st and 4th con-



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ducted searches in the mountainous region north of the corridor. Combat engagements, although not frequent since the enemy continued reluctant to oppose in strength, resulted in nearly 50 NVA/VC killed. On 29 May, the two battalions commenced HUNG QUANG 1/32B with a vertical assault into the highground west of Thuong Duc, 13 miles northwest of An Hoa. By end-month, the HUNG QUANG 1/32B maneuver elements, which included four Civilian Irregular Defense Group companies, skirmishing with the enemy frequently, had killed more than 25 NVA/VC.

Territorial Forces

Modernization of the RVNAF has significantly increased the combat effectiveness of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) in Quang Nam as well as throughout RVN. As of 1 May, 89 percent of the RF units and 80 percent of the PF platoons nationwide have received three-fourths of their authorized individual clothing and equipment. Thus, armed with modern weapons (M-16 rifle, M-60 machine gun, and M-79 grenade launcher) and outfitted with the latest small-unit communication equipment (AN/PRC-25 radio) territorial forces have become more capable of coping with hostile units.

To insure training and leadership maintain a level consistent with modernization, an extensive training program has been established for RF and PF units. RF companies and PF platoons periodically return to basic training centers for refresher instruction and special leadership courses. Each unit, in addition to assigned security operations, must conduct six hours of formal training weekly.

The NVA and VC, in a drive to discredit the RVNAF and weaken popular respect for their capabilities, have repeatedly attacked installations protected by territorial forces. This tactic has failed; RF and PF soldiers have killed 3,685 enemy,

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captured 198 others, and seized 1,583 weapons in I CTZ since the first of the year, and respect for territorial forces improves daily.

During May, enemy forces conducted minor attacks against several of the 57 RF companies and 212 PF platoons deployed in Quang Nam and a large assault on the Que Son district headquarters, which is discussed in the Combat Operations chapter. Highlighting the lesser attacks was a probe of the 137th PF Platoon, 11 miles west of An Hoa, by an unknown size enemy force shortly after 0800 on the 9th. Reacting to a call for assistance from the 137th, one platoon of the 704th RF Company and the 142d, 175th, and 149th PF Platoons, while maneuvering to reinforce, attacked the enemy rear guard 300 yards south of the defensive position. The enemy fled, leaving 25 dead, one wounded, and 11 weapons on the battlefield. Three PF and two RF soldiers were killed in the action.

Chieu Hoi Returnees

During May, 99 Hoi Chanh (32 VC, seven NVA, and 60 non-military supporters) defected to Free World forces in Quang Nam province--an increase of nearly 45 percent over the total received last month. Thus the 517 Hoi Chanh received in the province through May approaches the 659 ralliers of the first five months of 1969, the most successful year in the Chieu Hoi campaign.

Response to the Open Arms program is not expected to keep pace with that of last year because the 1969 record success resulted largely from extension of GVN influence into new areas affording large numbers of VCI cadre and sympathizers opportunity to defect with less risk. Since all but the mountainous regions of Thuong Duc are now under consolidation by the GVN, unexploited areas are limited, and defections have decreased--a situation not peculiar to Quang Nam but applicable to RVN as a whole.


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May Chieu Hoi results are compared with those of the past year in the following graph.

QUANG NAM CHIEU HOI RESULTS: MAY 69 - MAY 70



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
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AIR OPERATIONS

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing responded to the requirements of Free World forces with 40,975 fixed wing and helicopter sorties during May. This represents a 14 percent rise over April fixed wing sorties and a 12 percent climb in helicopter missions, most of which were registered in the CH-46D logistic and combat troop carrying category. Within the Republic of Vietnam, more than 3,300 attack missions dropped 8,643 tons of ordnance, while Marine helicopters lifted over 86,000 troops and passengers and 6,100 tons of cargo. During out-of-country operations, 849 strike and combat support sorties were logged over the Gulf of Tonkin and hostile regions of Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam.


Increased levels of 1st Wing air operations during May are compared with monthly totals of the past year in the following graphs.

