

DECLASSIFIED

FMFPAC: SPECAT EXCLUSIVES, IN and OUT, Jan-May 1971

INDEX - See following pages identified as pages 1 & 2 , Enclosure (1)
AND pages 1 - 3, Enclosure (2)

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335a (REV. 6-71)

T3050 RET/RETIRE 140 SPECAT MSGS

5750 MPAC 000273

1 A124T
C
O
X
D
Y
Z
DATE

MARCH C DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	FILE NUMBER	ORIGI- NATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.	CY. NO.	C O X D Y Z DATE

ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing

OPERATION CODE

X - ORIGINATING OR OFFICE
AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A - FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B - FOR GUIDANCE
C - FOR SIGNATURE
D - FOR COMMENT
E - FOR RECOMMENDATION
F - FOR CONCURRENCE

G - FOR INFORMATION

H - RETURN TO _____

I - _____

J - DISPOSITION _____

DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS

(COMPLETED BY ACTION OR ROUTING OFFICER AS APPROPRIATE)

 RETENTION PERIOD ESTABLISHED BY ROUTING OFFICER AS:

MONTHS

INDEFINITE (Historical Value)

UNTIL SUPERSEDED

PERMANENTLY (Record Material)

UNTIL OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AS DETERMINED ON ANNUAL REVIEW

REQUEST ACTION OFFICER ADVISE RETENTION ABOVE:

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER ESTABLISHING DISPOSITION

SECTION

ABQ

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ALL PERSONS WHO HANDLE THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT,
SIGN AND DATE IN NUMERICAL ORDER BELOW.

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
1		11	
2		12	
3		13	
4		14	
5		15	
6		16	
7		17	
8		18	
9		19	
10		20	

REMARKS (Entries to be signed and dated. For lengthy comments attach separate page and indicate
"Bucktag Comment Attached." Do not assign separate Control Number to Bucktag Comments.)

A

HISTORICAL	HD
ADMINISTRATIVE	AB
MCCC	AC
COUSEL	AE
RESERVE	AF
INFORMATION	AG
CHAPLAIN, USMC	AH
JUDGE ADVOCATE	AI
MEDICAL OFF, USMC	AM
DENTAL OFF, USMC	AN
DATA SYSTEMS	AP
POLICY ANALYSIS	AQ
LEGISLATIVE	AR
FISCAL	AS
WOMEN MARINES	AW
SYSTEMS SUPPORT	AY
INSPECTOR GENERAL	AZ
JOINT CONTROL	
CLASSIFIED FILES	ABQ

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Marine Corps History and Museums
in accordance with the provisions
of CNO ltr Ser 009D323/232095 of
21 Feb 1979

B. M. F. W.

Signature Date 11/13/92

RETURN TO ABQ
UPON COMPLETION OF ROUTINGDO NOT DETACH-THIS FORM IS A PERMANENT
PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT IS
ATTACHEDMATERIAL
ATTACHED IS

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO 96610

IN REPLY REFER TO:
7C/191/vjt

000273

24 JAN 1973

TOP SECRET

SECRET (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (2))

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)

Subj: Retention/Retirement of Special Category Messages

Ref: (a) MCO 5510.10

Encl: (1) Listing of SPECAT Messages (copy of machine run read in HD
(2) 140 SPECAT Messages

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (2) is forwarded herewith.

2. It is requested that one copy of enclosure (1) be signed and returned to this headquarters.

E. P. Simpson
E. P. SIMPSON
By direction

3050

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
(Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (2))

3/30/fcb

SECRET

4 JAN 1973

(UNCLAS upon removal of enclosures (1) and (2)).

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Subj: SPECAT Message Review CY71

Ref: (a) MCO 5510.10
(b) HqFMFPacBul 5510 of 27 Oct 1972Encl: (1) List of CY71 SPECAT messages recommended for forwarding to HQMC
(2) List of CY71 Personal/Exclusive/MARDIS/LIMDIS/MCEO/OEO messages recommended for forwarding to HQMC

1. Reference (a) directs the periodic review of both incoming and outgoing Special Category (SPECAT) messages for a determination of their value as Marine Corps historical documents. To comply with the provisions of reference (a) a local review board was established by reference (b).

2. The SPECAT Review Board established by reference (b) met on 22 Dec 1972 with representatives of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 and Management in attendance. Board methodology involved dismissing at the outset consideration of messages originated by, or addressed/readdressed to HQMC. Further, the board did not consider messages dealing with racial or subversive activities, as incoming messages pertaining to these subject areas are synopsized by appropriate Hq FMFPac divisions and forwarded to HQMC.

3. Enclosure (1) contains a list of SPECAT messages the board judged to have value as Marine Corps historical documents. The S&C system of filing all "blues" together necessitated board sighting of other than strictly SPECAT messages. Enclosure (2) contains a list of Personal/Exclusive/MARDIS/MCEO/OEO messages the board judged to have value as Marine Corps historical documents.

4. Recommendation

a. It is recommended that the SPECAT messages listed in enclosure (1) be forwarded to HQMC to comply with the provisions of reference (a).

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3/30/fcb

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Subj: SPECAT Message Review CY71

b. It is recommended that the messages listed in enclosure (2) be forwarded to HQMC because of their value as historical documents.


W. M. VANZUYEN

Approved:

4a 
4b 

Disapproved:



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CY71 SPECIAL CATEGORY (SPECAT) MESSAGES
RECOMMENDED FOR FORWARDING TO HQMC

<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
1. CINCPAC	021957Z Jan71	S (Op-3)	PACOM Strategies Appraisal and Policy Guidance
3. <i>3d MarDiv</i> CINCPAC	{ 06100 050639Z Jan71	TS (Op-4)	Cambodian Contingency Planning
2. CINCPACFLT	060828Z Jan71	TS (Op-4)	Cambodia Contingency Planning
4. ADMIN FMFPAC	061907Z Jan71	TS (Op-4)	Planned Operations
5. COMSEVENTHFLT	071526Z Jan71	TS (Op-4)	Cambodian Contingency Planning
6. CG III MAF	081115Z Jan71	TS (Op-4)	Cambodian Contingency Planning
7. CG I MAF	150102Z Jan71	TS (Op-4)	Planning for TF-79 Participation
9. CTG 76.4	220005Z Jan71	TS (Op-4)	Operation Cuu Long
10. CINCPAC	220245Z Jan71	TS (Op-4)	Redeployment Contingency Planning
11. CG FMFPAC	222218Z Jan71	TS (Op-4)	Planning for TF-79 Participation
14. CINCPACFLT	300638Z Jan71	TS (Op-4)	Contingency Planning
16. CG FMFPAC	050302Z Feb71	TS (Op-4)	Force Planning
17. CINCPAC	102240Z Feb71	TS (Op-4)	Redeployment Contingency Planning
18. CG FIRST MARDIV	130427Z Feb71	S (Op-4)	Surprise Firing Devices
22. COMUSMACV	170045Z Mar71	TS (Op-4)	Southeast Asia Redeployments

SECRET
ENCLOSURE (1)

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<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>23. CINCPAC</u>	200337Z Mar71	TS (gp-4)	Southeast Asia Redeployments
<u>25. CG FMFPAC</u>	302041Z Mar71	TS (gp-4)	Force Planning
<u>26. CINCPACFLT</u>	310428Z Mar71	TS (gp-4)	Redeployment Increment VII
<u>30. CINCPACFLT</u>	090353Z Apr71	S (gp-4)	Okinawa Reversion
<u>33. ADMIN CINCPACFLT</u>	122104Z Apr71	TS (gp-1)	Nuclear Weapons Deploy- ment Plans
<u>35. CG I MAF</u>	140357Z Apr71	TS (gp-1)	Amphibious Operations
<u>40. CG III MAF</u>	170732Z Apr71	TS (gp-1)	Amphibious Operations
<u>51. COMUSMACV</u>	181143Z May71	TS (gp-4)	Redeployment Increment VIII
<u>53. CINCPAC</u>	270336Z May71	TS (gp-4)	Redeployment Increment VIII
<u>66. SECDEF</u>	150045Z Jun71	S (gp-4)	Removal of Navy/Marine Flying Activities - Naha
<u>72. CINCPACFLT</u>	292054Z Jun71	TS (gp-1)	Relocation of PACOM Nuclear Weapons
<u>76. CINCPAC</u>	042132Z Jul71	C (gp-4)	Cold Turkey II Program
<u>77. ADMIN III MAF</u>	060900Z Jul71	S (gp-4)	Possible Deployment of Marine F-4 Squadron to Taiwan
<u>99. ADMIN III MAF</u>	180346Z Sep71	S (gp-4)	MACS-4
<u>101. CINCPACFLT</u>	182155Z Sep71	S (gp-3)	Kadena AB Availability

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<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>104. CINCPACREPRY</u>	<u>230800Z</u> <u>Sep71</u> <u>140135</u>	<u>S (Op-1)</u>	Weapons Dispersal
<u>108. CG III MAF</u>	<u>140316Z</u> <u>Oct71</u>	<u>S (Op-4)</u>	<u>hosted travel op</u> Naha VMFA Additional Deployment
<u>[REDACTED]</u>		<u>[REDACTED]</u>	<u>[REDACTED]</u>
<u>[REDACTED]</u> Oct71		<u>[REDACTED]</u>	<u>[REDACTED]</u>
<u>110. CG FMFPAC</u>	<u>160416Z</u> <u>Oct71</u>	<u>TS (Op-4)</u>	Senior Officer Requirements
<u>113. CG III MAF</u>	<u>210633Z</u> <u>Oct71</u>	<u>S (Op-4)</u>	CTG 79.3 Readiness Posture
<u>120. CG FIRST MAW</u>	<u>300323Z</u> <u>Oct71</u>	<u>S (Op-4)</u>	FMF Structure/MARCORBASE Support
<u>121. CG FMFPAC</u>	<u>302218Z</u> <u>Oct71</u>	<u>C (Op-4)</u>	WestPac Cadre for Blue Ridge
<u>134. COMNAVFORJAPAN</u>	<u>100820Z</u> <u>Dec71</u>	<u>U</u>	Conversion North Fuji Maneuver Area
<u>135. CTF-79</u>	<u>110606Z</u> <u>Dec71</u>	<u>TS (Op-4)</u>	Pakistan Contingency Operations
<u>136. CG FMFPAC</u>	<u>162001Z</u> <u>Dec71</u>	<u>S (Op-3)</u>	Counterintelligence Operations at MCAS Iwakuni
<u>139. CG III MAF</u>	<u>210113Z</u> <u>Dec71</u>	<u>TS (Op-1)</u>	Contingency Operations
<u>140. CG III MAF</u>	<u>210645Z</u> <u>Dec71</u>	<u>TS (Op-4)</u>	Contingency Operations

(Valid sep (Jan - Dec 71))

SECRET
ENCLOSURE (1)

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CY71 PERSONAL/EXCLUSIVE/MARDIS/MCEO/OEO
MESSAGES RECOMMENDED FOR FORWARDING TO HQMC

<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>8. CG FMFPAC</u>	182134Z Jan71	TS (Gp-4)	Contingency Planning
<u>12. CG FIRST MAW</u>	260450Z Jan71	S (Gp-4)	Effectiveness of Air Ops
<u>13. CG MARCORBASE CAMP BUTLER</u>	290845Z Jan71	S (Gp-4)	Real Estate - A Question
<u>15. CG FMFPAC</u>	302124Z Jan71	S (Gp-4)	AWG-10 Product Improvement Program
<u>19. CG THIRD MARDIV</u>	160755Z Feb71	S (Gp-4)	North Fuji Maneuver Area
<u>20. CG FIRST MARDIV</u>	020035Z Mar71	C (Gp-4)	Division Staffing
<u>21. CG FIRST MARDIV</u>	040530Z Mar71	U	Downgrading Officer Billets
<u>24. CG I MAF</u>	230058Z Mar71	S (Gp-4)	NE Asia Coord Comm (NEACC)
<u>27. CG FMFPAC</u>	020148Z Apr71	C (Gp-4)	Staffing of I MAF Hq
<u>28. CG THIRD MARDIV</u>	030530Z Apr71	S (Gp-4)	LVTP's
<u>29. CTF-79</u>	080540Z Apr71	S (Gp-4)	Equipment Readiness
<u>31. CG I MAF</u>	100730Z Apr71	S (Gp-4)	Tank Submersion
<u>32. CG FMFPAC</u>	110021Z Apr71	U	Personal Response Seminar in Cross-Cultural Interaction
<u>34. COMNAVBASE SUBIC</u>	130148Z Apr71	C (Gp-4)	Physical Security Program
<u>36. CG FMFPAC</u>	142306Z Apr71	TS (Gp-4)	Location of CONUS Based Battalion of Third Marines

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>37. CINCPAC</u>	150214Z Apr71	U	Msg of Appreciation
<u>38. CG FMFPAC</u>	160321Z Apr71	C (Op-4)	III MAF Amphibious Raid Trn
<u>39. CG FMFPAC</u>	160322Z Apr71	S (Op-4)	Oki Reversion Replacement Facility White Beach
<u>41. CINCPACFLT</u>	201502Z Apr71	TS (Op-4)	Location of CONUS Based Battalion of Third Marines
<u>42. CINCPACFLT</u>	201504Z Apr71	U	SEATO Exercise
<u>43. ADMIN FMFPAC</u>	230238Z Apr71	TS (Op-4)	Redeployment Planning
<u>44. ADMIN MARCORBASESPAC</u>	232354Z Apr71	S (Op-4)	Oki Reversion Conference
<u>45. CG FMFPAC</u>	240317Z Apr71	TS (Op-4)	Redeployment Planning
<u>46. CG FIRST MAW</u>	260237Z Apr71	S (Op-4)	WestPac North Radar Site Reconnaissance
<u>47. CG THIRD MARDIV</u>	010030Z May71	C (Op-4)	Cooperation/Coordination w/JSDF
<u>48. CG FMFPAC</u>	012219Z May71	C (Op-4)	Cooperation/Coordination w/JSDF
<u>49. CG FMFPAC</u>	072004Z May71	TS (Op-4)	ARG/MAU Spec Ops
<u>50. CG MCB CAMP BUTLER</u>	110504Z May71	C (Op-4)	Transfer of Water Plants to RDWC
<u>52. CG FMFPAC</u>	222245Z May71	TS (Op-4)	ARG/MAU Readiness
<u>54. CG FIRST MARDIV</u>	272315Z May71	C (Op-4)	Status Report of First MarDiv

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>53.</u> CG THIRD MAB	280547Z May71	<u>U</u>	Elimination of FLC Excesses
<u>54.</u> CG FMFPAC	282147Z May71	<u>C (gp-4)</u>	Use of Operation Freeze
<u>55.</u> CG THIRD MAB	312343Z May71	<u>S (gp-4)</u>	Deactivation of Third MAB Hq
56. CG ^(Jan - Dec 71) <u>58.</u> CG FMFPAC	022219Z Jun71	<u>U</u>	FMFPAC Training Readiness Evaluation
<u>59.</u> CG THIRD MAB	030415Z Jun71	<u>U</u>	Retrograde of Butler Bldgs
<u>60.</u> CG I MAF	050001Z Jun71	<u>S (gp-s)</u>	I MAF Accomplishments
<u>61.</u> CG FMFPAC	052125Z Jun71	<u>C (gp-4)</u>	Status Report on First MarDiv
<u>62.</u> CG THIRD MAB	060425Z Jun71	<u>C (und, jul 71)</u>	Summary of Recent Events
<u>63.</u> CG III MAF	091111Z Jun71	<u>C (gp-4)</u>	MO/MOA Management
<u>64.</u> CG FMFPAC	100205Z Jun71	<u>C (gp-4)</u>	Elimination of the Term Fragging in Official Correspondence
<u>65.</u> CG FMFPAC	110442Z Jun71	<u>U</u>	I MAF Accomplishments, Projects and Planning Tasks
<u>67.</u> CG THIRD MARDIV	210825Z Jun71	<u>C (gp-4)</u>	Naha Port Work Force Replacements
<u>68.</u> CG FMFPAC	220522Z Jun71	<u>U</u>	Marine Leader Pub
<u>69.</u> CG III MAF	250719Z Jun71	<u>S (gp-4)</u>	Nuclear Wpns Trn
<u>70.</u> CINCPACFLT	^{56 Eps} 261226Z Jun71	<u>U</u>	Msg of Appreciation from Adm Clarey

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>71. CG III MAF</u>	280510Z Jun71	S (Op-4)	NE Asia Coordinating Committee
<u>73. CG I MAF</u>	292320Z Jun71	C (Op-4)	Asg of CG 7th MAB for ROPEVAL 3-71
<u>74. CG FMFPAC</u>	300333Z Jun71	C (Op-4)	Naha Port Work Force Replacements
<u>75. CG FMFPAC</u>	032151Z Jul71	U (Op-4)	FMFPAC Training Readiness Evaluation
<u>78. ADMIN FMFPAC</u>	090115Z Jul71	TS (Op-4)	Northeast Asia Coordinating Committee
<u>79. CG FMFPAC</u>	182149Z Jul71	S (Op-4)	Readiness Posture
<u>80. CG FMFPAC</u>	222139Z Jul71	S (Op-4)	Chemical Weaponry
<u>81. CG FIRST MAW</u>	231209Z Jul71	S (Op-4)	Readiness Posture
<u>82. CG THIRD MARDIV</u>	252246Z Jul71	U	Occupation of Camp Hague
<u>83. CG FIRST MAW</u>	260613Z Jul71	C (Op-4)	A6A Readiness
<u>84. CG THIRD MAW</u>	292048Z Jul71	U	Carrier Quals
<u>85. COMFIRSTFLT</u>	310007Z Jul71	S (Op-4)	Airborne Mine Counter-measures
<u>86. ADMIN FMFPAC</u>	072222Z Aug71	C (Op-4)	A6A Readiness
<u>87. CG FMFPAC</u>	092212Z Aug71	C (Op-4)	CH-53D Assignment
<u>88. CG I MAF</u>	100500Z Aug71	C (Op-4)	Visit W/COMFIRSTFLT/ COMPHIBPAC
<u>89. CG FMFPAC</u>	152151Z Aug71	C (Op-4)	Visit to COMFIRSTFLT/ COMPHIBPAC

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SECRET
ENCLOSURE (2)

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<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
90. <u>ADMIN</u> FMFPAC	180329Z Aug71	C (Gp-4)	Utilization of Kadena AB by III MAF Forces
91. <u>CG</u> FMFPAC	212249Z Aug71	U	Aircraft Sound Suppression: MCAS Iwakuni
92. <u>CG</u> III MAF	241130Z Aug71	C (Gp-4)	Kadena AB Utilization by III MAF
93. <u>CG</u> THIRD MAW	012302Z Sep71	U	FMFPAC Annual Aviation Safety Awards
94. <u>CG</u> THIRD MARDIV	101111Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	Standardization of SOP's
95. <u>CG</u> III MAF	110313Z Sep71	C (Gp-4)	Combined MABLEX Planning
96. <u>ADMIN</u> III MAF	150201Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	III MAF Future Considera- tions
97. <u>ADMIN</u> III MAF	160214Z Sep71	C (Gp-4)	Special Landing Force Camp, Subic Bay
98. <u>CINCPACFLT</u>	170545Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	Amphibious Exercise Areas
100. <u>CG</u> FMFPAC	182138Z Sep71	C (Gp-4)	Combined MABLEX Planning
102. <u>CG</u> THIRD MARDIV	200130Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	Camp Fuji Training
103. <u>COMNAVFOR</u> JAPAN	210756Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	Camp Fuji Training
105. <u>CG</u> FIRST MARDIV	271822Z Sep71	C (Gp-4)	ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71
106. <u>CG</u> I MAF	122231Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	WestPac Cadre for Blue Ridge (LCC-19)
107. <u>CG</u> III MAF	140135Z Oct71	S (Gp-4)	Naha VMFA Additional Deployment
	<i>132258Z Oct 71</i>		

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SECRET
ENCLOSURE (2)

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<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>109. CG FMFPAC</u>	160415Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71
<u>111. CG FMFPAC</u>	160432Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71
<u>112. CG III MAF</u>	190810Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	WestPac Cadre for Blue Ridge (LCC-19)
<u>114. COMFIRSTFLT</u>	232225Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	Fleet Exercises
<u>115. CG III MAF</u>	240115Z Oct71	TS (Gp-4)	Task Force Hq
<u>116. CG III MAF</u>	270722Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	OPCON WestPac FMF Resources
<u>117. CG THIRD MARDIV</u>	290739Z Oct71	U	M-16 Marksmanship
<u>118. CG FMFPAC</u>	302116Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	Fleet Exercises
<u>119. CG FMFPAC</u>	302117Z Oct71	U	Materiel Readiness
<u>122. CG III MAF</u>	040618Z Nov71 300323 CG FIRST MAF 051319Z Nov71 dct	S (Gp-4)	III MAF Responsibilities listed time and Determination of FME Structure and MARCORBASE Supporting Establishment FY73-FY77
<u>123. CG THIRD MAW</u>	052228Z Nov71	U	Carrier Qualifications
<u>124. CG FMFPAC</u>	062021Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	PHIBPAC/FMFPAC Exchange of Information
<u>125. CG III MAF</u>	160529Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	Planning Requirements for III MAF
<u>126. CG FMFPAC</u>	200207Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	Planning Requirements for III MAF

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<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>127. CG THIRD MAW</u>	200247Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	SIOP Equipment Requirements
<u>128. CG FMFPAC</u>	202217Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	Request for Temporary Adjustment to Amphibious Ready Group ALFA/MAU Posture
<u>129. CG FMFPAC</u>	212225Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	III MAF Responsibilities
<u>130. CG FMFPAC</u>	221915Z Nov71	U	FMFPAC Training Readiness Evaluation
<u>131. ADMIN FMFPAC</u>	230332Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	Proposed Adjustment of LPH Resources Assignment
<u>132. COMPHIBPAC</u>	241836Z Nov71	C (Gp-4)	Amphibious Planning Responsibilities & Relationships
<u>133. CG FIRST MAW</u>	090021Z Dec71	C (Gp-4)	TRE - 3-71
<u>137. CG FMFPAC</u>	162004Z Dec71	U	Training Readiness Evaluation
<u>138. CG FMFPAC</u>	180315Z	S (Gp-4)	WestPac Forward Basing

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SECRET
EXCLUSIVE FOR

**STAFF SECTIONS NOT
 AUTHORIZED TO MAKE COPIES**

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CJS	
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G-2	✓ <i>copy</i>
G-3	✓ <i>copy</i>
G-4	✓ <i>copy</i>
G-5	✓ <i>copy</i>
Compt	✓ <i>copy</i>
CEO	✓ <i>copy</i>
Mgt	✓ <i>copy</i>

ZNY AAAAA
 R 021957Z JAN 71
 FM CINCPAC
 TO RUHHRGA/CINCSARPAC
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACAF
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RHMSMVA/CONUSMACV
 RUHKJAA/COMUSKOREA
 RUADJKA/COMUSJAPAN
 RHATAAA/COMUSTDC
 RHMFMTA/COMUSMACTHAI
 RUAGADA/CINCPACREPRY
 RUMMINGA/ CINCPACRFPPHIL
 RUEHBAC/CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA
 RUHJOSA/CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI
 RUMMINGA/CHJUSMAGPHIL
 RHATAAA/CHMAAG CHINA
 RHMFMTA/DEPCHJUSMAG THAI
 RUEASTA/CHDLG INDONESIA
 RUEASTA/CHMEDT BURMA
 RUEASTA/CMDAC JAPAN
 INFO RUEKJCS/CJCS

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION ONE OF THREE SECTIONS
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL ROSSON, ADMIRAL CLAREY, GENERAL
 NAZZARO, LT GEN JONES, GENERAL ARRAMS, GENERAL MICHAELIS, LT GEN
 GRAHAM, VADM BAUMAERGER, MAJ GEN SPITH, LT GEN LAMPFRT, RADM MUSE,
 COL SPENCER, RADM FUGH, MAJ GEN PICKETT, MAJ GEN TAYLOR, COL
 RUSSEL, COL FULTON, COL CARRIGAN, COL REYNOLDS, INFO FOR ADMIRAL
 MOORE FROM ADMIRAL MCCAIN

PACOM STRATEGIC APPRAISAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE (U)

A. CINCPAC 130406Z NOV 69 (ROM) NOTAL

1. (S) IN VIEW OF CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE NIXON
 DOCTRINE AND BASE AND FORCE REDUCTIONS RESULTING FROM
 BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, THE FOLLOWING PACOM STRATEGIC

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APPRAISAL AND PACOM POLICY GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST IN FOCUSING PACOM RESOURCES AND EFFORTS ON COMMON GOALS. IT WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL SUPERSEDED BY CINCPAC OR BY GUIDANCE FROM A HIGHER LEVEL. WITH REGARD TO SEA, THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REF A REMAINS IN EFFECT.

PAGE 3 RUHHHQA0134 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

2. (S) INTRODUCTION:

A. (S) IN GENERAL TERMS, CINCPAC IS CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE PACOM, DEFEND THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ATTACK THROUGH THE PACIFIC OCEAN AND TO SUPPORT NATIONAL POLICIES AND INTERESTS. FULFILLMENT OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRES A CAPABILITY TO MEET A COMPLEX ARRAY OF CONTINGENCIES THAT RANGE FROM RELATIVELY MINOR POLITICAL-MILITARY INSTABILITY TO CONDUCT OF GENERAL WAR. ATTAINMENT OF U.S. AND FREE WORLD OBJECTIVES IN THE PACOM, AS OUTLINED IN THE JSOP AND JSCP, IS COMPLICATED BY CONFRONTATION WITH FOUR COMMUNIST NATIONS--THE SOVIET UNION, COMMUNIST CHINA, NORTH KOREA AND NORTH VIETNAM; ALL OF WHOM ARE MOTIVATED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST DOCTRINE OF EXTENDING THEIR DOMINANCE AND POLITICAL BELIEFS TO NEIGHBORING NATIONS. WHILE EACH OF THESE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAS DEVELOPED DIFFERING OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS, EACH CONTINUES TO BE GUIDED BY THIS SINGLE AGGRESSIVE PURPOSE WITH DEPENDENCE UPON INTERNAL SUBVERSION AS A GENERALLY COMMON POLICY.

B. (S) THE FREE WORLD AND NON-COMMUNIST ORIENTED

PAGE 4 RUHHHQA0134 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
NATIONS OF THE PACOM REGION PRESENT A CROSS SECTION OF POLITICAL BELIEFS AND NATIONAL MOTIVATIONS. ALTHOUGH THESE NATIONS HAVE THE COMMON BASIC OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDING THEIR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, THEIR POLICIES AND METHODS FOR ACHIEVING THAT OBJECTIVE ARE, IN MANY INSTANCES, DIVERGENT. THIS DIVERGENCE IN APPROACH AMONG THE COUNTRIES IN PACOM IS A COMPLICATING FACTOR IN DEVELOPING PLANS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE CINCPAC MISSION. THE SINGLENESS OF PURPOSE AND SIMILARITY OF COMMUNIST POLICIES PLACE EMPHASIS UPON THE NEED TO INSURE AN EFFECTIVE FOCUS OF PACOM RESOURCES AND EFFORT. THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC APPRAISAL HAS BEEN DEVELOPED TO ACHIEVE THIS RESULT DURING THE CURRENT PERIOD OF MAJOR FORCE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE PACOM.

3. (S) PACOM STRATEGIC APPRAISAL:

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A. (C) FOUR COMMUNIST NATIONS EACH PRESENTING A POTENTIAL THREAT TO OUR SECURITY -- COMMUNIST CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, NORTH KOREA, AND NORTH VIETNAM -- BORDER THE WESTERN PACIFIC. WHILE THESE COMMUNIST NATIONS DO NOT HOLD IDENTICAL VIEWS REGARDING DOCTRINAL ISSUES, THEY ALL ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN ATTEMPTING TO EXTEND THEIR DOMINANCE

PAGE5 RUHHHQ0134 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY TO THEIR NEIGHBORS. THE FACT THAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THESE COMMUNIST POWERS IS NOT ALWAYS IN AGREEMENT INCREASES THE DIFFICULTY OF PREDICTING THE COURSE AND FORM OF THEIR AGGRESSIVE ADVENTURES.

B. THE COMMUNIST CHINESE ARE BEGINNING TO STIR. (S) THE COMMUNIST CHINESE FORCES APPEAR AT PRESENT TO BE DEFENSIVELY ORIENTED. IN THE PAST, COMMUNIST CHINA HAS DISPLAYED RESTRAINT WITH REGARD TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ISSUES THAT THEY DO NOT ASSESS AS A DIRECT THREAT TO THE CHINESE HOMELAND. THE COMMUNIST CHINESE HAVE ELECTED TO PURSUE A POLICY DESIGNED TO ATTAIN THEIR OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF POLITICAL PRESSURE AND SUCCESSION LEADING TO COMMUNIST CHINESE SUPPORTED WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. THEY ARE NOW EXTENSIVELY ENGAGED IN THIS PURSUIT AND MAY BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO THE FULL EXTENT OF THEIR RESOURCES. TO THESE TACTICS, COMMUNIST CHINA NOW IS ADDING A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY TO INFLUENCE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES: A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WHICH WILL SOON REACH AN OPERATIONAL STAGE ABLE TO SPAN MOST OF ASIA AS WELL AS THE SOVIET UNION.

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 C. (S) THE SOVIET UNION'S LONG RANGE GOAL IS TO ACHIEVE SOVIET HEGEMONY OVER ALL OF EAST ASIA, INCLUDING CHINA. ITS IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS, PRIMARILY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEANS, TO HAVE THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA LOOK TO THE USSR RATHER THAN CHINA OR THE U.S. FOR INSPIRATION AND HELP. TO THIS END THE USSR IS CONTINUING TO EXPAND ITS DIPLOMATIC, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC AREA. THIS EXPANSION IS ASSISTED BY A REINFORCED AND GROWING SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE. BACKED BY IMPRESSIVE ECONOMIC AND MANPOWER RESOURCES, SOVIET FAR EASTERN MILITARY STRENGTH, INCLUDING NUCLEAR MISSILES TARGETED THROUGHOUT THE REGION, WILL REMAIN A MAJOR THREAT.
 D. (S) IN COMPETING WITH PEKING FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE

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COMMUNIST WORLD, THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO ASSIST THEIR NORTH KOREAN AND NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ALLIES BY PROVIDING MODERN WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. POLITICALLY, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO SUPPORT CONTAINMENT OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITIES OF ITS LEADING TO GENERAL WAR. RECENT SOVIET MOVES TOWARD SOME FORM OF AN ANTI-PEKING ALLIANCE AMONG ASIAN NATIONS

PAGE 7 RUHHHQ0134 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
UNDERScore THE CURRENT DEFENSIVe MILITARY POSTURE OF THE USSR WHILE RELYING ON ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC AND CAUTIOUS MILITARY INITIATIVES TO ATTAIN ITS GOALS.

E. (S) WHILE NORTH KOREA REMAINS VOCALLY HOSTILE, THE CURRENT MILITARY BALANCE WITH SOUTH KOREA IS NOT UNFAVORABLE. NORTH KOREA CANNOT NOW MOUNT A SUCCESSFUL AGGRESSION WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL REINFORCEMENT AND ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FROM COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT NORTH KOREA WOULD RISK INITIATION OF HOSTILITIES WITHOUT EXPLICIT CONCURRENCE AND COVERT DIRECTION FROM THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA. THERE ARE AT PRESENT NO INDICATIONS OF SUCH INTENT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS, AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, WITH THEIR OWN INTERNAL PROBLEMS, ARE UNLIKELY TO ENCOURAGE HIGH RISK NORTH KOREAN ADVENTURES. ALTHOUGH SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS INVOLVING ASSAULTS, INFILTRATIONS, AND AGGRESSIVE ENCOUNTERS HAVE DECREASED TO A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL, THE NORTH KOREANS CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE NEW ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME THE INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE COUNTER-INFILTRATION DEFENSES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS
F. (S) NORTH VIETNAM SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA WILL CONTINUE TO BE A THREAT TO THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. HANOI'S OBJECTIVE TO DOMINATE ALL OF FORMER FRENCH INDOCHINA REMAINS UNALTERED. A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MAY FOR A TIME RELAX TENSIONS. IN ANY CASE THE COMMUNISTS MAY BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE THEIR SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS AT WHATEVER LEVEL THEY FEEL WILL NOT RESULT IN RESUMPTION OF DIRECT COLLECTIVE ACTION BY FREE WORLD MILITARY FORCES. AS A RESULT, A CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE AND SUPPORT IN SEASIA WILL EXIST FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

G. (C) THE CURRENT TREND TOWARD INCREASED NATIONALISM

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WILL CONTINUE TO ACCELERATE THROUGHOUT THE PACOM REGION. THIS TREND WILL BE MANIFEST IN REGARD TO U.S. MILITARY BASING RESTRICTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS TO TERRITORIAL WATERS CLAIMS. IN THE LONG TERM, PARTICULARLY IF TENSIONS LESSEN

PAGE 3 RUHHHQ0135 S E C R E T SPECIA. EXCLUSIVE FOLLOWING A VIETNAM SETTLEMENT, THE U.S. MAY EXPECT INCREASING PRESSURE FROM SOVEREIGN FOREIGN AUTHORITIES TOWARD REDUCED MILITARY FREEDOM OF U.S. ACTION DESPITE THEIR CONTINUED DEPENDENCY FOR SECURITY UPON U.S. SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE.

H. (S) INCREASED SOVIET PENETRATION INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN PLACES EMPHASIS ON THE LONG TERM STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE AREA. SOME NATIONS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL ARE BECOMING MORE SENSITIVE TO TRANSIT OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT DESTINED TO NATIONS OF THE AREA. THE IMPACT OF THIS SITUATION IS HEIGHTENED BY BRITISH RETRENCHMENTS EAST OF SUEZ. IN THE PAST, BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA TENDED TO STABILIZE THE REGION. RETRENCHMENT MAY RESULT IN RENEWED REGIONAL INSTABILITY WHICH WOULD FACILITATE EXPANSION OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE AREA.

I. (S) IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF CONTINUING COMMUNIST PRESSURE AND CHANGING ATTITUDES, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE PACOM AREA AND WILL ADHERE TO A POLICY WHICH HONORS EXISTING TREATY OBLIGATIONS. THIS POLICY DOES NOT PRECLUDE U.S.

PAGE 4 RUHHHQ0135 S E C R E T SPECIA. EXCLUSIVE ASSISTANCE TO ANY COUNTRY THREATENED BY EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO TREATY COMMITMENT, IF SUCH ACTION IS DETERMINED TO BE IN OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS. INHERENT IN THIS POLICY IS THE UNDERSTANDING THAT PRIMARY MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR RESISTING AGGRESSION SHOULD GENERALLY BE BORNE BY THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES CONCERNED, WITH MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES WHERE IT IS REQUIRED AND DEEMED APPROPRIATE. NONTHELESS, FURTHER REDUCTION OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL CAN BE EXPECTED.

4. (S) PACOM POLICY GUIDANCE: WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL POLICY, THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED FOR THE PACOM.

A. THE CENTRAL AIM OF PACOM STRATEGY IS TO DETER THE COMMUNISTS FROM USING THEIR MILITARY POWER TO THE

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DISADVANTAGE OF THE UNITED STATES WHILE MAINTAINING A MILITARY POSTURE TO FIGHT A GENERAL WAR SHOULD ONE BE FORCED UPON US. THIS STRESS ON DETERRENCE IS APPLICABLE AT ALL LEVELS OF CONFLICT AND CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED THROUGH VISIBLY STRONG AND EFFECTIVELY POSITIONED MILITARY FORCE.

PAGE 5 RUHHHQA0135 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 THE DISTANCES INVOLVED IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF PACOM FORCES EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR STRATEGICALLY POSITIONED BASES FROM WHICH HIGHLY MOBILE FORCES MAY BE RAPIDLY BROUGHT TO BEAR. WHILE NATIONAL POLICY DICTATES THE USE OF ALLIED INDIGENOUS FORCES TO MAINTAIN THEIR OWN INTERNAL SECURITY, THE PERSISTENT AND AGGRESSIVE CHARACTER OF COMMUNIST ACTIONS INDICATES THE CONTINUED POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED HOSTILITIES AT A LEVEL WHICH WOULD REQUIRE ACTIVE US PARTICIPATION IN SUPPORT OF US TREATY COMMITMENTS OR VITAL INTERESTS. TO ACHIEVE A VISIBLY EFFECTIVE DETERRENT MILITARY FORCE POSITIONED FOR PROMPT ACTION, THE PACOM WILL ADHERE TO THE POLICY OF DEPLOYMENT AS FAR FORWARD AS POLITICAL, GEOGRAPHIC AND FORCE STRUCTURE RESTRAINTS PERMIT. A CONTINUING APPRAISAL OF PACOM MILITARY BASING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTINUING POLITICO-MILITARY EVOLUTION WILL BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN ALL MILITARY PLANNING.
 B. IN THE LONG TERM THE PACOM POLICY IS TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT SEASIA FREE FROM THE DOMINATION OF A POWER HOSTILE TO US INTERESTS. BASED ON THE NIXON DOCTRINE, PRIMARY EMPHASIS MUST NOW

PAGE 6 RUHHHQA0135 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 BE PLACED ON 'SELF HELP.' THEREFORE, THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN FELT TO A PREDOMINANT POSITION AMONG ASIAN PROGRAMS. SELF DETERMINATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF RVN AND A REDUCTION OF US FORCES REMAIN OUR GOALS. ALTHOUGH US FAITHFULNESS TO ITS COMMITMENTS IN SEASIA HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN THE PAST, THE NON-COMMUNIST NATIONS OF SEASIA RECEIVE LITTLE SOLACE FROM OUR PAST ACTIONS. US DETERMINATION AND PERSEVERANCE IS GAUGED ON A DAY TO DAY BASIS IN THE CAPITALS OF ASIA. THEREFORE, THE SUCCESS OF VIETNAMIZATION, SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND THE SUPPORT OF THAILAND'S INDEPENDENCE WILL CONTINUE TO BE VITAL ELEMENTS OF US STRATEGY IN SEASIA. WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE FUTURE OF THESE NATIONS IS INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED.
 C. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, JAPAN WILL REMAIN

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THE MOST IMPORTANT US ALLY IN ASIA. ACCORDINGLY, THE FUTURE COURSE OF JAPANESE FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICIES, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA, ARE CRUCIAL TO US INTERESTS IN ASIA. THEREFORE, THE ROLE OF JAPAN MUST WEIGH HEAVILY IN THE FORMULATION OF ALL PACOM POLICY

PAGE 7 RUHHQAD135 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE DECISIONS.

D. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THE PROGRAMS TO MODERNIZE ROK FORCES ARE SECOND IN IMPORTANCE ONLY TO OUR SEASIAN PROGRAMS. WE MUST INSURE THAT THE CURRENT FAVORABLE BALANCE RELATIVE TO ROK SECURITY REMAINS ADEQUATE DESPITE CURRENT AND FUTURE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE PACOM FORCE POSTURE.

E. THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN AND THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR BASING OPTIONS IN THOSE NATIONS, REMAIN IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN OUR STATUS AS A PACIFIC POWER. OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO PROTECT THESE BASING OPTIONS.

F. THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE AND INDONESIA ARE OF VITAL STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. WE MUST RETAIN AND BUILD UPON OUR CURRENTLY HEALTHY RELATIONS WITH THOSE NATIONS; ENCOURAGE THE GROWING SPIRIT OF REGIONALISM IN THEIR AREA OF THE PACIFIC; AND SEEK TO INSURE THAT AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND MAINTAIN A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS IN ASIA.

G. THE NATIONAL POLICY OF INCREASED DEPENDENCE UPON INDIGENOUS ALLIED MANPOWER AGAINST EXTERNAL AND

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION THREE OF THREE SECTIONS INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS PLACES EMPHASIS UPON THE REQUIREMENT TO STRENGTHEN ALLIED FORCES AND TO ASSIST IN THE NATION BUILDING PROCESS. THIS TASK WILL BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT IF THE REDUCTIONS IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS CONTINUE. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE PACOM TO EVALUATE THOROUGHLY THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF OUR ALLIES TO INSURE THAT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ENCOMPASS ONLY THOSE ELEMENTS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO COUNTER THE ASSOCIATED THREAT. ADDITIONALLY, PROGRAMS MUST BE SELECTED WHICH ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES AND GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. INCREASING COMPETITION FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FUNDS WILL EMPHASIZE THE

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REQUIREMENT FOR FULLY JUSTIFIABLE PROGRAM SUBMISSIONS.

H. ESTABLISHMENT AND RETENTION OF ADEQUATE MILITARY
BASING IN THE PACOM WILL, TO A LARGE DEGREE, DEPEND
UPON ALLIED RECOGNITION OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF

PAGE 3 RUHHHQAO136 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 STRATEGICALLY DEPLOYED U.S. MILITARY FORCES. ALLIED NATIONS
 MUST BE MADE TO ACCEPT THE IMPORTANCE TO THEIR SECURITY OF
 THESE DEPLOYMENTS AND THE NECESSITY FOR A FLEXIBLE CAPABILITY FOR
 MILITARY RESPONSE TO MAINTAIN CREDIBLE DETERRENCE.
 APPROPRIATE U.S. COMMANDERS WILL EMPHASIZE PROGRAMS, WITHIN SECURITY
 LIMITATIONS, DESIGNED TO CONVEY TO MILITARY COUNTERPARTS
 A THOROUGH APPRECIATION OF THE DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP
 BETWEEN U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENTS AND THE PRESENCE OF
 RESPONSIVE U.S. MILITARY FORCES.

I. THE TURBULENCE RESULTING FROM BUDGET RESTRAINTS
 PLACES INCREASED IMPORTANCE UPON THE REQUIREMENT TO PLAN
 AND IMPLEMENT FORCE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
 OVERALL PACOM STRATEGIC POSTURE. SINCE THE RESPONSIBILITIES
 OF THE SERVICE COMPONENTS ARE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING
 AND INDEPENDENT, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT FORCE AND BASING
 ADJUSTMENTS BE EFFECTED BASED UPON JOINT REVIEW AND
 COORDINATION BY THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE,
 JCS AND CINCPAC IN ORDER TO INSURE THE PRESERVATION OF
 STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND HEALTHY RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUR
 ALLIES. THIS REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN MANIFEST IN THE ON-

PAGE 4 RUHHHQAO136 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 GOING PLANNING FOR BASE REDUCTIONS/ADJUSTMENTS IN JAPAN,
 OKINAWA, KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES. JOINT COORDINATION
 IN ALL SUCH PLANNING IS ESSENTIAL AT THE EARLIEST STAGE
 TO PROVIDE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND COORDINATED APPROACH
 TO OVERALL PACOM BASING REQUIREMENTS.

J. COMPLETE AND CONTINUOUS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.
 COVERAGE OF THE PACOM AREA IS REQUIRED TO ENABL THE TIMELY
 AND SELECTIVE APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER IN THE DEGREE
 REQUIRED AT ANY CRITICAL POINT IN SUPPORT OF U.S. NATIONAL
 OBJECTIVES. TO THIS END, PACOM WILL EMPHASIZE MAINTAINING
 ADEQUATE DEPLOYED TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES IN
 FORWARD AREAS TO SUPPORT ON-GOING OPERATIONS AS WELL AS
 QUICK REACTION CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT THE
 PACOM AREA. INTELLIGENCE FORCES MUST BE MISSION ORIENTED
 AND OF SUFFICIENT SIZE AND CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE FOR ALL
 NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS TO INCLUDE ANALYTICAL

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AND PRODUCTION SUPPORT CAPABILITIES, HUMAN AND TECHNICAL COLLECTION, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLUS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AND ADVISORY ASSISTANCE TO SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES. THE PACOM MUST MAINTAIN A SURVIVABLE INTEL-

PAGE 5 RUHHHQ0136 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
LIGENCE SYSTEM WHICH WILL PROVIDE ESSENTIAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER ALL CONDITIONS AND PREVENT CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE GAPS FROM OCCURRING.

K. THROUGHOUT THE PACOM AREA THERE IS HEAVY DEPENDENCE UPON EFFECTIVE AND SURVIVABLE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS. THE NEED FOR CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF LIGHT-WEIGHT, HIGHLY PORTABLE GROUND SATELLITE TERMINALS TO IMPROVE AND TO ASSURE EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL DATA IS EVIDENT. TO THIS NEED, THE COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACOM WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY MORE EXTENSIVE AUTOMATION WITHIN THE MILITARY SYSTEMS. SELECTIVE INTEGRATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES' COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND FACILITIES WITH PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS TO PROVIDE NEAR REAL-TIME DELIVERY OF OPERATIONALLY ORIENTED INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC TO COMMANDER AND COMMAND CENTER FACILITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROL OF PACOM FORCES IS REQUIRED. COMMANDERS WILL PLACE HIGH PRIORITY UPON IMPROVEMENT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.

5. (U) IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL RESOURCES IN THE PACOM

PAGE 6 RUHHHQ0136 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
BE ORIENTED TOWARD THE ABOVE GOALS TO INSURE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF A DECLINING MILITARY FORCE POSTURE IN THE PACOM. THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE PACOM MISSION WILL BE DEPENDENT, TO A LARGE DEGREE, UPON THE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS IN THESE VITAL AREAS.

6. WARM REGARDS

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FOR ADM MCCAIN, INFO GEN ABRAMS, VADM WFISNER AND LGEN JONES
FROM CLAREY. SANGLEY POINT NOT ADDEE. PASS TO ADM MCCAIN
CAMBODIA CONTINGENCY PLANNING (S)

A. CINCPAC 050639Z JAN 71

1. REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON FEASIBILITY OF PROVIDING AN LPH AS A FORWARD OPERATIONAL LOCATION (FOL) AFLOAT IN THE VICINITY OF KOMPONG SOM.
2. IT IS OPERATIONALLY FEASIBLE TO PROVIDE THIS CAPABILITY AND I HAVE ISSUED SAILING ORDERS FOR AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP ALFA (ARG ALFA) TO PROCEED TO THE GULF OF THAILAND (GOT) AND BE POSITIONED FOR OPTIMUM RESPONSIVENESS FOR THIS OR OTHER TASKING. THE ARG DEPARTS SUBIC LATE 6 JAN 71 TO ARRIVE GOT APPROX

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PAGE 2 RUHHBRA5970 T O P S E C R E T SPFCAT EXCLUSIVE
 60 HRS: MARINE MAIL WILL REMAIN FMBARKED TO RETAIN FLEXIBLE
 CONTINGENCY CAPABILITY.

3. FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO CONSIDERATIONS CITED PARA 1 REF A:
 A. IN VIEW OF AFOREMENTIONED TRANSIT TIME IT IS ESTIMATED
 APPROX 24 HRS WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO FMBARK ARMY SPECIAL AMMO AND
 HFLO SUPPORT EQUIPMENT OFF SVN. HOWEVER, THE ARG UPON ARRIVAL ON
 STATION WILL HAVE EMBARKED:

- (1) 14 CH-46'S
- (2) 3 CH-53'S
- (3) 3 UH-1F (GUNSHIP CAPABLE)
- (4) AMMO ABOARD LPH (712-2.75 ROCKETS, 79,200 R-7.62MM)
- (5) CONTINGENCY PACK-UP ABOARD LKA

NOTE: ARG COULD BE REINFORCED BY III MAF AH-1G'S (APPROX 6) TO
 PROVIDE APPROX 24 GUNSHIP SORTIES PER DAY.

B. OPERATIONS COULD BE SUPPORTED FOR PERIOD SPFCIFIED.
 C. IT IS FEASIBLE AND RECOMMENDED THAT ON-BOARD CH-46'S BE
 SUBSTITUTED FOR CH-47'S MISSION OF RESUPPLY/TROOP LIFT. THE
 CH-46'S WOULD BE REINFORCED FOR OUTSIZED LIFT REQUIREMENTS BY THE
 ON-BOARD CH-53'S.

PAGE 3 RUHHBRA5970 T O P S E C R E T SPFCAT EXCLUSIVE
 D. OPERATIONS FROM OUTSIDE OF 12 MILM TERRITORIAL LIMIT
 FEASIBLE BUT PERMISSION TO PENETRATE WOULD IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS
 IN TERMS OF TIME ENROUTE AND ON STATION. THIS WOULD APPLY
 PARTICULARLY TO ALL GUNSHIP SORTIES.

4. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED WITH INTRODUCTION OF U. S.
 FORCES INTO CAMBODIA ARE OF EQUAL MAGNITUDE WHETHER U. S. ARMY
 OR U. S. MARINE AIR FORCES ARE EMPLOYED BUT MUST BE ADDRESSED BY
 HIGHER AUTHORITY.

5. IN SUMMARY, EMPLOYMENT OF ARG ALFA AS FOL FOR THE SUBJECT
 OPERATION IS FEASIBLE AND RECOMMENDED. IT IS FURTHER STRONGLY
 RECOMMENDED THAT THE FULL AVIATION CAPABILITY OF THE EMBARKED MAU,
 REINFORCED BY III MAF AH-1G HFLO GUNSHIPS BE EXPLOITED. THIS
 COMBINATION WOULD PROVIDE A QUALIFIED SHIPBOARD TEAM
 WITH INTEGRAL SUPPORT, AND WOULD MINIMIZE LOGISTIC, SPECIAL
 SUPPORT, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS.

6. THE ARG'S ASSIGNED 120 HOUR REACTION POSTURE IS NOT DEGRADED BY
 SAILING AS INDICATED IN PARA 2 AND SHOULD A REQUIREMENT FOR THE
 ARG NOT MATERIALIZE, IT CAN BE RETURNED TO SUBIC.

7. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

#5970

CINCPACFLT

O 060828Z/JAN71

2-2

(2)
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 TOP: 6 JAN 71 1737Z

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAGEN ADAMS, LTGEN JONES IS
 IS AWARE, FROM MGEN WILSON. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY
 REQUEST GUARD SOURCE. (NOTE MSG IS BEING QUOTED IN ITS
 ENTIRETITY)

Z 050911Z JAN 71

FM CINCPACFLT
 INFO CONSEVENTHFLT
 CIF SEVEN NINE
 CIF SEVEN SIX

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM WEISNER, MGEN WILSON, AND
 RADM RUBEL FROM ADM CLAREY

Z 050639Z JAN 71

FM CINCPAC
 TO CINCPACFLT
 COMUSMACV

INFO ADMIN CINCPAC

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

TANGO CODE 3

FOR ADMIN CINCPAC

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL CLAREY,
 GENERAL ABRAMS INFO LTGEN CORCORAN FROM ADMIRAL MCCAIN
 DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.

CAMBODIAN CONTINGENCY PLANNING (S)

CINCPAC

Z 050911Z/JAN71

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1. FOR CINCPACFLT: AND RVNAF TACTICAL OPERATION TO SUPPORT TANK FORCES IN CLEARING THE PICH NIL PASS AND ROUTE FOUR IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON 22 JANUARY 1971. ATTENDANT TO THIS OPERATION IS THE US REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE STAND-BY HELICOPTER ASSISTANCE TO THE RVNAF. THIS ASSISTANCE WILL CONSIST PER DAY OF 20 SORTIES OF CH-47 CHINOOKS, 6 EACH AH-1G COBRAS, AND 2 EACH UH-1 MEDEVACS. DUE TO RANGE LIMITATIONS ONE HELICOPTER TO SUPPORT IN THE VICINITY OF THE PICH NIL PASS, COORDINATES VT 0340, A FORWARD OPERATIONAL LOCATION (FOL) FOR REARMING AND REFUELING MUST BE ESTABLISHED IN THE VICINITY OF KOMPONG SOM. ONE CONSIDERATION FOR THIS FOL IS THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USE OF AN LPH RPT LPH OR SIMILAR SHIP AS A FOL FLOAT. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE YOUR COMMENTS ASAP ON THE FEASIBILITY OF PROVIDING SUCH A FOL BASED ON THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

- A. SUPPORT SHIP TO ARRIVE IN THE KOMPONG SOM AREA IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO RECEIVE APPROPRIATE ARMAMENT AND OTHER HELICOPTER SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND BE AN OPERATIONAL STATION BY 11 JANUARY 71.
- B. SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS.
- C. POSSIBILITY OF SUBSTITUTING PRESENT ON-BOARD CH-46'S FOR CH-47'S MISSIONS OF RESUPPLY/TROOP LIFT.
- D. REMAIN OUTSIDE ONE TWO MILE TERRITORIAL LIMIT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PERMISSION BEING GRANTED TO PENETRATE THAT LIMIT.

2. FOR COMUSMACV:

A. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS ON THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF THE ABOVE CONCEPTS IN LIGHT OF PRESENT POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON US PERSONNEL IN CAMBODIA.

B. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE SIZE OF US ELEMENT ENVISIONED AT FOL SITE. FURTHER, HAS CONSIDERATION BEEN GIVEN TO A LAND-BASED FOL BEING MANNED COMPLETELY BY RVNAF PERSONNEL WHO PERFORM THE SECURITY, REARMING AND REFUELING MISSIONS.

C. REQUEST YOUR REPLY SOONEST SO THAT REQUIREMENT CAN BE SUPPORTED TO THE RVNAF.

3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

BT

CINCPAC

Z 050911Z/JAN/71

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P 061907Z JAN 71 ZFF-1

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MAJGEN WILSON FROM MAJGEN ADAMS. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
ONLY. //NOOOOO// AMG 221 RPT AMG 001
PLANNED OPERATIONS (U)

I. (TS) THE FOLLOWING IS AN ACCOUNT OF EVENTS
OCCURRING ON TUESDAY, 5 JANUARY 1971:

AT APPROXIMATELY 1400, THIS HQ WAS APPRISED
BY CINCPACFLT ACTION OFFICERS OF A PROPOSED MACV
OPERATION IN CAMBODIA. THE CONCEPT HAS SEVERAL
ALTERNATIVES AMONG WHICH WAS ONE REQUIRING AN LPH
AS A STAGING PLATFORM FOR U.S. ARMY CH-47 AND
COBRA AIRCRAFT. OUR REACTION (CINCPACFLT-FMFPAC)
WAS THAT THE EMBARKED MARINE HELO MIX OF 14-3-3
OFFERED A BETTER PACKAGE FROM THE POINT OF
FLEXIBILITY, SHIPBOARD EXPERTISE, AIRCRAFT

ADMIN FMFPAC

P 061907Z/JAN71

ACTN: S/SEC

1-2

(4)

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3515 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR ~~REF ID: A65112~~
CAPABILITY, SUPPLY SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL
SUITABILITY. WE ESTIMATED APPROX EQUAL CAPABILITIES
BETWEEN CH-47 AND CH-53 AND THAT A MAX OF 6 CH-47
COULD OPERATE FROM LPH. TO OFFSET ANY ARGUMENTS
ABOUT LACK OF HEAVY LIFT CAPABILITY INHERENT
IN THE 3 EMBARKED CH-53'S, WE EXPLORED WITH I MAF
THE POSSIBILITY OF FLYING 3 ADDITIONAL 53'S TO
CUBI TO JOIN 31ST MAU, UNFORTUNATELY, TIME AND
SPACE LIMITATIONS PRECLUDED OUR DOING
THIS. THE TIME SQUEEZE WAS CAUSED BY THE
SAILING ORDERS ALREADY ISSUED ARG ALREADY CINC'PACFLT
IN RESPONSE TO MALAYSIAN DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS.
OUR 3 CH-53'S HAD TO CLOSE CUBI REASONABLY CLOSE
TO ARG SAILING TIME (I.E., APPROX 061700H/JAN71).
AS IT NOW STANDS, THE ARG/MAU HAS SAILED FOR THE
GULF OF THAILAND PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN
DISASTER RELIEF BUT ALSO ALERTED TO BE PREPARED
FOR AN ALTERNATE MISSION. SHOULD THE CAMBODIA
MISSION BE ASSIGNED, BOTH CH-53 AND COBRA ASSETS
COULD BE SENT TO THE 31ST MAU FROM MAG-16. WE

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3515 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR ~~REF ID: A65112~~
FEEL IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE NAVY-MARINE TEAM
INTEGRITY BE MAINTAINED AND THAT TO MAINTAIN IT,
IN THIS INSTANCE, CALLS FOR PROVISION OF A BETTER
CAPABILITY THAN NAVY-ARMY TEAM COULD FIELD.
WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED AS EVENTS OCCUR.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT ADMIN FMFPAC

0515

P 061907Z/JAN 71

2-2

NNNN

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6 ASSIST

Z 071526Z JAN 71
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV
RUMFUFA/CTF SEVEN SIX
RUYRSAA/CTF SEVEN NINE
INFO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUHGOGA/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
RUHGOHA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
RUMOMPA/CG III MAF
RUHHFMA/CG FMF PAC
BT

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE //N00000//
FOR GEN ABRAMS, RADM GADDIS AND MGEN WILSON INFO ADM CLAREY,
LTGEN JONES, LTGEN ROBERTSON, CAPT WILDER AND COL MAROUSEK,
FROM WEISNER

CAMBODIAN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

A. CINCPAC 070735Z JAN 71
B. CINCPACFLT 071243Z JAN 71

1. REF A DIRECTS PLANS BE MADE TO USE THE LPH AS A FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION (FOL) FOR FANK/RVNAF OPERATION IN CAMBODIA. REF B DIRECTS COMSEVENTHFLT DESIGNATE A CINCPACFLT REPRESENTATIVE TO COMUSMACV.
2. FOR GEN ABRAMS: RADM GADDIS, CTF 76 IS DESIGNATED AS CINCPACFLT REPRESENTATIVE.
3. FOR RADM GADDIS: PROCEED WITH NECESSARY REPS OF YOUR STAFF AUGMENTED BY CTF 79 STAFF PERSONNEL AND CDR G. R. WEST, COMSEVENTHFLT STAFF TO COMUSMACV HEADQUARTERS AND ASSIST IN FORMULATING PLANS FOR THE USE OF THE LPH AS A FOL.
4. FOR MGEN WILSON: PROVIDE STAFF MEMBERS TO ASSIST RADM GADDIS AS REQUESTED AND AVAILABLE.
5. COMSEVENTHFLT WILL REQUEST CTF 72 PROVIDE A P3 AIRCRAFT FOR TRANSPORTATION TO SAIGON. ESTIMATE AIRCRAFT WILL DEPART NAHA AT APPROXIMATELY 08110010.

GP-4

BT

#0588 COMSEVENTHFLT
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PTTAZYUW RUMOMPA0867 0081115-AAAA--RUHHFMA.
ZNY AAAAA
P 081115Z JAN 71
FM CG III MAF
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ZEN/CG I MAF
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TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ADAMS AND
MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON/DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS

CAMBODIAN CONTINGENCY PLANNING (OPERATION CUU LONG 44/02) (S)

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG WAS RECEIVED FROM GEN ABRAMS AND IS
FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE:
SSO NOTE: QUOTE COMUSMACV'S 080428Z JAN 71 TS IN ITS
ENTIRETY.

Z 080428Z JAN 71
FM COMUSMACV
TO CINCPAC
INFO CINCPACFLT
CG III MAF DA NANG
CG DAMC CAN THO
BT

CG III MAF

P 081115Z/JAN71

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(6)

TOP SECRET

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PAGE TWO RUMOMPA0867 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR
 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN
 INFO ADMIRAL CLAREY, LTGEN ROBERTSON AND MAJOR MCCOWN FROM
 GENERAL ABRAMS
 SUB: CAMBODIAN CONTINGENCY PLANNING (OPERATION CUU LONG 44/02)
 (S)

REFS: A. CINCPAC 050639Z JAN 71 (TS) (NOTAL)
 B. COMUSMACV 060407Z JAN 71 (TS) (NOTAL)
 C. CINCPACFLT 060828Z JAN 71 (TS) (NOTAL)
 D. CINCPAC 061920Z JAN 71 (TS) (NOTAL)
 E. JCS 070050Z JAN 71 (TS) (NOTAL)
 F. CINCPAC 070735Z JAN 71 (TS) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REFERENCE A OUTLINES PLAN FOR SUBJECT OPERATION AND REQUESTS COMMENTS ON USE OF AN LPH TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION, REF B IS RESPONSE TO REF A INDICATING THE CONCEPT OF UTILIZING THE LPH IS FEASIBLE AND SUGGESTING THAT THE SHIP BE ANCHORED IN THE BAY NORTH OF KOMPONG SOM (UT 4000). REF C IS RESPONSE TO REF A INDICATING THE CONCEPT IS FEASIBLE AND THAT AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP ALFA (ARC ALFA) WILL SAIL LATE 6 JAN 71 FOR THE GULF OF THAILAND. REF D OUTLINES THREE ALTERNATIVES TO PROVIDING THE NECESSARY HELICOPTER SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION, REF E PROVIDES AUTHORITIES FOR SUBJECT PAGE THREE RUMOMPA0867 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR OPERATION, REF F REQUESTS PLAN ON UTILIZATION OF THE LPH.

2. (TS) THE LPH WITH ORGANIC AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED WITH A PROPOSED OPERATING AREA OR ANCHORAGE IN THE BAY NORTH OF KOMPONG SOM (VIC UT 4000). BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCE AND BLADE TIME INVOLVED IN FLYING AHIG'S FROM III MAF AREA OF OPERATIONS TO MR 4 AND THE AVAILABILITY OF US ARMY AHIG'S IN MR 4, IT IS NOT CONSIDERED DESIRABLE TO USE III MAF AIRCRAFT AS DISCUSSED IN REF C IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION. CURRENT PLANS OF USE OF THE LPH'S ORGANIC AIRCRAFT INCLUDES RESUPPLY OF AHIG AMMUNITION FROM SVN TO THE LPH, PROVIDING RVNAF EMERGENCY RESUPPLY AND TROOP LIFT SUPPORT BEYOND NVAF CAPABILITIES, AND SUPPLEMENTING THE CH 47 AIRCRAFT AS NECESSARY. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE DECK OF THE LPH WILL BE USED PRIMARILY AS A PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO STAGE SIX AHIG AND APPROXIMATELY SIX UH1H COMMAND AND CONTROL HELICOPTERS.

3. (TS) REF D INDICATED THE PRIMARY USE OF THE AHIG'S WILL BE ESCORT FOR CH-47'S. UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED, PLANNED PRIMARY USE OF AHIG AIRCRAFT IS FOR CLOSE SUPPORT OF RVNAF TROOPS IN CONTACT AS REQUIRED. HOWEVER, THESE AIRCRAFT WILL ALSO PROVIDE ESCORT OF THE MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTERS.

4. (TS) A SUPPORT OPERATIONS COORDINATING CENTER CONSISTING OF THE

CG III MAF

P 081115Z/JAN71

2-3

TOP SECRET

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PAGE FOUR RUMOMPA0867 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR COUNTERPARTS OF THE UNIT COMMANDERS INVOLVED IN THE PREPERATION AND VIETNAMESE INTERPRETERS WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON THE LPH. THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF US ARMY AND VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL ANTICIPATED TO BE ON BOARD THE SHIP IS 75 US AND 25 VIETNAMESE. AN ADVANCE PARTY OF APPROXIMATELY FIVE PERSONNEL WILL BE FLOWN TO THE LPH ONCE THE SHIP IS IN HELICOPTER RADIUS TO FINALIZE SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION AND COORDINATE REQUIREMENTS.

5. (TS) REQUEST ALL MESSAGE TRAFFIC FROM THE SHIP PERTINENT TO THE OPERATION INCLUDE THIS HEADQUARTERS AND CG DMAC AS INFO ADDRESSEES. FURTHER REQUEST THE SHIPS HF/SSB, HF, UHF AND VHF FREQUENCIES AND THE POSITION OF INTENDED MOVEMENT BE PROVIDED TO FACILITATE RENDEZVOUS BETWEEN THE SHIP AND ADVANCE PARTY.

GP-1

BT

UNQUOTE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

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0867

CG III MAF

P 081115Z/JAN71

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TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN
WILSON. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

PLANNING FOR TF-79 PARTICIPATION

1. (TS) THIS MSG SUMMARIZES HARV SPIELMAN'S RECENT TAD TO HQ MACV
TO REPRESENT ME AND ASSIST CTF-76 AS CINCPACFLT REP IN PLANNING
FOR PARTICIPATION OF TG79.4 IN OPERATION CUU LONG 44/02. HE AND
RADM GADDIS WERE IN SAIGON 8-12 JAN FOR THIS PURPOSE AS DIRECTED
BY CINCPACFLT AND COMSEVENFLT.

CG I MAF

P 150102Z/JAN71

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2. (TS) AS YOU KNOW, THE FANK RECENTLY HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES IN THE VICINITY OF PICH NIL PASS NORTH OF KOMPONG SOM AND THE PURPOSE OF THIS OPERATION IS TO OPEN ROUTE 4 FROM KOMPONG SOM TO NOM PENH AND TO HELP ESTABLISH FANK SECURITY IN THE AREA. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION RESTS WITH THE RVNAF WITH USMACV PROVIDING SUPPORT REQUIRED WHICH IS BEYOND RVNAF CAPABILITIES. THIS LATTER SUPPORT, IN ADDITION TO FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT, IS EXPECTED TO INCLUDE SUPPORT BY ROTARY WING GUNSHIPS AND TRANSPORT HELOS. USMACV ASSETS ARE ADEQUATE; HOWEVER, FROM MR-4 TIME ON STATION FOR AH-1G COBRAS WOULD BE EXTREMELY LIMITED, WHICH FOSTERED THE REQUIREMENT FOR SEVENTHFLT SUPPORT TO PROVIDE A HELO REFUELING AND RE-ARMING PLATFORM CLOSER TO THE TARGET AREA. MSG TRAFFIC WHICH I BELIEVE YOU HAVE SEEN REFLECTED A DESIRE OF CINCPAC AND PARTICULARLY CINCPACFLT TO COMMIT TG79.4 HELO ASSETS, AUGMENTED BY III MAF AH-1G'S, TO PROVIDE THE US HELO SUPPORT REQUIRED. WALT GADDIS AND HARV WERE TO WORK WITH USMACV PLANNERS AND DEVELOP AN LOI TO PROVIDE FOR THIS SUPPORT.

3. (TS) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, NOT INTENDED TO BE CRITICAL, HIGHLIGHT THE MORE SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THIS PLANNING:

A. USMACV CONCEPT FOR EMPLOYMENT OF AH-1G'S IS FOR CLOSE SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS RATHER THAN HELO ESCORT AS EARLY CINCPAC MSGS STATED. FAMILIARITY WITH AREA OF OPNS, ROE AND OPERATING PROCEDURES WITH RVNAF IN MR-4 CLEARLY INDICATE SOUNDNESS OF COMUSMACV DECISION NOT TO USE III MAF AH-1G'S. USMACV PROPOSAL TO EMPLOY TG79.4 HELOS WAS PRIMARILY TO GAIN CINCPAC SUPPORT FOR COMMITMENT OF SHIP PLATFORMS.

B. THOUGH CINCPAC HAD DIRECTED COMUSMACV TO DEVELOP, IN COORDINATION WITH CINCPACFLT REP, A PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARG, THE USMACV CONCEPT WAS DEVELOPED AND SUBMITTED PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF CINCPACFLT REP IN SAIGON. USMACV STAFF WOULD HAVE PREFERRED SUBSEQUENT REQUIRED PLANNING BE ACCOMPLISHED BY CG, DMAC AND CTG 76.4

C. FINAL PLAN PROVIDES FOR EMPLOYMENT OF TG79.4 HELOS FOR ALL LIFTS BETWEEN SHIPS AND BETWEEN SHIPS AND SHORE AND FOR SHORE TO SHORE LIFTS BEYOND CAPABILITY OF ARMY CH-47'S. THIS BELIEVED MOST EFFECTIVE FOR SUPPORT OF RVNAF, SAFE AND EFFICIENT OPNS AT SEA, AND MAINTAINING NAVAL ROLE OF MARINE CORPS FORCES IN ARG/MAU.

CG I MAF

P-150422Z JUN 71

2-3

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D. THE LOI ISSUED BY CTF-76 TASKED CTG79.4 WHICH OF COURSE HE HAD NO INHERENT AUTHORITY TO DO. HOWEVER, COMSEVENTHFLT BY MSG DIRECTED IT BE ISSUED TO BOTH CTG 76.4 AND 79.4 AND THE LOI WAS PHRASED TO BE A COMSEVENTHFLT DIRECTIVE. HENCE, I DON'T BELIEVE THIS CONSTITUTES A PRECEDENT WHICH WILL AFFECT US IN THE FUTURE.

E. BECAUSE OF FIRM LONG-STANDING POLICIES ON CONTROL OF AIR SPACE AND GROUND OPS, OUR AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE WILL BE COMPROMISED IN ANY USE OF ARG IN INDO-CHINA. CONSEQUENTLY, BELIEVE WE SHOULD SUPPORT AS NEEDED, AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING THE PRESCRIBED NAVAL CHARACTER AND RELATIONSHIPS CONSISTENT WITH THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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3-3

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P 182134Z JAN 71

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TOP SECRET PERSONAL FOR ADM CLAREY FROM LTGEN JONES.

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CONTINGENCY PLANNING (U)

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A. JCS 121558Z/SEP70 (TS)
B. CG FMFPAC 252005Z/SEP70 (TS) (SPECAT)

C. CINCPACFLT 262227Z/SEP70 (TS)
D. CINCPACFLT 090214Z/OCT70 (TS)

E. CINCPAC 220209Z/OCT70 (TS)
F. JCS 2472/625-10, 19NOV70 (TS)

1. (TS) THE JCS, IN A MID SEPTEMBER MESSAGE TO CINCPAC (REF A), NOTED THAT THE ONGOING REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES IN RVN COULD PROVIDE A SITUATION WHEREIN THE ENEMY MIGHT DECIDE TO UTILIZE HIS CAPABILITY TO INITIATE A SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE ACTION, AND TASKED CINCPAC TO DEVELOP THE NECESSARY CONTINGENCY PLANS.

2. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE JCS TASKING, I RECOMMENDED TO ADMIRAL CG FMFPAC

P 182134Z/JAN71

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TOP SECRET 8

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA2233 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR HYLAND IN REF B THAT, AS A MATTER OF SOME URGENCY, THE NAVY-MARINE TEAM PREPARE AND MAINTAIN PLANS FOR THE REINTRODUCTION OF MARINE FORCES INTO RVN. THESE PLANS WERE TO PROVIDE FOR A MAB AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ON SHORT NOTICE AND RAPID FOLLOW-ON DEPLOYMENT OF REMAINING ELEMENTS OF THE PACOM MARINE FORCES BY ALL AVAILABLE MEANS.

3. (U) ADMIRAL HYLAND CONCURRED IN MY RECOMMENDATION (REF C) AND REQUESTED THAT ACTION OFFICERS FROM BOTH HEADQUARTERS COORDINATE AND PREPARE A PROPOSED CINCPACFLT CONCEPT PLAN. THIS PLAN (REF D) WAS FORWARDED TO CINCPAC. CINCPAC USED PORTIONS OF THIS PLAN IN PREPARING A CONCEPT PLAN WHICH WAS FORWARDED TO JCS (REF E). WITH MODIFICATIONS, THE PLAN WAS APPROVED BY JCS IN REF F.

4. (TS) NOW THAT THE CONCEPT PLAN IS APPROVED, IT IS CONSIDERED PRUDENT TO PREPARE THE DETAILED PLANS FOR AN EMERGENCY REENTRY INTO RVN. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT COMSEVENTHFLT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH CTF 76 AND CTF 70, BE TACKED TO PREPARE AND MAINTAIN CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THE REENTRY OF MARINES INTO RVN. THESE PLANS SHOULD BE PREPARED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, SINCE THE CONTINUED REDEPLOYMENT OF U. S. FORCES FROM SEASIA COULD TEMPT THE ENEMY TO LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE.

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA2233 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR

5. (U) IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT THIS SUBJECT BE INCLUDED IN THE AGENDA OF THE FORTHCOMING SEVENTH FLEET SCHEDULING AND PLANNING CONFERENCE.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

2233

CG FMFPAC

P 182134Z/JAN71

2-2

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(8)

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ZTTAZYUW RUHGOGA8373 0220005-AAAA--RUHKMAA.

ZNY AAAA

RUAOADA-T-CTF SEVEN NINE
Z 220005Z JAN 71
FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
TO RUHKAAA/CINCPAC

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INFO RUHKBAAC/CINCPACFLT
FMMSMVA/COMUSMACV
RUHKMAA/CG FMFPAC
RUHGWOD/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUAOADA/CIF SEVEN NINE
ZEN/CIF SEVEN SIX
ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM MCCAIN INFO ADM CLAREY,
GEN ABRAMS, LTGEN JONES, VADM WEISNER, RADM GADDIS, MAJGEN WILSON
AND COL MAROUSEK FROM CAPI WILDER
DELIVER UPON RECEIPT

OPERATION CUU LONG 44/02 (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 212247Z JAN 71 (NOTAL)

B. CINCPAC 212115Z JAN 71 (NOTAL)

1. IAW REF A FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED IN RESPONSE REF B:
RM 31ST MAU. PRESENTLY EMBARKED AS LISTED

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PAGE TWO RUHGOGA8373 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

IWO JIMA: 990FF 1192 ENL

TULARE: 20FF 71ENL

CLEVELAND: 60FF 54ENL

WESTCHESTER CTY: 60FF 253ENL

NOTES 1. NO OTHER USMC PERS EMB OTHER THAN SHIPS COMPANY.

2. ASSAULT TROOPS NORMALLY EMB CLEVELAND TRANSFERRED TO
IWO JIMA FOR DURATION CURRENT OPS LEAVING ABD ONLY SECURITY
AND MAINT PERS.3. WESTCHESTER CTY NOT IN CUU/LONG 44/02 VISITING SUBIC
BAY AND HKONG

B. MODE OF OPERATIONS.

(1) CLEVELAND FUNCTIONS AS FWD OP LOCATION (FOL) FOR REFUELING
AND REARMING ARMY COBRA GUNSHIPS AND CMND/CONTROL (C/C)
HELOFNSUH1 TYPES, ENROUTE TO AND FROM BASE AT DUONG DONG
AND CAMBODIAN OP AREA. LPD OP AREAS ARE: KOMPONG SOM BAY,
OUTSIDE 6 FATH CURVE AND BEYOND 5 MILES FROM ALL LAND; SEA-
WARD FOL AREA WIOBIN RECTANGLE 10-25-N/103-30E, 10-20N/103-30E,
10-18N/103-36.5E, 10-23N/103-36.5E; NIGHT STEAMING 5 MI
CIRCLE CENTER 10-20N/103-25E HF UPD PROVIDED FLIGHT DECK,
COMMS, AND SPACE FOR SUPPORT OPS COORD CENTER (SOCC) FOR

PAGE THREE RUHGOGA8373 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIV
DMAC PERS WHO CONTROL HELO OPS.

(2) IWO JIMA USES 31ST MAU HELOS TO MOVE GUNSHIP AMMO AND
OTHER SUPPLIES FROM DUONG DONG AIRFIELD TO CLEVELAND, AND
TO PROVIDE OVERWATER SAR FOR ARMY GUNSHIP AND C/C HELOS.

LPH OPAREA BOUNDARIES 10-17N/103-29.25E, 10-15N/103-37.25E,
10-00N/103-34.75E, 10-00N/103-21E.

(3) TULARE IN AREA IF NEEDED. NO PARTICIPATION OP TODAY. OPAREA
5 MI CIRCLE CENTER 10-00N/103-40E.

(4) O'BRIEN AVAILABLE IF NEEDED. CONDUCTING RANDOM PATROL SEA-
WARD OF LINE FROM 10-17N/103-29.25E, 10-14.5N/103-38E,
10-05N/103-45.5E

C. NO USMC PERSONNEL MB 31ST MAU EMBARKED IN THIS FORCE HAVE
BDN ENTERED CAMBODIA FOR ANY PURPOSE.

2. COL MAROUSEK, BAX & ST MAU, CONCURS IN FOREGOING.

GP-1

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8373

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

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O P 220245Z JAN 71

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TO RUEFKJCS/CJCS
INFO RUHHBRA/CINCUSARPAC
RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUHHBRA/CINCPACAF
RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION 1 OF 9.
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL MOORER, INFO GENERAL ABRAMS
GENERAL ROSSON, GENERAL NAZZARO, ADMIRAL CLAREY, LT GEN
JONES FROM ADMIRAL MCCAIN
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

REDEPLOYMENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING (U)

A. JCS 9343/052506Z JAN 71
B. JCS 9181/312213Z DEC 70

1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED AN OUTLINE REDEPLOYMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDELINES FURNISHED IN REF B. REF A ALSO REQUESTED ASSESSMENT OF PAGE 2 RUHHHQ2591 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE LOGISTIC IMPACTS OF ACCELERATED REDEPLOYMENTS. LOGISTICS ASSESSMENTS, CONSTRAINTS, AND IMPACTS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED FOR THE FOUR VARIANTS SPECIFIED IN REF B AND ARE INCLUDED UNDER SPECIFIC HEADINGS BELOW.
2. (TS) IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT PLANNING FOR ACCELERATED WITHDRAWAL FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF INCREMENT SIX REDEPLOYMENTS WILL REQUIRE NOTICE TO STAND DOWN BY 1 MAR 71 TO BEGIN MOVEMENT IN APR TO JUN TIME PERIOD. DESIRED PERIOD FOR DEVELOPMENT OF TROOP LISTS IS 30 DAYS. THIS ESTABLISHES 1 FEB 71 AS LAST PRACTICAL DATE FOR CEASE FIRE WITHDRAWAL DECISION IF US/FW MILITARY WITHDRAWAL IS TO BE COMPLETED BY 31 DEC 71 UNDER THE PLANNING FACTORS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED. SHOULD THE DECISION BE MADE AFTER 1 FEB 71, OR SHOULD THE WITHDRAWAL COMPLETION DATE BE EXTENDED BEYOND 31 DEC 71, A CHANGE IS RECOMMENDED FROM

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SPECIFIC CALENDAR DATES TO A CONCEPT OF DECISION DATE PLUS NUMBER OF DAYS FOR EXECUTION TIMING. OUTLINE PLAN AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW.

3. (TS) MISSION. UNDER CEASEFIRE CONDITIONS, REDEPLOY US/FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES FROM RVN TO

PAGE 3 RUHHHQQA2891 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SELECTED DESTINATIONS IN PACOM AND CONUS BY 31 DEC 71,
UNDER A SCHEDULE WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE MOST SECURE WITHDRAWAL
POSSIBLE AND AN ORDERLY DISPOSITION OF SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT, AND
FACILITIES UNDER THE TIME LIMITATIONS IMPOSED.

4. (TS) ASSUMPTIONS.

A. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED BY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
FOR AN IN-PLACE CEASE FIRE IN VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS
WHICH PROVIDES THAT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ARE BANNED AND
ALL OFFENSIVE AIR, NAVAL, AND GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONS
ARE TERMINATED PRIOR TO 1 APR 71.

B. US/FWMAF HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO WITHDRAW FROM VTFT-
NAM COMMENCING 1 APR 71.

C. REDEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES WILL CONTINUE THROUGH
MAR 71 AS PRESENTLY PROGRAMMED, LEAVING A FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY
284,000 US AND 67,517 FW MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BE
REDEPLOYED FROM SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER INCREMENT VI
REDEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

D. ENEMY FORCES ARE STILL DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT RVN
AND IN THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT, THERE REMAINS
THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES.

PAGE 4 RUHHHQQA2891 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E. A CIVILIAN CONTRACT PROGRAM WILL BE ALLOWED
UNDER THE TERMS OF AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE OPERATIONS, CON-
STRUCTION, MAINTENANCE, RETROGRADE ACTIVITIES, AND TRAINING
OF RVNAF PERSONNEL.

F. TRANSPORTATION RESOURCES TO IMPLEMENT THIS PLAN,
THAT ARE BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF PACOM TO PROVIDE, WILL
BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM MSC AND MAC.

G. ALL US FORCES, TO INCLUDE ROLL-UP AND SHORTFALL
FORCES, WILL BE REDEPLOYED BY 31 DEC 71.

(1) A MAAG AND MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL WILL BE
AUTHORIZED UNDER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

(A) NO RESTRICTION ON SIZE OR FUNCTIONS.
(B) NO FUNCTIONAL RESTRICTION BUT A STRENGTH
LIMIT OF 25,000.

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(C) NO STRENGTH LIMITATIONS BUT IN-COUNTRY FUNCTIONS LIMITED TO ADVISOR PLUS MAJOR HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES (DIVISION/PROVINCE LEVEL AND ABOVE) AND MINIMUM ESSENTIAL SUPPORT FOR US ADVISORS.

(2) AS A VARIANT, THAT ALL US PERSONNEL WILL BE REDEPLOYED BY 31 DEC 71 EXCEPT A DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE

PAGE 5 RUHHHQA2891 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE
(DAO).

H. RVNAF WILL BE PERMITTED TO RELOCATE AS REQUIRED TO ASSUME APPROPRIATE RESPONSIBILITIES OF WITHDRAWING US/FWMA FORCES.

I. US FORCES IN THAILAND WILL BE UNAFFECTED BY THE NEGOTIATED WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT, BUT ACTIVITY LEVELS OUTSIDE THAILAND WILL BE SUBJECT TO CEASEFIRE PROVISIONS.

5. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

A. WHEN DIRECTED (PRIOR TO 1 APR 71) ALL US/FW FORCES WILL MAINTAIN A POSTURE THAT WILL PERMIT THEM TO:

(1) DEFEND THEMSELVES IF ATTACKED AND TAKE SUCH DEFENSIVE MEASURES AS NECESSARY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE FORCES INVOLVED.

(2) CONTINUE SUBSISTENCE LEVEL RESUPPLY AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT ACTIVITIES.

(3) ROTATE PERSONNEL AND CONTINUE EXISTING LEAVE, R&R, AND TROOP MORALE AND WELFARE ACTIVITIES, AND

(4) RESUME COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT OF A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE.

B. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE WILL

PAGE 6 RUHHHQA2891 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CONTINUE IN ORDER TO DETECT ENEMY INFILTRATION OR MANEUVER.

C. WITHDRAWAL PREPARATIONS WILL COMMENCE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER THE CEASEFIRE IS EFFECTED.

D. ON 1 APR 71 US/FW MILITARY FORCES WILL ACCELERATE REDEPLOYMENT FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

E. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WILL CONTINUE TO INSURE EARLY WARNING OF ENEMY ACTIVITY AND TO COMPLY WITH NATIONAL, PACOM, AND LOCAL REQUIREMENTS.

F. DURING THE WITHDRAWAL OF US/FW FORCES, LATERAL MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE ASSUMED TO BE PERMITTED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE WITHDRAWAL, PROVIDE FOR THE TURN-OVER OF EQUIPMENT, MATERIEL, AND FACILITIES TO THE RVNAF, AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY

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OF THE BASES CONCERNED. MAXIMUM RELIANCE WILL BE PLACED ON RVNAF AND THE NATIONAL POLICE TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF US EQUIPMENT, MATERIEL, AND FACILITIES. US INTERNAL FORCES AND PERIMETER SECURITY FORCES FOR MAJOR PORTS OF EMBARKATION AND RESUPPLY ACTIVITIES WILL BE RETAINED UNTIL PROGRAMMED ROLL-UP IS COMPLETED.

G. REDEPLOYMENT WILL TAKE PLACE IN FOUR (4) PHASES

~~TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION 2 OF 9.~~

AS SHOWN IN PARAGRAPH 6, BELOW.

H. THE BASIC OUTLINE PLAN REDEPLOYS ALL US FORCES BY 31 DEC 71, AND ADDRESSES THIS SITUATION THROUGHOUT, EXCEPT WHERE A VARIANT IS IDENTIFIED. THE VARIANTS ARE IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) VARIANT 1, MAAG AND MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORIZED WITH NO RESTRICTIONS ON SIZE OR FUNCTIONS.

(2) VARIANT 2, MAAG AND MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL OF 25,000 IS AUTHORIZED WITH NO FUNCTIONAL RESTRICTIONS.

(3) VARIANT 3, MAAG AND MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL

PAGE 2 RUHHHQ2892 ~~TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE~~ AUTHORIZED WITH NO STRENGTH LIMITATIONS, BUT IN-COUNTRY FUNCTIONS LIMITED TO ADVISOR PLUS MAJOR HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES (DIVISION/PROVINCE LEVEL AND ABOVE) AND MINIMUM ESSENTIAL SUPPORT FOR US ADVISORS.

(4) VARIANT 4, ALL US FORCES REDEPLOY EXCEPT A DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE (DAO).

6. (TS) REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITS AND PERSONNEL.

A. TOTAL US FORCES TO BE REDEPLOYED (AFTER INCREMENT VI) WILL BE APPROXIMATELY 284,000 SPACES, AND 67,517 FREE WORLD FORCES SPACES. REDEPLOYMENT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN FOUR (4) PHASES AS FOLLOWS: PHASE 1 (1 APR - 14 JUN), PHASE 2 (15 JUN - 14 AUG), PHASE 3 (15 AUG - 14 OCT), PHASE 4 (15 OCT - 31 DEC). THE REDEPLOYMENT IS DEPICTED BELOW.

PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4

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4-26 (10)

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ARMY (213,078)	61,135	42,785	44,708	64,450
AIR FORCE (45,600)	5,935	4,576	6,309	28,780
NAVY (12,100)	1,807	2,762	1,920	5,611
MARINE CORPS (13,345)	12,823	0	0	522
FREE WORLD (67,517)	7,317	22,200	22,000	16,000

PAGE 3 RUHHHQA2892 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 TOTAL 351,640 89,017 72,323 74,937 115,363

B. VARIANT 1 (MAAG AND MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORIZED
 WITH NO RESTRICTIONS ON SIZE OR FUNCTIONS)

(1) THE TOTAL US FORCE TO BE REDEPLOYED IS
 235,965 SPACES, THE FW FORCES TO BE REDEPLOYED REMAINS
 67,517 SPACES. THE TIMING OF PHASES REMAINS THE SAME.
 THE REDEPLOYMENT IS DEPICTED BELOW.

	PHASE 1	PHASE 2	PHASE 3	PHASE 4
ARMY (174,595)	61,135	42,785	44,708	25,967
AIR FORCE (39,894)	5,935	4,576	6,309	23,074
NAVY (8,477)	1,807	2,762	1,920	1,988
MARINE CORPS (12,989)	12,823	0	0	186
FW (67,517)	7,317	22,200	22,000	16,000
TOTAL 303,472	89,017	72,323	74,937	67,195

(2) COMPOSITION OF MAAG/MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL.

(A) ASSUMPTIONS.

1. EXTERNAL SECURITY PROVIDED BY GVN.
2. NO B-52 CONTROL ELEMENTS IN RVN.
3. ALL FW FORCES WILL REDEPLOY.
4. CURRENT ADVISORY/AID PROGRAMS WILL

PAGE 4 RUHHHQA2892 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 CONTINUE.

5. NO STRENGTH LIMITATIONS.
6. FUNCTIONS NOT LIMITED.
7. MINIMUM SUPPORT FOR U.S. ADVISORS.
8. AID TO CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTIES WILL

CONTINUE.

9. ADVISORY EFFORT TO RVN MOBILE FIELD
 FORCES (MFF) WILL BE TO MAJOR HEADQUARTERS, MR/CORPS
 DOWN TO DIVISON WITH MATS. TO REGIMENT AND OTHERS AS
 REQUIRED.

10. CORDS PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE UNMODIFIED
 TO PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVEL.

(B) DISCUSSION.

1. THE ORGANIZATION SHOWN REFLECTS SPACES
 TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL COMMAND AND CONTROL AND ADVISORY
 CINCPAC

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MISSION TO THE RVNAF AND GVN.

2. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WHICH HAVE BEEN
 INSTITUTED WILL CONTINUE AS PROGRAMMED. THE ADVISORY
 ELEMENT WILL WITHDRAW AS PROGRAMS ARE COMPLETED.

(C) ORGANIZATION.

PAGE 5 RUHHHQA2892 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

MAAG

HEADQUARTERS ADVISORS	1,375
ADVISORS	12,081
SUPPORT GROUPS	
ARMY	15,285
NAVY	223
AIR FORCE	2,577
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS GROUP	1,450
USA SPEC SECY GP	165
DEF COM AGENCY	185
MAAG TOTAL	33,341
MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL	
US ARMY	
SPT CIV WAR CAS	600
NSA/SCA	4,814
SIGNAL SPT	6,578
TEMPORARY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL	400
US NAVY	
NSA/SCA	133
USAF	

PAGE 6 RUHHHQA2892 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

NSA/SCA	1,717
SENSORS, AD ACTIVITY	344
USMC	
NSA/SCA	78
EMBASSY GUARD	163
TOTAL	14,827
TOTAL MAAG/MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL	48,168

C. VARIANT 2. (MAAG AND MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL OF 25,000
 WITH NO FUNCTIONAL RESTRICTIONS).

(1) TOTAL US FORCE TO BE REDEPLOYED IS 259,134
 SPACES, THE FW FORCES TO BE REDEPLOYED REMAINS 67,517
 SPACES. THE TIMING OF THE PHASES REMAINS THE SAME. THE
 REDEPLOYMENT IS DEPICTED BELOW.

PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4

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6-26 (10)

TOP SECRET

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ARMY (194,464)	61,135	42,785	44,708	45,836
AIR FORCE (41,812)	5,935	4,576	6,309	24,992
NAVY (9,781)	1,807	2,762	1,920	3,292
MARINE CORPS (13,077)	12,077	0	0	254
FREE WORLD (67,517)	7,317	22,200	22,000	16,000
TOTALS 326,651	89,017	72,323	74,937	90,374

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION 3 OF 9.

(2) COMPOSITION OF MAAG/MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL.

(A) ASSUMPTIONS.

1. EXTERNAL PHYSICAL SECURITY WILL BE PROVIDED BY GVN.
2. NO B-52 CONTROL ELEMENTS IN RVN.
3. ALL FW FORCES WILL REDEPLOY.
4. STRENGTH LIMITATION 25,000 TOTAL.
5. NO FUNCTIONAL RESTRICTIONS.
6. MINIMUM ESSENTIAL SUPPORT FOR US ADVISORS.

(B) DISCUSSION.

PAGE 2 RUHHHQA2893 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

1. THE ORGANIZATION SHOWN REFLECTS SPACES TO PROVIDE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE ADVISORY EFFORT TO THE JGS AND JGS-CONTROLLED AGENCIES, RVN MFF TO INCLUDE CORPS/MR AND DIVISION, AND CORDS ADVISORY EFFORT TO PROVINCE LEVEL ON A REDUCED SCALE.

2. SIGNAL SUPPORT WILL BE APPROXIMATELY 36 PERCENT OF REQUIREMENT AND WILL HAVE TO BE AUGMENTED BY CONTRACTOR SERVICE OR OTHER MEANS TO COMPLETE VIETNAMIZATION OF THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM.

3. SUPPORT SERVICES ARE CONSIDERED MINIMUM ESSENTIAL AND ARE BASED ON AN ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND WHICH WILL PROVIDE COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT.

(C) ORGANIZATION. (THIS IS A REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATION ONLY. STRENGTH FIGURES ATTRIBUTED TO SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES ARE SUBJECT TO FURTHER EVALUATION PREDICATED ON MISSION REQUIREMENTS).

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TOP SECRET

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MAAG	907
HEADQUARTERS	4,919
ADVISORS	
SUPPORT GROUPS	
ARMY	8,194

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NAVY	143
AIR FORCE	1,184
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS GP	928
US ARMY SPECIAL SECURITY GP	105
DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY	118
MAAG TOTAL	16,498
MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL	
US ARMY	
SUPPORT FOR CIV WAR CASUALTIES	384
NSA/SERVICES CRYPTOLOGIC ACTIVITIES (SCA) (INCLUDES 77 FOR DODSPFCRFP)	2,925
SIGNAL SUPPORT	3,371
TEMPORARY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL	256
SUBTOTAL	6,936
US NAVY	
NSA/SCA	85
SUBTOTAL	85
US AIR FORCE	
AIR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES	220
NSA/SCA	1,097

PAGE 4 RUHHHQA2893 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SUBTOTAL	1,317
USMC	
NSA/SCA	49
EMBASSY GUARD	104
SUBTOTAL	153
MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL TOTAL	8,491
TOTAL MAAG/MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL	24,989

D. VARIANT 3, (MAAG AND MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL WITH NO STRENGTH LIMITATIONS. FUNCTIONS LIMITED TO MAJOR HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES, AND MINIMUM ESSENTIAL SUPPORT FOR US ADVISORS).

(1) THE TOTAL US FORCES TO BE REDEPLOYED IS 243,609 SPACES. THE FWMA FORCES TO BE REDEPLOYED REMAINS 67,517 SPACES. THE TIMING OF PHASES REMAINS THE SAME.

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THE REDEPLOYMENT IS DEPICTED BELOW.

	PHASE 1	PHASE 2	PHASE 3	PHASE 4
ARMY (182,217)	61,135	42,785	44,708	33,589
AIR FORCE (40,152)	5,935	4,576	6,309	22,332
NAVY (8,251)	1,807	2,762	1,920	1,762
MARINE CORPS (12,989)	12,823	0	0	166

PAGE 5 RUHHHQ2893 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 FW (67,517) 7,317 22,200 22,000 16,000
 TOTAL 311,126 89,017 72,323 74,937 74,849

(2) COMPOSITION OF MAAG/MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL

(A) ASSUMPTIONS.

