

**CONFIDENTIAL**

017 765 #116

Declassified by the Director of Marine Corps  
History and Museums in accordance with the  
provisions of GNO ltr Op-9423323 Joy. Ser:  
10770 P962 of 12 October 1971.

Signature/Date *R.C. Jeffery* *3/1/77*

S.M. Spa, Waegre: Operations of U.S.  
Marine Forces, Vietnam

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING BY

**C9 FMF PAC**

\_\_\_\_\_

**DECLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

132

705142

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES  
VIETNAM  
JUNE 1970



116

FID

NO 17 765



FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

This is a summary of activities of US Marine Corps forces in Vietnam for the month of June 1970. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through May 1970.

0  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9

GROUP 2  
Exempted from automatic  
downgrading by CG FMFPAC

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

## CONTENTS

<b>SUMMARY</b> . . . . .	iii
COMBAT OPERATIONS . . . . .	1
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION. . . . .	16
AIR OPERATIONS. . . . .	29
LOGISTICS . . . . .	40
STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS. . . . .	48

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

## SUMMARY

Operations in Quang Nam Province continued in June much as they have during the first five months of 1970. There was no significantly heightened combat activity, although there was a weak surge of enemy shellings and ground probes early in the month which signalled the start of the final phase of the enemy Winter/Spring campaign. Planning and preparation were well underway for the next series of Marine unit redeployments, slated to begin in July, while III MAF elements continued to preempt enemy attempts to undermine pacification programs. In so doing Marine forces, including Combined Action Platoons, killed 602 enemy, took 72 prisoners, and captured 170 weapons.

Not included in the above figures are more than 75 enemy killed in a helicopter flame drop operation supporting Republic of Vietnam forces. This operation was the second of two during June which exemplified the inherent capability of a Marine aircraft wing to combine varied kinds of aircraft—fighter and attack jets, propeller driven observation planes, and four types of helicopters— with control elements to form just the right package for the mission at hand.

In the logistic field another milestone was reached as the Fleet Marine Force Pacific Rebuild Program ended. For more than four years this special program expedited repair and return of an array of heavy equipment essential for combat, thereby contributing to the efficacy of Marine forces. Continuing redeployments of Marine units terminated the requirement to continue the extra maintenance program.

Other signs of progress being made in Quang Nam are visible. A plan to resettle Go Noi Island came to fruition during the month as the first group of approximately 1,700 settlers moved in. Considering that the island has long been a center of enemy activity and the scene of much hard fighting, this major project, designed to exploit present enemy weakness in the area and strengthen GVN influence in the province, is indeed noteworthy. A rise in the population security rating for May also pointed

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

up pacification progress, as did the province elections. Large percentages of voters turned out in rural areas, as well as in Danang, to choose province-level officials for the first time since 1965. The voting took place without meaningful Viet Cong interference, as Marines and much improved ARVN and territorial forces provided adequate security.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~


UNCLASSIFIED

## COMBAT OPERATIONS

In June, III MAF increased emphasis on reconnaissance in force, ambush, and outpost activity to preempt a series of Front 4 highpoints expected as the final phase of the enemy Winter/Spring campaign. Marine ground and air forces reached out to interdict supply routes, assembly areas, and weapons sites and to counter enemy reconnaissance operations. Eleventh Marines artillery support, Division and Force reconnaissance deep-surveillance patrols, and 1st Wing air support aided the ARVN in lessening NVA/VC pressure around Thuong Duc.

The map below depicts the results of June operations and plots Marine infantry battalion locations at end-month.

## MARINE OPERATIONS: JUNE 1970



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Results of III MAF combat operations in Quang Nam through the first half of 1970 were substantial. Marines killed 3,760 NVA/VC, took 182 prisoners, and captured 832 weapons. These totals are somewhat less than during the same period last year, reflecting several factors. Perhaps most important is the fact that RVNAF units, now better equipped and more proficient, have taken on a larger share of the fighting. Almost as a corollary, Marine troop strength in the province has been reduced by some 8,300 men since June 1969. Additionally, Front 4 units during the past 18 months have paid a high price and have been forced to repair to base areas remote from the low-lands.

#### 11th Marines Support of ARVN Operations

Enemy pressure against Thuong Duc, manifested in limited ground attacks and frequent shellings, was eased during May, but continued into June. Among other support, III MAF rendered artillery fire throughout the month to ARVN operating near Thuong Duc. In addition to a platoon of 8-inch howitzers on Hill 52 (seven miles northwest of An Hoa) and a battery of 175mm guns at An Hoa which fired over 10,000 rounds for the Vietnamese, light artillery was displaced for brief periods on several occasions to give ARVN increased support and to surprise the enemy.

Hill 510, a relatively inaccessible peak five miles west-southwest of Thuong Duc and used occasionally as a radio relay site by 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, was selected as a firing position. From there, 4.2-inch mortars or 105mm howitzers could provide artillery fire for ARVN units and bring fire against rocket launching sites to the west of Thuong Duc in the Khe Con Valley. The hilltop had rudimentary earthworks remaining from earlier use as a fire support base (FSB) and accommodates up to six closely spaced 105s.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

At first light on 30 May, four 4.2-inch mortars and crews from 2d Battalion, 11th Marines were helilifted to Hill 510, immediately preceded by a reconnaissance team. The concept was to move the weapons in fast, surprise the enemy in locations thought to be safe from artillery fire, and move the pieces out before nightfall. The 4.2-inch mortars (as well as 105mm howitzers used later) with high-angle fire capability are ideal for attacking targets in mountainous terrain. Heavy ground fog effectively concealed the insert and helped achieve the desired surprise. Firing commenced at 1000 and continued throughout the day. At 1120, three 122mm rocket flashes were detected; immediately, the 4.2s went into action, expending 140 rounds, effectively neutralizing the launch site. By 1620, 530 rounds had been fired on 26 targets and the artillerymen returned to An Hoa.

A second similar operation was conducted on 2 June. This time, three 105mm howitzers from Battery E, 11th Marines, which could fire 4,800 yards deeper than heavy mortars, were used. The pieces and crews were helilifted from An Hoa to Hill 510 at 0720 and were ready to shoot at 0843. Throughout the day, 564 rounds were delivered on 38 targets, including an ammunition storage area hit with six rounds, causing a large secondary explosion. Also, an enemy soldier was killed during a mission against several VC in the open, and two rocket firing sites were cratered with direct hits. The artillery and cannoneers were extracted by 1500, shortly before foul weather closed in.

Other one and two-day operations, utilizing various mixes of artillery, were conducted during the month, like the one on 17-18 June. Then, two 4.2-inch mortars and two 105mm howitzers were emplaced and fired over 1,600 rounds against observed and intelligence targets.

#### Counter guerrilla Operations

The counter guerrilla effort during June by the 1st Marine Division consisted of small unit patrol and

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



UNCLASSIFIED

ambush tactics and short reconnaissance in force operations in the western Que Sons, northern Arizona area, and Elephant Valley. Pacifier patrols, helicopterborne elements which seek out and exploit targets of opportunity, caused the enemy to further restrict daylight activity. Division units also participated in a number of limited, pacification-oriented, coordinated operations (mainly cordon and search) with other forces.

Another upsurge of enemy activity, the final phase of his Winter/Spring campaign, was projected for June. However, except for a highpoint during the night of 3/4 June, no general, province-wide acceleration of action occurred. Weakness of the Spring offensive was as much a result of the enemy's poor preparation and inadequate logistic support as of Free World forces preemptive operations.

The graphs below compare counter guerrilla operations during June with monthly totals since July 1969.

### MARINE SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: JULY 1969 - JUNE 1970



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

-7th Marines Operations

The majority of III MAF ground action again was registered in southern Quang Nam (the Que Son mountains and northern Nui Loc Son basin), where 7th Marines elements made 191 contacts, generally with small NVA/VC units. The Regiment employed 1,211 patrols, 996 ambushes, and 222 company operations, with additional coverage provided by 292 scout/sniper team deployments. In all, June combat achieved 175 enemy killed and capture of 11 prisoners and 62 weapons.