MARINE AIR OPERATIONS: JUNE 1969 - MAY 1970



FIXED WING SORTIES

HELICOPTER SORTIES



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In-Country Fixed Wing Operations

Operations by Marine Air Groups-11 and 13 were an essential part of the flexible fire support and surveillance provided by 1st Wing during the month. Their 3,316 attack flights--an increase of 13.5 percent over April and 33 percent since March--provided the majority of close, direct, and interdiction air support required by Free World units in I CTZ. III MAF received 1,663 (38 percent) of the total fighter/attack sorties flown. Although contact with enemy dispositions remained at a low level, close air support was frequently required, as indicated by 2,519 missions logged wherein ordnance was delivered in close proximity to ground troops. Many of these flights were scrambled from a 15 minute alert pad, manned around-the-clock by A-4E and F-4B aircrews of MAG-13 to provide quick response.

In accomplishing their mission, 1st Wing aircraft delivered 4,518 air-to-ground rockets; 2,737 canisters of napalm; and 7,959 tons of bombs, ranging from 250 pounders to devastating 2,000 pounders, but using the medium, 500-pound size most often. Battle damage assessment of target areas revealed 314 military structures and 505 bunkers destroyed, 381 secondary explosions and fires among logistic stores, and 50 NVA/VC killed by Marine fixed wing strikes.

During May, there was also a significant increase in 1st Wing photo and visual reconnaissance sorties flown in I CTZ--145 by RF-4B aircrews and 579 by TA-4F and OV-10A crews. Some 450 of the more than 655 OV-10A flights by Marine Observation Squadron-2 were directed to visually reconnoiter possible enemy activity in the III MAF operations area. In addition, 121 TA-4F sorties made daily checks on enemy lines of communication (LOC) in the western border area where they connect with the Ho Chi Minh Trail resupply network.


The graphs on the following page compare May fixed wing operations with monthly totals since June 1969.

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
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IN-COUNTRY FIXED WING SUPPORT BY MARINE AIRCRAFT JUNE 1969 - MAY 1970

SORTIES FLOWN



ORDNANCE DELIVERED



Helicopter Operations

For the third consecutive month, helicopter sorties (35,288) flown by Marine Air Group-16 squadrons increased considerably. The 86,096 passengers carried during the month were the largest number of people helilifted since May 1969.

CH-53D helicopters of HMM-463 continued to record impressive increases in passengers and cargo hauled--5,647 flights lifted 43,390 passengers and 5,217 tons of cargo, representing 51 and 85 percent, respectively, of the totals for all helicopters. Thirty-one sorties, a small portion of CH-53 utilization, were used to recover salvageable, tactical aircraft down away from their home field; thus, substantial time and dollar savings were achieved. Pilots and crew members of the four CH-46D squadrons logged 19,525 missions.

Including one or more armed helicopters (UH-1E or AH-1G) in medical evacuation, reconnaissance team support, or combat heliborne assault missions creates an aircraft package which can rapidly place suppressive fire on enemy attempting to interrupt helicopter missions or ground maneuver. Armed escort operations by HML-167, equipped with UH-1Es, and HML-367, with AH-1Gs, accounted for more than 6,900 flights.


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Several actions during May exemplify the effectiveness of armed helicopter operations. On the morning of 6 May, two AH-1Gs observed and attacked eight enemy infiltrators two miles south of Liberty Bridge, killing six. Two days later and just northeast of the bridge, four AH-1Gs were credited with killing 11 NVA/VC and contributing to the capture of two more. Toward evening the same day, reconnaissance team PENNY WISE, engaged in heavy contact 18 miles west of An Hoa, requested suppressive fire and immediate extraction. Repeated firing passes by armed helicopters killed 13 NVA and enabled successful extraction of the team.

In addition to armed reconnaissance, UH-1E aircrews logged 3,590 visual reconnaissance and command and control sorties. These daily flights afforded Marine ground unit commanders unobscured observation of trail activity, terrain, potential landing zones, and avenues of approach.

The graphs below reflect 1st Wing helicopter operations for the past 12 months.