1. EXTERNAL PHYSICAL SECURITY WILL BE PROVIDED BY GVN.
2. NO B-52 CONTROL ELEMENTS IN RVN.
3. ALL FW FORCES WILL REDEPLOY.
4. NO STRENGTH LIMITATIONS.
5. ADVISORY FUNCTIONS LIMITED TO MAJOR HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES (DIVISION/PROVINCE LEVEL AND ABOVE).
6. MINIMUM ESSENTIAL SUPPORT FOR US ADVISORS.

(B) DISCUSSION

1. THE ORGANIZATION SHOWN REFLECTS STRENGTH FIGURES TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE ADVISORY EFFORT TO THE FOLLOWING RVNAF ELEMENTS/PROGRAMS:
 - A. JGS AND JGS CONTROLLED AGENCIES.
 - B. RVN MOBILE FIELD FORCES TO INCLUDE

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 CORPS/MR AND DIVISON.

- C. CORDS-MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
- D. NAVY ADVISORY GROUP TO INCLUDE MARINES.

- E. AIR FORCE ADVISORY GROUP.
2. THE FOLLOWING SUPPORT SERVICES ARE
 CONSIDERED MINIMUM ESSENTIAL AND ARE BASED ON AN ARMY
 SUPPORT COMMAND WHICH WILL PROVIDE COMMON SERVICE
 SUPPORT.

- A. AVIATION GROUP
- B. MEDICAL GROUP
- C. SIGNAL GROUP
- D. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS GROUP
- E. ENGINEER BATTALION

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F. MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
 G. AG ELEMENT
 H. AMERICAN FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION
 (AFVN).

3. NO CAPABILITY IS BUILT INTO THIS
 ORGANIZATION FOR ROLL-UP OR PROVISION OF EXTERNAL SECURITY.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION 4 OF 9.
 THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL ADVISORY FUNCTIONS WILL CONTINUE
 AT A REDUCED LEVEL AS THERE ARE NO COMBAT SUPPORT
 FUNCTIONS TO PERFORM.

(C) ORGANIZATION

MAAG	
HEADQUARTERS	1,041
ADVISORS	8,635
SUPPORT GROUPS	
ARMY	13,027
NAVY	223

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AIR FORCE	2,577
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS GP	1,450
US ARMY SPECIAL SECURITY GP	165
DEF COM AGENCY	185
MAAG TOTAL	27,303
MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL	
US ARMY	
SUPPORT FOR CIV WAR CASUALTIES	600
NSA/SERVICES CRYPTOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES (SCA) (INCLUDES 77 FOR DOD SPECREP)	4,814
SIGNAL SUPPORT	5,362
US NAVY	
NSA/SCA	133
SUBTOTAL	133
USAF	
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NSA/SCA	1,717
AIR DEFENSE ACT	344
SUBTOTAL	2,061
USMC	
NSA/SCA (INCLUDES 3 FOR DODSPECREP)	78

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EMBASSY GUARD	163
SUBTOTAL	241
MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL TOTAL	13,211
TOTAL MAAG/MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL	40,514

E. VARIANT 4, (DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE ONLY)

1. TOTAL US FORCES TO BE REDEPLOYED IS 283,823 SPACES. THE FW FORCES TO BE REDEPLOYED REMAINS AT 67,517 SPACES. THE TIMING OF THE PHASES REMAINS THE SAME. THE REDEPLOYMENT IS DEPICTED BELOW.

	PHASE 1	PHASE 2	PHASE 3	PHASE 4
ARMY (212,917)	61,135	42,785	44,708	64,289
AIR FORCE (45,533)	5,935	4,576	6,369	22,713
NAVY (12,054)	1,807	2,762	1,920	5,565
MARINE CORPS (13,319)	12,823	0	0	496
FW (67,517)	7,317	22,200	22,000	16,000
TOTALS 351,340	89,017	72,323	74,937	115,063

2. THE PROPOSED DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE WOULD RETAIN 300 TOTAL SPACES, WITH 250 FOR DAO/RVN AND A 50 SPACE SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTER CAMBODIA MAP FUNCTION.

7. (TS) ACCELERATED RETROGRADE OF MATERIEL. ESSENTIAL

PAGE 4 RUHHQA2894 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE TO THE SUCCESS OF ANY RETROGRADE PROGRAM IS THE EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR DEPOT DESTINATIONS FOR ALL THE RETROGRADE MATERIEL FOR EACH MILITARY SERVICE. TO FACILITATE SHIPMENTS, A LIMITED NUMBER OF DESTINATIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

A. MATERIEL FOR RETROGRADE IS THE SAME FOR EACH VARIANT STATED IN THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND MUST BE RETROGRADED BETWEEN 1 APR 71 AND 31 DEC 71.

B. IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND STANDDOWN, ORGANIC MAINTENANCE ELEMENTS WILL APPLY MAXIMUM EFFORT TO UPGRADE THE CONDITION OF ASSIGNED EQUIPMENT. REDEPLOYING UNITS WILL PREPARE EQUIPMENT FOR TURN-IN OR SHIPMENT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME IN THE STANDDOWN PERIOD. UNIT SUPPLY STOCKS WILL BE TURNED IN TO THE DEPUT.

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C. IN GENERAL, GROUND UNITS POSSESSING LARGE INVENTORIES OF EQUIPMENT WILL BE SCHEDULED TO REDEPLOY PRIOR TO 15 OCT. THE PERIOD FROM 15 OCT TO 31 DEC WILL BE THE ROLL-UP PHASE WITH MAXIMUM EMPHASIS ON PREPARATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR OUTLOADING OR RECONDITIONING TURN-INS FOR

PAGE 5 RUHHHQ2894 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
TURNOVER TO RVNAF. DEPOT STOCKS NOT DESIGNATED FOR TURN-OVER TO RVNAF WILL BE SCHEDULED FOR SHIPMENT OUT OF COUNTRY AT A UNIFORM RATE. IN GENERAL, LOW CUBE, HIGH DOLLAR VALUE STOCKS WILL HAVE FIRST PRIORITY FOR SHIPMENT; HIGH CUBE, LOW DOLLAR VALUE STOCKS WILL HAVE LOW SHIPPING PRIORITY.

D. IF TRANSPORTATION RESOURCES, (MSC SHIPS OR MAC AIRCRAFT) ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN QUANTITIES REQUIRED FOR FULL UTILIZATION OF PORT RETROGRADE CAPABILITY, CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO UTILIZATION OF OTHER STORAGE FACILITIES WITHIN PACOM WHERE KNOWN OR PLANNED LONG TERM U.S. PRESENCE WILL EXIST.

E. DURING THE REDEPLOYMENT PHASE FROM 1 APR 71 TO 31 DEC 71 IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE WILL BE 2 MILLION SHORT TONS TO BE SHIPPED FROM THE FOUR MAJOR RVN SEAPORTS DISTRIBUTED AS FOLLOWS:

DA NANG	526,000 S/T
QUI NHON	125,000 S/T
CAM RANH BAY	559,000 S/T

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NEWPORT 790,000 S/T

F. RETROGRADE CAPACITIES PUBLISHED FOR THESE PORTS IN THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NOV 70 RETROGRADE MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED UPWARD TO COMPENSATE FOR REDUCTION IN CARGO DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS RESULTING FROM THE CEASEFIRE AND REDEPLOYMENT. APPLYING ADJUSTED CAPACITIES, COMPUTATIONS SHOW THAT QUI NHON AND CAM RANH BAY COULD BE COMPLETELY CLEARED OF CARGO PRIOR TO 31 DEC 71. HOWEVER, THERE WOULD BE A BACKLOG OF 194,000 SHORT TONS AT DA NANG AND 384,000 SHORT TONS AT NEWPORT. (A REVIEW OF PORT RETROGRADE CAPABILITY NOW IN PROGRESS MAY RESULT IN ADJUSTMENT OF BACKLOG TONNAGE ESTIMATES).

8. (TS) PROBLEM AREAS, COSTS AND RISKS.

A. SECURITY.
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(1) MAINTENANCE OF A BALANCED COMBAT FORCE DURING THE SUCCESSIVE REDEPLOYMENT PHASES WILL BE CRITICAL.

(2) THE SECURITY OF US/FWMA FORCES WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR RVNAF TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN VACATED AREAS AND IN THE LATTER STAGES OF
~~TOP SECRET~~ EXCLUSIVE SECTION 5 OF 9.
MOVEMENT TO, ASSEMBLY AT, AND REDEPLOYMENT FROM EMBARKATION POINTS.

(3) FOLLOWING A CEASEFIRE AND DURING A REDUCTION OF US FORCES, A SIGNIFICANT US INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY MUST BE MAINTAINED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE REMAINING US FORCES, CINCPAC, AND US NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES.

B. EVALUATION OF ENEMY THREAT. WITHIN RVN, THE PRINCIPAL ENEMY THREAT WILL BE THAT PRESENTED BY HIS ATTEMPT TO EXPAND PRESENT AREAS OF CONTROL AND TO CONTINUE

PAGE 2 RUHHQQA2895 ~~TOP SECRET~~ EXCLUSIVE COVERT INFRASTRUCTURE EXPANSION AS THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE IS EMPHASIZED. MAIN FORCE UNITS ARE EXPECTED TO DISPERSE INTO COMPANY SIZE OR SMALLER UNITS TO AVOID DETECTION AND TO INFILTRATE VILLAGES AND HAMLETS. EVALUATION OF THE OVERALL INTERNAL THREAT WILL DEPEND UPON: CORRECTLY EVALUATING PACIFICATION PROGRESS; EXTENDING AGENT/INFORMANT NETWORKS; EXPANDING NATIONAL POLICE OPERATIONS; AND ASSISTING RVNAF INTELLIGENCE. THE OUT-OF-COUNTRY THREAT WILL PRINCIPALLY BE THAT OF A MAIN FORCE BUILD UP IN BORDER AREAS OF RVN. ASSESSMENT WILL DEPEND UPON CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF LOC BASE AREAS, CAMBODIA, LAOS, AND CONTINUATION OF AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION COVERAGE.

C. CONSOLIDATED RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM (CRIMP):

(1) GENERAL. FURTHER ACCELERATION OF THE CRIMP IS

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NOT FEASIBLE.

(2) LOGISTICS.

(A) BASIC PLAN. CURRENTLY, LOGISTICS SELF-SUFFICIENCY IS PROGRAMMED FOR BULK PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION, IN-COUNTRY AIRLIFT, INTRA-COUNTRY WATERLIFT, PORT OPERA-

PAGE 3 RUHHHQA2895 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIONS, AND MARINE EQUIPMENT OVERHAUL BY 1 JUL 72. THE ABILITY TO OVERHAUL SELF-SUSTAINING QUANTITIES OF APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF GROUND EQUIPMENT IS SCHEDULED TO BE ATTAINED BY JUL 73. COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ADVISORS WILL DISRUPT THE TRAINING PROGRAMS TO ENABLE THE RVNAF TO ATTAIN LOGISTIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY, DELAY THE ATTAINMENT OF CRIMP OBJECTIVES, AND DECREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF US PROVIDED RESOURCES. MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS DEPEND ON MILITARY ADVISORS TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS. SUCH MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS AS THE MARINE EQUIPMENT OVERHAUL, SHORE-BASED RADAR MAINTENANCE, VNAF BASE AND DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE, AND ARMY DEPOT UPGRADE WILL NOT BE COMPLETED DUE TO THE INABILITY OF RVNAF TO ACCEPT FURTHER ACCELERATION. CIVILIAN CONTRACT CAN PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AFTER DEPARTURE OF MILITARY ADVISORS, BUT ATTAINMENT OF LOGISTIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY WOULD BE IMPAIRED AS US UNITS PERFORM MANY FUNCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF.

(B) VARIANT 1 - WITH THE RETENTION OF ADVISORS THE TRAINING PROGRAMS WILL NOT SUFFER. HOWEVER, WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES SUCH PROGRAMS AS BULK PETROLEUM

PAGE 4 RUHHHQA2895 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIONS, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, INTRA-COUNTRY AIR AND WATERLIFT, AND PORT OPERATIONS WILL BE SEVERELY CRIPPLED AS US UNITS PRESENTLY PROVIDE A MAJOR PORTION OF THESE SERVICES.

(C) VARIANT 2 - THE EFFECT ON LOGISTIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY REMAINS THE SAME AS FOR VARIANT 1 AND BASIC PLAN. THE REDUCED NUMBER OF ADVISORS IN THIS VARIANT WILL SLOW THE TRAINING PROGRAMS NOW UNDERWAY IN THE MAINTENANCE AND SYSTEMS AREAS.

(D) VARIANT 3 - THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS FOR VARIANT 1.

(E) VARIANT 4 - THE LIMITED PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE FOR MONITORING AND ADMINISTERING THE MAP ARE NOT CAPABLE OF ASSISTANCE IN THE LOGISTICS AREA. THE OVERALL

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IMPACT ON THE CRIMP OF THIS VARIANT IS THE SAME AS FOR THE BASIC PLAN.

D. COMMUNICATIONS.

(1) THE INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (ICS) PROVIDES COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT FOR GVN CIVIL CONTROL, RVNAF COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND US (STATE DEPARTMENT) AND

PAGE 5 RUHHHQA2895 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MILITARY) COMMUNICATION SUPPORT. A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OR A PHASE DOWN TO A MAAG AND MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL BELOW A NOMINAL 40,000 BY DEC 1971 WOULD HAVE A CATASTROPHIC EFFECT UPON BOTH THE RVNAF AND THE GVN BECAUSE IT WOULD CAUSE DEACTIVATION OF SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF THE ONLY LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IN VIETNAM. A MASSIVE INFUSION OF CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL AND O&M FUNDING WOULD BE THE ONLY MEANS OF KEEPING THE LONG HAUL SYSTEMS OPERATIONAL.

(2) THE RVNAF CEIMP WILL NOT BE FULLY COMPLETED BY 31DEC 71; CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES WILL EXIST IN OPERATIONAL, MAINTENANCE, LOGISTICAL, MANAGEMENT, AND ENGINEERING SKILLS. OFFSHORE TRAINING, PROVIDING ALLOCATIONS AND FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE, COULD EVENTUALLY SATISFY A PORTION OF THE PERSONNEL SKILLS REQUIREMENT, BUT COMPLETE RVNAF SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN ALL C-E AREAS IS DEPENDENT UPON THE CONTINUATION OF CEIMP AS CURRENTLY PLANNED. IF ALL US MILITARY FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN FROM RVN BY THE END OF CALENDAR YEAR 1971, C-E I&M EFFORTS WOULD HAVE TO BE ABANDONED. THE ONLY POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE TER-

PAGE 6 RUHHHQA2895 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MINATION OF CURRENT CEIMP EFFORTS WOULD BE TO TRANSFER THIS PROGRAM FROM DOD TO STATE DEPARTMENT AUSPICES. THIS WOULD REQUIRE A MASSIVE AUGMENTATION OF BOTH FUNDS AND PERSONNEL FOR THE AGENCY GIVEN THIS RESPONSIBILITY.

(3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT: RVNAF IS NOT CAPABLE OF PRODUCING REQUIRED HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL, NOR ARE ANY PLANS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO PROVIDE THEM WITH THIS CAPABILITY. THE LACK OF A MAP FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN THIS AREA WOULD REQUIRE THE TRANSFER OF THIS ACTIVITY TO A NON DEFENSE OR CONTRACT AGENCY OTHERWISE RVNAF'S OPERATIONAL CIPHER/CODE CAPABILITIES WOULD BE GREATLY CURTAILED.

(4) VARIANTS 1 AND 3 WOULD ALLOW FOR CONTINUATION

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OF COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT THROUGHOUT RVN, CEIMP, AND THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT.

(5) VARIANT 2 WOULD ALLOW FOR CONTINUATION OF THE SUPPORT LISTED IN (4) ABOVE BUT AT A DRASTICALLY REDUCED LEVEL.

E. CONSTRUCTION.

(1) THERE WILL BE NO IMPACT ON CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION OF RVNAF FACILITIES DUE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US/FW FORCES. THERE WILL BE A PROBLEM IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CONTRACTS WHEN MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO OICC RVN ARE REPLACED BY NAVY CIVILIANS. THE NAVY FACILITY ENGINEER COMMAND OFFICE COULD OPERATE FROM THAILAND WITH SOME LOSS OF EFFICIENCY.

(2) THE ACCELERATED TRANSFER OF BASES TO RVNAF AND PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE FOR MAINTAINING THEM WILL PRESENT A SERIOUS PROBLEM. RVNAF WILL NOT HAVE PERSONNEL TRAINED TO ASSUME THE MAINTENANCE TASK BY 31 DEC 71.

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IT IS ESTIMATED \$22,000,000 WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN RVNAF BASES BY CONTRACT FOR ONE YEAR. IT IS ESTIMATE AN ADDITIONAL COST OF \$400,000 WILL BE REQUIRED TO TRAIN RVNAF MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL BY CONTRACT FOR ONE YEAR. EVEN WITH THIS TRAINING IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL THAT THEY WOULD BE SELF-SUFFICIENT IN BASE MAINTENANCE BY END CY 72. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING CONTRACTUAL MAINTENANCE SUPPORT RVNAF MUST MAKE DRASIC INCREASES IN PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FOR BASE MAINTENANCE AND INCREASES TO THEIR OWN TRAINING PROGRAMS. THESE INCREASES CAN ONLY COME AT THE EXPENSE OF COMBAT OR OTHER CURRENT OPERATIONS. BASES THAT HAVE HIGH VOLTAGE SYSTEMS MUST BE CONVERTED TO LOW VOLTAGE SYSTEMS THAT ARE WITHIN THEIR OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE CAPABILITIES AND WHICH MEET THEIR LOAD REQUIREMENTS. COST OF THIS CONVERSION IS NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME. THE

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RAPID CLOSURE OF U.S. BASES WILL INVITE VANDALISM AND STRIPPING. THEY WILL QUICLY BE RENDERED NON-FUNCTIONAL.
(3) THE WITHDRAWAL OF ENGINEER TROOPS DEDICATED TO LOC CONSTRUCTION WILL LEAVE 275 KM OF THE LOC RESTORATION PROGRAM UNFINISHED AND 120 KM OF RECONSTRUCTED ROAD

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SCHEDULED FOR MAJOR REPAIR THIS YEAR NOT RE-PAVED. THIS SHORT FALL CAN BE PARTIALLY OFFSET BY CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION AT A COST OF 44 MILLION DOLLARS AND A ONE TO TWO YEAR DELAY IN COMPLETION. IF THE LOC ARE NOT COMPLETED AND REPAIRED AS PLANNED, INTERIOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT WILL SUFFER SERIOUSLY. IN ADDITION, THE ROADS INVOLVED WILL DETERIORATE RAPIDLY AND REQUIRE MAJOR CONSTRUCTION EFFORT JUST TO KEEP THEM PASSABLE FOR LIMITED TRAFFIC. CONSIDERING CURRENT DIRECTOR GENERAL OF HIGHWAYS AND ARVN ENGINEER RESOURCES AND COMMITMENTS, IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL THAT THE NON-RESTORED SECTIONS OF HIGHWAYS QL-4, QL-20, QL-7A, QL-9, QL-10, QL-31, AND QL-27 COULD BE MAINTAINED OPEN TO TRAFFIC.

(4) A RESIDENT OICC COULD BE MAINTAINED IF A MAAG IS PERMITTED.

F. MAP/MASF PROGRAMS.

(1) ADMINISTRATION OF THESE PROGRAMS FROM OFF-SHORE LOCATIONS WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE. WITHOUT US PERSONNEL ON HAND, REQUIREMENT COULD NOT BE PROPERLY EVALUATED, VALIDATED, OR ADMINISTERED.

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G. VNAF MAINTENANCE.

(1) A MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY FOR GCA/RAPCON FACILITIES AT VNAF BASES WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE. VNAF PERSONNEL ARE BEING TRAINED AND WOULD EVENTUALLY BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE FACILITIES IN AN OPERATIONAL STATUS BY START OF 1974. HOWEVER, DURING THE INTERIM, A CONTINGENT OF 150 USAF ADVISORS WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE GCA/RAPCON FACILITIES.

(2) VNAF WILL NOT BE CAPABLE OF OPERATING AND MAINTAINING THE TWO PROGRAMMED C-7 SQUADRONS UNTIL JUNE 72. THESE SQUADRONS WILL REPRESENT 25 PERCENT OF THE VNAF AIRLIFT CAPABILITY.

(3) TO MEET SCHEDULED OPERATIONAL DATE FOR THE PROGRAMMED RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON, OUT-OF-COUNTRY TRAIN-

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ING WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR VNAF MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL.

(4) THE TRAINING OF VNAF PERSONNEL CAN CONTINUE UNDER VARIANTS 1, 2, AND 3, BUT AT A REDUCED RATE.

H. IMPACT ON STABILITY AND POLITICAL CONTROL OF GVN.

(1) BASIC PLAN AND VARIANT 4 - THE IMPACT OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF US AND FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE

PAGE 5 RUHHHQA2896 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FORCES WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE STABILITY OF THE GVN AND POLITICAL CONTROL BY THE GVN OF THE TERRITORY AND POPULATION OF RVN. THE GVN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE LOSS OF US ADVISORS AND THIS WOULD CERTAINLY RESULT IN REDUCED EFFECTIVENESS. MORALE WOULD BE LOWERED, THUS PROVIDING THE VC GREATER OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCCESS IN ITS ATTACK ON THE GVN. FURTHERMORE, IT COULD LEAD TO THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THE VC WERE CORRECT IN STATING THE US HAD NO INTEREST IN THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, HAD BEEN EXPLOITING THEM, AND WAS NOW DESERTING THEM. THE SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF WITHDRAWAL CAN BEST BE DETERMINED BY EXAMINING EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMS:

(A) TERRITORIAL SECURITY (RF/PF). THIS PROGRAM IS WELL ESTABLISHED AND WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE TO FUNCTION ADEQUATELY WITH MINOR SETBACKS IN TRAINING AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. THE RATE OF IMPROVEMENT AND UPGRADING WOULD PROBABLY BE SERIOUSLY SLOWED.

(B) PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM - PHUNG HOANG, NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCES (NPFF), AND NATIONAL POLICE. THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM WOULD BE SERIOUSLY

PAGE 6 RUHHHQA2896 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE AFFECTED WHILE THE PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE NP AND NPFF WOULD PROBABLY VIRTUALLY CEASE. LOCAL ACCOMMODATION COULD BE EXPECTED IN MANY AREAS.

(C) PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE FORCE (PSDF). THE TRAINING OF PSDF WOULD PROBABLY FALTER BUT THE PROGRAM WOULD CONTINUE.

(D) LOCAL ADMINISTRATION - VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT (VSD), ETHNIC MINORITIES, RURAL DEVELOPMENT (RD) CADRE. BOTH VSD AND RD CADRE WOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION; HOWEVER, THE ETHNIC MINORITIES WOULD BE IGNORED.

(E) GREATER UNITY - CHIEU HOI. THIS PROGRAM IS WELL ENTRENCHED AND COULD BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE WITH LOSS OF EFFECTIVENESS AND DISLOCATIONS IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.

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(F) BRIGHTER LIFE FOR WAR VICTIMS - REFUGEES AND SOCIAL WELFARE, VETERANS, CIVIL ACTION. THESE PROGRAMS ARE LARGELY MANAGED AND STIMULATED BY US ADVISORS; WITHOUT THESE ADVISORS, THE PROGRAMS WOULD MOST ASSUREDLY FALTER AND WOULD PROBABLY FAIL.

(G) PEOPLES INFORMATION - MOI/JUSPAO. THIS TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION 7 OF 9 PROGRAM HAS NOT ENJOYED SUCCESS EVEN WITH US SUPPORT AND WOULD BE IN SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES.

(H) PROSPERITY FOR ALL - PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC WORKS, LAND REFORM, AGRICULTURE, PUBLIC HEALTH, EDUCATION, INDUSTRY, SAIGON CIVIL ASSISTANCE GROUP (SCAG), LABOR, AND YOUTH. THESE PROGRAMS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PUBLIC WORKS ARE FAIRLY WELL DEVELOPED AND COULD BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

(I) THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON IS LARGEY DEPENDENT ON U.S. COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS TO LINK IT

PAGE 2 RUHHQQA2697 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL CENTERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. LACK OF CONSTANT AND RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THESE POLITICAL CENTERS WOULD QUICKLY WEAKEN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OVER THE POPULACE OF SVN.

(2) VARIANT 1 - THE IMPACT ON THE STABILITY OF THE GVN AND POLITICAL CONTROL BY THE GVN OF THE TERRITORY AND POPULATION UNDER THE VARIANT WOULD INITIALLY BE ACCEPTABLE, ASSUMING THAT SUFFICIENT US COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS REMAIN TO SUPPORT RVNAF. HOWEVER, THE IMPACT ON THE INCOMPLETE RVNAF SUPPORT STRUCTURE COULD RAPIDLY BECOME DEVASTATING TO THE GVN. EXTREME CARE SHOULD ALSO BE EXERCISED IN ANY WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT SINCE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SIMULTANEOUSLY HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT UPON THE MORALE OF THE PEOPLE AND DO MORE TO RAISE THE CINCPAC

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MORALE OF THE ENEMY THAN ANY EVENT SINCE THE NOV 68 BOMBING HALT IN RVN. WITH THE CAVEATS EXPRESSED ABOVE, THE OVERALL IMPACT OF THIS OPTION SHOULD BE LESS THAN ANY OTHER VARIANT AS IT WILL PROVIDE THE LARGEST AMOUNT OF VISIBLE US PRESENCE AND SUPPORT TO CURRENT VIETNAMIZATION AND PACIFI-

PAGE 3 RUHHHQA2897 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE CATION PROGRAMS. THE FACT THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT TOTALLY WITHDRAWN FROM RVN MUST BE EMPHASIZED BY INFORMATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS.

(3) VARIANT 2 - THE REDUCTION OF THE US ADVISORY EFFORT TO A MAAG OF 25,000 PERSONNEL (AND THE CORDS EFFORT TO 1,393 PERSONNEL) WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE STABILITY OF THE GVN AND CONTROL BY THE GVN OF THE TERRITORY AND POPULATION OF RVN. THIS OPTION IS CONSIDERED TO BE ONLY SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FOR THE REASON STATED IN THE BASIC PLAN. THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM SHOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE A HIGH PRIORITY AND THIS PROGRAM ALONE WOULD ABSORB FORTY PERCENT OF THE ADVISORS ALLOCATED TO PACIFICATION PROGRAMS. ONLY A TOKEN FORCE WOULD BE LEFT TO ADVISE AND ASSIST GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND LOCAL PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS ON ALL OTHER PROGRAMS.

(4) VARIANT 3 - THE IMPACT ON THE STABILITY OF THE GVN AND POLITICAL CONTROL BY THE GVN OF THE TERRITORY AND POPULATION OF RVN UNDER THIS VARIANT IS THE SAME AS DISCUSSED UNDER THE VARIANT ONE IF SOME LATITUDE IN APPLICATION OF THE VARIANT IS ALLOWED. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS CLEAR THAT

PAGE 4 RUHHHQA2897 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE TO HAVE AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-VCI PROGRAM (PHUNG HOANG), SOME US ADVISORY PERSONNEL MUST CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN THE DISTRICT LEVEL UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE GVN DEMONSTRATES ITS CAPABILITY TO ASSUME FULL CONTROL OF THE PROGRAM. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT IT WILL BE ABOUT 12 TO 18 MONTHS BEFORE THE VIETNAMESE CAN ASSUME THE DISTRICT PHUNG HOANG FUNCTION. NO OTHER MAJOR ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE STABILITY OF THE GVN AND POLITICAL CONTROL BY THE GVN OF THE TERRITORY AND POPULATION OF RVN SHOULD BE EXPECTED FROM ADOPTING THIS OPTION.

(5) ECONOMIC IMPACT - IF A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF US/FW FORCES OCCURS, US PIASTER EXPENDITURES ARE PROJECTED TO DECREASE BY 19.5 BILLION PIASTERS OR 130 MILLION DOLLARS DURING CY 71. THIS DECREASE IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE

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COUPLED WITH THE PROGRAMMED MASSIVE INCREASE IN THE GVN BUDGET WOULD CREATE AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, WITH SEVERE INFLATION AND EMPLOYMENT DISLOCATIONS. AT LEAST 120,000 LOCAL NATIONALS WOULD BE OUT OF WORK BY 31 DEC 71. IF THE US CONTINUES ECONOMIC SUPPORT AT ITS FY 70 LEVEL BY FINDING A WAY TO REPLACE THE 130 MILLION DOLLARS, THEN THE ADJUST-

PAGE 5 RUHHHQA2897 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MENT WILL BE LESSENED. IF A MAAG/MAAG SUPPLEMENTAL IS RETAINED UNDER VARIANTS 1 THRU 3 THEN THE LOSS DURING CY 71 WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 100 MILLION DOLLARS OR 15 BILLION PIASTERS.

I. COSTS.

(1) RETROGRADE OF MATERIEL - LATEST AVAILABLE DATA SHOWS A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 4.0 MILLION SHORT TONS OF UNIT EQUIPMENT AND DEPOT STOCKS IN RVN. ALLOWING FOR ATTRITION DURING REDEPLOYMENT AND TRANSFERS TO RVNAF, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 2.0 MILLION SHORT TONS MUST BE SHIPPED. AT CURRENT RATES IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE BACKLOG OF 578,000 SHORT TONS THAT WOULD EXIST AT DA NANG AND NEWPORT COULD BE PREPARED AND LOADED BY CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR AT A COST OF 8 MILLION DOLLARS. WITH THE US PORT CAPABILITY REMOVED THESE COSTS COULD BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE 25 PERCENT OR MORE. THESE FIGURES WOULD BE CONSTANT FOR THE BASIC PLAN AND VARIANTS 1 THRU 4. (RETROGRADE CAPABILITY REVIEW MAY CHANGE COST IMPACT.)

(2) ABANDONMENT OF MATERIEL. (IMPACT BEING REVIEWED.)

PAGE 6 RUHHHQA2897 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

(A) SERVICEABLE AND REPAIRABLE ITEMS - THE COST OF CONTRACTING FOR RETROGRADE SHIPMENT OF SHORT FALL CARGO HAS BEEN ESTIMATED AT \$20 PER TON FOR THE 194,000 TONS AT DANANG AND \$10 PER TON FOR THE 384,000 TONS AT NEWPORT, AT A COST OF 3.88 MILLION DOLLARS FOR DA NANG CARGO, AND 3.84 MILLION DOLLARS FOR NEWPORT CARGO. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE MORE ECONOMICAL TO LEAVE SHORT FALL CARGO IN-COUNTRY UNLESS REPLACEMENT VALUE EXCEEDED \$20 PER TON AT DA NANG AND \$10 PER TON AT NEWPORT.

(B) SCRAP AND OTHER SALVAGE YARD ITEMS - PROPERTY DISPOSAL INVENTORIES IN ADDITION TO RETROGRADE CARGO REQUIREMENTS DISCUSSED ABOVE ARE, BY PORT AREA: DA NANG 177,000 S/T, QUI NHON 39,000 S/T, CAM RANH BAY

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

19,000 S/T, AND NEW PORT 135,000 S/T. THIS SCRAP AND SALVAGE CARGO TONNAGE IS WITHIN THE RETROGRADE CAPABILITIES OF THE GUI NHON AND CAMRANH BAY PORTS AND COULD BE OFF LOADED IF ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE. AT DA NANG AND NEW PORT, HOWEVER, THE RETROGRADE CAPABILITY IS ALREADY SATURATED, AND THE ONLY ECONOMICAL DISPOSITION OF SCRAP AND SALVAGE ITEMS WOULD BE TO DISPOSE IN-COUNTRY. TOTAL ACQUISITION

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION 8 OF 9

COST OF THE NON-SCRAP ITEMS WAS 57 MILLION DOLLARS.

(3) COMMUNICATIONS - THERE ARE PRESENTLY UPWARDS OF ONE BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF US C-E ASSETS WITHIN RVN. THE MAJORITY OF THESE ASSETS ARE SCHEDULED FOR A TIME PHASED RETROGRADE OUT OF COUNTRY. HOWEVER, APPROXIMATELY 200 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF THESE FACILITIES ARE PRESENTLY SCHEDULED TO REMAIN IN RVN IN SUPPORT OF CEIMP. SHOULD THE CEIMP EFFORTS BE CANCELLED OR REDIRECTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH ACCELERATED US FORCE WITHDRAWALS, AN IMMEDIATE DECISION WOULD BE NECESSARY CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF

PAGE 2 RUHHHQA2898 ~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE THOSE ASSETS DESTINED FOR RETROGRADE. A LIMITED IN-COUNTRY CAPABILITY WILL ALLOW FOR A FEW FIXED ICS AND/OR DIAL TELEPHONE EXCHANGE (OTE) FACILITIES TO BE RETROGRADED DURING THE PROPOSED SHORTENED REDEPLOYMENT TIME FRAME. GUIDANCE WOULD BE REQUIRED FROM JCS TO IDENTIFY WORLD-WIDE REQUIREMENTS AND A PRIORITY LISTING OF C-E EQUIPMENT/FACILITIES ESTABLISHED SO THAT THE BEST POSSIBLE RETROGRADE EFFORTS ARE UTILIZED. IF CIVILIAN CONTRACT IS CONTEMPLATED, THE CONTRACT TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE BACKBONE ICS WOULD COST APPROXIMATELY 11.5 MILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY AND THEREFORE IS SUBJECT TO RISING LABOR AND MATERIAL COSTS.⁶ (4) CONSTRUCTION - IF THE CPAF CONTRACTOR (RMK-BRU) IS TERMINATED ON 31 DEC 71 THERE WILL BE 120 MILLION DOLLARS OF UNCOMPLETED RVNAF CRIMP PROJECTS. AFTER THE US MILITARY HAS WITHDRAWN, THE COST OF FACILITIES CONTRACT

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MAINTENANCE WILL BE 13 MILLION DOLLARS (ADD NAVY FIGURE FOR 22 MILLION TOTAL), CONTRACT LOC CONSTRUCTION 44 MILLION DOLLARS, AND CONTRACT TRAINING 400 THOUSAND DOLLARS.

(5) IF ALL NAVAL PERSONNEL ARE REDEPLOYED ADDITIONAL CONTRACTUAL COST TO PROVIDE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL

PAGE 3 RUHHQHQA2898 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE ASSISTANCE TO VNN WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) IN-COUNTRY BOAT AND CRAFT, PLUS VNN SHIPYARD WORKERS, 7.7 MILLION DOLLARS.
- (B) OUT-OF-COUNTRY BOAT AND CRAFT OVERHAUL, 10 MILLION DOLLARS.
- (C) BASE MAINTENANCE (NOT INCLUDED UNDER CONSTRUCTION), 9 MILLION DOLLARS.
- (D) LAND BASED RADAR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (ACTOVRAD PROGRAM), 1.5 MILLION DOLLARS.

J. FEASIBILITY AND RISKS.

(1) LOGISTICS

(A) THE TRAINING OF RVNAF LOGISTICS PERSONNEL AND THE DELIVERY OF EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN PROGRAMMED FOR ORDERLY AND EFFICIENT TRANSFER OF LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS FROM THE U.S. TO RVNAF ON SCHEDULES EXTENDING THROUGH FY 73. IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO COMPRESS THE SCHEDULE SUFFICIENTLY TO ELIMINATE ALL SHORTFALL IN RVNAF LOGISTICS CAPABILITY BY THE END OF CY 71.

(B) THE BASIC PLAN AND VARIANT FOUR SEVERELY DISRUPT VIETNAMIZATION AND THE CRIMP. UNDER VARIANTS ONE,

PAGE 4 RUHHQHQA2898 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE TWO, AND THREE THESE EFFECTS ONLY SLIGHTLY DECREASE. HOWEVER, UNDER ALL OPTIONS THE SHORTFALL AREAS WHICH REQUIRE UTILIZATION OF US RESOURCES UNTIL RVNAF ATTAINS SELF-SUFFICIENCY WOULD POSE CRITICAL HIGH-RISK PROBLEMS. EXPANSION AND CONTINUATION OF EXISTING CONTRACTS AND NEW CONTRACTS WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE ALL THE SERVICES REQUIRED. THE PROVISION OF THESE SERVICES BY CONTRACT IS NOT CONSIDERED AS EFFECTIVE AS SERVICES PROVIDED BY US MILITARY ASSETS. THE RISKS TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CRIMP UNDER THIS PLAN ARE CONSIDERABLY GREATER THAN UNDER THE DELIBERATE PHASE-OUT SCHEDULE.

(C) AN EARLIER STUDY OF ACCELERATED REDEPLOYMENT ESTABLISHED THAT A ROLL-UP FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 47,000 TROOPS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REMAIN IN-COUNTRY FOR FOUR MONTHS AFTER REDEPLOYMENT OF THE MAIN FORCE TO PREPARE

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TOP SECRET (10)

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EQUIPMENT TURNED IN BY REDEPLOYING UNITS FOR SHIPMENT OR TURNOVER TO RVNAF. PORT CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS PRECLUDE ANY ACCELERATION OF THE ROLL-UP OPERATION. THE ALTERNATIVE IS RETROGRADE SHIPMENT BY CONTRACT OR, AS A LAST RESORT, ABANDONMENT.

(D) REDEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL IS WITHIN THE

PAGE 5 RUHHHQ2898 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE CAPABILITIES OF MAC CHANNEL AIRLIFT. THE PEAK LOAD WOULD REQUIRE TEN B707-TYPE AIRCRAFT PER DAY.

(E) AS NOTED ABOVE, UNITS SELECTED FOR REDEPLOYMENT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE LAST ELEMENTS OF INCREMENT SIX WILL REQUIRE NOTICE TO STAND-DOWN NLT 1 MAR 1971. AT LEAST THIRTY DAYS WILL BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO STAND-DOWN FOR DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL OF TROOP LISTS.

(F) SERVICE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT IN THE HANDS OF UNITS WILL BE REQUIRED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER BEGINNING OF THE CEASE FIRE AND NOT LATER THAN 60 DAYS PRIOR TO INDIVIDUAL UNIT REDEPLOYMENT DATES. DISPOSITION INSTRUCTION FOR DEPOT STOCKS WILL BE REQUIRED NOT LATER THAN 1 MAY 71 TO PERMIT UNIFORM DRAWDOWN OF THE 2.7 MILLION SHORT TONS ON HAND. EVEN THEN, THE ENTIRE INVENTORY OF DEPOT STOCKS CAN NOT BE TRANSFERRED OR RETROGRADED PRIOR TO 31 DEC 71. RECOMMEND MSC AND MAC BE ALERTED TO INITIATE PLANNING TO PROVIDE NECESSARY TRANSPORTATION RESOURCES AND IDENTIFICATION OF COSTS TO HANDLE PASSENGER AND CARGO ESTIMATES CONTAINED

PAGE 6 RUHHHQ2898 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE HEREIN.

(2) CONSTRUCTION-CONTINUATION OF LOC CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS IS CONTINGENT ON APPROVAL OF FUNDS FOR CIVILIAN CONTRACTS. WITHOUT CONTRACT FUNDS, RAPID DETERIORATION OF LOC WILL OCCUR.

(3) CORDS - THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US FORCES BY 31 DEC 71 WOULD RESULT IN A WIDE- SPREAD AND SIGNIFICANT SLOW-DOWN IN MOST ASPECTS OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMS, PRIMARILY BECAUSE PRECIPITOUS WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AS A VICTORY FOR THE VC.

(4) INTELLIGENCE: INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF CRIMP OBJECTIVES SERVE IN THE CAPACITY OF ADVISORS TO AN IMMATURE RVNAF INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE, FOR SUPPORT OF BOTH U.S. AND RVNAF COMMANDERS, AND FOR EARLY

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WARNING ATTENDANT TO REENTRY. ACCELERATED WITHDRAWAL
WOULD GRAVELY IMPAIR U. S. OBJECTIVES UNLESS SOME SUIT-

ABLE ALTERNATIVE SUCH AS NON DEFENSE COVER OR CONTRACTUAL SUPPORT IS
SUBSTITUTED FOR U.S. STRENGTH IN CERTAIN NON-SENSITIVE
AREAS.

9. (TS) SUMMARY.

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FINAL SECTION OF 9
A. OUR EFFORTS TO DATE TO PROGRESSIVELY TURN OVER TO
THE GVN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR NATION HAVE MET WITH STEADY PROGRESS.
WE HAVE FOLLOWED A DELIVERATE PROGRAM WHICH IS CONSTRAINED
BY TIME AND THE GVN'S MAXIMUM ACCELERATED ABILITY TO ACCEPT RESPON-
SIBILITY. AN ACCELERATION OF THESE EFFORTS BY EIGHTEEN MONTHS, EVEN
UNDER CEASE FIRE CONDITIONS, WILL INVITE UNREALISTIC, MANAGEMENT AND
MILITARY RISKS SINCE THE ENEMY WILL MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO

PAGE 2 RUHHQQA2899 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
REINITIATE COMBAT OPERATIONS AT ANY TIME. THERE ARE ALREADY
ADVERSE IMPACTS OF VARYING DEGREE OF CALCULATED RISK WHICH ARE INHERENT
WITHIN THE PROPOSED PLAN AND WHICH MUST BE RECOGNIZED.
THESE INCLUDE:

- (1) MANY LONG LEAD TIME REQUIREMENTS IN THE CRIMP
CANNOT BE ACCELERATED BY ANY AMOUNT OF REPROGRAMMING.
THESE INCLUDE THE TRAINING OF PILOTS, AND LOGISTICS AND
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL. SHORTFALLS MUST BE MADE UP
THROUGH EXPENSIVE CONTRACTS OR THAT PORTION OF THE CRIMP
ABANDONED WITH PROBABLY DISASTROUS RESULTS.
- (2) OPERATIONAL IMPACTS WOULD BE SEVERE IN THE
EVENT OF A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. THE RVNAF WILL
NOT BE OPERATIONALLY READY NOR CAPABLE OF ASSUMING FULL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF THE RVN ON 31 DEC 71.
RENEWED HOSTILITIES COULD RESULT IN THE COLLAPSE
OF THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT DUE TO THE INABILITY OF THE
RVNAF TO PROVIDE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE.

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(3) THE ACCELERATED WITHDRAWAL WOULD UNDERCUT
THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT PSYCHOLOGICALLY.
(4) POSSIBLE ABANDONMENT OR LOSS OF MATERIEL

PAGE 3 RUHHQA2899 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY MEASURED AT THIS TIME BUT COSTS
COULD BECOME EXTREME. THE NEARLY ONE HALF MILLION SHORT
TONS WHICH CANNOT NOW BE RETROGRADED BY 31 DEC 71 WILL
INCREASE EACH DAY THE EXECUTE DECISION IS DELAYED.

B. CONCLUSION. FOR THE REASONS CITED ABOVE EACH
OPTION DISCUSSED UNDER THE FOUR VARIANTS OF THE PLAN HAS
SIGNIFICANT UNDESIRABLE FEATURES. THE BASIC PLAN AND
VARIANT FOUR ARE THE LEAST DESIRABLE. VARIANT THREE WOULD
RESTRICT THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADVISORS BELOW THE DIVISION/
PROVINCE LEVEL AND IMPACT UPON RVNAF TRAINING WHERE IT IS
MOST NEEDED AND IS CURRENTLY MOST EFFECTIVE. IF POLITICAL
REQUIREMENTS SHOULD DICTATE THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN,
VARIANT ONE WOULD BE LEAST DAMAGING TO THE LONG RANGE
INTERESTS OF THE U.S. IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND TO THE GVN.

10. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY. WARM REGARDS.

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TOP SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WII SON FROM

LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING

DUTY HOURS. //N00000//

PLANNING FOR TF-79 PARTICIPATION (U)

A. CG I MAF 150102Z/JAN71 (TS) (SPECAT)

1. (TS) APPRECIATE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON WHAT

WAS A CONFUSED SITUATION AT THIS END. OUR EFFORTS

HERE WERE TO INSURE THAT, IF CALLED ON, THE 31ST MAU

HAD THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE THE OPERATION A NAVY-MARINE

SHOW WITHOUT THE CONFUSION OF ARMY AIRCRAFT RIDING

SHOTGUN.

2. (TS) AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPED, IT BECAME EVIDENT

THAT HARV AND WALT GADDIS HAD LITTLE OPTION TO DO

OTHER THAN THEY DID. THE EXERCISE DID, HOWEVER

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REVALIDATE OUR GOAL OF 14 CH-46, 6 CH-53, AND 4 UH-1E
FOR LPH COMMITMENT. IT ALSO POINTED OUT THAT A COBRA
(AH) CAPABILITY WILL HAVE TO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE
UH PACKAGE OR ADDED TO IT WHEN THOSE ASSETS BECOME
AVAILABLE TO YOU.

3. (U) CONCUR WITH YOUR COMMENTS IN PAR 3C REF A.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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RUMOMPA-T-RUHHFMA CG FMFPAC

P 260450Z JAN 71

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUMOMPA/CG III MAE

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES AND LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM MGEN ARMSTRONG/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS//N00000//

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED FROM GENERAL ABRAMS AND IS QUOTED IN FULL.

QUOTE:

P 200530Z JAN 7VA1 ZFF-3

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMMRSA/CDR 7AF TSN

RUMFRBA/CIF-77

RUMSDFA/CG 1ST MAW DNG

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CLAY,
 VADM BARDSHAR AND MGEN ARMSTRONG FROM GEN ABRAMS DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

CG FIRST MAW

P 260450Z/JAN71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

12

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PAGE TWO RUMUMHA0058 C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 SUBJ: EFFECTIVENESS OF U. S. AIR OPERATIONS (U)

REF: A. ACJCS 052125Z JAN 71 (C) NOTAL

B. CINCPAC 070734Z JAN 71 (C) NOTAL

1. (C) COMUSMACV IS PLEASED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE ACJCS, REFA, AND CINCPAC, REF B, AND TMNADD HIS SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THIS SINGULAR ACCOMPLISHMENT.

2. (C) REF A IS QUOTED BELOW:

A. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U. S. AIR OPERATIONS IN STEEL TIGER OPERATIONS WAS MOST CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE OUTSTANDING SUCCESS ACHIEVED BY THE TACAIR SORTIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE TRUCK PARK AND STORAGE COMPLEX IN THE VICINITY OF BAN BAK. WE MAY NEVER KNOW PRECISELY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE DESTRUCTION OF THIS STORAGE COMPLEX HAS AFFECTED THE ENEMY'S OVERALL LOGISTIC CAPABILITY; HOWEVER, I AM CONVINCED THAT HIS CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT COMBAT OPERATIONS HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY DEGRADED AND THE DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY REPRESENTS ONE OF THE MOST OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENTS BY TACAIR IN COMMANDO HUNT OPERATIONS.