On 26 May, the 3d Battalion launched an 18-day search and clear operation in the Que Sons. The unit vertically enveloped into zones four and seven miles southeast of An Hoa at 1100 and commenced a methodical search along a widespread trail network. Initially, these operations produced several caches and numerous limited contacts, prompting lift of 850 ARVN soldiers from the 1st Ranger Group to an area southwest of the Marines, where the Rangers participated in coordinated operations. The 3d Battalion maneuver ended on 12 June with a score of nine NVA/VC killed, four others taken prisoner, and 44 individual and three crew served weapons seized; more importantly, several base camps and caches (containing over two tons of food and medical supplies) were discovered.

Second Battalion elements developed moderate contact during a series of search operations five miles west-southwest of FSB Ross. On the 17th, a Company G patrol discovered a company-size camp with eight caves and three huts, defended by a small security force. An intense firefight ensued, during which eight VC were killed. A search of the camp before it was destroyed revealed a moderate amount of ordnance, equipment, and food. Five more VC were killed in skirmishes on the 28th and 29th, when elements of Companies G and E intercepted enemy patrols attempting to evade.

On the 22d, the Regiment started a program to keep one company in the Que Son mountains on a 5-day

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~


UNCLASSIFIED

rotational basis. Company I commenced the reconnaissance in force seven miles north-northwest of FSB Ross. Also, elements of Companies B, F, and M engaged the enemy in three widely-separated clashes on the 22d and 23d, during which enemy losses totaled nine killed, one VC taken prisoner, and four rifles, one pistol, and a number of intelligence-interest documents captured.

The 7th Marines, during the first six months of the year, have compiled a record which reflects many brief but often fierce fights in southern Quang Nam. A total of 1,146 contacts resulted in 1,166 NVA/VC killed, 44 captured, and 291 weapons seized.

The map below depicts the extent of 7th Marines operations during June.

### 7TH MARINES OPERATIONS: JUNE 1970



UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

-5th Marines Operations

Pacifier patrols continue to highlight 5th Marines combat; nevertheless, the Regiment reaped significant results from patrols, ambushes, and coordinated operations with Korean Marine, ARVN, and territorial force elements. All told, contact was made in 93 of the more than 4,400 operations conducted during June, accounting for 105 NVA/VC killed or captured.

Coordinated operations resulted in more than 45 enemy killed or captured during the month. During 9-12 June, Company I manned blocking positions southwest of Hill 55 in conjunction with a 2d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment operation. This four-day maneuver netted 21 enemy killed, nine prisoners, and five weapons. At dawn on the 14th, Regional and Popular Force troops teamed with 2d Battalion elements to effect a cordon around My Hiep hamlet, five miles north of An Hoa. During the next two days, the encircled area was systematically searched, while USMC interrogator/translator and counterintelligence teams screened 125 villagers, six of whom were identified as VC and 15 others as VC suspects. Additionally, two VC attempting to break from the cordon were killed, and eight weapons, miscellaneous ordnance, and 15 pounds of documents were confiscated.

Pacifier patrols (1st Battalion) provided much of the month's action--four made contact during the first week and accounted for 13 NVA/VC killed and nine VC suspects detained. At 0645 on the 8th, Company H, 5th Marines, supported by tanks and AH-1G helicopters, engaged an NVA platoon four miles northeast of An Hoa. Company B (Pacifier) helilifted to the area and assaulted through the enemy position, which yielded eight NVA killed and four prisoners. Capitalizing on Pacifier mobility, 1st Battalion elements made a three-day (19-21 June) drive to interdict infiltration through the Arizona area. Several significant actions resulted, with the entire effort bringing 24 enemy killed and 13 taken prisoner. The highlight, however,

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

was seizure of 260,000 piasters (\$1 US = 118 piasters) and 5,000 dollars in \$50 bills.

Action in An Hoa basin/Thuong Duc corridor/western Go Noi Island has been less this year than in the past. However, as the NVA/VC continued to value and use the area as a rice bowl and an avenue of approach to Danang, the 5th Marines have extracted a heavy toll. Since 1 January, the Regiment has tallied 918 enemy killed, 90 NVA and VC prisoners, and 263 weapons captured.

#### -1st Marines Operations

While 1st Marines conducted nearly 2,000 patrols and 2,600 ambushes during June, action remained sparse in the rocket-threat area landward of Danang--46 contacts were recorded, with 13 enemy killed and 18 weapons captured. The enemy losses are in line with past monthly totals and reflect effectiveness of the counterguerrilla/pacification campaign to destroy the enemy at a distance from populous areas, provide security, and promote revolutionary development. In pursuing these goals, the Regiment has imposed the following costs on the enemy since January: 335 killed, 15 captured, and 168 weapons seized.

On 1 June, another rocket attack meant for Danang was thwarted. A 2d Battalion outpost sighted three enemy in a clearing four miles south of Danang and directed artillery fire on them, causing six secondary explosions and a large fireball. A later search of the area disclosed a large crater and, nearby, two firing pits with improvised launchers aimed toward the city. No trace was found of the rocketeers.

On the 18th, 470 3d Battalion troops were lifted into four landing zones at the northern end of Elephant Valley, centered 13 miles west-northwest of Danang. Only sporadic contact was made as the operation assured there were no significant forces in

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

the corridor, and the troops moved eastward to the normal 3d Battalion operating area.

During a coordinated operation with 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment elements on 26 June, a Company H platoon, guarding the Cau Do bridge five miles north-northeast of Hill 55, engaged three grenade-throwing VC. Two were killed and the third taken prisoner.

### Reconnaissance Operations

III MAF reconnaissance units had a full month, completing over 1,100 short and long-range patrols during which enemy elements were engaged 75 times. Supporting arms fire and occasional small arms clashes claimed 189 NVA/VC during June, while the patrols sustained six wounded and evacuated.

Although Marine reconnaissance patrols are inserted into western Quang Nam to monitor enemy movement and collect data which may influence action in the 1st Marine Division operational area, intelligence concerning enemy positioned around Thuong Duc was also provided to Quang Da Special Zone Headquarters. Targets pinpointed were either attacked by artillery and air strikes or assaulted by 51st ARVN Regiment units. Important also in supporting the ARVN, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion trained soldiers of the 51st in reconnaissance techniques during the month.

There were a number of significant 1st Reconnaissance Battalion sightings and contacts during June. On the 4th, team DELICATESSEN observed three groups of enemy, totaling an estimated 100 NVA/VC, transiting the area five miles west-southwest of An Hoa. Subsequent artillery missions completely saturated the target area with fire; however, the distance between the team and the target precluded casualty assessment. Another noteworthy action took place on the 11th, when patrol SWIFT SCOUT engaged an element, possibly from the 187th Sapper Battalion.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



UNCLASSIFIED

ion, 19 miles northwest of Danang. Just after insertion, the patrol made head-on contact with an enemy squad in camouflaged uniforms; 13 NVA were killed, eight of them by helicopter machine gun fire during extraction.

The most significant clash occurred on the 14th. FLAKEY SNOW, a team reconnoitering a mountainous area five miles south of Antenna Valley, became temporarily pinned down by 12.7mm machine gun and rifle fire from a large force. Between aerial rocket runs by a supporting OV-10A, the enemy (in groups of two and three) rushed the patrol. However, the Marines held their own in the heated, close action--18 NVA were killed. The remaining enemy withdrew and FLAKEY SNOW was extracted without further incident.

The following graphs portray, by month, III MAF reconnaissance operations and results since January.

### RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS: JAN - JUN 1970



UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

Kit Carson Scout (KCS) Program

Kit Carson Scouts, former enemy soldiers who rallied to and now work for the GVN, continue to assist Marines in tactical as well as psychological operations. Their knowledge of the terrain, the people, the locations of enemy personnel and supply caches, and enemy tactics has been invaluable. These Scouts have often located concealed mines and other surprise-firing devices and given warning of impending ambushes--tasks at which they are uniquely adept. KCS also familiarized III MAF troops with enemy tactics; since March, Scout HONG has been demonstrating techniques he used when an NVA sapper, thereby enhancing Marine unit capability to thwart such attacks. Following the COUNTY FAIR concept developed by Marines early in the war, KCS also have continued to make aerial and ground loudspeaker broadcasts to villages in which they describe VC methods and intentions and recount benefits of various GVN programs.

The graphs below present KCS statistics established since January.

