

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRETHEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (55111)
NAVMC HQ 335a (REV. 7-81)

T8082	FMFPAC SPECAT EXCL IN & OUT JUN-DEC70	MPAC	01	0
DOC. CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	FILE NUMBER	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.
				CY NO. DD MO DA YR DATE

ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing

OPERATION CODE

X - ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET	G - INFORMATION
A - APPROPRIATE ACTION	H - RETURN TO HOSR-3
B - GUIDANCE	I - INITIAL
C - SIGNATURE	J - DISPOSITION
D - COMMENT	K - DECISION
E - RECOMMENDATION	L - RETENTION
F - CONCURRENCE	O - (OTHER)

DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
(COMPLETED BY ACTION OR ROUTING OFFICER AS APPROPRIATE) RETENTION PERIOD ESTABLISHED BY ROUTING OFFICER AS

MONTHS

INDEFINITE (Historical Value)

UNTIL SUPERSEDED

PERMANENTLY (Record Material)

UNTIL OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AS DETERMINED ON ANNUAL REVIEW

REQUEST ACTION OFFICER ADVISE RETENTION ABOVE

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER ESTABLISHING DISPOSITION

K. J. Good *L Cpl*

SECTION

HOSR-3

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ALL PERSONS WHO HANDLE THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT,
SIGN AND DATE IN NUMERICAL ORDER BELOW.

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
1		11	
2		12	
3		13	
4		14	
5		15	
6		16	
7		17	
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10		20	

REMARKS (Entries to be signed and dated. For lengthy comments attach separate page and indicate "Bucktag Comment Attached." Do not assign separate Control Number to Bucktag Comments.)

RECLASSIFIED BY THE DIRECTOR OF
MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF CMC DIR SUR (6030.44) 20200905 OF
22 Feb 1979

B. Brinkley Signature Date **1/14/92**

15 SEP 1988

RETURN TO HOSR-3

UPON COMPLETION OF ROUTING

DO NOT DETACH - THIS FORM IS A PERMANENT PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH
IT IS ATTACHEDMATERIAL
ATTACHED IS**TOP SECRET**

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC: SPECAT EXCLUSIVES, IN & OUT
JUN - DEC 1970

79. CG FMFPAC 012215Z Jun 70 (TS) Gp-4
For MGEN WILSON info BGen JOHNSON from LTGEN BUSE
MARINE F4 TACTICAL DEPLOYMENTS

80. CG III MAF 080530Z Jun 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN BUSE from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING

81. MCBASESPAC 102119Z Jun 70 (S) Gp-4
For BGEN BARROW, MGEN WILSON from BGEN HOUGHTON
REVERSION OF OKINAWA

82. CG FMFPAC 152146Z Jun 70 (S) Gp-4
For ADM HYLAND from LTGEN BUSE
BASE REDUCTIONS

83. CINCPACFLT 190612Z Jun 70 (S) Gp-4
For VADM AURNAD and BRINGLE, RADMS COMBS, BIRD ...LTGEN BUSE, RADMS...from HYLAND
BASE REDUCTIONS

84. CINCPACFLT 031954Z Jul 70 (TS) Gp-4
For ADM MCCAIN info LTGEN JONES and VADM WIESNER from HYLAND
RELOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS III MAF

85. CG III MAF 040216Z Jul 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
I CORPS SUMMER CAMPAIGN PLAN

86. CG FMFPAC 071801Z Jul 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MGEN ARMSTRONG, MGEN WIDDECKE, MGEN WILSON and BGEN
PADAIINO from LTGEN JONES
FORCE PLANNING

87. CG FMFPAC 080143Z Jul 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LtGEN MCCUTCHEON from LTGEN JONES
FORCE PLANNING

88. CG III MAF 090221Z Jul 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING

89. CG III MAF 120347Z Jul 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FCRCE PLANNING

90. CG III MAF 161123Z Jul 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
REQUEST FOR MARINE CORPS ADVISORS

78082

91. CG FMFPAC 162208Z Jul 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN MCCUTCHEON from LTGEN JONES
REQUEST FOR MARINE CORPS ADVISORS
92. CG III MAF 210545Z Jul 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FLOAT/SOLID ANCHOR ATSB
93. CG FIRST MARDIV 220101Z Jul 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES and LTGEN MCCUTCHEON from MAJGEN WIDDECKE
PERSONNEL STRENGTH
94. CG FMFPAC 220228Z Jul 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN MCCUTCHEON from LTGEN JONES
FORCE PLANNING
95. CG III MAF 222356Z Jul 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES info MGEN ARMSTRONG, MGEN WIDDECKE, MGEN WILSON and BGEN
PADALINO
FORCE PLANNING
96. CG I MEF 240255Z Jul 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES info BGEN JOHNSON from MAJGEN WILSON
IWAKUNI FACILITIES
97. DEPCBM MCBASESPAC(FWD) 250047Z Jul 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from BGEN BARROW info MAJGEN WILSON
[DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE FUTURE OF MILITARY ON OKINAWA AT A SPECIAL AREA
JOINT COMMANDER MEETING ON 24 Jul]
98. CG FMFPAC 280245Z Jul 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN MCCUTCHEON from LTGEN JONES
[FORCE PLANNING]
99. CG III MAF 010827Z Aug 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING - 3D MAB
100. CG FIRST MARDIV 030950Z Aug 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES info LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
[FORCE PLANNING/PERSONNEL STRENGTH]
101. CG FMFPAC 032049Z Aug 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN MCCUTCHEON info MGEN ARMSTRONG, MGEN WIDDECKE, MGEN WILSON, BGEN
DWYER and BGEN PADALINO from LTGEN JONES
FORCE PLANNING
102. ADMIN FMFPAC 050236Z Sep 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN MCCUTCHEON from MGEN ADAMS
[Quote of text of COMNAVFORV 011730Z Sep 70]

103. CG III MAF 170522Z Sep 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR CCN AND CCC
104. CG III MAF 180502Z Sep 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR OPERATION TAILWIND
105. CG FMFPAC 250332Z Sep 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN MCCUTCHEON from LTGEN JONES
FORCE PLANNING
106. CG FMFPAC 252305Z Sep 70 (TS) Gp-4
For MGEN WILSON from LTGEN JONES
FORCE PLANNING
107. CG III MAF 271409Z Sep 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
SEPTEMBER WIEU
108. CG I MAF 291310Z Sep 70 (S) Gp-3
For LTGEN JONES from MAJGEN WILSON
[Quote of SPECAT EXCLUSIVE from ADM WEISNER 260128Z Sep 70]
109. CG I MAF 291315Z Sep 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from MAJGEN WILSON
PROPOSED SEVENTHFLT PHIBFOR
110. ADMIN FMFPAC 300406Z Sep 70 (TS) Gp-4
For MAJGEN WILSON from BGEN HOUGHTON
[Quote of ADMIN CINCPACFLT 300011Z Sep 70 to COMSEVENTHFLT]
111. CG FMFPAC 010520Z Oct 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from MAJGEN WILSON
PROPOSED SEVENTH FLT PHIBFOR
112. CG III MAF 010813Z Oct 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING
113. COMSEVENTHFLT 221124Z Oct 70 (S) Gp-4
For Adm HYLAND info LTGEN JONES from WEISNER
REORGANIZATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE TO FOUR SQUADRONS
114. CG III MAF 021344Z Oct 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES info GEN CHAPMAN from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
TRANSFER OF EXCESS FACILITIES
115. ADMIN FMFPAC 032219Z Oct 70 (S) Gp-4
For BGEN CONLEY from MAJGEN ADAMS
TEXT OF ADMIN FMFPAC 030346Z Oct 70 SPECAT for LTGEN MCCUTCHEON. "COMMAND
AND STAFF STRUCTURE IN SEASIA"

116. CG FMFPAC 092348Z Oct 70 (TS) Gp-4
For MGEN WILSON from LTGEN JONES
PROPOSED HQ III MAF T/O
117. CG FMFPAC 111953Z Oct 70 (S) Gp-4
For ADM HYLAND from LTGEN JONES
PROPOSED COMPHIBPAC REORGANIZATION
118. CG I MAF 120616Z Oct 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES from MAJGEN WILSON
FORCE PLANNING
119. CG FMFPAC 220005Z Oct 70 (S) Gp-4
For MAJGEN WILSON from BGEN HOUGHTON
PHIBRON REORGANIZATION
120. CG FMFPAC 230248Z Oct 70 (TS) Gp-4
For MGEN OWENS, MGEN WILSON, BGEN HOFFMAN, BGEN CONLEY, BGEN DWYER, BGEN
ARMSTRONG, info LTGEN MCCUTCHEON from LTGEN JONES
FORCE PLANNING
121. CG FMFPAC 312321Z Oct 70 (TS) Gp-4
For BGEN MILLER from BGEN HOUGHTON
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
TEXT of CINCPAC 310303Z Oct 70, "SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING "
122. CG FMFPAC 022017Z Nov 70 (S) Gp-4
For LTGEN MCCUTCHEON from LTGEN JONES
VMCJ EMPLOYMENT
123. CG FMFPAC 042243Z Nov 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN MCCUTCHEON from LTGEN JONES
TEXT of CINCPAC 030402Z Nov 70, "SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING"
124. CG III MAF 091405Z Nov 70 (TS) Gp-1
For LTGEN JONES from LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
VMCJ EMPLOYMENT
125. COMSEVENTHFLT 210106Z Nov 70 (S) Gp-3
For VADM WEISNER info ADM HYLAND, VADM RICHARDSON, MGEN WILSON and
RADM RUBEL from BAUMBERGER - 181030Z Nov]
For LTGEN JONES from WEISNER
AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES
126. COMSEVENTHFLT 220748Z Nov 70 (S) Gp-3
For ADM BAUMBERGER info ADM HYLAND, LTGEN JONES, MGEN WILSON and RADM
RUBEL from WEISNER
TAIWAN EXERCISES

127. COMNAVFORJAPAN 240141Z Nov 70 (S) Gp-3
For VADM WEISNER, info ADM HYLAND, LTGEN JONES and MAJGEN WILSON from
RADM BURKE
FUJI TRAINING AREA

128. COMUSTDC 271255Z Nov 70 (S) Gp-3
For VADM WEISNER, info ADM HYLAND, LTGEN JONES, MGEN WILSON and RUBEL
from BAUMBERGER
U/GRC COMBINED EXERCISES

129. CG FMFPAC 282219Z Nov 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MGEN WILSON from LTGEN JONES
SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

130. CG FMFPAC 292122Z Nov 70 (S) Gp-3
For MAJGEN WILSON, BGEN CONLEY, info LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MAJGEN ARMSTRONG
from LTGEN JONES
VMCJ EMPLOYMENT

131. CG FMFPAC 020335Z Dec 70 (S) Gp-4
For GEN CHAPMAN, info MGEN WILSON, COL ROEDER from LTGEN JONES
MO/MOA FOR I MAF

132. CG I MAF 080532Z Dec 70 (S) Gp-1
For LTGEN JONES from MGEN WILSON
US/GRC COMBINED EXERCISE

133. CG FIRST MAW 151210Z Dec 70 (TS) Gp-4
For LTGEN JONES info MGEN WIDDECKE from MGEN ARMSTRONG
FORCE PLANNING

134. CG FMFPAC 162215Z Dec 70 (TS) Gp-3
For MGEN ARMSTRONG from LTGEN JONES
SIXTH REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT

135. CG FMFPAC 182031Z Dec 70 (TS) Gp-3
For MAJGEN ARMSTRONG from LTGEN JONES
SIXTH REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT

136. CG FMFPAC 220115Z Dec 70 (TS) Gp-4
For MGEN ARMSTRONG info MGEN OWENS, MGEN WIDDECKE, MGEN WILSON and BGEN
DWYER from LTGEN JONES
FORCE PLANNING

137. ADMIN CINCPAC 231904Z Dec 70/Sends SECSTATE WASHDC 180155Z Dec 70 (S) Gp-~~not~~
BASE REALIGNMENT: HOUSING

138. ADMIN CINCPAC 231905Z Dec 70/Sends SECSTATE WASHDC 050107Z Dec 70 (S) Gp-~~not~~
BASE REALIGNMENTS

STAFF SECTIONS NOT

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE FOR

DRAFTED: LEBLANC

TYPED: RLP

TOD: 2 JUN 70 100507

DRAFTED G-3

30 MAY 70

SECT OPS

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PHONE 89532

CONCURRED

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TOP SECRET MCEO

2. (TS) ALTHOUGH SOME ADVANTAGES COULD ACCRUE BY SENDING AIRCRAFT TO KOREA, I CONSIDER THIS TASKING, ON THE WHOLE, TO BE UNDESIRABLE. FIRST, AND CONSIDERING CINCPAC'S STATED GOAL OF DEMONSTRATING U.S. RESOLVE TO THE ROK AND NORTH KOREA, THIS DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES ACCEPTANCE OF AIR FORCE MISSIONS, I.E., AIR DEFENSE AND ROK SUPPORT. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THESE DEPLOYMENTS FURTHER FRAGMENT THE MAF CONCEPT OF COLLOCATING AIR AND GROUND ELEMENTS. ~~WHICH IS OUR GOAL~~ OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE IS THE FACT THAT THE POSITIONING OF MARINE FORCES IN KOREA, OPCON TO THE AIR FORCE, WOULD DEGRADE THE RESPONSIVENESS OF MARINE AIR TO MEET THE CURRENT CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS OF I MEF.

3. (TS) HOWEVER, SINCE BY REFERENCE (B), COMSEVENTHFLT HAS BEEN TASKED TO DEVELOP A PLAN, I SUGGEST THAT YOUR RESPONSE TO COMSEVENTHFLT IDENTIFY THE PREVIOUSLY NOTED OBJECTIONS AND INCLUDE A SUPPORTING PLAN WHICH WILL PROVIDE YOU THE GREATEST FLEXIBILITY IN MEETING THESE INFREQUENT, SHORT DURATION DEPLOYMENTS AND WHICH WILL MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS ON OPERATIONAL READINESS OF DEPLOYING UNITS AS IS THE

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← DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM OF 18 CHARACTERS PER LINE →
TOP SECRET **MArINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

TOP SECRET MCEO

CASE IN SUPPORTING THE MISAWA STRIP ALERT. WITH
THIS IN MIND, YOUR PLAN SHOULD IDENTIFY ALL FORESEEN
SHORTFALLS, E.G., FACILITIES, SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, FINANCIAL
REQUIREMENT, ETC., ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORTING A KOREA DEPLOYMENT.

ADDITIONALLY, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE F-4 DEPLOYMENTS
TO KOREA WOULD PRECLUDE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISAWA
STRIP ALERT BY 1ST MAW (REAR): IF THIS BE TRUE, IT
SHOULD BE POINTED OUT IN YOUR PLAN WHICH IS TO BE
SUBMITTED TO COMSEVENTHFLT. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

IN
THIS
SPACE

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MArINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES **TOP SECRET** MCEO

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ZNY AAAAA

P 080530Z JUN 70
FM CG III MAF
TO RU44HFMA/CG FMFPAC

COPY 1A OF 2 COPIES
8 JUN 70 0705Z
000137

Fr CG
CC HAS BEEN

DCG	✓
Dep C/6	✓
G-1	✓ COPY ✓
G-2	
G-3	✓ COPY ✓
G-4	✓ COPY ✓
G-5	
Compt	✓ COPY ✓
Cmd. Ctr	

3

BT
TOP SECRET/SPECIAI/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE

O 070752Z ZYH ZFF-6 ZFF-3
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON
TO GEN BROWN CMDR 7AF TAN SON NHUT
LTG MILDREN CDG USARV LONG BINH
VADM KING COMNAVFORV SAIGON
LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG
INFO LTG COLLINS CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
LTG DAVISON CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH
LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG
MGG MCCOWN CG DMAC CAN THO

ZEM

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE MAC 7702 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. (TS) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDELINES AND ESTABLISHES
INITIAL PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF 50,000
US SPACES FROM RVN BY 15 OCT 1970 ON WHICH DATE THE MACV
SPACE CEILING WILL BE 84,000.

2. (TS) MAJOR COMBAT UNITS TO BE REDEPLOYED AND COMPONENT
SPACE REDUCTIONS ARE TENTATIVELY ESTABLISHED AS FOLLOWS:

THOUSAND SPACES

USA	2 BDE, PLUS CBT SPT AND CBT SVC SPT UNITS	17.4
USN	SPT AND NAVY W/MARINES	10.1
USAF	ELEMENTS	2.7
USMC	1 RLT W/AIR & SPT	19.8
TOTAL		50.0

CG III MAF

P 080530Z JUN 70

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

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OFFICER, ART 0610 SECURITY MANUAL

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3. (TS) GUIDELINES.

A. THIS PLANNING SHOULD BE HANDLED ON A CLOSE HOLD BASIS WITHOUT NOTIFICATION IN ANY MANNER TO THE UNITS TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED. FINAL DECISION REGARDING THE SPECIFIC COMPOSITION OF THIS INCREMENT IS NOT PLANNED UNTIL PUBLICATION OF A REVISED APPENDIX I TO ANNEX A, MACV OPLAN 183, ON OR ABOUT 30 JUNE.

B. COMBAT UNITS ARE TO REMAIN OPERATIONAL AS LATE IN THE PERIOD AS PERMITTED BY ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, STANDDOWN DATES SHOULD BE BASED ON A MAXIMUM LOGISTICAL EFFORT AND ESTABLISHED BY BACKWARD PLANNING FROM 15 OCTOBER.

C. SPECIFIC PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE INCLUDED IN APPENDIX I TO ANNEX A, MACV OPLAN 183. THE GENERAL POLICY IS, HOWEVER, THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF COMBAT UNIT REDEPLOYMENTS WILL BE MADE ROUTINELY BY MACV ON STANDDOWN. NORMAL MACV STRENGTH REPORTING WILL REFLECT DRAWDOWN FROM REDEPLOYMENT OF OTHER UNITS.

4. (TS) BASED ON THE FORCE PACKAGE OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 2, COMPONENT COMMANDERS ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE DETAILED TROOP LISTS TO REACH THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT COB 13 JUN 1970. INFORMATION REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TROOP LIST SUBMISSION IS:

A. UIC; FRN; UNIT; AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: LOCATION AND FUNCTION (COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT, OR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT). AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT CURRENTLY REFLECTED IN PROGRAM 9. INDICATE BY ASTERISK NEXT TO STRENGTH FIGURES INSTANCES WHERE THOSE FIGURES REPRESENT A DRAWDOWN IN AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF A UNIT REMAINING IN COUNTRY.

B. PROPOSED STANDDOWN DATE FOR EACH MAJOR COMBAT UNIT, E.G., BRIGADE, RLT, TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS, AVIATION COMPANIES AND SEPARATE ARTILLERY BATTALIONS.

C. STATEMENT OF IMPACT.

5. (U) DIRECT COORDINATION BETWEEN COMPONENT AND FIELDCOMMANDERS IS AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED. WHERE APPROPRIATE, FIELD COMMANDERS PROVIDE STATEMENTS OF IMPACT TO COMPONENT COMMANDERS ADDRESSED FOR INFORMATION TO THIS HEADQUARTERS. GP-4
 SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
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WARM REGARDS. GP-4

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MGEN WILSON FROM BGEN HOUGHTON. //N00000//

N REVERSION OF OKINAWA (u) N

T A. CINCPAC 030305Z/JUN70 (S) (PASEP) T

T B. AMEBASSY TOKYO 050150Z/JUN70 (S) (PASEP) T

T Y 1. (S) REF A REQUESTS THAT PLANNING BE INITIATED TO P E DETERMINE RELOCATION AND REVERSION RELATED COSTS AND P E REFERS TO A CINCPAC STUDY WHICH IS TO SERVE AS A P E GUIDELINE (NOTE: A COPY OF THIS STUDY HAS BEEN FOR- P E WARED BY MAIL ON 10JUN70 UNDER REG NUMBER 6070). P E

T H 2. (S) THIS CINCPAC STUDY HAS NOT IDENTIFIED ANY P E MARINE CORPS FACILITIES OR PROPERTY AS BEING DIRECTLY P E INVOLVED IN THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA AND THE ACCOMMO- P E TION OF JSDF UNITS THERE. HOWEVER, AS INDICATED IN P E REF B, THE "HORSE-TRADING" WITH THE GOJ FOR OKINAWA P E BASES IS NOT COMPLETED. FURTHER, WHILE NOT SPECIALLY P E IDENTIFIED IN THE CINCPAC STUDY, A REQUIREMENT FOR P E PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES. P E

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← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

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THE USE OF U.S. ARMY AND/OR MARINE RANGES AND TRAINING AREAS HAS BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE JSDF.

3. (S) ACCORDINGLY, WE CANNOT RELAX OUR VIGILANCE IN PROTECTING MARINE CORPS INTERESTS ON OKINAWA AND, IN FACT, MAY SUBSEQUENTLY BE REQUIRED TO GIVE UP SPACE ON OKINAWA TO THE JSDF OR TO SHARE MARINE FACILITIES WITH THE JSDF ON A JOINT-OCCUPANCY BASIS.

4. (S) WITH REGARD TO THE \$200 MILLION CREDIT INDICATED IN REF A, THERE ARE CERTAIN STRINGS ATTACHED. FIRST, REPAYMENT BY THE GOJ WILL ^{be} IN THE FORM OF GOODS AND SERVICES PROVIDED IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA. SECOND, SUCH REPAYMENT IS NOT ADDITION TO THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET, AND WHEN REPAYMENT IS MADE, THE DEFENSE BUDGET WILL BE REDUCED BY A LIKE AMOUNT.

5. (S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MSG IS TO BRING YOU UP-TO-DATE ON EVENTS RELATED TO OKINAWA REVERSION, TO ALERT YOU THAT WE MAY BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ACCOMMODATING THE JSDF ON OKINAWA, AND TO INFORM YOU THAT WE WILL BE REQUIRED TO IDENTIFY COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH REVERSION. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS POINTED OUT THAT ALL COSTS, NO MATTER HOW REMOTE, THAT CAN BE RELATED TO REVERSION MUST BE IDENTIFIED. THIS INCLUDES ITEMS SUCH AS RELOCATION COSTS, CONSTRUCTION COSTS, AND INCREASED OPERATING COSTS.

WARM REGARD PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
GP-4

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//NO0000//

BASE REDUCTIONS (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 272221Z/MAY70 (S)

1. (S) REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS REGARDING A PLAN FOR BASE REDUCTIONS AND RELATED UNIT MOVEMENTS AS A RESULT OF ANTICIPATED FISCAL CONSTRAINTS.

2. (U) MAG-36 IS CURRENTLY MAINTAINING A HELICOPTER DETACHMENT CONSISTING OF THREE CH-46 HELICOPTERS AT NAS ATSUGI IN SUPPORT OF MARINES TRAINING AT CAMP FUJI. SUBSEQUENT TO FOURTH REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT, AS SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE AND ON-GOING CAMP IMPROVEMENTS ARE COMPLETE, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS AND OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE MEDEVAC, ARTILLERY SPOT

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D AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR MARINES AT CAMP FUJI. IT IS
O ENVISIONED THAT THIS REQUIREMENT WILL INVOLVE CON-
N TINUOUS BASING OF THREE CH-46 AIRCRAFT WITH OCCASIONAL
O BASING OF SIX CH-46, THREE CH-53 AND FOUR OV-10
T AIRCRAFT TO SUPPORT SCHEDULED FIRE AND MANEUVER
N TRAINING.

D 3. (C) CAMP FUJI CANNOT ACCOMMODATE MARINE AIRCRAFT
O UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS. EXPEDIENCIES ARE BEING
N ~~INVESTIGATED~~ ~~SHeltering~~
T ~~INSTITUTED~~ TO ALLOW ~~HANGARING~~ OF AT LEAST TWO CH-46
E AIRCRAFT AT FUJI TO INSURE A RESPONSIVE MEDEVAC
I CAPABILITY. THE BALANCE OF THOSE AIRCRAFT REQUIRED
N IN SUPPORT OF TRAINING, HOWEVER, MUST BE BASED
F ELSEWHERE.

T 4. (S) IT WAS PLANNED THAT THE INCREASED NUMBER OF
H AIRCRAFT COULD BE SUPPORTED PRIMARILY FROM NAS ATSUGI
I WITH THE OPERATIONALLY READY AIRCRAFT FLYING TO CAMP
S FUJI ON A DAILY BASIS FOR OPERATIONS. THE LOSS OF
N NAS ATSUGI WILL IMPACT ON THE AIR SUPPORT FOR MARINES
S AT CAMP FUJI UNLESS BASING FOR THE MAG-36 DETACHMENT
A CAN BE FOUND.

C 5. (S) ACCORDINGLY, IT IS REQUESTED THAT RELOCATION
P PLANS IN CONNECTION WITH ATSUGI BASE CLOSURE
A INCLUDE BASING FOR A MAG-36 DETACHMENT CONSISTING OF
C PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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APPROXIMATELY 6 CH-46, 3 CH-53 AND 4 OV-10 AIRCRAFT
TO SUPPORT CAMP FUJI TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. WARM

REGARDS.

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PAGE TWO RUHHBRA5498 S E C R E T NOFORN S PECAT EXCLUSIVE
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM S AURAND AND BRINGLE, RADM COMBS, BIRD
 SMITH, MUSE, FAIRFAX, AND COX, INFO VADM KIDD, WEISNER, KING, AND
 SMITH AND TYREE, LTGEN BUSE, RADM SMALL, PLATE, PUGH, GROVERMAN,
 STEELE AND DAVIS FROM HYLAND
 BASE REDUCTIONS (U)

A. MY 272221Z MAY 70 NOTAL

1. (SNF) I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT RESPONSES TO
 REFERENCE (A) I HAVE RECEIVED FROM ALL OF YOU. I ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR
 INPUTS ARE RECEIVING OUR EQUALLY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO FURTHER
 DEVELOP OUR BASE REDUCTION PLANNING CONCEPT. ADMIRAL CLAREY HAS
 APPROVED OUR CONCEPT IN ORDER THAT OUR PLANNING CAN PROCEED IN PARA-

CINCPACFLT

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LLEL WITH THE CNO STUDY ON WORLDWIDE BASE REDUCTIONS BEING CONDUCTED BY NAVINSGEN. IN ADDITION, HE POINTED OUT THAT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT CHANGES, MODIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONS TO OUR CONCEPTUAL PLAN MAY BE NECESSARY AS A RESULT OF DECISIONS WHICH MUST BE MADE REGARDING THE SHAPE OF THE NAVY'S SHORE ESTABLISHMENT WORLDWIDE. AFTER CNO REVIEW OF THE NAVINSGEN STUDY REPORT DUE 30 SEP 70 WE CAN EXPECT GUIDANCE REGARDING ANY ADJUSTMENTS NECESSARY IN OUR PLANNING CONCEPT. I WILL KEEP YOU ALL INFORMED ON ALL RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR.
2. (SNF) NAVINSGEN INFORMALLY HAS ADVISED US THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT SOME LEAKS HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED CONCERNING CURRENT BASE REDUCTION STUDY AND PLANNING EFFORTS. I WISH TO RE-EMPHASIZE THE

PAGE THREE RUHHBRA5498 S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
POINT MADE IN REFERENCE (A) THAT ALTHOUGH BASE REDUCTION PLANNING
MUST GO AHEAD, IT IS A VERY SENSITIVE SUBJECT AND OBVIOUSLY MUST BE
KEPT ON A CLOSE-HOLD AND STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. SO FAR I BELIEVE
THAT OUR SKIRTS ARE CLEAN.

3. (U) BEST REGARDS

GP-4

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FOR ADM MCCAIN INFO LTGEN JONES AND VADM WIESNER
FROM HYLAND

RELOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS III MAF (U)

1. (TS) JUST PRIOR TO HIS RETIREMENT BILL BUSE PROPOSED RELOCATING HQ III MAF FROM VIETNAM TO OKINAWA, RETAINING THE THREE STAR BILLET, RATHER THAN INACTIVATE THE HEADQUARTERS WHEN MARINE FORCES IN VIETNAM ARE REDUCED TO MAB LEVEL AS THE RESULT OF PHASE V REDEPLOYMENTS. UPON RELOCATION TO OKINAWA KEITH MCCUTCHEON WOULD ASSUME ADDITIONAL DUTIES AS CTF 79 WHILE LOU WILSON, PRESENTLY CG I MEF/CTF 79/CG 3RD MAR DIV, WOULD REMAIN AS CG 3D MAR DIV. THE FLAG OF HEADQUARTERS I MEF WOULD BE MOVED TO CAMP PENDLETON WHERE, AS CTF 19, IT WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO COMFIRSTFLT. THIS WOULD GIVE US TWO FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS, ONE ON OKINAWA FOR THE WESTPAC MEF AND ONE AT PENDLETON FOR THE EASTPAC MEF.

PAGE TWO RUHHBRA3088 TOP SECRET LIMDIS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
2. (TS) THERE IS CONSIDERABLE MERIT ON THE FOREGOING CONCEPT, ESPECIALLY IN RETAINING A FULLY CAPABLE AND SEPARATE COMMAND ELEMENT FOR THE WESTPAC MARINE FORCE. AS YOU ARE AWARE, PRIOR TO THE VIETNAM WAR, MEF PLANNING AND EXERCISE RESPONSIBILITIES WERE PERFORMED BY A SMALL CONTINGENCY STAFF WITH MEF HEADQUARTERS CONSTITUTED ON AN AD HOC BASIS FOR EXERCISE PURPOSES ONLY. CONSEQUENTLY, III MAF HEADQUARTERS WAS FORMED IN VIETNAM AFTER MARINES HAD BEEN COMMITTED.

TODAY THE THREAT IN ASIA, THE SEVERAL CONTINGENCY PLANS CALLING FOR EARLY COMMITMENT OF A MEF, AND THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN A QUICK-RESPONSE REENTRY CAPABILITY TO ASSIST RESIDUAL FW/MAF FORCES IN VIETNAM ASSERT A REQUIREMENT FOR A FULL TIME MEF HEADQUARTERS. MOREOVER, IN VIEW OF CONSTRAINED FORCE LEVELS AND THE NUMBER OF MAJOR RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS, I CAN FORESEE

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R 031954Z JUL70

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GREATER DEMANDS BEING MADE OF OUR FORWARD DEPLOYED NAVY/MARINE TEAM DURING THE POST HOSTILITIES ERA. THEREFORE, IT SEEMS PRUDENT THAT WE PLAN NOW TO ENSURE THAT THE MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE FORWARD DEPLOYED PACOM STRATEGIC RESERVE BE MAINTAINED AT THE HIGHEST STATE OF READINESS POSSIBLE.

3. (U) SINCE THERE IS MUCH TO COMMEND BILL BUSE'S PROPOSAL, I REQUEST THAT YOU LEND IT YOUR FULL SUPPORT WHEN THE OCCASION ARISES.

4. (U) BEST REGARDS.

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PAGE TWO RUMLMPA0553 S E C R E T/LIMDIS/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN MC CUTCHEON

WELL AS CONTINUING SECURITY AND PACIFICATION OPNS IN POPULATED AREAS AND OPNS IN QUE SONS.

4. 51ST ARVN REGT AND MSF (CIDG) WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO CONDUCT OPNS IN HILLS TO WEST OF THOUNG DUC AND TO NW IN BA 127.

5. ARVN RANGERS (2 BNS), VIETNAMESE MARINE BDE, AND US MARINES (1-2 BNS) WILL WORK BA 112 OR AREA TO WEST ALONG YC 95 N-S GRID LINE. GENERAL SCHEME IS STILL BEING DISCUSSED.

6. SAM JASKILKA HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE ~~1GS~~ HAS APPROVED SENDING A VIETNAMESE MARINE BDE TO I CORPS ABOUT 5 JULY. DETAILS OF FORCE, IDENTIFICATION AND INTENDED LOCATION (TAOR) STILL ARE UNKNOWN EXCEPT THAT THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT LAM INTENDS TO BASE THEM INITIALLY OUT OF AN HOA BUT KEEPING THEM MOSTLY WELL OUT IN THE BUSH. AT THIS TIME IT LOOKS LIKE OUR BIGGEST PROBLEM CONCERNING THEM MAY BE HELO SUPPORT. WE ARE WATCHING THIS VERY CLOSELY.

7. SUTHERLAND RECOGNIZES HIS SHORTFALL IN HELOS TO SUPPORT ALL THESE ENTERPRISES AND HAS ASKED ABRAMS TO ATTACH ONE AIR ASSAULT HELO CO TO XXIV CORPS FROM 7 JULY TO 1 OCT. HE HAS ALSO ASKED ME TO HELP SUPPORT THE KHAM DUC OPN

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA0553 S E C R E T/LIMDIS/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN MC CUTCHEON

WITH SOME HEAVY LIFT HELOS.

8. I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED AS THESE PLANS PROGRESS. WARM REGARDS KEITH
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

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O TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, O

N MGEN ARMSTRONG, MGEN WIDDECKE, MGEN WILSON AND N

C BGEN PADALINO FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES O

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P 1. (TS) FORTHCOMING REDEPLOYMENTS WILL REQUIRE THE E

E RELOCATION OF HQ III MAF AS WELL AS THE 1ST MARDIV AND E

I 1ST MAW. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THESE RELOCATIONS BE E

N EFFECTED IN AS ORDERLY A MANNER AS POSSIBLE AND THAT, E

T CONCOMITANT THEREWITH, THE VAST AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT T

H AND MATERIAL WHICH IS TO BE MOVED BE THE SUBJECT OF T

S STRICT AND PRECISE ACCOUNTING. TO THIS END, I WOULD S

S LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH ALL OF YOU ON 15 JULY 1970 AT S

S HQ III MAF IN DANANG. S

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2. (TS) THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION AGENDA IS PROPOSED
FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION:

A. RELOCATION OF HQ III MAF TO OKINAWA

(1) TIMING FOR RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF HQ III MAF ON
OKINAWA AS IT RELATES TO ACTIVATION OF HQ 3D MAB IN RVN.

(2) SITE FOR HQ III MAF ON OKINAWA.

(3) ESTABLISHMENT OF MANNING LEVEL FOR HQ III MAF
ON OKINAWA AND DETERMINATION OF SOURCE OF PERSONNEL.

(4) TIMING FOR RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF HQ I MEF AT
CAMP PENDLETON.

B. RELOCATION OF 1ST MAW TO IWAKUNI. TIMING FOR
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF HQ 1ST MAW AT IWAKUNI AND DEACTIVA-
TION OF 1ST MAW(REA).

C. RELOCATION OF 1ST MARDIV TO CAMP PENDLETON.

TIMING FOR RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF HQ 1ST MARDIV AT CAMP
PENDLETON AND DEACTIVATION OF 5TH MEB. IN THIS REGARD,
CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO 5TH MEB PERFORMING

THE MISSION OF A 1ST MARDIV (REA) AT CAMP PENDLETON.

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GP-4

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T. A. CMC 022248Z JUL 70 (TS)(SPECAT)(MCEO) T

P. 1. (TS) REF A NOTES THE RETENTION IN RVN OF ONE VMFA, D
E ONE HMM, AND ONE MACS WITH NO FINITE REDEPLOYMENT E

I. TIME SPECIFIED. I

N. 2. (S) REQUEST YOU INFORM ME, WHEN KNOWN, OF N

T. REDEPLOYMENT TIMES OR ANY INDICATIONS THEREOF T
H. CONCERNING THESE THREE AVIATION UNITS SO THAT I MAY H
I. RESPOND TO REF A. WARM REGARDS. I

S. GP-4 S

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BT
S E C R E T /MARINENCORPS EYES ONLY/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN
JONES FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING (U)

I. XXIV CORPS HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY MACV TO PROVIDE AND
IMPACT STATEMENT CONCERNING THE EARLIER N-STAND-DOWN DATES
FOR INCREMENT IV REDEPLOYMENT AS PROVIDED BY CINCPAC.
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED AND PROVIDES THE XXIV
CORPS RESPONSE.

QUOTE

P 080800Z
FM BG SHEDD C/S XXIV CORPS DNG RVN
TO MG COWLES J3 MACV SGN RVN
INFO BG MILLER C/S III MAF

ZEM

S E C R E T DNG 1619 EYES ONLY

REFERENCE: MY TELECON THIS MORNING WITH BGEN KRAFT CONCERNING
PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENT DATE CHANGES FOR SOME MARINE COMBAT ELEMENTS.
1. WE ARE CONCERNED OVER THE IMPACT THAT THE EARLIER DATES WILL HAVE
ON THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN. THOUGH, THE CHANGE OF ABOUT TWO WEEKS FOR THE

CG III MAF

P 090221Z JUL70

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

~~SECRET~~

NCEO

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA1213 S E C R E T / M C E O / SPECAT / EXCL FOR INFANTRY UNITS AND SOMEWHAT MORE FOR THE ARTILLERY MAY SEEM MINOR, WHEN VIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES THAT WILL BE IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME, THE IMPACT WILL BE SIGNIFICANT. WE PLAN TO PRESS THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN UNTIL THE ONSET OF BAD WEATHER IN LATE SEPTEMBER. UNTIL THEN, ALL MAJOR AREAS OF THE CORPS WILL BE ENGAGED IN INTENSIFIED ACTIVITY.