B. THE SUCCESS OF THIS STRIKE EFFORT IS DUE NOT ONLY TO THE PAGE THREE RUMUMHA0058 C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SKILL OF THE TAC AIR CREWS AND SUPPORTING PERSONNEL BUT ALSO TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE CONVEY FACS IN THEIR SURVEILLANCE OF THE SUSPECTED AREA.

C. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONGRATULATE ALL OFFICERS AND MEN INVOLVED IN THIS MOST PRODUCTIVE STRIKE EFFORT. PLEASE PASS TO ALL KBNCERNED.

3. REF B FORWARDED REF A: AND IS QUOTED:

" I WHOLEHEARTEDLY CONCUR WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND COMMEND EVERY OFFICER AND ENLISTED MAN WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THIS EFFORT OF ANOTHER OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE. WELL DONE." WARM REGARDS.

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P 260450Z/JAN71

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TO COMMARCORBASESPAC

INFO CG I MAF
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S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO MGEN
 WILSON FROM BGEN BARROW
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
REAL ESTATE A QUESTION

- A. CG MCB CAMP BUTLER 190523Z DEC 70 (S)
- B. CG FMFPAC 271936Z DEC 70 (S NOFORN SPECAT)
- C. MCO 11012.7A
- D. MCO 11101.37C

CG MARCORBASE CAMP BUTLER

R 290845Z JAN 71

ACTN: S/SEC

1-3

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1. REF A PROVIDED INITIAL INFORMATION AND DATA PERTAINING TO THE POSSIBLE USE OF THE AIR FORCE SECURITY SITE LOCATED AT ONNA POINT AND REQUESTED GUIDANCE PRIOR TO PURSUING FURTHER THE ACQUISITION OF THIS FACILITY.

2. REF B PROVIDED GUIDANCE, AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIRD MARDIV REP ANOTHER VISIT/TOUR WAS CONDUCTED AT ONNA POINT FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF SPECIFIC USES OF THAT FACILITY. AS A RESULT OF THIS TOUR, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT ONNA POINT WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR THIRD RECON BN (MINUS) AND DIV SCHOOLS.

3. THE PRESENT BILLETING LOAD AT CAMP SCHWAB RESULTS IN LESS THAN 72 SQ FT PER MAN (WHICH IS THE COMFORTABLE SPACE CRITERIA AS OUTLINED IN REF C). IN THE EVENT THAT ALL UNITS HOME BASED AT CAMP SCHWAB ARE IN CAMP, I.E., THE TROOPS NOW DEPLOYED RETURN AND A SIMILAR UNIT DOES NOT DEPART, CAMP SCHWAB BILLETING WOULD PERMIT SLIGHTLY LESS THAN 50 SQ FT PER MAN (THE CROWDED OR EMERGENCY CRITERIA): THUS RESULTING IN A PERSONNEL OVERLOAD AS DEFINED IN REFERENCE D. THE PRESENT SITUATION NECESSITATES A TURN-OVER OF BARRACKS FROM THE DEPLOYING UNIT TO THE RETURNING UNIT, UPON RECYCLING OF THE DEPLOYED UNITS, TO AVOID OVER CROWDING. BY MOVING THE RECON BN FROM CAMP SCHWAB, ALL UNITS COULD BE BILLETED WITH APPROXIMATELY 50 SQ FT PER MAN.

4. A SIMILAR SITUATION WOULD EXIST AT CAMP HANSEN IN THE EVENT OF THE RETURN OF ALL DEPLOYED UNITS. ALTHOUGH THE BILLETING LOAD, WITH ALL UNITS ABOARD, WOULD NOT EXCEED MAXIMUM CAPACITY, THE NET BILLETING AREA PER MAN WOULD BE APPROX 62 SQ FT, WHICH IS WELL BELOW COMFORTABLE CONDITIONS;. MOVING THE DIV SCHOOLS WOULD PERMIT APPROX 65 SQ FT PER MAN.

CG MARCORBASE CAMP BUTLER

R 290845Z JAN 71

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5. AT PRESENT, CAMP HAUGE ACCOMODATES THIRD SHORE PARTY BN (MINUS), THIRD FSR UNITS, AND ELEMENTS OF MCB (INCLUDING THE TRANSIENT FACILITY). IT IS PLANNED TO RELOCATE SEVENTH COMM BN (MINUS) FROM CAMP SCHWAB TO CAMP HAUGE UPON PHASE-OUT OF THE TRANSIENT FACILITY, AND TO RELOCATE DIV SCHOOLS FROM CAMP HANSEN TO CAMP HAUGE AT THE SAME TIME. FOLLOWING THESE MOVES BILLETING SPACE AT CAMP HAUGE WILL BE APPROX 91 SQ FT PER MAN. THIS ACTION WILL ALLEVIATE THE SITUATION SOME WHAT AT CAMPS SCHWAB AND HANSEN AND WILL PERMIT BILLETING OF ALL UNITS ASSIGNED TO CAMP SCHWAB (INCLUDING SPACE FOR DEPLOYED UNITS) WITH APPROX 50 SQ FT PER MAN. THIS ACTION, COUPLED WITH THE RELOCATION OF RECON BN TO ONNA POINT, WOULD PROVIDE APPROX 54 SQ FT PER MAN.

6. FROM THE ABOVE IT IS SEEN THAT THE ALLEVIATION OF CROWDING AT CAMPS SCHWAB AND HANSEN COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE ACQUISITION OF ONNA POINT; HOWEVER, THE USE OF MOST OF CAMP HAUGE WOULD STILL BE REQUIRED--ONNA POINT IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUBSTITUTE FOR CAMP HAUGE. IF A CAMP HAUGE TRADE-OFF, AND A MEANINGFUL COST SAVINGS, ARE THE DETERMINANTS FOR ACQUISITION OF ONNA POINT, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT CAMP HAUGE BE RETAINED, AND THAT WE CEASE ANY FURTHER ACQUISITION ACTIONS. HOWEVER, IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT THE ALLEVIATION OF CROWDED CONDITIONS IS SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION, THEN IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT WE FURTHER PURSUE ACQUISITION OF ONNA POINT.

7. ONE ADDED THOUGHT THAT MAY BE WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION IS THAT ONNA POINT WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT LOCATION FOR A MID-PAC UNIT SUCH AS THE RADIO BN AND/OR SUPPORT COMPANY (COMM BN) AND/OR ANGLICO OR A FORCE RECON COMPANY. SUCH A MOVE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TRAINING BENEFITS, BUT THE ON-ISLAND CEILING AND OTHER FACTORS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED.

8. ONNA POINT HAS BEEN OFFERED TO OTHER SERVICES ON OKINAWA BY THE 313 AIR DIVISION. WE WILL LOCALLY STATE REQUIREMENT FOR THE INSTALLATION, AS AUTH BY PAR 2A, REF B.

9. WARM REGARDS.

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CG MARCORBASE CAMP BUTLER

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R 300638Z JAN 71

FM CINCPACFLT
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

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CCN: 0413
TOR: 300711Z JAN71

TOP SECRET PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM CLAREY. DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS CONTINGENCY PLANNING (U)

- A. CG FMFPAC 132134Z JAN 71
- B. CINCPAC 220209Z OCT 70
- C. JCS 2472/625-10 OF 19 NOV 70

1. (TS) REFERENCE A RECOMMENDED THE PREPARATION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS TO PROVIDE FOR THE RE-ENTRY OF MARINE FORCES INTO RVN DURING THE PERIOD OF CONTINUING REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES FROM SEASIA.
2. (TS) YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO PROCEED WITH PLANNING AS A PRUDENTIAL MATTER IS RECOGNIZED. I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THROUGH STAFF LIAISON THAT CINCPAC, AS OF 26 JAN 71, IS IN RECEIPT OF JCS GUIDANCE WHICH WILL ENABLE HIM TO PROMULGATE HIS CONCEPT PLAN AND TO PROVIDE DIRECTION FOR PREPARING SUPPORTING PLANS. WHILE AWAITING RECEIPT OF THE CINCPAC BASIS FOR PACFLT PLANNING, REQUEST YOUR PLANNERS MEET AT MY HEADQUARTERS TO REFINER OUR CONCEPT ALONG THE LINES OF REFERENCES PAGE TWO RUHHBRA4513 TOP SECRET PERSONAL FOR B AND C, AND TO DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ANTICIPATED PLANNING REQUIREMENTS. MY ACTION OFFICER ON THIS PROJECT IS LTCOL R.G. KUMMEROW, USMC CODE 621, EXT 53273/54224. ADDITIONAL DETAILS MAY BE ARRANGED THROUGH HIM BY YOUR STAFF.
3. (C) YOUR PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE THIS MATTER IN THE AGENDA OF THE SEVENTHFLT SCHEDULING CONFERENCE WAS NOT ACTED UPON PENDING CONFIRMATION OF THE STATUS OF THE CINCPAC PLAN.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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4513

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R 300638Z JAN 71

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PERSONAL FOR

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P 302124Z JAN 71 COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES
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TO RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW (REAR)
INFO RUAOAJA/CG I MAF

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 PERSONAL FOR BGEN CONLEY INFO MGEN WILSON FROM LT GEN JONES
AWG-10 PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (C)

A. CMC 062043Z/NOV70 (U)

1. (S) CMC, IN REF A, PROVIDED VERY CLEAR GUIDANCE AS TO THE DIRECTION OUR EFFORTS IN THE AVIATION FIELD ARE GOING TO TAKE. THE ONGOING AWG-10 PIP WAS ESTABLISHED IN FURTHERANCE OF THIS GOAL AND AS A RESULT OF THE POOR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE AUG-SEP 70 MAG-15 IWSR. COL JOHN DOERING'S DEBRIEF AT THIS HQ, FOLLOWING HIS RECENT STAFF VISIT TO YOUR COMMAND, DISCLOSED THAT SOME MISUNDERSTANDING EXISTS ABOUT MY DESIRES IN REGARD TO THE AWG-10 PIP. FIRST: OUR GOAL IS TO ATTAIN AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF READINESS IN THE AIR-TO-AIR MISSION. THIS MEANS GETTING THE RADARS UP AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, KEEPING THEM UP. THE MEANS TO THIS END HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO YOU. SO FAR THE RESULTS HAVE

CG FMFPAC

P 302124Z/JAN71

ACTN: S/SEC

1-2

(15)

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3714 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
BEEN UNSATISFACTORY. THEREFORE I RECOMMEND THAT:

A. THE AWG-10 PIP BE SUPERVISED BY A SENIOR FULL TIME COORDINATOR.

B. THE EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON DEVELOPING AWG-10 EXPERTISE AMONG THE MARINE TECHNICIANS. A COORDINATED, SUPERVISED TRAINING PROGRAM IS A MUST. THE FIVE WESTINGHOUSE PEOPLE WILL BE USED TO INSTRUCT AND SUPERVISE. THE MARINE TECHNICIANS PROVIDED FOR PIP WILL DO THE ACTUAL WORK. AS THESE MARINES DEVELOP PROFICIENCY, THEY SHOULD ROTATE TO THE SQDNS AND BE REPLACED WITH OTHER MARINES.

C. THE ACFT WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR SYSTEM MAINTENANCE. IN VIEW OF OUR LACK OF AIR-TO-AIR CAPABILITY, SQDN FLIGHT HOUR GOALS ARE PASSE. I APPRICIATE THAT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FLYING IS REQUIRED FOR PILOT PROFICIENCY AND MORALE. HOWEVER, WITH PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT, OUR PRIMARY GOAL OF SYSTEM READINESS AND AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS HOURS CAN BOTH BE ATTAINED.

D. WHEN FULL SYSTEM ACFT ARE GENERATED BY THE AWG-10 PIP, THE FLIGHT TIME THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WILL BE UTILIZED TO EXERCISE THE SYSTEMS. CONCURRENTLY, THE SQDN MAINTENANCE EFFORT WILL BE AIMED AT MAINTAINING THESE SYSTEMS IN A READY CONDITION.

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3714 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
3. (S) IT IS MY VIEW FROM HERE THAT THE PEOPLE, PARTS AND TEST EQUIPMENT PROVIDED FOR THE AWG-10 PIP, ALONG WITH NORMAL ASSETS, ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE TASK WE FACE. IF I AM IN ERROR NOW OR IF AT ANYTIME EVENTS MAKE THE GOAL UNATTAINABLE, I EXPECT TO BE NOTIFIED.

3. (S) IN REGARD TO THE F4J ACFT BEING RETURNED TO CONUS, THESE ACFT WILL RECEIVE EQUAL PRIORITY FOR THE AWG-10 PIP. I EXPECT THAT YOU WILL TRANSFER FULL SYSTEM ACFT ON A FAIR SHARE BASIS. THIS MAY SEEM UNREASONABLE BUT IN VIEW OF THE LARGESSE WE ARE RECEIVING WITH THE AWG-10 PIP, CMC'S STATED EMPHASIS ON THE BUILD UP IN LANT, AND THE ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF THE ACFT, I CONSIDER THIS ACTION TO BE PRUDENT. IF IT APPEARS THAT WE WILL BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE THE RETURNING SQDN WITH EVEN A MINIMAL NUMBER OF FULL SYSTEMS, PLEASE LET ME KNOW. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3714

CG FMFPAC

P 302124Z/JAN71

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 COMM NOTE: DTG TO RD FEB VICE JAN.
 ADEE ADDED PER FCON WITH CAPT GRIFFIN.

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TOD: 051913Z FEB 71

P 050302Z FEB 71
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMOMPA/CG III MAF
 INFO ZEN/CG I MAF
 BT

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON INFO
MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS. //N00000//
FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. CG FMFPAC 220115Z/DEC70 (TS-SPECAT-MCEO)
- B. CG FMFPAC 252114Z/OCT 70 (TS-SPECAT-MCEO)
- C. CMC 121455Z/NOV 70 (TS-SPECAT)

1. (TS) THE COMMANDANT HAS NOT YET INFORMED ME CONCERNING THE GENERAL OFFICER REASSIGNMENT INCIDENT TO REF A. HE DID, HOWEVER, DURING HIS VISIT HERE IN JANUARY, STATE THAT HE PREFERRED THE TITLE 3D MAB VICE III MAF (REAR) BE USED FOR THE SENIOR MARINE HQ REMAINING IN MRI.
2. (TS) HOWEVER, TO PROVIDE YOU WITH EARLY PLANNING INFORMATION, I AM PROPOSING BELOW A SERIES OF ACTIONS WHICH ARE KEYED TO THE RELOCATION OF HQ III MAF FROM RVN TO OKINAWA AND WHICH ARE TO BE EXECUTED SIMULTANEOUSLY AT 140400Z/APR 1971.

CG FMFPAC P 050302Z FEB 71
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1-2
 ACTN: S/SEC
 16

TOP SECRET

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0359 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR

A. CG III MAF WILL:

- (1) RELOCATE TO OKINAWA.
- (2) REPORT TO COMSEVENTHFLT AS CTF 79.
- (3) ASSUME OPCON OF 3D MARDIV, 1ST MAW AND

3D FSR.

(4) CARRY OUT MISSION AND TASKS AS SPECIFIED REF B,
AS AMENDED AND APPROVED BY REF C.

B. CG, I MAF WILL PASS FLAG OF I MAF TO CG, 3D MAW.

C. CG, 3D MAW WILL ASSUME ADDITIONAL DUTIES AS
CG, I MAF/CTF-19.

D. CG 1ST MAW WILL:

(1) ACTIVATE 3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE AND
ASSUME COMMAND THEREOF.

(2) ASSUME OPCON OF ALL III MAF UNITS REMAINING
IN RVN.

(3) REPORT TO CG XXIV CORPS FOR OPCON AS CG, 3D
MAB.

(4) PASS COMMAND OF 1ST MAW TO CG, 1ST MAW
(REAR).

E. CG, 1ST MAW (REAR) WILL:

- (1) ASSUME COMMAND OF 1ST MAW.

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0359 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR
(2) ASSUME COMMAND OF ALL FORCES PRESENTLY
ASSIGNED TO 1ST MAW (REAR).

(3) DEACTIVATE 1ST MAW (REAR).

(4) REPORT TO CG III MAF/CTF 79 FOR OPCON.

F. CG 1ST MARDIV WILL:

(1) RELOCATE TO MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP
PENDLETON, CALIF.

(2) ASSUME COMMAND OF ALL FORCES PRESENTLY
ASSIGNED TO 5TH MAB.

(3) DEACTIVATE 5TH MAB.

(4) REPORT TO CG FMFPAC FOR OPCON.

G. CG 5TH MAB IS REASSIGNED AS ASSISTANT DIVISION
COMMANDER, 1ST MARDIV.

3. (U) REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0359

CG FMFPAC

P 050302Z FEB 71

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PTTAZYUW RUHHHQAI126 0412234-AAAA--RUHHFMA.

ZNY AAAA

P 102240Z FEB 71

FM CINCPAC

TO RUEKJCS/CJCS

INFO RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUHHABA/CINCPACAF

RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUMUHTA/COMUSMACV

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL MOORER, INFO GENERAL ROSSON,
ADMIRAL CLAREY, GENERAL NAZZARO, LT GEN JONES, GENERAL ABRAMS
FROM ADMIRAL MCCAIN.

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

REDEPLOYMENT CONTINGENCY PLANS (U)

A. CINCPAC 282052Z NOV 70 (NOTAL)

B. CINCPAC 220245Z JAN 71

C. JCS 9374/052306Z JAN 71 (NOTAL)

1. (TS) THE DETAILED CINCPAC PLAN REQUESTED BY REF C WILL
BE COMPLETED BY 1 MAR 71. THE CINCPAC PLAN IS NUMBERED
5071. THE MACV PLAN WILL BE COMPLETED 1 APR 71 AND IS

CINCPAC

P 102240Z/FEB71

COG: S/SEC

1-3

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TOP SECRET

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PAGE 2 RUHHQAI126 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
NUMBERED J206. BOTH PLANS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE JCS
AND TO THE PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS ONLY. TO
ACCOMODATE THE CLOSEHOLD NATURE OF THE PLANNING, SUFFICIENT
COPIES OF THE CINCPAC PLAN WILL BE MAINTAINED HERE FOR
RAPID DISTRIBUTION UPON JCS DECISION TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN.
2. (TS) THE PLANNING ESTIMATES FORWARDED BY REFS A AND B
REMAIN UNCHANGED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HOWEVER, THAT THESE
ESTIMATES COULD VARY CONSIDERABLY WHEN FIRM PERSONNEL
POLICIES, UNIT DESTINATIONS, MOBILITY RESOURCE AVAILABILITY,
EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS, CONTRACTORS AUTHORITIES,
AND PROCEDURAL INSTRUCTIONS ARE MADE KNOWN. UNTIL THE ABOVE
INFORMATION IS MADE AVAILABLE FROM THE JCS AND THE SERVICES AND
IS RELATED TO SPECIFIC TIMETABLES, DETAILED PLANNING CANNOT
CONTINUE PAST THE PRESENT STAGE. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE
CINCPAC

P 102240Z/FEB71

2-3

TOP SECRET

17

TOP SECRET

TWO VARIABLES AFFECTING FUTURE PLANNING. FIRST, THE ALTERNATIVES POSTULATED ARE RELATED TO CALENDAR DATES. THE JCS DIRECTED DATES OF A CEASE-FIRE ON 1 JAN 71 WITH REDEPLOYMENTS COMMENCING ON 1 APR 71 NECESSITATE A DECISION DATE ON 1 FEB 71. ALL OF THESE DATES HAVE BEEN OVERTAKEN AT THIS TIME. SECOND, IT IS ASSUMED THAT U.S. REDEPLOYMENTS WILL

PAGE 3 RUHHHGA1126 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CONTINUE AFTER 1 MAY 71. THEREFORE, WHEN INCREMENT VII IS
ANNOUNCED THE REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULES IN THE PLAN WILL BE
OUTDATED.

3. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE RECOMMENDED:

A. CINCPAC AND MACV PLANS BEING DEVELOPED BE HANDLED
AS ONE-TIME PLANS AND NOT BE UPDATED UNTIL AN EXECUTION
DECISION IS IMMINENT.

B. SUPPORTING PLANS NOT BE DEVELOPED UNTIL AN EXECUTION
DECISION IS IMMINENT.

C. IT BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PLANS ARE STRICTLY RELATED
TO A POSTULATED CEASE-FIRE CONDITION AND IN NO WAY RELATED
TO UNILATERAL PLANS FOR ACCELERATED REDEPLOYMENTS PRIOR TO
THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES.

4. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY. WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

BT

#1126

CINCPAC

P 102240Z/FEB71

3-3

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P 130427Z FEB 71 COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES
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 INFO RUMOMPA/CG III MAF
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SECRET / SPECAT / MARCORPS EYES ONLY / EXCLUSIVE FOR
LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM MGEN WIDDECKE//NO3100//
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
SURPRISE FIRING DEVICES (U)

1. (S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO UPDATE YOU ON THE CURRENT STATUS WITHIN THE DIVISION OF OUR EFFORTS TO REDUCE CASUALTIES FROM SURPRISE FIRING DEVICES.
2. (S) AT THE OUTSET, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT ALTHOUGH SURPRISE FIRING DEVICES ARE STILL CAUSING TRAGIC DEATHS AND MAIMING TO OUR MARINES, WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS. AS A MATTER OF INTEREST IN THE 23RD INFANTRY DIVISION TO OUR SOUTH THIS TYPE CASUALTY HAS INCREASED DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS. THE TERRITORIAL, ARVN, AND ROK FORCES IN QUANG NAM CONTINUE TO SUFFER SERIOUS CASUALTIES, BUT THERE IS NO QUANTITATIVE DATA AVAILABLE ON TRENDS IN THESE UNITS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARE NOW INFORMED ON OCCASIONS BY

CG FIRST MARDIV P 130427Z/FEB 71 ACTN:S/SEC 1-2

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PAGE TWO RUMULVA1148 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR UNUSUALLY RELIABLE SOURCES THAT NVA/VC/VCI ARE KILLED OR SERIOUSLY WOUNDED BY THEIR OWN DEVICES.

3. (S) ONE WAY TO MEASURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR COUNTER-MEASURES IS THE RATIO OF DISCOVERED AND DESTROYED DEVICES TO THOSE DETONATED WITH CASUALTIES. FOR 1969, THIS RATIO EXHIBITED LARGE FLUCTUATION WITH A LOW OF LESS THAN ONE TO ONE AND A HIGH OF 3.84 TO ONE, WITH AN AVERAGE OF 1.83 TO ONE.

4. (S) IN 1970, SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE, BUT LARGE MONTHLY FLUCTUATION STILL EXISTED. IN JULY THE RATIO WAS 1.21 TO ONE AND IN DECEMBER THE RATIO 4.0 TO ONE WITH AN AVERAGE FOR THE YEAR OF 1.96 TO ONE, SURPASSING THE 1969 AVERAGE BY .13. THE BEST CONSISTENT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE DURING THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1970 THROUGH JANUARY 1971 WITH A RATIO 3.36 TO ONE, SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN ANY OTHER COMPARABLE PERIOD. DURING THIS SAME PERIOD, WE SUFFERED AN AVERAGE OF 58 CASUALTIES PER MONTH BY SURPRISE FIRING DEVICES WHICH IS ABOUT ONE THIRD OF THOSE PREVIOUSLY SUFFERED PER MONTH.

5. (S) WE HAVE HOPES FOR THE FUTURE, BUT I DO NOT WANT TO GIVE A FIRM PREDICTION AT THIS TIME AS TO WHAT OUR SUCCESS WILL BE AFTER THE STANDDOWN OF THE 5TH MARINES. STARTING IN MARCH, THE

PAGE THREE RUMULVA1148 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJORITY OF OUR TACTICAL FORCES MAY WELL BE WORKING ON THE LOW LANDS AND THE PROBLEM COULD BECOME EVER MORE DIFFICULT. OUR MINES AND BOOBY TRAP SCHOOLS AND CONTACT TEAMS WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE AS WELL AS OUR COMMAND EMPHASIS. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1148 CG FIRST MARDIV

P 130427Z/FEB 71

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OTTSZYUW RUOAJA1497 0470755-SSSS--RUHHFMA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 160755Z FEB 71

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO RUHOOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT (ZFF-1)

RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC (ZFF-1)

INFO ZEN/CG MARCORS CAMP BUTLER

BT

S E C R E T//PERSONAL FOR VADM WEISNER AND LTGEN JONES, INFO BGPN BARROW, FROM BGEN WILSON. DFLIVFR DURING WORKING HOURS// NORTH FUJI MANEUVER AREA (U)

1. (S) IN COORDINATION AND WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF COMUSJAPAN AND COMNAVFORJAPAN, WE ARE EMBARKING ON A PROGRAM TO COMMENCE FIRING IN NORTH FUJI MANEUVER AREA (NFMA). I HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY COMUSJAPAN THAT A SCHEDULE FOR FIRING IN NFMA AT THIS TIME HAS THE SUPPORT OF US EMBASSY, TOKYO, JAPANSE DEFENSE AGENCY, JOINT STAFF OFFICE, THE NATIONAL POLICY AGENCY, AND DEFENSE FACILITIES ADMINISTRATION AGENCY. FURTHER, THE NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE MORE POSITIVE CONTROL MEASURES THAN IN THE PAST.

2. (S) AS YOU KNOW I CONSIDER THE FIRING OF SUPPORTING ARMS IN NFMA TO BE MISSION ESSENTIAL TO THE TRAINING OF OUR BLTS DEPLOYED TO CAMP FUJI.

PAGE TWO RUOAJA1497 S E C R E T

ALL CONCERNED CONCUR THAT THE PRESENT POLITICAL CLIMATE AND THE WINTER WEATHER AT FUJI MAKE THIS A MOST PROPITIOUS TIME TO INITIATE ACTION.

3. (S) ACCORDINGLY, IN COORDINATION WITH COMUSJAPAN AND COMNAVFORJAPAN, FIRING HAS BEEN SCHEDULED ON THE FOLLOWING DATES:

23FEB71 COMBAT RANGE C(H-4) (81MM MORTARS)

24FEB71 COMBAT RANGE H-5 (105 MM HOW)

25FEB71 COMBAT RANGE H-5 (105 MM HOW)

4. (S) WHILE THERE WILL UNDOUBTFULLY BE SOME PROTEST AND UNFAVORABLE COMMENTS IN THE PRESS, THE EXTENT OF SUCH PROTEST SHOULD BE PROPORTIONATE TO THE INITIATIVE OF THE POLICE AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOV TO WITHSTAND ADVVERSE COMMENTS.

5. (U) IN THE EVENT THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE FIRING DATES OR IF THE FIRING MUST AGAIN BE POSTPONED, I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED. WARM REGARDS.

H-4

BT

0497

CG THIRD MARDIV

O 160755Z/FEB71

ACTN: S/SEC

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 ZNY AAAA
 RUMONPA -T- CG FMFPAC
 P 020035Z MAR 71
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV
 TO RUMONPA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMONPA/CG III MAF
 BT

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 CCN: 0281,0282

CONFIDENTIAL/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//NOS200//
 PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM MAJGEN
 WIDDEKE. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS. SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 DIVISION STAFFING (U)

1. (C) THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO YOUR REQUEST FOR MY VIEWS
 RELATIVE TO THE DESIRABILITY OF SUBSTITUTING LIEUTENANT COLONELS
 FOR COLONELS ON THE MARINE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS GENERAL AND
 SPECIAL STAFF. IN PREPARING MY COMMENTS I HAVE TRIED TO JUDGE
 THE EFFECTS OF SUCH A SUBSTITUTION FROM ALL ANGLES, INCLUDING:
 - A. IMPACT UPON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DIVISION.
 - B. IMPACT UPON THE TOTAL MARINE OFFICER POPULATION.
 - C. IMPACT UPON THE TOTAL MARINE CORPS STRUCTURE.
 - D. IMPACT UPON RELATIONSHIPS EXTERNAL TO THE DIVISION.
2. (C) ACCORDING TO THE TABLES OF ORGANIZATION HELD BY THIS
 HEADQUARTERS THE CURRENT AUTHORIZATION OF COLONELS TO THE

CG FIRST MARDIV

P 020035Z/MAR71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-5

(20)

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PAGE TWO RUMULVA0092 C O N F I D E N T I A L/MCEO/PERSONAL FOR/ BASIC MARINE DIVISION TOTALS 18. OF THIS TOTAL 1 NAVAL AVIATOR AND 11 GROUND COLONELS ARE ASSIGNED THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS. THE REMAINING 6 COLONELS ARE THE FOUR REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS AND THE COMMANDING OFFICERS OF THE HEADQUARTERS BATTALION AND SERVICE BATTALION. THERE ARE ALSO THREE NAVY CAPTAINS AUTHORIZED THE DIVISION; NAMELY, THE DIVISION SURGEON, THE DIVISION DENTAL OFFICER, AND THE DIVISION CHAPLAIN.

3. (C) SUBSTITUTION OF LIEUTENANT COLONELS FOR COLONELS ON THE DIVISION GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFFS WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COLONELS FROM 18 TO 7. THE 7 REMAINING COLONELS WOULD PROVIDE FOR A CHIEF OF STAFF, FOUR REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS, AND COMMANDING OFFICERS FOR HEADQUARTERS BATTALION AND SERVICE BATTALION. PRESUMABLY THE THREE NAVY CAPTAIN BILLETS WOULD BE DOWNGRADED TO COMMANDER.

4. (C) THE FIRST AND IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF REDUCING THE NUMBER OF COLONELS FROM 18 TO 7 WOULD BE TO CONSTRAIN SEVERELY THE DIVISION COMMANDER'S FLEXIBILITY AND DISCRETION IN ASSIGNING AND REASSIGNING HIS COLONELS TO BEST SUIT THEIR CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS. THIS IS A FUNCTION OF NUMBERS AND EASILY DEMONSTRATED. LESS EASY TO PROVE IS THE REDUCTION IN THE PAGE THREE RUMULVA0092 C O N F I D E N T I A L/MCEO/PERSONAL FOR/ LEVEL OF COMPETENCE WHICH I THINK WOULD ENSUE. HOWEVER, BASED UPON MY OBSERVATION THROUGH THE YEARS IN ASSIGNMENTS TO THE FLEET MARINE FORCE, I BELIEVE I CAN STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT THE GENERAL LEVEL OF COMPETENCE OF A RANDOM GROUP OF COLONELS WILL BE HIGHER THAN THAT OF A LIKE NUMBER OF LIEUTENANT COLONELS. IF THIS IS NOT SO, THEN THERE IS SOMETHING FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG WITH OUR CAREER DEVELOPMENT AND SELECTION SYSTEMS.

5. (C) THE TABLES OF ORGANIZATION WHICH WE HOLD INDICATE A TOTAL OF 45 LIEUTENANT COLONELS AUTHORIZED A BASIC MARINE DIVISION. IF THE SUBSTITUTION BEING DISCUSSED WERE EFFECTED, THIS NUMBER WOULD INCREASE TO 56. THE COMBINED LINEAL LIST FOR 1 JANUARY 1970 LISTS 763 COLONELS AND 2,025 LIEUTENANT COLONELS ON ACTIVE DUTY. THESE FIGURES ADMITTEDLY ARE A YEAR OLD BUT THEY ARE THE BEST IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO ME AND WILL SERVE TO MAKE SOME ROUGH COMPARISONS. WITH THREE MARINE DIVISIONS IN THE PEACETIME FORCE STRUCTURE THERE WOULD BE UNDER THE CURRENT TABLES OF ORGANIZATION A TOTAL OF 54 COLONELS AND 135 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BILLETS IN THE DIVISIONS AVAILABLE FOR ASSIGNMENT. WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO STRIP OUT THE NAVAL

CG FIRST MARDIV

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PAGE FOUR RUMULVA0092 C O N F I D E N T I A L/MCEO/PERSONAL FOR/ AVIATORS AND RESTRICTED OFFICERS THIS WORKS OUT TO ROUGHLY A 1 TO 15 RATIO TO TOTAL POPULATION FOR BOTH COLONELS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS. SIMPLY STATED, ONE OUT OF EVERY FIFTEEN COLONELS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS IN THE MARINE CORPS CAN, UNDER THE PRESENT STRUCTURE, EXPECT TO BE SERVING IN A MARINE DIVISION AT A GIVEN TIME. ALSO, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE NUMBER SO SERVING FOR BOTH RANKS IS PROPORTIONAL TO THE TOTAL POPULATION.

6. (C) IF THE SUBSTITUTION SUGGESTED WERE EFFECTED THERE WOULD BE 21 COLONEL BILLETS AND 168 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BILLETS IN THE THREE MARINE DIVISIONS. THIS WOULD TIP THE RATIO OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE IN A DIVISION TO 1 TO 36 IN THE CASE OF COLONELS AND 1 TO 12 IN THE CASE OF LIEUTENANT COLONELS. IN OTHER WORDS, TO GAIN A MODESTLY IMPROVED OPPORTUNITY FOR LIEUTENANT COLONELS TO SERVE IN A MARINE DIVISION WOULD COST A DISPROPORTIONATE REDUCTION IN OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLONELS TO SO SERVE. THE EFFECT WOULD BE THAT ONCE A GROUND OFFICER WERE PROMOTED TO COLONEL HIS CHANCES OF ASSIGNMENT TO A MARINE DIVISION WOULD BE VERY SLIM. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD NOT ONLY BE EXTREMELY DELETERIOUS TO HIS MORALE AND INCENTIVES, PAGE FIVE RUMULVA0092 C O N F I D E N T I A L/MCEO/PERSONAL FOR/ BUT WOULD ALSO REDUCE THE GENERAL LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS OF MARINE COLONELS IN OTHER AREAS BECAUSE FOR MOST THEIR EXPERIENCE WOULD NOT INCLUDE RECENT EXPOSURE TO THE REALITIES OF A MARINE DIVISION.

7. (C) THE RANK PYRAMID WHICH WOULD ENSUE WITHIN THE DIVISION STAFF SHOULD ALSO BE EXAMINED. OUR TABLES OF ORGANIZATION INDICATE THAT 23 OF THE 45 LIEUTENANT COLONELS AUTHORIZED A DIVISION ARE ON THE DIVISION STAFF. THIS RATIO OF 1 TO 1 BETWEEN STAFF AND COMMAND IS, I THINK, VERY GOOD AND ALLOWS GREAT FLEXIBILITY FOR REASSIGNMENT. ADDING 11 MORE LIEUTENANT COLONELS TO THE DIVISION STAFF WOULD BRING THE NUMBER ON THE STAFF UP TO 34, ALL OF WHOM WOULD BE MANAGED BY A SINGLE COLONEL, THAT IS, THE CHIEF OF STAFF. SENIORITY AND INDIVIDUAL ATTRIBUTES AMONG THE 34 WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS IN ASSIGNMENT AND CONTROL. FOR EXAMPLE, THE G-3 SECTION IS PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED TWO COLONELS AND FOUR LIEUTENANT COLONELS. WITH THIS RANK SPREAD IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE FOR A VERY JUNIOR COLONEL TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY AS THE DIVISION G-3. IN FACT, THIS EXACT SITUATION PRESENTLY PERTAINS IN THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION. BUT IF ALL BILLETS WERE CONVERTED

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PAGE SIX RUMULVA0092 C O N F I D E N T I A L/MCEO/PERSONAL FOR/ TO LIEUTENANT COLONELS, THEN THE MOST SENIOR OF THE SIX LIEUTENANT COLONELS ASSIGNED THE G-3 SECTION WOULD ALMOST NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE THE DIVISION G-3. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, THESE SECOND ECHelon GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF BILLETS COULD BE DOWNGRADED TO MAJOR. THE SAME ARGUMENTS AND COMPARISONS USED ABOVE WOULD THEN APPLY. IN EXCHANGE FOR MODESTLY IMPROVED OPPORTUNITIES OF MAJOR ASSIGNMENTS LIEUTENANT COLONEL OPPORTUNITIES WOULD BE GREATLY IMPAIRED.

8. (C) SOMETIMES COMPARISONS ARE MADE BETWEEN THE MARINE DIVISION STAFF AND THE ARMY DIVISION STAFF. IT IS TRUE THAT THE ARMY SEEKS QUITE PLEASED WITH ITS USE OF LIEUTENANT COLONELS AT THE DIVISION GENERAL STAFF LEVEL. HOWEVER, THERE ARE TWO BASIC DIFFERENCES WHICH ARE SOMETIMES OVERLOOKED. FIRST, THE ARMY DIVISION HAS TWO ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDERS, ONE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED FOR SUPPORT AND ONE FOR MANEUVER. THUS IT HAS BEEN MY OBSERVATION OF OUR NEIGHBORING ARMY DIVISIONS THAT ONE ADC FUNCTIONS AS THE DE FACTO G-1/G-4 AND THE OTHER AS THE DE FACTO G-2/G-3. SECOND, MANY OF THE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE MARINES AT DIVISION LEVEL ARE PERFORMED BY THE ARMY AT CORPS LEVEL.

C O N F I D E N T I A L/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//N0500// PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS. FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS

9. (C) I WON'T DWELL ON THE ADVANTAGES OF HAVING COLONELS AVAILABLE AT DIVISION LEVEL TO DEAL WITH OUR OPPOSITE NUMBERS OUTSIDE THE MARINE CORPS. I RECOGNIZE THAT VIET NAM IS A HIGHLY SPECIALIZED SITUATION, BUT CERTAINLY IT HAS BEEN TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO HAVE THESE COLONELS WHEN IT COMES TO OUR INTERACTIONS WITH THE VIETNAMESE, THE KOREANS, AND THE U.S. ARMY.

10. (C) IN SUMMARY, I WOULD NOT FAVOR THE SUBSTITUTION OF LIEUTENANT COLONELS FOR COLONELS ON THE DIVISION STAFF. THE PRESUMED IMPROVED INCENTIVES FOR THE LIEUTENANT COLONELS WOULD BE FAR OUTWEIGHED, IN MY OPINION, BY THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF DESTROYING THE PRESENT CAREFULLY BALANCED EQUILIBRIUM OF RANKS. I DO THINK THERE ARE CERTAIN BILLETS ON THE DIVISION STAFF WHICH

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PAGE TWO RUMULVA0093 C O N F I D E N T I A L/MCEO/PERSONAL FOR/ MAY BE OVER-RANKED. FOR EXAMPLE, I WOULD NOT ARGUE THAT THE G-3 PLANS OFFICER MUST BE A COLONEL. ALSO, PERHAPS THE COMMANDING OFFICER, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION, SHOULD BE A LIEUTENANT COLONEL. BUT I WOULD SUGGEST THAT SUCH SUBSTITUTIONS BE MADE ON A LINE BY LINE BASIS AND ONLY AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT ALL LIEUTENANT COLONEL BILLETS IN THE DIVISION OFFER A SUBSTANTIAL AND REWARDING CHALLENGE. DOING WELL IN THESE BILLETS SHOULD IN THEMSELVES PROVIDE SUFFICIENT JOB SATISFACTION. OTHER INCENTIVES AT THE LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEVEL WHICH I THINK WOULD BENEFIT NOT ONLY THE INDIVIDUAL BUT THE MARINE CORPS AS A WHOLE WOULD INCLUDE EARLIER HIGH LEVEL SCHOOLING. I THINK THIS IS ONE OF OUR GREATEST SHORTFALLS IN PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT. AND FINALLY, LETS NOT ENHANCE THE POSITION OF THE LIEUTENANT COLONELS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE COLONELS. THE MARINE DIVISION NEEDS NOT ONLY THE BEST COMMANDERS AVAILABLE BUT ALSO THE BEST AVAILABLE FUNCTIONAL MANAGERS. TO BE THE G-1 OR G-4 OR STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE OF A DIVISION CAN BE THE ACME OF ONE COLONEL'S CAREER IN THE SAME SENSE AS COMMANDING A REGIMENT MAY BE FOR ANOTHER. BEST REGARDS.

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TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
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UNCLAS E F T O // N01210// PERSONAL FOR
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN ARMSTRONG/DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
DOWNGRADING OF OFFICER BILLETS

A. CMC LTR AOIC-GLM-22A OF 5 FEB 71
B. DRAFT CG FMFPAC LTR IN/MEB UNDATED

1. THE WING STAFF DOWNGRADING OUTLINED IN REF A IS CONSIDERED DELETERIOUS TO ASTUTE STAFF FUNCTIONING, READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS. THE POSITIONS OUTLINED IN REF B ARE CONCURRED IN. I AM EMPHATICALLY OPPOSED TO DOWNGRADING THE G SECTION BILLETS AND SO INFORMED THE COMMANDANT DURING HIS JULY VISIT. THE FOLLOWING PROVIDES MORE DETAIL ON MY VIEWS.
2. THE WING REPRESENTS A TREMENDOUS INVESTMENT IN MATERIAL RESOURCES AND TECHNICAL SKILLS. DOWNGRADING THE G-1, G-3 AND G-4 BILLETS IS TO SAY THAT THESE BILLETS DO NOT REQUIRE THE EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE REQUIRED OF THOSE COLONELS WHO ARE TRULY CANDIDATES FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL. I DO NOT FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT THE WING G-2 BILLET. THE AIRCRAFT ALONE IN A QUOTE TYPICAL UNQUOTE WING REPRESENT AN INVENTORY VALUE IN EXCESS OF 600 MILLION DOLLARS.

CG FIRST MAW

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PAGE TWO RUMUMHA0037 UNCLAS E F T O PERSONAL FOR SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT ARE ALSO IMMENSE INVESTMENTS. THE WING IS A MORE CENTRALIZED ENTITY FROM THE OPERATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT ASPECTS THAN ITS GROUND COUNTERPART. THE WING AIRCRAFT ARE IN FACT EMPLOYED AND OPERATED THROUGH THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. OPERATIONS ARE CONTINUAL, DYNAMIC AND REQUIRE REAL TIME DECISIONS OF THE G-3. TO CONSIDERABLE EXTENT THESE CONSIDERATION APPLY TO THE G-4 AREA OF INTEREST WITH A LESSER DEGREE OF URGENCY IN ACTIONS. AN INHERENT CHARACTERISTIC OF AIR OPERATIONS IS THAT GROUP AND SQUADRON COMMANDERS HAVE LESS DIRECT INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF THEIR AIRCRAFT ON A GIVEN DAY THAN DOES THE WING G-3. A SINGLE MAG'S AIRCRAFT MAY BE ENGAGED IN DIVERSIFIED TASKS MANY HUNDREDS OF MILES APART AT ANY GIVEN TIME. FROM AN OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORT VIEWPOINT I CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE THAT THE WING G-3 AND G-4 BE SENIOR TO THE MAG COMMANDERS. TO HAVE A LESSER RANK WOULD BE UNSATISFACTORY.

3. UNILATERAL MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS ARE AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE A RARITY IN MY OPINION. IN THIS AREA ARMY DIVISIONS HAVE BG'S AS DEPUTIES FOR OPERATIONS AND FOR LOGISTICS. WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE AT A DISADVANTAGE IN OUR OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICS (INCLUDING REAL ESTATE) DAY BY DAY DEALINGS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARMY, AIR FORCE AND NAVY IF WE DID NOT HAVE STRONG COLONELS AS OUR REPRESENTATIVES. EXPERIENCE IN EVERY WAR INDICATES THAT THE WING GETS INVOLVED IN AN

PAGE THREE RUMUMHA0037 UNCLAS E F T O / PERSONNAL FOR OPERATIONAL OR SUPPORT SENSE WITH MORE DIFFERENT COMMANDS AND AGENCIES THAN ANY OTHER ELEMENT OF ANY SERVICE.

WE CAN NOT AFFORD TO BE OUT GUNNED.

4. THE G-1 BILLET LIKEWISE RATES A TOP PERFORMING COLONEL IN MY OPINION. PERSONNEL SKILLS MANAGEMENT IS A COMPLEX AND IMPORTANT TASK IN ANY MAJOR ORGANIZATION. THE AIRCRAFT WING IS A SEVERE CHALLENGE IN THIS AREA DUE TO THE IMMENSE DIVERSITY AND NUMBER OF TECHNICAL SKILLS REQUIRED.

5. THE ABOVE REFLECTIONS ARE BASED ON A WING IN COMBAT. HAVING BEEN A GROUP COMMANDER AND A WING G-2 IN OTHER THAN COMBAT EMPLOYMENT I FEEL THE SAME CONSIDERATIONS APPLY. THE NINE TOP NOTCH COLONELS REQUIRED FOR THE G-1, G-3 AND G-4 BILLETS IN THREE WINGS CAN AND MUST BE PROVIDED IF WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ABOUT READINESS. AT THE SAME TIME THESE NUMBERS ARE INSIGNIFICANT IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM ALLEGED IN PARA ONE OF REF A.

WARM REGARDS.

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 INFO RUHRSA/ CINCUSARPAC
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 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM MCCAIN, INFO: GEN ROSSON, ADM CLAREX,
 GEN NAZARRO, LTGEN JONES FROM GEN ABRAMS. DELIVER DURING DUTY
 HOURS. SECTION I OF II.
 SUBJ: SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENTS (U)

REF: A. JCS 5734/032117Z MAR 71 (TS) (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE)
 B. CII, CPAC 100359Z MAR 71 (TS) (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE)

1. (TS) REFERENCES ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING (1)
 THE SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND DURATION OF REDEPLOYMENTS THROUGH 31
 DEC 71 AND (2) A REASSESSMENT OF END FY 72 FORCE AND ACTIVITY
 LEVEL REQUIREMENTS IN THE RVN AND THAILAND.

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COG:S/SEC 1-5

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PAGE 2 RAHSMVA9249 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 B. REF B REQUESTED (1) COMUSMACV COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 5, REF A, BY 161700Z MAR 71, AND (2) VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PARAS 4 AND 6, REF A, NLT 13 APR 71.
 2. (TS) THIS MESSAGE ADDRESSES THE SIZE, COMPOSITION AND DURATION OF REDEPLOYMENTS THROUGH 31 DEC 71. OPTIONS CONTAINED IN PARA 5, REF A ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

ALTERNATIVE	SIZE	PHASING
A	29,000	1 MAY-30 JUN 71
B	60,000	1 MAY-31 OCT 71
C	90,000 - (29,000) (61,000)	TWO PHASES 1 MAY-30 JUN 71 1 JUL-31 DEC 71

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES. ALTERNATIVE A POSES NO PROBLEMS AND IS IN LINE WITH CURRENT MACV INCREMENT 7 REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING WHICH WOULD BRING FORCE CEILINGS TO THE JCS APPROVED 255,000 LEVEL ON

1 JUL 71. ALTERNATIVE B IS NOT RECOMMENDED. IT APPEARS TO REDEPLOY AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF SPACES FOR THE PERIOD IN QUESTION. MACV FAVORS A REDUCED REDEPLOYMENT RATE BETWEEN 1 JUL-15 OCT 71 TO (1) PROVIDE STABILITY THROUGH THE GVN NATIONAL ELECTIONS ON 3 OCT; (2) PERMIT A PERIOD OF ACCELERATED RETROGRADE OF EXCESS STOCKAGES; AND (3) FACILITATE THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE EQUIPMENT OF ONE THAI BRIGADE. ALTERNATIVE C IS MANAGEABLE AND ACTUAL REDEPLOYMENTS COULD BE SLOWED DURING THE 1 JUL-15 OCT 71 PERIOD TO ACCOMPLISH THE ABOVE THREE TASKS.