**KIT CARSON SCOUT PROGRAM: JAN - JUN 1970**

MONTH	STRENGTH	USMC PATROLS ACCOMPANIED	CLASSES CONDUCTED	PSYOPS BROADCASTS
JAN	101	1,023	13	18
FEB	108	845	13	22
MAR	109	623	8	15
APR	101	862	3	5
MAY	107	815	15	1
JUN	107	920	20	2

**KCS ACTIVITIES**

TOTALS	5,088	64	63	NVA/VC KILLED	POW/SUSPECTS APPREHENDED	WEAPONS CAPTURED	MINES/BOOBY TRAPS DETECTED	CAVES/TUNNELS DESTROYED	CACHES LOCATED
JAN				9	0/18	65	30	39	8
FEB				7	1/18	1	36	42	21
MAR				0	0/4	0	0	4	0
APR				2	0/2	0	16	8	2
MAY				3	11/3	2	15	23	7
JUN				7	24/26	9	65	64	1
TOTALS				28	36/71	77	162	180	40


**ENEMY LOSSES**

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Enemy Activity

The final stage of the Winter/Spring campaign, by Front 4 in Quang Nam and other Military Region 5 forces there and in Quang Tin, was forecast to commence on the night of 3/4 June. Although much less intense than the first phase highpoint of 31 March/1 April, the June increase took the same form--attacks-by-fire, sapper assaults, and ground probes. The upsurge, however, was short-lived, apparently because several enemy units were logistically unprepared and aggressive allied counteroffensive action preempted the efforts of others. Enemy activity declined as lunar illumination increased and was limited mainly to sapper, harassing, and terrorist incidents against RVNAF positions, civilian resettlement areas, and seats of GVN authority. During the month, the enemy managed to initiate 12 significant attacks--two ground and ten by indirect fire.



On 7 June, Thang Binh district headquarters and Go Thang refugee camp, both about three miles southeast of FSB Baldy, received indirect fire followed by estimated company-size sapper attacks. The RF, PF, and PSDF defenders repelled the attackers, killing 18 while sustaining four killed and 13 wounded. Two prisoners captured in the battle identified their unit as the 409th Sapper Battalion. They stated the 1st and 5th Companies attacked an outpost, the 2d and 3d Companies struck the headquarters and refugee camp, and the 4th and 6th Companies were in reserve.

Sapper units are organic to the NVA organization and enjoy equal status with the infantry and

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

artillery as a combat arm. They are manned by specially trained, highly motivated and disciplined assault troops. The upper-echelon of the NVA favor sapper attacks, since properly trained sappers obtain results far out of proportion to the size of the force involved.

Enlisted sappers are selected from regular infantry, artillery, and engineer units after completion of basic training. To qualify for selection, men must be in excellent physical condition, preferably have at least a fourth grade education, and believe adamantly in the communist cause. The individual sapper is a raider who relies upon secrecy, has a thorough knowledge of his objective and its avenues of approach, is familiar with techniques to overcome natural and man-made obstacles, and is an expert in the use of small arms and explosives.

III MAF and other Free World force units, with insight gained from former sappers (such as Kit Carson Scout HONG), have become more effective recently in countering sapper attacks. However, as manpower is a critical resource for the North Vietnamese, sapper attacks, along with mining and booby trapping, harassing fire, and terrorism, continue as mainstays of enemy tactics.

Terrorist activity was again heavily relied upon in the Quang Nam lowlands--33 incidents were registered during June. The target of one of the most extensive acts of terrorism in RVN since the TET 1968 offensive was Thanh My hamlet, situated near the Ba Ren bridge five miles southwest of Hoi An. Early on 11 June following a 200-round mortar shelling, two 189th Sapper Battalion companies assaulted the hamlet, shooting everyone in sight and lobbing grenades and satchel charges into bunkers where civilians had taken cover. The hamlet was 85 percent destroyed, and 74 civilians were killed and another 63 wounded in the attack.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

By end-June, Quang Nam enemy forces were avoiding contact, while evaluating the Winter/Spring campaign and preparing for further operations in the summer months. The Summer/Fall campaign reportedly will shift emphasis gradually toward a political/economic offensive. However, NVA/VC goals remain unchanged: (1) upset the Free World force defenses, (2) inflict maximum casualties, (3) promote revolution in populated areas, (4) disrupt pacification, (5) seize control of rural areas, and (6) expand the infrastructure and revolutionary organizations.

The map on the following page portrays locations of enemy units in Quang Nam at end-June.




UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

**UNCLASSIFIED**

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE  
QUANG NAM



★ Province capital

TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT/SUPPORT UNITS		ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT PERSONNEL	GUERRILLAS	TROOPS IN PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE UNITS
NVA	VC			
<b>7,800</b>	<b>1,800</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>3,900</b>	<b>500</b>

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

June activity was highlighted by commencement of the Go Noi Island resettlement project, a major stepping stone in Quang Nam's pacification program, and the conduct of the nationwide provincial and municipal council elections, held on the 28th. The tempo of CAP and CUPP operations was consistent with that of previous months, although seven Combined Action Platoons were disestablished and two more stood down in preparation for relocation. ARVN operations, focusing principally around Thuong Duc, resulted in 218 enemy killed, one taken prisoner, and 185 weapons captured throughout the month.


Go Noi Island Resettlement

For years, Go Noi Island has been the center of considerable effort by both Free World forces and NVA/VC. Persistent enemy attempts to isolate and control the island have been countered by US, ARVN, and ROKMC operations to return it to GVN dominion. Each time gains from allied operations have diminished as a determined enemy reinfiltrated to the underground hideouts interlacing the island. Go Noi is essential to the NVA/VC as it provides an ideal forward staging area for forces moving east through well-used avenues of approach such as Thuong Duc corridor, Charlie Ridge, the An Hoa basin, and Antenna Valley. It is a relatively secure refuge close by the major population centers of Quang Nam province and convenient for caching logistic stockpiles. In addition to the agricultural value of the island and surrounding territory, the accompanying map readily reveals another reason for the importance of Go Noi. It lies at the intersection of major lines of communication, athwart the north-south railway, within reach of National Route 1, and astride the major waterway linking the coal-rich An Hoa region to the densely populated coastal plain. Reestablishment of normalcy to the Go Noi area is essential if the railroad is to be rebuilt and the agricultural and industrial potential of the An Hoa basin is to be exploited.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

**GO NOI ISLAND RESETTLEMENT PROJECT**

In mid-1968, Operation ALLEN BROOK, accompanied by land clearing, destroyed large enemy forces and complexes in this region. However, gradual enemy resurgence followed redeployment of friendly forces to meet other tactical requirements. The next year, Operation PIPESTONE CANYON repeated the process as part of an ever-widening drive to force the NVA/VC out of the populated lowlands. This time, to prevent another rebirth of enemy influence on Go Noi, it was decided to resettle the island. To be

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

of lasting effect, such a program required that the established government (rather than the US) put it into effect and provide sufficient security for sustained growth. By the end of PIPESTONE CANYON, the province government was ready to start the long process.

In March of this year, Quang Nam officials announced their intention to resettle Go Noi, although planning for the project by US and Quang Nam agencies had begun long before. For example, sorting out land ownership, confused by long years of war and unrecorded population movement, required months of effort by the one provincial official at Hoi An (the province seat) who was familiar with the land records. In its final form, the plan called for the resettlement of 17,000 refugees--most, former residents--in three areas of the island. Bridges and roads to the mainland were to be established to ease commercial, political, and military access. Local defense was to be centered around a three-company RF group which would furnish internal security of the resettlement villages. A reinforced Combined Action Platoon (CAP), comprised of 22 Marines and one PF platoon, would conduct mobile security operations outside the village perimeters. Capitalizing on the natural richness of Go Noi's bottomland soil, the villagers, as their fathers before them, will make their livelihood from agriculture--with one distinct difference. Instead of traditional subsistence farming, cultivation of high cash-value truck crops will be emphasized. In addition to security for and supervision of the entire project, the GVN is providing cash allowances and construction material for settlers.