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Initially deployed to RVN in March 1966 with HMM-164, the CH-46 Sea Knight, powered by two T58 jet engines, has replaced the UH-34D as the Marine Corps primary vertical assault helicopter. As a result, III MAF gained a more powerful, medium transport helicopter, providing increased troop and cargo capacities. Standard operating procedure for logistic resupply was changed to take advantage of CH-46 superiority. At logistic support areas (LSA), larger quantities of stores were prestaged and rigged in cargo nets for quick hook-up underneath a hovering Sea Knight. The suspended, external load saved time at both LSA and destination (fire support base or field position of a maneuver unit); increased efficiency when comparing flight time versus stores delivered; decreased exposure time in a landing zone for both helicopters and serviced customers; and reduced either time or helicopters required for resupply missions.

Some supplies are carried internally loaded on small trailers or pallets, which are quickly rolled on and off utilizing the Integrated Cargo Handling and Rescue System. The arrangement consists of a rear cargo ramp and door, utility winch, and rollers in the aircraft floor. This procedure also provides faster aircraft turn-around and decreased handling of supplies.

The tandem rotor CH-46 has proven itself a dependable and versatile workhorse, capable of performing diverse tasks--troop and cargo transport, medical evacuation, visual reconnaissance, search and rescue, and tactical aircraft recovery--under varied operating conditions. The CH-46A has been replaced by the more powerful "D" model, which, like its predecessor, has performed well in mountain regions to the west and in humid, coastal areas.

A review of CH-46 totals since the helicopter joined the 1st Wing reveals the magnitude of its role in III MAF operations. Since March 1966, the Sea Knight has flown 713,580 sorties--29 percent of USMC helicopter totals. During the past year, CH-46 aircrews logged 218,546 sorties, carried 436,618 passengers, and delivered 20,054 tons of cargo.


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The following graphs show CH-46 sortie totals since its introduction into RVN and passengers and cargo heli-lifted during the past 12 months.

CH-46 HELICOPTER OPERATIONS



Out-of-Country Operations

In May, 1st Wing fighter/attack aircrews produced another operational first, as Marine tactical jets struck in Cambodia, supporting attacks against enemy sanctuaries. Twenty-two direct and close air support missions were flown for US Army 4th Division and ARVN 22d Division elements in Operation BINH TAY I. The maneuver was targeted against Base Area 702 located approximately 12 miles south of the Laos-Vietnam-Cambodia tri-border area and 40 miles west of Pleiku, RVN. On 5 and 6 May, MAG-13 flew eight missions, employing 1,000-pound bombs to clear landing zones prior to heliborne assaults. Flights on 22 May, ten

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
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more direct air support missions, dropped quarter-ton napalm canisters and 500-pound snake eyes (bombs with large fins that retard descent rate and allow accurate, low-level delivery). The final four sorties were scrambled on 23 May from the MAG-13 alert pad to provide close air support for an ARVN element in heavy contact with a bunkered enemy force.

The remaining 827 out-of-country missions carried out ongoing interdiction, air defense, and aerial reconnaissance efforts over Laos, NVN, and the Gulf of Tonkin. Over 220 were interdiction sorties by MAG-11 A-6A squadrons, VMA(AW)-225 and 242, which struck 610 stationary and 143 moving targets. The latter were detected by the plane's automatic moving target indicator (AMTI).

Several actions in Laos are cited to show the efficiency of AMTI and A-6A Intruder crews. On 1 May, a single plane scored a highly successful mission during which four trucks were detected and destroyed and ten fires ignited. During the evening of 11 May, a flight of three A-6As located and hit enemy road traffic, accounting for seven trucks damaged, 15 secondary explosions, and two fires. Toward the end of the month, Intruders located an active AA gun position on Route 922 and a convoy of trucks. During subsequent bombing, seven trucks were damaged, the gun position was destroyed, and 20 secondary explosions were observed around the AA weapon site.