2. IN CENTRAL ICTZ, ARVN FORCES HAVE BEGUN SUBSTANTIAL MOVES TO THE WEST. AS THESE FORCES LEAVE THE POPULATED AREAS, THE IMPORTANCE OF USM INFANTRY CONTINUING TO OPERATE IN THOSE AREAS INCREASES. FURTHER, THE ARVN OFFENSIVE WILL REQUIRE AN INCREASE IN ARTILLERY SUPPORT, A REQUIREMENT THAT WILL GROW WHEN THE VN MARINE BRIGADE ARRIVES AND IS EMPLOYED IN AND TO THE WEST OF BA 112.

3. IN SOUTHERN ICTZ, THE AMERICAL AND 2D ARVN DIVISIONS WILL BE MAKING A DEEP PENETRATION TO THE VICINITY OF KHAM DUC. IT IS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT THAT THE DEEP ARVN OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL ICTZ CONTINUE IN ORDER TO PREVENT ENEMY FORCES THERE FROM CONCENTRATING AGAINST THE KHAM DUC FOB; BUT THAT US MARINE FORCES (THE 7TH MARINES) REMAIN ACTIVE IN THE QUE SON VALLEY TO COMPENSATE FOR A SHIFT OF NOW ADJACENT AMERICAL UNITS TO THE KHAM DUC AREA.

4. IN NORTHERN ICTZ, THE 1ST ARVN AND 101ST DIVISIONS WILL BE ENGAGED IN HEIGHTENED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH, THESE OPERATIONS WILL HAVE LITTLE DIRECT INFLUENCE ON OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE, WE PLAN TO MOVE ARTILLERY FROM NICTZ TO CICTZ WHEN MARINE ARTILLERY BEGINS TO LEAVE. EARLIER REDEPLOYMENT DATES FOR MARINE ARTILLERY WOULD REQUIRE SHIFTING TUBES FROM NICTZ AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE MOST NEEDED THERE.

5. IN SUM, THE DATE CHANGE WOULD PROBABLY MEAN SCALING DOWN SUMMER CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES EARLIER THAN PLANNED, WITH A RESULTING REDUCTION OF NEEDED PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY.

ENDQUOTE

2. ALTHOUGH WE WERE AWARE OF THE CONTENTS AND POSITION TAKEN BY XXIV CORPS WE CHOSE NOT TO CONCUR OR NONCONCUR WITH ITS CONTENTS. WE DID POINT OUT THAT WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE VNMC BDE IN I CORPS ON OR ABOUT 10 JULY THAT THE TROOP DENSITY AND COMBAT SUPPORT WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS IT IS NOW, AFTER INCREMENT IV REDEPLOYMENTS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

DP

1110

CG III MAU

P 090221Z JUL70

2-2

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Fr. Co. 1

CUTTING SECTION

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MCEO

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ZNY AAAAA
P 120347Z JUL 70
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET/T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS //N05400//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. FMFPAC 080143Z JUL 70 (TS) (SPECAT) (MCEO)

B. MY 151740Z JUN 70 (S) (MCEO)

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, I HAVE NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO ADD AT THIS TIME TO THE INFORMATION I PROVIDED IN REF B.
2. THE VMFA, HMM, MACS, AND RAD BN(-) WERE DELETED FROM THE 50,000 INCREMENT FOUR REDEPLOYMENT AND THEIR SPACES REALLOCATED TO THE OTHER SERVICES. PENDING ANNOUNCEMENT OF FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS, CURRENT THINKING IS THAT THESE UNITS WILL NOW REDEPLOY IN INCREMENT FIVE BETWEEN 15 OCT AND 31 DEC 70, BUT THIS IS ONLY SPECULATION. THERE IS NO INTENTION ON MY PART TO RETAIN THESE UNITS WITH THE 3D MAB, EXCEPT FOR THE PREVIOUSLY AGREED 85 SPACES IN RADIO BN. HOWEVER, AS NOTED IN REF B, I FEEL CERTAIN THAT XXIV CORPS AND COMUSMACV WILL MAKE A STRONG PITCH TO RETAIN AS MUCH OF THE BATTALION FOR AS LONG AS THEY CAN.

C. 1740Z JUN 70

D. 1740Z JUN 70

E. 1740Z JUN 70

F. 1740Z JUN 70

P 120347Z JUL 70

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

89

~~SECRET~~

~~EXCLUSIVE FOR STAFF SECTIONS ONLY~~
~~NOT AUTHORIZED TO MAKE COPIES~~
 MCEO

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*Emt**35*

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ZNY AAAAA

P 161123Z JUL 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

COPY 1A OF 2 COPIES
16 JUL 70 1200Z 000589

BT

S E C R E T /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LETGEN MCCUTCHEON/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//N05400//

REQUEST FOR MARINE CORPS ADVISORS (U)1. (S) FOLLOWING IS MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM VADM KING:
QUOTE

1. (S) THE U.S. NAVY'S EFFORTS TO SECURE COMPLETE GVN CONTROL OF LOWER NAM CAN DISTRICT OF AN XUYEN PROVINCE ARE HINDERED DUE TO A LACK OF RELIABLE, WELL TRAINED VIETNAMESE FORCES SKILLED IN THE TACTICS OF NAVAL INFANTRY.

2. (S) THE COMBAT ENVIRONMENT IN THE AO IS VERY SIMILAR TO THAT COMMANDANT HENDERSON FOUND TO BE SUCH A CHALLENGE IN THE FLORIDA EVERGLADES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. WE NEED SOME OF HIS SPIRIT IN THIS WAR IN THE SOUTHERN DELTA.

3. (S) I AM CONVINCED THAT A MAJOR STEP TO SHIFT THE ADVANTAGES TO OUR SIDE AND ENSURE THE ULTIMATE DESTRUCTION OF THE VC/NVA FORCES OPERATING IN NAM CAN WOULD BE THE ADDITION OF U.S. MARINE CORPS ADVISORS TO OUR TASK ORGANIZATION THERE.

CG III MAF

P 161123Z JUL 70

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

~~SECRET~~

SECRET
EXCLUSIVE FOR
MCEO

4. (S) I PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING AS A FEASIBLE PLAN:

- A. A MARINE ADVISORY CONTINGENT CONSISTING OF ONE MAJOR, THREE CAPTAINS AND THREE SERGEANTS OR STAFF SERGEANTS ASSIGNED TAD TO NAVFORV FOR A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS.
- B. PHASED INPUT TO ENSURE CONTINUITY OF EFFORT AND EXPERIENCE AS ADVISORS ARE ROTATED INTO THE TACTICAL ORGANIZATION.
- C. PROVISIONS FOR VOLUNTARY EXTENSION FOR PERIODS OF THREE MONTHS NOT TO EXCEED TWO SUCH EXTENSIONS FOR EACH ADVISOR.
- D. THE FIELD GRADE OFFICER WOULD BE ASSIGNED THE DUTIES OF SENIOR GROUND ADVISOR AND DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR BASE DEFENSE, WITH THE OTHER MARINES AS HIS IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES.
- E. ACCREDITATION OF THESE ADVISORS TO NAVFORV IN COUNTRY ALLOWANCE WHILE TAD FROM PARENT USMC ORGANIZATION.

5. (S) I WOULD WELCOME A VISIT FROM YOU OR MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL AND TO VISIT THE OPERATING AREA OF SEAFLOAT/SOLID ANCHOR AT ANY TIME.

6. WARM REGARDS.

UNQUOTE

2. (S) THE REQUEST COMES AT A TIME WHEN WE ARE PULLING BACK OUR TAD PERSONNEL TO MEET MANPOWER PROBLEMS OCCASIONED BY REDEPLOYMENT. DESPITE THE PROPOSAL THAT THE REQUESTED ADVISORS BE ACCREDITED TO NAVFORV, THE SPACES WOULD STILL COME OUT OF III MAF'S HIDE. COMNAVFORV IS TALKING ABOUT A LONG-TERM PROGRAM. THE TAD PLUS EXTENSIONS MENTIONED IN THE MESSAGE ALONE COVER A NINE-MONTH PERIOD. CONSIDERING REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING, III MAF AND THE FUTURE MAB WOULD BE UNABLE TO SUSTAIN THE EFFORT.

3. (S) NAVFORV COULD REQUEST SPACES FOR MARINE ADVISOR SPACES IN THE JTD. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INCREASING THE PROFICIENCY OF SEAFLOAT/SOLID ANCHOR NAVAL INFANTRY AND AT THE SAME TIME PRECLUDE THE PERSONNEL PROBLEMS THAT TAD ASSIGNMENT WOULD CAUSE III MAF.

4. (S) IT IS MY PRESENT INTENT TO REPLY TO ADM KING THAT I AM UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH HIS REQUEST FOR TAD ADVISORS AND SUGGEST HE SUBMIT A REQUEST FOR A JTD CHANGE. A PROPOSAL TO CHANGE THE NAVFORV JTD TO INCLUDE MARINE ADVISORS APPEARS TO MERIT CORPS SUPPORT. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ADVICE.

5. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2390 CG III MAF P 161123Z JUL 70

2-2

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EXCLUSIVE FOR
MCEO

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FROM CG FMFPAC	DTG 172208Z JUL 70	Cmd. DRAFTED JAS
TO CG III MAF	PRECEDENCE <div style="text-align: center; border: 1px solid black; border-radius: 50%; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;">38</div>	SECT <u>G-1</u> IN PHONE 39-542
INFO	<input type="checkbox"/> FLASH <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> IMMEDIATE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> PP PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> MAIL <input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRED <i>G-5</i> <i>DCS</i> RELEASE SITE <i>111123Z JUL 70</i>
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~~SECRET//SPEC~~ MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

SECRET//SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN JONES.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//NO0000//

REQUEST FOR MARINE CORPS ADVISORS (U)

A. CG III MAF 161123Z/JUL70 (S) (MCEO)

1. (S) I CONCUR WITH YOUR EVALUATION OF THE MANPOWER PROBLEMS OCCASIONED BY THE REDEPLOYMENT AND THE INABILITY OF III MAF AND THE FUTURE MAB TO SUSTAIN MARINE ADVISORS TAD TO NAVFORV.

2. (S) THE SOLUTION OPEN TO VADM KING IS, AS YOU POINT OUT, *I agree that* TO REQUEST MARINE ADVISOR SPACES IN THE NAVFORV CTD. WITH THE CONTINUING WITHDRAWAL OF MARINE FNP SPACES FROM VIETNAM, THE MARINE CORPS MAY BENEFIT FROM AN INCREASED ADVISORY ROLE.

~~WOULD BE INCLINED TO FAVOR SUCH A PROPOSAL SHOULD IT BE MADE BY~~
 NAVFORV.

3. WARM REGARDS.

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

6P-4

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

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INTENDED TO MAKE COPIES~~**SECRET**

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 P 210545Z JUL 70
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUE4HFMA/CG FMFPAC

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BT

S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON(DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
 FLOAT/SOLID ANCHOR ATSB (U)

1. THIS IS THE MESSAGE I SENT TO VADM KING CONCERNING HIS REQUEST FOR MARINE ADVISORS. QUOTE

P 200220Z JUL 70
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV

BT

S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR VADM KING FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
 MARINE CORPS ADVISORS FOR VIETNAMESE GROUND UNITS ATTACHED TO SEA
 FLOAT/SOLID ANCHOR ATSB (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 101125Z JUL 70

1. (S) I HAVE STUDIED YOUR PROPOSAL THAT III MAF PROVIDE A MARINE ADVISORY CONTINGENT ON A TAD BASIS TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE VIETNAMESE NAVAL INFANTRY FOR SEAFLOAT/SOLID ANCHOR OPERATIONS. I CONCUR IN YOUR CONCEPT AND SINCERELY APPRECIATE YOUR CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO MEET THE NEED.

2. (S) AS YOU ARE AWARE, III MAF WILL LOSE SUBSTANTIAL MANPOWER ASSETS (APPROXIMATELY 44.5 PERCENT) IN THE CURRENT INCREMENT-IV REDEPLOYMENT. FUTURE REDEPLOYMENTS WILL REDUCE THE MARINE FORCES IN I MILITARY REGION EVEN FURTHER. AS A CONSEQUENCE, I REGRET THAT THE PERSONNEL ASSETS ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN III MAF TO SUPPORT YOUR PROPOSAL.

3. (S) I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU REQUEST ADVISOR SPACES IN THE

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA2991 S E C R E T

NAVFORV JTD AS A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. I HAVE CONFERRED WITH LTGEN JONES AND HE CONCURS IN THIS RECOMMENDATION.

4. IF A VISIT BY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WILL ASSIST, PLEASE ADVISE.

WARM REGARDS

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

3162

CG III MAF

P 210545Z/JUL70

SECRET

ACTN: S/SEC

S E C R E T

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EXCLUSIVE FOR THE **SECRET**
MCEO

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MAF-T-FMFPAC DEDICATED
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0 220101Z EUL70
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF
BT

S E C R E T /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES
AND LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE/DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

A. CG FMFPAC SPDLTR 59/JPO/NHF OF 1 MAY 68
B. CG FIRST MARDIV 250630Z JUNE 70 (NOTAL)

- (S) DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF THE COMMANDANT TO THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION, HE QUERIED ME RELATIVE TO THE FOXHOLE STRENGTHS OF DIVISION RIFLE COMPANIES. ON TWO OCCASIONS I RESPONDED THAT LATELY THE RIFLE COMPANIES HAS BEEN AVERAGING APPROXIMATELY 180 ON ROLLS, 160 EFFECTIVE STRENGTH AND 140 FOXHOLE STRENGTH. THE COMMANDANT MENTIONED THAT THE INFORMATION HE HELD WAS THAT THE FOXHOLE STRENGTHS WERE GREATER THAN THE FIGURES I GAVE HIM.
- (S) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE DIVISION'S STRENGTH IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST CG FMFPAC IN THE EVENT HQMC QUERIES THAT HEADQUARTERS RELATIVE TO THIS SUBJECT.

CG FIRST MARDIV

0 220101Z/JUL70

ACTN: S/SEC

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93

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PAGE TWO RUMLLUA2864 S E C R E T /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/
EXCLUSIVE FOR

3. (S) AS BACKGROUND, THIS HEADQUARTERS USES THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS IN DETERMINING AND REPORTING RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTHS:

- A. ON ROLLS. ALL MARINES JOINED TO THE REPORTING UNIT IN STRENGTH CATEGORIES, CHARGEABLE AND NON-CHARGEABLE. THIS DEFINITION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE A.
- B. EFFECTIVE. MARINES IN A CHARGEABLE STRENGTH CATEGORY WHO ARE PHYSICALLY PRESENT AND CAPABLE OF PERFORMING DUTY THAT CONTRIBUTES TO THE UNIT MISSION. THIS DEFINITION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE A.
- C. FOXHOLE. A RIFLE COMPANY'S EFFECTIVE COMBAT OR FIELD STRENGTH. IT IS THAT PORTION OF A COMPANY'S STRENGTH THAT IS COMMITTED TO COMBAT.

(1) FOXHOLE STRENGTH INCLUDES EFFECTIVE STRENGTH MARINES ASSIGNED TO THE COMPANY FORWARD POST OR LEFT IN THE COMPANY REAR BECAUSE THE COMPANY MISSION DOES NOT REQUIRE ALL EFFECTIVE PERSONNEL.

(2) FOXHOLE STRENGTH DOES NOT INCLUDE EFFECTIVE STRENGTH MARINES PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED TO ADMINISTRATIVE OR LOGISTICAL DUTIES WITH THE COMPANY REAR OR HELD IN THE COMPANY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS, E.G., LIGHT DUTY, ORIENTATION TRAINING,

PAGE THREE RUMLLUA2864 S E C R E T /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/
EXCLUSIVE FOR

REMOVED FROM THE FILED FOR ROTATION OR TO PREPARE FOR R&R. INSO FAR AS I CAN DETERMINE, THIS DEFINITION WAS GENERATED WITHIN THIS HEADQUARTERS TO INDICATE ACTUAL FIELD OR OPERATIONAL STRENGTH.

4. (S) THE CURRENT REVISED DIVISION MANNING LEVEL PROVIDES FOR 1,123 OFFICERS AND 19,457 ENLISTED. THE OUT OF COUNTRY NON-EFFECTIVE ALLOWANCE (OOCNE) OF 51 OFFICERS AND 1,077 ENLISTED, ADDED TO THE MANNING LEVEL, ESTABLISHES AN RVN CEILING OF 1,174 OFFICERS AND 20,534 ENLISTED. ON 19 JULY, THE 1ST DIVISION STRENGTH WAS 1,148 OFFICERS AND 18,958 ENLISTED, FOR A TOTAL SHORTAGE OF 26 OFFICERS AND 1,576 ENLISTED VERSUS THE RVN CEILING.

5. (S) THE RECENT TREND IN RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTHS HAS BEEN STEADILY DOWNWARD DUE TO AN OVERALL REDUCTION IN DIVISION STRENGTH. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MANNING LEVEL OF A RIFLE COMPANY IS 205. THE AVERAGE ON-ROLL STRENGTH ON 31 MAY 70 WAS 192; THE EFFECTIVE STRENGTH, 173; THE FOXHOLE STRENGTH, 150. ON 30 JUNE THESE STRENGTHS WERE 186, 163, AND 140, RESPECTIVELY. ON 19 JULY THESE STRENGTHS WERE 177, 156, AND 134 RESPECTIVELY.

6. (S) AN ALALYSIS OF HEADQUARTERS UNITS OF THE INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY REGIMENTS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION REVEALS THAT THESE HEADQUARTERS UNITS ARE OVER STRENGTH WHILE THE RIFLE COMPANIES ARE

~~SECRET~~ (2)

PAGE FOUR RUMLLUA2864 S E C R E T/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/
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UNDER STRENGTH. IN SOME CASES THERE ARE VALID REASONS FOR OVER-
AGES IN HEADQUARTERS UNITS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN HEADQUARTERS
BATTALION THERE IS A SCAMP PLATOON AND DIVISION SCHOOLS FOR WHICH
THERE IS NO AUTHORIZED MANNING LEVEL BUT NONETHELESS MUST BE
STAFFED. IN THE INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY REGIMENTS, THERE ARE IN
SOME CASES EQUALY VALID REASONS FOR THE OVERAGE IN THE REGIMENTAL
HEADQUARTERS UNITS, SUCH AS HEADQUARTERS LOCAL SECURITY ELEMENTS,
LIAISON PERSONNEL, AND REQUIRED FSAC AND COC AUGMENTATION. HOW-
EVER, IN MY OPINION THE OVERAGE IN HEADQUARTERS UNITS THROUGHOUT
THE DIVISION HAS BEEN EXCESSIVE AND POSITIVE ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN
TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION.

7. (S) IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABOVE, COUPLED WITH THE RECENT DOWN-
WARD TREND IN OVERALL DIVISION STRENGTH, ON 25 JUNE I DIRECTED,
IN REFERENCE B, EACH REGIMENTAL COMMANDER AND THE COMMANDING OFFI-
CER OF HEADQUARTERS BATTALION TO REVIEW IN DETAIL THEIR PERSONNEL
ASSIGNMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PROCEDURES TO ENSURE MAXIMUM ON-ROLLS,
EFFECTIVE, AND FOXHOLE STRENGTHS IN THE TACTICAL UNITS OF THIS
COMMAND, AND FURTHER THAT THEY WOULD MAKE A WEEKLY REPORT OF
PROGRESS MADE TO INCLUDE SUCH THINGS AS NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL WHO
HAVE BEEN REASSIGNED FROM HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS, OR REASONS WHY

PAGE FIVE RUMLLUA2864 S E C R E T/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/
EXCLUSI

SUCH REASSIGNMENTS WERE NOT POSSIBLE, AND FUTURE PLANS TO REDUCE
THEIR HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS.

8. (S) BASED ON INFORMATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TO THIS HEADQUAR-
TERS, OVERALL DIVISION SHORTAGES WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED
DURING LATE AUGUST DUE TO INCREASED REPLACEMENT INPUT; THIS
COUPLED WITH THE CURRENT ON-GOING PROGRAMS, AS OUTLINED ABOVE,
WILL MARKEDLY IMPROVE RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTHS.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2864

CG FIRST MAR DIV

0 220101Z/JUL70

3-3

SECRET

93

EXCLUSIVE FOR STAFF SECTION'S TOP SECRET
MCEO

TOD: 22JUL70 0423Z

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O TOP SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON O

N FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER N
O DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000// OT FORCE PLANNING (U) TYPE
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T 0454 SECURITY MANUAL. T

B. CG FMFPAC 070402ZJUL70 (C)

P 1. (S) REF A RECOMMENDED ESTABLISHMENT OF FIRST
I MARDIV (REAR) AT CAMP PENDLETON ON OR ABOUT
N 1 SEPTEMBER 1970. REF B STATED THAT THE RECOMMENDATION
T CONTAINED IN REF A WOULD BE DISCUSSED DURING CG
T FMFPAC FORTHCOMING WESTPAC TRIP, 11-16 JULY 1970. TS 2. (TS) DURING OUR RECENT DISCUSSION AT YOUR
S HEADQUARTERS CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF RELOCATION. SS I MENTIONED THAT I WAS OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO
P IF REPRODUCED ALL COPIES MUST BE
A SERIALIZED AND IMMEDIATELY RECORDED
C WITH THE TOP SECRET CONTROL PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES TO TOP SECRET
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← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/MCEO

ESTABLISHMENT OF 1ST MARDIV (REAR) AT PENDLETON

BECAUSE I FELT THAT 5TH MEB COULD FULFILL THAT

FUNCTION ADEQUATELY AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

3. (TS) I KNOW THAT YOU ARE PRESENTLY EVOLVING
RELOCATION PLANS AND WILL MAKE AN OFFICIAL PROPOSAL
IN THIS REGARD IN THE NEAR FUTURE. SHOULD THESE PLANS
INCLUDE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 1ST MARDIV (REAR) OR (FWD)
AT CAMP PENDLETON, THE SECURITY ASPECTS SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED. SPECIFICALLY, I WOULD DOUBT THAT
ANYTHING COULD BE SENT TO PENDLETON UNDER THE
AEGIS OF HQ 1ST MARDIV UNTIL THE UNITS COMPRISING
THE 16 OCTOBER THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1970 REDEPLOYMENT
HAD BEEN PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES, TOP SECRET/MCEO

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FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
RUMLLUA/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUAOAJA/CG I MEF
ZEN/CG FLC

BT

~~TOP SECRET//SPECAT//EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO MGEN
ARMSTRONG, MGEN WIDDECKE, MGEN WILSON AND BGEND PADALINO//
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//N03121//
FORCE PLANNING (U)~~

- A. YOUR 071301Z JUL 70 (TS) (SPECAT)
- B. YOUR 220228Z JUL 70 (TS) (SPECAT) (NOTAL)
1. THIS CONFIRMS DISCUSSIONS HELD WITH ADDRESSES AT THIS HQ
ON 14 JUL RELATIVE AGENDA ITEMS POSED IN REFA. SUBJECT
MATTER WAS NOT DISCUSSED WITH CMC DURING HIS VISIT HERE.
2. PROPOSED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR TRANSITION FROM III
MAF TO 3D MAB GENERALLY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
- A. ON/ABOUT 15 SEP 70: ACTIVATE MAB PLANNING STAFF WITH

CG III MAF

O 222356Z JUL 70

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

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P 240255Z JUL 79

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TO CG SMEPAC

19 SEP 1960
TNGD CG FIRST MAW BEAR

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO BGEN
JOHNSON FROM MAJGEN WILSON
IMAKUNI FACILITIES (UD)

1. (S) IN FURTHERANCE OF OUR FONECOM OF 21 JULY CONCERNING
COMPLTAIRWING 162340Z JUL 73 (C), I HAVE LOOKED INTO
THIS MATTER AND, SUBJECT TO YOUR APPROVAL, PROPOSE TO SEND
THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO VADM WEISNER'S REQUEST:

NOTE.

SP CTF 79

1. (S) I HAVE LOOKED INTO THE FACILITIES SITUATION AT HANWELL PEP OUR DISCUSSION ON THE 19TH. A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF ALL STATION AND TENANT REQUIREMENTS, BASED ON NAVFAC P-50, IS BEING

CC-T-MEE

P 240255Z JUL 70 ACTN: S/SAC 1-3

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PAGE 2 RUOAJA S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DOCUMENT, HAS BEEN MADE.

2. (S) FUNDAMENTALLY, THERE IS A 33 PERCENT SPACE SHORTFALL FOR COVERED STORAGE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND MAINTENANCE SPACE. FACILITY PROJECTS AND/OR MILCON LINE ITEMS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS; HOWEVER, THE CURRENT FISCAL CLIMATE IN WASHINGTON LEADS TO A HIGHLY PESSIMISTIC FUNDING OUTLOOK. THERE IS ONE SIGNIFICANT CONTRADICTION TO THAT OUTLOOK, IN THAT EARLY THIS YEAR, SECDEF RELEASED HIS HOLD ON A FY 68 PROJECT TO ADD-ON SHOP AND ADMIN SPACES TO AN EXISTING HANGAR. THIS HALF - MILLION DOLLAR CONTRACT HAS BEEN AWARDED AND IS UNDERWAY. ADDITIONALLY, THE FOLLOWING PROJECTS ARE IN THE OFFING OR UNDERWAY:

A. 5 40 FOOT X 100 FOOT BUTLER BLDGS WERE DISMANTLED AT CHU LAI AND SHIPPED TO IWAKUNI. THIS IS A 25,000 DOLLARS PROJECT FOR WHICH CG FMFPAC HAS SUBMITTED A REQUEST FOR FUNDS TO CONSTRUCT THESE BLDGS BY THIRD MARDIV ENGINEER TROOPS. HOPEFULLY, THIS IS TO COMMENCE DURING AUGUST OR WHEN FUNDED.

B. A NAVAIRPAC FACSTEAM IS IN THE THROES OF COMPLETELY REVIEWING THE AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE FACILITY REQUIREMENTS GENERATED BY THE TWO MAG AND VPRON BASE LOADING. WHEN EXECUTED

PAGE 3 RUOAJA S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR THIS WORK WILL LEAD TO MORE EFFICIENT USE OF EXISTING SPACE. C. AN ELECTRICAL PROJECT HAS BEEN FUNDED TO INCREASE HANGAR POWER BY 1200 KILOWATTS. 25,000 DOLLARS IN MATERIAL HAS BEEN ORDERED AND WE ARE CONTEMPLATING CONSTRUCTION BY SEABEES COMMENCING ABOUT OCTOBER. THE DELAY IN START IS DUE TO MATERIAL LEAD TIME.

D. RETROGRADE OF ONE MILLION SQFT EXCESS AM-2 MATTING FROM RVN HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR REINFORCING THE IWAKUNI ASPHALT PARKING AREA. THREE QUARTERS OF THIS HAS BEEN SHIPPED AND LAID WITH REMAINDER TO ARRIVE AS SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE. WHEN THIS IS ALL DOWN, THERE SHOULD BE NO AIRCRAFT PARKING SPACE PROBLEM.

3. (S) THE BILLETING/BERTHING PICTURE IS GRIM, BUT WITH A CONTINUATION OF THE WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION OF THE PAST, WE BELIEVE EVERYONE CAN GET A BUNK UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH MEET THE DOD EMERGENCY CRITERIA OF 50 SQFT/MAN. CURRENT BARRACKS ALLOCATION REVEALS AN IMBALANCE, WHEREIN BILL JOHNSON'S PEOPLE ARE CROWDED INTO SPACES WHICH PROVIDE LESS AREA PER MAN THAN 50 SQFT, WHILE STATION AND NAVY UNITS PERSONNEL ENJOY NEAR NORMAL (72 SQFT/MAN). THE CURRENT CROWDING IS PARTIALLY DUE TO THE NECESSITY TO VACATE BARRACKS FOR

CG I MEF

P 240255Z JUL 70

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PAGE 4 RUOAJA S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
RENOVATION, A SEABEE PROJECT, FUNDED BY CG FMFPAC AND SCHEDULED
FOR COMPLETION IN OCT. THE COMPUTED EMERGENCY CAPACITY OF
IVAKUNI IS 790 OFFICERS AND 6109 ENLISTED. THE 1 JAN 1971
PREDICTED BASE LOADING IS 601 OFFICERS AND 6115 ENLISTED.
ACCORDINGLY, CONSIDERABLE BELT TIGHTENING ON THE PART OF STATION
AND NAVY UNITS IS REQUIRED AND IN SOME INSTANCES UNIT INTEGRITY
FOR BILLETING WILL HAVE TO GO BY THE BOARDS. IN THE MEANTIME
CG FMFPAC HAS REQUESTED EMERGENCY PROCUREMENT OF RELOCATABLE
MODULAR BARRACK BLDGS TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE. I AM NOT NOW
POSITIVE OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS PROJECT BUT ANTICIPATE IT WILL
BE SUFFICIENT TO ASSURE UNIT INTEGRITY AND MAKE SPACE AVAILABLE
WELL ABOVE THE 50 SQFT/MAN LEVEL. I WOULD FURTHER ANTICIPATE
THAT TRANSIENT BILLETING WILL HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED ON THE
ALREADY LIMITED LOCAL ECONOMY.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY, ALL RECOGNIZABLE REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED
INTO ENGINEERED FACILITY PROJECTS AND, WHERE POSSIBLE, FUNDED
LOCALLY OR AT FMFPAC LEVEL. OTHERWISE, THEY HAVE SUBMITTED TO
WASHINGTON FOR APPROVAL AND FUNDING. WE CANNOT EXPECT MASSIVE
APPROVAL BUT WE DO EXPECT SOME ASSISTANCE TO RELIEVE THE
PRESSURE. I RECOGNIZE WE HAVE AN UNDESIRABLE SITUATION BUT
BELIEVE THAT WHOLEHEARTED MAKE-DO COOPERATION ON A SHARE AND
SHARE ALIKE BASIS WILL GET US THROUGH. WARM REGARDS.
UNQUOTE.

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CG I MEF

P 240255Z JUL 70

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TO COMMARCORBASESPAC

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INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

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S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM BGEN BARROW.
 INFO MAJGEN WILSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //N0929//

1. GENERAL LAMPERT CALLED A SPECIAL AREA JOINT COMMANDER MEETING AT 1600 24 JULY. WE DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF MORE OR LESS ROUTINE MATTERS, E. G., LABOR AND OFF BASE INCIDENTS, AND THEN HE BROUGHT UP GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S RECENT VISIT, THIS TOPIC BEING REAL PURPOSE OF AJC MEETING AS I SAW IT.
2. IN GEN WESTMORELAND'S TALK TO LOCAL ARMY COMMANDERS HE EMPHASIZED BUDGET PROBLEMS, SPECULATED THAT ARMY WOULD END UP SMALLER THAN PRE-KOREA, AND STRESSED NEED TO SEEK MORE CROSS-SERVICING/CONSOLIDATION ARRANGEMENTS, ALL OF WHICH HE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH OTHER HEADS OF SERVICE. SPECIFIC POSSIBILITIES EMERGING FROM HIS TRIP WOULD BE BROUGHT UP TO OTHER HEADS OF SERVICE AND IN HAWAII.
3. GEN WESTMORELAND STATED THAT WHILE OKINAWA WAS REGARDED AS HOME OF 173RD AIRBORNE BGD, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO RELINQUISHING THAT CLAIM IN FAVOR OF POSITIONING THE REMAINING ONE THIRD OF THIRD MARDIV ON OKINAWA. RELATED THERE TO, ARMY COULD TAKE OVER LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF MARINES. HE ALSO SPOKE OF MARINE AVIATION SERVING ARMY NEEDS ON OKINAWA. (MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT MARINE SUPPORT WOULD INCLUDE AIRCRAFT NOT SIMPLY MOVING ARMY AIRCRAFT FROM HAMBY TO FUTEMA).

DEPCOMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD) 0 250047Z JUL 70 ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

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4. GEN WESTMORELAND REQUESTED GEN LAMPERT TO PRODUCE A SHOPPING LIST OF POSSIBLE CONSOLIDATIONS ON OKINAWA. AFTER STATING TO ME THAT HE HAD NOT BROUGHT MATTER UP WITH THE COMMANDANT BECAUSE HE DIDN'T WANT TO PRE-EMPT GEN WESTMORELAND AND THAT HE HAD GOTTEN GEN HAINES PERMISSION TO PASS TO OTHER MEMBERS OF AJC, GEN LAMPERT READ FROM HIS PROPOSED SHOPPING LIST MESSAGE. THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES WERE LISTED AS CONSOLIDATION POSSIBILITIES:

- A. ALL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
- B. INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
- C. OFF DUTY EDUCATION
- D. CERTAIN SPECIAL SERVICES/RECREATION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS POOLS AND HOBBY SHOPS
- E. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
- F. PURCHASING AND CONTRACTING
- G. CERTAIN MEDICAL, E.G., PREVENTIVE MEDICINE, MEDICAL EXAMS LOCAL NATIONALS
- H. VEHICLE MAINTENANCE
- I. DISBURSING. ONE SERVICE PAY ALL.
- J. CERTAIN COMM-ELECT
- K. RYUKYUAN SECURITY GUARDS

5. GEN LAMPERT SOUGHT A REACTION FROM THOSE PRESENT. BEYOND OBSERVING THAT THE ENTIRE MATTER WAS ALL VERY INTERESTING, I REMAINED MUTE, AS DID OTHERS. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED IF SITUATION DEVELOPS FURTHER AND, OF COURSE, WOULD APPRECIATE SAME TO INCLUDE SPECIAL GUIDANCE, IF ANY.

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O SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM O

O LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING N

O WORKING HOURS //N00000// O

T A. CG III MAF 222356Z JUL70 (TS/MCEO) T

T 1. (S) DURING THE COMMANDANT'S 23-24 JULY VISIT HERE, T

T HE TOLD ME TO PASS ON TO BILL VAN RYZIN HIS APPROVAL T

T OF YOUR DESIRE FOR A BRIGADIER JUNIOR TO ED SIMMONS T

I TO BE IN CHARGE OF THE WRAP-UP FORCE. AS YOU KNOW I

N FROM MY MSG TO ARMY HE ALSO GAVE HIS APPROVAL OF N

T THE CONLEY-QUINN DEAL. ALTHOUGH THE STAFF IS STILL T

T CHECKING OUT YOUR TIME TABLE CONTAINED IN REF A THERE T

T APPEARS TO BE NO DIFFICULTY INVOLVED. IN FACT, I ALSO T

S TALKED THIS OVER IN GENERAL TERMS WITH THE COMMANDANT S

P AND HE SEEMED TO BE WELL SATISFIED WITH YOUR PLANS S

A PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES SECRET

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THEREFORE, THINGS ARE SHAPING UP IN CONNECTION WITH
YOUR REDEPLOYMENT. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHEN AND HOW
WE CAN BE OF ASSISTANCE.

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2. (S) YOUR REQUEST FOR REDUCTION IN MARINE POPULATION AT THE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY BRINGS INFORMAL RESPONSE FROM THE HQMC ACTION OFFICER LEVEL INDICATING THE NECESSARY MOVES WILL BE AUTHORIZED SHORTLY, WITH ANTICIPATION HERE THAT MARINE CONFINNEES WILL BE REDUCED TO WELL BELOW 70 BY 10 AUGUST.
3. (S) CHUCK'S REPORT OF REDUCED "FOXHOLE" STRENGTHS IN HIS RIFLE COMPANIES APPEARS TO BE A MATTER OF BOOKKEEPING. THE BEST WAY TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM IS TO TALK "ON ROLLS" AND "EFFECTIVE", WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE ILLUSIVE TERM "FOXHOLE." FORTUNATELY, BY END-JULY OUR REPLACEMENT INPUT SHOULD HAVE REDUCED THE REPORTED SHORTFALL CONSIDERABLY. WE SHOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO MONITOR THIS SITUATION MORE CLEARLY WITH THE REINSTITUTION OF WEEKLY REPORTS.

MICEO

4. (S) LASTLY, I AM PLEASED TO PASS ON THAT CHAPPIE
WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPRESSED MOST FAVORABLY WITH HIS III
MAF VISIT, AND COMMENTED IN PARTICULAR ON THE HIGH
MORALE AND PROFESSIONALISM REFLECTED IN YOUR UNITS.

5. WARM REGARDS.

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

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TOP SECRET//SPECAT//EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN
MCCUTCHEON//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//DELIVER DURING WORKING
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FORCE PLANNING - 3D MAB

A. CG III MAF LTR SER 002333070 DTD 2 JUN 70 (TS)

B. CG XXIV CORPS 152300Z JUN 70 (SD) (PASED)

1. REF A PROVIDED PLANNING DATA FOR KEYSTONE ROBIN
REDEPLOYMENTS TO INCLUDE UNIT DESIGNATIONS AND STRENGTHS
TO REMAIN IN COUNTRY AS 3D MAB DURING PERIOD 1 JAN -
1 MAY 70

2. MAB PLANNING IN REF A WAS BASED ON EARLIER CGFMFPAC/
CMC PREFERENCES FOR 10.8K MAB PLUS .6K CAG AND 1.2K
ROLL-UP FORCE. COMPOSITION OF MAB WAS BASED ON PROVISION
OF ALL AROUND BALANCED FORCE CAPABLE OF OPERATING
ANYWHERE IN I MR BUT NOT PROVIDING AIR FIELD DEFENSE.