US and Korean Marine forces are contributing to the program, with 1st Marine Division serving as project coordinator for all US military assistance. This aid includes construction of access roads and bridges to the island, land clearing, construction of defensive berms and fortifications, preparation of village sites, plowing, excavation of approximately six miles of irrigation ditch, construction of dwellings, and provision of building materials.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



UNCLASSIFIED

During June, activity shifted from planning to execution; by the middle of the month, Marine engineers had begun work on the access road, and bulldozer operators had cleared over 120 acres of farmland near the first resettlement site (shown on the previous map). By the 19th, 106 families returned to their native soil, and work continued on access roads and fortifications. On 25 June, a road from Route 1 and a temporary pontoon bridge to Go Noi were completed, permitting insertion of heavier equipment for extensive land clearing. At the end of the month, Vietnamese, Korean, and US efforts were in full swing, promising early completion of the first resettlement village.

#### Elections

On the 28th, the Republic of Vietnam held local elections nationwide to select provincial and municipal councilmen, the first such since 1965. Village and hamlet elections were held in 1967, 1969, and again this year, but province council elections, originally planned for 1968, were postponed because of the TET offensive.

In Quang Nam province, the polls opened at 0700, and voting continued uninterrupted throughout the day. According to numerous intelligence reports, the enemy planned to use acts of terrorism and repression to disrupt the voting, despite possible attraction of international and local attention to elections which the communists had belittled. Election day did show an increased number of terrorist incidents, but predicted wide-scale activity failed to materialize, due largely to extensive measures by GVN and Free World forces to insure public safety at the polls as well as close surveillance of voting sites by National Police.

Their success is reflected in the election statistics; throughout Quang Nam province (exclusive of Danang), over 83 percent of all eligible voters

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED


cast ballots. In Danang, approximately 73 percent went to the polls. Both figures reflect a level of interest which compares quite favorably with voting in more established democracies.

An examination of the professional backgrounds of the candidates shows a wide cross section of experience, encompassing servicemen, farmers, teachers, businessmen, and government employees. As 80 percent of the incumbents were not reelected, no single professional group dominated the results.

The June elections have surfaced promising indicators for the future. First, the GVN demonstrated an increased ability to conduct meaningful elections with requisite security for widespread participation, and most important, increasing numbers of people are turning to the ballot box for redress of grievances.

#### Combined Action Force

During June, the Combined Action Force (CAF) continued organizational readjustments which focused on 1st Combined Action Group (CAG) units located in Quang Tin province. Two platoons were temporarily relocated on the 24th and 27th to 1st CAG headquarters in preparation for eventual movement to Quang Nam province as part of 2d CAG. On the 25th, five platoons and one company headquarters were deactivated, followed by two more platoons and an additional company headquarters on the 29th. At the end of the month, the CAF was comprised of four CAG's, 17 companies, and 103 platoons distributed throughout the five northern-most provinces as shown on the following map.




UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

# COMBINED ACTION FORCE: 30 JUNE 1970



CAG	CACO	CAP
4	17	103

PERSONNEL		
SEA	SEA	T/M
1,534	105	2,498/77

Since its inception, the Combined Action Program has been directed principally toward destruction of the source of guerrilla strength--logistic, political, and paramilitary support in rural communities. CAPs, while denying the Viet Cong freedom of action, represent the credible permanence of government authority and develop increasingly self-sufficient local military units. Thus, CAP Marines are engaged in

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

a process of perpetually working themselves out of a job. One of the tangible results of the program has been improved caliber of I CTZ territorial forces, generally recognized as the best in the Republic of Vietnam.

CAPs are essentially offensively oriented; they have initiated over two-thirds of all their contacts. Exemplifying this activity were events on the night of the 16th, when a CAP 3-5-1 element triggered an ambush against 20 VC two miles southeast of Phu Bai combat base. After a brief firefight, nine dead VC, seven assault rifles, one rocket grenade launcher, and assorted equipment and documents were discovered in the killing zone. In a similar action on the night of the 20th, CAP 2-4-3 ambushed a party of 14 VC one mile northeast of Hieu Nhon district headquarters (adjacent to Hoi An). The VC returned fire and pulled back, following which the CAP swept the ambush site, only to come under enemy fire. After a second brief exchange, the enemy fled, leaving behind six dead and a pack with miscellaneous medical supplies. One Marine and a PF were wounded during the contact.

On many occasions, CAP interaction has achieved excellent results. One such case started at dusk on the 26th, when a CAP 1-3-4 patrol directed artillery against six VC nine miles east-southeast of Chu Lai. The enemy scattered, and the patrol shifted fires onto probable routes of escape. A subsequent search of the area uncovered five VC killed. An hour and a half later and two miles to the southeast, a CAP 1-3-1 patrol picked up the sixth VC, who had suffered multiple fragment wounds. The following morning while operating with CAP 1-3-1, a CAP 1-3-3 patrol received small arms fire about three miles southeast of the previous day's initial contact and responded in kind while awaiting artillery fire. As the shells impacted, the enemy broke and fled. The patrol continued to advance and, 1,000 yards to the south, observed and engaged four armed VC, killing three.



The following graphs compare the month's CAF activities with those of the past year.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

**COMBINED ACTION ACTIVITIES: JULY 1969 - JUNE 1970****OPERATIONS CONDUCTED****ENEMY LOSSES**Combined Unit Pacification Program

During June, the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) continued operations in previously assigned villages populated by nearly 30,000 civilians. As with CAP units, stress is on developing a residual skill in the tandem territorial unit, and RF/PF operational initiative is encouraged. In view of predicted heightened enemy harassment of pacification projects, CUPP units increased emphasis on hamlet security, particularly patrolling and night ambushes.

The total number of CUPP contacts was down to 52 from 82 the previous month, despite forecasts of increased enemy activity. Nonetheless, some brisk actions were generated, the most notable of which took place on the 9th and 15th. In the first, a Company A, 7th Marines CUPP team observed ten VC at twilight, four miles northeast of FSB Ross, and immediately engaged them with organic weapons. A subsequent sweep revealed six VC killed, one AK-47, and miscellaneous documents, including a pay roster. The second action started at 0700 on the 15th, as two Company A, 7th Marines CUPP teams moving into blocking positions four miles southwest of FSB Baldy came under small arms and mortar fire. The CUPP

UNCLASSIFIED


~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

units returned fire and established communications with a helicopterborne 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Pacific patrol. Following several firing runs by armed helicopters, the enemy was observed fleeing to the east and the heliborne patrol was inserted. Later that morning while sweeping the contact area, the CUPP teams found six NVA killed, two assault rifles, two rocket grenade launchers, and assorted ammunition and field equipment. Total results of the morning action--involving the CUPP units, Pacific, and elements of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines--were ten NVA killed, one captured, and eight weapons seized.

The following graphs reflect CUPP results since December.

#### MARINE CUPP RESULTS: DECEMBER 1969 - JUNE 1970



#### Territorial Forces

During the month, Quang Nam territorial units conducted 260 operations, a large number of which were preparatory for the elections held on the 28th; combat results were 222 enemy killed, 86 captured, and 74 weapons seized.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

In addition to continued emphasis on coordinated operations and ambushes, Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF) units are training for a greater range of military tasks. One-week schools for RF and PF mine detector teams were conducted in June to prepare them for daily road sweep duties. On the 15th, Corps-wide training of PF artillery forward observers commenced, using collocated artillery units for instruction and practical application. Other schools directed toward improving the RF/PF capabilities included the 1st Marine Division two-week noncommissioned officer course (75 PF NCOs have graduated since the first of the year) and the 2d ROKMC Brigade NCO academy which, thus far, has graduated 189 RF squad leaders. Unit training also progresses; the 101st RF Battalion completed seven weeks of battalion-level training at the Dong Da Center on 14 June. Although the Battalion returned to Dien Ban, plans envision employment throughout the province as required.

#### Hoa Khanh Children's Hospital

Gradually developing from a small roadside dispensary begun in 1965, the 120-bed Hoa Khanh Children's Hospital was officially dedicated on 19 January 1969 and became the most important Force Logistic Command civic action project. It is generally considered to be the finest of its kind outside of Saigon. Sturdily constructed of brick and tile and incorporating two operating rooms, an emergency treatment room, an intensive care unit, x-ray and pharmaceutical sections, a nursery, wards, and ancillary facilities, the hospital was the product of countless hours of volunteer effort and approximately \$300,000 donated by servicemen and CONUS contributors. Its principal purposes are to provide medical care and treatment of Vietnamese children and to serve as a pediatrics training site for Vietnamese physicians and nurses. Eventually, control, operation, and maintenance of the hospital will shift to the Vietnamese; however, to provide interim man-

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED


agement in the face of continuing redeployments, operational and administrative control of the hospital was transferred to the World Relief Commission on 30 June. Force Logistic Command will continue to provide informal support.