3. (TS) THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE REDEPLOYMENT PACKAGES ARE SUBMITTED:

A. ALTERNATIVE A-29,000 SPACES.

ARMY

COMBAT	3409
3 MANEUVER BNS (OR EQUIVALENTS)	
1 AIR CAV SQDN	
COMBAT SUPPORT	2410
1 AIR DEFENSE BN (-)	
1 AVN BN (-)	
1 FA BN	
1 MILITARY POLICE CO (-)	
OTHERS	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	9211
TOTAL ARMY	15,030
NAVY	
COMBAT SUPPORT	516
TOTAL NAVY	516
AIR FORCE	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	748
TOTAL AIR FORCE	748
USMC	
COMBAT	3691
3 INF BNS	
COMBAT SUPPORT	3575
2 ATK SQDNS	
1 FA BN	
5 HELO SQDNS	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	
TOTAL USMC	5440
0 170045Z/MAR71	12,735
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ALTERNATIVE A TOTAL: 29,000
 B. ALTERNATIVE B - 60,000 SPACES.
 ARMY

COMBAT	9519
1 BRIGADE	
3 MANEUVER BNS (OR EQUIVALENTS)	
1 AIR CAV SQDN	

PAGE 5 RHMSMVA9249 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 COMBAT SUPPORT 9958

1 AIR DEFENSE BN (-)	
1 AVN BN (-)	
5 FA BNS	
2 ENGR BNS (CBT)	
3 HELICOPTER COS	
3 FW AVN COS	
1 MILITARY POLICE CO	
2 SIGNAL BNS	
OTHERS	

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	20,903
TOTAL ARMY	40,380
NAVY	

COMBAT SUPPORT	1316
3 ARL	
SUP ACT	
OTHERS	

TOTAL NAVY	1316
AIR FORCE	

COMBAT	338
2 FTR SQDN	

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 COMBAT SUPPORT 734

1 TAL SQDN	
1 SOS SQDN	

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	4426
TOTAL AIR FORCE	5498
USMC	

COMBAT	3691
3 INF BNS	
COMBAT SUPPORT	3575
2 ATK SQDNS	
1 FA BN	
3 HELO SQDNS	

COMUSMACV	0 170045Z/MAR71	3-5
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COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	5540
TOTAL USMC	12,806
ALTERNATIVE B TOTAL:	60,000
C. ALTERNATIVE C - 90,000 SPACES- TWO PHASES:	
(1) PHASE I - SAME AS ALTERNATIVE A (29,000 SPACES)	
(2) PHASE II - (61,000 SPACES)	
ARMY	
COMBAT	17,688
TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FINAL SECTION OF 2	
3 BRIGADES	
1 ARMORED CAV SDN	
COMBAT SUPPORT	13,866
10 FA BNS	
3 ENGR BNS (CBT)	
6 HELICOPTER COS	
6 FW AVN COS	
3 SIGNAL BNS	

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COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	20,334
TOTAL ARMY	51,888
NAVY	
COMBAT SUPPORT	636
3 ARL	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	964
TOTAL NVAY	1,600
AIR FORCE	
COMBAT	676
4 FTR SDN	
COMBAT SUPPORT	734
1 TAL SDN	
1 SOS SDN	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	6,002
TOTAL AIR FORCE	7,412
USMC	
SPACE REDUCTION	100
PHASE 2 TOTAL:	61,000

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ALTERNATIVE C TOTAL: 90,000
4. (TS) ALTERNATIVE A FORCE PACKAGE, PARA 3A ABOVE, REFLECTS

PAGE 3 RHMSMVA9250 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CURRENT INCREMENT 7 PLANNING AND HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH MACV
SERVICE COMPONENTS. IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE HOLD AND TENTATIVE
NATURE OF THE REQUIREMENT, SERVICE COMPONENTS HAVE NOT BEEN COM-
SULTED IN PREPARING THE DETAILED FORCE PACKAGES TO SUPPORT
ALTERNATIVES B AND C. AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS ARE BASED ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT THE ONE AIR WAR CONCEPT WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT
AND THAT SUFFICIENT AIR ASSETS WILL REMAIN IN SEA TO SUPPORT
10,000 TACAIR SORTIES PER MONTH THROUGHOUT FY 72. THIS IS
ESSENTIAL TO THE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT OF THE RVNAF AND THE
ORDERLY REDEPLOYMENT OF U. S. FORCES. IN THIS CONTEX, THE ABOVE
FORCE PACKAGES ARE SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT WHEN AN ALTERNATIVE IS
SELECTED AND DETAILED PLANNING COMMENCES.

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COMUSMACV

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RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
RUHHFMA/CGFMFPAC
RHMSMVA/CONUSMACV

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TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION 1 OF 2
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL MOORER, INFO GENERAL ROSSON,
ADMIRAL CLAREY, GENERAL NAZZARO, GENERAL ABRAMS, LT GEN
JONES FROM ADMIRAL MCCAIN
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENTS (U)

A. JCS 5734/082117Z MAR 71

1. (S) REF A REQUESTED EXAMINATION OF THREE ALTERNATIVES
FOR FUTURE REDEPLOYMENTS, TO INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING SERVICE COMPOSITION AND MAJOR UNITS BY TYPE FOR
EACH ALTERNATIVE.

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PAGE 2 RUHHGQA2795 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

2. (TS) AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE ALTERNATIVES REVEALS THAT ALTERNATIVE A IS THE MOST DESIRABLE, AS THE 29,000 TO BE REDEPLOYED WILL REDUCE THE FORCE CEILING TO THE LEVEL OF 255,000 BY 1 JUL 71 AS RECOMMENDED BY THE JCS, FOR WHICH PLANS ARE CURRENTLY BEING DEVELOPED. ALTERNATIVE B IS NOT RECOMMENDED, SINCE THE NUMBER OF SPACES TO BE REDEPLOYED IS IN EXCESS OF THAT DESIRED. A REDUCED REDEPLOYMENT RATE IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL BETWEEN 1 JUL-15 OCT 71 TO PROVIDE STABILITY THROUGH THE GVN NATIONAL ELECTIONS ON 3 OCT 71; TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACCELERATED RETROGRADE FOR EXCESS STOCKAGES; AND TO FACILITATE THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR ONE THAI BRIGADE. WHILE ALTERNATIVE C IS MANAGEABLE, IT ALSO APPEARS TO REDEPLOY AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF SPACES DURING THE PROPOSED PERIOD EVEN THOUGH REDEPLOYMENTS COULD BE SLOWED FROM 1 JUL-15 OCT 71 TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASKS OUTLINED ABOVE.

3. (TS) AS U.S. FORCES WITHDRAW, THE SIZE AND QUANTITY OF MATERIALS IN RVN TO BE REDISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE OF RVN ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY, SINCE A LARGE SHARE (60-90 PERCENT) OF RVNAF'S REQUIREMENTS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION HAVE ALREADY BEEN FILLED. THEREFORE, THIS WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASED WORKLOAD IN MAINTENANCE, SANITIZATION OF EQUIPMENT, PACKING AND CRATING, AND PROPERTY DISPOSAL OPERATIONS. TO ACCOMMODATE THESE INCREASED WORKLOADS, ADJUSTMENTS TO THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE C TROOP COMPOSITION, IF SELECTED, MAY BE NECESSARY. EARLY SERVICE DECISIONS ARE NEEDED INDICATING WHETHER REMAINING U.S. UNITS (PARTICULARLY BASELINE UNITS) WILL REDEPLOY WITH OR WITHOUT UNIT EQUIPMENT. THIS DETERMINATION WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON DEVELOPING THE COMPOSITION OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS DURING THE REMAINING PHASES OF U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM VIETNAM.

4. (TS) THE RECOMMENDED COMPOSITION OF REDEPLOYMENT PACKAGES FOR THE THREE ALTERNATIVES OUTLINED IN REF A FOLLOWS:

A. ALTERNATIVE A-29,000 SPACES (1 MAY - 30 JUNE 71)

ARMY

3409

COMBAT
 3 MANEUVER BNS (OR EQUIVALENTS)
 1 AIR CAV SQDN

COMBAT SUPPORT
 1 AIR DEFENSE BN (-)

2410

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PAGE 4 RUHHHQA2795 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

1 AVN BN (-)	
1 FA BN	
1 MILITARY POLICE CO (-)	
OTHERS	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	9211
TOTAL ARMY	15,030
NAVY	
COMBAT SUPPORT	516
TOTAL NAVY	516
AIR FORCE	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	748
TOTAL AIR FORCE	748
USMC	
COMBAT	3691
3 INF BNS	
COMBAT SUPPORT	3575
2 ATK SQDNS	
1 FA BN	
3 HELO SQDNS	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	5440

PAGE 5 RUHHHQA2795 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

TOTAL USMC	12,706
ALTERNATIVE A TOTAL:	29,000
B. ALTERNATIVE B - 60,000 SPACES.	
ARMY	
COMBAT	9519
1 BRIGADE	
3 MANEUVER BNS (OR EQUIVALENTS)	
1 AIR CAV SQDN	
COMBAT SUPPORT	9958
1 AIR DEFENSE BN (-)	
1 AVN BN (-)	
5 FA BNS	
2 ENGR BNS (CBT)	
3 HELICOPTER COS	
3 FW AVN COS	
1 MILITARY POLICE CO	
2 SIGNAL BNS	
OTHERS	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	20,903
TOTAL ARMY	40,380

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NAVY

COMBAT SUPPORT	1316
3 ARL	
SUP ACT	
OTHERS	
TOTAL NAVY	1316
AIR FORCE	
COMBAT	338
2 FTR SQDN	
COMBAT SUPPORT	734
1 TAL SQDN	
1 SOS SQDN	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	4426
TOTAL AIR FORCE	5498
USMC	
COMBAT	3691
3 INF BNS	
COMBAT SUPPORT	3575
2 ATK SQDNS	
1 FA BN	
T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FINAL SECTION OF 2	
3 HELO SQDNS	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	5540
TOTAL USMC	12,806
ALTERNATIVE B TOTAL	60,000
C. ALTERNATIVE C - 90,000 SPACES - TWO PHASES:	
(1) PHASE I - SAME AS ALTERNATIVE A (29,000 SPACES)	
(2) PHASE II - (61,000 SPACES)	
ARMY	
COMBAT	17,588
3 BRIGADES	
1 ARMORED CAV SQDN	
COMBAT SUPPORT	13,866
10 FA BNS	
3 ENGR BNS (CBT)	
6 HELICOPTER COS	
6 FW AVN COS	
3 SIGNAL BNS	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	20,334
TOTAL ARMY	51,888
NAVY	
COMBAT SUPPORT	636
3 ARL	
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	964
TOTAL NAVY	1,600
AIR FORCE	
COMBAT	676
4 FTR SQDN	
COMBAT SUPPORT	734
1 TAL SQDN	

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R 200337Z MAR 71

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1 SOS SQDN

PAGE 3 RUHHHQ2796 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

	TOTAL AIR FORCE	6,002
	USMC	7,412
SPACE REDUCTION		100
	PHASE 2 TOTAL:	61,000
	ALTERNATIVE C TOTAL:	90,000

5. (TS) THE ALTERNATIVE A FORCE PACKAGE, APRA 3A ABOVE, IS IN LINE WITH CURRENT PLANNING, AND HAS BEEN COORDINATED BY MACV WITH SERVICE COMPONENTS. THE FORCE PACKAGES FOR ALTERNATIVES B AND C HAVE NOT BEEN COORDINATED WITH MACV SERVICE COMPONENTS, IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVE AND TENTATIVE NATURE OF THE REQUIREMENT. AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN ALL THREE ALTERNATIVES ARE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ONE AIR WAR CONCEPT WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT, AND THAT SUFFICIENT AIR ASSETS WILL REMAIN IN SEA TO SUPPORT 10,000 TACAIR SORTIES PER MONTH THROUGHOUT FY72. THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT OF THE FNAF AND THE ORDERLY REDEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES. IN THIS REGARD, ALL OF THE ABOVE FORCE PACKAGES ARE SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT AS DETAILED PLANNING FOR THE SELECTED ALTERNATIVE PROGRESSES.

PAGE 4 RUHHHQ2796 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
6. (TS) IN SUMMARY, ALTERNATIVE A PROVIDES FOR THOSE REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO MEET THE END FY 71 FORCE LEVELS PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED BY THE JCS, FOR WHICH DETAILED PLANNING HAS ALREADY BEGUN. ADDITIONALLY, IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S FORTHCOMING ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING REDEPLOYMENTS IN APR 71, IT APPEARS APPROPRIATE TO PLAN ONLY FOR THOSE REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO MEET END FY 71 AUTHORIZATIONS. THEREFORE, RECOMMEND THAT ALTERNATIVE A BE ADOPTED FOR INCREMENT SEVEN REDEPLOYMENTS.

7. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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 PERSONAL FOR LTGEN. JONES, INFO BGEN CONLEY FROM MGEN METZGER.
 DELIVER DURING OFFICE HOURS.

NORTHEAST ASIA COORDINATING COMMITTEE (NEACC) (U)

1. (S) IN VIEW OF BROAD POLICY IMPLICATIONS
 REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED MESSAGE:

QUOTE:

FM CTF SEVEN NINE
 TO COMSEVENTHFLT
 INFO CTF SEVEN ONE
 CTF SEVEN SIX
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE

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NORTHEAST ASIA COORDINATING COMMITTEE (NEACC) (U)
 A. 5AF/TF 71 NEACC BASIC MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

CG I MAF

P 230058Z/MAR71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-3

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PAGE TWO RUOAJA3027 S E C R E T

B. NWP 22 (B)
C. NWP 32 (C)

1. (S) REF A STATES THAT THE NORTHEAST ASIA COORDINATING COMMITTEE (NEACC) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING AND/OR RESOLVING ANY MUTUALLY AGREEABLE ITEMS OF INTEREST TO 5AF AND SEVENTHFLT FOR OPERATIONS IN NEASIA. IF 17 IS THE DESIGNATED COMSEVENTHFLT EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR ALL NEACC MATTERS. NEASIA AS APPLICABLE HEREIN IS DEFINED AS:

- A. THE AIRSPACE, LAND MASS (INCLUDING OFFSHORE ISLANDS) AND TERRITORIAL/INLAND WATERS OF JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA.
- B. THE INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN, THE YELLOW SEA, AND THE EAST CHINA SEA IN OR OVER WHICH U. S. FORCES OPERATE IN RELATION TO U. S. OBJECTIVES IN NEASIA.

2. (S) THE NEACC CONFERENCE HELD 9-11 MARCH REVEALED THAT COORDINATING AND CONTROL DECISIONS REGARDING AIR OPERATIONS AND AIRSPACE CONTROL AFFECTING CTF 79 AIR ASSETS WERE BEING MADE WITHOUT USMC PARTICIPATION OR CONCURRENCE. REF A THE BASIC NEACC AGREEMENT BETWEEN 5AF AND CTF 71 DOES NOT ADDRESS INCREASED USMC AIR ASSETS NOW AVAILABLE AND OPERATING IN NEASIA, NOR DOES IT PROVIDE FOR CTF 79 COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION EXCEPT IN AN OBSERVER

PAGE THREE RUOAJA3027 S E C R E T

ROLE. FUTHER IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR CTF 76 PARTICIPATION WHO MAY BE CATF IN CONTINGENCY OPS INVOLVING CONTROL OF MARINE AIR AFLOAT.

3. (S) THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL PRINCIPLES OF REFS B AND C NOR THOSE OF COMSEVENTHFLT TO HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS. REF A ESSENTIALLY AGREES TO 5AF PEACETIME CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS AS WELL AS AIRSPACE CONTROL AND BY IMPLICATIONS AND APPENDICES SIMILAR CONTROL DURING FUTURE KOREAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. THE BASIC MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT IS NOT ENTIRELY LIMITED TO COORDINATING AIR OPERATIONS BUT ALSO ADDRESSES CERTAIN SURFACE OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF JAPAN.

4. (C) THE MINUTES OF THE LATEST NEACC MEETING PROPOSED THAT THE NEACC STAFF SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF COMMANDER, 5AF AND COMSEVENTHFLT VICE CTF 71 WITH IF 79 REPRESENTATION ON THE OTHER PANELS. IT WAS AGREED THAT COMSEVENTHFLT WILL REPRESENT BOTH NAVY (CARRIER) AND MARINE (SHORE BASED AVIATION ASSETS) AND THAT ANY AGREEMENT FOR CONTROL OF AIR FOR CONTINGENCIES AND EXERCISES MUST FOLLOW JCS APPROVED DOCTRINE AND PLANS. POLICY FOR CONTROL OF AIR IN THE AMPHIBIOUS AREA IS WELL UNDERSTOOD. HOWEVER ONCE CMD IS ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND THE AOA IS DISSOLVED THE CHANGES IN JCS APPROVED CINCPAC OPLAN 50-27 CHANGE 4 SHOULD BE THE DOCTRINE FOR CONTROL OF AIR.

CG I MAF

P 230058Z/MAR71

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PAGE FOUR RUAOAJA3027 S E C R E T

5. (U) IT IS PROPOSED THAT A CONFERENCE OF DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES FROM COMSEVENTHFLT, CTF 71, CTF 79, CTF 76, AND CTG 79.3 CONVENE TO DEVELOP A FIRM COMSEVENTHFLT POLICY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CTF 79 AVIATION ASSETS IN NEASIA AND MODIFY OR ABROGATE THE PRESENT BASIC MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ACCORDINGLY.

6. (S) IF AGREED, THE FOLLOWING ITEMS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED:

- A. SIOP TRAINING. COORDINATION OF USAF, USN AND USMC FLIGHTS IN NEASIA.
- B. USMC PARTICIPATION IN PARPRO AND APPROPRIATE COORDINATION PROCEDURES.
- C. AVIATION COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES AND FACILITIES TO INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE ENTRY OF MTDS INTO WESTPAC NORTH.
- D. PRESENT AND FUTURE PLANS FOR THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT OF JAOCC AND ITS AUTHORITY TO TASK/CONTROL OF CTF 79 FORCES.
- E. CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN PRESENT BASIC MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AND CURRENT COMSEVENTHFLT CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR NEASIA OPERATIONS.
- F. AIRSPACE CONTROL VERSUS CONTROL OF ASSETS TO JOINT/US COMMANDS FOR TRAINING OR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.
- G. COMMUNICATIONS, PARTICULARLY CONTINGENCY WARNING AND

PAGE FIVE RUAOAJA3027 S E C R E T

EXECUTION ORDERS.

- I. DISTRIBUTION OF NEASIA AIR INTELLIGENCE AND AOB.
- J. UTILIZATION OF AIR FORCE/NAVY/USMC FORCES FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION.
- K. CONSOLIDATED AIR FORCE/NAVY/USMC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
- L. ASSIGNMENT OF CTF 79 PERSONNEL TO NEACC PANELS.
- M. PARTICIPATION OF CTF 79 PERSONNEL AS VOTING MEMBERS OF NEACC.

UNQUOTE.

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//N00000//

FORCE PLANNING (U) (REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT SEVEN)

A. CINCPAC 232343Z/MAR71 (TS) (SPECAT)

B. PAR 2103.5 CINCPACFLTINST 5440.3B

C. COMUSMACV 280100Z/MAR 71 (TS) (SPECAT)

1. (U) REFS A AND B REFER.

2. (TS) CONCUR WITH PAR 3D OF REF C REGARDING THE
 PROPOSED TROOP LIST FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF MARINE
 FORCES FROM RVN DURING INCREMENT SEVEN.

3. (TS) THE FOLLOWING MARINE UNITS REDEPLOYING FROM
 RVN DURING INCREMENT SEVEN ARE PLANNED TO REMAIN IN
 PACOM AT THE DESTINATIONS INDICATED. UNITS/DETS ARE
 IDENTIFIED BY LINE NUMBER IN PAR 3D OF REF C:

LINE NR DESTINATIONS

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3326 T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

002	HAWAII
008	29 PALMS, CALIF
010	HAWAII
011	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
013	OKINAWA
014	OKINAWA
015	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
016	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
017	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
018	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
019	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
020	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
022	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
023	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
024	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
025	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
026	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF
027	IWAKUNI, JAPAN
028	EL TORO, CALIF
029	EL TORO, CALIF

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3326 T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

LINE NR	DESTINATIONS
030	EL TORO, CALIF
031	HAWAII
032	IWAKUNI, JAPAN
033	SANTA ANA, CALIF
034	SANTA ANA, CALIF
035	OKINAWA
036	HAWAII
037	HAWAII
038	OKINAWA
039	EL TORO, CALIF
040	OKINAWA

4. (TS) REF A FURTHER REQUESTS COMMENTS REGARDING THE PROPOSED DATES (26 APRIL-1 MAY71) FOR INCREMENT SEVEN MOVEMENT PLANNING CONF. INASMUCH AS THESE DATES CONFLICT WITH SEVENTH FLEET 1ST QTR FY-72 SCHED CONF, RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO CONDUCTING INCREMENT SEVEN MOVEMENT PLANNING CONF 19-24 APRIL 71.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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Mgt	

FROM CEARLEY
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT VI

A: CINCPAC 232343Z MAR 71

B. COMUSMACV 280100Z MAR 71
1. (C) REFERENCE A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON/CONCURRENCE IN THE TROOP LIST SUBMITTED BY REFERENCE B, ALONG WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THOSE UNITS TO REMAIN IN PACOM AND THEIR PROPOSED DESTINATIONS, AND COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE.

2. (S) CONCUR WITH THE USN TROOP LIST. REDEPLOYING USN SPACES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORT TO USMC UNITS; THEREFORE NO USN UNITS WILL BE REDEPLOYED.

3. (TS) CONCUR WITH THE USMC TROOP LIST. THE FOLLOWING USMC UNITS

SINCERELY, T.

P 3104287 MAR 71

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PAGE 2 RUHHBRA3293 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 IDENTIFIED BY LINE NUMBER ARE RECOMMENDED TO REMAIN IN PACOM:

LINE NUMBER - - DESTINATION

002	-	-	-	HAWAII
008	-	-	-	29 PALMS, CALIFORNIA
010	-	-	-	HAWAII
011	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
013	-	-	-	OKINAWA
014	-	-	-	OKINAWA
015	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
016	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
017	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
018	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
019	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
020	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
022	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
023	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
024	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
025	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
026	-	-	-	CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA
027	-	-	-	IWAKUNI, JAPAN
028	-	-	-	EL TORO, CALIFORNIA
029	-	-	-	EL TORO, CALIFORNIA
030	-	-	-	EL TORO, CALIFORNIA
031	-	-	-	HAWAII
032	-	-	-	IWAKUNI, JAPAN

PAGE 3 RUHHBRA3293 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

LINE NUMBER - - - DESTINATION

033	-	-	-	SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA
034	-	-	-	SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA
035	-	-	-	OKINAWA
036	-	-	-	HAWAII
037	-	-	-	HAWAII
038	-	-	-	OKINAWA
039	-	-	-	EL TORO, CALIFORNIA
040	-	-	-	OKINAWA

4. (TS) WOULD PREFER THAT THE MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE BE SCHEDULED THE WEEK OF 19 APRIL VICE 26 APRIL 1971. THE COMSEVENTHFLT QUARTERLY SCHEDULING CONFERENCE IS PLANNED FOR THE SAME TIME FRAME AS THE INCREMENT VII CONFERENCE. FMFPAC REPRESENTATIVES ARE THE SAME INDIVIDUALS FOR BOTH CONFERENCES. IF ADJUSTMENT IS NOT PRACTICABLE, THE PRESENTLY PROPOSED DATES OF 26 APRIL - 1 MAY 1971 ARE ACCEPTABLE.

5. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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CINCPACFLT

P 310428Z MAR 71

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D EQUIV SPACES MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE → D

0 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN DWYER, INFO 0

N MAJGEN OWENS AND BGEN HOFFMAN FROM LTGEN JONES. 0

O MARDIS. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS//NO0000// 0

T STAFFING OF I MAF HEADQUARTERS

T A. CG FMFPAC 262137Z MAR71

T B. ADMIN FMFPAC 050435Z MAR71 (TS)

P 1. (U) REF A PROVIDED THE BILLETS TO BE MANNED ON
 I A PERMANENT BASIS FOR I MAF HQ AND STATED THAT HQMC
 N WILL PROMULGATE A M/L REFLECTING THESE BILLETS FOR
 I THE FOURTH QTR FY71. PERSONNEL FOR THE I MAF STAFF
 N WILL BE REALIZED BY DRAWING DOWN FROM THE FOURTH QTR
 T MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS FOR MAJOR EASTPAC COMDS AS
 THIS FOLLOWS:

COMD	OFF	ENL	TOTAL
FIRST MARDIV	9	6	15
THIRD MAW	5	4	9

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CONFIDENTIAL/MARDIS

FORCE TROOPS	2	2	4
TOTALS	16	12	28

2. (U) AS HQ, I MAF WILL RETAIN THE SEPARATE MCC 1C0, PERSONNEL WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE STAFF DIRECTLY FROM HQMC. PERSONNEL TO MEET THE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, HOWEVER, ARE NOT EXPECTED TO BE ASSIGNED TO NOR ARRIVE AT I MAF UNTIL MID OR LATE FOURTH QTR.

3. (C) IT IS MY DESIRE THAT THE I MAF HQ COMMENCE FUNCTIONING AS A VIABLE HEADQUARTERS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER ITS ESTABLISHMENT IN EASTPAC. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST YOU COORDINATE WITH BOB OWENS AND CARL HOFFMAN AND FORM A NUCLEUS STAFF OF APPROXIMATELY ¹⁰ TO 12 OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL ON A TAD BASIS BY 14 APRIL 1971. ^{2W} I ENVISION THAT SOME OF THESE PERSONNEL MAY LATER BE PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO MAF AND OTHERS RETURNED TO THEIR PARENT COMMANDS AS PERMANENT PERSONNEL ARE ASSIGNED. YOU CAN USE YOUR DISCRETION IN SELECTING THE BILLETS TO BE MANNED USING THE GUIDELINES OF REF B. PERSONNEL SHOULD BE PROVIDED PROPORTIONATELY FROM EACH MAJOR CMD AS INDICATED IN PAR 1 ABOVE INSOFAR AS AVAILABILITY PERMITS. TO ASSIST IN THIS INITIAL STAFFING, I PLAN TO SEND COL WALLY HEYER, OUR G-3 PLANS OFFICER, ON TAD TO THE I MAF STAFF ON 14 APR. HE WILL REMAIN THERE FOR UP TO 45 DAYS IF SUCH IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY.

4. AS YOU KNOW, CHUCK WIDDECKE WILL ASSUME COMMAND OF I MAF AFTER HIS RETURN TO CAMP PENDLETON.

GP-4

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

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O 030530Z APR 71
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO RUEHHEM/CG FMFPAC
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SECRET //NOFORN// PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MAJGEN METZGER
LVTP5'S (U)

1. (S) WITH REFERENCE TO OUR CONVERSATION ON THE NUMBER OF LVTP5'S THAT SHOULD BE HELD IN THE AMTRAC BN. WE HAVE BEEN USING 80 AS OUR AUTH ALLOWANCE. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT IN VIEW OF THE MANNING LEVEL IMPOSED ON THE BN, AT SOME TIME IN THE PAST A DECISION WAS MADE TO HOLD THEM AT THAT LEVEL ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO DOCUMENTATION TO INDICATE WHY.
2. (S) LOU WILSON MADE THE DECISION THAT THEY SHOULD BE UP TO FULL T/E ALLOWANCE OF 100 LVTS AND A PRIORITY 5 REQUISITION WAS SUBMITTED ON 1 MARCH 1971. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS REQUISITION WAS PASSED TO NCSA ON 1 APRIL.
3. (S) IN VIEW OF LIMITED AVAILABLE AMPH LIFT AND THE LIMITATIONS AND REDUCED MANNING LEVEL OF THE AMTRAC BN, THERE IS A SERIOUS QUESTION IN MY MIND WHETHER IT MAKES GOOD SENSE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH AN ADDITIONAL 20 LVTP5'S WHICH WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED, ON

PAGE TWO RUEAOAJA0324 **SECRET**

ISLAND THE ORF IS AUTH 5 LVTP5'S IN ADDITION TO 16 FOR MOUNT OUT AND 16 FOR MOUNT OUT AUGMENTATION. THESE COULD BE MANNED IN CASE OF AN IMPERATIVE TACTICAL REQUIREMENT. I WOULD BE APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR GUIDANCE AND DESIRES IN THIS AREA.

GP-4

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CG THIRD MARDIV

O 030530Z APR 71

ACTN:S/SEC

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PAGE TWO RUQAJA0842 S E C R E T

DEGRADED. THE TWO DISABLED TANKS REPRESENT FORTY PERCENT OF THE COMBAT ARMOR CAPABILITY OF THE MAU. I EXPECT ALL EFFORTS TO BE DIRECTED TO RESTORING THE TANKS TO AN OPERABLE CONDITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THEY MAY BE REEMBARKED IN ARG ALFA.

2. (C) IN YOUR INVESTIGATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE SUBMERSION, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO PARTICULARLY ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) WAS APPROPRIATE BEACH RECON, HYDRO DATA AND INTELLIGENCE PROVIDED IN AN ACCURATE AND TIMELY MANNER IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE.

(B) ARE YOU SATISFIED THAT THE TANK UNIT WAS PROPERLY TRAINED AND FOLLOWED GOOD OPERATION PROCEDURES.

3. (C) THE 18 HOUR DELAY IN SUBMITTING THE INITIAL REPORT TO THIS HDQ IS CONSIDERED EXCESSIVE. LIKEWISE THE LACK OF INPUT TO FORSTAT REFLECTING REDUCED MAJOR EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE IS NOTED WITH CONCERN. A FORSTAT REPORT REFLECTING YOUR EQUIPMENT READINESS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IMMEDIATELY. FURTHER, IT IS REQUESTED THAT FUTURE REPORTS OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS, BOTH NARRATIVE AND FORSTAT IF APPLICABLE, BE EXPEDITIOUSLY SUBMITTED.

GP-4

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CCTF SEVEN NINE

P 080540Z/APR71

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R 090353Z APR 71

FM CINCPACFLT

INFO CG FMFPAC

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR MAJGEN JONES FROM RICHARDSON

1. FOLLOWING MSG PASSED TO YOU FOR INFO. QUOTE:

P 060454Z APR 71

FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUADLBA/COMNAVFORJAPAN

INFO RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

BT

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE //N00000//
FOR RADM BURKE INFO VADM WEISNER FROM RICHARDSON
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

OKINAWA REVERSION (U)

A. COMNAVFORJAPAN 020826Z APR 71

1. (SNF) IN REFERENCE A, YOU EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER OUR CAPABILITY
TO SATISFY USMC MOUNT OUT REQUIREMENTS IN THE RYUKYUS. I CAN ASSURE
YOU THAT THE PORTION OF A STUDY DEVELOPED BY CINCPAC, IN COORDINATION
WITH HIS COMPONENT COMMANDERS, ON THE JAPANESE ASSUMPTION OF DEFENSE
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE RYUKYUS PROTECTS NAVAL INTERESTS TO SATISFY
USMC MOUNT OUT REQUIREMENTS. THE CINCPAC STUDY WAS FORWARDED TO THE
JCS FOR APPROVAL ON 24 SEPT 1970.

2. (SNF) INFORMAL LIAISON WITH OPNAV CONFIRMS THAT THE JCS PAPER NOW
UNDER REVIEW IN OSD, THAT YOU MENTIONED, QUOTES VERBATIM THE CINCPAC
STUDY. THIS STUDY CLEARLY DEFINES THE MARINE REQUIREMENTS AND

CINCPACFLT

R 090353Z/APR71

COG: S/SEC 1-2

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PAGE 2 RUHHBRA4198 S E C R E T NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
NECESSITY FOR ADEQUATE STAGING AND MOUNT OUT AREAS. IT PROVIDES FOR
RETENTION OF RIGHTS TO UNLIMITED USE OF ALL ACCESS READS TO STAGING
AREAS. AND, THE NAVY PIER, AND UTILIZATION OF ARMY LAND FOR STAGING
BY BOTH USA AND USMC AS AN ALTERNATE TO USE OF CURRENT USMC STAGING
AREA. FURTHER, IT INCLUDED THE REQUIREMENT FOR U.S. PRE-EMPTIVE
RIGHTS TO USE JAPANESE FACILITIES SUCH AS ACCESS ROADS, AND PLANNED
JAPANESE SEAPLANE RAMP AND PARKING APRON FOR USMC MOUNT CUT UNDER
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

4. (SNF) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PROGNOSIS FOR SECDEF APPROVAL
OF THE JCS PAPER IS FAVORABLE. UPON SECDEF APPROVAL, AS YOU KNOW,
THE MATTER WILL BE IN THE HANDS OF THE MILRONT WHEN U.S. -GOJ
NEGOTIATIONS GET UNDERWAY.

5. (SNF) I APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN EXPRESSED IN REFERENCE A AND
SOLICIT YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT TO ENSURE THAT WE LET NOTHING FALL
THROUGH THE CRACKS ON THE OKINAWA REVERSION.

6. (U) BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE.

2. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

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R 090353Z/APR71

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 FM CG I MAF
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S E C R E T //N04400// PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN METZGER
 DELIVER DURING OFFICE HOURS
TANK SUBMERSION

A. CTG 79.4 091525Z APR 71 (S-PERS FOR) (NOTAL)
 B. CTF 79 080540Z APR 71 (S-PERS FOR)
 1. (S) REF A IS CTG 79.4 INTERIM REPORT RESULTING FROM REF B AND
 IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO:
 QUOTE:

P 091525Z APR 71
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO CTF SEVEN NINE
 BT

S E C R E T //N00000//
 PERSONAL FOR MGEN METZGER FROM COL DICKEY
 DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS
 EQUIPMENT READINESS (U)
 A. CTG SEVEN NINE 080540 AP 71
 B. MCO P3000/28 W/CH 1-1

CG I MAF

R 100730Z/APR71

ACTN: S/SEC
 1-4

81

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PAGE TWO RUAOAJA1168 S E C R E T

C. CTG 79.4 061015Z APR 71

D. CMC 121954Z FEB 71

1. REF A WAS DELIVERED 090105Z.

2. WITH REGARD TO PARA 2A OF REF A:

A. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED BY CTG 76.4: QUOTE

(1) BEACH INTELLIGENCE AND HYDRO DATA WAS PROVIDED IN CTF 471 OPORD 320-71 BASED ON UDT-13 DET ECHO AND PN UOU BEACH SURVEY REPORT OF 12 DEC 70. THE INFO FOR BLUE BEACH ONE WHERE TANKS LANDED, INDICATED 'MINOR SAND BAR ACTION' BUT 'INSUFFICIENT TO DISRUPT AMPHIBIOUS LANDING CRAFT'. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS DISCLOSED CONDITIONS CHANGED IN THE ENSUING FOUR MONTHS AFTER INITIAL SURVEY.

(2) ASPRIXIDEDAXRR IN CTF 471 OPORD 320-71, USS FRESNO (LST 1182), WITH UDT DET, CONDUCTED A CHECK-TYPE BEACH RECON AND MADE MSG SURF REPORTS OF DESIGNATED BEACHES COMMENCING ABOUT H-6 HOURS. SURROBS WERE RECEIVED IN TIMELY MANNER (EVERY TWO HOURS, COMMENCING ABOUT H-6 HOURS) AND INDICATING MAX SURF 1.5 FEET 100 PERCENT SPILLING. THE HYDRO RECON FOR BLUE BEACH ONE WAS NOT RECEIVED UNTIL H-44 MIN (VICE H-90 MIN SPECIFIED IN OPORD) AND WHEN RECEIVED COULD NOT BE USED AS IT WAS KEYED TO A BEACH SURVEY SKETCH NOT DISTRIBUTED TO THE PCS OR ASSAULT GROUP COMMANDER. TIME REMAINING AFTER EFFORTS TO DECIPHER AND PLOT THE

PAGE THREE RUAOAJA1168 S E C R E T

REPORT DID NOT PERMIT OBTAINING CLARIFICATION.

(3) AFTER FIRST BOATED WAVE ENCOUNTERED SAND BAR, UDT WAS DIRECTED TO CONDUCT RESURVEY FOR BLUE BEACH ONE TO LOCATE SITE TO SAFELY LAND LCM-8 WITH ON CALL WAVE OF TANKS. SAFE SITE WAS LOCATED ON EXTREME RIGHT FLANK OF BEACH. THIS POST H-HOUR SURVEY REVEALED A SAND BAR 25 YARDS OUT WITH LEAST DEPTH OF 2.5 TO 4 FEET EXTENDING ACROSS LEFT HALF OF BEACH. AVERAGE DEPTH REPORTED BETWEEN BAR AND BEACH WAS 5-6 FEET WITH MAX 7 FEET, IN ONE SPOT. UNQUOTE.

B. BASED ON THE ABOVE, MY CONCLUSIONS ARE THAT HYDROGRAPHIC DATA WAS: (1) UNTIMELY (THROUGH A SERIES OF CIRCUMSTANCES)

(2) INACCURATE, ASSUMING THE REPORT THAT THE TANK WAS IN 8-9 FEET OF WATER TO BE ACCURATE (UDT REPORTED MAX DEPTH TO BE 7 FEET).

3. WITH REGARD TO PARA 2B OF REF A:

A. ALTHOUGH WELL TRAINED THE TANK PLATOON LACKS EXPERIENCE IN WET LANDINGS. PREVIOUS AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS HAVE BEEN EITHER TURNAWAYS OR DRY LANDINGS. THE PLATOON COMMANDER AND THE PLATOON SERGEANT ARE NEW (JAN 71) IN THE PLATOON AND ONLY THE PLATOON SERGEANT AND ONE SECTION LEADER HAVE PREVIOUS WET LANDING EXPERIENCE. THE BLT 1/9 OPERATION/ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS INDICATE PROBABILITY OF A WET LANDING AND DIRECTED INSTALLATION OF FORDING KITS FOR ALL BLT 1/9 EQUIPMENT GOING

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PAGE FOUR RUAOAJA1168 S E C R E T

ASHORE BY SURFACE MEANS. THE PLATOON COMMANDER DID NOT INSTALL HIS FORDING GEAR BASED ON FOLLOWING REASONS:

(1) TANK DEEP WATER FORDING GEAR WAS ABOARD A TRUCK ON THE LST. TANKS WERE ABOARD THE LPD. TANKS AND TRUCKS WERE INITIALLY TOGETHER BUT SHIFT IN LOADING WAS MADE IN SUBIC TO PERMIT SPACE FOR LVT'S ABOARD LPD IN CASE LST, WHICH CARRIED LVT'S, SUFFERED A RECURRANCE OF DIFFICULTY WITH HER STERN GATE, THUS AT LAST MINUTE PRECLUDING HER PLAY IN THE EXERCISE. (THIS SEPARATION WAS NOT IN ITSELF REASON FOR FAILURE TO UTILIZE FORDING GEAR AS THERE WAS ADEQUATE TIME PRIOR TO THE LANDING TO OBTAIN IT).

(2) BEACH INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO TANK PLATOON INDICATED 1:30 AVERAGE GRADIENT AND 8 FEET OVER THE SAND BAR.

B. WHEN THE BOAT GROUNDED, A BOAT HOOK WAS DIPPED INTO THE WATER AT THE BOW AND INDICATED 4 FEET DEPTH.

C. MAXIMUM DEPTH FORDABLE WITH DEEP WATER FORDING GEAR IS 8 FEET. TANK B31 (IN WHICH THE PLATOON LEADER WAS RIDING) WAS IMMERSED IN 8-9 FEET WITH WAVES OVER/INTO TURRENT. WITH FORDING GEAR B31 MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE STALLED. ACTUAL DAMAGE INCURRED TO EITHER B31 OR B32 IS AS YET UNKNOWN SO THE EFFECT OF THE LACK OF FORDING GEAR IN THIS REGARD IS ALSO UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.

D. THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY INTERVIEW WITH THE TANK PLATOON

PAGE FIVE RUAOAJA1168 S E C R E T

LEADER, DISCUSSION WITH CO BLT 1/9 AND AN EXPERIENCED TANK OFFICER (LTCOL COLLIER). ADDITIONAL DETAILS AND STATEMENTS OF OTHERS CONCERNED WILL BE PROVIDED IN THE INVESTIGATION CONVECO, BY CO BLT 1/9 WHEN COMPLETED.

E. MY CONCLUSIONS AT THIS POINT ARE: THAT THE TANK PLATOON IS ADEQUATELY TRAINED BUT HERETOFORE LACKED EXPERIENCE IN WET LANDINGS; THAT THE PLATOON LEADER WAS REMISS IN NOT INSTALLING DEEP WATER FORDING GEAR AND DID NOT FOLLOW GOOD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES IN THIS RESPECT. IN SO FAR AS HIS LAUNCHING HIS TANK IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE DEEP WATER I RESERVE JUDGEMENT PENDING RESULTS OF BLT 1/9'S INVESTIGATION. FINALLY, BASED ON A SOMEWHAT LIMITED OBSERVATION MY OPINION OF THE TANK PLATOON LEADER IS THAT HE IS WELL MOTIVATED, INTELLIGENT, HONEST YOUNG SECOND LIEUTENANT.

4. WITH REGARD TO PARA 3 OF REF A, FORESTAT REPORTING:

A. DEADLINED STATUS OF THE TWO TANKS USMC SERIAL NUMBERS 202028 AND 201264, IF CRITERIA WERE MET, COULD HAVE BEEN REFLECTED/REPORTED ON FORSTAT CARD-TYPED D (UNIT READINESS INFORMATION REPORT) OR FORSTAT CARD-TYPE G (UNIT EQUIPMENT INFORMATION REPORT).

B. FORSTAT CARD-TYPE D WOULD BE SUBMITTED IF THE LOSS OF THE TWO TANKS EFFECTED EITHER EQUIPMENT READINESS RATING OR COMPOSITE READINESS

CG I MAF

R 100730Z/APR71

3-4

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PAGE SIX RUAOAJA1168 S E C R E T

RATING I.E. REDUCTION TO A LOWER C. RATING THAN THE PRESENT C-1 CATEGORY. ALTHOUGH THE LOSS IS SIGNIFICANT, IT IS NOT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IAW THE CRITERIA OF TABLE 21 TO REF B TO REDUCE EITHER OVERALL EQUIPMENT READINESS RATING OR COMPOSITE READINESS RATING FROM C-1 TO C-2.

C. A FORSTAT CARD-TYPE G IS SUBMITTED BY THE MAU ON ALL MAJOR EQUIPMENT LISTED IN TABLE 16 OF REF B, WHICH IS UNDER CUSTODIAL CONTROL OF THE HMM OR BLT I.E., CH-46D, CH-53D, UH-1E, 106MM RR AND 81MORTAR. OTHER EQUIPMENT EMBARKED WITH THE MAU LISTED IN TABLE 16, I.E., LTV'S, M48 TANKS AND 105 HOW ARE UNDER CUSTODIAL CONTROL OF THE ATTACHED UNIT PARENT COMMAND ON OKINAWA AND ARE, IAW PARA 3802.2 OF REF B, REPORTED UNDER FORSTAT BY THE PARENT COMMAND UPON NOTIFICATION OF STATUS CHANGE BY THE MAU. REF C NOTIFIED 3RD TANK BN OF THE DEADLINE STATUS OF THE TWO TANKS, USMC SERIAL NUMBERS 202028 AND 201264. THUS FORSTAT CHANGE CARD-TYPE G ON THE TANKS MUST BE SUBMITTED BY THAT COMMAND RATHER THAN BY THIS HQ.

5. HOWEVER IN SO FAR AS THE MARES SYSTEM IS CONCERNED, THE DEADLINE STATUS OF THE TWO TANKS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED BY THIS HQ ON 6APR71 ON THAT DATE CONDITION OF THE TANKS WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED TO INITIATE MARES CARD-TYPE GB TO DEADLINE THE TANKS FOR LTI'S (PARA

PAGE SEVEN RUAOAJA1168 S E C R E T

22504.2A OF REF B REFERS), TWO SUCH CARDS HAVE NOW BEEN SUBMITTED.

6. REGRET LATE SUBMISSION REFERENCE (A) AND MARES CARD-TYPE BG.

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE.

2. (S) I HAVE PASSED THE INFO IN REF B TO CTG 76 AND I AM TAKING REMEDIAL ACTION IN HOUSE. HOPEFULLY RADM GADDIS WILL DO SAME.
VERY RESPECTFULLY.

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 TO RUAOAJA/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW (REAR)
 RUAOAJA/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER
 RUAOANA/THIRD FORSERVREGT
 RUAOBMA/MCAS (H) FUTEMA
 INFO RUWJDFA/CG MCB CAMP PENDLETON
 BT

UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN METZGER, BGEN CONLEY, BGEN BARROW,
 COL ROEDER AND COL LAMAR, INFO MAJGEN BOWMAN FROM LTGEN JONES.
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS //N05391//

SUBJ: PERSONAL RESPONSE SEMINAR IN CROSS-CULTURAL INTERACTION
 A. CG FMFPAC 292253Z MAR 71 (NOTAL)

1. THE SUGGESTION MADE IN REF A AND PERSONALLY APPROVED BY
 GENERALS METZGER AND BOWMAN REINFORCES THE OPINION THAT THE
 URGENCY OF THIS PROGRAM CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED. ACCORDINGLY,
 THIS IS THE PROPOSED TRAINING SCHEDULE IN BROAD FORM FOR
 OKINAWA. TO ACHIEVE ITS GREATEST IMPACT A SINGLE CAMP SHOULD BE
 THE SITE OF THIS PILOT PROGRAM; AND THAT CAMP SHOULD BE CAMP
 HANSEN.