3. REF B AND EXPRESSIONS FROM XXIV CORPS STRONGLY INDICATE
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PAGE TWO RUMLMPA4766 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO
 3D MAB WILL REMAIN IN DANANG AREA AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE
 FOR DEFENSE OF VITAL AREA AND ROCKET BELT. TO DATE, HOWEVER,
 NO EXPLICIT STATEMENT OF MAB MISSION HAS BEEN RECEIVED.

4. TO MEET DANANG VITAL AREA/ROCKET BELT DEFENSE MISSION,
 III MAF NOW EMPLOYS FOUR INF BNS, AN MP BN, AND LOCAL
 SECURITY/REACTION FORCES PROVIDED BY ALL UNITS IN AREA. IN
 THE MAB ONLY THREE INF BNS AND NO MP BN WILL BE LEFT.
 ADDITIONALLY, ABOUT 15,000 PERSONNEL WHO NOW CONTRIBUTE TO
 LOCAL SECURITY IN THE AREA WILL HAVE DEPARTED.

5. IN VIEW THESE CONSIDERATIONS, IT APPEARS HIGHLY DESIRABLE
 TO BEEF UP INFANTRY STRENGTH OF MAB BY A FOURTH BN. THERE
 IS NO WAY TO GET THIS BN WITHIN 12.5K WITHOUT GIVING UP
 SOMETHING. A CLOSE REVIEW OF MAB STRUCTURE INDICATES IT
 IS HEAVY ON LONG RANGE ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT FOR DANANG
 AREA MISSION. ALSO TANKS WOULD BE OF LITTLE VALUE IN THIS AO.

6. I THEREFORE INTEND TO PROPOSE AS THE PREFERRED MAB
 STRUCTURE FOUR INF BNS AND ONE FIXED WING SQDN. I AM STUDYING
 WHETHER THE A-4 OR THE A-5 WILL GIVE ME THE MOST RETURN. TO
 GAIN PROGRAM SPACES FOR THE 4TH INF BN, I WILL DELETE THE
 OTHER FIXED WING SQDN AND ITS SHARE OF H&MS/MABS, MAB-11 HQ,

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA4766 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO
 THE 175MM GUN BTRY, THE 155MM SP HOW BTRY, AND THE TANK CO,
 AND WILL REDUCE 2D CAG TO 400. THE 200 CAG SPACES RECOUPED
 WILL BE RETAINED AS CUPPS, SO NO DEGRADATION IN THIS PROGRAM
 WILL OCCUR. AS A HEDGE ON LONG RANGE ARTY, I WILL RETAIN
 THE UNMANNED TOWED 155MM HOWS NOW IN HQ BTRY 11TH MAR.

7. INFORMAL LIAISON WITH XXIV CORPS AND 7TH AF AND OUR
 EXPERIENCE WITH MACV IN INCREMENT 4 INDICATES THEY MAY
 FAVOR RETENTION OF FW AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER BELIEVE WE SHOULD
 LEAD WITH 4 BN OPTION BECAUSE IT IS WHAT WE NEED TO DO OUR
 JOB AND SECONDLY IT WILL FORCE A DECISION ON MAB MISSION
 OR PROVISION OF OTHER FORCES FOR VITAL AREA SECURITY. WE
 WILL BE PREPARED TO FALL BACK ON TWO SQDN MAB IF NECESSARY.
 WARM REGARDS.

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4766 CG III MAF

P 010827Z AUG 70

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TO RUMLMPA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

S E C R E T /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES/ INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS

A. CG 1ST MARDIV 220101Z JUL70 (SPECAT)

B. CG III MAF 222356Z JUL70 (SPECAT)

1. (S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO INFORM YOU OF THE
CURRENT PLANS FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE DIVISION'S HEADQUARTERS
BATTALION, HOW THESE PLANS ADVERSELY IMPACT ON THE DIVISION'S
COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES, AND TO DISCUSS WHAT IS PLANNED
TO DO ABOUT IT. THESE MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED WITH LTGEN
MCCUTCHEON PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE AND HE GAVE HIS GENERAL APPROVAL
TO THE APPROACH OUTLINED HEREIN.2. (S) AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION, THE 1 JULY AUTHORIZED ALLOW
ANCE OF THE DIVISION, INCLUDING OUT OF COUNTRY NON-EFFECTIVE
ALLOWANCE (OOCNE), IS 1,192 OFFICERS AND 20,835 ENLISTED, FOR A

CG FIRST MARDIV

P 030950Z/AUG70

ACTN; S/SEC 1-4

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PAGE TWO RUMLLUAC316 S E C R E T SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/ TOTAL OF 22,027. ON 15 OCTOBER 1970, THE TOTAL AUTHORIZED ALLOWANCE, INCLUDING OOCNE, WILL BE 644 OFFICERS AND 11,172 ENLISTED, FOR A TOTAL OF 11,816. FURTHER, THE CURRENT MANNING LEVEL OF HEADQUARTERS BATTALION IS 209 OFFICERS AND 1,273 ENLISTED, FOR A TOTAL OF 1,482. THE ACTUAL ON-ROLLS STRENGTH TOTALS 1,398. THIS OVERAGE OF 416 IS PRIMARILY RELATED TO THE SCAMP PLATOON AND VALID REQUIREMENTS IN COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS FUNCTIONS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT FIELDS SUCH AS LOCAL SECURITY AND THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE'S ACTIVITIES. IN THIS REGARD, AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCE A, STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO REDUCE ALL HEADQUARTERS UNITS TO THEIR ABSOLUTE HARD-CORE REQUIREMENTS.

3. (S) CURRENT REDEPLOYMENT DIRECTIVES/PLANS PROVIDE FOR A DRAW-DOWN ON HEADQUARTERS BATTALION AS FOLLOWS:

- A. FIRST ELEMENT: DEPARTING ABOUT 19 AUGUST, RESULTING IN A MANNING LEVEL TOTALING 1,015 AND AN ON-ROLLS STRENGTH OF 1,281.
- B. SECOND ELEMENT: DEPARTING ABOUT 26 SEPTEMBER, RESULTING IN A MANNING LEVEL OF 514, INCLUDING 26 IN THE SCAMP PLATOON. THIS FIGURE OF 514 REPRESENTS APPROXIMATELY 35 PERCENT OF THE ORIGINAL MANNING LEVEL OR 27 PERCENT OF THE 1 JULY ONROLL STRENGTH.

CG FIRST MARDEV

P 030950Z/AUG70

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PAGE THREE RUMLLUA0316 S E C R E T SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/

4. (S) IN REVIEWING HOW SUCH DRASTIC REDUCTIONS WERE PLANNED, I FIND THAT THEY WERE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF THE FOLLOWING:

- AN INITIAL REQUIREMENT TO REACH A DIVISION WIDE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, INCLUDING OOCNE, OF 11,816 BY 15 OCTOBER.
- A REQUIREMENT/DESIRE TO RETAIN WITHIN THE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AS MANY TACTICAL UNITS AS POSSIBLE, AS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT THE ENGINEER CAPABILITY HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED THIS MONTH.
- A CHANGE IN REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPT FOR MARINE FORCES. ORIGINAL PLANNING PROVIDED FOR A REDUCTION TO A MAB SIZE FORCE IN ONE INCREMENT ON 15 OCTOBER (INCREMENT 4). HOWEVER, THIS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED TO SPREAD THE REDUCTION OVER THE PERIOD 15 OCTOBER - 1 JANUARY (INCREMENTS 4 AND 5). THE RETENTION OF AN ADDITIONAL RLT AND MAJOR AVIATION UNITS BEYOND 15 OCTOBER WHILE REMAINING WITHIN STRINGENT CEILINGS PRECLUDED RETENTION OF ALL BUT A MINIMAL HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT.

5. (S) IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THE PLANNING FACTORS DISCUSSED ABOVE ARE VALID. HOWEVER, AS CITED ABOVE, THE SITUATION HAS NOT DEVELOPED AS INITIALLY CONCEIVED. AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCE B, THE BRIGADE WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR GROUND AND AIR OPERA-

PAGE FOUR RUMLLUA0316 S E C R E T SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/ TIONS ON "ABOUT 15 NOVEMBER 1970" AS OPPOSED TO "EARLY THIS SUMMER" AS ORIGINALLY BELIEVED DURING THE PLANNING STAGE.

INSOFAR AS CAN BE DETERMINED NOW, THE DIVISION'S TAOR, ITS TASKS, AND ITS OVERALL FUNCTIONS WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE UNTIL THE BRIGADE ACTUALLY ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS; THE ARVN/VIETNAMESE MARINE BRIGADE, UNDER CURRENT PLANS, WILL NOT ASSUME A TAOR UPON THE STAND-DOWN AND SUBSEQUENT DEPARTURE OF RLT-7. TO THE CONTRARY, THESE UNITS WILL MERELY BE LOCATED IN THE AREA OF THE 5TH MARINES AND 7TH MARINES, TAKING OVER SOME OF THEIR FACILITIES, BUT NOT THEIR TAORS.

6. (S) IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABOVE, THE TWO-MONTHS PERIOD OF 15 SEPTEMBER, WHEN THE SECOND ELEMENT OF HEADQUARTERS BATTALION STANDS DOWN, TO 15 NOVEMBER IS CRITICAL IN THAT THE DIVISION'S FUNDAMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES WILL REMAIN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME, BUT WITH INADEQUATE, OR, AT BEST, MARGINAL, COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.

7. (S) ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THAT, TO DATE, NO DEFINITE WORD HAS BEEN PROMULGATED RELATIVE TO THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE DIVISION (-) SUBSEQUENT TO 15 OCTOBER. AS A RESULT, IT IS MANDATORY THAT WE RETAIN AN ADEQUATE COMMAND AND CONTROL MECHANISM BEYOND THAT

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2408

PAGE FIVE RUMLLUA0316 S E C R E T SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/
DATE.

8. (S) DURING THE PERIOD 15 SEPTEMBER - 15 NOVEMBER, DIVISION HEADQUARTERS WILL HAVE A REQUIREMENT FOR A TOTAL OF 832 OFFICERS AND MEN VERSUS A MANNING LEVEL OF 514. TO MEET THE 832 ACTUAL STRENGTH REQUIREMENT, IT IS PLANNED TO USE THE FOLLOWING RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE DIVISION WITHOUT ANY REQUIREMENT TO REQUEST CHANGES IN MANNING LEVELS OR REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULES:

MANNING LEVEL:

488

MANNING LEVEL SCAMP PLATOON:

26

OOCNE ALLOWANCE:

132

OTHER PERSONNEL WITHIN APPROVED
AND ACTUAL DIVISION STRENGTH:

186

TOTAL: 832

THE 186 PERSONNEL CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE AUTHORIZED CEILINGS OF THE DIVISION AND FROM THE PERSONNEL ACTUALLY ASSIGNED WITH ONLY SLIGHT DETRIMENT TO OTHER DIVISION UNITS, AS THIS REPRESENTS LESS THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE TOTAL DIVISION AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND ACTUAL PERSONNEL WHO WILL BE AVAILABLE.

9. (S) I SINCERELY BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE APPROACH IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED. THE DIVISION CAN CONTINUE TO

PAGE SIX RUMLLUA0316 S E C R E T SPECAT/MARINE COPS EYES ONLY/
PERFORM ITS CURRENT MISSION WITHOUT RESORTING TO MARGINAL CAPABILITIES. NO REQUESTED CHANGES IN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITS OR SHIPPING SCHEDULES ARE INVOLVED; NO REDUCTIONS IN TAORS OR TASKS ARE REQUIRED. IN BRIEF, BY MAKING THESE ADJUSTMENTS WITHIN AUTHORIZED CEILINGS, THE DIVISION WILL HAVE A HEADQUARTERS WHICH IS STILL AUSTERE BUT YET ADEQUATELY STRUCTURED AND MANNED. FOR THE TASK AT HAND.

GP-4

BT

0316

CG FIRST MARDIV

P 030950Z/AUG70

4-4

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	TO/CC CG III MAF INFO CG FIRST MAW CG FIRST MARDIV CG I MEF CG FIFTH MEB CG FLC COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES	PRECEDENCE <input type="checkbox"/> FLASH <input type="checkbox"/> IMMEDIATE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE <input type="checkbox"/> MAIL	PHONE 39-530 CONF/REP G-1 W G-3 V G-4 E COMPT V DCS V RELEASE SIGN Wm K Jones

D ← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES
 O IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EX-
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 T AUTHORITY. ART
 0454 SECURITY MANUAL.

INFO MGEN ARMSTRONG, MGEN WIDDECKE, MGEN WILSON,

BGEN DWYER AND BGEN PADALINO FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE

CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 222356Z/JUL70 (TS) (SPECAT)

B. CG FMFPAC 071801Z/JUL70 (TS) (SPECAT)

C. CMC 061345Z/FEB70 (TS) (SPECAT)

1. (TS) REF A PROPOSES SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR TRANSI-

TION FROM III MAF TO 3D MAB WHICH WAS DISCUSSED AT HQ

III MAF ON 14 JULY 1970 RELATIVE TO AGENDA ITEMS POSED

S IN REF B.

2. (TS) FOLLOWING COMMENTS PERTAIN:

A. MAINTAINING A SMALL 1ST MARDIV (FWD) AND 1ST

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MAW (FWD), SUBSEQUENT TO THE REDEPLOYMENT OF 1ST MAR DIV/1ST MAW "FLAGS" FROM RVN, COULD CONCEIVABLY TEND TO OBSCURE THE COMMAND LINES DURING THE RELOCATION. UPON REDEPLOYMENT OF 1ST MARDIV/1ST MAW, COMMAND OF THOSE ELEMENTS REMAINING IN RVN SHOULD PASS TO THE SENIOR MARINE COMMANDER IN RVN TO AVOID ANY IMPLICATION THAT OPCON MIGHT BE EXERCISED FROM "OUT OF COUNTRY." THE REQUIREMENT TO RETAIN A SMALL DIVISION AND WING REAR ECHELON IS UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED. HOWEVER, TO PRECLUDE ANY MISINTERPRETATION BY THE PRESS, SUGGEST REMAINING ELEMENTS BE IDENTIFIED, FOR EXAMPLE, AS DET HQ BN 1ST MARDIV AND DET MWHG-1, 1ST MAW.

B. CG 5TH MEB IS PRESENTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR EXECUTION OF THE 82 SERIES CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR SOUTH AMERICA AND CUBA. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT THIS DESIGNATION CONTINUE SO THAT ROSS DWYER WILL HAVE COMMAND AT ALL TIMES OF FMFPAC FORCES AT CAMP PENDLETON *UNTIL CHUCK ARRIVES.* ADDITIONALLY, ROSS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO ME FOR ALL ASPECTS OF DEACTIVATIONS, REDEPLOYMENTS, AND REDesignATIONS FOR

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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D DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE D

O ~~TOP SECRET LIMDIS~~ LIMDIS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN O

T MCCUTCHEON FROM MGEN ADAMS . MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. N

O DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000// O

T 1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF COMNAVFORV 011730Z/SEP70 T

T (TS) TO CINCPACFLT, INFO CNO WHICH I AM PROVING FOR T
INFORMATION. T

P QUOTE: P

F FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. COMUSRACV 230426Z AIG 70

B. CINCPAC 292210Z AIG 70 (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REF A IS COMUSMACV REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO TRADE OFF
1610 MARINE SPACES FOR 1610 ARMY SPACES IN KEYSTONE ROBIN.A. REF B REQUESTED COMMENTS FROM CINCPACFLT ON THE MACV REQUEST.
FYI YOUR READDRESSALS WERE FIRST INDICATIONS THIS ISSUE.2. (TS) THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 60 NAV SPACES WITH THE 1610 MARINES.
THESE HAVE NOT BEEN ADDRESSED NOR CONSIDERED IN REF A OTHER THAN TO
INDICATE THAT NAVY REDEPLOYMENT TOTAL OF 8800 DOES NOT CHANGE.3. (TS) IF THE TRADE OFF IS APPROVED, COMNAVFORV WILL BE UNABLE TO
IDENTIFY APPROXIMATELY 60 ADDITIONAL NAVY SPACES REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE
THE 8800 REDEPLOYMENT. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE ARMY TRADE OFF PACK-
AGE BE EQUAL TO THE TOTAL OF THE USMC AND ASSOCIATED NAVY SPACES AND
LET THE NAVY REDEPLOYMENT BE ADJUSTED ACCORDINGLY. MACV HAS BEEN
ADVISED OF ABOVE AND REQUESTED TO INFORM COMNAVFORV WHEN USMC
REDEPLOYMENT CONSIDERED. ALL NAVY SPACES WITH MARINES.A. IF REPRODUCED ALL COPIES MUST BE
SERIALIZED AND IMMEDIATELY RECORDED.

C. UNQUOTE. WITH THE TOP PAGER TO PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

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TOP SECRET 24681 ← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

TOP SECRET LIMDIS

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES TOP SECRET LIMDIS 103

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P 170522Z SEP 70

COPY 1 OF 2

FM CG III MAF

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TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

170714Z SEP 70

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

// N03003//

TOP SECRET HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR CCN AND CCC (S)

A. COMUSMACV 330919Z SEP 70 (S) (PASEP)

B. MY 041425Z SEP 70 (S) (PASZBP)

C. MY 101559Z SEP 70 (S) (PASEP)

D. CG XXIV CORPS 120115Z SEP 70 (S) (PASEP)

E. COMUSMACV 131515Z SEP 70 (S) (PASEP)

I. (S) REFS A THROUGH E ARE THE LATEST ACCOUNTING OF OUR EXPERIENCE IN SUPPORT OF MACSOG OPERATIONS. I HAVE PASSED THESE REFS TO YOU SEPARATELY. THEY SEQUENTIALLY TRACE A PATTERN WHICH IS TYPICAL OF OUR EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF MACSOG SINCE 1965. WHILE I QUESTION THE IMPORTANCE OF MACSOG EFFORT, I ALSO NOTE THE RESULTING DEGRADATION TO OUR HELICOPTER OPERATIONS IN QUANG NAM. THE LOSS OF TWO CH-53 HELOS THESE PAST FEW DAYS SHARPENS MY CONCERN.

CG III MAF

P 170522Z SEP 70

ACTN: S/SEC 1-3

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PAGE TWO RUMLMPA2401 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCL FOR/M C E O
 2. (TS) REF C EXPRESSED THIS VIEW TO SUTHERLAND AND DOCUMENTED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM. DURING THE PERIOD 21 AUG - 3 SEP 70, WE LOST NUMEROUS SUPPORT HOURS DUE TO COMMITMENT OF HELICOPTERS TO MACSOG. AS THE FIGURES SHOW, THERE IS GROSS INEFFICIENCY. THE SUPER SENSITIVITY OF THE OPERATIONS WILL NOT PERMIT DETAILED EVALUATION (FROM HERE) OF THEIR PRODUCTIVITY.

3. (TS) SINCE REF C I HAVE UPDATED THE STATISTICS AS FOLLOWS:

A. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS FOR 10 DAY PERIOD ASSIGNED TO CCC

	STANDBY HOURS	FLT TIME
6 AH-1G	36	0
6 CH-53D	6	0
MISSION SLIPPED 24 HOURS BY WEATHER		
6 SEPT		
6 AH-1G	36	0
6 CH-53D	6	0
MISSION SLIPPED 24 HOURS BY WEATHER		
7 SEPT		
6 AH-1G	91.3	10.7
6 CH-53D	91.2	10.8

A/C LAUNCHED FROM MMAF 1300H FOR KONTUM. NO MISSIONS FLOWN.

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA2401 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCL FOR/M C E O

8 SEPT		
6 AH-1G	130.7	13.3
6 CH-53D	129.1	14.9

A/C FLEW TO KONTUM AND DAK PEK. NO MISSIONS FLOWN.

9 SEPT		
6 AH-1G	68.3	9.7
6 CH-53D	63.3	9.7

A/C RETURNED TO MAG-16 TO ASSUME 48 HOUR STANDBY. NO MISSIONS FLOWN.

10 SEPT		
4 AH-1G	10.4	17.6
5 CH-53D	7.8	27.2

A/C FLEW TO KONTUM 1300H AFTER BEING SCRAMBLED. A/C RETURNED TO MMAF 2000H FOR 30 MIN ALERT STANDBY.

11 SEPT		
4 AH-1G	16.9	25.1
5 CH-53D	13.2	26.3

A/C MADE INSERT. ALL A/C HIT BY GROUND FIRE.

12 SEPT		
4 AH-1G	24.0	10.0

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA2401 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCL FOR/M C E O

5 CH-53D 34.8 7.7

13 SEPT

4 AH-1G 82.8 13.2

5 CH-53D 107.6 12.4

EMERGENCY EXTRACT ATTEMPT ABORTED WHEN CH 53D SHOT DOWN.

14 SEPT

4 AH 1G 53.0 25.0

6 CH 53D 85.4 21.6

4 OV-10A 13.5 21.0

8 A4E 0.0 (SCRAMBLED) 8.7

MISSION COMPLETE. ONE CH 53D SHOT DOWN DURING EXTRACTION.

B. TOTAL CUMULATIVE MISSION EFFECTIVENESS DURING 10 DAY ASSIGNMENT
TO CCC.

TYPE A/C	FLT TIME HRS	COMMITTED TIME HOURS	USAGE RATIO
AH 1G	124.6	675.0	.1845
CH 53D	131.1	735.5	.1775
OV-10A	21.0	34.5	.6087
A4E	8.7	8.7	1.0000

4. (S) OBVIOUSLY THE HOURS AND ASSETS WE LOSE SUPPORTING MACSOG

PAGE FIVE RUMLMPA2401 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCL FOR/M C E O
 COMES RIGHT OUT OF OUR HIDE HERE IN QUANG NAM. WHILE THE COST IS
 SPREAD AMONG ALL THOSE WE SUPPORT, MOST OF THE TAB IS PICKED UP BY
 OUR OWN MARINES. IT IS CERTAINLY NOT VERY COST EFFECTIVE NOR
 PRODUCTIVE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2401

CG III MAU

P 170522Z SEP 70

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ZNY AAAAA

P 180502Z SEP 70

CCN: 000295

FM CG III MAF

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TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT COPY 1 OF 2 COPIESS E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN
MCCUTCHEON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS ONLY)

HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR OPERATION TAILWIND (S)

I. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE

P 170756Z ZFF 4 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF

TO CG XXIV CORPS

INFO COMUSMACV

ZEM

S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN SUTHERLAND INFO GEN ABRAMS
FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//N03320//

HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR OPERATON TAILWIND(S)

A. MY 041425Z SEP 70 (S)

B. MY 101559Z SEP 70 (S)

CG III MAF

P 180502Z/SEP70

ACTN:S/SEC

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PAGE TWO RUMLMPA2531 S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES
FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/MCEO

1. (S) REF A ACKNOWLEDGED SUPPORT TO OPERATION TAILWIND WITH AIRCRAFT REQUIRED TO ENSURE MISSION SUCCESS. REF B EXPRESSED MY CONCERN FOR THE INEFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF III MAF HELICOPTERS WHILE ASSIGNED TO EITHER THE CCN OR CCC MISSION.
2. (S) OPERATION TAILWIND WAS COMPLETED ON 14 SEP 70, THE FINAL WRAP-UP OF MISSION EFFECTIVENESS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF TWO CH-53 HELOS BEARS SOME HARD ANALYSING.
3. (S) THE TOTAL CUMULATIVE MISSION EFFECTIVENESS DURING THE 10 DAY ASSIGNMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

5 SEP 1970 - 14 SEP 1970

TYPE A/C	FLT TIME HOURS	COMMITTED TIME HOURS	USAGE RATIO
AH-1G	124.6	675.0	.1845
CH-53D	131.1	738.5	.1775
OV-10A	21.0	34.5	.6087

4. (S) IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE HIGH COMMITTED TIME AND THE LOW FLIGHT HOUR RATIO PLACES A SEVERE DRAIN AND DEGRADATION ON THE HELICOPTER SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO OUR NORMAL CUSTOMERS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. THE LOSS OF TWO VALUABLE ASSETS WHEN INVOLVED IN A LOW EFFICIENCY ENDEAVER RAISES NUMEROUS

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA2531 S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES
FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/MCEO
QUESTIONS.

5. (S) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE PROGRAM CONTINUE TO BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO BE SURE THAT THE RESULTS OBTAINED ARE IN CONCERT WITH THE RESOURCES COMMITTED.

WARM REGARDS.

UNQUOTE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2531 CG III MAF

P 180502Z/SEP70

2-2

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TOP SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON

FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
 DURING WORKING HOURS. **11000000//**

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 100007Z/SEP70 (TS) (SPECAT)
 B. CG FMFPAC 261916Z/AUG70 (TS) (SPECAT)
 C. FMFPACO 5440.20 (PROV T/O, I MAF)

1. (S) YOUR COMMENTS CONTAINED IN REF A ON MY PROPOSAL (REF B) CONCERNING RELOCATION OF HQ III MAF, 2
 ARE APPRECIATED.

2. (TS) IN RESPONSE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN PARAS 2A AND 2B OF REF A, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS PROVIDED:

A. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE III MAF WITH THE HQ

The MAU (SLF)

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TOP SECRET - MCEO

AND LIAISON TO COMNAVBASESUBIC AS TASKED, IT WILL BE PROPOSED THAT T/O M-4918 BE MODIFIED TO INCLUDE THOSE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL PROVIDED IN REF C FOR THAT PURPOSE.

B. IT IS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT T/O M-4918 DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE PERSONNEL FOR INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS. HOWEVER, DUE TO MARINE CORPS CEILING CONSTRAINTS ON OKINAWA, THE ASSOCIATED H&S CO (T/O M-4919) CANNOT BE ACTIVATED. RATHER, IT IS PLANNED THAT III MAF HQ BE SATELLITED ON A HOST COMMAND ON OKINAWA FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING SUPPORT. ADDITIONAL COMM SUPPORT WILL BE OBTAINED BY DIVISION AND WING UNITS PROVIDING NECESSARY AUGMENTATION TO THE HOST COMMAND ON OKINAWA.

3. (TS) IT IS MY INTENTION, BASED UPON REF A AND THE ABOVE, TO MODIFY MY PROPOSED MSG TO CMC (REF B) AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARS 1,2,3 AND 5: NO CHANGE, REMAIN AS STATED IN REF B.

B. PAR 4: DELETE AND REPLACE WITH:
QUOTE

4. (TS) HQ III MAF T/O

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← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS ~~ANALYSES~~ ~~PARAPHRASES~~ ~~YES ONLY~~
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A. T/O AS SPECIFIED IN TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

NUMBER M-4918 WITH FORCE COMMANDER SECTION MODIFIED
 AS INDICATED TO PROVIDE FOR A LIEUTENANT GENERAL,
 AND THE ADDITION OF ~~2~~ HQ ELEMENTS FOR THE ~~7TH FLEET~~
~~LANDING FORCES Afloat~~ AND A LIAISON SECTION.

(CHANGES UNDERLINED).

LINE	BILLET DESCRIPTION	RANK	MOS
1	FORCE COMMANDER SECTION		
2	FORCE COMMANDER	LGEN	9903
3	AIDE	MAJ	9910
4	AIDE	CAPT	9910
5	SERGEANT MAJOR	SGTMAJ	9999
6	FOOD SERVICES TECHNICIAN	MSGT	3382
7	COOK SPECIALIST	SGT	3372
8	STENOGRAPHER	SGT	0142
8A	MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR	SGT	3531
8B	COOK SPECIALIST	CPL	3372

(ADD FOLLOWING SECTION STARTING WITH LINE #200)

LINE	BILLET DESCRIPTION	RANK	MOS
200	HQ MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT (SLF)		
201	MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT COMMANDER SECT		
202	COMMANDING OFFICER	COL	9910
203	S-1 SECTION		

705

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~YES ONLY~~

TOP SECRET

→ DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →
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D O N O T T Y P E I N T H I S S P A C E	204	S-1 /ADJ		LT	0130	D O N O T T Y P E I N T H I S S P A C E
		ADMIN MAN/DRIVER	CPL			
	205	ADMIN MAN/DRIVER	CPL	0141		
	206	INTELLIGENCE SECTION				
	207	INTELLIGENCE OFFICER	MAJ	0202		
	208	IMAGERY INTERP	SSGT	0241		
	209	OPERATIONS SECTION				
	210	OPERATIONS OFFICER	LTCOL	0302		
	211	FSC/ASST OPNS OFFICER	MAJ	0802		
	212	AIR OBSERVER	LT	0805		
	213	OPNS CHIEF	GYSGT	9711		
	214	ADMIN MAN	CPL	0141		
	215	LOGISTICS SECTION				
	216	LOG OFFICER	LTCOL	0402		
	217	SUPPLY/ADMIN CHIEF	MSGT	3091		
	218	EMBARK CHIEF	GYSGT	0431		
	219	ADMIN MAN	CPL	0141		
	220	COMM SECTION				
	221	COMM OFFICER	MAJ	2502		
	222	COMM CHIEF	SSGT	2539		
	223	RAD OPR	CPL	2533(2)		
	224	RAD OPR	LCPL	2533(2)		
	225	TOTAL 16 OFF 24 ENL	/1			

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES FOR SECRET MC2025 ONLY

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TOP SECRET

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

TOP SECRET - MCEO

226	SUBIC BAY LIAISON SECTION		
227	LIAISON OFFICER	MAJ	9910
228	ADMIN MAN	SGT	0141
229	ADMIN/SUPPLY MAN	SGT	3041
230	MAIL CLERK	CPL	0161
231	COOK	CPL	3371
232	TOTAL 1 OFF AND 5 ENL		

NOTE: 1 8 OFF AND 12 ENL FOR A HQ STAFF AS INDICATED
 HOWEVER, SINCE AT PRESENT AND FOR THE FORESEEABLE
 FUTURE THERE IS ONLY A REQUIREMENT FOR ONE MAU (SLF)
 HQ (BASED UPON ONE LPH IN WESTPAC), THE 8 ADDITIONAL
OFF AND 12 ADDITIONAL ENL (20 TOTAL) ARE RETAINED AS
TO BE
 A CONTINGENCY FOR MANNING A SECOND MAU (SLF) HQ STAFF
THESE ARE
 IF REQUIRED. 20 SPACES TO BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT OTHER
 III MAF STAFF SECTIONS WHEN SECOND MAU (SLF) HQ STAFF
 NOT REQUIRED.

(PRESENT LINES 200-209 OF T/O M-4918 WILL BECOME
 LINES #233-241 RESPECTIVELY)

B. THE H&S COMPANY WHICH SUPPORTS A MAF HQ (T/O
 M-4919) WILL NOT BE ACTIVATED DUE TO MARINE CORPS
 CEILING CONSTRAINTS ON OKINAWA. NO THE MAF WILL BE
 SATELLITED ON A HOST COMMAND ON OKINAWA AND THAT COM

TOP SECRET

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

TOP SECRET - MCEO

MAND WILL BE TASKED TO PROVIDE FOR INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS. REQUIRED ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY III MAF TASKING ITS DIVISION AND WING TO PROVIDE AUGMENTATION TO THE HOST COMMAND COMMUNICATION FACILITY.

Conrad
THE 4. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT III MAF WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE. IT IS ENVIS-
IONED THAT THESE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE LESS THAN THE TOTALS REFLECTED IN TABLE OF ORGANIZATION NUMBER M-4918 AS MODIFIED IN 4A ABOVE.
UNQUOTE.

4. (U) YOUR FURTHER VIEWS AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE REVISIONS TO MY PROPOSED MESSAGE TO CMC WOULD BE APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES TOP SECRET MCEO

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~~MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY~~

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TOD: 26SEP70 0546Z

Fr: CG	FROM	DTG	DRAFTED
CG FMFPAC	CG FMFPAC	252305Z SEP 70	SECT <u>G-3 OPS</u>
DCG ✓	CG I MAF	PRECEDENCE	PHONE <u>39-532</u>
C/S		<input type="checkbox"/> FLASH	CONFURRED
Dep CGS		<input type="checkbox"/> IMMEDIATE	G-1, G-2, G-4, COMPI
G-1		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY	MAF, CEO & ENGR
G-2		<input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE	HAVE CONFURRED
G-3		<input type="checkbox"/> MAIL	G-3
G-4			RELEASE SIGN
G-5			<u>Wm K Jones</u>
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~~CCO~~ DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

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TOP SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WILSON FROM

N LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING
0 WORKING HOURS. //N00000//

N
OFORCE PLANNING (U)T
Y
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E

A. CMC 142346Z/AUG70 (TS) (PASEP)
B. ADMIN FMFPAC 222235Z/AUG70 (TS) (PASEP)

1. (TS) REF A PROVIDED ALTERNATIVES TO ASSIST IN EASING

I
NTHE BASE LOADING/HOUSING PROBLEMS AT MCAS, KANEOHE
IN THE POST RVN TIME FRAME. REF B, IN PART, INFORMEDT
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I
SCMC OF ACTIONS BEING TAKEN BY CG FMFPAC IN AN ATTEMPT
TO RELOCATE CERTAIN UNITS, CURRENTLY LOCATED OR
PLANNED TO BE LOCATED AT MCAS, KANEOHE AND FURTHERT
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ADVISED THAT THE RELOCATION OF A MAU, AS PROPOSED REF A,

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WOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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TOP SECRET - MCEO

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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2. (TS) THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE MAU UNDER
CONSIDERATION SHOULD REMAIN IN THE PACOM FORCE STRUC-
TURE. FURTHER, *it might be* ~~desirable~~ PREFERABLE THAT THE MAU
BE LOCATED IN WESTPAC TO ENHANCE OUR CONTINGENCY POS-
IN His case
TURE. *1* BASING THE MAU ON OKINAWA PERMANENTLY WOULD BE
MOST DESIRABLE. HOWEVER, THIS MUST BE RULED OUT
BECAUSE OF THE PERSONNEL CEILING CONSTRAINT.

ATTENDANT DISADVANTAGES IN PERMANENT BASING ON OKINAWA
ALSO ACCRUE IN VIEW OF THE OVERTAXED BILLETING AND
TRAINING SPACE PREVAILING THERE NOW.

3. (TS) THE TTPI APPEARS TO OFFER BASING POSSIBILI-
TIES. A MARINE PRESENCE THERE MIGHT SERVE TO INDICATE
U.S. INTEREST, ALBEIT MILITARY, AFTER A LONG PERIOD
OF DISINTEREST AND NEGLECT. TINIAN WOULD BE MY CHOICE
BECAUSE OF ITS SMALL POPULATION, FEW COMMERCIAL
INTERESTS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF ABANDONED AIRFIELDS
WHICH COULD BE USED BY HELICOPTERS. OUR MODE WOULD
HAVE TO BE EXPEDITIONARY SINCE I AM CONVINCED THAT ANY
CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS WOULD NOT BE FUNDED.

4. (TS) IT IS ENVISIONED THAT THE MAU WOULD BE
CONSTITUTED FROM UNITS EITHER PRESENTLY LOCATED AT
KANEOHE OR FROM THOSE IN THE RESIDUAL FORCE (3D MAB)

TOP SECRETPAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES **TOP SECRET** EYES ONLY**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - MCEO

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DESTINED FOR KANEOHE UPON REDEPLOYMENT FROM RVN.

THE MAU WOULD BE UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND STRUCTURED SIMILARLY TO THAT OF THE SLF ALTHOUGH THE HELO COMPONENT COULD BE A COMPOSITE SQUADRON OR A CH-46 DETACHMENT. (THIS REQUIRES AN INTENSIVE LOOK ONCE WE PASS THE CONCEPTUAL STAGE BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN ESTABLISHING AN ADDITIONAL HELO SUPPORT SITE). THIS POSTURE THEN WOULD GIVE YOU ANOTHER BATTALION AS WELL AS ADDING A HELO SQUADRON/DETACHMENT TO MAG-36; AND WOULD REDUCE THE KANEOHE BASE LOADING BY A BLT PLUS.

5. (TS) THE DEPLOYMENT TIME FOR THE MAU ON TINIAN SHOULD
RECOGNIZE THE AUSTERE EXPEDITIONARY ENVIRONMENT
ENVISIONED THEREAT. THUS, WITH A SLF DEPLOYED (ONE
SLF IN POST RVN TIME FRAME), A BLT AT FUJI, AND A MAU
ON TINIAN, THE CEILING CONSTRAINT WOULD NOT BE EXCEEDED
AND CERTAINLY A VARIETY OF TRAINING COULD ENSUE.