MARINE OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIR OPERATIONS



Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron-11 TA-4F pilots flew 150 sorties over Laos to detect hostile activity and control strike aircraft. Thus, two visual reconnaissance and three tactical air controller missions were averaged per day over North Vietnamese LOCs through the Laotian Steel Tiger area adjacent to I CTZ.

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EA-6A and RF-4B aircrews of Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron-1 gathered intelligence and assessed strike damage in the Laotian panhandle, flying daily photographic and occasional electronic warfare (EW) flights. Laotian flights totaled 71, while 185 other missions located, and when necessary, jammed NVN radar sites. RF-4Bs logged four more NVN flights photographing areas of intelligence interest.

MAG-13 F-4B crews supplied barrier combat air patrols at Yankee Station over the Gulf of Tonkin for the US Navy on six occasions, logging 53 night sorties. These operations required on-station, in-flight refueling from a Marine KC-130 tanker at night, a maneuver requiring skillful coordination and flying by tanker and F-4B crews. Remaining F-4B missions included 61 armed escort flights for unarmed or lightly armed aircraft and 79 strike flights targeted against LOCs, truck parks, and staging areas in Laos.

Aircraft Losses

During May, two F-4Bs were lost as a result of direct enemy action. On the 15th, one was hit in the engine section by ground fire while on a close air support mission seven miles northwest of Danang. The crew ejected on final approach at Danang Air Base shortly after an explosion and fire occurred in the aft fuselage. The other F-4B was hit by AA fire while on an escort mission over Laos on the 27th and crashed near Quang Tri city.

Distribution of Marine Aircraft


There were no changes in 1st Wing unit locations and only minor variances in numbers of aircraft assigned during May. The chart on the following page indicates allotments and placement at end-May.

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MARINE AIRCRAFT BASED IN I CTZ : MAY 1970



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LOGISTICS

Throughout the month, III MAF logistic effort closely paralleled the general level of activity across Quang Nam province--steady and well-ordered. While Force Logistic Command, Division, and Wing combat support and combat service support elements continued operations bolstering Marine air and ground combat units, all organizations continued to identify materiel excesses and prepare them for in-country redistribution or retrograde on opportune amphibious shipping. Of particular note during May were the closing of the Naval Support Activity Hospital in Danang and the completion of an extensive land clearing operation in the vicinity of Barrier Island.

Medical Support

On the 15th, the Naval Support Activity (NSA) Hospital, Danang--the largest casualty hospital in Vietnam--closed its doors as a result of the continuing redeployment of US forces. Designed principally to provide medical services involving specialties not available in organic Marine medical units, the NSA Hospital possessed all the professional services of a general hospital plus a preventive medicine unit, Naval medical research unit, frozen blood bank, optical fabrication shop, armory (primarily storage for medevac weapons), helicopter landing point, and triage area. Responding to the build-up of Marine forces in I CTZ, construction of the hospital began in July 1965, and its opening followed on 10 January 1966, despite an enemy sapper attack in October 1965 which destroyed three receiving wards, the central sterilization hut, and x-ray and laboratory facilities. By July 1966, the hospital had expanded to its planned capacity of 400 beds, but was further increased by an additional 200 beds in 1968; in mid-1969, a temporary 100-bed expansion was authorized to handle a surge in malaria incidence. Peak utilization occurred during 1968 when 23,437 patients were admitted, over

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half of whom were treated for wounds or injuries requiring more than 23,000 major surgical procedures; more than 2,500 were admitted during the May 1968 enemy offensive alone. Notwithstanding a tremendously heavy workload and repeated attacks-by-fire resulting in hospital staff and equipment casualties, the NSA Hospital consistently provided medical services of the highest excellence which will long be remembered by the thousands of Americans, Koreans, and Vietnamese treated therein.

Following closure of the NSA Hospital, services beyond the capability of organic Marine medical units are being provided by the USS Sanctuary (AH-17) and the US Army 95th Medical Evacuation Company.