2. I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT A TOTAL OF 10 OFFICERS AND 10 STAFF
 NCO'S/NCO'S INSTRUCTOR TRAINEES SELECTED FROM WITHIN THIRD
 MARDIV, 1ST MAW REAR/MCAS (H) FUTEMA, 3D FSR, AND CAMP BUTLER
 THE REASON FOR THIS

NUMBER WOULD BE TO ALLOW FOR SHAKEDOWN AND POSSIBLE ATTRITION.
 IN MULTIPLE CONVERSATIONS WITH CHAPLAIN SCHNEIDER, THE REQUISITE
 SKILLS FOR THE TRULY "SUCCESSFUL" INSTRUCTOR ARE SIMPLE: A GOOD
 LEADER, WHO IS BRIGHT, IMAGINATIVE, ARTICULATE, SECURE, MODEST,
 A QUICK THINKER, HONEST, GENUINELY MOTIVATED IN THE PEOPLE
 BUSINESS, CAREER ORIENTED, AND WITH ENOUGH GUTS TO TELL THE
 TROOPS WHAT HE THINKS INSTEAD OF WHAT HE THINKS HE OUGHT TO SAY
 TO TROOPS. I KNOW THAT THIS SOUNDS LIKE A REAL WATER WALKER,
 BUT THERE ARE SOME OUT THERE. OF SECONDARY IMPORT IS A FORMAL
 EDUCATION. IF POSSIBLE, AND I STRESS IF POSSIBLE, A DEGREE IN
 THE HUMANITIES WITH A BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE MAJOR WOULD HELP THE
 GUY AT THE INITIAL STAGES. HOWEVER, THE OVERALL INSTRUCTOR
 TRAINEE GROUP SHOULD NOT BE "LILY WHITE." SOME MINORITY GROUP
 REPRESENTATION IS VIRTUALLY ESSENTIAL.

3. THE INSTRUCTOR TRAINEES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN AN

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P 110021Z APR 71

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INTENSIVE TRAINING PROGRAM FROM 19 APR TO 22 MAY AND THIS REQUIRES THEIR FULL COMMITMENT. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THEY BE IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THEIR TOUR SO THAT WE CAN ALL DERIVE THE MAXIMUM BENEFIT FROM THIS TRAINING.

4. THE FOLLOWING IS THE PROPOSED ITINERARY OF CHAPLAIN SCHNEIDER AND HIS ENLISTED ASSISTANT, GYSGT WRENCH. ADDITIONALLY, I INTEND TO SEND CAPT ERNEST KIMOTO FROM THE HUMAN AFFAIRS BRANCH OF THIS HQ TO ASSIST CHAPLAIN SCHNEIDER IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE.

12 APR	DEPART CAMP PENDLETON - ARRIVE HAWAII; ATTEND THE CINCPAC DEBRIEF OF MR. RENDER
13 APR	BRIEF LTGEN JONES AND DEPART HAWAII
14 APR	ARRIVE OKINAWA
15/16 APR	BRIEF MAJGEN METZGER/BGEN BARROW, COL ROEDER, COL LAMAR, AND COL ZITNIK
17/18 APR	PRE-TRAINING PREPARATION
19 APR	COMMENCE TRAINING OF INSTRUCTORS
19-23 APR	TEAM BUILDING PROCESS
24-25 APR	INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
26-30 APR	SEMINAR CONTENT DEVELOPMENT
1-2 MAY	INTERNALIZING AND READING PERIOD
3-7 MAY	SEMINAR BY TRAINERS AND PROCESSING FEEDBACK
8-9 MAY	INTERNALIZING AND READING PERIOD
10-14 MAY	SEMINAR BY TRAINEES, TEAM NO. 1, AND PROCESSING FEEDBACK
15-16 MAY	INTERNALIZING AND READING PERIOD
17-21 MAY	SEMINAR BY TRAINEES, TEAM NO. 2, AND PROCESSING FEEDBACK
22 MAY	GRADUATION AND SELECTION OF INSTRUCTORS
23-26 MAY	WRAP-UP AND LAUNCH OF TRAINING PROGRAM
27 MAY	BRIEF BY CHAPLAIN SCHNEIDER TO ALL PARTICIPATING COMMANDS
28 MAY	DEPART OKINAWA
28 MAY	BRIEF LTGEN JONES AND PROVIDE COMPLETE PROGRAM DETAILS AT ACTION OFFICER LEVEL FOR FURTHER FMFPAC/MARCORBASESPAC IMPLEMENTATION

5. WARM REGARDS.

BT

CG FMFPAC

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~~TOP SECRET FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM ENGEN INFO BGEN HOUGHTON FROM RADM ISAMAN. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.~~

NUCLEAR WEAPON DEPLOYMENT PLANS (U)

- A. ADMIN CINCPAC 022217Z APR 71 (PASEP)
- B. CINCPA MAR 71 (PASEP)
- C. CINCPAC 200349Z MAR 71 (PASEP)
- D. COMUSTDC 260530Z MAR 71 (PASEP)

1. (TS/FRD) REFS A THROUGH D ARE PASSED FOR INFORMATION. TENTATIVE PLANS FOR USING TAINAN AB TO STAGE MARINE SIOP SORTIES UPON OKINAWA REVERSION ARE STILL ON TRACK, BUT SUBJECT TO MUCH SPADE WORK. CONTINUANCE OF DETAILED PLANNING AT THIS POINT IN TIME IS LIMITED BY UNKNOWN USAF FORCE LEVELS IN WESTPAC AND USAF POSTURE IN TAIWAN FOR THE FY 73 AND SUBSEQUENT TIME FRAME. THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF RESIDUAL PACAF FORCES AT TAINAN AB, WHICH WILL AFFECT MARINE SECURITY AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS, ARE UNKNOWN AND UNOBTAINABLE FROM CINCPACAF. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE UNDETERMINED USAF POSTURE IN TAIWAN IN FY 73 RESULTS, IN PART, FROM THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION OF CHANGES TO NUCLEAR WEAPON DEPLOYMENT ALLOCATION IN TAIWAN WHICH ARE NECESSITATED BY OKINAWA REVERSION.

ADMIN CINCPACFLT

R 122104Z APR 71 COG: S/SEC 1-2

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2. (TS/FRD) THE MARINE USE OF TAINAN AB IS ALSO DEPENDENT ON AIR FORCE CONSTRUCTION OF WEAPON STORAGE FACILITIES AT CCK AB WHICH THEN PERMITS AIR FORCE CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT CCK AB AND VACATING THE STORAGE FACILITIES AT TAINAN AB. WE ARE BECOMING CONCERNED THAT TAINAN AB WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR OUR USE ON 1 JULY 1972 BECAUSE OF THE LONG LEAD TIME INVOLVED IN (1) APPROVAL OF FY 73 TAIWAN NUCLEAR WEAPON DEPLOYMENTS, (2) DETERMINATION OF THE USAF TAIWAN POSTURE, AND (3) AUTHORIZATION/FUNDING/CONSTRUCTION OF THE CCK AB STORAGE FACILITY.

3. (TS/FRD) WHETHER THE EVENTUAL CCK AB FACILITY IS TO STORE 90 OR 137 USAF WEAPONS, OR SOME OTHER NUMBER, IS NOT MATERIAL TO US SO LONG AS STORING THE 47 NAVY SIOP WEAPONS AT TAINAN AB IS AUTHORIZED AND THE STORAGE FACILITIES ARE MADE AVAILABLE. A DELAY OF AUTHORIZATION FOR NAVY STORAGE FOR WEAPONS AT TAINAN AB WILL EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDE ANY LARGE SCALE MARINE SIOP CONTRIBUTION IN THE PACOM AFTER FY 72. IT IS A MATTER OF CONCERN THAT THE DELAY IN A

PAGE 3 RUHHBRA5043 TOP SECRET FRD SPECAT EXCLUSIVE DECISION ON TAIWAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT MAY INVOLVE DELIBERATIONS ON PROPOSALS WHICH COULD RESULT IN A DECISION AGAINST AUTHORIZATION OF NAVY WEAPONS AT TAINAN AB. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED IN OBTAINING A FAVORABLE DECISION.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

BT

ADMIN CINCPACFLT

R 122104Z APR 71

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R 130148Z APR 71
FM COMNAVBASE SUBIC
TO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUHHBRA/COMSERVPAC
RUMMWGA/COMUSNAVPHIL
RUHHFMA/CG MARCOR BASES PACIFIC
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPA~~C~~
RHLSAA/COMNAVCOM

BT

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PERSONAL FOR ADM CLAREY INFO VADM BRINGLE, LGEN JONES, RADM O'BRIEN,
MUSE AND FITZPATRICK FROM SHAWCROSS.

PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM

A. CINCPACFLT 090427Z APR 71 NOTAL

1. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN TAKING MANY ACTIONS ACROSS THE COMMAND SPECTRUM AT SUBIC TO IMPROVE OUR PHYSICAL SECURITY POSTURE. EACH TYPE COMMANDER/COMMAND SPONSOR INVOLVED HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE AND HELPFUL IN BUDGET AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF COORDINATED EFFORT IN TIGHTENING OUR EXTERNAL SECURITY AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL COMMAND ACTIONS TO IMPROVE INTERNAL SECURITY WHERE LACKING. I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE RESULTS, ALTHOUGH WE APPEAR TO BE INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE AND MUST CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AND SOPHISTICATE OUR EFFORTS.
2. THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT AREA REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY AND EARLY RESOLUTION IS THAT OF ESTABLISHING A CENTRALIZED SECURITY ORGANIZATION (PROVOST MARSHALL) FOR EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALL DEDICATED SECURITY FORCES (MARBKs, CONSOLIDATED BASE SECURITY, ARMED FORCES POLICE). WE REASONED SOMETIME AGO THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WAS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE AND EXPLOIT OUR MANY EFFORTS IN DEVELOPING AN IMPROVED SECURITY SYSTEM. HOWEVER, WE WERE UNCERTAIN JUST HOW TO PROCEED.

COMNAVBASE SUBIC

R 130148Z/APR71

COG:SSEC 1-2

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1. IN THIS REGARD, THE CNO TEAM VISIT AND THE BARROW REPORT HAVE REINFORCED THIS CONCEPT, AND AS ADVISED BY GEORGE MUSE, WE HAVE FORMED AN AD HOC COMMITTEE TO REVIEW BOTH REPORTS AND DEVELOP A RECOMMENDED COMUSNAVPHIL/COMNAVBASE SUBIC SECURITY ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS FOR SUBIC/CUBI, SAN MIGUEL AND CAPAS. THE AD HOC GROUP IS COMPROMISED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH OF THE TYPE COMMANDERS: COMMAND SPONSORS WITHIN THE LOCAL AREA COORDINATION AUTHORITY SPECIFIED BY REF A. THE COMMANDING OFFICER, MARINE BARRACKS SUBIC IS CHAIRING THIS EFFORT.

2. IN THE INTERIM, I HAVE DESIGNATED THE CO MARBKS AS ACTING NAVAL BASES SECURITY OFFICER- THE 'CZAR' AS RECOMMENDED IN BOTH REPORTS. I BELIEVE THE DELIVERATIONS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WILL SUPPORT THIS CONCEPT AND IT IS IMPORTATN THAT WE RECOGNIZE NOW THAT A PROPER OPERATIONAL STAFF WILL BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THIS DUAL-HATTED INDIVIDUAL. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF THE DEDICATED FORCES CURRENTLY ASSIGNED SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE PROVIDED BY THE PRESENT SPONSORS.

3. AS REQUESTED, PROGRESS REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED AS APPROPRIATE. ASSUMING VALIDATION OF THE CONDEPT SUPPORTING THE ORGAIZATIONAL ENTITY OF AN OTC, E.E. CO MARBKS, WE WILL REQUIRE APPROVAL OF BILL JONES AND CMC. OTHER BILLET ARRANGEMENTS CAN QUITE PROBABLY BE HANDLED WITH LES O' BIRENS'S PERSONNEL ASSETS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED.

4. WARM REGARDS.

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COMNAVBASE SUBIC

R 130148Z/APR71

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P 140357Z APR71
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TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

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TOR: 140828Z APR 71

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TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION ONE OF THREE SECTIONS FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN METZGER

1. (TS) FOLLOWING MESSAGES QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

A. QUOTE:

O 120408Z APR71
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
INFO CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTF SEVEN NINE
BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
INFO MGEN MTZGER, CAPT WILDER AND COL DICKEY FROM WEISNER
DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE:

O 112152Z APR71
FM ADMIN CINCPACFLT
TO COMSEVENTHFLT
INFO CTF SEVEN SIX
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM WEISNER INFO RADM GADDIS FROM RICHARDSON
P 102316Z APR71
FM CINCPAC
TO COMUSMACV
CINCPACFLT
BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL ABRAMS AND ADMIRAL CLAREY FROM
ADMIRAL MCCAIN
DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (U)
A. CINCPAC 030508Z FEB71

CG I MAF P 140357Z APR 71
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1. (TS) REF A FORWARDED SCENARIO LBR DEPLOYMENT OF AN ARG/MAU TO OPERATE OFF THE COAST OF SOUTHERN RVN, WITH THE BASIC PURPOSE OF INHIBITING MOVEMENT OF RVN TROOPS TO COUNTER LAMSON 719 OPERATIONS, ARG ALFA EXECUTED THE PLANS DEVELOPED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF REF A, DURING THE PERIOD 11 FEB TO 7 MAR 71. IN THE FRAME-WORK OF CONTINUING DRAWN-DOWN OF U.S. FORCE LEVELS, THE CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF A CAPABILITY FOR SHORT-FUSED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT LANDINGS IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO SOLICIT YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF AGAIN EXERCISING ARG ALFA IN THE RVN LITTORAL, TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF AN EXERCISE LANDING IN RVN.

2. (TS) ASSUMPTIONS:

A. AN EXERCISE AREA CAN BE SELECTED THAT WILL IMPOSE LITTLE DANGER OF DIRECT COMBAT, ALTHOUGH U.S. FORCES WOULD STAND READY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AT ALL TIMES.

B. POSITIVE BENEFIT WOULD ACCRU FROM OVERT DEMONSTRATION THAT AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING EXERCISES CAN NOW BE HELD IN RVN.

C. RVN IS COGNIZANT OF USG CONSTRAINTS ON REINTRODUCTION OF THE MAU INTO RVN. UNLESS APPROPRIATELY REMINDED PERIODICALLY THAT WE ARE MAINTAINING A QUICK-REACTION AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY, THE ENEMY MAY SUBSTANTIALLY DISCOUNT THE THREAT SUCH FORCES POSE. THIS WOULD PERMIT GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF RVN DEFENSE FORCES, TO THE LIKELY DETRIMENT OF RVNAF OPERATIONS.

D. THE EXERCISE PERIOD WILL BE LIMITED TO 5-7 DAYS.

3. (TS) CONCEPT: A REASONABLY SECURE AREA WILL BE SELECTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING REALISTIC TRAINING FOR THE ARG/MAU, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE CAN EXECUTE A ROUTINE AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING EXERCISE IN RVN. THIS WOULD SERVE TO EMPHASIZE BOTH THAT VIETNAMIZATION IS PROCEEDING WELL, AND THAT ARG ALFA/MAU 31 CONTINUES TO CONSTITUTE AN AVAILABLE "FORCE IN BEING". FURTHER, IT WOULD IMPLICITLY INDICATE A STRATEGIC RESOLVE TO USE AVAILABLE U.S. FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES IN SEA.

4. (TS) YOUR EVALUATION SHOULD INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, CONSIDERATION OF THE FOLLOWING MATTERS:

A. AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE ONLY, OR AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARVN OPERATIONS.

B. HOLD AT SEA, TURN-AWAY LANDING, ACROSS-THE-BEACH, OVER-THE-BEACH OR OTHER.

C. OPTIMUM AND ALTERNATE AREAS OF OPERATIONS OR FEINTS.

D. EXPECTED BENEFITS, AND LIKELY EFFECT ON ENEMY ACTIVITIES.

E. PLANNED DURATION.

F. BEST DATES FOR EXECUTION.

5. (U) REQUEST REPLY ARRIVE CINCPAC NLT 16 APR 71.

6. (U) WARMEST REGARDS.

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CG-I MAF

P 140828Z APR 71

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PAGE FIVE RUOAJA1587 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
UNQUOTE.

2. ALL BEST WISHES.

GP-1

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UNQUOTE

B. QUOTE:

O 120410Z APR71
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
INFO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN METZGER, RADM GADDIS INFO COMMODORE
WILDER AND COL DICKEY FROM VADM WEISNER
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (U)

A. CINCPAC 102316Z APR 71 (PASEP)

1. (S) REQUEST COORDINATED COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OPERA-
TIONS OUTLINED REF A TO REACH COMSEVENTHFLT NLT 150001Z7 APR 71.
IN VIEW OF SHORT FUSE AND CURRENT LOCATIONS OF ARG/MAU/CTF 76
SUGGEST MARINE-NAVY COORDINATION BE ACCOMPLISHED BY ARG ALFA/31ST
MAU AND COORDINATED COMMENTS BE SUBMITTED BY CTF 76

2. (U) ALL BEST WISHES.

GP-1

BT

UNQUOTE

C. QUOTE:

O 131230Z APR71
FM CTF SEVEN NINE
TO CTF SEVEN SIX
INFO COMSEVENTHFLT
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

BT

T O P S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM GADDIS INFO VADM WEISNER, COMMODORE WILDER,
COL DICKEY FROM MAJGEN METZGER DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (U)

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120410Z APR71 (S) (SPECAT)

BT

1587

CG I MAF

P 140828Z APR 71

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TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS
FOR LT GEN JONES FROM MGEN METZGER

B. CINCPAC 102316Z APR71 (TS)

C. CTF SEVEN NINE 121138Z APR71 (C)

I. (TS) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SUBMITTED IAW
REF A PARA 4.

A. CONCUR AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORT PROPOSAL AND CONCEPT
CONTAINED REF B. SUGGEST USE OF EITHER OPTION. THE CONTINUED MAIN-
TENANCE OF A CAPABILITY FOR SHORT FUSED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT LANDINGS
SHOULD ENCOMPASS THE ABILITY TO EXERCISE INDEPENDENTLY OR IN
CONJUNCTION WITH ARVN OPERATIONS.

B. AN EXERCISE OF THIS NATURE SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN A REALISTIC
MANNER. REPETITIVE DEMONSTRATIONS, FEINTS, AND TURN AWAY LANDINGS
RUN THE DANGER OF LOSING DESIRED EFFECT.

C. THE SELECTION OF THE OPTIMUM AND ALTERNATIVE AREAS OF OPERATION
OR FEINTS SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISION OF THE MAU/
ARG COMMANDERS.

D. EXPECTED BENEFITS:

(1) VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF U. S. UNWILLINGNESS TO ABANDON RVN
WHILE DEMONSTRATING ANNOUNCED POLICY OF BEING PREPARED TO DEFEND
U.S. INSTALLATION DURING DRAWDOWN.

(2) DEMONSTRATE RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
AND PROVIDE A REALISTIC VEHICLE FOR STAFF PLANNING AND TROOP EXERCISES.

(3) PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY FOR GATHERING AIR AND GROUND
INTELLIGENCE RESULTING FROM ENEMY REACTION TO UNEXPECTED INSERTION OF
GROUND FORCES.

LIKELY EFFECT ON ENEMY ACTIVITIES.

(1) WILL CAUSE ENEMY TO DIVERT FORCES FROM CONCENTRATED
EFFORT AGAINST DANANG COMPLEX.

(2) PREEMPT ENEMY'S INTENTIONS AND PRECLUDES POSSIBLE
BUILDUP OF ENEMY SUPPORT OR LOGISTIC BASE.

(3) COULD FORCE THE ENEMY TO CONCENTRATE FORCES TO MEET
NEW AMPHIBIOUS THRUST AND PROVIDES US WITH OPPORTUNITY TO LOCATE
AND FIX ENEMY POSITIONS.

E. RECOMMEND DURATION OF EXERCISE TO BE 7-10 DAYS. THIS
PERMITS ADEQUATE TIME TO ESTABLISH OPS ASHORE, CONDUCT THE EXERCISE

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AND BACKLOAD.

F. IN VIEW OF ARG/MAU TURNOVER SCHEDULE RECOMMEND PERIODS 29APRIL - 15 MAY AND 20 MAY - 28 JUNE. ESSENTIAL PLANNING TO BE CONDUCTED BY CTG 76.4/79.4 IN ACCORDANCE WITH WNP - 22A.

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

D. QUOTE:

P 131921Z APR 71
 FM CTF SEVEN SIX
 TO COMSEVENTHFLT
 INFO CTF SEVEN NINE
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 FOR VADM WEISNER INFO MGEN METZGER, COMMODORE WILDER, COL DICKEY
 FROM RADM GADDIS

DELIVER UPON RECEIPT

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120410 APR 71
 B. CINCPAC 102316Z APR 71
 C. CTF 79 131230Z APR 71

1. IN COMPLIANCE WITH REF A. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY ARG ALFA/31ST MAU ON REF B ARE SUBMITTED

A. QUOTE

O 130750Z APR 71

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO ZEN/CTF SEVEN SIX
 INFO RUAOAJA/CTF SEVEN NINE

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 RADM GADDIS INFO MAJGEN METZGER FROM CAPT WILDER AND COL DICKEY
 DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (U)

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120410Z APR 71
 B. CINCPAC 102316Z APR 71

1. REFS A AND B REQUESTED AN EVALUATION OF THE CONCEPT OF AGAIN EXERCISING ARG ALFA/MAU 31 IN THE RVN LITTORAL AS A FORCE IN

CG I MAF

P 140828Z APR 71

5-8

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TOP SECRET

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PAGE FIVE RUAOAJA1588 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE BEING. THIS CONCEPT HAS BEEN EVALUATED; JOINT ARG/MAU COMMENTS FOLLOW:

2. CONSIDERATIONS:

- A. ARG/MAU, MAINTAINING 120 HR REACTION TO RVN, HAS NOT HAD RECENT OPPORTUNITY FOR IN COUNTRY LIAISON AND HAS VERY LIMITED BEACH FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING AND WORK UP.
- B. ARG/MAU, AS A POWERFUL, VERSATILE ANDIOBILE FORCE, WOULD NECESSARILY BE A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH IN NVN MILITARY PLANNING IF REINSERTION BELIEVED TO BE A VIABLE US OPTION.
- C. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT IN TERMS OF TRAINING BENEFIT AND INCREASED READINESS OF ARG/MAU TO REINSERT IN SVN, AND IN EFFECT ON NVN MILITARY PLANS, REINSERTION OF ARG/MAU FORCES IN SVN WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE.
- D. PRESENCE OF ARG OFFSHORE, AND A TURN AWAY LANDING MIGHT INFLUENCE NVN PLANING AND OPERATIONS BUT WOULD NOT CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE REINSERTION AS A VIABLE US OPTION. CONSIDER THAT A FULL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT FOR TRANING WOULD BE OF MORE BENEFIT TO US AND RVN MILITARY INTERESTS.
- E. CONSIDER THAT THE CLOSER THE LANDING TO NVN, THE MORE CONCERNED HE BECOMES DEFENSIVELY, BUT ALSO THE MORE PROVOCATIVE THE US LANDING WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY NVN AND ITS ALLIES.
- F. CONSIDER THAT A FULL SCALE IN-COUNTRY REHEARSAL WOULD REQUIRE ASSIGNEMENT OF CAS/CAP, NGFS AND AERIAL RECON SUPPORT FROM SEVENTHFLT ASSETS AND ASSUME THAT MAU FORCES WOULD NOT CHOP TO IN-COUNTRY COMMANDS FOR OPS AS PROPOSED.
- G. CONSIDER A PHASED PROGRAM LEADING TO FULL SCALE TRAINING ASSAULT WOULD KEEP NVN GUESSING OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD AND BE OF MAXIMUM TRAINING BENEFIT TO ARG/MAU. SUGGEST IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER:

- (1) ARG/MAU STAFF LIAISON VISIT TO RVN FOR PLANNING PURPOSES
- (2) ARG BEACH SURVEY OPS AT SELECTED BEACHES
- (3) ARG/MAU TURN AWAY REHEARSAL LANDING
- (4) ARG/MAU REHEARSAL LANDING AT A SITE WELL SOUTH
- (5) ARG/MAU EXERCISE LANDING AT A NORTHERN OR CENTRAL RVN BEACH.

3. COMMENTS SUBJECT TO THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED.

- A. THE CONCEPT FOR REF B WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY AN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARVN OPERATIONS. A US UNILATERAL EXERCISE TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH AN ARVN OPERATION SIMILAR TO ARG OPERATIONS IN GOT DURING LAMSON 719, IS ENVISIONED. BY SO BT

1588

CG I MAF

P 140828Z APR 71

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FINAL SECTION OF THREE SECTIONS FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN METZGER

DOING, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT REINSERTION AS A VIABLE US OPTION WOULD BE DEMONSTRATED AND NVN DEFENSIVE EFFORTS AGAINST ARVN OPERATIONS WOULD BE INHIBITED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE ARG/MAU. B. MAXIMUM TRAINING BENEFIT WOULD BE GAINED BY A COORDINATED ACROSS-THE-BEACH AND OVER-THE-BEACH OPERATION UTILIZING THE FULL ARG/MAU ASSETS.

C. OPTIMUM AREA OF OPERATIONS WOULD BE IN THE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN AREAS OF RVN, THE CLOSER TO NVN THE BETTER; ALTERNATELY, EXERCISES ANYWHERE IN RVN WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF DEMONSTRATING THAT WE CAN EXECUTE A ROUTINE AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING EXERCISE IN RVN, THAT ARG ALFA/31ST MAU CONTINUES TO BE A FORCE IN BEING, AND WOULD INDICATE A STRATEGIC RESOLVE TO USE US FORCES TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES IN SEA.

D. EXPECTED BENEFITS:

- (1) INCREASED TRAINING AND READINESS OF ARG ALFA/31MAU.
- (2) INCREASED UNIT MORALE, BOTH WITHIN ARG ALFA/31MAU AND ARVN.
- (3) REESTABLISHMENT OF LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ARG ALFA/31MAU AND IN-COUNTRY.

LIKELY EFFECT ON ENEMY ACTIVITIES:

- (1) MAJOR INHIBITION ON ENEMY OPERATION IS THREAT OF RAID TYPE OPERATIONS IN NVN.
- (2) WOULD FORCE SIGNIFICANT ENEMY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AGAINST ARG/MAU DIVERTING EFFORT FROM OTHER AREAS.
- (3) MOBILITY OF ARG/MAU WOULD FORCE DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY DEFENSIVE MEASURES OVER WIDER AREA.
- (4) INCREASED EFFECT ON DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES BY STRATEGIC MOVEMENT OF ARG/MAU DURING OF RVN OPERATIONS.

E. RECOMMENDED DURATION IS 3 TO 7 DAYS. (MAX TRAINING BENEFIT TO MAU REALIZED WITHIN 5 DAYS, MAU OPERATIONS ASHORE LIMITED TO 15 DAYS, UNLESS CATEGORY IV AND V L-FORM AUTHORIZED FOR USE. LPH C-3 STATUS IN PERSONNEL WOULD PROBABLY LIMIT SUPPORT OF FULL FLIGHT OPS TO ABOUT 3 DAYS.

F. AS THIS IS A TRAINING EXERCISE, RECOMMEND ALLOW 10 DAYS

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PAGE THREE RUAOAJA1589 T O P S E C R E T ESPECAT EXCLUSIVE
MINIMUM FOR PLANING, TO INCLUDE IN-COUNTRY LIAISON AND
ORDERLY WORK-UP.

GP-1

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UNQUOTE

2. BASICALLY CONCUR WITH COMMENTS PROVIDED ABOVE WITH THE FOLLOWING
EXCEPTION/AMPLIFYING REMARKS.

 A. BASIC ASSUMPTION FOR ALL PLANNING IS THAT JCS APPROVAL FOR
REINSERTION OF US FORCES INTO RVN WILL BZ FORTHCOMING.

 B. BELIEVE THAT ANY AREA IN RVN WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON VC, NVN
OPS IN RVN.

 C. REGARDING PARA 3A: RECOMMEND THAT FIRST OPERATION OF THIS TYPE
BE AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE ONLY WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT IN ARVN IN-COUNTRY OPS.
DUE PAUCITY OF LANDING BEACHES IN WESTPAC AREA AND REQUIREMENTS FOR
CONTINUED HIGH LEVEL ARG/MAU READINESS POSTURE, THE SIGNIFICANT
TRAINING VALUE SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED. COORDINATION WITH IN-COUNTRY
COMMANDER WOULD BE CONDUCTED BOTH BEFORE AND DURING EXERCISE. IF A
TRAINING SCENARIO WERE TO FIT A SUPPORT ROLE FOR ARVN OPS, CONCUR
THAT LANDING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AVAILABLE OPTION. FOR LATER
LANDINGS THIS WOULD BE PREFERRED OPTION.

 D. CONCUR COMMENTS REF C. IF POSSIBLE TO CONDUCT EXERCISE NEAR
TERM, CONCUR DATES REF C. IF LONGER LEAD TIME ENVISIONED, CONSIDER
FIRST EXERCISE COULD COMMENCE UPON COMPLETION KEYSTONE ORIOLE, WHEN
ARG BRAVO RECONSTITUTED AS ADDITIONAL READY FORCE. UNTIL THAT
TIME, PREFER LIMIT OPERATION TO LESS THAN 7 DAYS.

3. WARM REGARDS.

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UNQUOTE

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

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1589

CG I MAF

P 140828Z APR 71

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TOP SECRET. PERSONAL FOR ADM CLAREY FROM LTGEN JONES.
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS. //NO3020//

LOCATION OF CONUS BASED BATTALION OF THE THIRD MARINES (U)

1. (S) IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN KANEHOHE MARINE CORPS AIR STATION (KMCAS) BASE LOADING AT PRE-RVN LEVEL UNTIL MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS ARE EASED AND MORE HOUSING BECOMES AVAILABLE (FY 73-74), CMC DIRECTED THAT ONE BN OF THE THIRD MARINES BE RETAINED IN CONUS. AS A RESULT OF THIS DECISION, THE FIRST MARINE BRIGADE GROUND ELEMENT UPON COMPLETION OF RVN REDEPLOYMENTS WILL CONSIST OF RLT-3, MINUS ONE BATTALION (LOCATED IN CONUS).

2. (S) IN SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE, CMC PROPOSED LOCATING THE CONUS BASED BATTALION OF THE THIRD MARINES AT CAMP LEJEUNE, NORTH CAROLINA VICE CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF. INTRODUCTION OF THIS ADDITIONAL BATTALION INTO THE 2D MARINE DIVISION WOULD SERVE TO REDUCE THE PERSONNEL TURBULENCE PRESENTLY ASSOCIATED WITH MEETING LANTCOM'S REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THREE CONTINUOUS BATTALION SIZE

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P 142306Z/APR71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1486 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR COMMITMENTS (I.E., CARIB, GTMO, MED). IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL FY 73-74 WHEN SUFFICIENT HOUSING BECOMES AVAILABLE AT KMCAS. AT THAT TIME, RLT-3 WOULD BE BROUGHT BACK TO FULL STRENGTH (I.E., THE THIRD MARINES WOULD HAVE THREE FULLY MANNED INFANTRY BATTALIONS AT KMCAS).

3. (TS) IN THE POST-RVN TIME FRAME, THE 3D MARINE DIVISION (THE GROUND PORTION OF THE WESTPAC MAF) WILL CONTINUE TO BE MINUS ONE RLT (I.E., RLT-3). THEREFORE, POST-RVN PLANNING HAD PROVIDED FOR RLT-3 TO BE LOCATED IN ITS ENTIRETY AT KMCAS AS PART OF THE 1ST MARBDE AND CONSTITUTING THE REMAINING ONE-THIRD GROUND PORTION OF THE WESTPAC MAF. THERE ARE SEVERAL CONTINGENCY PLANS WHICH REQUIRE INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE WESTPAC MAF. THEREFORE, A REDUCTION OF RLT-3 FROM A REGIMENTAL HQ AND THREE BATTALIONS TO A REGIMENTAL HQ AND TWO BATTALIONS (AS PROPOSED IN PAR 2 ABOVE) WOULD NECESSARILY IMPACT ON THE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO THOSE PLANS WHICH ARE INDICATED BELOW:

- A. SEATO 4 (DEF OF SEASIA)
- B. SEATO 6 (DEF OF PROTOCOL STATES)
- C. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 5027 (DEF OF KOREA)
- D. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 5041 (DEF OF SEASIA - UNILATERAL)

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1486 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
E. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 5042 (OFFENSIVE OPTIONS AGAINST CHICOM
INTERVENTION IN SEASIA)

F. CINCPAC OPLAN 5020 (U.S. RESPONSES TO NK PROVACATIONS)
G. CINCPACFLT OPLAN 5022 (NAVAL ASSISTANCE TO REVOLUTIONARY OUTBREAKS IN NK, COMMUNIST CHINA AND NVN).
4. (TS) THE 1ST MARDIV IN EASTPAC CAN PROVIDE A REPLACEMENT FOR THE BATTALION RELOCATED TO CAMP LEJEUNE TO FULFILL THE REQUIREMENT FOR INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE WESTPAC MAF. HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO EXECUTE A CONTINGENCY IN PACOM REQUIRING TWO MAF'S (E.G., CINCPACFLT OPLANS 41 AND 27) CINCLANT WOULD HAVE TO DEPLOY ONE INFANTRY BATTALION TO PACOM. THIS WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE A CHANGE TO THE CURRENT VOLUME II (FORCES), JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN. I AM PREPARED TO INITIATE A REQUEST FOR SUCH A CHANGE.

5. (S) THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS HAS REQUESTED THAT I SOLICIT YOUR VIEWS CONCERNING RELOCATION OF A BATTALION FROM CAMP PENDLETON TO CAMP LEJEUNE. IN ORDER TO MEET THE CMC SUSPENSE DATE OF 23 APRIL 1971, AN EARLY REPLY WOULD BE APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS.

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Note: PAO will prepare "pass" for CG.

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P 150214Z APR 71

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PERSONAL FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES FROM ADMIRAL
MCCAIN

PLEASE PASS TO FIRST MARINE DIVISION

1. IT IS WITH GREAT PRIDE THAT I SALUTE THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION UPON YOUR REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU HAS DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB OF HELPING TO PRESERVE FREEDOM AND SELF DETERMINATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. YOUR MAGNIFICENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PERSONAL BRAVERY HAVE ADDED NEW PAGES TO THE GALLANT ANNALS OF MARINE TRADITIONS. I COMMEND YOUR EXEMPLARY COURAGE AND ACTS OF PATRIOTISM THAT WILL ALWAYS BE REMEMBERED BY THOSE WHO VALUE FREEDOM AND LIBERTY. GOD BLESS EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU.

2. WARM REGARDS. ADMIRAL JOHN S. MCCAIN, JR., U.S. NAVY.

BT

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CONFIDENTIAL. PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON, INFO

MGEN METZGER FROM LTGEN JONES. MARDIS. DELIVER

DURING DUTY HOURS. //N00000//

14 MAJ AMPHIBIOUS RAID TRAINING (U)

1. (C) WITH DEACTIVATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS TROOP CARRYING DESTROYERS, THE CAPABILITY OF THE NAVY TO SUPPORT AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS LIES PRIMARILY IN THE NEW FAMILY OF 20 KNOT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS: LST/LPD/LSD, AND THE AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT SUBMARINE (LPSS).

PACFLT CURRENTLY HAS ONE LPSS, GRAYBACK, HOME-PORTED AT SUBIC BAY.

2. (C) AS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED WITH LOU METZGER DURING HIS VISIT HERE, GRAYBACK PROVIDES A UNIQUE CAPABILITY. THE SHIP HAS SUFFICIENT BERTHING TO ACCOMMODATE 60

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO
OUTGOING UNCLASSIFIED SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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BE CONDUCTED GENERALLY IN THE SUBIC AREA AND, DURING
PERIODS OF SHIP UPKEEP, THE FORCE COULD BE BILLETED IN
THE SLF CAMP AND TRAIN IN THE ZAMBALES AREA.

5. (U) SUGGEST YOU DISCUSS THE FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE FOREGOING IN THE 1ST QTR FY-72 WITH APPROPRIATE SEVENTH FLEET COMMANDERS AT THE FORTHCOMING SEVENTH FLEET SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. IN THIS REGARD, MY REPRESENTATIVE, LTCOL CONLIN, WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSIST YOU AND YOUR STAFF AS YOU MAY DESIRE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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 TO RUOAJA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUOAJA/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUOAJA/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON, INFO MAJGEN METZGER AND BGEN
 BARROW FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

OKINAWA REVERSION REPLACEMENT FACILITY WHITE BEACH (S)

A. JCSM 522-70 OF 12NOV70 (TS) (NOTAL) SUBJ: JAPANESE ASSUMPTION
 OF DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES ON OKINAWA
 B. CG MCB CAMP BUTLER LTR 14/LAT/MML 11000 SER NO S-93A-71 OF
 3APR71 (S) (NOTAL)

C. COMSEVENFLT 171410Z/FEB71 (S) (PASEP)

D. CG FMFPAC 202252Z/FEB71 (S) (PASEP)

E. CINCPACFLT 262141Z/FEB71 (S) (PASEP)

F. COMFLEACTS RYUKYUS 050854Z/MAR71 (U) (PASEP)

1. (S) AS YOU KNOW I HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH THE POSSIBLE
 REDUCTION OF COMFLEACTS RYUKYUS FACILITIES AT WHITE BEACH IN

CG FMFPAC

P 160322Z APR 71

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1635 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
LIGHT OF THE IMPAIRMENT SUCH ACTION COULD HAVE ON OUR AMPHI-
BIOUS READINESS POSTURE THERE. A REVIEW AND UPDATING OF THE
SITUATION SEEMS APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME TO PROVIDE NECESSARY
BACKGROUND FOR YOUR EVALUATION AND POSSIBLE USE.

2. (S) REF A IS A MEMO FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM THE JCS
SETTING FORTH SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATION
RELATING TO JAPANESE ASSUMPTION OF DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITY ON
OKINAWA. IT IS A KEY REFERENCE IN ANY DISCUSSION RELATING TO
OKINAWA REVERSION. CINCPAC REP RYUKYUS IS KNOWN TO HOLD A
COPY OF THIS MEMO AND I STRONGLY RECOMMEND YOUR EARLIEST
PERUSAL. WE HAVE INFORMATION FROM CINCPAC THAT THE SECDEF ON
7 APR 71 COMMENTED ON AND APPROVED MANY OF THE POSITIONS
PROPOSED IN REF A. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SECTION
DEALING WITH THE JAPANESE MARITIME SELF DEFENSE FORCE AT WHITE
BEACH HAS ESSENTIALLY BEEN APPROVED AS WRITTEN. REF A IN
RELATION TO WHITE BEACH DESCRIBES THE PLANNED JMSDF DEPLOYMENT
AND DISCUSSES PERIODIC MOUNT-OUTS BY MARINE CORPS UNITS AS WELL
AS OTHER SERVICE USES OF THE AREA. THE MEMO FURTHER RATHER
SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND WITHIN THE
WHITE BEACH COMPLEX WHICH MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1685 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN FOR ACCOMODATING THE JMSDF CONSTRUCTION
REQUIREMENT. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IS PARAGRAPH 17B(7) OF THE
APPENDIX TO REF A, PART OF WHICH IS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS: "BY
PROVIDING LAND AREA FOR ACCOMODATING THE JMSDF CONSTRUCTION
REQUIREMENTS ENTIRELY WITHIN NAVY-CONTROLLED LAND AS SHOWN IN
ANNEX G HERETO, THE ARMY LAND IN THE VICINITY OF PIER BRAVO
REMAINS UNDISTURBED FOR STAGING USE BY BOTH THE U.S. ARMY AND
MARINE CORPS. AGREEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND JAPAN ON JOINT USE SHOULD INSURE RETENTION OF RIGHTS TO UN-
LIMITED USE OF ALL ACCESS ROADS TO STAGING AREAS AND THE NAVY
PIER FOR ROUTINE AND TRAINING MOUNT-OUTS; AND ESTABLISH U.S.
PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS TO USE THE JSDF SEAPLANE RAMP, PARKING APRON
AND PIER ACCESS ROADS FOR U.S. MARINE CORPS MOUNT-OUT UNDER
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS." WHILE THE FORGOING PROVISION WOULD
APPEAR TO PROVIDE THE NEGOTIATING GUIDANCE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE
PROTECTION OF U.S. RIGHTS FOR THE ESSENTIAL USE OF THE WHITE
BEACH AREA. THERE IS THE DANGER THAT THE GOJ WILL NOT ACCEDE TO
THE U.S. DEMANDS AND THUS SERIOUSLY DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY TO
MOUNT-OUT THROUGH WHITE BEACH. IN RESPONSE TO A CINCPAC CALL
FOR OKINAWA REVERSION RELATED CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS, A PROJECT
CG FMFPAC

P 160322Z APR 71

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PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA1685 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 FOR REPLACEMENT OF STAGING FACILITIES IN THE WHITE BEACH AREA
 WAS DEVELOPED BY CAMP BUTLER. HOWEVER, THIS INITIAL PLAN HAD TO
 BE REVISED, SINCE IT REQUIRED THE USE OF CERTAIN AREAS THAT HAD
 BEEN DESIGNATED FOR USE BY THE JMSDF IN REF A. ACCORDINGLY,
 CAMP BUTLER HAS PREPARED A SUBSTITUTE, AND LESS DESIRABLE PLAN
 WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE STAGING FACILITIES TO BE MOVED TO A
 MORE REMOTE AREA IN U.S. ARMY LAND. THIS LATER PLAN WAS FOR-
 WARDDED TO THIS HQ BY REF B. THE PROJECT WAS FORWARDED ON THE
 9TH OF APRIL, TO CINCPACFLT WITH INFORMATION COPIES TO CINCPAC
 AND CINUSARPAC. I WOULD REQUEST THAT YOU ASK GENERAL BARROW
 TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A COPY OF REF B TOGETHER WITH THE SKETCH
 WHICH WAS SUBMITTED AS ENCL (2) THERETO. AS OF THE 12TH OF APR,
 WHEN WE FIRST LEARNED OF THE REPORTED SECDEF 7APR ACTION ON REF
 A, IT APPEARS THAT PERHAPS THE GUIDELINES REGARDING UTILIZATION
 OF OKINAWA REVERSION REPLACEMENT FUNDS WILL BE CHANGED. OUR
 INFORMAL INFORMATION IS THAT REVERSION RELATED PROJECTS WILL BE
 SUBMITTED THROUGH SERVICE CHANNELS FOR INCLUSION IN THE REGULAR
 FY-73 MILCON PROGRAM, AND THAT INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL
 \$200,000,000 PAY-BACK IN GOODS AND SERVICES FROM THE GOJ HAVE
 YET TO BE DEVELOPED. WE ARE WAITING FOR FORMAL DIRECTION FROM

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA1685 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 CINCPAC AS TO CHANGES WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED IN FUTURE HANDLING
 OF THE REVERSION RELATED CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS FOR WHITE BEACH.
 IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WILL BE FORTHCOMING
 UNTIL CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS NOW BEING HELD IN
 WASHINGTON.

3. (S) A RELATED MATTER OF CONCERN WAS THE PREVIOUS CINCPACFLT
 PLAN TO DRASTICALLY REDUCE THE HARBOR AND PORT SERVICES AT WHITE
 BEACH. HAD THIS PLAN BEEN EXECUTED THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
 WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHOUT DEDICATED U.S. NAVY PORT FACILITIES AT
 OKINAWA. AS A RESULT OF A STRONG RECLAMA BY COMSEVENTHFLT IN
 REF C WHICH I ENDORSED IN REF D CINCPACFLT IN REF E REQUESTED
 A MODIFICATION TO THE PLAN. REF F IS THE REVISED SUPPORT
 REQUEST TO PROVIDE NECESSARY SERVICES TO USMC FORCES AT WHITE
 BEACH, TENGAN PIER, AND KIN LST RAMPS WITH FIRE FIGHTING SUPPORT
 FROM MARCORBASES CAMP BUTLER. FROM ALL INDICATIONS THIS ACTION
 IS BACK ON THE RIGHT TRACK.

4. (U) I WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU ADVISED OF FURTHER
 DEVELOPMENTS AND WOULD APPRECIATE RELEVANT INFORMATION WHICH
 MAY DEVELOP THERE THAT WILL ASSIST ME AT THIS LEVEL.
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1685

CG FMFPAC

P 168322Z APR 71

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P 170732Z APR71
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

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TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON
1. (TS) FOLLOWING MESSAGE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

A. QUOTE:

O 150610Z APR71
FM COM 7TH FLT
TO CINCPACFLT
INFO CTF 76
CTF 79

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM CLAREY INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON AND RADM
GADDIS FROM WEISNER.
DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (U)

A. CINCPAC 102316Z APR 71 PASEP
3. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 112151Z APR 71 PASEP
C. COMPHIBRON ONE 122330Z APR 71 NOTAL
1. (TS) REF A PRESENTED A CONCEPT FOR CONDUCTING AN AMPHIBIOUS
EXERCISE LANDING IN THE RVN LITTORAL AND REQUESTED COMMENTS/
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUBJECT EXERCISE. REF B REQUESTED COMMENTS/
RECOMMENDATIONS ON REF A FROM SOMSEVENTHFLT BY 151800Z APR 71.
2. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SUBMITTED AS
REQUESTED.

CG III MAF

P 170732Z/APR71

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A. COMMENTS:

(1) CONCUR AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORT PROPOSAL AND CONCEPT CONTAINED REF A.

(2) THE CONDUCT OF AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AS A SINGLE OPERATIONS OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN ARVN OPERATION ARE BOTH POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, DUE TO EXTENSIVE IN-COUNTRY LIAISON REQUIRED FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS AND VERY LIMITED RECENT ARG/MAU LIAISON WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES IT APPEARS ADVANTAGEOUS TO CONDUCT THE FIRST AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE AS A UNILATERAL OPERATION. FOLLOW ON EXERCISES COULD BE COORDINATED WITH ARVN OPERATIONS AS DESIRED.

(3) THE RECENT SOVIET OVERFLIGHT OF THE INCHOPPING PHIBRON REPORTED REF C INDICATES A POSSIBLE HIGH LEVEL OF INTEREST IN THE EW PHIBRON ONE TRANSIT CONSISTING OF SIX SHIPS. IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUALLY LARGE SIZE OF THIS PHIBRON WHICH IS GROUP SAILING TO WESTPAC, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE NEAR FUTURE WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY OPPORTUNE TIME TO CONDUCT THE PROPOSED LANDING IN RVN. THIS GROUPING OF UNUSUAL EGENTS SHOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE CONCERN AND CONFUSION TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

(4) CONSIDERING THE CURRENT ARG/MAU SCHEDULES AND TURN-OVER REQUIREMENTS, THE MOST OPPORTUNE TIME FRAMES TO CONDUCT A LANDING EXERCISE IN RVN WOULD BE 29 APRIL TO 15 MAY OR 20 MAY TO 28 JUNE.