6. (TS) IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THERE ARE MYRIAD OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CONCEPT. POLITICAL SANCTION FOR THE TTPI ENTRY, ACQUIREMENT OF ANOTHER PERSONNEL CEILING NOT CREDITED TO OKINAWA, ADDITIONAL STORAGE SPACE ON OKINAWA FOR THE

אַתָּה בְּנֵי אֶתְנָאָרָה

TOP SECRET

2405

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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TOP SECRET - MCEO

MAINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TINIAN MAU, AND PERSONNEL AND FUNDING SUPPORTABILITY
ARE SOME OF THE MAJOR ONES. HOWEVER, I DO FEEL THIS
PROPOSAL HAS MERIT AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS
ON THE CONCEPT ADDRESSED HEREIN. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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VV MFA015PTTAZYUW RUMLMPA3854 2701409-AAAA--RUHHFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 271409Z SEP 70

0362

FM CG III MAF

27SEP70 2244Z

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR
 LTGEN JONES FRM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON(DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
 SEPTEMBER WIEU

1. SEPT WIEU HELD MACV HQ 27 SEP FROM 0900-1600.
2. J-2 BRIEFED THAT CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED COSVN HAD ISSUED INSTRUCTION RELATIVE TO STRATEGY TO BE PURSUED FOR CONDUCT OF THE WAR. EMPHASIS WAS TO BE ON SMALL UNITS, ECONOMY OF FORCE, GUERRILLA WARFARE. GUERRILLA WAR WAS NECESSARY TO COPE WITH ENEMY WHO WAS NUMERICALLY STRONGER IN BOTH PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL, TO DEFEAT THE PACIFICATION EFFORT, TO OVERCOME THE SEVERE LOGISTIC PROBLEMS FACED BY VC/NVA, AND BECAUSE OF THE EXPANDED WAR IN INDO CHINA THE DOCUMENTS FURTHER DIRECTED THAT UNITS WOULD BREAK DOWN INTO THREE TO FIVE MAN CELLS, THEY WOULD LIVE AMONG THE POPULACE, THEIR WEAPONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE APPRO-

CG III MAF

P 271409Z SEP 70

ACTN: S/SEC 1-3

107

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

271409Z SEP 70

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA 354 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MCEO
PRIATE TO THE GUERRILLA AND SAPPER MISSION, AND THEY
WOULD ATTACK THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM.

3. ALTHOUGH THESE DOCUMENTS RETAINED TO COSVN WE HAVE
SEEN SOME INDICATIONS OF THIS IN QUANG NAM TOO. SPECI-
FICALLY THE EMPHASIS ON TARGETING PACIFICATION
STRATEGY REPRESENTS A REGRESSION TO STAGE ONE TACTICS
AND IS REALLY INDICATIVE THAT ENEMY REALIZES HE IS
LOSING IN THE MILITARY EFFORT.

4. THE 7TH AF BRIEFED ON PLANS TO ALLOCATE THE 14,000
TAC AIR SORTIES DURING UPCOMING NE MONSOON PERIOD. SEVENTY
PER CENT OR 9,800 SORTIES WOULD GO TO STEEL TIGER AREA IN
LAOS AND ANOTHER THOUSAND TO BARREL ROLL. REMAINING 3,200
WOULD COVER RVN. NO BREAKDOWN TO MRS WAS INDICATED. GENERAL
ABRAMS APPROVED THE 9,800 FOR STEEL TIGER IN PRINCIPLE BUT
INSTRUCTED THEM TO TAKE HARD LOOK AT BARREL ROLL AND ALSO TO
ANALYZE BEST METHOD FOR APPLICATION OF AIR EFFORT IN LAOS,
THAT IS, WHETHER TO TRY AND COVER WHOLE PANHANDLE OR TO
SELECT A VITAL ZONE AND KEEP IT UNDER ATTACK 24 HOURS A DAY
FOR 60 DAYS.

5. GENERAL ABRAMS MADE FOLLOWING SUMMARY POINTS IN CON-

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA 354 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MCEO
CLUSION. INFILTRATION IS DOWN. NONE TO COSVN SINCE JULY.
THREE REGIMENTS POSSIBLY IN PIPELINE NOW AND THERE ARE A LOT
OF THINGS THEY COULD DO BUT THEY WILL NOT HAVE DRAMATIC
IMPACT ON WAR. ENEMY HAS TO RELY ON GUERRILLA IN RVN
NOW AND AT SAME TIME HAS HAS TO KEEP LOC'S IN LAOS OPEN OR
HE IS IN DEEP TROUBLE IN RVN AND CAMBODIA. THE ULTIMATE
POLITICAL OUTCOME IN RVN MAY WELL DEPEND ON HOW STRONG REMAINING VCI
ARE IN RVN. WE HAVE TO REALLY GO TO WORK AND GRIND
THEM DOWN.

6. LOU CLAY TOLD ME AT LUNCH HE IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING
RECOMMENDING DOING AWAY WITH SEEK DAWN. THIS IS THE ENTIRE
AUTOMATED PORTION OF HIS TACS AND OF COURSE INCLUDES OUR
TDCC INTERFACE. I ASKED HIM WHY AND HE SAID TO SAVE THREE
MILLION BUCKS A YEAR. HE EVIDENTLY THINKS HIS MANUAL SYSTEM
WOULD BE ADEQUATE IN VIEW OF REDUCTION OF NAVR AIR EFFORT AND
SMALL LIKELIHOOD OF ENEMY RESORTING TO OFFENSIVE AIR ATTACKS.

7. CLAY ALSO SAID HE HAD RECEIVED MY LETTER RELATIVE TO THE
COMMAND RELATIONS CHART IN THE 7TH AF COMMANDO HUNT REPORT
HE SAID HE MAY EVEN DELETE IT BUT HE WOULD SEND ME A PROPER
FACETIOUS REPLY.

CG III MAF

P 271409Z SEP 70

2-3

107

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2405

PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA3354 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR /MCEO
8. SUTHERLAND AND I REMAINED AFTER WIEU AND GOT SPECIAL
BRIEFING FROM MACSOG REPS ON OPERATION TAILWIND. THE
OPERATION DID ACCOMPLISH SOME GOOD AND THE TEAM BROUGHT
BACK SOME VALUABLE DOCUMENTS WHICH GAVE MACV DATA ON LOGISTIC
SYSTEM IN PANHANDLE. I TOLD THEM MY TWO MAIN COMPLAINTS
WERE THAT I HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED IN ADVANCE AND THAT
COORDINATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL COULD BE IMPROVED. I
LEFT AN AFTER ACTION REPORT WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF LATER.
AND I AM FORWARDING YOU COPY.

WARM REGARD.

GP-4

BT

3854

CG III AF

P 271409Z SEP 70

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107

TOP SECRET

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39

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0111
30SEP70 0147Z

P 291310Z SEP 70
FM CG I MAF
TO CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MAJGEN
WILSON

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE WAS RECEIVED
FROM ADM WEISNER INFO RADM RUBEL.

QUOTE

260123Z SEP 70
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTF 76
CTG 79
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN WILSON AND RADM RUBEL
FROM WEISNER.

A. CINCPACFLT OPORDER 201-YR

1. A PROPOSAL FOR REORGANIZING PHIBPAC INTO FOUR SQUADRONS
IS BEING CONSIDERED. THE EXPRESSED PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED
CHANGE IS TO " PROVIDE IMPROVED DEPLOYMENT CYCLES OF
5-6 MONTH WESTPAC 14 MONTHS EASTPAC; BALANCE THE SQUADRONS
STRUCTURE AND LIFT; ESTABLISH SQUADRON INTEGRITY AND PROVIDE
RESPONSIVENESS IN INCREASED EASTPAC/MIDPAC TRAINING CONTINGEN-
CIES, HOMEVALS, ETC. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SCHEDULES, OVERHAULS
AND POST SHAKEDOWNS INDICATE THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATION TO BE
THE LEAST DISRUPTIVE IN TERMS OF HOMEPORT CHANGES AND OVER-
HAULS. THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS ARE/GERMANE IN THIS REORG:

CG I MAF

P 291310Z SEP70

ACT: 6 SEC

~~SECRET~~
~~AS SEEN~~

SECRET

2408

A. DEPLOY CURRENT PHIBRON 3 IN NOV 70 AS SCHED.
 B. NOT DEPLOY PHIBRON 1 IN FEB 71
 C. REORGANIZE EFFECTIVE FEB 71
 D. DEPLOY NEW RON 1 MAY 71 WITH FOLLOW-ON DEPLOYMENTS AT SIX MONTHS INTERVALS.

TYPE	RON 1 (SD)	RON 3 (SD)	RON 5 (LB)	RON 7 (SD)
LPH	NEW ORLEANS (F)	TRIPOLI (F)	OKINAWA (F)	DOLS, IWO JIMA (F)
LPD	DUBUQUE (F)	DULUTH (F)	JUNEAU (F)	CLEVELAND
LPD	VANCOUVER	OGDON		DENVER (F)
				DOLS
LKA	DURHAM DOLS	MOBILE	ST LOUIS	TULARE
LDS	CL HOMASTON	ANCHORAGE	PT DEFIANCE	MONTICELLO
LSD			ALAMO	
LST	PEORIA	TUSCALOOSA	MANITOWOC	FRESNO
LST	FREDERICK	SCHENECTADY	SUMTER	SAN BERNADINO
			CAYUGA	DOLS
LST				RACINE DOLS.
THE LIFT CAPABILITY AND LIGHTERAGE AVAILABILITY WOULD BE				
FURS	5000	5010	4350	5010
SQUARE (v)	111.8	114.6	123.1	104.9
CUBE (K)	251.4	251.4	215.4	180.8
LCU	1	1	1	1
LCM 3	14	14	14	10
LCM 6	5	5	5	9
LVT	40 PLUS	40 PLUS	40 PLUS	40 PLUS

NOTE 1. DOLS INDICATES HOMEPORT CHANGE REQUIRED.

NOTE 2. DISESTABLISHMENT OF CURRENT PHIBRON 9 AND 11 STAFFS WILL RESULT IN RELEASE OF 26 OFF/60 ENL BILLETS.

NOTE 3. PHIBRON 1 COULD DEPLOY 1 APR 71 TO LESSEN THE TIME DURING WHICH ONLY 1 CURRENT 6 PHIBRON IS IN WESTPAC.

2. (S) THE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO REF A ARE PROPOSED IF REFORG IS APPROVED

A. PARA 3. J, ADD: "(15) DIRECT A FLAG OFFICER TO REPORT TO COMSEVENTHFLT AS COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCE."

B. PAGE A-11-1 PARA; B CHANGE TO READ: "ONE PHIBRON WITH VERTICAL AND SURFACE ASSAULT CAPABILITY PLUS ASSOCIATED DETACHMENTS AND UNITS TO SUPPORT AN RLT (-) REINFORCED WITH COMPOSITE HELO SQUADRON AND ONE COLORED BEACH. LANSIPRONS OF 542 AND 1 66 CLASS LST UNTIL INACTIVATED ONE LCC OR OTHER APPROPRIATE FLAGSHIP."

2. (U) REQ COMMENTS ON ABOVE PROPOSAL NLT 29 SEP WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON SHORTFALLS WHICH MAY EXIST AND IMPLICATION REORGANIZATION WILL HAVE ON WESTPAC OPERATIONS. ENSURE COMMENTS CONTAIN COMPARISON OF LOAD CAPABILITY OF PRESENT SQUADRONS WITH LOAD CAPABILITY OF THE PROPOSED SQUADRONS. NOTE IS TAKEN OF THE ABSENCE OF ONE ARG DURING PERIOD 11 MAR-1 APR 71.

3. (U) ALL BEST WISHES.

GP-3

BT

2776

UNQUOTE

2. WARM REGARDS

GP-3 CG I MAF

P 291010Z SEP70

2-2

SECRET

SECRET

DEP LG HAS BEEN
DCG

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Dep. C/S	
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G-2	
G-3	✓ <i>copy</i>
G-4	✓ <i>copy</i>
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En-P-O⁴ 60%

P 291315Z SEP 70
FM CG I MAF
TO CG FMFPAC

CCN: 8043
TOR: 30SEP70 0026Z

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BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MAJGEN
WILSON

PROPOSED SEVENTHFLT PHIBFOR (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING QUOTED MESSAGE IS THE RESPONSE TO COM-
SEVENTHFLT 260128Z SEP 70 (S-SPECAT) QUOTED IN CG I MAF
291310Z SEP 70 (S-SPECAT) FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

"P 290913Z SEP 70

FM CTF SEVEN NINE

TO CONSENTHELT:

TO CONSEVEN SIX
GTE SEVEN SIX

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM WEISNER AND RADM
RUBEL FROM MAJGEN WILSON.

PROPOSED SEVENTEEN PERIOD (D)

A. CONSEVENTHELT 2601287 SEP 70 (S-SPECAT)

B. CINCPAC 180141Z SEP 70 (S)

1. (S) REF A REQ COMMENTS ON A PROPOSED REVISED CONFIGURATION OF PHIBRON SUPPORTING SEVENTH FLEET. REF B PROVIDES POLICY FOR SIZE OF ROUTINE TRAINING OF ARG/SLF STATING THAT THE LANDING FORCE IN SUCH EXERCISES WILL NOT EXCEED A BLT WITH NECESSARY SUPPORT UNITS.

2. (S) AS VIEWED FROM HERE, THE PROPOSED PHIBRON WILL BE CAPABLE OF LIFTING AND LANDING, BY SURFACE AND VERTICAL MEANS, A MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT (MAU) COMPOSED OF A HQ, TWO BLTS AND ONE HMM REINFORCED WITH THREE CH 53 AND THREE UH 1E. NO SHIPPING SHORT FALL FOR THAT SIZE FORCE APPEARS TO EXIST. HOWEVER, SUCH GROUPMENT WILL CAUSE LOSS OF FLEXIBILITY IN EXECUTION OF TRAINING AND CONTINGENCY MISSIONS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. LIMITATION STATED REF A (NOT TO EXCEED A BLT) WILL DICTATE SPLITTING THE PHIBRON FOR ANY GIVEN EXERCISE, THUS ESTABLISHING THE REQUIREMENT TO ACTIVATE SECOND CAFT/CLF STAFFS FOR THE REQUIRED TIME, SINCE THE ENTIRE FORCE WILL BE UNABLE TO LAND IN A COORDINATED ASSAULT.

GG I MAF

P 2913157 SEP 70

ACTN: 8/86

N: S/SEC 1-3
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CONFIDENTIAL 2908

B. IN GENERAL, THE PREPONDERENCE OF THE TF 79 CONTINGENCY PLANS CALL FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A BLT AS THE INITIAL ASSAULT FORCE. WHILE THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING THE SECOND BLT READILY AVAILABLE AS A RESERVE IS RECOGNIZED, THERE ARE SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN THIS POSTURE. AND RLT MINUS HAVING THE CAPABILITY OF VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT OF ONLY ONE HMM (REIN) MAY BE OF QUESTIONABLE TACTICAL VALUE IN SO FAR AS THESE TOTAL HELO ASSETS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO GAIN AND TO SUSTAIN HARMFUL IMPACT OF A BLT ASSAULT. FURTHER, IT APPEARS THAT THE NAVAL COMMAND ELEMENT PROPOSED, WOULD PPECLUE THE AVAILABILITY OF A PARALLEL NAVAL COMMAND FOOR THE COMMITMENT OF THE LANDING FORCE IN ANY POSTURE LESS THAN THE RLT(-).

C. EXECUTION OF SIMULTANEOUSLY SEPARATE CONTINGENCIES WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE IN THAT NEITHER THE PROPOSED CATF NOR CLF WOULD POSSESS ADEQUATE CONTROL ASSETS FOR SEPARATE AOA.

D. THE CAPACITY OF THE SLF CAMP SUBIC IS 1500 PERS, THUS, IF ALL SHIPS ARE IN-PORT SUBIC, SIMULTANEOUSLY, A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF MARINES WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN BILLETED ABOARD SHIP. IN THE SAME RESPECT, THE LIMITED TRAINING AREA AT SUBIC WOULD BE SEVERELY TAXED TO ACCOMODATE A FORCE OF THIS SIZE.

E. CONTINUED USE OF THE FUJI/NUMAZO TRAINING AREA DURING THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE IS REQUIRED. CURRENT SITUATION THERE LIMITS USE TO ONE BLT AND ONE ARTY BN (REIN). SHIPPING TO ROTATE THE BN WOULD BE REQUIRED FORM THE SINGLE PHIBRON UNLESS OTHER LST'S WERE MADE AVAILABLE-SOURCE OF WHICH, IF ANY-IS NOT KNOWN. 3. (S) THE PRINCIPAL CHANGE OF THE TOTAL SHIP MIX IS THE SUBSTITUTION OF ONE LST FOR A LKC. THERE IS A LOSS OF GENERAL BALE CUBE FOR WHICH ADJUSTMENT WILL HAVE TO BE MADE. AN ADEQUACY OF SQUARE FOR ROLLING STOCK/CONTAINERIZED CARGO APPEARS EVIDENT.

4. (S) CURRENT SKED TO EMBARK BLT 2/4 IN PHIBRON 11 ON 16 NOV AND TO CHANGE PHIBRON 3 FOR PHIBRON 522-24 NOV IS EXCELLENT FROM CTF 79 POINT OF VIEW. UNDOUBTEDLY SOME SHIFT IN CHANGE-OVER THIRD QTR DATES WILL BE REQUIRED FOR CHANGE OVER

CG I MAF

P 291315Z SEP 70

2-3

SECRET

109

1485
REF ID: A65102
1. EXECUTIVE FOR

OF PHIBRON WERE IN APRIL; HOWEVER, EARLY APRIL CHANGE OVER IS PREFERABLE IN THAT IT WOULD CAUSE THE LEAST STAND-DOWN TIME FOR SLF UNLESS PHIBRON '11 IS EXTENDED.

5. (S) IN SUM, THE PROPOSAL IN REF (A) PROVIDES FOR ONLY ONE LPH IN WESTPAC FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PROPOSING THE ADDITION OF ANOTHER BLT AND REGT (SLF) HQ WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL HELO LIFT CAPABILITY OVER THAT CURRENTLY PROVIDED FOR ONE BLT. IT IS CONSIDERED MORE ADVISABLE TO PROVIDE SHIPPING FOR ONE HELO CONFIGURED BLT LANDING FORCE AND FOR ONE SURFACE LANDED BLT LANDING FORCE ALONG WITH THEIR COUNTERPART NAVAL COMMAND ELEMENTS. IN PERIODS WHEN SHIPPING IS NOT AVAILABLE, THAT BLT WOULD BE CONFIGURED FOR AIRLIFT COMMITMENT. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT" WARM REGARDS
GP-4
BT

CG I MAF

P 291315Z SEP 70

3-3

REF ID: A65102
109

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Fr: CG	FROM	90	TOD: 300857Z SEP 70	DRAFTED
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D DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE D

O TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN WILSON FROM O

BGEN HOUGHTON. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
 DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000//

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF ADMIN CINCPACFLT

300011Z SEP 70 TO COMSEVENTHFLT. PLEASE PROTECT

OUR SOURCE.

QUOTE:

CINCPAC JAOCK/FOCUS LENS FY 71 (U)

- A. CINCPAC 212335Z SEP 70 PASEP
- B. SAF COMMAND CENTER FUCHU 261430Z SEP 70 PASEP
- C. CINCPAC 310343Z JUL 70 PASEP
- D. (S) BY REF A CINCPACFLT WAS REQ TO PROVIDE REPRESENTATION ON THE JOINT AIR OPERATIONS CENTER KOREA (JAOCK) FOR FOCUS LENS FY 71. IN

REF B SAF REQ 14 OFF/17 ENL (USN) PERS TO STAFF THE JAOCK.

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
EXCLUSIVE FOR
MCEO

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

2. {TS} THE MISSION OF JAOCK WILL BE TO COORDINATE THE EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL AIR IN THE KOREAN THEATER. CINCPAC 5027 PLAN CH-4 COVERS THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF JAOCK AND WILL BE PROMULGATED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. A COPY WILL BE MAILED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN THE MEANTIME REF C APPLIES.

3. {TS} THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL REQ BY SAF TO STAFF JAOCK IS PARTIALLY EXCESSIVE FOR A CPX. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF INFO CONTAINED IN REF {C} BELIEVE IT IS VITAL THAT THE NAVY REPS PROVIDED BE EXTREMELY KNOWLEDGEABLE AND BE HEADED BY A CAPTAIN AS NEW TACAIR CONTROL PROCEDURES WILL BE EXERCISED IN FOCUS LENS AND ARE LIKELY TO BECOME SOP. WE SHOULD ASSURE THAT PROCEDURE/POLICIES EVOLVED ARE APPROPRIATE TO JAOCK AS RELATED TO NAVY PARTICIPATION. BLUE RIBBON REPS SHOULD BE A ONE TIME REQUIREMENT. IF INFEASIBLE TO FURNISH A CAPTAIN CINCPACFLT CAN PROVIDE. CGFMFPAC WOULD LIKE MARINE PARTICIPATION ALSO.

4. {U} REQ YOUR COMMENTS ON PARA- 3, AND THE EXTENT OF PARTICIPATION YOU CONSIDER FEASIBLE, INCLUDING MARINES.

S
 P
 A
 C
 E

UNQUOTE
 WARM REGARDS
 GP-4

Copy to:

G-3 (1)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

S
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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~


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Enclosure

P 010520Z OCT 70
FM CG I MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
PT

CCN. 0804
TOR 10CT70 1745Z

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SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN JONES
FROM MAJGEN WILSON

PROPOSED SEVENTHFLT PHIRFOR (U)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING QUOTED MESSAGE IS CTF 76
RESPONSE TO COMSEVENTHFLT 250120Z SEP 70 (S-SPECIAL)
QUOTED IN CG I MAF 291310Z SEP 70 (S-SPECIAL) FOR YOUR
INFORMATION.

QUOTE

P 280655Z SEPTEMBER 1970

FM: CTF 76

TO: COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO: CTF 79

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM WEISNER INFO MSG:
WILSON FROM RADM RUBLE.

FOUR SQUADRON AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (C)

A. YOUR 250125Z JUL 70 (NOTAL)

B. MY 171250Z JUL 70 (NOTAL)

C. CINCPACFLT OPORD 201-64.

1. (U) IN RESPONSE TO REF A, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, IN
ADDITION TO THOSE IN RFF B ARE SUBMITTED.

CG I MAF

P 010520Z/OCT70

ACTN: S/SEC

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4. (S) MY INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE TO PAGE A-1 I-I PARA B OF REF C IS THAT THE ONE COLORED BEACH IS TO BE STATIONED IN WESTPAC AND NOT NECESSARILY ENTIRELY EMBARKED IN THE ARG. THIS INTERPRETATION IS IN KEEPING WITH THE PRESENT MODUS OPERANDI AND AS OF NOW I HAVE NO INFO THAT THIS WILL CHANGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

5. (S) THE NEW ARG WOULD BE AN INHERENTLY MORE POWERFUL AND POTENT FORCE. TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY TO POSITION A SLT-SIZED ARG IN TWO WIDELY SEPARATE AREAS, SUCH AS GOT AND SO COULD BE ACHIEVED FROM A NAVY VIEWPOINT BY HAVING THE PHIBGRU COMMANDER BECOME THE SECOND ARG COMMANDER. BECAUSE OF PORT LOADING CONSIDERATIONS, THERE WOULD POSSIBLY BE SOME LOSS OF UNIT INTEGRITY OF THE EMBARKED RLT (-) REIN DURING UPKEEP/REHAB OR PORT VISITS. THROUGH CAREFUL SCHEDULING, THOUGH, THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE RESOLVEABLE.

6. (S) THE ABSENCE OF ONE OF THE PRESENTLY CONFIGURED ARGS DURING MAR AND APR 71 IS A CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER:

- A. PRECEDENT FOR THIS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED DURING THE KEYSTONE OPERATIONS.
- B. PAUL REVERE AND THE 3 LST 1156 CLASS COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO RE-INSERT SLF B ADMINISTRATIVELY WITHIN 216 HRS.

7. (C) RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL CHANGE TO PARA 1, APPENDIX II TO ANNEX A OF REF C: ADD: 9PG.

8. (C) IN SUMMARY, THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES. THE FEW DISADVANTAGES ARE ACCEPTABLE.

9. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

2. (U) BELIEVE REF A QUOTED MESSAGE IS GARBLED AND SHOULD READ YOUR 260128Z SEP 70. REF B IN QUOTED MESSAGE IS NOT HELD AT THIS HQS.

3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

CG I MAF

P 010520Z/OCT70

3-3

SECRET

REPORT TO
CLIQUE FOR
MCIO

2405

TOP SECRET

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(1)

FMF CG PAR 0001 Show to:	
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O

FIC #17

PTTAZYUW RUMLMPA0048 2740813-AAAA-RUHHFMA.

ZNY AAA44A

P 010813Z OCT 70

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FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

CCN 0505

BT

TOR 10CT70 0958Z

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS. //M03010//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

AH

A. CG FMFPAC 250332Z SEP 70 (TS) (SPECAT)

B. CG FMFPAC 171746Z SEP 70 (TS)

1. I CONCUR IN THE CONTENTS OF REF A. THE PROPOSAL SHOULD
PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR THE OVERALL OPERATION OF
III MAF ON OKINAWA.2. WITH REGARD TO SPECIFICS, I NOTE IN PARA 4.C. OF YOUR
PROPOSED MESSAGE TO CMC IN REF A THAT YOU ENVISION MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT III MAF ON OKINAWA WILL BE LESS THAN
THOSE REFLECTED IN I/O M-4918, AS MODIFIED. I RECOMMEND THAT
THESE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, AS WELL AS THE EXACT NATURE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR III
MAF BY THE HOST COMMAND, BE DETERMINED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT

C 010813Z OCT 70

P 010813Z OCT 70

ADM 1-2

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
EXCLUSIVE FOR
MCEO

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA0040 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/
 MCEO

THE COMPOSITION OF THE III MAF STAFF, BOTH IN TERMS OF ORGANIZATION AND SECTION STRENGTH, CAN BE FIXED AS A BASIS FOR THE PLANNED CONFIGURATION OF THE III MAF HQ BLDG AT FUTEMA, OR ELSEWHERE, SHOULD THAT SITE NOT PROVE FEASIBLE. REF B PERTAINS TO LOCATING III MAF AT FUTEMA.

3. SIMILARLY, AND WITH REFERENCE TO AUGMENTATION COMMUNICATION SUPPORT CITED IN YOUR PROPOSAL, I RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE CAPABILITY OF THE HOST COMMAND TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION SERVICES FOR III MAF;

A. AUTODIN AND COMMUNICATION CENTER FACILITIES.

B. TELEPHONE SYSTEM.

C. AUTSEVOCOM TERMINALS.

D. WIRE VOICE INTERCOMMUNICATION SYSTEM.

E. DEDICATED RED ROCKET CIRCUITRY.

F. SSO COMMUNICATION FACILITIES.

TO THE MINIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE 7TH COMMUNICATION BN, FORCE TROOPS, IF AVAILABLE ON OKINAWA, SHOULD BE TASKED TO PROVIDE AUGMENTATION COMMUNICATION SUPPORT RATHER THAN THE DIVISION OR WING AS PROPOSED IN REF A, AS THIS IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE BATTALION'S MISSION.

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA0040 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/
 MCEO

4. THERE ARE A FEW MINOR CHANGES, CHIEFLY IN SECTION STRENGTH AND RANK COMPOSITION, THAT I WOULD LIKE TO SEE INCORPORATED IN THE MODIFIED T/O M-4913, AS FOLLOWS:

A. RECOMMEND ADD LINE 24A, REPORTS/STATISTICS MAN, LCPL, 3141.

B. RECOMMEND CHANGE THE RANK OF THE ASS'T CEO/AVIONICS OFF, LINE 123, FROM LINE 1 TO MAJOR, WITH THE BILLET TO BE FILLED BY A NAVAL AVIATOR, AND DELETE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A NAVAL AVIATOR IN LINE 124.

C. RECOMMEND ADD LINE 124A, ASS'T CEO PLANS/OPNS OFF, LTCOL, 2502.

D. RECOMMEND CHANGE THE RANK OF THE FORCE ENGINEER OFFICER, LINE 139, FROM COLONEL TO LT COLONEL AND DELETE ENGR QPN OFF/ENGR INTELL B, LINE 141.

E. RECOMMEND DELETE G-7 SECTION, LINES 161-164, AND ADD A MI OFFICER WITH THE RANK OF CAPTAIN TO THE G-4 SECTION.

F. RECOMMEND CHANGE TO RANK OF THE ORDNANCE OFF, LINE 167, FROM LTCOL TO MAJOR.

WARM REGARDS.

OP-4

SI

0040

CG III MAF

P 010813Z OCT 70

2-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE FOR****SECRET**
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PTIAZYUN RUHJSPA0311 2751124-AAAA--RUHHFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 021124Z OCT 70

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FM COMSEVENTHFLT

CON: 0672

TO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

TOR: 20CT70 1331Z

INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMF PAC

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR ADM HYLAND INFO LT GEN JONES FROM WEISNER

REORGANIZATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE TO FOUR SQUADRONS.

A. CINCPACFLT 250352Z SEP 70 NOTAL

B. CINCPAC 180141Z SEP 70 PASEP

1. REF A CONTAINED A PROPOSAL BY VADM JOHNSON FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF PHIBPAC INTO FOUR SQUADRONS. COMMENTS WERE REQUESTED.

2. COMSEVENTHFLT CONCURS WITH THE RATIONALE SUPPORTING THE PROPOSED CHANGE AND INTERPOSES NO OBJECTION TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING PROVISION:

A. TO AFFORD FLEXIBILITY NECESSARY TO MEET CONTINGENCIES AND TO CONDUCT TRAINING IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B, THE PROPOSED SUPER ARG SHOULD BE SO CONSTITUTED THAT IT CAN BE EASILY DIVIDED INTO TWO DISTINCT SELF CONTAINED GROUPS. THIS INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO PERSONNEL, EQUIP, LFORM, COMMAND STRUCTURE ETC.

COMSEVENTHFLT

P 021124Z OCT 70

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

SECRET

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2485

EXCLUSIVE FOR

3. IN IMPLEMENTING THE ABOVE IT IS ENVISIONED THE PHIBGRU COMMANDER AND THE SLF HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE WITH THE LPH CONSIDERED READY GROUP. THE PHIBR COMMANDER AND A BATTALION COMMANDER WOULD BE WITH THE NOV LPH READY GROUP THAT HAS ONLY AN OVER THE BEACH CAPABILITY. IN EFFECT THIS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE PRESENT 2 ARG COMPOSITION WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE PHIBGROUP COMMANDER WOULD ASSUME THE ADDITIONAL FUNCTION OF THE PRESENT ARG ALFA SQUADRON COMMANDER.

4. IT IS NOTED THAT WITH THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION, BOTH THE PHIBGROUPS AND PHIBRON'S WOULD BE ON 6 MONTH DEPLOYMENTS. TO ENSURE REQUIRED CONTINUITY IN WESTPAC IT IS CONSIDERED THAT PHIBGRU TURNOVER'S AND PHIBRON TURN OVER'S SHOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 3 MONTHS APART.

5. FROM A LOAD CAPABILITY VIEWPOINT, TWO SLFS AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED COULD BE EMBARKED IN ONE OF THE NEW PHIBRONS WITH NO SHORTFALL. VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF THE PRESENT SQUADRONS WHICH COULD DEPLOY SIMULTANEOUSLY SHOW THAT PHIBRONS ONE AND NINE, NOW SKED WESTPAC JUN-SEP 71, HAVE THE SMALLEST LIFT CAPABILITY WHEREAS PHIBRONS FIVE AND SEVEN, NOW SKED WESTPAC NOV 71-MAR 72, HAVE THE LARGEST LIFT CAPABILITY. COMPARISONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

	PHIBRON 1/9	PHIBRONS 5/7	AVERAGE NEW FOR
PER	5460	5422	5490
SQUARE (K)	137.1	139.1	113.5
CUBE (K)	162.6	361.6	229.2

6. THE NEW SQUADRONS HAVE LITTLE LIFT CAPABILITY THAN THE "LARGEST LIFT COMBINATION" OF THE OLD SQUADRONS; HOWEVER, THIS IS FAR LESS SIGNIFICANT THAN IT APPEARS. BOTH PHIBRONS FIVE AND SEVEN, WITH A NEW LKA, HAD A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF UNUSED SQUARE AND CUBE WHILE RECENTLY DEPLOYED WITH AN EMBARKED SLF.

7. IN CONCLUSION IT WOULD APPEAR THE PLANNED REORGANIZATION WOULD AFFECT EASTPAC MORE THAN WESTPAC. ALTHOUGH THE DEPLOYED AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS WOULD BE FROM THE SAME SQUADRON IT WOULD STILL BE NECESSARY TO DIVIDE THEM INTO TWO AMPHIBIOUS GROUPS. FOR SCHEDULING PURPOSES THE TWO DISTINCT READY GROUPS OF THE SUPER ARG WILL QUITE POSSIBLY CONTINUE TO BE REFERRED TO AS ARG ALFA AND ARG BRAVO WHILE IN WESTPAC.

7. ALL BEST WISHES.

GP-4

BT

0311

COMSEVENTHFLT

P 021124Z OCT 70

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113

SECRET

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G-2	✓
G-3	✓
G-4	✓
G-5	✓
Compt	✓
Cmd Ctr	✓

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MFA 121

PTT 22YHII PUMUIMPA2255 275174Z-0000-014HFM A 1400ZIA.

ZNY 1400Z.

6978

RUH4HFM A 17- CMC

20CT78 1715Z

P 021344Z OCT 78

FM CG III MAF

TO RUH4HFM A/CC FMFPAC

INFO PHTOFIA/CMC

BT

SECRET //N74520//

SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN JONES INFO GEN CHAPMAN
FROM LT GEN MCCUTCHEON

TRANSFER OF EXCESS FACILITIES (U)

A. COMUSMACV 240301Z SEP 73 (U) (PASFP)

B. ADMIN PAC 221222Z MAY 73 (S)

C. CG USARV 200342Z AUG 73 (C) TOTAL

D. CG III MAF 251212Z AUG 73 (S)

E. COMUSMACV 071536Z SEP 73 (U) (PASFP)

F. CG III MAF 110603Z SEP 72 (U)

1. (S) PEF A STATES THAT COMM/ELFC EQUIP IN THE CG 200000Z
WILL BE LEFT INTACT AND IN PLACE AT ALL CARGO AND CATERING UNITS
TR BY III MAF UNITS UNLESS SPECIFIC AUTH FOR REMOVAL IS
GIVEN BY COMUSMACV.

* (1) PERIMETER SECURITY EQUIP AND SYS

CG III MAF

P 021344Z OCT 78

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

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114

**SECRET
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ADM CONLEY****STAFF SESSIONS NOT
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D → DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE

O SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN CONLEY FROM MAJ GEN

N ADAMS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING

T WAKING HOURS //N00000//

I 1. (S) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF ADMIN FMFPAC 030346Z OCT 70

P SPECAT FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON WHICH I AM PROVIDING

E FOR LTGEN JONES' INFORMATION. IT IS REQUESTED THAT A

IN COPY OF THIS MSG BE HAND DELIVERED TO MAJ FINDLAY

T (CG AIDE-DE-CAMP) PRIOR TO GEN JONES' DEPARTURE FOR

S RVN.