Land Clearing Operations

While air and ground forces continued to attrit North Vietnamese transborder resupply efforts, ARVN and US elements made steady progress in identifying and dismantling the communist support machinery within the Republic of Vietnam. Throughout the history of the Indochinese conflict, one of the enemy's principal assets has been his ever-expanding, underground network of tunnels and caves, the actual extent of which staggers western imagination. They not only provide dispersed concealment for arms and equipment close by targeted population centers, but also permit escape from decisive encounter with counter guerrilla forces. In the course of combat operations, supporting arms and combat engineers have been employed for piecemeal destruction of underground caches and tunnels which are generally a small portion of an extensive subterranean system; however, passage of time frequently brings a regeneration of these or similar installations. To date, the only permanent solution has been destruction of the entire network interlacing an area through massive land clearing operations.

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One unit specifically organized and tasked for land clearing is the Joint Land Clearing Company, comprised of two engineer platoons, one Marine and one US Army, headquartered by a Marine command element provided by the 9th Engineer Battalion. This unique organization counts 18 bulldozers and seven demolitionists among its assets and, in conditions of moderate weather and security, can clear two to three acres per day for each tractor employed. Due to earth collapse caused by the tractor's weight, a bulldozer operator can detect tunnels up to 24 inches beneath the surface. The majority of tunnels are dug approximately eight inches down under bamboo groves because of the high water table in many of the populated coastal areas. Through the use of standard blades and Rome plows (a blade specifically designed for timber clearance), tractors collapse, level, and fill the tunnels, bunkers, and trenches comprising these installations. Normally, demolitionists are used for ordnance destruction, but also can be employed to demolish cave and tunnel complexes beyond the capability of bulldozers.

Specific areas to be cleared are determined by the Vietnamese government, integrating the requirements for long-range security enhancement with due consideration for property rights. In planning, the commanders of the land clearing company, security force (usually a rifle company), and battalion having military cognizance of the area coordinate with local government officials, establish the particulars for local security and fire support, and determine projected logistic support requirements such as tractor maintenance and resupply of petroleum products, water, and explosives. A helicopterborne reconnaissance of the target area completes the initial preparations for the operation.

Following transportation by landing craft or flat-bed trucks to a staging area, the land clearing company and supporting security force move to a pre-selected site in the objective area to establish a base camp complex with landing zone, defensive berms, and cleared fields of fire, from whence clearing operations commence. Each quadrant of the surrounding territory--to a radius of approximately a mile and a half--is cleared in turn, with tractors operating in echelon where terrain permits; the constant rattle of detonating booby traps serves as sufficient discouragement for local curiosity, thereby simplifying the task of coordination with the populace. Although the se-


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curity force can usually suppress the occasional small arms, RPG, and mortar fires experienced, helicopterborne reinforcement is rapidly available should the enemy desire to strongly contest the operation. After the land surrounding the base camp is cleared, the camp is relocated, and the process is repeated until the entire area is completed.

On 25 May, the Joint Land Clearing Company concluded a ten-week operation in the vicinity of Barrier Island (shown on the map below) resulting in 10,700 acres of land cleared, 1,503 enemy bunkers destroyed, almost two and a half miles of enemy trench-line filled, and 802 items of ordnance destroyed. In the 12 months previous to this effort, 7th and 9th Engineer Battalion elements participated in ten separate operations, clearing over 34,000 acres of land and destroying or recovering more than 7,000 items of ordnance.

LAND CLEARING OPERATIONS: 19 MAR - 25 MAY 1970



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Ordnance

In May, consumption of 81mm mortar illumination ammunition and 2.75-inch white phosphorus aviation rockets rose; the resulting shortfall of illumination shells was offset by the arrival, on the 29th and 30th, of two ships from Sasebo and Subic Bay with over 46,000 additional rounds and by increased future CONUS/WestPac shipments. The heightened expenditure of white phosphorus rockets--used by observation aircraft to mark targets for attack aircraft and by armed helicopters for varied tasks--is being met by priority air shipment to Danang.