(5) THE CONDUCT OF THE PROPOSED EXERCISE WOULD SHOW U.S. DETERMINE NOT TO ABANDON RVN EVEN IN THE FACE OF TROOP DRAW DOWNS AND WOULD FURTHER DEMONSTRATE THE IMPRESSIVE REACTION TIME AND FIRE POWER OF THE ARG/MAU.

(6) DUE TO LIMITED RECENT AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING LIASION BETWEEN ARG/MAU AND IN COUNTRY COMMANDS, THE SELECTION OF A SITE FOR THE ACTUAL LANDING SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE ARG/MAU COMMANDERS AFTER APPROPRIATE LIASION WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES. (7) THIS EXERCISE, CL FOLLOWING THE GOT OPERATIONS

WHICH DID NOT RESULT IN A LANDING, SHOULD NOT INCLUDE NUMEROUS TURN AWAY LANDINGS, FEINTS ETC, BUT SHOULD BE A FAST OVER THE BEACH AND HELO LANDING CONDUCTED WITHOUT DELAY AFTER ARRIVAL OF ARG/MAU IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA.

(8) THE MAXIMUM TRAINING BENEFIT FOR MAU CAN BE ACHIEVED IN FIVE DAYS. IN VIEW OF THIS AN OPERATION OF LEAST 3 DAYS AND NOT MORE THAN 7 DAYS DURATION WOULD BE OPTIMUM. THIS SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY A MINIMUM OF 10 DAYS NOTIFICATION TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE TIME FOR PLANNING AND IN-COUNTRY COORDINATION.

(9) THE TRAINING TO THE ARG/MAU WOULD BE VERY BENEFICIAL, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE LIMITED TRAINING AREAS AVAILABLE FOR ARG/MAU OPERATIONS IN WESTPAC.

(10) THE INCLUSION OF PREPLANNED AND ON CALL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT WOULD INCREASE THE SHOW OF STRENGTH AND VERSATILITY OF SEVENTHFLT FORCES. ATTACK AIRCRAFT FROM A YANKEE STATION CARRIER COULD PROVIDE THIS SUPPORT.

(11) ALTHOUGH A LANDING EXERCISE ANYWHERE IN RVN IS DESIRABLE, THE CLOSER TO THE DMZ IT IS CONDUCTED, THE MORE UNSETTLING IT IS.

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ING IT WOULD BE TO THE ENEMY AND THE EASIER IT WOULD BE TO SUPPORT WITH CARRIER AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) THAT INITIAL LANDING BE CONDUCTED AS A UNILATERAL AM-

PAGE FIVE RUAOAJA2098 **TOP SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
PHIBIOUS EXERCISE ONLY. IF DESIRED, FOLLOW ON EXERCISE CAN BE
COORDINATED WITH ARVN OPERATIONS.

(2) OPCON OF THE LANDING FORCE REMAIN WITH COMSEVENTHFLT.

(3) THAT TIME FRAMES 29 APR - 15 MAY OR 20 MAY - 28 JUNE BE
UTILIZED FOR CONDUCT OF THIS OPERATION. EARLIER TIME FRAME CON-
SIDERED OPTIMUM.

(4) THAT THE LANDING BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT A TURN AWAY RE-
HEARSAL TO PROVIDE MOST REALISTIC OPERATION POSSIBLE. REHERSAL
CAN BE CONDUCTED AT ANOTHER LOCATION PRIOR TO MOVEMENT TO RVN
WATERS.

(5) THAT OPERATION BE CONDUCTED IN NORTHERN SVN. ACTUAL
LANDING SITE TO BE DETERMINED BY ARG/MAU COMMANDERS. PRIMARY
AND ALTERNATE SITES WOULD BE SELECTED.

(6) THAT DURATION OF EXERCISE BE 3 TO 7 DAYS WITH 5 DAYS AS
OPTIMUM.

(7) THAT YANKEE STATION CARRIERS PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT AS
REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING.

C. BENEFITS:

(1) EXCELLENT TRAINING FOR THE ARG/MAU.

(2) REESTABLISH CLOSE LIAISON AND COORDINATION WITH IN-
COUNTRY COMMANDS.

(3) CAPITALIZE ON ENEMY UNREST GENERATED BY SIGHTING OF
LARGE PRIBRON GROUP SAILING TOWARD WESTPAC, POSSIBLY CREATING
HIGH LEVEL OF APPREHENSION IN THE ENEMY.

(4) DEMONSTRATE RAPID REACTION, STRENGTH AND FIRE POWER
OF ARG/MAU.

(5) DEMONSTRATE CAPABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND U.S.
INSTALLATIONS DURING DRAW DOWN.

(6) PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO GATHER AIR AND GROUND INTELLIGENCE
AND OBSERVE ENEMY REACTION TO UNEXPECTED AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION.

(7) MAY CAUSE ENEMY TO DIVERT FORCES FROM EFFORTS AGAINST
DANANG COMPLEX.

(8) MAY FORCE THE ENEMY TO CONCENTRATE FORCES TO MEET AMPHIB-
IOUS THRUST AND PROVIDE US WITH OPPORTUNITY TO LOCATED AND FIX
ENEMY POSITIONS.

3. ALL BEST WISHES.

GP-1

UNQUOTE

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

BT

#2098

CG III. MAF

P 170732Z/APR70

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 INFO RUHHBRA/ADMIN CINCPACFLT

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO VADM RICHARDSON FROM CLAREY.
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

ADMIN CINCPACFLT TAKE AS HOTEL SIXTEEN.

LOCATION OF CONUS BASED BATTALION OF THE THIRD MARINES (U)

A. CGFMFPAC 142306Z APR 71.

1. (TS) I APPRECIATE CMC'S CONCERNED AS EXPRESSED IN REF A REGARDING THE 2D MARDIV PERSONNEL PROBLEMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CAPABILITY TO FULFILL LANTCOM CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS DURING THIS PERIOD OF PERSONNEL TURBULENCE. HOWEVER, I CANNOT CONCUR IN THE PROPOSAL TO RELOCATE AN INFANTRY BATTALION FROM PACOM TO LANTCOM IN VIEW OF EXISTENT CONTINGENCY COMMITMENTS OF PACIFIC FLEET MARINE FORCES. IN A BROADER SENSE, THE TOTAL PROJECTED AVAILABILITY OF PACOM GROUND FORCES WILL PLACE AN INCREASED DEPENDENCY ON MARINE GROUND FORCES DURING THE PERIOD PROPOSED FOR THE RELACATION. IN ANY EVENT, AS YOU ACKNOWLEDGED ANY CHANGE IN

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA5717 T O P S E C R E T

PACOM FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE APPROVED THROUGH JOINT CHANNELS. WE HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THIS WITH CINCPAC.

2. (TS) I CONCUR IN YOUR PLAN FOR TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION OF ONE BATTALION FROM RLT-3AT CAMP PENDLETON PENDING AVAILABILITY OF HOUSING AT KANEODE MARINE CORPS AIR STATION.

3. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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CINCPACFLT

P 201502Z APR 71

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TOP SECRET

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R 201504Z APR 71
FM CINCPACFLT
TO RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUMFUFA/CTF SEVEN SIX
RUAOAJA/CTF SEVEN NINE
INFO RUHHBRA/ADMIN CINCPACFLT
BT

UNCLAS //N01650//
FOR VADM WEISNER, LTGEN JONES, LTGEN ROBERTSON, RADM GADDIS INFO VADM
RICHARDSON FROM CLAREY.
ADMIN CINCPACFLT TAKE AS HOTEL FOURTEEN.
SEATO EXERCISE PX-43

A. CINCPAC 172330Z APR 71 PASEP
1. REF A HAS BEEN NOTED WITH PLEASURE AND IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE
CAREFUL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF PX-43 IN THE MONTHS PRECEDING
THIS EXERCISE RESULTED IN A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL SEATO EXERCISE. PLEASE
CONVEY TO ALL THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF PACFLT NAVAL AND MARINE UNITS
THAT PARTICIPATED IN 'SUBOK' MY CONGRATULATIONS ON A JOB WELL DONE.
3. WARM REGARDS.

BT

#5719

CINCPACFLT

R 201504Z APR 71

ACTN:S/SEC

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42

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P 230238Z APR 71
FM ADMIN FMFPAC
TO RUMJNWA/CG FMFPAC ZFF-1
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TOP SECRET PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN ADAMS.
//N03000// AM: 002 RPT AM: 002

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

1. (TS) AT PRESENT, SLF "A" IS ON 120 HOUR REACTION TIME TO
RESPOND TO CONTINGENCIES IN RVN. HOWEVER, OF CONCERN, IS THE
VULNERABILITY OF 3D MAR FORCES FROM 3 MAY 71 ONWARD BECAUSE OF
STANDDOWN OF THEIR PRINCIPAL COMBAT UNITS. THROUGHOUT THE SIX
REDEPLOYMENTS CONDUCTED THUS FAR, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME WE WILL
NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DEFEND OURSELVES.

2. (TS) ALTHOUGH THE 196TH BRIGADE, AMERICAL DIV, IS DUE TO
TAKE OVER TACTICAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 3D MAR TAOR, IT WOULD
SEEM PRUDENT TO HAVE THE 31ST MAU AVAILABLE SHOULD IT BECOME
NECESSARY.

3. (TS) TO THIS END THEN THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL HAS BEEN PREPARED
FOR YOUR RELEASE IN ORDER THAT THE MATTER MAY BE DISCUSSED AT
THE FORTHCOMING SEVENTH FLEET SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. QUOTE:

ADMIN FMFPAC

P 230238Z/APR71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-3

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43

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA2365 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
PRIORITY

FM CG FMFPAC
TO CG III MAF
INFO CINCPACFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT

BT

T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON INFO ADM CLAREY
AND VADM WEISNER FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

//N00000//

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

- A. COMUSMACV 230100Z/MAR71 (TS) (SPECAT) (NOTAL)
- B. CG III MAF 260113Z/MAR71 (TS) (NOTAL)
- C. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 260317Z/MAR71 (TS)
- D. CINCPAC 270525Z/FEB71 (TS) (NOTAL)
- E. CINCPACFLT 272344Z/MAR71 (TS) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE WITHDRAWAL OF 3D MAB FROM RVN
DURING INCREMENT VII (REF A) IT IS NECESSARY TO STANDDOWN IN
ADVANCE OF EMBARKATION. REF B CONTAINS STANDDOWN SCHEDULE.

SIGNIFICANTLY, THE PRIMARY COMBAT UNITS OF 3D MAB (I.E., 1ST
MARINE REGIMENT; 1ST BN, 11TH MARINES; VMA-311; AND VMA(AW)-225)

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA2365 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
WILL COMPLETE THEIR STANDDOWN BY 8MAY 71. FROM THAT TIME UNTIL
THE COMPLETION OF EMBARKATION, ABOUT 29 JUNE 71 (REF C), 3D MAB
WILL BECOME PROGRESSIVELY MORE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK.

2. (TS) REF D OUTLINES CINCPAC'S CONCEPT FOR RVN REENTRY (FRESH
MANDATE) AND PROVIDES THE BROAD GUIDELINES FOR REACTION TO A
VARIETY OF ENEMY INITIATED ACTIONS IN RVN. REF E REQUESTS
COMSEVENTHFLT PROVIDE FRESH MANDATE SUPPORTING CONCEPT PLAN BY
1 MAY 71.

3. (TS) I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF VC/NVA INITIATED
ACTIONS DIRECTED AT INFILTRATING A SIGNIFICANT LOSS UPON 3D MAB
DURING THE CRITICAL EMBARKATION PERIOD OF INCREMENT VII. WHILE
WE ARE ON TRACK CONCEPTUALLY, IT WOULD APPEAR PRUDENT THAT WE
TAKE POSITIVE ACTIONS TO INSURE THAT OUR REACTION FORCES ARE IN
POSITION AND AT THE READY TO RESPOND DURING THE PERIOD 8MAY-29
JUNE 71. THE FORTHCOMING COMSEVENTHFLT SCHEDULING AND PLANNING
CONFERENCE PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PRINCIPALS TO COORDINATE
THEIR SCHEDULES AND CONFIRM THAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INSURE
THAT WE WILL BE IN THE BEST POSSIBLE POSTURE TO RESPOND RAPIDLY
AND EFFECTIVELY, SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY. ACCORDINGLY, I
RECOMMEND THAT YOU DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH COGNIZANT COMMANDERS

ADMIN FMFPAC

P 230238Z/APR71

2-3

43

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE FOUR RU4HFM A2365 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
AT THE SEVENTHFLT SCHEDULING AND PLANNING CONFERENCE 26-30APR71.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2365

ADMIN FMFPAC

P 230238Z/APR71

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43

TOP SECRET

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PERSONAL FOR
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FM ADMIN MARCORPSBASESPAC **AUTHORIZED TO MAKE COPIES**

TO AUROTA DEPCOMMARCORPSBASESPAC {FUD}

INFO AUROTA CG III MAF

BT

SECRET PERSONAL FOR BGEN BARROW INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM
MGEN ADAMS MARDIS

OKINAWA REVERSION CONFERENCE

A. SEC STATE 210344Z/APR71 {S}

1. {U} BOB - MR ROGNER GS-16 DIRECTOR OF BASE UTILIZATION UNDER
ASD {I&L} WILL ARRIVE OKINAWA SUNDAY MORNING AS HEAD OF JTF TO
DISCUSS BILLETING MATTERS INDICATED IN REF A.

2. {U} NEITHER CMC NOR THIS HQS WILL FURNISH A REPRESENTATIVE
AND ACCORDINGLY REQUEST THAT YOU ACT AS THE MARINE REPRESENT-
ATIVE IN THIS MATTER. UNDERSTAND MR. ROGNER INTENDS TO CALL
CONFERENCE SUNDAY PM UNDER ASPECIES OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
TO KICK OFF THE PROJECT.

3. {S} MAJOR AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION IS THE 150K GROSS SF
IDENTIFIED IN REF A AT NAHA. THIS FIGURE WAS PROPORTEDLY SP.
ADMIN MARCORPSBASESPAC P 232354Z/APR71 ACTN: S/SEC 1-3

6-4
294

COL KIRSTEIN G-4 39444

Adams

44
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DERIVED AFTER CONSIDERING ALL U.S. RESIDUAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FACILITIES AT THAT BASE. USMC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ROTATIONAL SQUADRON WERE BASED ON 163 PERSONNEL AND WERE INCLUDED IN US RESIDUAL REQUIREMENTS. YOU SHOULD INSURE THAT BARRACKS SPACE IS DESIGNATED AND ADEQUATE FOR OUR PURPOSES.

4. {C} OF COURSE THE CONFERENCE COULD DEVELOP A SPIN OFF INTO OTHER AREAS SO IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE GOOD FIGURES BASED ON THE CURRENT DESIRABLE HABITABILITY CRITERIA FOR MARINES ON OKINAWA I.E. 72 SQFT OF NET LIVING AREA AND NOT REPEAT NOT EMERGENCY CRITERIA. ONNA POINT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME BECAUSE ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT FIRM AND THE DIVISION SCHOOLS REQUIREMENT IS AN ADDITIVE NEED.

5. {S} INFORMATION HERE INDICATES MR ROGNER IS A STRONG FRIEND OF THE MARINE CORPS AND IS IMPRESSED WITH OUR BILLETING PROBLEMS ON OKINAWA. AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE 150K SQFT FOR THE JSDF IS SETTLED, HE DESIRES TO TOUR MARINE CORPS BILLETING FACILITIES. HE SHOULD BE ACCORDED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO INSPECT OUR BASING POSTURE, BUT SHOULD BE SHOWN THE GOOD AS WELL AS THE BAD AND ACCCOMPANIED BY PERSONNEL COMPLETELY FAMILIAR WITH FUTURE PLANS FOR RELOCATIONS AND ADDITIONAL INCOMING UNITS. MR ROGNER'S IMPRESSIONS OF THE CRITICALITY OF OUR SITUATION WILL GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS INSURING A "FAIR SHARE" FOR THE MARINE CORPS OF \$60M IN CONSTRUCTION FUNDS WHICH MAY BECOME AVAILABLE FOR OKINAWA. ALL ADDITIONAL BUILDINGS REQUIRED SHOULD BE DISCUSSED

ADMIN MARCORPSBASESPAC

P 232354Z/APR71

2-3

SECRET MARDIS

44

SECRET

SECRET

IN TERMS OF MODULAR RELOCATABLES STRUCTURES.

b. {S} IN ADDITION, IT APPEARS THAT THE BALL MAY HAVE BEEN FUMBLED AT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON OUR AREA REQUIREMENTS AT WHITE BEACH. ACCORDINGLY, THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED WITH MR. ROGNER. WE WILL ALSO SEND A MESSAGE TO CMC ON THIS SUBJECT TO INSURE THAT THE ISSUE IS RAISED AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL. WARM REGARDS, ART.

GP-4

ADMIN MARCORPSBASESPAC

P 232354Z/APR71

3-3

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TO RUAOAJA/CG III MAF
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TOP SECRET PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON INFO ADM CLAREY
 AND VADM WEISNER FROM LTGEN JONES. //N00000//
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

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- B. CG III MAF 260113Z/MAR71 (TS) (NOTAL)
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CG FMFPAC

P 240317Z/APR71

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TOP SECRET

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA2554 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
WILL COMPLETE THEIR STANDDOWN BY 8MAY71. FROM THAT TIME UNTIL
THE COMPLETION OF EMBARKATION, ABOUT 29 JUNE 71 (REF C), 3D MAB
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RECOMMEND THAT YOU DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH COGNIZANT COMMANDERS
PAGE THREE RUHHFMA2554 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
AT THE SEVENTHFLT SCHEDULING AND PLANNING CONFERENCE 26-30APR71.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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2554

CG FMFPAC

P 240317Z/APR71

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P 260237Z APR 71
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO CG FMFPAC

INFO CG III MAF
MACG ONE EIGHT
MACS EIGHT

BT

SECRET MARDIS //N04600//
WESTPAC NORTH (WPN) RADAR SITE RECONNAISSANCE

A. COMUSKOREA 090220Z APRIL 71 (U)
B. CG FMFPAC 170032Z MARCH 71 (C)

1. (C) IAW THE AUTH CONT REFS A AND B ON SITE SURVEY CONDUCTED 12-16 APRIL 71 OF POSSIBLE SITES IN SE KOREA FOR LOCATING MACS-8 IN CONNECTION WITH WPN TEST AND FUTURE TRNG DEPLOYMENTS.
2. (S) EXTENSIVE AERIAL AND VEHICULAR RECONNAISSANCE OF POHANG, PUSAN AND CHINHAE AREAS CONDUCTED IN SEARCH OF POSSIBLE SITES. COMUSKOREA REPS PROVIDED OUTSTANDING SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE IN ALL ASPECTS OF THIS SURVEY. RECON REVEALED ONLY FOUR POSSIBLE SITES SUITABLE FOR WPN TESTING. RESULTS OF ON SITE SURVEY AS FOLLOWS.

A. TAEBO PENINSULA (ROK NIKI/HERC BTRY HQS COMPOUND)

CG FIRST MAW

P 260237Z/APR71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-3

46

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COORD-495927. ADVANTAGES: 1. ADJACENT TO POHANG K-3 AIRBASE TO FACILITATE LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF DEPLOYED UNIT.
 2. NEAR BEACH WHICH COULD BE UTILIZED BY AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING FOR DEBARKING/EMBARKING MACS SUPPLIES AND EQUIP.
 3. MINIMUM ENGINEERING EFFORT REQUIRED TO PREPARE SITE FOR EQUIP EMPLACEMENT.

DISADVANTAGES:

1. HIGH GROUND SOUTH OF SITE PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY ROK NIKE/HERC BATTERY; PROBABLE RF INTERFERENCE.
2. MARGINAL COVERAGE OF SOUTHERN PORTION OF AIRSPACE OVER KOREAN STRAITS WOULD LIMIT AREA AVAIL FOR GCI TRNG WITH FIRST MAW TACT A/C.
3. AREA WITHIN NIKE BATTERY HQS COMPOUND NOT OF SUFFICIENT SIZE TO POSITION ALL MACS EQUIP, WOULD REQUIRE SOME EQUIP TO BE POSITIONED OUTSIDE OF COMPOUND.

B. PUSAN (US ARMY 51ST AMMO BASE DEPOT) - COORD 114903.

ADVANTAGES:

1. PROVIDES GOOD COVERAGE OF AIRSPACE OVER KOREAN STRAITS FOR GCI TRNG W/FIRST MAW A/C.
2. SITE LOCATED INSIDE US ARMY CONTROLLED AREA, WITH ACCESS TO CLASS I AND III SUPPLY SUPPORT.
3. CLOSE TO PORT FACILITY AND K-9 AIRFIELD.

DISADVANTAGES:

1. WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE ENGINEERING EFFORT TO PREPARE SITE PRIOR TO EMPLACE EQUIP AND COMPLETE ACCESS ROAD TO SITE.
2. CLOSE TO AMMO STORAGE AREA WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER HERO STUDY.

C. PUSAN-VICINITY-COORD 145956.

ADVANTAGES:

1. PROVIDES GOOD COVERAGE OF AIRSPACE OVER KOREAN STRAITS.
2. IN PROX OF K-9 AIRFIELD AND PORT FACILITY.
3. ENG EFFORT TO PREPARE SITE NOT AS EXTENSIVE AS REQUIRED FOR SITE LISTED PAR 2 B.

DISADVANTAGES:

1. SITE IN PROX MAJOR MICROWAVE RELAY FACILITY WHICH COULD POSS PRESENT RFI PROBLEMS.
2. SITE NOT LOCATED WITHIN ESTABLISHED COMPOUND WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE PERIMETER SECURITY OF SITE.

D. CHINHAE, WON PO RI (ABANDONED USN VHF SITE)- COORD 738852.

ADVANTAGES:

1. GOOD ALL WEATHER ACCESS ROAD TO SITE.

CG FIRST MAW

P 260237Z/APR71

2-3

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2. PROVIDES ADEQUATE RADAR COVERAGE OF AIRSPACE OVER KOREAN STRAITS.

3. ACCESS TO GOOD PORT FACILITY.

DISADVANTAGES:

1. CHINHAE AIRFIELD TO BE CLOSED TILL MID SUMMER 71. ADMIN/LOGISTICS FLIGHTS IN SUPPORT OF DEPLOYED UNIT WOULD HAVE TO USE TAEGU OR PUSAN.

2. LIMITED SPACE AVAIL TO POSITION MACS EQUIP.

3. SITE NOT LOCATED WITHIN ESTABLISHED COMPOUND WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE PERIMETER SECURITY OF SITE.

3. (S) BASED ON THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, SITE PARA 2C CONSIDERED PRIMARY AND SITE PARA 2B CONSIDERED ALTERNATE.

4. (C) ADEQUATE BILLETING AND MESSING FACILITIES ARE NOT AVAILABLE WITH CLOSE PROXIMITY TO ANY OF THE ABOVE SITES.

5. (C) THE FOLLOWING MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO DEPLOYING ELEMENTS OF MACS-8 TO ANY OF THE SITES LISTED IN PARA 2.

A. CONDUCT RFI AND HERO STUDIES AS REQUIRED.

B. COMPLETE LAND USE AGREEMENTS FOR SITE PROPERTY.

C. OBTAIN FREQUENCY CLEARANCE.

D. PLAN AND COMPLETE ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS ON SELECTED SITE.

E. ARRANGE FOR SHIPPING.

6. IN VIEW OF THE TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS, THE APPARENT LACK OF AVAIL SHIPPING, AND THE LIMITED TIME REMAINING IN WPN TESTING, IT IS NOT CONSIDERED FEASIBLE FOR MACS-8 TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WPN TEST PROGRAM. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT MACS-8 PARTICIPATION NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE WPN TEST SCENARIO.

7. (S) REQUIREMENT FOR MACS SITE WITHIN FIRST MAW LOCAL FLYING AREA RECOGNIZED. REQUEST AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE SEARCH FOR SUITABLE MACS SITE TO WHICH MACS-8 COULD PERIODICALLY DEPLOY ON EXERCISE BASIS AND/OR FOR POSSIBLE PERMANENT RELOCATION. THIS SEARCH WILL CONSIST OF REQUESTING FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS BY COMUSKOREA OF TWO BEST SITES LOCATED IN KOREA DURING RECON AND AN EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE SITES IN JAPAN.

GP-4

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CG FIRST MAW.

P 260237Z/APR71

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P 010030Z MAY 71
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

BT

CONFIDENTIAL//PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO
FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM MGEN METZGER - DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS

COOPERATION/COORDINATION WITH THE JAPANESE SELF DEFENSE FORCE (C)
1. (C) DURING MY RECENT TRIP TO JAPAN I CALLED UPON MGEN MATSUKANE
(G-2) AND GENERAL KINUGASA (CHIEF OF STAFF, JAPANESE GROUND SELF
DEFENSE FORCE). DURING THIS CALL BOTH OFFICERS MADE IT ABUNDENTLY
CLEAR THAT THEY DESIRED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH AND TRAIN WITH, U. S.
MARINES. THEIR RATIONALE WAS THAT SOON THE UNITED STATES MARINE
CORPS WOULD BE THE ONLY GROUND FORCE PRESENT ON JAPAN/OKINAWA AND
THAT THE GROUND DEFENSE FORCE HAD MORE IN COMMON WITH THE MARINE
CORPS THAN IT DID WITH THE U. S. ARMY. I RESPONDED THAT SPEAKING
FOR THE 3D MARINE DIVISION, I WOULD BE VERY PLEASED TO WORK AS
CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE GROUND SELF DEFENSE FORCE UNITS AND
POINTED OUT THAT 4/12 HAD ACTUALLY FIRED GROUND DEFENSE FORCE TOWED

CG THIRD MARDIV

P 010030Z/MAY71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

47

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO RUAOAJA0003 C O N F I D E N T I A L
155MM HOWITZERS AT MOUNT FUJI. THIS SEEMED TO PLEASE BOTH OFFICERS.
I TOLD THEM, SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATE CLEARANCES I WAS READY TO
START THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION WITH THE GSDF. THEY BOTH
IMPLIED THEY WOULD BE VISITING OKINAWA AND I INVITED THEM TO VISIT
THE 3D MARINE DIVISION.

2. (C) DURING MY VISIT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON 16 MARCH, I WAS
BRIEFED OF YOUR INTEREST IN THIS MATTER AND THEREFORE CONSIDER
IT DESIRABLE TO REPORT THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT TO YOU. I WAS
ACCOMPANIED ON THIS VISIT BY COMMANDER BATH, THE ASSISTANT NAVAL
ATTACHE, WHO INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS MAKING AN APPROPRIATE REPORT
THROUGH THE INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AND THAT OUR WORKING WITH THE
JSDF WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH U. S. POLICY.

3. (U) I WILL CONTINUE TO PROCEED ALONG THIS LINE. VERY RESPECTFULLY.
GP-4

BT

H0003

CG THIRD MARDIV

P 010030Z/MAY71

2-2

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CONFIDENTIAL

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PERSONAL FOR

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S/S	<i>✓</i>

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R 012219Z MAY 71
 FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUAOAJA/CG THIRD MARDIV
 INFO RUAOAJA/CG III MAF

BT

CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL FOR MGEN METZGER
 INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER
 DURING DUTY HOURS. //N00000//
COOPERATION/COORDINATION WITH THE JAPANESE SELF
DEFENSE FORCE (C)

A.. CG THIRD MARDIV 010030Z/MAY71 (C) (PERSONAL)
 1. (U) I APPRECIATE THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY
 REFERENCE (A) AND YOUR INITIATIVE IN THIS MATTER.
 2. (C) FOR THE LONG TERM, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WE
 SHOULD BE ALERT THAT WE DO NOT MAKE COMMITMENTS OR
 SET PRECEDENTS WHICH MIGHT WORK TO OUR DISADVANTAGE
 AT A FUTURE DATE. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE TRAINING
 FACILITIES AND AREAS IN WESTPAC ARE MINIMAL AT BEST.
 WE MUST AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH WILL PROVIDE IMPETUS
 TO THE CREEPING ENCROACHMENT WE ARE ALREADY EXPERI-
 ENCING (E.G., THE NTA FIREBASE SITUATION).

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0125 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR
3. (C) BASICALLY, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE YOUR APPROACH
HAS MERIT AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED. PLEASE KEEP ME
INFORMED AS DEVELOPMENTS UNFOLD. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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P 072004Z MAY 71
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUAOAJA/CG III MAF
BT
TOP SECRET PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON
FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING DUTY
HOURS. //N00000//
ARG/MAU SPEC OPS (U)

1. (TS) I HAVE SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADM
CLAREY WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFORMATION.

QUOTE. 070143Z MAY

FM CG FMFPAC
TO CINCPACFLT
INFO COMSEVENTHFLT
BT

TOP SECRET //N03200//
ARG/MAU SPEC OPS

A. CG FMFPAC 240317Z/APR71 (IS-SPECAT)

B. COMSEVENTHFLT 042336Z/MAY71 (TS)

1. (TS) IN RESPONSE TO A CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF 3D MAB
FORCES DURING THE PHASEDOWN PERIOD (8MAY-29JUN71) EXPRESSED IN

CG FMFPAC

P 072004Z/MAY71

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0704 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 REF A, COMSEVENTHFLT IN REF B PROPOSES SCHEDULING ARG ALFA/31ST
 MAU FOR ARG OPS AT DANANG ON 14 MAY, 30 MAY AND 24 JUNE.
 ADDITIONALLY, REF B PROPOSES THE SORTIE OF ONLY THE LPH WITH
 HMM EMBARKED FROM SUBIC TO DANANG FOR LPH/HELO OPS ON 13-14 JUNE.
 THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO FOUR SHOW OF FORCE VISITS TO DANANG WITH
 THE BULK OF THE TIME SPENT IN UPKEEP AT SUBIC; RATHER THAN
 MAINTAINING THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ARG ALFA/31ST MAU IN THE
 DANANG AREA DURING THE CRITICAL PHASEDOWN PERIOD.

2. (TS) WHILE THE REQUIREMENT FOR TRAINING AND UPKEEP IS APPRECIATED, THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN REF A IS BASED ON THE DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY OF THE VC/NVA TO RAPIDLY LAUNCH STRONG ATTACKS OF SHORT DURATION AND WITHOUT WARNING AGAINST POINT TARGETS. SUCH ATTACKS, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS MILITARILY UNREWARDING, COULD ACHIEVE SHORT-TERM PSYCHOLOGICAL OR POLITICAL GAIN. FOR EXAMPLE, BY INFILCTING A SIGNIFICANT LOSS UPON WITHDRAWING MARINES, IT COULD BE MADE TO APPEAR TO THE UNSOPHISTICATED THAT, RATHER THAN VOLUNTARILY WITHDRAWING, THE MARINES WERE "KICKED-OUT" OF RVN BY THE VC/NVA.

3. (TS) THE EXPECTED SITUATION IN MR 1 DURING THE 3D MAB PHASEDOWN INDICATES A REQUIREMENT FOR MAINTAINING A CAPABILITY PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0704 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR TO RESPOND RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY. A 120-HR REACTION TIME DOES NOT ALLOW FOR THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE NECESSARY TO COUNTER THE ENEMY CAPABILITY DESCRIBED ABOVE. THE THREE ONE-DAY ARG ALFA/31ST MAU OPS IN THE DANANG AREA REPRESENT A DETERRENT BUT ONLY WHEN THEIR PRESENCE IS FELT BY THE ENEMY.

4. (TS) THE PROPOSAL TO FRACTIONALIZE THE 31ST MAU BY SORTIE OF ONLY THE LPH WITH HMM EMBARKED FROM SUBIC TO DANANG, IS CONSIDERED UNDESIRABLE, PARTICULARLY AT THE TIME WHEN FORCES ASHORE ARE APPROACHING THEIR LOWEST NUMBER. WHILE THE 2-3 DD/DE COULD PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT, IF REQUIRED, THAT PORTION OF THE MAU EMBARKED ABOARD THE LPH WOULD HAVE ONLY A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO COUNTER AN ENEMY ATTACK AGAINST REMAINING 3D MAB UNITS. FURTHER, THE COMBAT POWER OF THE LANDING FORCE IS A PRODUCT OF ITS BALANCE AND TACTICAL INTEGRITY WHICH ARE DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON THE ABILITY OF THE LANDING FORCE COMMANDER TO CONTROL ALL HIS UNITS. FORCE FRACTIONALIZATION IS INIMICAL TO THIS END AND INHIBITS THE LANDING FORCE COMMANDER'S CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY HIS FORCES RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

5. (TS) ACCORDINGLY, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO MODIFYING THE ARG ALFA/31ST MAU SCHEDULE DURING

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(49)

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PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA0704 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
THE PERIOD 8 MAY-29 JUN 71 TO INSURE THAT THESE FORCES ARE
CAPABLE OF REACTING AS AN ENTITY TO ENEMY ATTACK AGAINST 3D
MAP WITHIN 48 HOURS.

UNQUOTE

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

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TO COMMARCORBASESPAC

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TRANSFER OF WATER PLANTS TO RDWC (U)

A. CG MARCORB CAMP BUTLER 060740Z MAY 1971 (C)

I. (C) REF A REPORTED A POTENTIAL RATE INCREASE AND ITS
EFFECT ON THE COST OF WATER AT CAMPS HANSEN AND SCHWAB.
THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL FACTORS ARE FURNISHED FOR CON-
SIDERATION.

A. (C) THE RYUKYUAN ELECTRIC POWER CORPORATION (REPC)
WAS FORMED SEVERAL YEARS AGO WITH A NUCLEUS OF U.S. CITIZENS
IN KEY JOBS. OVER A PERIOD OF ABOUT THE LAST SIX YEARS
THESE KEY JOBS WERE TAKEN OVER BY RYUKYUANS, AND BY JULY
ONLY THREE U.S. CITIZENS WILL REMAIN. THE COMPANY MANAGEMENT
HAS GRADUALLY DEVELOPED WITH SOME DIFFICULTY AND IS
FINALLY CONSIDERED COMPETENT TO OPERATE INDEPENDENT OF U.S.
CONTROL. THE RYUKYUAN DOMESTIC WATER CORPORATION (RDWC) IS AN
OPERATING CORPORATION IN NAME ONLY WITH THE ARMY FACILITIES
ENGINEER RUNNING AND MAINTAINING THE PLANT. IT APPEARS, THAT
AT THE EARLIEST IT WILL BE DECEMBER 1971 BEFORE ALL ARMY ASSETS
AND PERSONNEL (BOTH U.S. AND RYUKYUAN) CAN BE TURNED OVER TO THE
RDWC, AND AT THIS TIME THERE IS A PARALLEL TO THAT OF REPC
SIX YEARS AGO. INITIALLY ABOUT 18 U.S. AND THIRD COUNTRY
NATIONALS WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO RDWC TO JOIN 4 ALREADY
EMPLOYED; AND THESE REPRESENT KEY SUPERVISORS, ESSENTIAL
FOR OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE TO INSURE AGAINST PLANT BREAK-

CG MARCORB CAMP BUTLER P 110504Z/MAY71 ACTN:S/SEC 1-2

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DOWN AND LOW QUALITY WATER. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SEVERAL YEARS WILL BE REQUIRED TO PHASE OUT THESE KEY PERSONNEL BY REPLACEMENT WITH COMPETENT RYUKYUANS CAPABLE OF RUNNING A PLANT OF THIS SIZE. AS AN ILLUSTRATION, A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE CURRENT WATER SHORTAGE ON OKINAWA WAS THE INABILITY OF THE TOMARI (NAHA) TREATMENT PLANT TO ADEQUATELY TREAT THEIR NORMAL POLLUTED RAW WATER SOURCE, THEREBY DICTATING A DRAWDOWN ON THE RESERVOIRS. THIS PLANT HAS BEEN OPERATED FOR YEARS BY RYUKYUANS EMPLOYED BY THE NAHA MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. IN CONTRAST, THE ARMY TYBASE PLANT SUCCESSFULLY AND ROUTINFLY PROCESSES EQUALLY POLLUTED RAW WATER. IN ADDITION, THE GROWTH OF ALGAE HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN THE CLEAR WELLS OF THE TOMARI PLANT WHICH SHOULD NOT OCCUR IN A PROPERLY RUN PLANT.

2. (C) THE FILLING OF KEY RDWC BILLETS WITH NON-RYUKYUANS IS ACCEPTABLE EXCEPT THAT REVERSION WILL OCCUR WITHIN ABOUT A YEAR AND THE CONTINUATION OF THESE KEY NON-ASUKYUAN PERSONNEL WILL BE QUESTIONABLE. IF THESE PERSONNEL ARE NOT CONTINUED, POTENTIAL MAJOR PROBLEMS CAN BE ANTICIPATED IN EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN AND IN THE QUALITY OF WATER PRODUCED. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT SERIOUS HEALTH HAZARDS WOULD OCCUR, BUT THAT THE HIGHER U.S. STANDARDS MAY NOT BE MET. AS IS ROUTINE NOW, AND TO BE CONTINUED REGARDLESS OF THE STATUS OF THE MARINE CORPS WATER TREATMENT PLANTS, WOULD BE THE SAMPLING AND TESTING OF WATER RECEIVED AT EACH MARINE CORPS INSTALLATION ON OKINAWA.

3. (C) INASMUCH AS THE BULK OF THE THIRD MARDIV IS HOUSED AT CAMPS HANSEN AND SCHWAB AND AS DISCUSSED IN REF A THESE WATER TREATMENT PLANTS ARE NOT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ISLAND WATER SYSTEM, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE MARINE CORPS RETAIN ITS WATER TREATMENT PLANTS UNTIL THE RDWC DOES IN FACT BECOME AN OPERATING CORPORATION. IT IS BELIEVED THAT BY AGREEMENT WITH RDWC THE JOINT USE OF THE HANSEN RESERVOIR COULD BE CONTINUED INDEFINITELY. THE MARINE CORPS WATER TREATMENT FACILITIES ARE A SMALL FRACTION OF THE U.S. FACILITIES WHICH WILL BE TURNED OVER TO RDWC. RETENTION OF THE CAMPS HANSEN AND SCHWAB PLANTS BY THE MARINE CORPS WILL HAVE NO NOTICEABLE IMPACT UPON RDWC, NOR ADVERSE EFFECT UPON ITS BECOMING A FUNCTIONING CORPORATION.

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FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHOA/CINCPAC
INFO RUHHRGA/CINCPACFLT
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUHHABA/CINCPACAF

RUMMRSA/CMUR, 7TH AF TAN SON NHUT
RUMOAVA/DCG USARV LONG BINH
RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUMUGKA/COMNAVFORV

BT
T O Q S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (J3)
FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN INFO GENERAL ROSSON, ADMIRAL CLAREY, GENERAL NAZZARO, GENERAL CLAY, LTG MCCAFFREY, LT GENERAL JONES, REAR ADMIRAL SALZER FROM GENERAL ABRAMS. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. SECTION I OF III

SUBJ: REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT EIGHT (U)

REF: CINCPAC MSG. DTG 060833Z MAY 71 (TS) (SPECAT)

1. (TS) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE, THE DETAILED TROOP LIST FOR 28,700 SPACES IN KEYSTONE ORIOLE BRAVO IS AS FOLLOWS:

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A. US ARMY

LINE

NR	UIC	FRN	UNIT	STR	MR	F
W001	WDD1AA	526N006	1/44 AD BN AW SP	362-	1	D
W002	WDQ7AA	526CC020	6/55 AD BTY 50 CAL MG	142	1	D
W003	WFUZAA	526N007	4/60 AD BN AW SP	230-	2	D
W004	WDD2AA	526N006A	G/65 AD BTY 50 CAL MG	142	1	D
W005	WGQCAA	099Z158	40 AG DET APU TYPE T	16	1	X
W006	WARHAA	099Z015	E/17 AR CAV TRP/SEP			
W007	WANGAA	805A006	ABN BDE/	210	2	A
W008	WC5LLA	502K034	1/77 AR BN TANK	615	1	A
			180 AV CO ASLT SPT			
			HEL	268	2	D
W009	WAAVAA	202C012	D/227 AV CO ASLT HEL	121-	2	D
W010	WAAWAA	202C014	A/228 AV CO ASLT HEL			
			SPT	167-	1	D
W011	wdx6AA	526G083	235 AV CO AERIAL WPNS	254	4	D
W012	WGQCAA	517P006E	343 AV DET ALFD OPNS	21	2	D
W013	W1ZMAA	099Z001F	BI HQS SPT CMD QNH	46-	2	X
W014	WGRPAA	517P065G	46 BI DET PUB INFO	5	2	X

PAGE 3 RHMSMVA9327 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

W015	WGODAA	701I017	48 BI PE DET	5	1	X
W016	WA8GAA	526H391	2 CA CO	171	3	X
W017	WA89AA	202D0061	1 CM DET CBR CENTER	5	2	X
W018	WCZNAAA	407C009	51 CM DET CBR CENTER	10	2	X
W019	WGFCAA	805A016	86 CM DET CBR CENTER	5	1	X
W020	WCKAAA	407F087	19 CS CO SSS DS	20-	2	X
W021	WCD1AA	526H691	62 CS HHC MAINT			
			SUPPORT BN	34-	2	X
W022	WG6BT0	805A008	75 CS HHC SPT BN	823	1	X
W023	WB21AA	202E015	85 CS CO LT MNT DS	183	1	X
W024	WB12AA	526H686	98 CS CO LT EQIIP MNT	9-	2	X
W025	WC2DAA	202E026	136 CS CO LT MNT DS	15-	2	X
W026	WD4JAA	526H695	160 CS CO HVY EQUIP			
			MAINT	28-	2	X
W027	WARLAA	099X098	173 CS BN SPT ABN	704	2	X
W028	WCZXAA	202B019	223 CS CO SSS DS	26	1	X
W029	WDMLAA	526H469K	229 CS CO SUP-SVC DS	76-	3	X
W030	WDMRAA	526H679	483 CS CO FLD SVC FWD	30-	3	X
W031	WFAPAA	502L038	506 CS CO SUP-SVC DS	30-	3	X
W032	WCZSAA	202E033	625 CS CO SUP-SVC DS	148-	1	X

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W033	WHFUAA	805D111	794 CS MAINT CO DS/DN	63-	2	X
W034	WANUAO	805A003	A/7 EN CO	256	1	D
W035	WAZPAA	526H007	14 EN BN COMBAT ARMY	812	1	D
W036	WDZRAA	526H295	15 EN CO LIGHT EQUIP	186	2	X
W037	WAZ2AA	5020026	20 EN BN COMBAT ARMY	812	2	D
W038	WBA4AA	526H052	73 EN CO CONST SPT	143	2	X
W039	WCW5AA	5020028	103 EN CO CONST SPT	111-	3	X
W040	WARKAA	099Z123	173 EN CO CBT (ABN)	194	2	D
W041	WGNVAA	517P039A	196 EN DET FIELD MAINT	10	1	X
W042	WBCUAA	202D009	509 EN CO PANEL BRIDGE	126	2	X
W043	WBCDAA	407F031	510 EN CO MAINT DS	14-	3	X
W044	WBB3AA	407F028	584 EN CO LIGHT EQUIP	154-	2	X
W045	WBB4AA	202B0085	630 EN CO LIGHT EQUIP	186	1	X
W046	WXW4AA	407F029	864 EN BN CONST TYPE B	899	2	X
W047	WFFHAA	502J012	1 FA HHB SRAC ARTY	119-	2	D
W048	WANFAA	805A004	5/4 FA BN 155 MM SP	658	1	D
W049	WA1LAA	701C033	7/8 FA BN 175/8 IN			

PAGE 5 RHMSMVA9327 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

W050	WBHRAA	805D154	HOW SP	565	3	D
			2/12 FA BN 155 MM			
			TWD	598	3	D
W051	WA3AAA	701C140	F/26 FA BTY TGT ACQ	102-	1	D
W052	WA2GAA	502J006	5/27 FA BN 105 HOW			
			TWD	520	2	D
W053	WC4QAA	202D050	7/29 FA BTY B SEARCHLIGHT	150	2	D
W054	WCYWAA	099X011	77 FA DET RADAR-CM	9	2	D
W055	WD3GAA	805D311	F/77 FA BTY	133	3	D
W056	WA2NAA	526H617	C/1/92 FA BN 155 TWD	125-	2	D
W057	WFKZAA	502J017	237 FA DET RADAR-CM	9	2	D
W058	WGJCAA	701C139B	241 FA DET RADAR-CM	9	2	D
W059	WGJEAA	701C139D	243 FA DET RADAR-CM	9	2	D
W060	WGJEAA	701C139D	243 FA DET RADAR-CM	9	2	D
W061	WGJFAA	701C139E	244 FA DET RADAR-CM	9	2	D
W062	WG3KAA	701C141B	253 FA DET RADAR-CM	9	2	D
W063	WG3LAA	701C141C	254 FA DET RADAR-CM	9	3	D
W064	WG3MAA	701C141D	255 FA DET RADAR-CM	9	2	D
W065	WG3NAA	701C141E	256 FA DET RADAR-CM	9	2	D

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PAGE 6 RHMSMVA9327 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 W066 WHZTAA 805D258 278 FA DET RADAR TPS

			25	8	3	X
W067	WARMAA	099Z018	3/319 FA BN 105 HOW			
			TWD	484	2	D
W068	WGQ8AA	805C057	64 FI SEC DISBURSING	37-	1	X
W069	WANLAA	805A001	1/5 IN HHC MECH BDE	350	1	A
W070	WANKAA	805A007	1/11 IN BN (1/5 DIV)	920	1	A
W071	WFM1AA	517P074	39 IN PLT SCOUT DOG	31	2	A
W072	WE8wAA	526H736	43 IN PLT SCOUT DOG	31	1	A
W073	WE82AA	804E030	47 IN PLT SCOUT DOG	31	1	A
W074	WG22AA	804E029	58 IN PLT SCOUT DOG	31	1	A
S075	WAN4AA	805A005	1/61 IN BN MECH(1/5			
			DIV)	908	1	A
W076	WG5YAA	804L013	75 IN DET CBT TRACKER	10	2	A
W077	WG74AA	701E034	C/75 IN CO RANGER	158-	2	A
W078	WG8DAA	701B040	N/75 IN CO RANGER			
			(173 BDE)	61	2	A
W079	WG50AA	804L015	77 IN DET CBT TRACKER	10	1	A
W080	WARJAA	099X126	173 IN HHC ABN BDE			
			(ABN)	301	2	A

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (J3)

FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN INFO GENERAL ROSSON, ADMIRAL CLAREY, GENERAL NAZZARO, GENERAL CLAY, LT GENERAL MCCAFFREY, LT GENERAL JONES, REAR ADMIRAL SALZER FROM GENERAL ABRAMS. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