### Chieu Hoi Returnees

One of the significant returns of the Chieu Hoi program has been information obtained, for the most part, from individuals eager to demonstrate their sincerity. The Hoi Chanhs, who are frequently well informed, often contribute specific data about enemy unit positions, locations of cached material, or plans for future operations. In many instances, information provided is general, but no less valuable.

During the month, 75 Vietnamese (26 VC guerrillas, three NVA, and 46 VC sympathizers) rallied in Quang Nam province, a decrease from last month. The following graph compares Chieu Hoi results this month with those of the past year.

**QUANG NAM CHIEU HOI RESULTS: JUN 69 - JUN 70**



UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET



UNCLASSIFIED

Pacification

Pacification progressed slowly in June despite enemy disruptive attempts, the most significant of which was the Thanh My massacre. Evidently realizing ploys to halt pacification and gain control over the populace through propaganda, proselytizing, and minor intimidation were unsuccessful, the enemy turned to major acts of terrorism. Two examples were the previously related 11 June attack on Thanh My hamlet--in which some 130 civilians were killed or wounded and over 300 homes were destroyed--and a 4 June attack on Hong An hamlet located seven miles south of Hoi An. In the latter, early morning mortar fire killed 22 inhabitants, wounded 14 more, and destroyed 33 homes. While information gleaned early in the month from enemy documents supported the conclusion that a campaign of large scale terrorism would ensue, the enemy now appears to recognize the wanton attack at Thanh My as a serious political blunder. According to prisoner statements, Viet Cong political cadre are claiming the attack was against the Ba Ren bridge, and civilians were unfortunately caught in the midst.

The map on the following page portrays the end-May pacification status for Quang Nam province, as reflected by 1970 Hamlet Evaluation System data.


UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

# QUANG NAM PACIFICATION STATUS

UNCLASSIFIED



## POPULATION STATISTICS

DISTRICT	SECURE	VC-CONTROL	NOT RATED	TOTAL
DANANG	391,963	0	0	391,963
HOA YANG	174,619	2,070	0	176,689
HIEU DUC	16,845	0	0	16,845
DIEN BAN	45,238	17,167	989	63,394
DAI LOC	43,493	2,663	0	46,156
THUONG DUC	12,611	1,109	24,002	37,722
DUC DUC	30,692	7,108	0	37,800
QUE SON	33,376	16,072	8,671	58,119
DUY XUYEN	35,293	9,503	0	44,796
HIEU NHON	81,920	11,982	0	99,902
QUANG NAM PROVINCE	866,050	9,660	30,002	973,386
PERCENTAGE	89%	1%	3%	100%

BASED ON END-MAY HES 70 DATA.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED


## AIR OPERATIONS

In June, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing tactical squadrons flew over 42,900 fixed wing and helicopter sorties in support of Free World operations. More than 740 of the sorties were out-of-country fixed wing strike and combat support flights, either for interdiction and surveillance in Laos or for reconnaissance and combat air patrols over the Gulf of Tonkin. In excess of 38,000 sorties were logged by the Wing's seven helicopter squadrons in transporting over 85,000 passengers and 7,800 tons of cargo.

During the month, as the Wing continued to helilift troops and provide armed helicopter support for Pacifier patrols, another new technique involving helicopters was developed. The tactic, large air strikes with bombs and barrels of napalm, employed virtually every type of rotary and fixed wing aircraft possessed by 1st Wing.

The following graphs compare fixed wing and helicopter sortie totals during June with those since July 1969.

## MARINE AIR OPERATIONS: JULY 1969 - JUNE 1970



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

### In Country Fixed Wing Operations

While the enemy refrained from committing forces to large-scale engagements in preference for small attacks against selected objectives, 1st Wing again increased missions to detect NVA/VC movements and locations. Three MAG-11 squadrons (H&MS-11, VM CJ-1, and VMO-2), tasked with surveillance as a primary mission, logged 731 photographic and visual reconnaissance (VR) flights. Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron-11 TA-4Fs, with two pilots in the tandem configured cockpits, ranged the AA-guarded border region of Laos and I CTZ, totaling 108 VR sorties.

In areas closer to friendly maneuver elements, VMO-2 OV-10A pilots, with aerial observers in the rear seat, flew 400 VR and 315 forward air controller (airborne) and artillery spotting missions. On the afternoon of 24 June, three visual reconnaissance flights by TA-4Fs and an OV-10A discovered substantial base camp activity in western Quang Nam province. One locale, believed to be a rest area for the 38th and 141st NVA Regiments and a transshipment point serviced by the 220th Transportation Regiment, evidenced well worn trails, neatly cultivated fields along the streams, numerous personnel huts, bunkers, and fighting holes. Additionally, a ten-foot tower with three long cables, apparently used for communications, was sighted.

Marine Air Groups-11 and 13 continued to supply essential fixed wing attack support, providing 2,497 strike missions. III MAF ground units received 1,345 fighter/attack sorties, 43 percent of all close, direct, and interdiction air support flown by the 1st Wing during June.

Several flights during the month illustrate results obtained from fixed wing employment. A single A-6A from MAG-11 struck an enemy position seven miles south of FSB Ryder on 15 June. An airborne Americal Division forward air controller (FAC) reported 17 bunkers and four structures destroyed by the aircraft.

UNCLASSIFIED


~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

The next day a Marine FAC, directing a strike five miles north-northwest of An Hoa, credited another A-6A with 13 secondary explosions. On the morning of 19 June, two F-4Bs were scrambled from the Chu Lai alert pad and headed for northern I CTZ to hit a newly discovered enemy logistic area. The final tally from the two-aircraft strike was 15 secondary explosions, eight fires, and a bunker razed. Two days later, preplanned F-4B sorties for the 101st Airborne Division struck a large fortified position and demolished 30 bunkers.

A resume of in-country fixed wing operations and ordnance delivered is illustrated on the following graphs.

### IN-COUNTRY FIXED WING SUPPORT BY MARINE AIRCRAFT JULY 1969 - JUNE 1970



### Helicopter Operations

During June, the total number of sorties flown by helicopter squadrons of Marine Air Group-16 substantially increased. The 38,109 sorties, the largest monthly total since September 1969, carried 85,499 passengers (a slight decrease from last month) and 7,826 tons of cargo, the highest volume since August 1969.

Following the normal operational pattern, CH-46Ds flew twice as many sorties (19,794) as any other USMC helicopter. The majority were logistic and combat troop lifts that carried over 43,400 passengers. Two of the largest

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

lifts were accomplished in mid-June: on the 16th, nine CH-46Ds landed 500 men of the 51st ARVN Regiment two and one-half miles west-southwest of Thuong Duc on Hill 551; and on the 18th, eight CH-46Ds inserted 470 troops of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines into four landing zones in the north end of Elephant Valley, 15 miles northwest of Danang.

Of the 10,794 sorties flown by UH-1E and AH-1G aircrews, 7,981 were armed helicopter missions used to escort other helicopters on such missions as combat troop assaults. Participating in a cordon and search operation in the vicinity of Football Island three miles north-northeast of An Hoa on 30 June, four AH-1Gs caught three boatloads of VC attempting to escape across the Thu Bon river. The Cobras took them under fire, killing 16 and destroying the boats.


Besides delivering 6,717 tons of cargo, HMH-463 (20 CH-53Ds) helilifted 38,500 passengers/troops. Since January, the CH-53D has been used increasingly to insert combat troops into landing zones--a practice which permits rapid troop build-up due to greater capacity and speed of the aircraft. One such mission landed 165 men of the 5th Marines into a blocking force position 11 miles west of Hoi An on 9 June; another, on 16 June, moved 950 ARVN Rangers into a landing zone southeast of Thuong Duc. Representative of the carrying capacity of the CH-53D Sea Stallion was 113,000 pounds of ammunition and supplies brought to 3d Battalion, 1st Marines in northern Elephant Valley by three CH-53Ds shortly after the troops landed by CH-46Ds. Also, four CH-53Ds delivered (under fire) 80,000 pounds of 105mm howitzer ammunition to 5th Special Forces and 51st ARVN elements at Thuong Duc.