Aviation Logistics

The Maintenance Material Management (3M) System, a computerized management tool, enables aviation commanders at all levels to monitor and more effectively control aircraft maintenance efforts. Examples of the data which are immediately available to these commanders are current information on aircraft maintenance schedules, parts usage, manpower utilization, aircraft readiness, and flight hours. Included sub-systems permit expedited communications and movement of replacement parts between supply installations and maintenance areas, consequently reducing supply response time. During the month, provisions were completed for implementing an additional management tool--the Visual Information Display System (VIDS). Utilizing large display boards, VIDS depicts current status of aircraft or aircraft components requiring repair at organizational or intermediate levels and provides a positive means of controlling the repair cycle through a maintenance activity.

At end-month, the total 1st Marine Aircraft Wing assets, including those undergoing progressive aircraft rework (PAR) or battle damage repair (BDR), were as reflected on the following page.

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STATUS OF 1ST WING AIRCRAFT: MAY 1970

Aircraft Model	Total Assigned	PAR	BDR	Other	Total In-Country
A-4	26	4	1	0	21
TA-4	12	3	1	0	8
A-6	25	0	0	0	25
EA-6	11	0	0	0	11
F-4	60	14	3	0	43
RF-4	10	3	0	0	7
C-117	5	0	0	0	5
US-2	3	1	0	0	2
OV-10	19	0	1	0	18
AH-1	25	0	0	0	25
UH-1	40	5	0	0	35
CH-46	122	35	1	0	86
CH-53	20	0	1	0	19
TOTAL	378	65	8	0	305

NORS/NORM/OR

During May, 1st Wing operational readiness continued to improve in most categories, with notable upswings in CH-53, AH-1, and CH-46 readiness. The drop in A-4 readiness was primarily attributable to the temporary unavailability of replacements for the constant speed drive on the aircraft electrical generator.


The accompanying graphs display the NORS/NORM/OR (not operationally ready due to supply/maintenance and operationally ready) statistics for the major aircraft types presently assigned.

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
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NORS/NORM RATES - 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING


A-4 (ATTACK)




F-4(FIGHTER-ATTACK)




A-6A (ATTACK)




OV-10A (RECONNAISSANCE)




AN-16 (HELO)




UH-1E (HELO)



CH-46 (HELO)



CH-53 (HELO)



NORS — NORM — READY —

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
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STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. Enemy Order of Battle

ENEMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ AND THE DMZ: MAY 1970



PROVINCE	TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT/SUPPORT UNITS		GUERRILLAS	COMBAT BATTALIONS				SUPPORT BATTALIONS	
				INFANTRY		SAPPER		ROCKET/ ARTILLERY	OTHERS
	NVA	VC		NVA	VC	NVA	VC		
DMZ	8,300	0	0	3	0	1	0	6	10
QUANG TRI	11,100	1,200	850	13	0	3	0	4	1
THUA THIEN	10,500	400	700	15	1	4	0	2	0
QUANG NAM	5,200	2,300	3,900	11	1	2	2	2	12
QUANG TIN	3,200	3,000	1,800	3	6	1	3	2	12
QUANG NGAI	800	2,100	3,000	3	3	1	1	1	9
TOTALS	39,100	9,000	10,250	48	11	12	6	17	44

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2. III MAF STRENGTH

	<u>Off</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Danang	2,803	34,286		203	1,318	
Chu Lai	274	2,596		8	44	
Phu Bai	11	467		1	28	
Quang Tri	10	305		1	19	
Binh Son	3	238		-	14	
Total	3,101	37,892		213	1,423	

3. MARINE GROUND OPERATIONSa. Counter guerrilla Operations

	<u>May</u>	<u>1970</u>
Patrols	4,876	25,735
Ambushes	7,351	32,842
Sniper posts	834	3,463
Company maneuvers	227	1,333

b. Reconnaissance Operations

	<u>May</u>	<u>1970</u>
Patrols	1,019	5,107

c. Combined Action Force Operations

	<u>May</u>	<u>1970</u>
Patrols	8,842	36,700
Ambushes	6,088	29,083

4. ENEMY LOSSES

	<u>Killed</u>		<u>Captured</u>		<u>Weapons</u>	
	<u>May</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>1970</u>
Counter guerrilla	389	2,281	62	138	137	646
Reconnaissance	186	981	-	10	17	74
CAF	133	495	21	139	80	302
CUPP	34	129	4	24	5	43
Total	742	3,886	87	311	239	1,065