A QUOTE:

THIS COMMAND AND STAFF STRUCTURE IN SEASIA (U)

S A. CNO 302114Z/SEP70 (S) (READDRESSED BY ADMIN

A CINCPACFLT 020352Z/SEP70) (PASEP)

S 1. (S) REF A QUOTED A MEMO FROM SEC DEF WHICH

A EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT THE VARIOUS HEADQUARTERS

C PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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G-3 ✓ Copy	INFO	<input type="checkbox"/> MAU	Repls 3
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← DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 60 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WILSON FROM
 LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
 DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//
 PROPOSED HQ III MAF T/O (U)

A. FONECON BETWEEN COFS I MAF AND FMFPAC CMD CENTER
 090120W/OCT70

i. (TS) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A THE FOLLOWING IS
 PROVIDED RELATIVE TO THE PROPOSED T/O FOR HQ III
 MAF UPON RELOCATION:

A. T/O AS SPECIFIED IN TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
 NUMBER M-4918 WITH FORCE COMMANDER SECTION MODIFIED
^{Below}
 AS INDICATED TO PROVIDE FOR A LIEUTENANT GENERAL,
 MINOR ADJUSTMENTS IN CERTAIN STAFF SECTIONS, AND THE
 ADDITION OF HQ ELEMENTS FOR THE MAU (SLF) AND A
 SECTION: IF REPRODUCED ALL COPIES MUST BE
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116

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→DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS AIR GROUP

TOP SECRET - MCEO

(CHANGES UNDERLINED MARKED WITH AMPERSAND)

D O N O T E I N T H I S S P A C E	LINE BILLET DESCRIPTION	RANK	MOS	MA	AG	ENL	D O N O T E I N T H I S S P A C E
2 ♦ FORCE COMMANDER	♦ LGEN	9903		1			2
3 AIDE	♦ MAJ	9910		1			3
4 AIDE	♦ CAPT	9910	1				4
5 ♦ SERGEANT MAJOR	♦ SGTMAJ	9999				1	5
6 ♦ FOOD SERVICES TECHNICIAN MSGT	♦ 3382					1	6
7 ♦ COOK SPECIALIST	SGT	♦ 3372				1	7
8 ♦ STENOGRAPHER	♦ SGT	♦ 0142			♦ 1		8
♦ 9A ♦ MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR	♦ SGT	♦ 3531			♦ 1		9A
♦ 8B ♦ COOK SPECIALIST	♦ CPL	♦ 3372			♦ 1		8B
♦ 8C				1	2	♦ 6	8C
♦ 24A ♦ REPORTS STATISTICS MAN	♦ LCPL	♦ 0141				1	24A
25				1	2	♦ 4	25
♦ 95A ♦ MOTOR TRANS OFFICER	♦ CAPT	♦ 3502			♦ 1		95A
99				2	3	4	99
123 ASST CEO/AVIONICS OFF	♦ MAJ	♦ 6202					123
224 ASST CEO/ELECTRONICS OFF MAJ	MAJ	0005	0001	0002	0003	0004	224

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116

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2405

—DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 63 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE—

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET-MCEO~~

LINE BILLET DESCRIPTION RANK MOS NA AG BM

124A~~ASST CEO PLANS/OPS OFF~~ LCOL 2502 41

128

41 4 3

139 FORCE ENGR OFF LCOL 1302 1 0

141 DELETE

144 41 2 0

161 DELETE

162 DELETE 41 2 0

163 DELETE

164 DELETE 41 2 0

165 DELETE

167 ORDNANCE OFF MAJ 2002 1 0

199 ORGANIZATION TOTAL 10 47 103 0

(ADD FOLLOWING SECTIONS STARTING WITH LINE #200)

200 HQ MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT (SLF) 0

201 MARINE AMPHIB UNIT COMDR SECT 0

202 COMMANDING OFFICER COL 9910 1 0

203 S-1 SECTION 0

204 S-1/ADJ LT 0130 1 0

205 ADMIN MAN/DRIVER CPL 0141 1 0

206 INTELLIGENCE SECTION 0

207 INTELLIGENCE OFFICER MAJ 0202 1 0

208 IMAGERY INTERP SSGT 0243 0

~~TOP SECRET PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ 116 ~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

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→ DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

TOP SECRET-MCPO

LINE	EILLET DESCRIPTION	RANK	MOS	NA	AG	ENL
209	OPERATIONS SECTION					
210	OPERATIONS OFFICER	LCOL	0302		1	
D	211 FSC/ASST OPNS OFFICER	MAJ	0802		1	
O	212 AIR OBSERVER	LT	0805		1	
N	213 OPNS CHIEF	GYSGT	9711		1	
O	214 ADMIN MAN	CPL	0141		1	
T	215 LOGISTICS SECTION					
T	216 LOG OFFICER	LTCOL	0402		1	
P	217 SUPPLY/ADMIN CHIEF	MSGT	3091		1	
E	218 EMBARK CHIEF	GYSGT	0431		1	
I	219 ADMIN MAN	CPL	0141		1	
N	220 COMM SECTION					
N	221 COMM OFFICER	MAJ	2502		1	
T	222 COMM CHIEF	SSGT	2539		1	
H	223 RAD OPR	CPL	2533		2	
I	224 RAD OPR	LCPL	2533		2	
S	225 TOTAL+1			16	24	
P	226 SUBIC BAY LIAISON SECTION					
A	227 LIAISON OFFICER	MAJ	9910		1	
C	228 ADMIN MAN	SGT	0141		1	
E	229 AEMIN/SUPPLY MAN	SGT	3041		1	
E	230 MAIL CLERK	CPL	0161		1	

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← DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

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BY ME BILLET DESCRIPTION	RANK	MOS	NA	AG	ENL
231 COOK	CPL.	3371			1
232 TOTAL				1	4
233 OVERALL ORGANIZATION TOTAL			10	64	131

NOTE: ~~+1~~ 8 OFF AND 12 ENL FOR A MAU HQ STAFF AS INDICATED. HOWEVER, SINCE AT PRESENT AND FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE THERE IS ONLY A REQUIREMENT FOR ONE MAU (SLF) HQ (BASED UPON ONE LPH IN WESTPAC), THE 8 ADDITIONAL OFF AND 12 ADDITIONAL ENL (20 TOTAL) ARE TO BE RETAINED AS A CONTINGENCY FOR MANNING A SECOND MAU (SLF) HQ STAFF IF REQUIRED. THESE 20 SPACES ARE TO BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT OTHER III MAF STAFF SECTION(S) WHEN SECOND MAU (SLF) HQ STAFF NOT REQUIRED.

(PRESENT LINES 200-209 OF T/O M-4918 WILL BECOME LINES 234-242 RESPECTIVELY.)

B. THE H&S COMPANY WHICH SUPPORTS A MAF HQ (T/O M-4919) WILL NOT BE ACTIVATED DUE TO MARINE CORPS CEILING CONSTRAINTS ON OKINAWA. HQ III MAF WILL BE SATELLITED ON A HOST COMMAND ON OKINAWA AND THAT COMMAND WILL BE TASKED TO PROVIDE FOR INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS. REQUIRED ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED

~~TOP SECRET~~PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES ~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

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3488

→DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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BY III MAF TASKING ITS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS TO PROVIDE
AUGMENTATION TO THE HOST COMMAND COMMUNICATION
FACILITY.

WARM REGARDS.

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D DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE D

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N LITGEN JONES //NOOOOO// N

T PROPOSED COMPHIBPAC REORGANIZATION (U) T

E A. CINCPACFLT 250352Z/SEP70 (S) (SPECAT) E

P B. CINCPACFLT OPO 201-(YR) P

I C. LFM 01/NWP 22 (B) (C) I

IN 1. (S) REF B REQUESTS COMMENTS ON A PROPOSAL BY
T COMPHIBPAC TO REORGANIZE PHIBPAC INTO FOUR AMPHIB-
E IOUS SQUADRONS VICE SIX. WHILE THE RATIONALE FOR
I THIS PROPOSAL IS APPRECIATED, IT DOES IMPACT
N DIRECTLY ON THE ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES, AND
T METHODS OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE SEVENTH FLEET LANDING
E FORCE TO SUCH AN EXTENT AS TO BE OF CONCERN.

S 2. (S) SPECIFICALLY, COMPHIBPAC PROPOSES CHANGING
P PAGE A-11-1 PAR 1:B. REF B TO READ: "ONE PHIBRON
A WITH VERTICAL AND SURFACE ASSAULT CAPABILITY PLUS
C

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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A 117

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

ASSOCIATED DETACHMENTS AND UNITS TO SUPPORT AN RLT(-) REINFORCED WITH COMPOSITE HELO SQUADRON ~~BEACH~~ AND COLORED BEACH...". THERE IS AN IMPLICATION IN THIS PROPOSAL THAT SLF ALFA (A MAU CONSISTING OF A BLT AND A COMPOSITE HELICOPTER SQUADRON) PLUS SLF BRAVO (A BLT-REIN WITH TWO UH-1E'S) EQUALS AN RLT(-)(REIN). IT DOES NOT, EITHER IN ORGANIZATION OR CAPABILITY. TO EXECUTE A COORDINATED RLT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ACROSS A COLORED BEACH REQUIRES A COMMAND/CONTROL AND SUPPORT CAPABILITY NOT PRESENTLY RESIDENT IN SLF ALFA OR BRAVO (SEPARATELY OR COMBINED). TO ACHIEVE THIS CAPABILITY IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REPLACE THE PRESENT AUSTERE SLF ALFA HEADQUARTERS WITH A FULLY FUNCTIONAL RLT HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS. WITH ONLY TWO RLT HEADQUARTERS AVAILABLE ON OKINAWA, IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL TO DEPLOY ONE AFLOAT CONTINUALLY.

3. (S) ON THE OTHER HAND, RETENTION OF THE PRESENT 7TH FLEET TWO-BLT LANDING FORCE STRUCTURE (ONE MAU AND ONE BLT PLUS TWO UH-1E'S) WHILE NOT CAUSING ANY AMPHIBIOUS LIFT SHORTFALLS APPEARS TO BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH COMPHIBPAC'S PROPOSED 7TH FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCE ORGANIZATION. AS INDICATED IN

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

PAR 213 REF C, "THE INTERRELATION OF NAVAL AND LANDING FORCE TASKS DURING THE PLANNING FOR AND EXECUTION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION REQUIRES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PARALLEL CHAINS OF COMMAND AND CORRESPONDING COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION." WHILE THE PROPOSED COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCE WOULD BE A PARALLEL COMMANDER TO COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET LANDING FORCE (COMFLTF), THERE IS PRESENTLY NO LANDING FORCE COMMANDER PARALLEL TO THE PROPOSED PHIBRON/AMPHIBIOUS TASK GROUP COMMANDER. REDESIGNATION OF THE PRESENT SLF ^{CLF 79} ^{WOUAD 74} (MAU) COMMANDER AS COMMANDER OF THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING GROUP WOULD APPEAR TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, THIS BELIES THE FACT THAT A COORDINATED RLT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ACROSS A COLORED BEACH STILL CANNOT BE EXECUTED.

4. (S) THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SEVENTH FLEET LANDING FORCE INTO INDEPENDENT BLT/MAU SIZE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ELEMENTS PROVIDES AN OPERATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY NOT FOUND IN THE LARGER AELOAT RLT(-)(REIN). THIS IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT SINCE THE PREPONDERANCE OF TF 79 CONTINGENCY PLANS CALL FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A BLT AS THE

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

INITIAL ASSAULT FORCE. WITH TWO LANDING FORCES ONE CAN ALWAYS BE KEPT ON THE LINE, WHILE THE OTHER STANDS DOWN FOR UPKEEP, BLT ROTATION, TRAINING, PORT VISITS, ETC. FOR THOSE OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS REQUIRING INTRODUCTION OF A LARGER FORCE, A MAB WOULD BE THE FORCE LEVEL INDICATED. THE INTRODUCTION OF A MAG BY AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WOULD REQUIRE AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT LIFT WHICH EXCEEDS THAT PROVIDED IN ANY ONE OF THE PROPOSED PHIBRONS AND WOULD REQUIRE AIRLIFT/SEALIFT AUGMENTATION. THE LANDING FORCE COMMAND/CONTROL AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO EXPAND THE AFLOAT BLT/MAU SIZE LANDING FORCES INTO A MAB COULD BE PROVIDED BY CTF-79, WHEN REQUIRED, WITHOUT HAVING TO MAINTAIN THOSE ELEMENTS AFLOAT. THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF KEEPING THE INITIAL LANDING FORCE ASSAULT ELEMENTS IN THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE REACTION POSTURE WITH THE LEAST ATTENDANT DISRUPTION IN THE OPERATIONAL SCHEDULING AND ADMINISTRATIVE/LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF TF-79 UNITS.

5. (S) ACCORDINGLY, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE ACKNOWLEDGED BENEFITS ATTENDANT TO COMPHIBPAC'S PROPOSED REORGANIZATION WITHOUT DEROGATION TO LANDING FORCE ORGANIZATION/CAPABILITIES IT IS

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RECOMMENDED THAT PAGE A-11-1 PAR 1.B. REF B BE
 CHANGED TO READ: "ONE PHIBRON ORGANIZED IN TWO
 UNITS TO SUPPORT ONE MAU CONFIGURED FOR VERTICAL/
 SURFACE ASSAULT AND ONE BLT REINFORCED WITH TWO
 UH-1E HELOS CONFIGURED FOR SURFACE ASSAULT AND
 ALSO ONE COLORED BEACH.

SUFFICIENT SHIPBOARD COMMAND AND CONTROL
 FACILITIES TO PROVIDE FOR SIMULTANEOUS SEPARATE
 EMPLOYMENT OF BOTH AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT UNITS AND TO
 EMBARK A MAB HEADQUARTERS, WHEN REQUIRED.

LANSHIPRONS OF 542 AND 1156 CLASS 1ST UNTIL
 INACTIVATED.

1 LCC OR OTHER APPROPRIATE FLAGSHIP CAPABLE OF
 SUPPORTING CTF-76 AND CTF-79.

~~VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WARM REGARDS.~~

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TO CG FMFPAC

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BT

~~TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES~~ *ATT*
FROM MAJGEN WILSON
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 252305Z SEP 70 (TS SPECAT).
 1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON A CONCEPT WHICH
 WOULD ADD ONE BLT PLUS HELO COMPONENT TO I MAF. IN
 ORDER TO AVOID EXCEEDING CURRENT PERSONNEL CEILING
 CONSTRAINTS ON OKINAWA THE ADDITIONAL FORCES WOULD
 BE CREDITED TO TINIAN. TO ACHIEVE PROJECTED BASING
 THE BLT WOULD BE ROTATED FROM OKINAWA TO TINIAN BY
 AIR LIFT OR SEA LIFT AS AVAILABLE. THE DURATION OF
 DEPLOYMENT TO TINIAN IS ANTICIPATED TO BE SAME
 APPROXIMATE LENGTH AS CURRENTLY USED FOR SLF "A".
 2. (TS) IN ORDER TO TEST SUCH A CONCEPT IT IS
 PROPOSED THAT BLT 2/4 EMBARKED IN A NON-LPH CON-
 FIGURED ARG CONDUCT A SURFACE LANDING EXERCISE AT
 TINIAN BETWEEN 24 NOV AND SECOND STANDDOWN TIME
 CURRENTLY ESTIMATED TO BE DURING PHASE VI OF KEY-
 STONE ROBIN. THIS WOULD AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY TO
 PUT TROOPS ON THE GROUND TO DETERMINE THE ADEQUACY
 OF TINIAN AS TRAINING AREA. THE DURATION OF THE
 EXERCISE WOULD BE NOT MORE THAN 5 DAYS.

CG I MAF

P 120616Z/OCT70

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3. (TS) SOME OF THE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES ARE:

- A. NEW AND DIFFERENT TRAINING AREA.
- B. RETAINS BLT IN PACOM STRUCTURE.
- C. ADDS STRENGTH TO I MAF IN GROUND AND HELO CAPABILITY.
- D. PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO ROTATE BLT AND GAIN ADDITIONAL AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING.
- E. PERMITS ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITY TO TEST SOME CONTINGENCY PLAN AND EXERCISE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.
- F. PROVIDES AN ADDITIONAL IDEAL FIELD TESTING AREA FOR EQUIPMENT AND TACTICS UNDER ACTUAL CONDITIONS.
- G. ENABLES US TO PROVIDE A PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PROGRAM IN DEVELOPING ROADS, SANITATION, WATER SOURCES, AND TO EXERCISE OTHER CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS.

4. (TS) SOME OF THE DISADVANTAGES ARE:

- A. PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF PHIBRONS WOULD FORSEEABLY OFFER A ROTATION BY SURFACE MEANS ONLY ONCE EVERY SIX MONTHS BECAUSE OF THE TIME DISTANCE FACTOR INVOLVED IN THE 120 HOUR ARG/SLF READINESS POSTURE.
- B. THERE WOULD BE A NOTICEABLE INCREASE IN THE PERSONNEL PIPELINE; AN ADDITIONAL 1200 PEOPLE MAY BE SIGNIFICANT IN CONSIDERATION OF A REDUCED POST RVN MARINE CORPS POSTURE.
- C. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IS CONTINGENT ON AVAILABILITY OF SHIPPING; LACK OF SHIPPING AND/OR AIRLIFT CAPABILITY AND SLOW SUPPLY SUPPORT POSTURE IN AN AUSTERE SITUATION WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY BENIFITS DERIVED.
- D. THE LOCALE IS CENTERED IN THE MARIANNAS TYPHOON BELT AND FOR PERSONNEL SAFETY WOULD REQUIRE CONSTRUCTION OF PERMANENT TYPE TYPHOON SHELTERS.
- E. ALTHOUGH AN EXPEDITIONARY ENVIRON IS ENVISIONED AN EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT ON LAND WOULD REQUIRE A MORE PERMANENT CANTONMENT STRUCTURE FOR HABITABILITY, WITH ATTENDANT FUNDING DIFFICULTIES.

5. (TS) RECOMMEND, YOUR CONCURRENCE, CONDUCT AN INITIAL TEST FOR GROUND ELEMENT ONLY (AUGMENTED BY THE TWO HELO WHICH WILL ACCOMPANY BLT BRAVO). COMBINED GROUND/HELO OPERATION CAN BE CONDUCTED AT A SUBSEQUENT DEPLOYMENT WHICH SHOULD FOLLOW ON AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY. THIS WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN ADDITIONAL EXERCISE AND LEND TO CONTINUE USE OF BASES IN THE TTPI.

WARM REGARDS.

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CORPS EYES ONLY...//N00000//

(56)

PHIBRON REORGANIZATION (U)

A. COMPHIBPAC LTR SER 31-0346 OF 29 SEP 70 (C)(NOTAL)

1. (C) REF A PROPOSES REORGANIZATION OF COMPHIBPAC
INTO FOUR VICE SIX PHIBRONS (EACH TO CONSIST OFSEVEN/EIGHT SHIPS AND CAPABLE OF LIFTING AN RLT (-)
REINFORCED WITH A COMPOSITE HELO SQUADRON).PHIBRONS WOULD DEPLOY CONSECUTIVELY FOR SIX MONTHS
TO WESTPAC. WITH ONE PHIBRON DEPLOYED AT ANY TIMETO WESTPAC, ONLY ONE-FOURTH OF THE PACFLT AMPHIBIOUS
FORCE WOULD BE DEPLOYED VICE THE CURRENT ONE-THIRD.2. (C) THE ADVANTAGES WHICH ACCRUE TO COMPHIBPAC
FROM THIS PROPOSAL ARE OBVIOUS AND ARE IN CONSONANCE
WITH BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS AND REFLECT CNO'S POLICY**SECRET****SECRET**

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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D 3. (S) CINCPACFLT HAS REQUESTED THAT THIS PROPOSAL
 O FOR BE PLACED ON THE AGENDA DURING THE SEVENTHFLT SCHEDUL-
 N ING CONFERENCE, 3D QTR FY-71.

O 4. (S) ~~the~~ FMFPAC HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE
 N COMBINATION OF SLF A WITH SLF B DOES NOT EQUATE TO
 O AN RLT (-) (REIN) AND THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL
 T TO MAINTAIN AN RLT HQ AFLOAT MERELY TO PROVIDE A
 P COMMAND EQUIVALENT AND PARALLEL TO THE PROPOSED
 E SINGLE PHIBRON ARG COMMANDER. ~~WOULD SMACK OF THE~~ ^{IS} ~~FURTHER IT~~
 I ADMINISTRATIVE TAIL WAGGING THE OPERATIONAL DOG.

N ADDITIONALLY, UNLESS THE PROPOSED SINGLE PHIBRON ARG
 T IS CAPABLE OF OPERATING IN TWO UNITS, THE FLEXIBILITY
 H AND CAPABILITY INHERENT IN THE CURRENT TWO ARG/SLF
 THIS ORGANIZATION WILL BE LOST. ACCORDINGLY, ~~the~~ FMFPAC
 S CONSIDERS THAT EACH PROPOSED PHIBRON SHOULD BE
 P ORGANIZED IN TWO UNITS TO SUPPORT ONE MAU (CONFIGURED
 A FOR VERTICAL/SURFACE ASSAULT) AND ONE BLT REINFORCED
 S WITH TWO UH-1E HELOS (CONFIGURED FOR SURFACE ASSAULT).
 P THERE SHOULD ALSO BE SUFFICIENT SHIPBOARD COMMUNICATIONS
 A AND CONTROL FACILITIES TO PROVIDE FOR SIMULTANEOUS
 S SEPARATE EMPLOYMENT OF BOTH AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT UNITS
 P AS WELL AS FOR EMBARKATION OF A
 A AND TO EMBARK A MAB HQ WHEN REQUIRED.

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5. (S) IN AMPLIFICATION OF THE ABOVE, IT REMAINS THE POSITION OF THIS HQ THAT PACOM/PACFLT CONTINGENCIES REQUIRE THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP CAPABILITY IN WESTPAC TO LIFT AND ASSAULT LAND A MAB. IN TERMS OF ACHIEVING THAT GOAL, THE PROPOSED SINGLE PHIBRON ARG REPRESENTS A REDUCTION FROM THE CURRENT WESTPAC AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT LIFT CAPABILITY. ~~AND, HENCE,~~ A STEP BACKWARD. AN RLT (-) REINFORCED WITH A COMPOSITE HELO SQUADRON IS NOT CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING THE TYPE OF INDEPENDENT SUSTAINED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ASSOCIATED WITH A MAB CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENT. SINCE THE RLT IS DESIGNED TO OPERATE AS PART OF A LARGER FORCE, ITS PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT AS THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE SEVENTHFLT WOULD BE AWKWARD, RESTRICTIVE AND, THEREFORE, IN APPROPRIATE.

6. (S) WHILE IT DOES NOT POSSESS THE REQUISITE COMBAT POWER TO MEET ^{ALL} PACOM/PACFLT CONTINGENCIES, THE MAU IS A BALANCED FORCE AND IS THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM ORGANIZATION THAT IS NORMALLY EMPLOYED TO FILL ROUTINE FORWARD AFLOAT DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS. SINCE IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE WILL BE INSUFFICIENT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPPING UNDER THE PROPOSED

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REORGANIZATION TO ACCOMMODATE A MAB IN WESTPAC, A
MAU PLUS A BLT (W/2 UH-1E'S) WOULD BE THE PREFERRED
FORCE COMPOSITION FOR THE SEVENTHFLT SPECIAL LANDING
FORCE, THEREWITH AFFORDING A BALANCED CAPABILITY AND
FLEXIBILITY NOT POSSESSED BY ^{AN} RLT (-) (REIN). *46*

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7. (C) ESSENTIAL TO ANY CONSIDERATION REGARDING THE
REORGANIZATION OF THE SEVENTHFLT SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
IS COMSEVENTHFLT'S INTENDED EMPLOYMENT OF THAT FORCE
VIS-A-VIS HIS CONTINGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES. COMPHIB-
PAC AND CG I MAF CAPABILITIES WOULD THEN DICTATE THE
FORCE SIZE AND ORGANIZATION, WHICH WOULD BEST MEET THOSE
RESPONSIBILITIES. IT IS REQUESTED ^{THE} THEREFORE THAT YOUR REPRE-
SENTATIVES AT SEVENTHFLT SCHED CONFERENCE BE PREPARED
TO ADDRESS SPECIFIC MAU/BLT WESTPAC CONTINGENCY
REQUIREMENTS.

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8. (U) REPRESENTATIVES FROM THIS HQ TO THE SEVENTHFLT
SCHED CONFERENCE WILL BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE
POSITION STATED ABOVE. *WARM RECARDS.*

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DCG C/S	CG THIRD MARDIV	CONCURRED	
Dep C/S	CG FORTRPS FMFPAC	G-3	
G-1	CG FIRST MAW (REAR)	Dep c/s	
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N TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN OWENS, MGEN

N

O WILSON, BGEN HOFFMAN, BGEN CONLEY, BGEN DWYER

O

BGEN ARMSTRONG, INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN

T

T JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING
Y HOURS ONLY.//N00000//
FORCE PLANNING (U)T
YP A. CG FMFPAC 250257Z/AUG70 (TS) - (SPECAT) - (NOTAL)
E B. ADMIN FMFPAC 140417Z/JUL70 (S)P
EI 1. (TS) REF A, USING REF B AS A BASIS, CITED CERTAIN
N UNITS WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY BE ADDED TO AND SOME WHICH
MIGHT POSSIBLY BE DELETED FROM INCREMENT IV MARINE
T TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS. INCREMENT IV WAS COMPLETED ON
H 15 OCT 1970 AND THOSE UNITS ADDED IN REF A DID DEPLOY
I WHILE THOSE DELETED DID NOT.I
N
T
H
I
SS 2. (S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO APPRISE YOU
OF FUTURE REDEPLOYMENT PLANS OF MARINE FORCES FROMS
P
A
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

RVN.

3. (TS) NO MARINES ARE SCHEDULED TO REDEPLOY DURING
 D INCREMENT V (16OCT-31DEC70). DURING INCREMENT VI
 O (1JAN-30APR71), 12.4K MARINES ARE SCHEDULED FOR

N REDEPLOYMENT. CURRENT PLANNING; HOWEVER, ENVISIONS
 O THAT THE BULK OF THIS 12.4K WILL REDEPLOY DURING
 T THE PERIOD MARCH AND APRIL 1971. DURING THIS TIME
 I FRAME, IT IS PRESENTLY PLANNED THAT FLC WILL BE
 P DEACTIVATED IN RVN, AND THE FLAGS OF THE 1ST MARDIV
 E AND 1ST MAW AND A MAJOR PORTION OF THE REMAINDER OF
 I THEIR HEADQUARTERS' UNITS WILL BE RELOCATED TO CAMP
 N PENDLETON AND IWAKUNI RESPECTIVELY.

N 4. (TS) THE TROOP LIST REFLECTING THE UNITS THAT WILL
 T COMPRISE INCREMENT VI IS BEING PREPARED. I DO NOT
 H ANTICIPATE THAT THIS TROOP LIST WILL BE FIRM UNTIL
 I SOMETIME IN DEC AS THE COMPOSITION OF THE RESIDUAL
 S FORCE HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED.

S 5. (TS) CURRENT PLANNING PROVIDES FOR THE RESIDUAL
 P FORCE TO REMAIN IN RVN UNTIL 30 JUN 71. HOWEVER, I
 A WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE 30 JUNE DATE IS A
 C PLANNING DATE AND HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY APPROVED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGE

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TOP SECRET

24080

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - MCEO

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

6. (U) I WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED AS
PLANNING GUIDANCE BECOMES AVAILABLE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES TOP SECRET - MCEO

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D ← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE → D

O TOP SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ~~LTGEN MCCUTCHEON~~ BGEN MILLER O

BGEN HOUGHTON.

FROM ~~LTGEN JONES~~. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER O

DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000//

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IN TEXT OF CINCPAC 310313Z OCT 70(TS)

TO COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF,

INFO CG FMFPAC.

QUOTE:

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

A. JCS 4845/302219Z OCT 70 (PASFP)

1. (TS) REF A REQUESTS CINCPAC COMMENTS ON AN ALTERNATIVE TO CURRENT REDEPLOYMENT PLANS. THIS ALTERNATIVE WOULD RETAIN A USMC MAB OF 12,700 IN THE RVN THROUGH FY 72 IN LIEU OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE UNITS OF EQUIVALENT STRENGTH. 2. (U) REQUEST YOUR VIEWS ON THIS ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL RE PROVIDED NLT 020700W NOV 70.

UNQUOTE:

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WARM REGARDS

GP-4

TOP SECRET

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CG FMFPAC		FROM	DTG	DRAFTED G-3
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D → DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE → D

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SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM
LTGEN JONES MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DUR-
ING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//

VMCJ EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. CG III MAF 241146Z/OCT70 (TS) (SPECAT) (MCEO)
B. 7TH AF 241140Z/OCT70 (S) (PASEP)
C. SSO MACV 261028Z/OCT70 (S) (NOTAL)
D. CG FMFPAC *312237* Z/OCT70 (S)

1. (S) APPRECIATE INFORMATION FORWARDED BY RE-
FERENCE (A) CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE TASKING OF VMCJ-
1 TO SUPPORT LAOS INTERDICTION EFFORT. THE 7TH
AIR FORCE AND MACV HAVE SURFACED THIS SUBJECT IN

GENERAL SERVICE TRAFFIC (REF B AND C). MY *ANSWER* *L*

TO BOTH

IS CONTAINED IN REF D.

2. (S) WITH REGARD TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF EA-6'S

~~SECRET~~
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2485

OF NAVY ELINT AIRCRAFT AND/OR EB-66 REENTRY IS ~~we think~~
~~REASONABLE~~
~~THE MOST BRAVING~~ SOLUTION TO 7TH AIR FORCE'S
REQUIREMENT. WARM REGARDS

6P-4

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6-3 (4)

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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ABOARD CVA'S, WE HAD PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED THE SUBJECT WITH PACFLT AND IT WAS DETERMINED IMPRACTICAL NOW TO OPERATE FROM THESE DECKS FOR VARIED REASONS (LACK OF EA-6A PECULIAR SUPPORT AND SPACE PROBLEMS, PILOT CARRIER QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, CVA FORCE LEVELS). AS YOU ARE AWARE, ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL ASPECTS OF REDEPLOYING THE EA-6'S IS THE FACT THE PRIORITY OF EFFORT FOR EA-6A PECULIAR EQUIPMENT AND PARTS HAS BEEN SHIFTED TO FMFLANT IN ORDER TO SUPPORT A FORTHCOMING EA-6A DEPLOYMENT. IN VIEW OF THESE AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, I COULD NOT SUPPORT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF EA-6A'S AS SUGGESTED BY 7TH AF/MACV.

3. (S) AS YOU CAN SEE BY REF (D), WE'VE STRESSED THE EA-6A'S LACK OF CURRENT CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT (OR JAM) CERTAIN SA-2/AAA ASSOCIATED ACQUISITION RADARS (~~EE~~ SPOONREST/KNIFEREST). 7TH AIR FORCE IS BASING THEIR THREAT ASSESSMENT LARGELY ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE RADARS INTO SAC BOMBING AREAS. *Rams*
~~EE~~ ^{CEW} NAVY AIRCRAFT, WITH MULTIPLE ^{CEW} POSITIONS AND CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT THESE ACQUISITION RADARS AS WELL AS FANSONG RADARS OPERATING IN DUMMY TEST MODES, ARE FLYING IN THE AREA. ADDITIONAL AND JOINT TASKING

PAGE OF PAGES

22
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M FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER N

M DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000// O

T 1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF CINCPAC 030402Z NOV70 T

T (TS) TO JCS, INFO COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, T
CINCPACAF, CG FMFPAC WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFOR- T
MATION. T

E QUOTE: E

I SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U) I

I A. JCS 4845/302219Z OCT 70 PASEP I

I 1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED CINCPAC COMMENTS ON AN ALTERNATIVE I
TO CURRENT REDEPLOYMENT PLANS, WHICH WOULD RETAIN IN THE I
RVN THROUGH FY 72 A MAB OF ABOUT 12,700 IN LIEU OF ARMY I
AND AIR FORCE UNITS OF EQUIVALENT STRENGTH. I

I 2. (TS) PLANNING FOR THE FORCE STRUCTURE REMAINING IN THE I
RVN AFTER 1 JUL 71 IS AT AN ADVANCED STAGE, HAS BEEN BASED I
ON CURRENT JCS AUTHORIZED SPACE CEILINGS, AND IS DESIGNED I
TO MEET THE SHORTFALL IN RVNAF CAPABILITIES DURING THE I

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P 1. (TS) PLANNING FOR THE FORCE STRUCTURE REMAINING IN THE P
RVN AFTER 1 JUL 71 IS AT AN ADVANCED STAGE, HAS BEEN BASED P
ON CURRENT JCS AUTHORIZED SPACE CEILINGS, AND IS DESIGNED P
TO MEET THE SHORTFALL IN RVNAF CAPABILITIES DURING THE P

A 3. (TS) ACCELERATED REDEPLOYMENTS ARE CREATING PROBLEMS A
IN THE ORDERLY PLANNING CYCLE, RESULTING IN VIETNAMIZATION. A

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DOUBLE SPACE MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

STATIONING PLANS, BASE TURNOVERS, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE MOMENTUM OF U.S. COMBAT OPERATIONS BEING ADVERSELY AFFECTED. FURTHER, WITH PLANS FOR RFDEPLOYMENTS AND RESIDUAL FORCES NEARING FINALIZATION, ANY ADDITIONAL CHANGES WILL IMPACT SEVERELY ON LOGISTIC PLANNING.

D 0 4. (TS) RETENTION OF THE MAR IN THE RVN DURING FY 72 WOULD PRECLUDE COMPLETE RECONSTITUTION OF THE PACOM USMC STRATEGIC RESERVE, IN THAT ONLY 1 2/3 DIVISION-WING TEAMS WOULD BE RECONSTITUTED RATHER THAN THE TWO TEAMS CURRENTLY PROGRAMMED. ADDITIONALLY, MANPOWER AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, COULD BE EXPECTED TO FURTHER DEGRADE THE SIZE AND EFFICACY OF THE 1 2/3 DIVISION-WING TEAM. CONSIDERING

T U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THAILAND AND KOREA AS WELL AS IN THE RVN, THE EARLY RECONSTITUTION OF THE PACOM STRATEGIC USMC RESERVE AS A QUICK REACTION FORCE IS ESSENTIAL IN LIGHT OF THE ACTIVE HOSTILITIES THROUGHOUT THE PACOM.

Y 0 5. (TS) THE USMC AIR SQUADRONS PROPOSED IN THE ALTER-
E NATIVE OF RFF A WOULD NOT REPLACE AIR FORCE SQUADRONS ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS SINCE USMC DOCTRINE PRESCRIBES THEIR PRIMARY MISSION AS PROVISION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO USMC GROUND FORCES. THEREFORE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT USMC TACAIR WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN AN OUT-OF-COUNTRY ROLE.

I N 6. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, A FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE RVN BASED ON CURRENTLY PLANNED AUTHORIZATIONS IS PREFERRED AND RECOMMENDED.

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UNQUOTE:

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES


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TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

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TOP SECRET//SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR
 LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/DELIVER DURING WORKING
 HOURS//NO3700//

VMCJ EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 022017Z NOV 70 (S) (SPECAT) (MCEO)

B. CG FMFPAC 312237Z OCT 70 (S)

1. (S) REF A AND B ADDRESS THE EMPLOYMENT OF EA-SA IN
 SEA AND PROVIDE SUPPORTING RATIONALE AS TO WHY THEY SHOULD
 NOT BE COMMITTED.

2. (TS) APPRECIATE THE DESIRABILITY OF EA-SA PRESENCE IN
 THE MED, BUT DO NOT AGREE THAT THAT DOES
 OR SHOULD REDUCE PAC CAPABILITY. THE IMMEDIATE
 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT IS VERY REAL RIGHT HERE AND NOW.
 WHILE THE REDEPLOYMENT OF VMCJ-1 TO IWAKUNI WAS IN THE BEST
 PAROCHIAL INTEREST, IN RETROSPECT IT WAS CONTRARY TO THE
 BEST NATIONAL INTEREST. HOWEVER OUR POINT HAS BEEN MADE,

CG III MAF

P 091405Z/NOV70

ACTN:S/SEC

1-2

124

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AD 8953

PTTAZYUW RUHGOAA1635 3250106-AAAA--RUHHFMA.

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P 210106Z NOV 70

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

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S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR LTGEN JONES FROM WEISNER

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED FROM COMUSTDC AND IS QUOTED
FOR YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE.FOR VADM WEISNER, INFO ADM HYLAND, VADM RICHARDSON, MGEN WILSON AND
RADM RUBEL FROM BAUMBERGER (181030Z NOV 70)

COMSEVENTHFLT PASS TO ADM HYLAND

AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 060230Z NOV 70V

B. COMUSTDC 240515Z OCT 70 (NOTAL) PASEP TO COMSEVENTHFLT

C. CINCPAC 300900Z DEC 69 (NOTAL)

1. DURING ADM HYLAND AND RADM RUBELS VISIT TO TAIPEI I TOOK THE
LIBERTY OF DISCUSSING SUBJECT OF US-GRC EXERCISES WITH THEM. I EXPLAINED
THAT OBJECTIVE WAS TO FIND A SUBSTITUTE FOR FORMER PIONEER THIS
FISCAL YEAR. FORMER PIONEER HAS BEEN CANCELLED BY STATE (ACTUALLY
AT HIGHER LEVEL). BUT CHINESE DO NOT KNOW ABOUT IT. ESSENTIAL THAT

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PAGE 2 RUHGOAA1635 S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
WE COME UP WITH AN AGREED CONCEPT FOR SUBSTITUTE PRIOR TO NOTIFYING
THEM. WE FELT HERE AND AMBASSADOR HAS AGREED, THAT A UNILATERAL U.S.
AMPHIBIOUS LANDING WITH CHINESE ARMY IN DEFENSIVE ROLE MIGHT ACCOM-
PLISH THE DUAL OBJECTIVE OF (A) PROVIDING A SEMI-COMBINED EXERCISE
WHICH WOULD PARTIALLY ASSUAGE THE CHINESE AS RESULT OF CANCELLATION
OF FORMER PIONEER, AND (B) PROVIDE NEEDED SEVENTH FLEET AMPHIBIOUS
TRAINING.