The CH-53D was employed in its newest tactical role--dropping large quantities of napalm in 55-gallon drums on the enemy--three times during the month. A complete discussion of these operations follows the graphs on the next page, which compare 1st Wing helicopter operations during the past year.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

INCLASSIFIED



### -Flame Drop Operations

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, by virtue of the fact that it has a variety of organic rotary wing as well as fixed wing aircraft, has consistently demonstrated its unique ability to tailor a special package of aircraft with different capabilities to accomplish a particular mission. A concept (named Thrashlight), which envisioned using large numbers of different types of helicopter and fixed wing aircraft to deliver tons of mixed ordnance on an area, started to evolve on 31 May and 3 June. On those dates, relatively small quantities of 55-gallon drums of napalm were dropped from CH-53D helicopters to support Korean Marines southwest of Danang. The barrels, as expected, burst on the ground spreading napalm in every direction. The mixture was then ignited by aerial rockets. As these flights confirmed feasibility of the helicopter napalm drop technique, the concept was expanded to include conjunctive use of fixed wing aircraft to deliver high explosive ordnance, armed helicopters to protect the napalm carriers, search and rescue helicopters, and command and control aircraft. Timing and control of such a package was recognized

INCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

as a complex problem--one, however, that was solved through the Wing's close intersquadron working relationships and centralized control of all participating rotary and fixed wing aircraft.

An opportunity to try this new technique presented itself when intelligence reports indicated that a major enemy headquarters, the command post of Front 4, had moved from Base Area 112 to a position in western Quang Nam province, some 35 miles southwest of Danang. The new enemy camp was located in a mountainous area with deep ravines and canyons covered with dense, triple canopy jungle. Since the location of the area and prevailing tactical considerations precluded a ground assault against the headquarters, 1st Wing proposed to attack the target with a.... concentrated Marine air strike of helicopter-dropped napalm augmented by 1,000 and 2,000-pound, delayed fuze bombs delivered by high performance attack aircraft. ....

The plan, executed at 0600 on 7 June, employed eight 12-plane CH-53D flights, with 20 55-gallon barrels of napalm in two standard cargo nets slung under each helicopter. Each flight consisted of four waves of three aircraft, spaced ten minutes apart and escorted by two AH-1G's. Dropping the napalm from 1,500 to 2,000 feet above the terrain ensured penetration of the jungle canopy, bursting of the barrels, and spreading of the mixture. The napalm was ignited on the ground by white phosphorus and high explosive 2.75-inch rockets fired by an OV-10A or AH-1G. Sections of F-4Bs and A-6As carrying heavy, delayed fuze bombs struck the target before the napalm drops and then again between waves. In addition to the OV-10A FAC(A), a CH-46D for search and rescue and a UH-1E for command and control stayed on station near the strike zone during the eight-hour operation. Total sorties logged in the operation were 99 CH-53D, 60 AH-1G, five CH-46D, six UH-1E, 14 A-6A, 20 F-4B, nine OV-10A, and three RF-4B.

Post-strike photography by the RF-4Bs revealed bunkers caved in and numerous trails uncovered. One intelligence report indicated that the Front 4 Commander was forced to displace again. More specific bomb damage assessment (BDA) was precluded due to terrain, jungle canopy, and infeasibility of search by ground elements.

With the lessons learned and the knowledge that such a large, coordinated air effort could be highly successful,

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

1st Wing prepared a similar strike package for Quang Da Special Zone Headquarters. The operation was designed to facilitate ongoing 51st ARVN Regiment maneuver to relieve Thuong Duc from enemy pressure and diminish the enemy anti-aircraft capability which imperiled Wing aircraft resupplying forces in that area. Helicopters of the 1st Wing had encountered daily rocket and mortar fire on resupply missions to Thuong Duc and ARVN ground elements.

The ground scheme of maneuver called for 51st Regiment elements to move quickly from Hill 551 to the target area of a B-52 strike scheduled for 15 June. The avenue of approach into the target area was a narrow ridgeline controlled by the enemy. Approximately 1,900 yards of ridgeline, with deep bunkers dug just below the crest, was designated as the target for the Marine rotary and fixed wing strike. The B-52 strike went on schedule, but the flame drop operation was postponed one day due to heavy cloud cover.

From the outset of the drop at 0615 until 0900, three flights of CH-53Ds, interspersed with F-4Bs and A-6As, worked over the target to within 400 yards of friendly units. Starting at 0900, fixed wing aircraft with 77 napalm canisters and 20mm guns attacked within the 400-yard distance for a half hour. Again, OV-10A, AH-1G, UH-1E, and CH-46D planes were in the area to provide their respective services. As an added feature, a section of A-4Es carrying Rockeye II bombs (canisters that open at a preselected time after drop and disperse armor-piercing bomblets over a target area) were on station continuously to suppress expected AA fire. The ARVN battalion moved as scheduled at 0930, with the Thrashlight strikes continuing to the immediate northwest. At the same time, CH-46Ds lifted a second 500-man ARVN battalion to Hill 551. Originally scheduled to continue until 1300, the operation was terminated at 1130 in order to provide helicopters for another ARVN lift into a landing zone six miles east, where a second B-52 strike was targeted. An operation recap shows flights by 72 CH-53Ds, 25 CH-46Ds, 12 A-6As, 24 F-4Bs, 12 A-4Es, plus continuous coverage by OV-10As, AH-1Gs, and UH-1Es.

The Thrashlight cleared the way for the ARVN to move some 3,700 yards toward the objective in one day, unopposed except for occasional sniper fire. Enemy losses


UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

to the air operation were some 70 NVA/VC killed on or near the ridgeline and seven 12.7mm AA sites destroyed.

The successful flame drop package developed by 1st Wing and executed on 16 June is depicted in the following representation.

### THRASHLIGHT OPERATION: 16 JUNE 1970



### Out-of-Country Operations

During June, fixed wing aircrews of Marine Air Groups-11 and 13 flew 741 strike and combat support missions over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and the Gulf of Tonkin. Four of the strike missions seeded a fording point in Cambodia with MK-36 Destructor bombs (500-pounders detonated by magnetic influence or time fuzes) and 234 interdicted supply lines through Laos.


Two A-6A squadrons in MAG-11 flew 212 night sorties over Laos. During these missions, aircrews detected and dropped munitions on 79 moving and 547 stationary targets.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Single aircraft are scheduled for each Laotian armed reconnaissance mission and are assigned a specific

#### MARINE OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIR OPERATIONS



road network to search with its radar. In some instances, an F-4B armed escort is provided to detect and suppress antiaircraft fire directed at the A-6A. Flying behind and above the A-6A, the F-4B crew pinpoints AA weapons firing at the A-6A and attacks the weapon positions with Zuni rockets and Rockeye II dispensers. In addition to the expected benefits accruing from this tactic--destruction of AA guns and protection for the strike aircraft--a more subtle, but no less desirable gain has resulted. The enemy, fearful of giving away his position to the F-4Bs, has often forborne from shooting at the A-6A.

VMCJ-1 aircrews flew 73 percent of their 213 electronic warfare (EW) missions in support of intelligence operations targeted against North Vietnam, while they also logged 41 photographic flights over Laos to document bomb damage assessment and film potential targets. All but one of the 156 EA-6A flights in support of NVN operations were flown off-shore over the Gulf of Tonkin, because the sophisticated electronic systems of the aircraft enable it to complete its mission offset at a distance to avoid exposure to enemy missiles or AA fire.

Normally scheduled for five flights a day, TA-4Fs of H&MS-11 flew 148 sorties over the area of Laos adjacent to I CTZ. The mission has a dual role--continuing visual reconnaissance of the Ho Chi Minh Trail network and controlling fixed wing on preplanned strikes or against targets of opportunity. Generally, one of the daily missions is scheduled for in-flight refueling from a Marine KC-130F tanker to extend time available for area reconnaissance.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

MAG-13 aircrews had registered 22 sorties before ceasing F-4B combat strike operations in the Steel Tiger region of Laos on 16 June. Monsoon weather in the region, in-country attack requirements, and pending redeployments were the main reasons for discontinuing flights. Nevertheless, Marine F-4B armed escort flights over Laos for TA-4Fs, RF-4Bs, and A-6As continued, as F-4B crews logged 55 missions during the month. Taking advantage of its air-to-air weapons system, the versatile F-4B reverted to its fighter mode to fly barrier combat air patrols (BARCAP) for extended periods during four days. The 46 Marine F-4B BARCAPs and 12 associated KC-130F tanker missions provided relief for Navy units which normally give airborne protection to ships and special mission aircraft in the northern Gulf of Tonkin.