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5. MARINE AIR OPERATIONSa. Fixed Wing Operations

	<u>May</u>	<u>1970</u>
Total sorties	4,844	24,019
Tons of bombs	7,959	30,942
Rockets	4,518	15,920
Canisters of napalm	2,737	10,222
20mm and 7.62mm rounds	410,020	1,457,710

b. Helicopter Operations

Total sorties	35,288	154,206
Passengers carried	86,096	361,718
Tons of cargo carried	6,161	28,983

6. SUPPLY STATUSa. Class I-(Rations)

	<u>Rations</u>	<u>Days of Supply</u>
Combat Meals	105,000	2.3
B Rations	332,500	7.5
A Rations	377,900	8.2

b. Class II-(Clothing, Equipment, and Weapons)

	<u>FLC</u>	<u>3d FSR</u>
Requisitions processed	30,885	21,398
Requisition fill rate	46%	49%

c. Class III and III(A)-(Petroleum)

	<u>Danang</u>		<u>Quang Tri</u>		<u>An Hoa</u>	
	<u>1,000 Gals</u>	<u>Days Supply</u>	<u>1,000 Gals</u>	<u>Days Supply</u>	<u>1,000 Gals</u>	<u>Days Supply</u>
JP-4	-	-	277	2.2	19	2.4
MOGAS	104	13.0	-	-	-	-
Diesel	165	9.0	-	-	-	-

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a. <u>Air Shipments</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>
From CONUS	41
From other WestPac areas	155
Total	196
b. <u>Surface Shipments</u>	<u>Measurement Tons</u>
From CONUS	46,711
From other WestPac areas	10,914
Total	57,625

8. RESUPPLY WITHIN RVN

a. <u>Air Shipments</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>
Danang to Chu Lai	276
Other	101
Total	377
b. <u>Surface Shipments</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>
Danang to Chu Lai	5,133

9. RETROGRADE CARGO FROM RVN

a. <u>Air Shipments</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>
USMC	79
USAF	41
Total	120

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b. <u>Surface Shipments</u>	<u>Measurement Tons</u>
MSTS conventional ships	17,178
MSTS roll on/off ships	3,146
Fleet amphibious ships	2,043
Total	22,367

10. ENGINEER PROJECTS

	<u>Constructed/ Under construction</u>	<u>Repaired/ Under repair</u>	<u>Removed</u>
<u>Roads</u>	119.1 miles	-	-
<u>Bridges</u>			
Class-15	-	1	
Class-30	-	2	
Class-60	1	4	

11. MEDICAL AND DENTAL SERVICES

a. <u>Medical</u>	<u>Patients</u>
Battle injuries	288
Non-battle injuries	320
Disease cases	879
Admitted to III MAF facilities	1,507
Deaths in III MAF facilities	27
Evacuated out of RVN	318
Returned to duty	724
Hospitalized as of 31 May	529
b. <u>Dental</u>	<u>Procedures</u>
Operative, crown, and bridge	42,777
Prosthetics	1,411
Oral surgery	6,587
Preventive dentistry	14,564

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a. <u>Contributions</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>1970</u>
Supplies from military sources	\$17,400	\$108,235
Civil Affairs Psywar Fund	\$1,010	\$8,025
Voluntary contributions	\$4,475	\$26,465
b. <u>USMCR Civic Action Fund</u>		
Receipts	\$2,417	\$11,204
Expenditures	-	\$10,942
c. <u>General WALT Scholarship</u>		
Students supported	1,068	N/A
d. <u>MEDCAP/DENTCAP Treatments</u>		
Medical	59,236	341,568
Dental	667	3,130
e. <u>Individuals Trained</u>		
Health Workers	115	643
f. <u>Construction Projects</u>		
Schools, dispensaries, wells	55	154

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