2. CTF SEVEN SIX AND SEVEN NINE REPS IN DISCUSSING EXERCISE INDIC-
ATED PREFERENCE TO HOLD TO POSITION OUTLINED REF A.

3. THE IMPRACTICALITY OF COMBINED US/GC LANDING DUE TO POLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE EMPHASIZED. AMBASSADOR HAS MADE THIS POINT
VERY CLEAR AND REITERATED POSITION (PRESUMED TO EMANATE FROM STATE
DEPT WHEN SOUNDED OUT ON THE PROPOSAL OUTLINED REF A. FURTHER, SINCE
THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVIDE A 'SUBSTITUTE' FOR FORMER PIONEER
IT SEEMS ESSENTIAL THAT WE HAVE SOMETHING TO PROPOSE THAT WOULD IN-
VOLVE CHINESE GROUND FORCES. FYI CINCPAC VIEWS CONCEPT AS PROPOSED

COMSEVENTHFLT

P 210106Z/NOV70

ACTN: S/SEC

1-2

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PAGE TWO RUMUMPA0987 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR

NEITHER THE NAVY NOR THE AIR FORCE HAS THE EQUIPMENT TO DO
THE JOB ACCOMPLISHED BY THE EA-6A. ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY, THEY
NOW ADMIT IT.

3. (TS) AS REPORTED TO YOU, THE MAJOR MACV AIR EFFORT HAS
SHIFTED TO LAOS. IN CONSONANCE WITH THAT SHIFT OUR A-6'S
STARTED GOING BACK OVER THE FENCE ON 7 NOV. CONCUR WITH THE
DECISION BECAUSE OUR FULL SORTIE GENERATING CAPABILITY WAS
NOT BEING USED IN-COUNTRY. THE ENEMY RESUPPLY LINES.
THROUGH LAOS MUST BE CLOBBERED. IN TURN HE HAS TO KEEP THEM
OPEN TO SURVIVE, AS I SEE IT. HIS ONLY COUNTER IS TO
MOVE IN RADAR CONTROLLED AAA AND SAMs. UTILIZING THE
EA-6 IN THAT ENVIRONMENT WOULD WORK TO OUR ADVANTAGE AS WELL AS
TO THE BENEFIT OF THE USAF AND NAVY.

4. (S) IT APPEARS TO ME THAT TO TELL CINCPAC THAT WE CANNOT
COMMIT AN ELEMENT OF HIS RESERVE TO THIS OPERATIONAL REQUIRE-
MENT IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN OPEN ADMISSION THAT WE ARE NOT THE
FORCE IN READINESS WE PURPOSE TO BE. WOULD RATHER SEE US
TAKE THE TACK THAT WE SHOULD PARTICIPATE AND THIS IS WHAT
IT WILL TAKE TO MAKE IT TOTALLY SUCCESSFUL. IN THIS REGARD,
WE SHOULD USE THIS LEVER ON THE NAVY TO PRY OUT BETTER
PAGE THREE RUMUMPA0987 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR

EA-6 SUPPORT BE IT FOR SSE OR PARTS SUPPLY; AND BE IT FOR
EITHER THE PAC OR LANT THEATER, IT IS TO THE NAVY'S ADVANTAGE
TO ENSURE THE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITY IS AVAILABLE AND
OPERABLE.

5. (S) IN POINT OF FACT, THE "GIVE" TO LANT DID NOT DRAWDOWN
VMCJ-1 BELOW 100 PERCENT T/E. EXCESS PLATFORMS AND ASSOCIATED/
EXCESS EQUIPMENT WERE ALL THAT WERE TRANSFERRED, BUT THE VITAL
ALQ-76 WITH ASSOCIATED JAMMERS, THE CHAFF DISPENSER PODS
(ALE-32), THE ALQ-76 UPACS AND THE INTEGRAL SELF-PROTECTION
EQUIPMENT WERE ALL ON HAND AND IN AMPLE SUPPLY. THE AIR
FORCE IS SO HOT TO GET THIS CAPABILITY BACK IN SEA, I
BELIEVE THEY WOULD PROVIDE THE AIR TRANSPORT FOR THE VANS
WITHOUT TOUCHING YOUR KC-130 ASSETS.

6. (S) WOULD ALSO PROPOSE ANOTHER WAY TO REINTRODUCE THE E-6AS
IN-COUNTRY. THEY COULD BE TRADED OFF FOR A LIKE NUMBER OF
STRAIGHT A-6A, AT LEAST UNTIL VMFA-115 STANDS DOWN IN FEB.
IF THAT IS NOT POLITIC, THEN ALTERNATIVELY PUT THEM ABOARD
A 7TH FLEET CARRIER. GATHER FROM WEISNER'S INQUIRES, HE
WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO GET THEM. LACK OF PILOT CV TRAINING
IS VIEWED AS A PROBLEM, BUT NOT PROHIBITIVE WHEN ONE CONSID-
PAGE FOUR RUMUMPA0987 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR

ERS THE REMARKABLE CARRIER SAFETY RECORD OF THE A-6.

7. (S) IN SHORT, THE EB-66/EKA-3S CAN'T HACK IT AND THE
EA-6B IS NOT YET AVAILABLE, THEREFORE RECOMMEND WE TAKE
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE EA-6A PICTURE AND COMMIT THEM IF AT ALL
POSSIBLE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

BT

0987

CG III MAF

P 091405Z/NOV70

2-2

124

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~

WITH FAVOR. I AM CERTAIN HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT CONCEPT IN REF A SINCE THAT AMBASSADOR WOULD NOT.

4. IN RESPONSE TO REQUIREMENT TO RECOMMEND SUBSTITUTE (S) FOR FORMER PIONEER SERIES COMBINED UW EXERCISE REF B RECOMMEND A CPX EXERCISE

PAGE 3 RUHGOAA1635 S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SIMILAR TO THE FOCUS LENS SERIES CONDUCTED IN KOREA AND COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE WITH THE U.S. LANDING FORCE (BLT6) PLAYING THE AGGRESSOR ROLE WITH GRC (PREDOMINENTLY ARMY) FORCES PLAYING DEFENSIVE ROLE. AS INDICATED PARA ONE (A) PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE EXERCISE IS TO SUBSTITUTE FOR FORMER PIONEER AND PROVIDE GRC ARMY PARTICIPATION IN COMBINED US/GRC EXERCISES. THIS IS A SENSITIVE ISSUE LOCALLY WITH GRC NAVY AND AIR FORCE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN COMBINED EXERCISES AT LEAST QUARTERLY WHEREAS ARMY PARTICIPATION IN COMBINED EXERCISES WAS CONFINED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO FORMER PIONEER. THE SCENARIO SUGGESTED MET THE UNILATERAL LANDING REQUIREMENT, WAS CLEARED BY THE AMEMBASSY AND WAS IN CONSONANCE WITH:

- A. CINCPAC POSITION REF C WHICH INDICATED THAT COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES WERE PONDEROUS IN DEVELOPMENT, HAVE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, AND WERE NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE ADVANCE LEVEL OF TRAINING INDICATED BY THE ARG/SLF AND RECOMMENDED THAT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF ARG/SLF COULD BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY UNILATERAL U.S. AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING OPERATIONS UTILIZING FOREIGN BEACHES.
- B. STATE/DEFENSE GUIDANCE RECEIVED JAN 70 WHICH INDICATED U.S. DID NOT ANTICIPATE COMMITMENT OF U.S. GROUND FORCES TO DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.
- C. CINCPAC DELETION OF PREVIOUS COMMITMENT MARINE AIR GROUP TO DE

PAGE 4 RUHGOAA1635 S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FENSE OF TAIWAN IN LATEST REVISION OF 25 OPLAN. WHEN DELETION WAS CHALLENGED RATIONALE PROVIDED INFORMALLY BY CINCPAC STAFF INDICATED:

(1) CINCPAC OPLAN 5025 OPERATIONAL CONCEPT DID NOT PENVISAGE EMPLOYMENT MAJOR U.S. GROUND FORCES.

(2) DESIRABILITY RETAINING THE MAG FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH AMPHIBIOUS FORCES AS AN AIR SUPPORT COMPONENT OF MARINE TEAM ELSEWHERE IN WESTPAC.

5. HOPE YOU CAN DISCUSS ABOVE WITH JOHNNY PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FROM JAPAN.

6. BEST REGARDS. UNQUOTE.

2. I WAS UNABLE TO DISCUSS SUBJECT WITH ADM HYLAND. ALL BEST WISHES.

GP-3

#1635

COMSEVENTHFLT

P 210106Z/NOV70

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P 220748Z NOV 70

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RUSTABA/COMUSTDC

INFO RUHHFMA/CINCPACFLT

RUHHFMA/FPAC

RUYRSAA/CIF SEVEN NINE

RUMFUF/CTF SEVEN SIX

BT

S E C R E T NOFORN SPECIALLY EXCLUSIVE

FOR ADM BAUBERGER, INFO ADM WYLAND, INFO AGERS, INFO ADM TAYLOR AND
RADM RUBEL FROM WEISNER
TAIWAN EXERCISESCOPY 1A OF 2 COPIES

CCN: 62/1

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ATT ATT

A. COMUSTDC 181030Z NOV 70

B. COMSEVENTHFLT 0600Z NOV 70

1. REGRET REF WAS NOT RECEIVED IN TIME TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM.
2. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, YOUR PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND
IN ADDITION TO THE PROBLEMS CITED IN REF B, BELIEF THAT THE FOLLOWING
FACTORS SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED:

A. AN EXERCISE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED TO PRECLUDE INCIDENTS WHICH
NECESSARILY HAVE SO MANY ARTIFICIALITIES THAT LITTLE TRAINING
VALUE WOULD BE GAINED BY OUR FORCES.

B. A U.S. NAVY/MARINE CORPS EXERCISE IN TAIWAN THAT DID NOT
INCLUDE THE ROC NAVY/MARINE CORPS COULD EASILY BE CONSIDERED A
SLIGHT BY THOSE SERVICES.

3. MY OPINION AT THIS POINT IN TIME IS THAT WE SHOULD CONFINED
OURSELVES TO A CPX. YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO HOLD A FOCUS EXERCISE
CPX IS CONCURRED IN. IF WE ARE UNABLE TO CONFINED OURSELVES TO A
CPX AND MUST HAVE SOME TYPE OF EXERCISE BELIEVE THE PROPOSED
SCENARIO SHOULD BE CHANGED TO ELIMINATE THE DISADVANTAGES CITED
ABOVE AND IN REF B.

4. ALL BEST WISHES.

GP-3

BT COMSEVENTHFLT

1831

P 220748Z/NOV70

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FM COMNAVFORJAPAN

TO RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUAOCFA/CTF SEVEN NINE

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SECRET /NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM WEISNER, INFO ADM HYLAND
LTGEN JONES AND MAJGEN WILSON FROM RADM BURKE
FUJI TRAINING AREA (U)

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 210834Z NOV 1970

1. REF (A) DISCUSSED U.S. USE OF THE FUJI TRAINING AREA AND MADE
RECOMMENDATION TO RETURN NORTH FUJI TO JAPANESE GROUND SELF DEFENSE
FORCE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL. I CONCUR WITH SENTIMENTS YOU EXPRESSED.
I SEE NO BENEFIT TO U.S. RETAINING CONTROL OF THE AREA. BY WAY OF
BACKGROUND AND INFORMATION, THE FOLLOWING IS OFFERED:

A. IN JULY 1968, THE FUJI MANEUVER AREA (COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS
EAST FUJI) REVERTED TO GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (GOJ) CONTROL. ENCL (16)
TO MINUTES OF THE 173RD U.S./GOJ JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING U.S./GOJ
FACILITIES SUB-COMMITTEE, MEMO NO 587 OF 12 JUL 1968 (SUBJECT:

COMNAVFORJAPAN

P 240141Z/NOV 70

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S L C E

PAGE TWO RUADLBA1117 S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 CONVERSION OF EAST FUJI MANEUVER AREA, FAC 3127) STATES IN PARA 10
 • THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGREES TO NEGOTIATE THE CONVERSION OF
 NORTH FUJI MANEUVER AREA, FAC 3123, UNDER THE SAME PROVISIONS
 ENUMERATED ABOVE IN PARAGRAPHS 5 THROUGH 9, WHEN AGREEABLE TO THE
 GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN. PARAGRAPHS 5 THROUGH 9 OF ENCL (16) SUCCINCTLY
 STATE THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE AREA WILL BE A MANEUVER AND IMPACT
 AREA FOR THE TRAINING OF GROUND TROOPS AND SUPPORTING ELEMENTS;
 THAT THE SAME TRAINING PRIVILEGES NOW IN EFFECT IN THE EAST FUJI AREA
 APPLY.

B. U.S. MEMO TO GOJ FACILITIES ADJUSTMENTS PANEL, DATED 5 SEP 1969
 (SUBJECT: CONVERSION OF NORTH FUJI MANEUVER AREA, FAC 3123, AND
 REDESIGNATION AS AN ADDITION TO FUJI MANEUVER AREA, FAC 3183.)
 PROPOSED • THAT NORTH FUJI MANEUVER AREA, FAC 3123 LOSE ITS IDENTIY
 AS A SEPARATE FACILITY AND AREA; THAT IT BE REDESIGNATED AS AN
 ADDITION TO AND PART OF, FUJI MANEUVER AREA. TO DATE, GOJ HAS NOT
 RESPONDED. ON TWO OCCASIONS, GOJ REPS WERE QUERIED INFORMALLY. GOJ
 REPS ADVISED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO APPEASE LOCAL
 UNIONS IN THE NORTH FUJI AREA AS TO LAND RELEASES; THAT, AN OFFICIAL
 GOJ ANSWER/REPLY CANNOT BE EXPECTED BEFORE FEB-APR 1971.

C. I HAVE PREPARED A LETTER ADDRESSED TO CG, MARINE CORPS BASES, CAMP

PAGE THREE RUADLBA1117 S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 BUTLER, OKINAWA FOR COMMENTS ON LAND AREA RELEASES THAT ARE EXPECTED
 FROM GOJ IN THE RETURN OF NORTH FUJI.

D. I ALSO CONCUR THAT GOJ WOULD HAVE FUNDING PROBLEMS AND THIS IS
 PROBABLY THE MAIN REASON FOR NOT ANSWERING THE U.S. DOCUMENT OF SEP
 1969.

2. NEW TOPIC. ON SUNDAY, 22 NOV. 1970, U.S. AMBASSADOR MEYER, TO
 JAPAN, ACCCOMPANIED BY HIS POL-MIL CHIEF, MR. HOWARD MEYERS, WERE AT TH
 FUJI TRAINING AREA FOR A BRIEF AND HELO FLY OVER OF THE AREAS. THE
 VISIT WAS COMBINED WITH ANOTHER ENGAGEMENT IN THE VICINITY OF THE
 FUJI AREAS. I WAS IN ATTENDANCE FOR THE BRIEF AND HELO FLY OVER.
 THE VISIT AFFORDED THE AMBASSADOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE AREAS
 FIRST HAND AND BE BRIEFED ON A MATTER WHICH HAS COME TO HIS ATTENTION.
 HE DID NOT EXPRESS OPINIONS.

3. IN AN AREA OF RELATED INTEREST, ON 24 NOV. 1970, THE DIRECTOR,
 POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPT. OF STATE, WILL BE AT THE U.S.
 EMBASSY, TOKYO FOR DISCUSSION WITH U.S. MILITARY COMMANDERS AND
 THEIR ASSISTANTS. IN ADDITION TO THIS, I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE
 AMBASSADOR, AT HIS REQUEST, TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF NAVY
 REALIGNMENT PLANS. WILL ADVISE.

4. WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

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COMNAVFORJAPAN

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**S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM WEISNER, INFO
ADM HYLAND, LTGEN JONES, MGEN WILSON AND RUSSEL FROM BAUMBERGER
U/GRC COMBINED EXERCISES**

A. CINCPAC 302223Z OCTOBER 70

B. COMSEVENTHFLT 220748Z NOVEMBER 70

C. COMUSTDC 181030Z NOVEMBER 70

D. CINCPACINST 03550.1D

E. COMSEVENTHFLT 060230Z NOVEMBER 70

F. CINCPAC 180141Z SEPTEMBER 70

1. REF A REQUESTED COMUSTDC COORDINATE WITH COMPONENT COMMANDERS
IN DEVELOPING AN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE, WHEREIN THE US AMPHIBIOUS
TASK FORCE SIMULATES THE AGGRESSOR AND GRC FORCS THE DEFENDERS

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P 271255Z/NOV70

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PAGE TWO RUHPSDD8869 S E C R E T
 WITH THE AIM OF CONDUCTING THIS EXERCISE DURING THE FOURTH QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 71. REF B INTRODUCED FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL FACTORS:

A. AN EXERCISE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED TO PRECLUDE INCIDENTS WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE SO MANY ARTIFICIALITIES THAT LITTLE TRAINING VALUE WOULD BE GAINED BY OUR FORCES. COMMENT: THIS ISSUE NOT RAISED REF C. DO NOT FORSEE ANY PARTICULAR PROBLEM HERE.

B. A US NAVY/MARINE CORPS EXERCISE IN TAIWAN THAT DID NOT INCLUDE ROC NAVY/MARINE CORPS COULD EASILY BE CONSIDERED A SLIGHT BY THOSE SERVICES. COMMENT: THIS MAY BE PROBLEM BUT BELIEVE MANAGEABLE.

2. I WOULD LIKE TO GO FORWARD TO CINCPAC WITH EXERCISE AS OUTLINED IN FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS. OVERALL OBJECTIVE IS INVOLVEMENT OF GRC ARMY IN AN EXERCISE MORE MEANINGFUL THAN CPX. REALIZE THIS INVOLVES SOME FEATURES OBJECTIONABLE TO NAVY/MARINE TEAM BUT FROM MY VANTAGE POINT THE OVERALL INTERESTS OF US WOULD BENEFIT.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF D, THE FOLLOWING EXERCISE IS PROPOSED

A. TENTATIVE NAME-FOOD FREEZER
 B. TYPE-COMBINED U/S/GRC.

PAGE THREE RUHPSDD8869 S E C R E T

C. CONCEPT/OBJECTIVES OF THE EXERCISE:

(1) TO EXERCISE US FORCES, SLF/ARG IN PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF A UNILATERAL AMPHIBIOUS LANDING.

(2) AT THE PRESENT TIME THE CONCEPT IN PARA 1.F. REF A/ PROVIDES A SOUND BASIS FOR INITIAL PLANNING. AS A SUGGESTION TO ALLEVIATE THE SPECTER OF THE US BEING PORTRAYED AS AGGRESSORS, (PARA 3 OF REF E), A QUICK REACTION LANDING BY THE SLF, TO: LAND, SIEZE AN OBJECTIVE, RENDER IT USELESS TO THE ENEMY AND WITHDRAW; WITHIN AN APPROXIMATE THREE DAY TOTAL TIME FRAME, WOULD HAVE POSSIBILITIES. THIS TYPE EXERCISE PLAN WOULD PROVIDE THE ARG/SLF WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE AND TEST A QUICK REACTION LANDING PLAN AGAINST A LARGE, WELL DEFENDED OBJECTIVE, CONCURRENTLY THE GRC WOULD BE ABLE TO TEST ITS CAPABILITY TO DEFEND A STRATEGIC AREA AGAINST A LARGE WELL-EQUIPPED LANDING FORCE.

(3) THE THREE DAY TIME FRAME THAT THE US FORCES WOULD BE ASHORE:

(A) WILL REQUIRE A RAPIDLY MOVING SCENARIO; THUS MINIMIZING PUBLIC EXPOSURE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSEQUENT ADVERSE REACTION.

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PAGE FOUR RUHP8669 S E C R E T

(B) SIDESTEP THE ISSUE OF VICTORY/DEFEAT RAISED IN REF C. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WITH US/GRC BLUE SKY EXERCISES, THE US FORCES ACT AS AGGRESSORS WITHOUT ADVERSE POLITICAL REACTION.

D. MISSION: ASSIST THE GRC FORCES IN INCREASING READINESS TO DEFEND TAIWAN AND CREATE A CLIMATE OF IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING. ADDITIONALLY, US FORCES (1) THE AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP/MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT AND BATTALION LANDING TEAM WOULD OBTAIN VALUABLE AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING IN A NEW AREA OF OPERATIONS.

E. DATES: JUNE 71 (TENTATIVE).

F. CRITICAL OR LIMITING DATES TO CANCEL THE EXERCISE: 30 DAYS PRIOR COMEX.

G. DIRECTING HEADQUARTERS: COMSEVENTHFLT OR AS DIRECTED BY COMSEVENTHFLT.

H. PARTICIPATING COMMANDERS, HEADQUARTERS FORCES:

(1) COMSEVENTHFLT NAVAL AND MARINE UNITS AS ASSIGNED.

(2) GRC FORCES AS ASSIGNED.

I. SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION ANTICIPATION ANTICIPATED FROM:

(1) OTHER UNIFIED OR SPECIFIED COMMANDS: NONE

(2) UNASSIGNED FORCES OF THE US MILITARY SERVICES: NONE

(3) OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES OR DEPARTMENTS: NONE

PAGE FIVE RUHP8669 S E C R E T

(4) ALLIED NATION: GRC ONLY.

J. SIMULATED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: NOT ANTICIPATED.

K. COORDINATION EFFECTED: WILL REQUIRE COORDINATION WITH AMEMBASSY TAIWAN, CHNAAC CHINA AND CHINESE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, WHEN CONCEPT APPROVED. LIMITED TO IS ONLY AT PRESENT TIME.

L. RECOMMEND GENERAL PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY: EXERCISE TO BE CONDUCTED IN LOW KEY AND RELATIVELY UNINHIBITED AREA OF TAIWAN. NO POLITICAL SCENARIO WILL BE PREPARED. NEWS COVERAGE IS NOT DESIRED OR INTENDED; HOWEVER, A CONTINGENCY STATEMENT WILL BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 3E, REF D.

M. GENERAL POLICY CONCERNING:

(1) DIPLOMATIC INFORMATION: REQUIRES APPROVAL OF JCS AND STATE PRIOR TO ESTABLISHING ANY COMMITMENTS WITH GRC.

(2) SECURITY RESTRICTION: AT PRESENT MUST BE CLASSIFIED SECRET NOFORN UNTIL APPROVAL OBTAINED FOR CONDUCT OF EXERCISE, FINAL SECURITY WOULD BE PREDICATED ON JOINT US/GRC DETERMINATION.

(3) PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS: TO DEMONSTRATE US/GRC SOLIDARITY AND DEMONSTRATE ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER.

4. REQUEST COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING EXERCISE.

5. BEST REGARDS.

GP-3

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TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR, LTGEN MCCUTCHEON,
 MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. (SECTION I OF V)
 //N00000//

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF CINCPAC 262117Z
 NOV 70 (TS) TO JCS, INFO COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC,
 CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CG FMFPAC, ADMIN CINCPAC WHICH
 I AM PROVIDING FOR INFORMATION.

QUOTE:

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

A. JCS 5906/141504Z NOV 70 (PASEP)

1. (TS) REF A ADVISED THAT CURRENT BUDGET AND MANPOWER
 CONSTRAINTS COULD PRECLUDE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 260,000
 U.S. FORCE LEVEL CURRENTLY PLANNED FOR THE RVN, AND REQUEST-

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 ED (1) A RE-ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE RVN BEYOND THE
 END OF FY71, AND (2) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REQUIRED END
 FY71 IN COUNTRY STRENGTHS, TO INCLUDE COMMENTS ON THE
 FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT OF REDUCING U.S. FORCES IN THE RVN
 TO NOT GREATER THAN 250,000 BY END FY71.

2. (TS) GENERAL. THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION
 IN THE RVN IS PROJECTED BEYOND END FY71 WHEREVER POSSIBLE,
 AND CONSIDERS THE PROGRESS OF CRIMP, THE STATUS OF THE LOC
 PROGRAM, AND PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION, WHERE APPLICABLE.
 IT PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR THE REQUESTED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
 AND THE MINIMUM END FY71 U.S. FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR
 ACCOMPLISHING U.S. PRIORITY GOALS IN THE RVN.

3. (TS) ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

A. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(1) THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF NORTH VIETNAM IN
 INDOCHINA REMAIN BASICALLY UNCHANGED. THE PRIMARY AIM OF
 HANOI IS THE REUNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM UNDER
 ITS CONTROL. THE LONG TERM GOAL IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
 SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OVER LAOS AND CAMBODIA, BUT THIS REMAINS
 SUBORDINATE TO THE PRIMARY AIM OF REUNIFICATION.

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E

(2) THE ENEMY IS FACED WITH NEW PROBLEMS HE HAS NOT
 ENOUNTERED IN THE LAST DECADE. AT THE PRESENT TIME, LAOS
 IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO HANOI, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF
 THE SUPPLY CORRIDOR THROUGH THE LAO PANHANDLE. THIS IS
 CURRENTLY THE ONLY FEASIBLE ROUTE AVAILABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS FOR
 MOVING MEN AND SUPPLIES TO CAMBODIA AND THE COSVN AREA OF SOUTH
 VIETNAM. HANOI HAS BEEN FORCED TO EXPAND LINES OF COM-
 MUNICATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF
 KOMPONG SOM, DISRUPTION OF LOC'S BY THE CROSS-BORDER
 OPERATIONS INTO CAMBODIA, AND THE CRITICAL NEED TO RESUPPLY
 ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH. IN CAMBODIA, THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT
 IN MARCH OBLIGED THE ENEMY TO REASSESS THE SITUATION AND REORIENT
 HIS EFFORTS TO REPLACE VITAL SUPPLY LINES. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS,
 HE ELECTED TO DIVERT MAIN FORCE UNITS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM,
 FURTHER LIMITING HIS OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY IN
 THE COSVN AREA OF THE REPUBLIC. THE ENEMY'S FUTURE MILITARY
 EFFECTIVENESS IN SOUTHERN INDOCHINA IS DIRECTLY RELATED
 TO HIS ABILITY TO SOLVE THE SEVERE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH
 HE NOW FACES.

(3) DESPITE HIS MANY UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS, THE ENEMY

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PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSVICE FOR M C E (ISLIKELY TO MAINTAIN A LIMITED CAPABILITY FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. HE WILL PROBABLY RETAIN THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT LIMITED GROUND ATTACKS IN SELECTED AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS. DESPITE INCREASING MANPOWER DEMANDS, THE ENEMY RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO INFILTRATE PERSONNEL INTO THE SOUTH AND HAS INCREASED INFILTRATION INTO THE COSVN AREA. THE VC/NVA WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SAPPER, TERRORIST, AND GUERRILLA ATTACKS ON POPULATED AREAS IN THE RVN AND WILL PROBABLY STEP-UP ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN HIS VIETNAMESE INFRASTRUCTURE TO CARRY OUT POLICITCAL OBJECTIVES. INCREASED ENEMY EMPHASIS WILL PROBABLY BE GIVEN TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAMBODIA. THE DEPLOYMENT OF SEVERAL SAPPER UNITS INTO CAMBODIA SINCE APRIL SUGGESTS THAT THE ENEMY WILL INCREASE THIS TYPE ACTIVITY IN THE FUTURE. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HANOI WILL CONTINUE ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE U.S. RESOLVE AND GVN EFFECTIVENSS THOUGH A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE.

(4) CONSIDERING THE ENEMY'S CURRENT PROBLEMS, CAPABILITIES, AND OPTIONS, THE FOLLOWING TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE ARE ANTICIPATED:

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 (A) NVA IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE ITS STRATEGY OF PROTRACTED WARFARE IN SOUTH VIETNAM UTILIZING GUERRILLA AND LOCAL FORCES TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENCE IN POPULATED AREAS. INCREASED EMPHASIS WILL BE GIVEN TO COUNTER-PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES AND THE STRENGTHENING OF GUERRILLA AND SAPPER FORCES. THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO UTILIZE LIMITED GROUND ATTACKS BY FIRE TO COUNTER PACIFICATION AND CAUSE ALLIED CASUALTIES WITH A MINIMUM OF EXPOSURE OF HIS OWN PERSONNEL.

(B) IN CAMBODIA, THE SHORT TERM MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF NVN ARE PROBABLY TO SECURE A SUPPLY CORRIDOR IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE COUNTRY AND TO NEUTRALIZE FANK INTERFERENCE WITH REESTABLISHMENT OF LOC'S AND BASE AREAS. TO CONTAIN FANK IN THE POPULATION CENTERS AND THUS ACHIEVE GREATER SECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE VC/NVA WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE THEIR CURRENT ATTACKS AGAINST SMALL URBAN AREAS AROUND PHNOM PENH AND CITIES LOCATED ON KEY ROAD AND WATER ROUTES. THE COMMUNISTS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO EXPAND THEIR WAR EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES, BOTH TO OBTAIN CONTROL OVER THE RICH GROWNING AREA AND TO FORCE THE FANK TO SPREAD

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PAGE SIX RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
MORE THINLY, INCREASING ITS VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK.

(C) IN THE LONG TERM, COMMUNIST STRATEGY WILL DEPEND IN PART ON THE SUCCESS OF CURRENT LOGISTICAL EFFORTS IN THE LAO PANHANDLE AND THE PACE OF U.S. WITHDRAWALS. UNLESS ENEMY FORCES ARE RESUPPLIED IN THE SOUTH THEIR ABILITY TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THE EFFECT OF INCREASED COMMUNIST ACTIVITY ON U.S. WITHDRAWALS. LIMITED ENEMY MILITARY PRESSURE WHICH WOULD NOT SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE SAFETY OF REMAINING U.S. FORCES WOULD MOST LIKELY NOT AFFECT THE PACE OF U.S. WITHDRAWALS. HOWEVER, A MAJOR INCREASE IN ACTIVITY MAY WELL SLOW DOWN OR HALT REDEPLOYMENT. THEREFORE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT ENEMY MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE LONG TERM WILL PROBABLY BE DESIGNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO HIS COUNTER-PACIFICATION EFFORTS AND WILL BE TAILORED TO THE ACCELERATED WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES. HOWEVER, ONCE THE WITHDRAWALS ARE COMPLETED AND IF NORTH VIETNAM SUCCEEDS IN RESOLVING ITS LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH, ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY MIGHT WELL INCREASE IN SCOPE AND INTENSITY.

B. ALLIED SITUATION BY MILITARY REGIONS.

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON,
MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000// SECTION II OF V

(1) MR I. OPERATIONS IN MR I IN SUPPORT OF THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN WERE NOT COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL IN ELIMINATING ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS; HOWEVER, THE ENEMY HAS WITHDRAWN TO THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE REGION AND HIS ACCESS TO THE POPULATION CENTERS HAS BEEN RESTRICTED. ALLIED EFFORTS TO CONTROL AND PROTECT NATURAL RESOURCES WITH PRIORITY GIVEN TO RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL. SECURITY OF THE LOCAL RICE HARVEST WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY TERRITORIAL FORCES WHILE REGULAR UNITS PROVIDED SECURITY IN CONTESTED AREAS. THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVEMENT IN THE ABILITY OF TERRITORIAL FORCES TO CARRY OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE AREA SECURITY CONCEPT, BUT AS IN OTHER REGIONS, THESE FORCES HAVE LEADERSHIP AND DESERTION PROBLEMS. SHOULD THE ENEMY ELECT TO INITIATE

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA 3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS, RVNAF DOES NOT CURRENTLY POSSESS
 THE CAPABILITY TO COMBAT THE THREAT WITHOUT ASSISTANCE
 FROM THE U.S./FWMAF.

(2) MR II. DURING THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN FOURTEEN KNOWN
 OR SUSPECTED ENEMY BASE AREAS WERE TARGETED AND ELEVEN WERE
 ATTACKED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF SUCCESS. THIS CAMPAIGN DID
 NOT COMPLETELY IDENTIFY AND DISRUPT INFILTRATION ROUTES AND
 LOC'S FROM THE TARGET AREAS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN VC
 MR VI AND THE HIGHLANDS. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN RECENT
 IMPROVEMENT DUE IN PART TO REPLACEMENT OF THE MR II COMMANDER,
 THERE WAS A GENERAL LACK OF AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT ON THE PART
 OF ARVN AND ROK FORCES. THE INAUGURATION OF LOCK-ON OPERATIONS,
 TARGETING FRIENDLY FORCES AGAINST SPECIFIC ENEMY UNITS, AND
 CORPS-WIDE EMPHASIS ON TRAINING AND SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS
 SHOULD ACHIEVE IMPROVED RESULTS. TERRITORIAL FORCE GROWTH
 HAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED RVNAF MR II CAPABILITIES. IT
 HAS BEEN NECESSARY IN SOME CASES TO USE REGULAR FORCES TO AUGMENT
 TERRITORIAL FORCES IN SECURE AREAS AND CONSOLIDATION ZONES AT
 THE EXPENSE OF OPERATIONS IN THE CLEARING ZONES. THE ON-GOING
 REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT IN THE

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 VACATED AREAS UNTIL REMAINING U.S./FW/RVN FORCES ARE REALIGNED
 AND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY ADJUSTED TO COVER THESE AREAS.

(3) MR III. THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN GOALS OF ATTRITION
 AGAINST ENEMY FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE WERE GENERALLY
 ATTAINED. THE ENEMY'S DETERMINATION TO DISRUPT THE PACIFI-
 CATION PROGRAM PERSISTED IN SPITE OF THE SUPPLY PROBLEMS
 WHICH HINDERED HIS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. EFFORTS BY THE
 ENEMY ALONG THIS LINE WERE DISRUPTED, WHICH CAN BE ATTRIBUTED
 TO HIS MOVEMENT DEEPER INTO CAMBODIA AND THE U.S./RVNAF
 CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS. WITH THE REDUCED LEVEL OF ACTIVITY,
 RVNAF PROGRESSIVELY ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE CONDUCT
 OF THE INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS OVER LARGER AREAS. FLEXIBILITY
 WAS ASSURED BY THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL U.S. AND FW FORCES
 IN MR III FOR REINFORCEMENT, IF NECESSARY. TERRITORIAL
 FORCES HAVE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURING LARGER
 AREAS AROUND SOME POPULATION CENTERS AND LOC'S, THUS FREEING
 REGULAR UNITS FOR OPERATIONS IN BASE AREAS, INTERDICTION
 EFFORTS, AND CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA. THE
 INCREASE IN RVNAF CAPABILITY AND THE PLANNED REALIGNMENTS
 TO COMPENSATE FOR U.S. REDEPLOYMENTS, COUPLED WITH THE THUS-

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PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 FAR STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN MR III TERRITORIAL FORCES ARE EXPECTED
 TO OFFSET ANY ADVERSE EFFECT OF THE U.S. REDEPLOYMENTS PLANNED
 FROM MR III DURING THE REMAINDER OF THIS FISCAL YEAR. AS IN
 OTHER MR'S, RVNAF DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO COMBAT THE
 THREAT IN RVN CONCURRENT WITH OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA, WITHOUT
 U.S./ARVN FORCES PRESENCE IN-COUNTRY.

(4) MR IV. SUSTAINED GVN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MR IV AND IN
 CAMBODIA HAVE INFILCTED SIGNIFICANT LOSSES ON THE RVN IV AND HE
 HAS ELECTED TO DISPERSE INTO SMALLER ELEMENTS WHICH HIS
 MAIN FORCE THREAT CAN BE REINFORCED. THRE HAS BEEN MOVED
 IN MR III TERRITORIAL FORCES, WHICH HAS ALLOWED FOR REGULAR
 FORCES TO CONCENTRATE ON BIST AREAS, CROSS-BORDERS OPERATIONS,
 AND MAINTAIN A POSTURE TO RIET TO ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATION
 CENTERS. HOWEVER, AS IN OTHER MR'S THE EXPANSION OF THE
 TERRITORIAL FORCES HAS RESULTED IN AN OFFICER SHORTAGE.
 C. THE LOC PROGRAM. THE LOC PROGRAM HAS BEEN UNDER
 CONTINUOUS REVIEW SINCE MARCH 1970 RESULTING IN DEFERRAL OF
 441 KM OF ROADS. THE REDUCTD LOC PROGRAM DIRECTED BY OSD
 ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1970 IS CONSIDERED THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
 TO FACILITATE ATTAINMENT OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND PACIFICATION

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 GOALS. RVNAF ENGINEER UNITS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR 485 KM AND ADDITIONAL WORK SWITCHED FROM U.S. FDS IV-2 TO
 RVNAF WOULD CAUSE A SCHEDULE SLIPPAGE SINCE NEW WORK WHICH IS
 BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF 1970. THIS IS NOT AVAILABLE
 FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL WORK FOR THE CPMFAC
 ABOUT 602 KM OF ROADS ARE ASSIGNED TO U.S. FDS IV-2
 COMPLETION AFTER 1970. THE MAJOR EFFORT WILL BE CONCENTRATED
 ON UPGRADING ROADS IN THE DENSELY POPULATED RVN AND IN
 COMPLETING QL-20, THE IMPORTANT CONNECTIVE BETWEEN CPMFAC AND
 THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE RVN. NINE REINFORCED ENGINEER
 CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS (9,000 MEN), WILL BE REQUIRED DURING
 CY71 TO ENABLE COMPLETION OF THESE 602 KM BY MID-1972.
 INDIVIDUAL BATTALIONS WILL BE RELEASED UPON COMPLETING
 ASSIGNED WORK. DEPENDING UPON CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS, IT IS
 POSSIBLE THAT TWO BATTALIONS MIGHT BE RELEASED FOR REDEPLOYMENT
 IN LATE 1971. THE ALLOCATION OF AN ADDITIONAL \$15 MILLION
 AND DOD'S APPROVAL TO EXTEND THE CPMFAC CONTRACT ACCORDINGLY
 WOULD PERMIT THE CONSTRUCTION OF 40 KM OF LTL-27 BY CONTRACTOR
 IN LIEU OF TROOP EFFORT. THIS WOULD BE TRADE-OFF IN
 FUNDING, BUT WOULD RELEASE ONE REINFORCED ENGINEER BATTALION.