#### Aircraft Losses

Four 1st Wing aircraft were destroyed as a result of direct enemy action during June. Two CH-46Ds were lost while making emergency extractions of reconnaissance teams; the first overturned and burned upon detonating a mine in the landing zone and the other crashed and burned after taking heavy automatic weapons fire while hovering for extraction. Both an A-4E and F-4B were hit and downed on 7 June while delivering ordnance for close air support.

#### Distribution of Marine Aircraft

Although planning for increment four redeployments was in full swing, no actual changes were made in 1st Wing unit locations during the month. The following chart details the distribution of aircraft assigned at end-June.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

## MARINE AIRCRAFT BASED IN I CTZ : JUNE 1970

DANANG	CHU LAI	MARBLE MOUNTAIN (CON'T)
<b>1ST WING</b>	<b>MAG-13</b>	
H&MS-17	H&MS-13	HML-367
C-117D 3	C-117D 1	AH-1G 25
US-2A/B 3	VMA-311	HMM-161
	A-4E 25	CH-46D 27
<b>MAG-11</b>	VMFA-115	HMM-262
H&MS-11	F-4B 22	CH-46D 28
C-117D 1	VMFA-122	HMM-263
TA-4F 12	F-4B 18	CH-46D 32
VMCJ-1	VMFA-314	HMM-364
RF-4B 10	F-4B 17	CH-46D 33
EA-6A 11	<b>TOTAL 83</b>	HMH-463
VMA(AW)-225	<b>MARBLE MOUNTAIN</b>	CH-53D 20
A-6A 14	<b>MAG-16</b>	<b>TOTAL 205</b>
VMA(AW)-242	H&MS-16	
A-6A 12	CH-46D 1	<b>TOTAL USMC AIRCRAFT</b>
VMO-2	HML-167	<b>FIXED WING 168</b>
OV-10A 19	UH-1E 39	<b>HELICOPTER 205</b>
<b>TOTAL 85</b>		

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

## LOGISTICS

On 3 June, the President announced the fourth redeployment since July of last year; by mid-October, 50,000 troops will be removed from the Republic of Vietnam. The Marine Corps share of this shift, code named KEYSTONE ROBIN ALFA, numbers over 18,000 and includes an infantry regiment, an artillery battalion, four aircraft squadrons, and several support units. While planning incremental stand down, staging, and embarkation for redeployment to commence 9 July, III MAF logisticians continued uninterrupted support of Marines in I CTZ, redistribution and/or retrograde of materiel excesses, and reconstitution of mount-out and mount-out augmentation stocks. Additionally, the progressive reduction of Marine forces in-country has permitted a scaling down of the extensive maintenance support effort, to include termination of the highly successful Fleet Marine Force Pacific Rebuild Program on 30 June.

Mount-out/Mount-out Augmentation

As a force in readiness, Marine units have long been prepared to deploy on short notice, carrying enough supplies to last 60 days. These supplies, divided into two blocks called mount-out (first 30 days) and mount-out augmentation, were brought to Vietnam by combat and service units during the 1965/1966 buildup. As intended, they were used while III MAF rapidly developed the in-country support capability for continued operations ashore. As Marine units redeploy and resume their roles as ready expeditionary forces, it is necessary to reconstitute mount-out (MO) and mount-out augmentation (MOA). Toward this end, a program now in progress was planned in December 1968; its goals are threefold. First, reestablishment of unit logistic readiness had to be accomplished without impeding redeployment progress. Second, maximum use of excesses in the supply pipeline (resulting from units leaving RVN) was to be made in building MO/MOA. Third, to facilitate management of the program and to relieve combat units of the task, automatic data processing was to be used to compute and list MO/MOA for each unit, either as a single entity or as part of a task organization. Rebuilding of MO/MOA stocks began with the start of KEYSTONE EAGLE in July 1969 and con-

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

tinued throughout CARDINAL and BLUEJAY. Reconstitution of MO/MOA achieved thus far from excesses (generated by the first three increments) has provided approximately one-third of the MO/MOA required by redeployed forces. The program's full potential will be realized as successive redeployment increments allow release of large amounts of Force Logistic Command (FLC) and 3d Force Service Regiment (FSR) operating stocks.

### Engineer Operations

In addition to routinely provided close combat engineer support such as mine and booby trap detection and removal, field fortification improvement, and demolitions work, Marine engineers participated with Seabees in two road construction projects shown on the accompanying map: Upgrading of Route 4 between Dien Ban and Thuong Duc continues; however, unseasonable rains have hindered progress, retarding completion by approximately two weeks. A new project, that of upgrading nearly 20 miles of Route 1, was begun during the month and when completed, will enhance the all-weather trafficability of this major artery.

### **LOC IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS: JUNE 1970**



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Within the city of Danang, a Seabee project was begun to resurface nearly 12 miles of road essential for continuous logistic and redeployment traffic between port facilities and outlying installations. Completion is expected during August. Also, construction of bridge access to Go Noi Island was started which, when finished, will enhance security and economic opportunities for the new resettlement project discussed in the Revolutionary Development and Pacification chapter.

### Maintenance

In keeping with the general reduction of US military effort in Vietnam, the FMFPac Rebuild Program terminated on the 30th, after four years of service to WestPac Marines. Originally conceived in 1966 as an adjunct to the Replacement and Evacuation (R and E) Program, the Rebuild Program encompassed rebuild/rehabilitation for ground materiel, including certain Navy-provided aviation ground support items known as Section M equipment. A major objective of the program was to reduce the average 60-day time loss for retrograde and return of combat-essential items. To accomplish this, 3d FSR on Okinawa was tasked with 5th echelon maintenance (repair of materiel requiring major overhaul or complete rebuild of parts, subassemblies, or the end item) as well as overflow 3d and 4th echelon maintenance from FLC. In addition to its own facilities, 3d FSR expanded its capability through support agreements which garnered, among others, the resources of Yokosuka Public Works Center, augmented by subcontracts with local civilian contractors. In execution of its function as program manager, 3d FSR performed the following tasks.

- Maintained data of repair and work load capabilities of those facilities providing maintenance support to WestPac units.

- Designated the facility to which an item was shipped for repair/rebuild.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~




~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

-Arranged for shipment of all items to and from the repair facilities.

-Determined the repairability of all items in accordance with stated criteria.

In the following diagram, the external arrows represent Replacement and Evacuation Program flow, while the internal arrows depict the Rebuild Program cycle.

### MAINTENANCE PROGRAM SUPPORTING III MAF



These two complementary programs were meshed with the in-country maintenance effort to achieve a balance of endeavor throughout the system. Items were retrograded when parts were unavailable or repairs could not be accomplished within a specified period. Thus, end items were to remain at FLC for only 30 days and at FSR for 90 days. However, an extension at either location was granted in cases where required parts would become available to allow completion within 30 days. As a result, a maintenance flow cycle was established whereby items would be washed

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

out of the WestPac inventory if repair parts were unavailable, following which a demand for new or replacement end items was levied on the supply system.

Equipment rebuild was programmed on a fiscal year schedule; however, provisions were incorporated for induction of critical items into the cycle at any time. Selection of new items for inclusion was based on three considerations.


-The item represented a critical shortage in RVN and/or had a high failure rate.

-The item could be rebuilt within 90 days.

-Timely replacement of the item was not expected.

Although the project was initially directed toward the rebuild of tactical generators, it was expanded to include artillery pieces, tractors, floodlights, forklifts, trucks, trailers, cranes, and other combat-essential items. The extent of the Rebuild Program since its inception is shown below. Additional benefits accrued were substantial savings in transportation and repair costs.

### REBUILD SUMMARY: JULY 1966-JUNE 1970



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**Ordnance

While ground munition stocks remained generally at levels prescribed to meet operational requirements, a shortfall of 175mm gun high explosive projectiles resulted from delays in production, sharply increased III MAF expenditures, and suspension of three ammunition lots due to malfunctions. To control existing assets more closely, the available supply rate (a planning factor) for 175mm projectiles was reduced from 20 to 16 rounds per gun per day. Additionally, over 2,500 projectiles were shipped from off-shore facilities, and future increased shipments were programmed to alleviate the shortage.

Excepting Rockeye II bombs, MK-82 500-pound bombs, and linked 40mm high explosive ammunition, in-country aviation munition assets continued to exceed the required 45-day stockage level. Electric fuzes for bombs, 20mm ammunition, 2.75-inch rockets (unscarfed), and Sidewinder missiles in excess of present requirements were retrograded during the month, since there has been little or no recent usage of these commodities.

Aviation Logistics

During June, 1st Wing aircraft assets were as shown on the following page. Additionally, aircraft involved in progressive aircraft rework (PAR) or damage repair during the period are reflected.

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

## STATUS OF 1ST WING AIRCRAFT: JUNE 1970

Aircraft Model	Total Assigned	PAR	Damage Repair	Other	Total In-Country
A-4	25	4	0	0	21
TA-4	12	3	1	0	8
A-6	26	0	0	0	26
EA-6	11	0	0	0	11
F-4	57	14	5	0	38
RF-4	10	2	0	0	8
C-117	5	0	1	0	4
US-2	3	1	0	0	2
OV-10	19	0	1	0	18
AH-1	25	0	0	0	25
UH-1	39	5	1	0	33
CH-46	121	34	2	0	85
CH-53	20	0	0	0	20
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>373</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>299</b>

NORS/NORM/OR

Since cracks in the main rotor head castings were suspected, each CH-53D aircraft assigned to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was grounded for a period of about two days. All aircraft were inspected with negative results and returned to operational status.

A-6A and EA-6A operations were restricted to flights of less than 450 knots and 3Gs pending completion of an inspection for wing cracks, which was brought about by wing failure on a Navy A-6A. However, flights of operational necessity have not been limited by this restriction.

The NORS/NORM and OR (not operationally ready due supply/maintenance and operationally ready) data for selected in-country Marine aircraft are depicted on the following page.

UNCLASSIFIED


SECRET

~~SECRET~~


UNCLASSIFIED

# NORS/NORM RATES - 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING


A-4 (ATTACK)




F-4(FIGHTER-ATTACK)




A-6A (ATTACK)




OV-10A (RECONNAISSANCE)




AH-1G (HELO)




UH-1E (HELO)



CH-46 (HELO)



CH-53 (HELO)



NORS — NORM — READY —

UNCLASSIFIED


~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

# STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS

## 1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

### ENEMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ AND THE DMZ: JUNE 1970



PROVINCE	TROOPS IN CONFIRMED COMBAT/SUPPORT UNITS		GUERRILLAS	COMBAT BATTALIONS				SUPPORT BATTALIONS	
				INFANTRY		SUPPORT		ROCKET/ARTILLERY	OTHERS
	NVA	VC		NVA	VC	NVA	VC		
DMZ	7,700	0	0	4	0	1	0	6	8
QUANG TRI	14,200	1,200	1,000	17	0	4	0	1	2
THUA THIEN	10,500	300	700	15	1	4	0	5	1
QUANG NAM	7,800	1,800	3,900	10	2	2	2	2	12
QUANG TIN	5,900	3,000	1,800	3	5	2	2	2	10
QUANG NGAI	2,800	2,100	3,100	3	3	1	1	1	9
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>58,900</b>	<b>8,400</b>	<b>10,500</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>42</b>

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

2. III MAF STRENGTH

	<u>Off</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Danang	2,650	33,156		198	1,450	
Chu Lai	262	2,267		8	32	
Phu Bai	11	407		1	36	
Quang Tri	9	283		1	17	
Binh Son	3	260		-	16	
Total	2,935	36,373		208	1,551	

3. MARINE GROUND OPERATIONSa. Counter guerrilla Operations

	<u>June</u>	<u>1970</u>
Patrols	5,022	30,757
Ambushes	6,697	39,589
Sniper posts	1,002	4,465
Company maneuvers	259	1,592

b. Reconnaissance Operations

	<u>June</u>	<u>1970</u>
Patrols	1,131	6,288

c. Combined Action Force Operations

	<u>June</u>	<u>1970</u>
Patrols	7,386	44,086
Ambushes	5,724	34,807

4. ENEMY LOSSES

	<u>Killed</u>		<u>Captured</u>		<u>Weapons</u>	
	<u>June</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>1970</u>
Counter guerrilla	309	2,590	44	182	104	750
Reconnaissance	189	1,170	-	10	8	82
CAF	83	578	22	161	49	351
CUPP	21	150	6	30	9	52
Total	602	4,488	72	383	170	1,235

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

5. MARINE AIR OPERATIONSa. Fixed Wing Operations

	<u>June</u>	<u>1970</u>
Sorties	4,832	28,851
Tons of bombs	6,456	37,398
Rockets	6,065	21,985
Canisters of napalm	1,884	12,106
20mm and 7.62mm rounds	348,774	1,806,484

b. Helicopter Operations

Sorties	38,109	192,315
Passengers carried	85,499	447,217
Tons of cargo carried	7,826	34,809

6. SUPPLY STATUSa. Class I-(Rations)

	<u>Rations</u>	<u>Days of Supply</u>
Combat Meals	71,300	1.5
B Rations	328,700	7.0
A Rations	161,500	3.4

b. Class II-(Clothing, Equipment, and Weapons)

	<u>FLC</u>	<u>3d FSR</u>
Requisitions processed	39,115	38,157
Requisition fill rate	54%	54%

c. Class III and III(A)-(Petroleum)

	<u>Danang</u>		<u>Chu Lai</u>		<u>An Hoa/Baldy</u>	
	<u>1,000 Gals</u>	<u>Days Supply</u>	<u>1,000 Gals</u>	<u>Days Supply</u>	<u>1,000 Gals</u>	<u>Days Supply</u>
JP-4	193	2.1	312	2.2	103	3.6
MOGAS	90	11.0	-	-	-	-
Diesel	154	10.0	-	-	-	-

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

7. RESUPPLY TO RVN

a. <u>Air Shipments</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>
From CONUS	36
From other WestPac areas	97
Total	133
b. <u>Surface Shipments</u>	<u>Measurement Tons</u>
From CONUS	6,017
From other WestPac areas	12,227
Total	18,244

8. RESUPPLY WITHIN RVN

a. <u>Air Shipments</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>
Danang to Chu Lai	144
Other	106
Total	250
b. <u>Surface Shipments</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>
Danang to Chu Lai	6

9. RETROGRADE CARGO FROM RVN

a. <u>Air Shipments</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>
USMC	59
USAF	117
Total	176

UNCLASSIFIED  
SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

b. <u>Surface Shipments</u>	<u>Measurement Tons</u>
MSTS conventional ships	6,793
MSTS roll on/off ships	-
Fleet amphibious ships	13,617
Total	20,410

10. ENGINEER PROJECTS

	<u>Constructed/ Under construction</u>	<u>Repaired/ Under repair</u>	<u>Removed</u>
<u>Roads</u>	-	48.6 miles	-
<u>Bridges</u>			
Class-15	-	-	-
Class-30	2	2	-
Class-60	-	1	-

11. MEDICAL AND DENTAL SERVICES

a. <u>Medical</u>	<u>Patients</u>
Battle injuries	193
Non-battle injuries	144
Disease cases	399
Admitted to III MAF facilities	736
Deaths in III MAF facilities	20
Evacuated out of RVN	185
Returned to duty	395
Hospitalized as of 30 June	146
b. <u>Dental</u>	<u>Procedures</u>
Operative, crown, and bridge	42,000
Prosthetics	1,400
Oral surgery	6,500
Preventive dentistry	14,500

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

12. CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

a. <u>Contributions</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>1970</u>
Supplies from military sources	\$29,362	\$137,597
Civil Affairs Psywar Fund	\$1,656	\$9,681
Voluntary contributions	\$1,430	\$27,895
b. <u>MEDCAP/DENTCAP Treatments</u>		
Medical	66,504	408,072
Dental	1,063	4,193

0  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~