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PAGE SIX RUHHFMA3229 **TOP SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 D. IMPACT OF REDUCED TACAIR: B-52 SORTIES. COMMENCING
 14 AUG 70, TACAIR SORTIES WERE LIMITED TO THE OVERALL MONTHLY
 TOTAL OF 14,000. RVNAF IMPROVEMENT IS NOTED IN THE NUMBER OF
 OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRONS AS WELL AS AN INCREASED
 EFFICIENCY IN THE CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS; HOWEVER, THIS DOES
 NOT COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF USAF CAPABILITY AS UNITS REDEPLOY.
 VNAF AIRCRAFT DO NOT HAVE THE ORDNANCE CAPACITY, THE AIR
 REFUELING CAPABILITY, NOR THE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY OF USAF
 AIRCRAFT. THESE CAPABILITIES ARE NECESSARY FOR ALL WEATHER
 OPERATIONS IN-COUNTRY AND INTERDICTION MISSIONS IN LAOS/CAMBODIA.
 SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH MAY IMPINGE ON THE TACAIR SUPPORT CIRCUM-
 STANCE ARE: AN INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY; AN
 INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUIRED FOR THE INTERDICTION
 CAMPAIGN IN LAOS; OR A FURTHER DRAWDOWN ON THE TOTAL AVAILABLE
 U.S./FWMAF TACAIR ASSETS. THE NUMBER OF B-52 STRIKES PER DAY
 HAS REMAINED THE SAME SINCE THE SORTIES REDUCTION WENT INTO
 EFFECT; HOWEVER, THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF
 AIRCRAFT PER STRIKE. PRIOR TO 17 AUGUST, SOME STRIKES WERE
 MADE UP OF SIX AIRCRAFT, AND SOME CONSISTED OF THREE AIRCRAFT.
 ALL STRIKES ARE NOW MADE UP OF THREE AIRCRAFT.

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON,
 MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. SECTION III OF V
 //N00000//

E. APPRAISAL OF GVN FORCES.

(1) OVERALL. THE CABODIA OPERATIONS ARE EXAMPLES OF
 RVNAF ABILITY OF PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS. THOUGH RVNAF
 CONTINUES TO IMPROVE IN EFFECTIVENESS IT CANNOT MEET THE
 PRESENT AND PROJECTED OVERALL THREAT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT
 U.S. AND FWMAF COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT, AND COMBAT SERVICE
 SUPPORT ASSISTANCE. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN MR I AND
 MR II. THIS U.S.-FWMAF SUPPORT ENABLES RVNAF TO MAINTAIN
 A CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GKR
 AND DISRUPT NVA/VC ACTIVITIES ALONG THE CAMBODIAN/RVN
 BORDER AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE THE CONDUCT OF IN-COUNTRY
 EFFORTS. RVNAF OVERALL STRENGTHS AS PROJECTED ARE ACCEPTABLE.
 IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SUFFICIENT MANPOWER RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3230 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 TO SUPPORT PROGRAMMED FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASES. WITH THE
 NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF DEFICIENCIES IN DEPOT, AIR/SEALIFT, AND
 PORT OPERATIONS, RVNAF IS CURRENTLY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN
 PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR A FORCE STRUCTURE OF AP-
 PROXIMATELY 1.0 MILLION MEN. INCREASED EMPHASIS IS REQUIRED
 IN MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY AREAS TO PREVENT A GRADUAL DETERIORA-
 TION OF COMBAT READINESS. THE RVNAF NON-TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS
 SYSTEM IS ALMOST VOID IN THE AREAS OF TECHNICAL ENGINEERING AND
 MANAGEMENT SKILLS, LIMITED IN RELIABILITY, INADEQUATE
 IN CAPACITY, AND DEFICIENT IN MIDDLE MANAGEMENT SUPERVISION
 OF MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS. OF ALL PROBLEMS IN THE C-E
 FIELD, THE MOST CRITICAL ARE THE ACUTE SHORTAGE OF TRAINED
 TECHNICAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL AND THE DEPENDENCE
 OF THE RVNAF COMMO STRUCTURE ON U.S. MILITARY INTEGRATED
 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS FOR LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS THROUGHOUT
 RVN. ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO COMPENSATE FOR THESE SEVERE
 LIMITATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE PROGRESS OF THE CRIMP HAS BEEN
 SATISFACTORY THUS FAR, WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. COMMUNICATIONS UNITS BASED
 ON A DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE RVNAF CAPABILITY HAS INCREASED FASTER
 THAN ANTICIPATED SHOULD BE CLOSELY MONITORED. ACTIVATIONS AND EXPANSION

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3230 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 OF RVNAF UNITS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AT THE EXPENSE OF
 EXISTING UNITS. ALSO, SKILL LEVELS OF TECHNICIANS AND
 ABILITY OF LEADERS IN A GREAT MANY CASES IS BELOW THAT
 REQUIRED DUE TO LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING. A
 COMPREHENSIVE COMBINED REVIEW OF THE RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE
 WAS INITIATED ON 20 NOVEMBER 1970 TO DETERMINE CHANGES
 REQUIRED IN THE RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE FOR FY72 AND FY73
 IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CAPABILITIES.
 (2) ARVN. CRIMP HAS PROVIDED INCREASED ARTILLERY
 CAPABILITIES. THE PROVISION OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO RF/PF
 WILL FREE THE ARVN CORPS AND DIVISION ARTILLERY FOR THE SUPPORT
 OF ARVN OPERATIONS. WHERE FEASIBLE, ACTIVATIONS OF ARVN UNITS
 ARE BEING ACCELERATED; HOWEVER, EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY
 IS THE PRIMARY LIMITING FACTOR. THIS FACTOR AND TRAINING
 PROBLEMS DISCUSSED BELOW COMBINED WITH MANPOWER COMPETITION
 AMONG THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS PRECLUDE ADDITIONAL ACCELERATIONS
 IN FY71. THE ACTIVATIONS OF SOME ADMINISTRATIVE AND
 LOGISTICAL UNITS HAVE FALLEN BEHIND SCHEDULE. IT IS
 ANTICIPATED THESE UNITS WILL BE ACTIVATED IN THE SECOND
 HALF OF FY71 AFTER COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS ARE

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PAGE SIX RUHHFMA3230 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O IS PROGRESSING SLOWLY. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE PLANNED MANNING LEVELS ARE ATTAINED, THE VNN WILL NOT HAVE THE BENEFIT OF AN ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION. COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS ARE KEEPING PACE WITH THE SCHEDULED ASSUMPTION OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, BUT COMSEC REMAINS AN AREA OF CONCERN AND IS RECEIVING PRIORITY ATTENTION. THE VNN SHIPYARD CAN SATISFACTORILY ACCOMPLISH THE PRESENT WORKLOAD BUT FACES SEVERE MANPOWER PROBLEMS IN ASSUMING THE ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD SUPPORTED BY SRF GUAM AND INHERENT IN VNN EXPANSION. ALL BROWN WATER COMBAT ASSETS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TURNED OVER BY DEC 70, ALL BLUE WATER ASSETS BY JUL 71, AND ALL LOGISTIC CRAFT BY JUL 72. IT IS EXPECTED THAT ALL COMBAT OPERATIONS WILL BE VIETNAMESE COMMANDED BY 15 JAN 71, WITH EXCEPTION OF MARKET TIME OUTER BARRIER. BY JUL 72 CAPABILITIES IN EOD, SALVAGE, HARBOR DEFENSE, MINESWEEPING, AND SPECIAL WARFARE SHOULD BE REALIZED. THESE PROGRAMS ARE PACED BY THE INCREASINGLY ACUTE SHORTAGE OF EXPERIENCED LEADERS WHICH IS COMPENSATED FOR ONLY IN PART BY THE EXCELLENT NAVAL ADVISORY EFFORT. THE ADVISORY GROUP ITSELF HAS NOT RECEIVED SUFFICIENT ADVISORS PROGRAMMED THROUGH THE 32-WEEK LANGUAGE SCHOOL AND THIS PROGRAM T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCGOWTCHON, MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00200// SECTION IV OF V SECTIONS IS REGARDED AS CRITICAL.

(4) VNAF. OPERATIONALLY, VNAF HAS CONTINUED TO IMPROVE IN THE AREAS OF WEAPONS DELIVERY TECHNIQUES, HELICOPTER ASSAULT, AND TRANSPORT. THE VNAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IS NOW CONTROLLING ALL VNAF OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF AND HAS ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OPERATIONS IN MILITARY REGION IV. VNAF SHOULD BE ABLE TO ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY COUNTRY-WIDE BY THE END OF CY71. THE DASC IN MR III WILL BE TURNED OVER IN FEB 71. COMPLETE SELK-SUFFICIENCY IN AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING IS PROGRAMMED FOR DECEMBER 1971. IMPROVEMENT IN THE MATERIEL AND MAINTENANCE AREA HAS CONTINUED. BETWEEN 1 DEC 70 - 1 APR 71, 9 ADDITIONAL SQDNS (5 HELICOPTER, 2 FIGHTER AND 1 TRANSPORT AND 1 LIAISON) WILL BE ACTIVATED. OPERATIONAL

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3231 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 READINESS DATES FOR THESE NEW SQUADRONS VARY WITH TYPE OF EQUIPMENT, BUT THE AVERAGE IS 120 DAYS AFTER ACTIVATION. IT IS EXPECTED THAT AS VNAF EXPANDS, THE PRESENT CORE OF OPERATIONALLY EXPERIENCED CREW MEMBERS WILL BE SEVERLY DILUTED BY MOVEMENT INTO NEWLY ACTIVATED UNITS. THE VNAF REMAINS DEPENDENT ON USAF IN CERTAIN ESSENTIAL TECHNICAL AREAS INCLUDING HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE, COMMUNICATIONS, AND BASE CIVIL ENGINEERING. THESE FACTORS COUPLED WITH VNAF LIMITATIONS IN NIGHT AND ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY MILITATE AGAINST ACCELERATION OF USAF REDEPLOYMENTS IN FY71 OF 72.

(5) VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC). THE VNMC HAS DEMONSTRATED PROFICIENCY IN ALL PHASES OF PLANNING AND CONDUCTING TACTICAL OPERATIONS. AT THE PRESENT THE VNMC CAN DEPLOY THREE BRIGADES. THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES WILL NOT DEGRADE THIS CAPABILITY, BUT WILL PLACE GREATER DEMANDS ON VNAF ASSETS, ESPECIALLY AIR SUPPORT TO VNMC. PRESENT LEVELS OF COMBAT ARE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE VNMC TRAINING BASE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. AS IN ALL RVNAF UNITS, DESERTIONS CAUSE SOME CONCERN BUT MEASURES TO IMPROVE DEPENDENT WELFARE AND INCREASE CAREER MOTIVATION ARE BEING GIVEN INCREASED

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3231 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 COMMAND ATTENTION IN THE VNMC TO REDUCE THIS PROBLEM.

(6) TERRITORIAL FORCES. EFFECTIVE 1 JUL 70, RVNAF WAS REORGANIZED AND THE RF/PF ARE NOW PART OF ARVN. AS OF 30 SEP, RF WAS AT 95.3 PERCENT STRENGTH AND PF AT 96 PERCENT STRENGTH. THE CONTINUED EXPANSION OF THESE FORCES HAS CREATED A SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS AND NCO'S. IN SOME REGIONS, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS COULD NOT BE MET WITH VOLUNTEERS; THEREFORE, DESIGNATED PROVINCES WERE GRANTED PERMISSION TO DRAFT PERSONNEL FOR THESE ORGANIZATIONS. THE CAPABILITIES OF SOME TERRITORIAL FORCE UNITS HAVE INCREASED WITH THE RECEIPT OF NEW EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY THE M-16 RIFLE. THE ORIGINAL FY71 PROGRAM WAS ACCELERATED AND AN ADDITIONAL 23 RF COMPANIES AND 670 PF PLATOONS WERE ORGANIZED AND TRAINED IN FY 70. ON 1 JUN 1970, JGS BEGAN EARLY ACTIVATION OF THE FY71 FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASE TOTALING 76 RF COMPANIES AND 804 PF PLATOONS. THIS ACCELERATION WAS AIDED BY REDUCING THE AUTHORIZED TOE STRENGTHS OF PF PLATOONS IN MR IV FROM 35 TO 32 MEN, THUS PROVIDING AN ADDITIONAL 296 PLATOONS. THIS WILL ULTIMATELY RAISE THE AUTHORIZED TOTAL OF TERRITORIAL FORCES TO 1,679 RF COMPANIES AND 7,335 PLATOONS.

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PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3231 **TOP SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THE ACCELERATED ACTIVATION HAS CAUSED REFRESHER TRAINING TO
 FALL BEHIND SCHEDULE. ALTHOUGH THIS PROBLEM AREA IS NOW
 RECEIVING COMMAND EMPHASIS, IT IS DOUBTFUL IF PRESENT
 RATES OF REFRESHER TRAINING CAN OVERCOME THE BACKLOG IN
 FY71. DESERTIONS CONTINUE TO BE A MATTER OF CONCERN.

F. SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT.

(1) THE CURRENT MAJOR ENEMY THREAT IN-COUNTRY
 IS IN MR I WHERE THE ENEMY RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH
 LARGE SCALE ATTACKS. SHOULD HE EXERCISE THIS CAPABILITY,
 RVNAF WOULD BE SORELY PRESSED TO CONTAIN THE THREAT.
 TRANSITIONAL FORCE PLANNING MUST CONSIDER THIS CONTINUING
 THREAT AND THE SERIOUS IMPACT ON THE OVERALL VIETNAMIZATION
 PROGRAM OF A SETBACK OF RVNAF IN MR I. MR II REMAINS THE
 SECOND MAJOR IN-COUNTRY THREAT AREA. FORCE PLANNING FOR
 THIS REGION MUST PROVED THE ESSENTIAL U.S. COMBAT FORCES
 TO INSURE SECURITY OF CRITICAL U.S. FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS,
 AND PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS PROVIDING SUFFICIENT SUPPORT TO
 RVNAF AND FWMAF TO MEET THE THREAT. FORCE PLANING FOR MR
 III MUST PROVIDE SECURITY FOR U.S. FACILITIES AND WELL AS A
 REINFORCING CAPABILITY FOR BOTH MR II AND MR IV.

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA3232 **TOP SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 (2) THE CAPABILITY OF RVNAF HAS CONTINUED TO
 INCREASE. ACTIVATIONS AND TURNOVERS HAVE BEEN ACCELERATED
 TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. THIS ACCELERATION AND
 CONTINUED PROGRESS HAS BEEN POSSIBLE DUE IN PART TO THE
 OPTIMISM OF GVN AND RVNAF IN THE FACE OF THE REDUCED ENEMY
 ACTIVITY IN-COUNTRY. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THIS LOW
 LEVEL OF ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE PAST THE COMPLETION OF
 CURRENTLY ANNOUNCED U.S. WITHDRAWALS. U.S. FORCE PLANNING MUST
 THEREFORE BE SUCH THAT SUFFICIENT U.S. FORCE IS RETAINED IN
 ORDER THAT U.S./RVNAF/FWMAF CAN COUNTER THE ENEMY IN-COUNTRY
 THREAT WHILE PERMITTING RVNAF TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN
 CAMBODIA.

4. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
 FOR THE TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FORCE (TSF) HS BEEN DEVELOPED
 TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF RVNAF DURING THIS
 CRITICAL PERIOD OF THE VIETNAMIZATION PROCESS. THE TSF
 SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TO U.S., RVN, AND FW
 FORCES; PROVIDES MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE AND MODERNIZE

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PAGE SIX RUHHFMA3231 **TOP SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO PACIFICATION, CIVIC ACTION, AND GVN SECURITY PROGRAMS. TEMPORARILY INCLUDED IN THE TSF ARE UNITS SCHEDULED TO TURNOVER THEIR EQUIPMENT TO RVNAF AS PART OF THE CRIMP, AND UNITS ENGAGED IN THE LOC PROGRAM.

5. (TS) REQUIREMENTS.

A. THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE TSF MUST BE SUCH AS TO INSURE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE WAR EFFORT ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE GVN IN A TIMELY, EFFICIENT MANNER WITHOUT INCURRING UNACCEPTABLE RISKS TO U.S. PRIORITY GOALS IN SVN OR LONG RANGE GOALS IN SEA. THE TSF HAS BEEN DILIGENTLY TAILORED TO MEET THE THREAT AND PROVIDE FOR CONTINUED SMOOTH ASSUMPTION OF THE VIETNAMIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES, WITH THE FOL BEING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RVNAF INTO A COHESIVE, BALANCED, FIGHTING FORCE. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING FOR COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOR RVNAF, TSF MUST BE ABLE TO REINFORCE RVNAF, IF NECESSARY, AND MUST CONTINUE SUPPORT TO FW FORCES AS PROVIDED FOR BY EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

B. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT AND PROJECTED THREAT AND THE RVNAF CAPABILITY TO MEET THE THREAT MAKE IT MILITARILY ESSENTIAL THAT THE TSF BE COMPOSED OF A MINIMUM OF 9 BRIGADE **TOP SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MGREN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS //NO0000// SECTION V OF V SECTIONS

EQUIVALENTS AS THE GROUND COMBAT FORCE. EVERY EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO OPTIMIZE THE DISPOSITION OF THIS MINIMAL ESSENTIAL FORCE TO INSURE CONTINUED PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION. IN DESIGNING THE TSF, COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS HAVE BEEN TAILORED AND POSITIONED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY SUPPORT TO THESE COMBAT ELEMENTS, UTILIZING MINIMAL PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES. SELECTED COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS SUCH AS AVIATION, ARTILLERY, ENGINEER, AND SIGNAL UNITS WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO FWMAF AND RVNAF UNTIL RVNAF CAPABILITIES ARE DEVELOPED.

C. ALTHOUGH THE APPROVED FORCE LEVEL FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IS SLIGHTLY IN EXCESS OF 260 THOUSAND SPACES, EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN EXPENDED TO DESIGN THE TSF WITHIN THIS FIGURE. CURRENT PLANNING ENVISIONS A FORCE OF 255,000 SPACES AT END FY 71 AS

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3232 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO THE MINIMUM STRENGTH NECESSARY FOR THE TSF. SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS HAVE BEEN REALIZED AS A RESULT OF METICULOUS TAILORING OF THE COMBAT SUPPORT, COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT, ADVISORY, COMMAND AND CONTROL SPACES, AS WELL AS IN DEBIT/CREDIT ACCOUNTS. THE NET EFFECT OF THESE EFFORTS SHOULD REDUCE THE ARMY STRENGTH REQUIREMENT TO 198,000 OF THE TOTAL 255,000 TSF FORCE. THIS IS CONSIDERED THE MINIMAL ESSENTIAL FORCE. IF BECAUSE OF MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS THE U.S. ARMY CANNOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES MEET THIS 198 THOUSAND SPACE REQUIREMENT THEN THE RETENTION OF A TAILORED U.S. MARINE FORCE (MAB) IS CONSIDERED A NECESSARY ALTERNATIVE. SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION IN ARMY SPACES WILL BE REALIZED DURING THE FIRST HALF OF FY72 AND AS A RESULT OF REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE LOC ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION BATTALION (899 SPACES) AND REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE 175MM GUN BN (565 SPACES) AND ONE ADA BN (692 SPACES), BOTH TRANSFERRING ASSETS TO RVNAF AS PART OF THE CRIMP. THE NET RESULT IS THAT THE ARMY STRENGTH REQUIREMENT WILL REDUCE AT LEAST 2,100 SPACES DURING THE PERIOD 1 JULY - 31 DEC 71.

D. THE PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED AIR ACTIVITY (SORTIES) LEVELS

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3232 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO WILL CONTINUE TO BE REQUIRED THROUGH AT LEAST CY 71. CONSEQUENTLY, THE REQUIRED USAF END FY 71 CEILING WILL APPROXIMATE THE 44,750 SPACES CURRENTLY PLANNED.

3. ANALYSIS OF THE 11,600 SPACE NAVY CEILING REVEALS THAT THIS FORCE IS THE MINIMAL ESSENTIAL AND THEREFORE, NO SAVINGS OF NAVY SPACES CAN BE REALIZED.

F. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THERE WILL BE A REQUIREMENT FOR AND INCREASE IN USMC SPACES FROM THE CURRENT JCS APPROVED 500 TO APPROXIMATELY 650 SPACES.

G. THE PROPOSED 250,000 SPACE CEILING FOR END FY71 IS NOT CONSIDERED FEASIBLE SINCE IT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCES TO MEET THE ENEMY THREAT WHILE CONCURRENTLY INSURING PROGRESS IN THE CRIMP AND VIETNAMIZATION OVERALL, AS DISCUSSED ABOVE.

6. (TS) IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, A TSF STRENGTH LEVEL OF 255,000 SPACES FOR END FY 71, WITH THE ARMY PORTION THEREOF BEING 198,000 SPACES, IS CONSIDERED THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL TO INSURE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF ON-GOING MISSIONS. FURTHER, THIS COURSE OF ACTION WILL RELEASE USMC FORCES IN JUNE 71 FOR COMPLETE RECONSTITUTION OF THE PACOM USMC STRATEGIC

CG FMFPAC

P 282219Z/NOV70

14-15

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

24-85

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3232 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO RESERVE, AS CURRENTLY PLANNED. CONSIDERING THE ACTIVE HOSTILITIES THROUGHOUT PACOM, THIS IS PARTICULARLY ESSENTIAL, SINCE THE ARMY'S MANPOWER PROBLEM PRECLUDES RECONSTITUTION OF THE USARPAC RESERVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT AN ARMY-USMC TRADE-OFF IS REQUIRED TO MEET THE 255,000 LEVEL DUE TO MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS, AN EARLY DECISION WILL BE NECESSARY TO INSURE EFFICIENT TAILORING OF THE TSF AND TO INSURE CONTINUITY IN REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING. FURTHER REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES DURING FY72 MUST BE CLOSELY RELATED TO COMMENSURATE QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN RVNAF AND THE THEN EXISTING ENEMY SITUATION.

7. (TS) RECOMMENDATIONS:

- A. THAT A TSF OF A MINIMUM OF 255,000 SPACES AT END FY 71 BE APPROVED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.
- B. THAT THE U.S. ARMY STRENGTH AUTHORIZATION OF A MINIMUM OF 198,000 SPACES FOR END FY 71 BE APPROVED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

UNQUOTE.

VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WITH WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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CG FMFPAC

P 282219Z/NOV70

15-15

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TOP SECRET

129

SECRET

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MCEO

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C/S	✓
Dep C/S	✓
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PAC FGS

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PTIAZYUW RUHHFMA3279 3332122-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

TOD: 10NOV70 1525Z

RUMUMPA - T- CG FIRST MAW

DRAFTED: G-3

P 292122Z NOV 70

CONCURRED: DEP C/S, C/S, G-3

FM CG FMFPAC

RELEASED: CG

TO ZEN/CG I MAF

ZEN/CG FIRST MAW (REAR)

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

RUMUMPA/CG FIRST MAW

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN WILSON, BG GEN CONLEY,
 INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MAJGEN ARMSTRONG FROM LTGEN JONES
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//N00000//
VMCJ EMPLOYMENT (1)

A. CTF SEVEN SEVEN 241100Z NOV 70 (C) (PASEP)

1. (S) I AM EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE RAPID REACTION OF YOUR
 EA-6A'S TO A CONTINGENCY SITUATION. PLEASE ADD MY WELL DONE TO
 THAT OF VADM BARDSHAR IN REF A.2. (S) THE SUBJ OF EA-6A EMPLOYMENT AND THE PERSONNEL AND
 LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE AIRCRAFT AWAY FROM HOME
 BASE HAS BEEN ADDRESSED IN A RECENT SPECAT TO GEN CHAPMAN.
 GEN CHAPMAN'S RESPONSE SHARES OUR CONCERN IN MAINTAINING THE
 EA-6A CAPABILITY TO MEET SPECIFIC WESTERN PACIFIC REQUIREMENTS.

CG FMFPAC

P 292122Z NOV 70

ACTN: S/SEC

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S 4 05

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3279 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO
 HE STATES THAT:

- A. VMCJ-1 WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY RESPONSE TO BIT AND PIECE SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS THAT CAN BE AUTHORIZED.
- B. CURRENT PRODUCTION EA-6A GSE AND TEST EQUIPMENT IS BEING DIRECTED TO VMCJ-2; HOWEVER, SELECTIVE REPLACEMENTS FOR VMCJ-1 WHEN IDENTIFIED, WILL RECEIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT FROM HQMC.
- C. EXAMINATION OF TOTAL EA-6A CRITICAL SKILLS BY HQMC INDICATES VMCJ-1 IS SHORT CERTAIN SKILLS. IF URGENTLY REQUIRED THESE RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE A-6A ASSETS NOW IN WEST-PAC. REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL EA-6A PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED BY NUMBER, GRADE, AND MOS.
- D. APPROVAL FOR RE-ENTRY OF EA-6A INTO SEASIA IS GRANTED CONTINGENT UPON THE FOLLOWING:
 - (1) RE-ENTRY APPROVAL CAN BE OBTAINED THROUGH CINCPAC/JCS CHANNELS.
 - (2) TOTAL EW ELEMENT OF VMCJ-1 DEPLOYS INTACT WITH EA-6A PECULIAR SSE.
 - (3) COLLOCATING ELEMENT AT SUITABLE LAND BASE WITH A-6A UNIT POSSESSING ADEQUATE GSE AND SSE.
- 3. (S) IT IS APPARENT THAT IN ORDER FOR US TO MAINTAIN AND

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3279 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO
 IMPROVE OUR EW POSTURE WE MUST CONTINUE TO IDENTIFY PROBLEM AREAS THAT CANNOT BE REMEDIED AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVELS, THEN REQUEST SPECIFIC ASSISTANCE. FOR EXAMPLE, A HARD LOOK AT THE RECENT SHORT TERM EA-6A DEPLOYMENT IN-COUNTRY SHOULD BE TAKEN, AND ANY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT SHORTCOMINGS NOTED SHOULD BE SURFACED AND FORMALLY ADDRESSED.

4. (S) I BELIEVE THAT COMMAND ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TOWARD EARLY RESOLUTION OF EA-6A EQUIPMENT READINESS PROBLEMS, AS NOTED IN DAILY FORSTAT. FOR ME TO SUPPORT ADMIN AND LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS IN A TIMELY MANNER A DETAILED STATUS REVIEW OF THE FOLLOWING WOULD BE NECESSARY:

- A. TSG-90
- B. ALC-86
- C. ALC-76 (INCLUDING RAM AIR TURBINES)
- D. SSE
- E. TEST EQUIPMENT
- F. ADDITIONAL PECULIAR EA-6A EQUIPMENT PROBLEM AREAS.
- 5. (S) AS AN ASSOCIATED ITEM, REQUEST ONE TIME IDENTIFICATION BY NUMBER, GRADE, AND MOS OF ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT A DETACHED EA-6A ELEMENT WHILE RETAINING A FULL RF-4B CG FMFPAC

P 292122Z NOV 70

2-3

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PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3279 S E C R E T SPECAT MCIO

CAPABILITY.
6 (S) WHILE IT LOOKS LIKE WE ARE COVERING THE ENTIRE GAMUT
NOW IS THE TIME TO IDENTIFY PROBLEM AREAS SO THAT WE CAN STRESS
OUR PRIOPITIES. WE ARE READY TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY
POSSIBLE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

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CG FMFPAC

P 292122Z NOV 70

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PTTAZYUW
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P 020335Z DEC 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEOFIA/CMC

3360335-AAAA--RUEOFIA.

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CONCURRED:G-4, COMPT, FSO, C/S
RELEASED:CG

INFO ZEN/CG I MAF
ZEN/THIRD FORSERVREGT
BT

TOD: 20DEC70 0550Z

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN, INFO MGEN
WILSON, COL ROEDER FROM LTGEN JONES //N00000//
MO/MOA FOR I MAF

1. (S) THE REQUIREMENT TO ATTAIN 100 PCT MO STOCKS FOR I MAF BY 1JAN71 RAISES SEVERAL CRUCIAL MANAGEMENT ISSUES. THE POLICY WITHIN FMFPAC HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARDS THE ATTAINMENT OF COMBAT READINESS FOR I MAF UNITS WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS AND FISCAL/LOGISTICAL POLICIES. ACCORDINGLY THE PACE OF PHYSICAL ATTAINMENT OF MO/MOA FOR I MAF HAS BEEN ATTENUATED BY THE TOTAL LOGISTIC POSTURE IN WESTPAC CONSIDERING THE OPERATING STOCKS ON HAND AND IDENTIFIED IN A FUNDED PIPELINE INCLUDING THE EXCESSES BEING GENERATED BY REDEPLOYMENTS. IN ESSENCE, WE HAVE DEFINED OUR PROBLEM AS ATTAINING THE MO/MOA

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ACTN:S/SEC 1-3

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PAGE TWO RUHHFM S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR OBJECTIVES WITH THE MINIMUM EXPENDITURE OF RESOURCES BY UTILIZING TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE AVAILABLE WESTPAC EXCESS ASSETS. ACCORDINGLY, THE REPORTING SYSTEM FOR WESTPAC HAS EMPHASIZED FINANCIAL CONTROL OF THE PIPELINE, WHILE THE LOGISTICAL SYSTEM HAS BEEN GEARED TO IDENTIFICATION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE EXCESS STOCKS. THE MAJOR EXCEPTION TO THIS PROCEDURE WAS THE APPLICATION OF APPROXIMATELY \$4 MIL OF YEAR END FY 70 O&MMC FUNDS FOR MO/MOA REQUIREMENTS WHICH WERE NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH REDISTRIBUTION.

2. (U) OUR TASK HAS HAD SEVERAL DISTINCTIVE PARTS BOTH AS IT PERTAINS TO REAL VIS A VIS APPARENT READINESS AS WELL AS RESOURCES WHICH WE CONTROL VIS A VIS EXTERNALLY CONTROLLED RESOURCES. FOR EXAMPLE I BELIEVE THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT OPERATING STOCKS AVAILABLE ON OKINAWA WHICH CAN BE SAFELY APPLIED TO THE MO REQUIREMENT PRIOR TO 1 JAN 71. HOWEVER, SPECIFICATION OF A SHORT RANGE TARGET DATE INTRODUCES A NEW SET OF PARAMETERS WHICH WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL EVALUATION: I.E., FEASIBLE ACTIONS MEASURED AGAINST PROGRESS TOWARDS REAL IMPROVEMENTS IN READINESS WHILE CONTINUING TO SUPPORT COMBAT

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR OPERATIONS IN RVN.

3. (S) AS I SEE THIS LATTER TASK RELATING TO ACTIONS UNDER MY CONTROL, IT IS PRIMARILY ONE OF ACCELERATING IDENTIFICATION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS FOR THE MO REQUIREMENT. I HAVE ALREADY TAKEN ACTION TO MODIFY OUR REPORTING SYSTEM SO THAT ADEQUATE VISIBILITY OF PROGRESS TOWARDS PHYSICAL ATTAINMENT OF MO/MOA "ON HAND" STOCKS WILL BE PROVIDED. FURTHER THERE WILL BE EXCESSES NOT YET IDENTIFIED GENERATED BY ADDITIONAL REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES FROM RVN, AND I HAVE TAKEN THE NECESSARY ACTIONS TO ACCELERATE THE IDENTIFICATION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF THESE RVN EXCESS ASSETS TO OUR MO/MOA REQUIREMENTS. ALTHOUGH REQUIREMENTS FOR MO/MOA HAVE BEEN LODGED AGAINST PURA THE IMPACT TO DATE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE SINCE USARV ASSETS HAVE NOT YET BEEN INCLUDED IN SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY. NEVERTHELESS THE REDISTRIBUTION ACTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE WILL NOT RESULT IN ANY REAL INCREASE IN ON HAND STOCKS SINCE THESE ASSETS ARE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE AND WOULD MERELY BE RECATEGORIZED.

4. (C) AS OF 31 OCT 70, THE FISCAL RECORDS OF THE 3D FSR/FLC SHOW AN AGGREGATE OF O&MMC OUTSTANDING OBLIGATIONS FOR MARINE CORPS SYSTEM PROCUREMENT FOR FY69 OF \$13.7 MILLION AND FY70

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PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 OF \$16.4 MILLION. AT THE CURRENT RATE OF MATERIAL RELEASE BY
 MCSA PHILA WESTPAC ELEMENTS OF THIS COMMAND COULD LOSE \$5.6
 MILLION OF FY69 FUNDS THROUGH APPROPRIATION LAPSE. A SIGNIFI-
 CANT PORTION OF THESE FUNDS ARE RELATED TO STOCK REPLENISHMENT/
 MO/MOA REQUIREMENTS. ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZING THAT THE MATERIAL
 SYSTEM IS CONSTANTLY FLUCTUATING, IN PART DUE TO CERTAIN
 MANAGEMENT ACTIONS, THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF THIS LOSS
 IS CONSIDERED ACCURATE BASED ON PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, ANALYSIS
 AND EVALUATION.

5. (U) ACCORDINGLY, THE PROBLEM OF MATERIAL READINESS AS IT
 RELATES TO SUPPORT FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES IS NOT ONE OF FINAN-
 CIAL DEFICIENCIES BUT ONE OF RESPONSIVENESS TO FUNDED REQUIRE-
 MENTS. THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO ASSIST THIS COMMAND IN ACHIEVING
 MO/MOA READINESS AS WELL AS PROVIDING REQUIRED SUPPORT FOR
 FORCES IN GARRISON, ACTIONS BEYOND MY CONTROL ARE NECESSARY.
 THE MOST EXPEDITICUS MEANS TO ACHIEVE THE NEEDED OBJECTIVES IS
 THROUGH DIRECT CITATION BY MCSA PHILADELPHIA OF THIS COMMAND'S
 O&M DOLLARS TO THE APPROPRIATE INTEGRATED MANAGER WHEN THE
 ICP HAS NO MARINE CORPS STOCK FUND DOLLARS TO FUND REQUIREMENTS.

6. (S) IN SUMMARY:

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 A. CURRENTLY DEFINED UNFUNDED I MAF MO DEFICIENCIES COULD
 BE FINANCED BY 31 DEC 70, HOWEVER, THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE
 DYNAMIC AND THE DEFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM SECTION M TRANSFER
 AND CONVERSION OF THE FSR TO THE M SERIES I/E ARE NOT INCLUDED.

B. ECONOMICAL PROGRESSION TOWARDS THE 100 PCT GOAL OF STOCK
 ATTAINMENT FOR THE MO REQUIREMENT IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE
 PHASEDOWN OF STOCKS AND STOCK LEVELS IN RVN AND THE PIPELINE
 DELIVERY OF REQUIRED MATERIALS. TOTAL ON HAND MO ATTAINMENT
 FOR ACTIONS UNDER BY CONTROL CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO
 30 APRIL 71 AND FOR ON HAND MOA ATTAINMENT PRIOR TO 30 JUNE 71.

7. (S) THEREFORE YOUR CONCURRENCE WITH THE FOLLOWING CON-
 CLUSIONS OR ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE IS REQUESTED:

A. ATTAINMENT OF 100 PCT "ON HAND" STATUS FOR MC STOCKS FOR
 I MAF BY 1 JANUARY 71 IS NOT FEASIBLE WITHOUT EXTRAORDINARY
 MEASURES WHICH DO NOT APPEAR TO BE PRUDENT WITHOUT A FIRM
 COMMITMENT TO DEPLOY.

B. INCREASED RESPONSIVENESS TO FUNDED REQUIREMENTS IS A
 KEY ELEMENT TO EARLY ATTAINMENT OF OUR GOAL AS REGARDS "ON
 HAND" MO/MOA.

C. ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED TO INSURE THAT THE PRIOR YEAR
 PAGE SIX RUHHFMA S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 FUNDS OF THIS COMMAND ARE APPLIED TOWARDS EXPRESSED MATERIAL
 REQUIREMENTS AND THAT LOSS THROUGH APPROPRIATION LAPSE IS
 MINIMIZED. VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WITH WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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P 020335Z/DEC70

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EXCLUSIVE FOR
MCEO

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P 080532Z DEC 70
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REF ID: A65656
SECRET NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM
JOHN WILSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
US/GRC COMBINED EXERCISE (U)

- A. CINCPAC 302223Z OCT 70 (PASEP) (C)
- B. CINCPACFLT 312322Z OCT 70 (PASEP) (C)
- C. CTF 79 050137Z NOV 70 (PASEP) (S)
- D. CTF 76 032142Z NOV 70 (PASEP) (C)
- E. COMSEVENTHFLT 061232Z NOV 70 (PASEP) (C)
- F. CINCPACFLT 282143Z NOV 70 (S)
- G. COMUSTDC 271255Z NOV 70 (SPECAT) (S)
- 1. (S) REF A STATED THAT IN VIEW OF CANCELLATION OF
POWER PIONEER EXERCISE IT IS PRUDENT TO PROVIDE
SUBSTITUTE EXERCISE MORE IN KEEPING WITH DEFENSE
COMMITMENT TO THE GRC. REF A FURTHER STATED THAT A
CPX AND OR AN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE WHEREIN THE U.S.
FORCES SIMULATES THE AGGRESSOR AND THE GRC FORCES THE
DEFENDERS WERE CONSIDERED BEST SUITED TO OBJECTIVES.
REF B REQUESTED FEASIBILITY OF CONDUCTING AMPHIBIOUS
EXERCISES DISCUSSED REFERENCE A. REF C PROPOSED SCENARIO
IN WHICH THE U.S. FORCES SHOULD NOT BE AGGRESSORS
FOR REASONS WHICH MAKE THE AGGRESSORS ROLE INCONSISTANT
WITH OUR OBJECTIVES. REF D PROPOSED TO DISCUSS SCOPE
AND SCENARIO OF PROPOSED EXERCISE AT JOINT MEETING
WITH CTF 73 AND COMUSTDC. REF E REAFFIRMED OUR POSITION,
CONTRA AGGRESSOR ROLE, AND STATED THAT IN ANY CASE U.S.
SUPPORT OF THE GRC IN THE DEFENSE OF TIAMAN, WOULD BE THE
DOMINANT THEME WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR COMMITMENT
TO THE GRC AND WOULD REASSURE THEM OF OUR COMMON PURPOSE.
REF F STATED THAT IF IT IS CONSIDERED INFEASIBLE TO
CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE UTILIZING SCENARIO PROPOSED
BY COMSEVENTHFLT RECOMMEND ELIMINATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS
EXERCISE. REF G PROPOSED A COMBINED US/GRC EXERCISE WITH A
UNILATERAL AMPHIBIOUS LANDING.

CG I MAF

P 080532Z/DEC70

ACTN: 3/SEC

1-3

REF ID: A65656
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LANDING.

2. (S) THE LATEST PROPOSAL (REF 60) BY VADM BAUMBURGER WOULD APPEAR TO BE A PLOY TO PULL HIS CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE. AFTER THE JOINT STAFF DISCUSSION CONDUCTED AT I MAF HQ, OF THE PROPOSED REPLACEMENT EXERCISE FOR TAIWAN, RADM RUBEL INVITED CTF 79 PARTICIPATION IN DISCUSSIONS TO BE HELD IN TAIPEI 15-17 NOV. I SENT GERRY FINK AND ONE OF HIS PLANNERS TO THE JOINT MEETING, HOPEFULLY THAT SINCE CTF-76 AND CTF-79 HELD A COMMON AGREEMENT AND HAD WRITTEN A JOINT POSITION PAPER, OTHER PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN AS EASILY RESOLVED.

3. (S) THE JOINT CONFERENCE WITH VADM BAUMBURGER'S J-3 CAPTAIN McMAHON WAS LESS THAN SALUTORY AND SOME RATHER INTERESTING DEVELOPMENTS WERE BROUGHT TO LIGHT. McMAHON, AT FIRST REFUSED TO MEET WITH CAPTAIN COLE THE N-3 OF THE TF-76 STAFF AND GERRY, WHO IS MY I MAF G-3. IN LIEU THEREOF McMAHON SENT A JUNIOR ASSISTANT WHO WAS NEITHER EMPOWERED TO CONCUR IN DECISIONS NOR DID HE HAVE ANY INKLING OF WHY THE MEETING WAS BEING HELD. APPARENTLY GERRY CHARMED McMAHON WITH SOME RATHER STRONG LANGUAGE AND THE JOINT SESSION STARTED SUMMARILY. McMAHON CLAIMS TO HAVE WRITTEN ALL THE TDC MESSAGES ON THE EXERCISE TRAFFIC, McMAHON APPARENTLY ACTS AS LIAISON/INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE AMBASSADOR AND VADM BAUMBURGER.

4. (S) ALTHOUGH NOT GERMANE, THE OTHER INFORMATION GATHERED BY GERRY DURING THE COURSE OF HIS RESEARCH ON TDC RECORDS REVEALED INTERNECINE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MAAG AND TDC, BOTH OF WHICH ARE IN CONTENTION FOR SURVIVAL. THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND ILLUMINATES CAPT McMAHON'S THINKING: THE MAAG, WHICH IS ARMY ORIENTED, CONTROLS MAP FUNDING WHICH GOES TO THE GRC ARMY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE. TDC IS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO REDUCE THE ARMY AND HAS SUCCEEDED BY APPROX 100,000 LINE NUMBERS. McMAHON REFERS TO THE CHINESE MARINE CORPS AS TWO DIVISIONS OF THE ARMY AND TRIES TO PROVE HIS POINT BY EXAMPLES OF THE INTER SERVICE TRANSFER OF OFFICERS BETWEEN THE TWO SERVICES. McMAHON APPARENTLY WAS AT THE HUE OF AN ABORTIVE MOVE TO REDUCE THE GRC MARINE CORPS TO TWO REGIMENTS, AN EFFORT THAT WAS THWARTED BY CHIANG HIMSELF. IN ADDITION McMAHON APPARENTLY HAS INFLUENCE WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRS MR. ARMSTRONG, PLUS HE IS THE OLDEST MEMBER OF THE TDC STAFF IN TENURE.

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5. (S) WITH ABOVE AS BACKGROUND, McMAHON THROTTLED ANY DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING BY ISSUING THE FOLLOWING EDICT.
A. THE AMBASSADOR HAS STATED THERE WILL BE NO COMBINED EXERCISES.

B. THE AMBASSADOR DESIRES TO KEEP U.S. FORCES IN LOW PROFILE, AND THAT A CPX OF THE NATURE OF FOCUS LENS OR AN EXERCISE ENVISIONING THE USE OF NAVAL SURFACE FORCES AND AIR FORCES WOULD SUIT THE AMBASSADOR'S PURPOSES.
C. THERE WAS NO NEED TO EXERCISE MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES SINCE HE "McMAHON" HAD WRITTEN THEM OUT OF THE "ROCHESTER" PLAN. McMAHON FURTHER STATED THAT IF THE MARINES WANTED TO EXERCISE SOMEWHERE HE COULD GET THEM TWO JIMA.

6. (C) IT NOW APPEARS THAT IN VIEW OF REFERENCE (F) THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN REFERENCE (G) ARE NO LONGER GERMANE. HOWEVER THE ABOVE BACKGROUND IS SENT FOR YOUR INFORMATION IN VIEW OF THE COMMANDANT'S PROSPECTIVE VISIT TO TAIWAN IN JANUARY. I KNOW YOUR OPINION OF McMAHON, WHICH IS CORROBORATED HERE.

7. (U) SORRY GENERAL YUAN HAD TO DECLINE THE INVITATION. WE HAD AN INTERESTING AND INFORMATIVE PROGRAM PREPARED FOR HIM. WARM REGARDS

SP-1

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CG I MAF

P 080532Z/DEC70

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Mgt	

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RUMOMPA T CG FMFPAC DEDICATED
P 151210Z DEC 70

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO ZEN2/CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

TOP SECRET /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO MGEN
WIDDECKE FROM MGEN ARMSTRONG/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS //N03121//
FORCE PLANNING.

1. (S) SEVERAL ONGOING PROJECTS AND ACTIONS HAVE BEEN DELAYED DUE
TO RECENT ILLNESSES OF LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND MYSELF. THIS MESSAGE IS
INTENDED AS REVIEW OF KEY ISSUES TO INFORM YOU OF RECOMMENDATIONS
I WILL MAKE TO LTGEN ROBERTSON. URGENCY OF DECISIONS COMPELS
SURFACING THESE MATTERS AT THIS TIME IN ORDER THAT WE DO NOT STEER
NEW MAF COMMANDER IN A DIRECTION CONTRARY TO YOUR VIEWS.
IN ANY CASE YOU WILL BE AWARE OF MY CONCERNS AND FOREWARNED FOR
YOUR JANUARY VISIT.

2. (TS) MAF/MAB ISSUE. WE HAVE AN ESTABLISHED STRUCTURE AND HAVE
T/O FOR MAB DESIGNED TO OPERATE AS AN AIR GROUND TEAM FOR PROLONGED
PERIOD. IT'S HEADQUARTERS CAPABILITIES ARE OPERATIONALLY ORIENTED

CG FIRST MAW

P 151210Z/DEC70

ACTN: G-3

1-4

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IT IS APPARENT THAT WE MUST REORIENT OUR PLANS IF FMF UNITS ARE TO BE OUT OF RVN BY 30 JUNE. IF THIS IS THE CASE INCREMENT SEVEN STANDDOWN WILL, IN FACT, MERGE WITH AND OVERLAP INCREMENT SIX. OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONING OF SENIOR MARINE HEADQUARTERS WILL BE NEGLIGIBLE AS CONTRASTED WITH PERSONNEL, LOGISTIC AND EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS. ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION WILL BE TO GET MARINE UNITS OUT OF RVN EFFICIENTLY AND AS EFFECTIVE UNITS. IN THE TIME FRAME ALLOWED THIS WILL BE REAL CHALLENGE PARTICULARLY AS CONCERNS RELATIONSHIPS WITH MACV, XXIV CORPS AND 7TH AF WHO WILL BE RELUCTANT TO GIVE US THE UNCOMMITTED TIME NEEDED TO GET OUT IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER. THE POINT IS THAT WE MUST REDESIGN AND REORIENT THE HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT, UNDER THE SAME CEILING, IN CASE WE WITHDRAW BY 30 JUNE. I FEEL STRONGLY THAT III MAF HQ (RETAILORED) SHOULD REMAIN IN COUNTRY UNTIL THE BITTER END IF WE ALL LEAVE BY 30 JUNE. IF THERE EVER WILL BE A TIME THREE STARS ARE NEEDED IT IS DURING THE MAY-JUNE PERIOD AFTER CG FMAW AND CG FMARDIV DEPART. I WOULD RELUCTANTLY SETTLE FOR TWO STARS AND WOULD BE VERY STRONGLY OPPOSED TO A ONE STAR MAB COMMANDER DURING THIS PERIOD, UNLESS THE MARINES ARE TO BE HERE PAST 1 JULY IN AN OPERATIONAL CAPACITY. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO START ON THE RIGHT PATH NOW IN PLACING KEY PEOPLE. WE CANNOT AFFORD PAGE THREE DE RUMUMHA0133 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJOR DISRUPTIONS. THE REALLY KEY REQUIREMENT IS A FIRM DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT ALL MARINES GO BY 30 JUNE SO WE CAN PLAN ACCORDINGLY.

3. (S) ADCON OF RVN AVIATION UNITS. RELATED DIRECTLY TO THE MAF/MAB ISSUE IS ONE THAT IS PRIMARILY FMAW ORIENTED AND ON WHICH LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND I WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT. THIS CONCERNS RVN AVIATION UNITS REMAINING ADCON (COMMAND LESS OPCON) OF CG FMAW. THE COMPRESSED TIME FRAME AND THE ENORMOUS PROBLEM OF REDEPLOYING TWO MAG'S AND REDISTRIBUTING PERSONNEL, MATERIAL AND AIRCRAFT MAKES IT IMPRUDENT TO DESTROY CONTINUITY OF EFFORT AT A CRITICAL TIME. SHIFTING INTO A SHORT LIVED COMMAND SCHEME CAN ONLY RESULT IN CONFUSION AND INEFFICIENCY. WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THIS WITH A SMALL HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT OF SEVEN OFFICERS, TWENTY - SEVEN ENLISTED. THE PERSONNEL SPACES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE FNG INCREMENT SIX (1MAY) TOTALS. THE TITLE IS NOT IMPORTANT BUT MY RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE FMAW DET RVN. COMPLEMENT WOULD BE LARGELY LOGISTICS, PERSONNEL AND COMM SKILLS, OIC WOULD PROBABLY BE MY CURRENT G-4 THE TOUGHEST REDEPLOYMENT AND REDISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS ARE AVIATION. WE THINK FMAW CAN DO THE JOB BEST. AT THIS STAGE I AM SORRY WE WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL IN OUR ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE MAG-11 IN INCREMENT S1 WITHDRAWL.

CG FIRST MAW

P 151210Z/DEC70

2-4

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE FOUR DE RUMUMHA0138 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
4. (S) CONSOLIDATIONS OF FUNCTIONS FMAW/FMAW REAR.

THIS ITEM IS RELATED DIRECTLY TO THE ADCON ISSUE. I HAVE DIRECTED MY STAFF TO ACCOMPLISH A 25 PERCENT REDUCTION IN FMAW HEADQUARTERS DURING JANUARY. WE ARE EXAMINING FUNCTIONS TO SEE HOW WE COULD MOVE INCREMENTALLY TO PRESERVE CONTINUITY ON CONSOLIDATION WITH REAR. FOR EXAMPLE, I PROPOSE THAT WE MOVE OUR COMPTROLLER OFFICE TO IWAKUNI AS EARLY AS 1FEB71. RATIONALE AS FOLDS:

A. THE COMPTROLLER SHOP, CONSISTING OF FOUR (4) OFFICERS AND SIX (6) ENLISTED, WOULD DEPLOY AS A DETACHMENT OF H&HS-1. ONE (1) ENLISTED WOULD REMAIN, ATTACHED TO G-1 AS A TAD CLERK, AS WELL AS ENTIRE DISBURSING SECTION.

B. THE REMAINING IN COUNTRY CAN PERFORM THEIR FINANCIAL FUNCTIONS AS THEY ARE NOW DOING BY MSG TRANSMISSIONS TO THE COMPTROLLER SHOP AT IWAKUNI.

C. THE PHASE II BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR FMAW, DUE THE END OF MARCH WILL INCLUDE THOSE UNITS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO WING (REAR). BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR UNITS LEFT IN COUNTRY WILL BE FORMULATED BY FMAW AND SUBMITTED TO THE MAJOR COMMANDS ASSUMING ADCON/OPCON OF THOSE UNITS IN EARLY FY-72 FOR INCLUSION IN THEIR BUDGET ESTIMATE. THE PHASE II BUDGET TIME/FRAMES AND PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT DATES FOR THE WING HEADQUARTERS

PAGE FIVE DE RUMUMHA0138 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
EMPHASIZE THE EARLY MOVEMENT OF THE COMPTROLLER SHOP.

D. FMAW (REAR) COMPTROLLER SHOP IS SHORT OF FISCAL PERSONNEL AT THE PRESENT TIME. COMBINING THE TWO OFFICES WILL PROVIDE AND ECONOMY OF PERSONNEL AND A MORE REPRESENTATIVE FMAW PHASE II BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR FY-71-72-73. I CAN ENVISION NO JURISDICTIONAL OR MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT AND AM SURE WE CAN FIND OTHER FUNCTIONS THAT WILL LEND THEMSELVES TO INCREMENTAL MOVES. YOUR MANAGERS CAN ADDRESS MESSAGES TO BOTH CG FMAW AND CG FMAW REAR AND WE CAN COORDINATE AS REQUIRED.

5. (S) C/S III MAF/AWC FMAW. SWITCH OF JOSLYN AND QUINN.
RELATED TO ALL OF THE ABOVE AND PARTICULARLY TO THE MAF/MAB ISSUE IS AIR/GROUND BALANCE IN MAG HQ. THIS IS A SENSITIVE ISSUE BECAUSE IT IT MUST INVOLVE A MILD COMPLAINT AS BACKGROUND. THE ENTIRE CHAIN OF PRINCIPALS IN III MAF STAFF HAVE BEEN AVIATORS AND I HAVE HAD AN ABUNDANCE OF ASSISTANCE IN RUNNING FMAW. I THINK THE III MAF STAFF HAS DONE A FINE JOB BUT ITS COMPOSITION WAS WRONG IN PRINCIPLE AND NOW WE ARE GOING THE OTHER WAY AND DOING SOAT PRECISELY THE WRONG TIME SINCE THE BIGGEST REDEPLOYMENT HEADACHES ARE AVIATION. WE ARE REALLY CONCERNED ONLY WITH PRINCIPLE SINCE BILL JOSLYN SPENT A TOUR IN WING G-3 AND IS HIGHLY CAPABLE CHIEF OF STAFF. FOR THIS SAME REASON HE WOULD ALSO MAKE

PAGE SIX DE RUMUMHA0138 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

CG FIRST MAF

P-151210Z/DEC70

3-4

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

3488

FINE AWC. BILL QUINN WHO HAS BEEN IN RUN LONG ENOUGH TO KNOW THE ROPES OPERATIONALLY, LOGISTICALLY AND POLITICALLY WOULD BE GOOD C/S III MAF. IF NAVY REGS PARA 1374 IS BLOCK TO NON AVIATOR AWC ASSUMING COMMAND IN AN ACTING CAPACITY DURING THE CG'S ABSENCE THE COMMANDANT SHOULD ASK FOR AN EXCEPTION OR GET THE REGULATION CHANGED. IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS I HAVE HEARD MANY WORDS ABOUT WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO IMPROVE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIPS. WE NEED ACTIONS INSTEAD OF WORDS AND THIS IS ONE SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT EXAMPLE OF MAINTAINING BALANCE THAT CAN BE DONE AND SHOULD BE POLICY. CHUCK WIDDECKE AND I ARE SENSITIVE TO SUCH ISSUES BECAUSE WE HAVE NO AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS, AT ANY LEVEL, AND DOING OUR UTMOST TO SEE THAT NONE DEVELOP. THE SAME EFFORT SHOULD BE REFLECTED UP THE LINE AND ALSO, THIS ISSUE RELATES DIRECTLY TO YOUR RECENT MESSAGES ON PROFESSIONALISM AND RETENTION.

6. (S) MY APOLOGIES FOR THE LENGTH OF THIS EXPRESSION. ASSURE YOU IT HAS NOT BEEN DEVELOPED IN ISOLATION, HOWEVER, I OFFER THESE VIEWS AS THE PERSONAL VIEWS OF THE LAME DUCK CG III MAF AND WILL CONVEY EACH OF THEM TO LTGEN ROBERTSON UNLESS YOU SPECIFICALLY ADVISE OTHERWISE. THE DIVERSITY OF ISSUES DISCUSSED HEREIN SHOULD NOT OBSCURE THE REALLY KEY POINT THAT ASAP IS ALREADY TOO DARNED LATE FOR FIRM DECISION ON BEING OUT BY 30 JUNE. INCREMENT FOUR WAS A SHAMBLES DUE TO LATE AND CHANGED

PAGE SEVEN DE RUMUMHA0138 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DECISIONS. INCREMENT SEVEN COULD BE A CATASTROPHE. VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MAF

P 151210Z/DEC70

4-4

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 FROM LTGEN JONES, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
 DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000//
 SIXTH REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT (U)

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF JCS 082213Z DEC 70 (TS)
 TO CINCPAC, INFO COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT,
 CINCPACAF, CGFMFPAC WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFOR-
 MATION.

QUOTE:

SUBJ: SIXTH REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT (U)

REFS: A. CINCPAC 222201Z NOV 70. B. CINCPAC 030124Z DEC 70.

1. (TS) REF A FORWARDED FOR APPROVAL A RECOMMENDED TROOP LIST
 FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF 60,000 SPACES FROM THE RVN DURING THE
 PERIOD 1 JAN-30 APR 71. REF B PROPOSED THAT THE SIXTH
 REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE BE SCHEDULED
 4-8 JAN 71.

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P 162215Z/DEC70

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ZNY AAAAA

P 182031Z DEC 70

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TO RUMOMPA/CG III MAF

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SIXTH REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT (U)

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF JCS 082213Z/DEC70 TO
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 CINCPACAF, CG FMFPAC WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR
 INFORMATION.

QUOTE

JCS SEND

SUBJ: SIXTH REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT (U)

REFS: A. CINCPAC 222201Z NOV 70. B. CNCPAC 030124Z DEC 70.

1. (TS) REF A FORWARDED FOR APPROVAL A RECOMMENDED TROOP LIST
 FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF 60,000 SPACES FROM THE RVN DURING THE
 PERIOD 1 JAN-30 APR 71. REF B PROPOSED THAT THE SIXTH
 REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE BE SCHEDULED

CG FMFPAC

P 182031Z DEC 70

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA2380 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR MCEO
4-8 JAN 71.

2. (TS) THE TROOP LIST AND DESTINATIONS IN REF A ARE APPROVED,
EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS:

MARINE CORPS. CONCUR IN MARINE CORPS AIR ELEMENTS BEING
REDEPLOYED TO JAPAN; HOWEVER, TOTAL SPACES IDENTIFIED WOULD EXCEED
PLANNED MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS IN JAPAN. THEREFORE, SPACES
ASSOCIATED WITH THESE AIR ELEMENTS BEING REDEPLOYED TO JAPAN AND
THOSE SPACES TO BE DEACTIVATED IN THE RVN WILL BE PROVIDED
SEPARATELY BY THE US MARINE CORPS.

3. (S) CONFERENCE DATE OF 4-8 JAN 71 IS APPROVED. PERSONNEL
POLICIES AND EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SIXTH
REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY BY THE SERVICES.
THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLIC AFFAIRS EXPLOITATION REGARDING THIS
REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT.

4. (TS) IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT MINOR ADJUSTMENTS TO THIS TROOP
LIST MAY BE REQUIRED. THEREFORE, THE ASSOCIATED DEPLOYMENT
ADJUSTMENT NOTIFICATION (DAN) WILL NOT BE FINALIZED AND
DISTRIBUTED UNTIL AFTER THE MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE.
SUBSEQUENT TO ISSUANCE OF THE DAN, RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE
SIXTH REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT TROOP LIST SHOULD BE FORWARDED AS

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA2380 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR MCEO
CINCPAC CHANGE REQUESTS TO THE SEASIA DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM IN
ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL DAN/DEPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT REQUEST
PROCEDURES.

UNQUOTE.

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

2380

CG FMFPAC

P 182031Z DEC 70

2-2

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ZNY AAAAA

RUMOMPA -T- CG FIRST MAW

RUMOMPA -T- CG FIRST MARDIV

P 220115Z DEC 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMOMPA/CG III MAF

INFO ZEN/CG THIRD MAW

RUMOMPA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMOMPA/CG FIRST MARDIV

ZEN/CG I MAF

ZEN/CG FIFTH MAB

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ARMSTRONG INFO MGEN OWENS, MGEN WIDDECKE, MGEN WILSON AND BGEN DWYER FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000// FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG 1ST MAW 151210Z/DEC70 (TS) (SPECAT) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) APPRECIATE YOUR ADVISING ME OF THE KEY ISSUES STATED IN REF A. MY RESPONSE IN REGARD TO EACH ISSUE IS AS INDICATED BELOW:

A. MAF/MAB AND ADCON OF RVN AVIATION UNITS. THE KEY POINT HERE, AS YOU HAVE NOTED, IS WHETHER 3D MAB WILL BE RETAINED IN RVN PAST 30 JUNE 71. IN THIS REGARD, A RECENT FONECON WITH FOSTER LAHUE INDICATED THAT THE JCS HAD RECOMMENDED THAT THE ARMY

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA2623 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCCEO. PORTION OF THE TSF BE 198,000, WHICH MEANS THAT, IF SECDEF APPROVES, A MAB WILL NOT BE RETAINED IN RVN BEYOND 30 JUNE 71. IF THAT IS THE CASE, I CONCUR THAT REDESIGNING AND REORIENTING THE HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT, UNDER THE SAME CEILING, IS NECESSARY AND THAT A TRANSITION FROM III MAF TO 3D MAB, AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, IS NO LONGER REQUIRED.

(1) IN CONSIDERING A TITLE FOR THE SENIOR MARINE HQ REMAINING AFTER DEPARTURE OF CG III MAF IN APRIL 1971, I WOULD PROPOSE HQ III MAF (REAR) AS AN ACCEPTABLE ONE BASED UPON OUR PLANS TO RELOCATE HQ I MAF TO CAMP PENDLETON UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF HQ III MAF ON OKINAWA. IT MUST BE MADE PERFECTLY CLEAR TO COMUSMACV, IN THE MATTER OF RVN COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, THAT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF (REAR) WOULD BE EXERCISED SOLELY BY COMUSMACV, THROUGH CG XXIV CORPS, AND THAT NO VESTIGE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL RESIDES WITH CG III MAF ON OKINAWA.

(2) I WELL APPRECIATE THE MANAGERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH WILL DEVOLVE UPON III MAF (REAR) AND FULLY UNDERSTAND THE ASSISTANCE THAT A THREE STAR COULD PROVIDE. HOWEVER, CINCPAC HAS RECOMMENDED THAT CG III MAF AND HQ III MAF BE RELOCATED TO OKINAWA IN APRIL 1971. THEREFORE, RETENTION OF A MAJOR GENREAL

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA2623 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCCEO TO SERVE AS CG III MAF (REAR) IS THE NEXT BEST ALTERNATIVE TO SATISFY THE REQUIRED RELATIONSHIPS WITH MACV, XXIV CORPS, AND 7TH AF. SINCE THE PRIMACY OF CONCERN DURING THE PHASE DOWN WILL BE - AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT - AVIATION CONSIDERATIONS, IT SEEMS PRUDENT AND I AM CONSIDERING RECOMMENDING THAT YOU SERVE AS CG III MAF (REAR) AND THAT BILL QUINN BE DESIGNATED CG 1ST MAW AND TAKE THE WING OUT OF COUNTRY. UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT, COMMAND LESS OPCON OF 1ST MAW UNITS IN RVN (ALONG WITH THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF III MAF (REAR)) WOULD REST WITH CG FMFPAC. THEREFORE, I CANNOT CONCUR IN YOUR PROPOSAL FOR THE FORMATION OF A "1ST MAW DET RVN" (PAR 3, REF A APPLIES). HOWEVER, I FEEL CERTAIN THAT AUTHORIZATION OF DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN YOU AND CG I MAF/III MAF WOULD SATISFY YOUR CONCERN RELATIVE TO THE CLOSE COORDINATION REQUIRED BETWEEN RVN AND JAPAN/OKINAWA BASED UNITS.

(3) ADDITIONALLY, IN THE MATTER OF GENERAL OFFICER CHANGES, I AM CONTEMPLATING SENDING BILL JOSLYN TO OKINAWA TO ASSIST DONN ROBERTSON IN ESTABLISHING HQ III MAF AT THAT LOCATION. ED SIMMONS THEN WOULD BE ASSIGNED AS CHIEF OF STAFF, III MAF (REAR) SINCE ROSS DWYER WOULD BECOME ADC 1ST MARDIV UPON DEACTIVATION OF 5TH MAB.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA2623 T O P S E C R E T SPECIAI EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 B. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT. AS STATED IN REF A, THE CURRENT
 STRUCTURE PLANNED FOR 3D MAB PROVIDES FOR A CAPABILITY AS A
 SEPARATE ENTITY NOT UNLIKE THAT COMMON TO REGULARLY ESTABLISHED
 MAJOR COMMANDS IN WESTPAC. HOWEVER, SINCE A MAB ORGANIZATION IS
 NOT REQUIRED, ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE MADE TO INCLUDE THE
 CURRENTLY PLANNED 3D MAB FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WITHIN III
 MAF (REAR) FURTHER, WITH REFERENCE TO THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM WITHIN THE
 1ST MAW, IF YOU NOW HAVE A PERSONNEL LEVEL IN YOUR COMPTROLLER
 STAFF IN EXCESS OF THAT CURRENTLY REQUIRED, THE PERSONNEL SHOULD
 BE NOMINATED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR REASSIGNMENT TO 1ST MAW
 (REAR). MOVEMENT OF THE PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE 1ST MAW COMP-
 TROLLER FUNCTION FROM RVN WILL NOT OCCUR PRIOR TO BUT CON-
 CURRENTLY WITH THE MOVEMENT OF 1ST MAW FLAG TO IWAKUNI. SUBSE-
 QUENT THERETO, THE REQUIRED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE AVIATION
 ELEMENTS REMAINING IN RVN WILL BE PROVIDED THROUGH III MAF (REAR)
 COMPTROLLER STRUCTURE.

C. C/S III MAF/AWC 1ST MAW. SWITCH OF JOSLYN AND QUINN.
 COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PAR 1.A.(2) AND (3) CONCERNING III MAF/
 III MAF (REAR) AND 1ST MAW, PRECLUDE ADOPTION OF THE JOSLYN/
 QUINN SWITCH AND WOULD APPEAR TO SATISFY YOUR CONCERN ABOUT AIR-

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA2623 T O P S E C R E T SPECIAI EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 GROUND IMBALANCE AT THE HQ III MAF LEVEL.

2. (TS) I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN OVER THE TURBULENCE IN
 INCREMENT IV REDEPLOYMENTS. HOWEVER, I AM SURE YOU APPRECIATE
 THAT MANY OF THESE LAST MINUTE CHANGES WERE NECESSITATED
 BECAUSE DECISIONS AT HIGHER GOVERNMENTAL LEVELS WERE NOT PROVIDED
 IN A TIMELY FASHION. WE HAVE ALREADY STARTED OUR PLANNING ON
 INCREMENT VI REDEPLOYMENTS AS THEY ARE CURRENTLY DEFINED. OF
 COURSE, THIS PLANNING WILL ONLY BE AS STABLE AS THE GUIDANCE ON
 WHICH IT IS BASED. PERSONNEL CRITERIA WILL PROVIDE FOR MUCH
 SMOOTHER MOVES. WE ARE PLACING PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ADEQUATE
 KEY PERSONNEL WITH UNITS TO REDEPLOY AND THE NEEDLESS RETENTION
 IN-COUNTRY OF THOSE WHOSE SKILLS ARE OF VERY LIMITED VALUE THERE.
 I AM FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH OUR PROGRESS TO DATE ON LOGISTIC
 RETROGRADE. HOWEVER, CONTINUING ACTIONS MUST BE TAKEN TO
 COORDINATE ANY CHANGES WHICH IMPACT ON LOGISTICS IN BOTH THE
 OPERATIONAL AND SERVICE CHAINS OF COMMAND AND THIS ACTION CAN BE
 BEST ACCOMPLISHED AT THIS LEVEL.

3. (S) I PLAN TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED HEREIN WITH
 DONN ROBERTSON DURING HIS BRIEF LAY OVER HERE ON 21 DECEMBER.
 AND, AGAIN, WHEN I AM IN-COUNTRY IN EARLY JAN 71, AFTER DONN HAS
 HAD A CHANCE TO GET HIS FEET ON THE GROUND. WARM REGARDS. GP-4
 BT

2623

CG FMFPAC

P 220115Z/DEC70

3-3

TOP SECRET

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1. FOLLOWING CONSTITUTES ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS ON HOUSING ASPECTS OF BASE REALIGNMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND IS PEGGED TO PARAS IN REF B.

2. RE PARA 2 OF REF B PROCEED ALONG LINE OUTLINED.

3. RE PARA 3 REF B THERE IS STRONG FEELING HERE THAT GOJ SHOULD BE PRESSED HARD TO REDIRECT RESOURCES TO CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING IN SASEBO IN LIEU OF PREVIOUSLY AGREED HOUSING AT YOKOSUKA AND ATSUGI. HOUSING REQUIREMENT AT SASEBO IS 55 UNITS V

CE 400 UNITS MENTIONED IN PARA 2 B (3) REF B.

ADDITIONAL HOUSING AT ATSUGI IS OF SECOND LEVEL PRIORITY COMPARED TO SASEBO HOUSING; HOWEVER, 200 STUDENT HIGH SCHOOL AT YOKOSUKA IS A FIRM REQUIREMENT. EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO EFFECT ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEW SASEBO HOUSING ON ONE FOR ONE EXCHANGE W

TH FIRST PHASE OF YOKOHAMA AREA HOUSING SUCH THAT SECOND PHASE (REMAINING UNITS) COULD BE USED FOR ADDITIONAL DOD HOUSING SHOULD REQUIREMENTS LATER DEVELOP AND/OR AS PART OF HAKATA REQUIREMENTS INDICATED IN PARA 4 BELOW.

4. RE PARA 5 REF B. DIFFICULT HERE AT THIS TIME TO PIN DOWN REQUIREMENTS AT HAKATA-ITAZUKE. OUR POSITION IS TO PRESS GOJ HARD FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NECESSARY REPLACEMENT SUPPORT FACILITIES (FAMILY HOUSING, DORMITORIES, BOQS, AND OTHER SUPPORT FACILITIES) TO ADEQUATELY HOUSE CRZPTIOLOGIC COMMUNITY AND REQUIRED SUPPORT PERSONNEL AT HAKATA AND SIMILARLY REQUIRED FACILITIES FOR ENCLAVE PERSONNEL (ESTIMATED 11 AIR FORCE MJL AND 110 NAVY MIL) AT ITAZUKE. SHOULD GOJ AGREE TO THESE REQUIREMENTS WE WOULD BE WILLING TO RELEASE ITAZUKE ANNEX. ROGERS

BT

3748

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R 231904Z DEC 70

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FM ADMIN CINCPAC

INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUHHLHA/NSA PAC

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

QUOTE

R 050107Z DEC 70

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEIKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1287

INFO RUMJSL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0982

RUHHHQ3749/CINCPAC

RUHHRGA/CINCPACAF

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUADJKA/COMUSJAPAN

RUACADA/HICOMRY

RUEKJCS/SECDEF

RUEKJCS/JCS

RUENAAA/CNO

RUEFHQA/CSAF

RUEADWD/CSA

BT

SECRET STATE 198475

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: BASE REALIGNMENTS

REFS: A. TOKYO 9733 B. TOKYO 9734 C. TOKYO 9735
D. TOKYO 9605 E. STATE 185348

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ACTN: S/SEC

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1. VERY PLEASED WITH PROGRESS ON NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES IN BASE REVIEW COMMITTEE.

2. FULLY AGREE THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PROVIDE GOJ WITH 90 DAY NOTICE ON RIFS, BUT REGRET THAT ON FIRST ROUND WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO. BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT FOLLOWING WILL GO LONG WAY TOWARD MEETING GOJ, EMB AND USFJ REQUIREMENTS.

3. STAFF LEVEL HERE IS CURRENTLY PROPOSING DECEMBER 17 FOR SCC MEETING AND ASSOCIATED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AS PROPOSED REF D, WHICH WILL PERMIT NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS PRIOR TO ADJOURNMENT (EXPECTED DECEMBER 18). FINAL DECISION ON DECEMBER OR JANUARY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT HAS NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN MADE, ALTHOUGH EXPECTED SHORTLY. ORIGINAL GUIDANCE IN REF E ON RIF NOTIFICATION WILL HOLD REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THERE IS DECEMBER OR JANUARY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, LATEST DATE FOR INITIAL RIF NOTICES IS JANUARY 18. BECAUSE OF 45 DAYS REQUIRED BETWEEN NOTIFICATION AND ACTUAL TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT, IT IS EXPECTED HERE THAT EMPLOYEES IN FIRST ROUND OF RIFS WOULD TERMINATE EMPLOYMENT ABOUT MARCH 5.

4. IF DECEMBER PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT PERMITS EARLIER NOTIFICATION, ACTUAL EMPLOYMENT SHOULD STILL BE TERMINATED ON OR ABOUT MARCH 5. THIS WOULD RESULT IN LONGER NOTIFICATION PERIOD, ALTHOUGH NOT 90 DAYS FOR FIRST GROUP OF RIFFED EMPLOYEES. NOTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES CAN BE MADE AS SOON AFTER PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AS IS AGREEABLE TO USFJ, EMBASSY AND GOJ. AS PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF OKINAWA ACTIONS TO BE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH MAINLAND JAPAN ACTIONS, ABOVE GUIDANCE APPLIES TO OKINAWA AS WELL.

5. RE PARAS 2D AND E OF REF C, DEFINITION OF ITAZUKE ENCLAVE AREA IS SPELLED OUT IN 5TH AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED ACTION DIRECTIVE 71-1 ON ITAZUKE AIR BASE. THIS NOW BEING STAFFED BY USAF WITH USAF APPROVAL EXPECTED IN LATTER PART DECEMBER. THIS USAF PLAN WILL HAVE TO BE COMBINED WITH NAVY AND NSA REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH OVERALL DOD RESIDUAL REQUIREMENTS AT ITAZUKE. WASHINGTON APPROVAL OF COMBINED PLAN NECESSARY BEFORE PRESENTATION TO GOJ. COMBINED PLAN WILL INCLUDE RELOCATION REQUIREMENTS FOR GOJ FUNDING IN EXCHANGE FOR RETURN OF ITAZUKE HOUSING ANNEX. IRWIN

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