W081	WARPAA	099Z023	2/503 IN BN (173D			
			ABN BDE)	920	2	A
W082	WGZBAA	701B013	3/503 IN BN (173D			
			ABN BDE)	920	2	A
W083	WDMNAA	526E015	4/503 IN BN (173D			

PAGE 2 RHMSMVA9328 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

			ABN BDE)	920	2	A
W084	WG5XAA	804L012	557 IN PLT CBT TRACKER	23	1	A
W085	W04DAA	804L002	LG DEP CAM RANH BAY	212	2	X
W086	W023AA	804L003	LG DEP LONG BINH	150	3	X
W087	W030AA	804L004	LG DEP QUI NHON	7	2	X
W088	WDCYAA	517P008A	6 MD CTR CONVALESCENT	194	2	X
W089	WBJQAA	099Z109	8 MD HSP FIELD	73	2	X
W090	WBKVAA	526H173	18 MD HSP SURG MBL	132	1	X
W091	WBM2AA	202E005	498 MD CO AIR AMB	167	2	X
W092	WGUSAA	804E083	930 MD DET DISP GEN	21	3	X
W093	WFNTAA	526H385	24 MH DET	2	2	X
W094	WCZPAA	407C010	172 MI DET SEP INF BDE	38	2	X
W095	WDJPAA	805A015	517 MI DET BDE	38	1	X
W096	WB08AA	502L030	54 OD CO AMMO DS-GS	92	1	X
W097	WET5AA	701D205	71 OD CO AMMO DS-GS	136	3	X
W098	WB1NAA	202B034	630 OD CO AMMO DS-GS	10	2	X
W099	WDNOAA	517P039H	206 QM DET LDRY-BATH	12	1	X

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W100	WFUNAA	526H528	514 QM CO PETROL OPER	15'	2	X
W101	W15TAA	099Z165	SC AGY COMM OPS CEN	22'	3	X
W102	W15NAA	099Z167	SC AGY (TEL MGMT AGY)	48	3	X

PAGE 3 RHMSMVA9328 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE						
W103	W1V6AA	526I176A	SC REG COMM GP	18'	3	X
W104	W0VRAA	804L021	1 SC SEA SIG SCH	18'	3	X
W105	W25ZAA	805D186	SC DET SPT	77	2	X
W106	W25PAA	805D253	SC DET SPT	37	3	X
W107	WCJTAA	526E013	16 SC DET PICTORIAL	5	3	X
W108	WCEEAA	526H143B	36 SC BN CMBT AREA HHC	84	3	X
W109	WCGNAA	805D002B	51 SC DET MW-TS	8	1	X
W110	WC4RAA	805D054	63 SC DET (DCO)	25	3	X
W111	WCJPAA	805D056	201 SC DET (DCO)	25	3	X
W112	WC1WAA	805D057	206 SC DET (MTCO)	25	2	X
W113	WCEVAA	526H351B	221 SC CO PICTORIAL	26'	3	X
W114	WC1ZAA	805D058	224 SC DET (MTCO)	25	2	X
W115	WDFMAA	526H192	261 SC CO SPT	61'	2	X
W116	WEWNAA	805A013	298 SC CO LT INF BDE	102	1	X
W117	WDVPAA	526H251	337 SC CO RADIO RELAY	23'	1	X
W118	WCGDAA	099Z029	362 SC CO RADIO RELAY UHF	155'	2	X
W119	WCEKAA	526H040A	459 SC BN CBT AREA CO C	76'	2	X
W120	WCEKAO	805D241	A/459 SC BN	170'	2	X

PAGE 4 RHMSMVA9328 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE						
W121	WCEKCO	805D244	C/459 SC BN	108	2	X
W122	WCYUAA	805D060	506 SC DET (MTCO)	25	1	X
W123	WCFNAA	502L013	518 SC CO RAD RLY UHF	48'	2	X
W124	WCFBAA	805D025	534 SC CO ABN BDE	102	2	X
W125	WHSXAA	805D240	542 SC CO SPT	176	2	X
W126	WHSYAA	805D238	556 SC CO SPT	64'	2	X
W127	WFUDAA	526H535	588 SC CO SUPPORT	168	1	X
W128	WHU2AA	805D234	589 SC CO SPT	24'	2	X
W129	WCNNAA	202E062	10 TC CO MDM TRK CGO	50'	3	X
W130	WCQPA	805D105	51 TC DET MDM HEL CGO	72	1	X
W131	WFUSAA	701D124	57 TC CO LIGHT TRUCK 5T	179	1	X
W132	WCL8AA	407I005	97 TC CO HVY BOAT	40'	2	X
W133	WCQ3AA	805D091	166 TC DET ACFT MNT MDM	38	2	X
W134	WEQ6AA	805D064	440 TC CO TML TRANS	5'	4	X
W135	WCPEAA	517P004	534 TC CO MDM TRK CGO	10'	3	X
W136	WCPYAA	526H095	538 TC CO MDM TRK PETRL	28'	3	X

COMUSMACV R 181143Z/MAY71

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

W137 WFS9AA 526H578 545 TC CO LIGHT TRK

PAGE 5 RHMSMVA9328 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

	ST	133	2	X
W138	DEBIT/CREDIT ACCT	69		
	ARMY TOTAL	21,769		

* INDICATES A UNIT DRAWDOWN
B. US NAVY

LINE

NR	UIC	FRN	UNIT	STR	MR	F
N001	N50852	804D022	ARL-23	212	4	X
N002	N50963	0170014J	ARL-24	212	4	X
N003	N58131	502L062	ARL-30	212	4	X
N004			DEBIT/CREDIT ACCT	486		
			NAVY TOTAL	1,122		

C. USMC

LINE

NR	UIC	FRN	UNIT	STR	MR	F
M001	99K039		NAVFORV	2*	3	X
M002	99K043Z		I CORPS JTD	3	1	X
M003	99K044		NAV ADV GRP JTD	4*	3	A
M004	99K045		SOG JTD	5*	3	X
M005	99K047		DEF COM AGCY JTD	6*	3	X

PAGE 6 RHMSMVA9328 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

M006	99K048	SUB UNIT 1, 1ST			
		ANGLICO	5*	3	D
M007	99K101	CO L MAR SPT BN	40	1	X
M008	05J001	DCPG LNO JTD	3	3	X
M009	05J062	NOG DET YOV-10	21	1	D
		DEBIT/CREDIT ACCT	20		
		USMC TOTAL	109		

* INDICATES A UNIT DRAWDOWN
D. US AIR FORCE

LINE

NR	UIC	FRN	UNIT	STR	MR	F
J001	JBKL70	098F330	14 SOP WG	50*	2	A
J002	JSSM60	098F330B	18 SOP SQ AC 119K	91	2	A
J003	JBKRQ0	098A420	0823 CEH SQ	399	3	X
J004	JBH070	098F380	0035 TFG WG	181	2	A
J005	JBFC00	098F380A	615 TFG SQ/F100	117	2	A
J006	JBFBP0	098F380B	352 TFG SQ/F100	117	2	A
J007	JBHV0	098F380C	612 TFG SW/F100	117	2	A
J008	JBFCZ0	098F380D	614 TFG SQ/F100	117	2	A
J009	JBM480	098F500	0035 AVN SQ	124	2	D

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#9328

COMUSMACV

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (J3)
 FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN INFO GENERAL ROSSON, ADMIRAL CLAREY, GENERAL NAZZARO, GENERAL CLAY, LTG MCCAFFREY, LT GENERAL JONES, REAR ADMIRAL SALZER FROM GENERAL ABRAMS. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. SECTION III OF III

J010	JBM400	096F540	0035 FDM SQ	330-	2	D
\$ J011	JBKRTO	096F541	14 FDM SQ	172-	2	D
J012	JBJX50	098F550	0435 MUM SQ	294-	2	D
J013	JBHYKO	098F700	0035 COS GP	25-	2	X

PAGE 2 RHMSMVA9329 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

J014	JBJ160	098F700A	35 CEG SQ	43-	2	D
J015	JBJX20	098F700B	35 WEP SQ	79-	2	A
J016	JBJ180	098F700C	35 SER SQ	30-	2	X
J017	JBHZG0	098F700\$	35 SUP SQ	79-	2	D
J018	JBJ170	098F700E	35 TRS SQ	36-	2	X
J019	JBC210	098F900	0035 DIS DS	10-	2	X
J020	JBNSG0	098G350B	537 TAL SQ/C-7A	131	2	A
J021	JBNW30	098G500	12 AVN SQ	18-	2	D
J022	JBNU40	098G540	12 FDM SW	87-	2	D
J023	JBKR80	098G700	12 COS GP	7-	2	X
J024	JBKS80	098G700A	12 CEG SQ	6-	2	X
J025	JBKR90	098G700B	12 SEP SQ	1-	2	A
J026	JBNP70	098G700C	12 SER SQ	6-	2	X
J027	JBNP80	098G700D	12 SUP SQ	10-	2	X
J028	JBNU00	098G700E	12 TRS SQ	5-	2	X
J029	JBC050	098J350	19 TAL SQ/C-123	221	3	A
J030	JBKLH0	098J460	0460 TR WG	199	3	A
J031	JBFDPO	098J460A	12 TR SQ/ RF-4C	275	3	A
J032	JBKLNO	098J460D	460 TR WG	51	3	A
J033	JBKLLO	098J500	0460 AVN SQ	202	3	D

PAGE 3 RHMSMVA9329 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

J034	JBKLJ0	098J540	0460 FDM SQ	259-	3	D
J035	JBHY60	098J700	0377 COS GP	34-	3	X
J036	JBJ260	098J700A	377 CEG SQ	29-	3	A
J037	JBJX00	098J700B	377 SEP SQ	7-	3	A
J038	JBJ380	098J700C	377 SER SQ	27-	3	X
J039	JBHZD0	098J700D	377 SUP SQ	54-	3	X
J040	JBJ270	098J700E	377 TRS SQ	25-	3	X
J041	JBHY70	098J900	0377 DIS DS	5-	3	X
J042			DEBIT/CREDIT ACCT	1,620		
			AIR FORCE TOTALS	5,700		

-INDICATES A UNIT DRAWDOWN

\$ UNITS SCHEDULED TO MOVE TO THAILAND PENDING APPROVAL.

E. SUMMARY OF SERVICE TOTALS:

US ARMY	21,769
US NAVY	1,122
US MARINES	109
US AIR FORCE	5,700
TOTAL	28,700

2. (U) CONTINUED DETAILED PLANNING AND COORDINATION MAY NECESSITATE SUBSEQUENT MINOR ADJUSTMENTS TO THE PROPOSED TROOP LIST.

GP-4

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P 222205Z MAY 71
 FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMULVA/CG THIRD MAB
 INFO RUAOAJA/CG III MAF
 BT

I O P S E C R E T. PERSONAL FOR MGEN ARMSTRONG, INFO
 LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING
 DUTY HOURS. //N00000//
ARG/MAU READINESS (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 120407Z MAY 71 (TS)

1. (TS) BY REF A, ARG ALFA/31ST MAU WAS REQUESTED TO
 ASSUME A 72-HOUR REACTION TIME TO MRI SUBJECT TO
 CONTINUING EVALUATION OF RISK FACTORS INVOLVED. THIS
 REACTION TIME IS PRESENTLY IN EFFECT.
2. (TS) THE 72-HOUR REACTION TIME VICE THE NORMAL
 120 HOUR WAS PROMPTED BY MY CONCERN FOR THE
 VULNERABILITY OF 3D MAB FORCES DURING THE PHASE DOWN
 PERIOD 8 MAY TO 29 JUNE BECAUSE OF THE REDUCED COMBAT
 CAPABILITY. I REALIZE THAT THERE WAS NOT, NOR IS THERE
 NOW, A DEFINABLE ENEMY THREAT TO THE DANANG VITAL AREA.

CG FMFPAC

P 222205Z MAY 71

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA2317 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
HOWEVER, THE LACK OF SATURATION PATROLLING IN THE
LOWLAND AREA ADJACENT TO DANANG, THE MANY
APPROACHES INTO THAT AREA (MADE MORE ACCESSIBLE BY THE
LACK OF PATROLLING), COUPLED WITH THE EVER DECREASING
COMBAT CAPABILITY OF 3D MAB FORCES, COMPELLED ME TO
REQUEST ADMIRAL CLAREY TO HAVE THE ARG/31ST MAU NEAR
AT HAND SHOULD THEIR SERVICES BE REQUIRED.

3. (TS) MAINTENANCE OF THE 72-HOUR REACTION TIME BY
THE ARG IS RESTRICTING THE DESIRED SHIP UPKEEP AT SUBIC.
ADDITIONALLY, THE WET-WELL LIFTS REQUIRED BY COMNAUFORV
CANNOT BE SATISFIED. HOWEVER, ADMIRAL CLAREY HAS BEEN
MOST COOPERATIVE WITH ME IN THIS ENTIRE MATTER AND
FEELS, AS DO I, THAT THERE IS AN IMPLIED THREAT PRESENT
BECAUSE OF THE STATUS OF 3D MAB FORCES DURING THE PHASE
DOWN.

4. (TS) IN CONSIDERING A PERIOD OF LESS CRITICALITY FROM
NOW UNTIL THE END OF INCREMENT VII, AN EXAMINATION
HERE INDICATES THAT PERHAPS THE PERIOD FROM 1 JUNE TO
30 JUNE WOULD BEST FIT THAT CATEGORY SINCE THE
MARINE POPULATION WILL HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED
AND THE ARMY ELEMENTS WILL HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT OPPOR-
TUNITY TO FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE AO AND PREPARE
THEIR DEFENSIVE PLANS.

5. (TS) WITH AN APPRECIATION OF THE BACKGROUND WHICH
PROMPTED THE 72-HOUR REACTION STATUS AND YOUR
ON-THE-SCENE AWARENESS OF THE PRESENT TACTICAL
SITUATION IN THE DANANG AREA, YOUR COMMENTS CONCERNING
THE LEAST CRITICAL TIME PERIOD IN THE TIME FRAME FROM
NOW TO 30 JUNE 1971 - IF YOU CONSIDER THERE IS ONE - ARE
REQUESTED. AN EARLY RESPONSE WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

WARM REGARDS.

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2317

CG FMFPAC

P 222205Z MAY 71

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FM CINCPAC

TO RUEKJCS/CJCS

INFO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV
 RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION 1 OF 3
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL MOORER INFO GENERAL ABRAMS,
 GENERAL NAZZARO, ADMIRAL CLAREY, GENERAL ROSSON AND
 LT GEN JONES FROM ADMIRAL MCCAIN
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT EIGHT (U)

- A. CINCPAC 102331Z APR 71 (NOTAL)
- B. COMUSMACV 130147Z APR 71 (NOTAL)
- C. JCS 1269/171609Z MAY 71

1. (TS) REF A PROVIDED PHASING OF REDEPLOYMENT
 INCREMENTS TO MEET PRESIDENTIAL GUIDANCE OF 100,000
 U.S. FORCE LEVEL REDUCTION BY 1 DEC 71. REF B, AMONG
 OTHER THINGS, ADVISED THAT THE SPACES INVOLVED IN
 INCREMENT EIGHT WOULD TOTAL 28,700. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE,
 DETAILED PLANNING FOR INCREMENT EIGHT HAS BEEN INITIATED
 TO INSURE THE CONTINUITY OF ORDERLY REDEPLOYMENTS. AS
 A RESULT, THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED TROOP LIST FOR 28,700
 SPACES IN KEYSTONE ORIOLE BRAVO TO REDEPLOY DURING THE
 PERIOD 1 JUL-31 AUG 71 IS SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL.

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2. (TS) COMPOSITION OF TROOP LIST BY SERVICE:

A. U.S. ARMY

LINE

NR	FRN	UNIT	SPACES
W001	526N006	1/44 AD BN AW SP	362&
W002	526CC020	G/55 AD BTY 50 CAL MG	142
W003	526N007	4/60 AD BN AW SP	230&
W004	526N006A	G/65 AD BTY 50 CAL MG	142
W005	099Z158	40 AG DET APU TYPE T	16
W006	099Z015	E/17 AR CAV TRP/SEP ABN BDE 210	
W007	805A006	1/77 AR BN TANK	615
W008	502K034	180 AV CO ASLT SPT HEL	268
W009	202C012	D/227 AV CO ASLT HEL	121&
W010	202C014	A/228 AV CO ASLT HEL SPT	157&
W011	526G083	235 AV CO AERIAL WPNS	254
W012	517P006E	343 AV DET ALFD OPNS	21
W013	099Z001F	BI HQS SPT CMD QNH	46&
W014	517B065G	46 BI DET PUB INFO	5
W015	701I017	48 BI DET PUB INFO	5
W016	526H391	2 CA CO	171
W017	202D0061	1CM DET CBR CENTER	5
W018	407C009	51 CM DET CBR CENTER	10
W019	805A015	86 CM DET CBR CENTER	5
W020	407F087	19 CS CO S&S DS	20&
W021	526H691	62 CS HHC MAINT SUPPORT BN	34&
W022	805A003	75 CS HHC SPT BN	823
W023	202E015	85 CS CO LT MNT DS	183
W024	526H686	98 CS CO LT EQUIP MNT	9&
W025	202E026	136 CS CO LT MNT DS	15&
W026	526H695	160 CS CO HVY EQUIP MAINT	28&
W027	099Z098	173 CS BN SPT ABN	704
W028	202B019	223 CS CO S&S DS	26
W029	526H469K	229 CS CO SUP SVC DS	76&
W030	526H679	483 CS CO FLD SVC FWD	30&

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W031	502L038	506 CS CO SUP SVC DS	308
W032	202E033	625 CS CO SUP SVC DS	148&
W033	805D111	794 CS MAINT CO DS/DN	63&
W034	805A003	A/7 EN CO	256
W035	526H007	14 EN BN COMBAT ARMY	812
W036	526H295	15 EN CO LIGHT EQUIP	186
W037	5020026	20 EN BN COMBAT ARMY	812
W038	526H052	73 EN CO CONST SPT	143
W039	5020028	103 EN CO CONST SPT	111&
W040	099Z123	173 EN CO CBT (ABN)	194
W041	517P039A	196 EN DET FIELD MAINT	10
W042	202D009	509 EN CO PANEL BRIDGE	126
W043	407F031	510 EN CO MAINT DS	14&
W044	407F028	584 EN CO LIGHT EQUIP	154&
W045	202B0085	630 EN CO LIGHT EQUIP	186
W046	407F029	864 EN BN CONST TYPE B	899
W047	502J012	1 FA HHB SRAC ARTY	119&
W048	805A004	5/4 FA BN 155 MM SP	658
W049	701C033	7/8 FA BN 175/8 IN HOW SP	565
W050	805D154	2/12 FA BN 155 MM TWD	598
W051	701C140	F/26 FA BTY TGT ACQ	102&
W052	502J006	5/27 FA BN 105 HOW TWD	520
W053	202D050	7/29 FA BTY B SEARCHLIGHT	150
W054	099X011	77 FA DET RADAR-CM	9
W055	805D311	F/77 FA BTY	133
W056	526H617	C/1/92 FA BN 155 TWD	125&
W057	502J017	237 FA DET RADAR-CM	9
W058	701C139B	241 FA DET RADAR-CM	9
W059	701C139C	242 FA DET RADAR-CM	9
W060	701C139D	243 FA DET RADAR-CM	9
W061	701C139E	244 FA DET RADAR-CM	9
W062	701C141B	253 FA DET RADAR-CM	9
W063	701C141C	254 FA DET RADAR-CM	9
W064	701C141D	255 FA DET RADAR-CM	9

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TOP SECRET

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W065	701C141E	256 FA DET RADAR-CM	9
W066	805D258	278 FA DET RADAR TPS	8
W067	099Z018	3/319 FA BN 105 HOW TWD	484
W068	805C057	64 FI SEC DISBURSING	37&
W069	805A001	1/5 IN HHC MECH BDE	350
W070	805A007	1/11 IN BN (1/5 DIV)	920
W071	517P074	39 IN PLT SCOUT DOG	31
W072	526H736	43 IN PLT SCOUT DOG	31
W073	804E030	47 IN PLT SCOUT DOG	31
W074	804E029	58 IN PLT SCOUT DOG	31
W075	805A005	1/61 IN BN MECH (1/5 DIV)	908
W076	804L013	75 IN DET CBT TRACKER	10
W077	701E034	C/75 IN CO RANGER	158&
W078	701B040	N/75 IN CO RANGER (173 BDE)	61
TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SECTION 2 OF 3			
W079	804L015	77 IN DET CBT TRACKER	10
W080	099X126	173 IN HHC ABN BDE (ABN)	301
W081	099Z023	2/503 IN BN (173D ABN BDE)	920
W082	701B013	3/503 IN BN (173D ABN BDE)	920
W083	526E015	4/503 IN BN (173D ABN BDE)	920
W084	804L012	557 IN PLT CBT TRACKER	23
W085	804L002	LG DEP CAM RANH BAY	212&
W086	804L003	LG DEP LONG BINH	150&
W087	804L004	LG DEP QUI NHON	7&
W088	517P068A	6 MD CTR CONVALESCENT	194
W089	099Z109	8 MD HSP FIELD	73
W090	526H173	18 MD HSP SURG MBL	132
W091	202E005	498 MD CO AIR AMB	167
W092	804E063	930 MD DET DISP GEN	21
W093	526H385	24 MH DET	2
W094	407C010	172 MI DET SEP INF BDE	36
W095	8057A015	517 MI DET 38 BDE	38
W096	502L030	54 OD CO AMMO DS-GS	92&
W097	701D205	71 OD CO AMMO DS-GS	136&
W098	202B034	630 OD CO AMMO DS-GS	10&

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TOP SECRET

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W099	517P039H	206 QM DET LDRY-BATH	12
W100	526H528	514 QM CO PETROL OPER	15&
W101	099Z165	SC AGY COMM OPNS CEN	22&
W102	099Z167	SC AGY (TEL MGMT AGY)	48
W103	5261176A	SC REG COMM GP	18&
W104	304L021	1 SC SEA SIG SCH	18&
W105	805D186	SC DET SPT	77
W106	805D253	SC DET SPT	37
W107	526E013	16 SC DET PICTORIAL	5
W108	526H143B	36 SC BN CMBT AREA HHC	64
W109	805D002B	51 SC DET AW-TS	8
W110	805D054	63 SC DET (DCO)	25
W111	805D056	201 SC DET (DCO)	25
W112	805D057	206 SC DET (MTCO)	25
W113	526H351B	221 SC CO PICTORIAL	26&
W114	805D058	224 SC DET (MTCO)	25
W115	526H192	261 SC CO SPT	61&
W116	805A013	298 SC CO LT INF BDE	102
W117	526H251	337 SC CO RADIO RELAY	23&
W118	099Z029	362 SC CO RADIO RELAY UHF	155&
W119	526H040A	459 SC BN CBT AREA CO C	76&
W120	805D241	A/459 SC BN	170
W121	805D244	C/459 SC BN	108
W122	805D060	506 SC DET (MTCO)	25
W123	502L013	518 SC CO RAD RLY UHF	48&
W124	805D025	534 SC CO ABN BDE	102
W125	805D240	542 SC CO SPT	176
W126	805D238	556 SC CO SPT	64&
W127	526H535	588 SC CO SUPPORT	168
W128	805D234	589 SC CO SPT	24&
W129	202E062	10 TC CO MDM TRK CGO	50&
W130	805D105	51 TC DET MDM HEL CGO	72
W131	701D124	57 TC CO LIGHT TRUCK ST	179
W132	407I005	97 TC CO HVY BOAT	40&
W133	805D091	166 TC DET ACFT MNT MDM	38
W134	805D064	440 TC CO TML TRANS	5&
W135	517P004	534 TC CO MDM TRK CGO	10&
W136	526H095	538 TC CO MDM TRK PETRL	28&
W137	526H578	545 TC CO LIGHT TRK ST	133&
W138	DEBIT/CREDIT ACCT		69
	ARMY TOTAL		21,769

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B. U.S. NAVY

N001	804D022	ARL-23	212
N002	0170014J	ARL-24	212
N003	502L062	ARL-30	212
N004		DEBIT/CREDIT ACCT	486
		NAVY TOTAL	1,122

C. U.S. AIR FORCE

J001	098F330	14 SOP WG	50
J002	098F330B	18 SOP SQ AC 119K \$	91
J003	098A420	0823 CEH SQ	399
J004	098F380	0035 TFG WG	181
J005	098F380A	615 TFG SG/F100	117
J006	098F380B	352 TFG SQ/F100	117
J007	098F380C	612 TFG SW/F100	117
J008	098F380D	614 TFG SQ/F100	117
J009	098F500	0035 AVN SQ	124
J010	098F540	0035 FDM SQ	330&
J011	098F541	14 FDM SQ	172
J012	098F550	0435 MUM SQ	294&
J013	098F700	0035 COS GP	25&
J014	098F700A	35 CEG SQ	43&
J015	098F700B	35 SEP SQ	79&
J016	098F700C	35 SER SQ	30&
J017	098F700D	35 SUP SQ	79&
J018	098F700E	35 IRS SQ	36&
J019	098F900	0035 DIS DS	10&
J020	098G350B	537 TAL SQ/C-7A	131
J021	098G500	12 AVN SQ	18&
J022	098G540	12 FDM SQ	97&
J023	098G700	12 COS GP	7&
J024	098G700A	12 CEG SQ	6&
J025	098G700B	12 SEP SQ	1&
J026	098G700C	12 SER SQ	6&
J027	098G700D	12 SUP SQ	10&
J028	098G700E	12 IRS SQ	5&
J029	098J350	19 TAL SQ/C-123	221
J030	098J460	0460 TR WG	199

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FINAL SECTION OF 3

J031	098J460A	12 TR SQ/RF-4C	275
J032	098J460D	460 TR WG	51
J033	08J500	0460 AVN SQ	202&
J034	098J540	0460 FDM SQ	259&
J035	098J700	0377 COS GP	34&
J036	098J700A	377CEG SQ	29&
J037	098J700B	377 SEP SQ	7&
J038	098J700C	377 SER SQ	27&
J039	098J700D	377 SUP SQ	54&
J040	098J700E	377 IRS SQ	25&
J041	098J900	0377 DIS DS	5&
J042		DEBIT/CREDIT ACCT	1,620
		AIR FORCE TOTAL	5,700

D. USMC

M001	99K039	NAVFORV	2&
M002	99K043Z	I CORPS JTD	3
M003	99K044	NAV ADV GRP JTD	4&
M004	99PRT	SOG JTD	5&
M005	99K047	DEF COM AGCY JTD	6&
M006	99K048	SUB UNIT 1, 1ST ANGLICO	5&
M007	99K101	CO L MAR SPI NB	40
M008	05J001	DCPG LNO JTD	3
M009	05J062	NOG DET YOV-10	21
		DEBIT/CREDIT ACCT	20
		USMC TOTAL	109

& INDICATES DRAWDOWN IN UNIT STRENGTH.

\$ UNITS SCHEDULED TO MOVE TO THAILAND PENDING APPROVAL.

E. SUMMARY OF SERVICE TOTALS:

U.S. ARMY	21,769
U.S. NAVY	1,122
U.S. AIR FORCE	5,700
U.S. MARINES	109
TOTAL	28,700

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TOP SECRET

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F. CONTINUED DETAILED PLANNING AND COORDINATION MAY NECESSITATE SUBSEQUENT MINOR ADJUSTMENTS TO THE PROPOSED TROOP LIST.

3. (TS) RECOMMEND CONUS AS THE DESTINATION FOR ALL UNITS IN THE PRECEDING LIST, EXCEPT FOR THE USAF UNIT IDENTIFIED ABOVE FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO THAILAND. THE 173RD ANB BDE IS STILL BEING CONSIDERED FOR RETENTION IN THE PACOM. THEREFORE, THE PROPOSED DESTINATION FOR THIS UNIT WILL BE PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO REF C, BY SEPARATE COMMUNICATION.

4. (S) A MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE FOR INCREMENT EIGHT REDEPLOYMENTS IS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR THE PERIOD 21-26 JUNE 71. RECEIPT OF PERSONNEL POLICIES AND EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS BY MACV COMPONENTS FROM THE SERVICES NLT 10 JUNE 71 IS ESSENTIAL TO ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS FOR THE 21 JUNE 71 CONFERENCE.

5. (C) RECOMMEND APPROVAL OF THE TROOP LISTS AND THE PERIOD 21-26 JUNE 71 FOR THE MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE AT CAMP SMITH, HAWAII.

6. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY. WARM REGARDS.

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PERSONNEL FOR

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Dep C/S	<i>✓</i>
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 FM CG FIRST MARDIV
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CONFIDENTIAL//NO1300// SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 (PERSONAL FOR) LTGEN JONES FROM BGEN DWYER. DELIVER DURING
 WORKING HOURS.

Eng 0

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STATUS REPORT ON FIRST MARDIV (C)

1. WITH THE CEREMONY, ARPH CPX AND VISITORS BEHIND US WE HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE A NUMBER OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE READINESS OF THE DIVISION IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. THE PRINCIPAL AREAS OF CONCERN ARE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL READINESS. THESE AND CERTAIN OTHER AREAS ARE DISCUSSED BELOW:

2. PERSONNEL. IN TERMS OF GROSS NUMBERS WE ARE PROJECTING A 1JUL71 TOTAL USMC OFF/ENL STRENGTH OF 13,317 AGAINST THE END FOURTH QTR M/L OF 11,496.

A. WITH RESPECT TO OFFICERS, ON 1 JUL WE EXPECT TO BE AT M/L BUT THE SUMMER TRANSFERS AND THE EARLY OUT PROGRAM WILL TAKE THEIR TOLL. WE WILL BE SHORT LTCOL TO CAPTAIN. BASED UPON CURRENTLY AVAILABLE INFO (INFORMAL OR OTHERWISE) THE FIELD GRADE PICTURE LOOKS LIKE THIS:

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PAGE 2 RUWJNWB2387 C O N F I D E N T I A L

RANK	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
COL (M/L 14)	12	13	14	14	15	15	15
& LCOL (M/L 43)	20	23	28	36			
&& MAJ (M/L 79)	45	50	55	60	62	63	64

NOTE: & 12 O/B OR DUE IN ARE IN ZONE FOR COL. SIX PREVIOUS PASSES,
6 UP FOR FIRST TIME

&& 15 MAJORS IN ZONE FOR LTCOL FOR FIRST TIME. 8 PRESENTLY ON BOARD.

(1) COLS FINK (MA) AND F. J. HUNT (G-2 TYPE) ARE DUE IN JUN;
COL GRUBAUGH (ARTY) IN JULY AND COL HOUCK (COMMUNICATOR) REPORTS IN AUG. CODE OF PROMISES US AN 03 TYPE; HOWEVER, AS OF NOW THERE IS NO ONE OF THE LIKES OF A JUDGE OR KELLEY ON THE HORIZON. UNLESS A REAL CHARGER IS MADE AVAILABLE - AND SOON - I PLAN TO GIVE THE 1ST MARINES TO BOB BURHANS WHO, ALTHOUGH SHY ON EXPERIENCE, IS LONG ON POTENTIAL. I'M CONFIDENT HE CAN PRODUCE. I DO NOT PLAN TO PUT A COLONEL IN THE 5TH MARINES UNTIL THE PERSONNEL SITUATION WARRANTS. TONY MONTI STAYS WITH 7TH MARINES.

(2) AS YOU REQUESTED KNOWN IN BOUND LTCOLS ARE LISTED BELOW:

E. R. PUCKETT	3002	PASSED TWICE	MAR '72
D. J. BURGER	0302	PASSED ONCE	JUL — <i>TO 1ST FSR</i>

PAGE 3 RUWJNWB2387 C O N F I D E N T I A L

J. F. VIELHAUER	0802	PASSED ONCE	SEP
E. Z. GRABOWSKI	0302	(COMMANDER 2/3 IN MAB)	SEP
J. D. ROWLEY	0302		JUL
E. W. HERICH	0302		AUG
J. F. ROCHE	0302		AUG
H. G. EDEBOHLS	1802		SEP
J. L. SAUL	1802		SEP
J. F. JONES	3001		SEP
R. S. HENLEY	0802		AUG
L. J. CAVALLO	0802		SEP
D. Z. BOYD	0302		SEP
C. A. BARSTOW	0302		JUL
A. LUKEMAN	0302		JUL
R. W. BADEKER	0302		SEP
W. T. LAYTON	0302		AUG

(3) WHILE WE DON'T KNOW MANY OF THEM, A REVIEW OF THEIR CAREER PATTERNS SUGGESTS THAT HQMC HAS ATTEMPTED TO PROVIDE US OUR FAIR SHARE OF GOOD OFFICERS. IF THEY ARRIVE AS SCHEDULED WE EXPECT TO COVER THE COMMAND SLOTS IN THE 1ST MARINES BY JULY OR AUGUST AT

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PAGE 4 RUWJNWB2387 C O N F I D E N T I A L

THE LATEST. SOME OF OUR SEPARATE BATTALIONS MUST BE COMMANDED BY MAJORS, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT RUN. OF SOME CONCERN IS THE FIELD GRADE ENGINEER PICTURE WHERE WE STAND AT 50 PERCENT OF AUTHORIZED LTCOL/MAJ. OVERALL, WE'LL BE ABLE TO PLUG THE MOST CRITICAL SPOTS UNTIL THE SUMMER UNDERLAP RUNS ITS COURSE, ALTHOUGH THERE WILL NOT BE MUCH DEPTH FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.

(4) WE'RE LOSING UPWARDS OF 100 COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS TO THE EARLY OUT PROGRAM, THE MAJORITY OF WHICH LEAVE IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE DEPARTS WITH THEM IN A NUMBER OF AREAS, ONE OF WHICH IS SUPPLY.

B. ENLISTED-WISE OUR PROJECTION FOR 1JUL INDICATES THAT WE WILL BE SLIGHTLY OVER M/L WITH OVERAGES IN ALL GRADES SAVE FOR E-2/E-1. HOWEVER, SKILL SHORTAGES WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST, THE MOST CRUCIAL BEING SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEER FIELDS. MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN THESE AREAS IS MANDATORY IF WE ARE TO MAKE RAPID HEADWAY IN RESTORING THE SUPPLY/MATERIAL READINESS OF THE DIVISION. AS YOU ARE AWARE THIS HAS BEEN A CHRONIC PROBLEM.

C. ALTHOUGH PREVIOUSLY TOUCHED ON IN PART, IN LIGHT OF YOUR DESIRES RE THE 1ST MARINES, THEIR PERSONNEL SITUATION DESERVES FURTHER AMPLIFICATION. AS YOU KNOW, ALL FIELD GRADE OFFICERS BUT TWO (ONE

PAGE 5 RUWJNWB2387 C O N F I D E N T I A L

PASSED OVER 1802) WILL LEAVE, SOME UNDER 60 DAYS. EXTENSIVE PCS OF CAPTAINS IS ALSO UNDERWAY. CO OF 2/1 INFORMED ME THAT ALL HIS CAPTAINS ARE UNDER ORDERS. SOME, NOT ALL, OF THE CAPTAINS IN THE OTHER BATTALIONS WILL ALSO BE ON PCS. IN ESSENCE, WE WILL HAVE TO REPLACE A MAJOR PORTION OF THE COMMAND STRUCTURE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AT A TIME WHEN OUR TOTAL ASSETS ARE LOW. IN SOME INSTANCES WE'LL PLUG THE GAPS IN THE INTERIM WITH YOUNGER OFFICERS. THE FIELD GRADE SLOTS WILL NOT BE COMPLETELY FILLED UNTIL LATE IN 1ST QTR FY 72. STRENGTH OF THE BATTALIONS IS EXPECTED TO BE IN THE VICINITY OF 850-900 MEN. ON 24 MAY REGIMENTAL STRENGTH WAS 2865 OUT OF 3418 RETURNED OR SCHEDULED TO RETURN. WITH LARGE MARINE BARRACKS QUOTA DEMANDS FOR RVN RETURNEES THE STRENGTH WILL PROBABLY DROP FURTHER. CONUS M/L FOR THE REGT IS 3231. WHILE I WILL ADDRESS MATERIAL CONSIDERATIONS LATER, THE 1ST MARINES HAVE A NUMBER OF DEFICIENCIES WHICH DEGRADE ITS MATERIAL READINESS. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THEY CAN BE ALLEVIATED IN SHORT ORDER. WHAT THIS ALL BOILS DOWN TO IS THAT THE REGIMENT IS NOT NOW IN OPTIMUM CONDITION NOR WILL IT BE FOR THE NEXT 60 DAYS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POTENTIAL IS TREMENDOUS AND ONCE SHAKEN DOWN IN GARRISON THEY SHOULD RECOVER QUICKLY.

3. MATERIAL. THE MAINTENANCE BACKLOG ON 15 MAY INCLUDED 157 ENG ITEMS:

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428 MOTOR TRANSPORT AND 864 COMM-ELEC. THE TOTALS IN MT AND COMM-ELEC WILL GO UP WITH THE ARRIVAL AND LTI OF INCREMENT VI AND VII GEAR. YOUR OVERFLOW MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IS AN OUTSTANDING ONE. THE CONFERENCE HERE WITH JERRY BROWN OF YOUR STAFF WAS MOST HELPFUL. WE'RE READY TO ROLL AND WITH YOUR HELP, BARSTOW AND HQMC, I'M OPTIMISTIC THAT WE CAN MOVE FAST IN THIS AREA. OF COURSE OUR PROGRESS, IN PART, IS DEPENDENT ON HAVING THE NECESSARY SUPPLY AND TECHNICAL SKILLS ON BOARD. WE'VE IDENTIFIED THE PROBLEM, THE PROGRAM LOOKS GOOD, OUR ORGANIZATION IS SOUND. I'LL SEE TO IT THAT IT'S PROPERLY SUPERVISED.

4. FACILITIES. AS ANTICIPATED THE UNITS AT HORNO ARE CRAMPED - BOTH IN BILLETING AND STORAGE. WE ARE MAKING ADJUSTMENTS LOCALLY TO OFFSET THESE DEFICIENCIES. SOME IMMEDIATE ACTION IS ALSO REQUIRED TO IMPROVE THE ARMORIES AT MARGARITA AND HORNO - THEY ARE INADEQUATE AT BOTH LOCATIONS. WE'RE WORKING WITH BASE ON THIS. I'M ALSO WORKING ON A MAJOR REQUEST TO BASE TO IMPROVE RECREATIONAL FACILITIES AT THESE CAMPS. THERE'S MUCH TO BE DONE IN THIS AREA. UNFORTUNATELY BASE IS FUND LIMITED.

5. TRAINING. DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS EMPHASIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE PLACED ON INDIVIDUAL AND MISSION ORIENTED TRNG. FOR THE RECENTLY RETURNED UNITS WE'LL BE STRESSING FUNDAMENTALS - TRYING TO ELIMINATE C O N F I D E N T I A L//N01300// FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS (PERSONAL FOR) LTGEN JONES FROM BGREN DWYER. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

THE BAD HABITS OF RVN. WE'LL BE SUPPORTING 6600 RESERVES AND CONDUCTING SOME ELEVEN VARIOUS TYPE EXERCISES IN THE NEXT 90 DAYS, INCLUDING A MABFEX IN JUNE AND OTHERS PREPARATORY TO OUR MABLEX IN SEPT. PHYSICAL TRNG WILL BE STRESSED. NOT ALL THE RETURNEES ARE IN GOOD CONDITION.

6. MISCELLANEOUS. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT ON GOING 'PEOPLE' AND 'COMMUNICATION' PROGRAMS WILL CONTINUE TO BE EMPHASIZED CONCURRENTLY WITH OTHER PROGRAMS TO ENHANCE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS.

7. GENERAL, THAT IS HOW IT LOOKS FROM HERE. THERE'S MUCH TO BE DONE BUT WHAT HAS TO BE DONE IS CLEARLY IDENTIFIED. PEOPLE DRIVE THE WHOLE PROBLEM. WE WILL BE ON THE LEAN SIDE FOR AWHILE. BUT THE JOB WILL BE DONE -- AND DONE WELL. VERY RESPECTFULLY.

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BT CG FIRST MARDIV
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P 280547Z MAY 71
 FM CG THIRD MAB
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

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UNCLAS E F T O //NG4400//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MAJGEN ARMSTRONG. DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURSELIMINATION OF FLC EXCESSES

1. THIS IS A PREVIEW FOR YOUR INFO OF THE SUBJ STATUS WHICH WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE FLC END OF MONTH REPORT.
2. EXCESS ON HAND: NONE FROM THE INITIALLY REPORTED EXCESS. THERE IS, HOWEVER, \$107,000 IN LUMBER FOR WHICH ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS HAVE NOT MATERIALIZED. NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS FOR A MIPR SALE TO THE ARMY. NO PROBLEM ANTICIPATED.
3. EXCESS DUE IN: THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED \$51,000 AT THE END OF APRIL HAS BEEN REDUCED TO \$3,446. FLC HOLDS REQUISITIONS AND HAS FUNDS OBLIGATED. THE ARMY IS HAVING DIFFICULTY LOCATING THE REQUISITIONS. EFFORTS CONTINUING TO REDUCE THE \$3,446. THIS AMOUNT POSES NO REAL FINANCIAL PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD GET CONFIRMATION OF CANCELLATION REQUESTS BEFORE DEOBLIGATING THE FUNDS.
4. FOLLOWING IS A RECAP OF CREDITS BEING OBTAINED FROM THE ARMY VIA MIPR.
 CLASS I - \$307.782
 CLASS IV - 173,390 (LUMBER, CONCERTINA, SANDBAGS, STAKES)
 THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE \$107,000 LUMBER IN PARA 2 ABOVE NOR DOES IT INCLUDE THE \$204,000 FLC FUNDING OBLIGATIONS FOR LUMBER TRANSFERRED FROM THE ARMY DANANG SPT COMMAND TO THE 2D LOG CMD FOR USE BY THE 3D FSR.
5. IN RESPECT TO GARRISON PROPERTY BY THE END OF MAY ALL PROPERTY EXCEPT \$150,000 AT CAMP BOOKS (FLC) WILL HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO OTHER SERVICES, RETROGRADED OR DISPOSED OF.

BT CG THIRD MAB

P 280547Z MAY 71

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PERSONAL FOR BGEN BROWN FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER
DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY //N00000//
USE OF OPERATION FREEZE (C)

1. (C) BY SEPARATE ROUTING MY ASST C/S, G-2 HAS PROVIDED YOUR G-2 AN SOP FROM THE 3D MARINE DIVISION ON "FREEZE". THIS METHOD OF CONTROL HAS BEEN VERY EFFECTIVELY USED IN WESTPAC TO SMOKE OUT VIOLATORS, WILLINGLY OR UNWILLINGLY BEING SHELTERED BY CONTEMPORARIES AFTER ACTS OF SERIOUS NATURE SUCH AS ATTACKS ON PERSONNEL OR SABOTAGE HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT.
2. (C) I ASKED ART ADAMS TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT WITH YOU AND WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE MY SUPPORT ON THIS TECHNIQUE SHOULD ANY INCIDENTS DEVELOP IN THE FUTURE IN WHICH THIS TECHNIQUE COULD POSSIBLY HELP US QUICKLY BRING IN TO FOCUS SUSPECTS WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE REMAIN UNKNOWN.
3. WARM REGARDS.

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S E C R E T //N03100//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN ARMSTRONG//DELIVER DURING DUTY
HOURSDEACTIVATION OF THIRD MAB HQ

1. (S) AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR STAFFS THAT IT IS SIMPLER TO IN FACT DEACTIVATE THE MAB IN COUNTRY. ALL IT TAKES IS A MESSAGE. AS WE COME NEARER TO THE END IT IS MORE AND MORE APPARENT THAT THE CONCEPT WE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WHEREIN SOME KEY STAFF MEMBERS WOULD STAY IN HAWAII FOR A SHORT TIME IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. WE WILL HAVE BUSINESS ON THE WIRE WHEN WE LEAVE. THERE WILL BE ABOUT TWELVE PEOPLE IN THE CP ELEMENT ON THE LAST DAY HERE INCLUDING COURIERS. ONLY ABOUT SEVEN OF THESE PERSONNEL WILL ACTUALLY BE REQUIRED IN HAWAII FOR THE SHORT TAD PERIOD.

2. (S) TIMING THE DEPARTURE AND PROVIDING EXPEDITIOUS MOVEMENT TO HAWAII FOR THE CP ELEMENT ALONG WITH THE RECORDS AND FILES POSES A PROBLEM. IN ADDITION TO THE CP ELEMENT THERE WILL BE ABOUT 35

CG THIRD MAB

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PAGE TWO RUMULVA2819 S E C R E T

PEOPLE REMAINING ON THE DOCK WHEN THE LAST SHIP IS LOADED. SINCE WE CAN'T AFFORD TO GET COMMITTED TO A RIGID DEPARTURE SCHEDULE THESE PEOPLE AND THE CP ELEMENT WILL DEPART RVN FOR OKINAWA BY KC-130. ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE ABOUT 2000 POUNDS AND 250 CUBIC FEET OF RECORDS AND FILES INCLUDING CLASSIFIED. TO ACCOMPLISH ITS INTENDED PURPOSE THE CP ELEMENT AND ITS FILES SHOULD GET TO HAWAII AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. I PROPOSE THAT THIS BE DONE BY KC-130 DEPARTING OKI THE DAY FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE FROM RVN. REALIZE THAT FEASIBILITY IS IN PART DEPENDENT ON ROUNDING OUT THE LOADS ECONOMICALLY FOR BOTH DIRECTIONS. IT WOULD BE PERFECT FOR HANDLING THE FILES AND THE CLASSIFIED MATTER.

3. (S) WE HAVE JUST ADVISED YOU BY OPEN MESSAGE OF THE REDUCED SHIPPING REQUIREMENT. ALTHOUGH THE LAST THREE SHIPS CAN BE SCRUBBED THE CHANGE HASN'T BEEN THAT DRAMATIC. WE HAD ONLY PART OF THE SPACE IN ALL THREE SHIPS. MOVING EVERYTHING FORWARD GIVES US SOME BREATHER HOWEVER AS WE SHOULD NOW COMPLETE THE LAST LOADING ON 26 JUNE IF ALL GOES WELL. THUS THE CP TYPES SHOULD LEAVE ON 27 JUNE AND IT ALL WILL BE OVER.

4. (C) PLAN TO HAVE COL OLTIMER HEAD THE CP ELEMENT AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR MOVEMENT. IF YOU APPROVE I WOULD LIKE TO PEEL OFF HERE ON THE 27TH ALONG WITH CAPT FINNERAN AND TAKE PANAM OUT OF SAIGON FOR HAWAII. VICE CMDR

7TH AF HAS OFFERED ASSISTANCE IN GETTING TO SAIGON.

5. (C) WILL SOON BE SENDING YOU A REPORT ON OUR ACTIONS TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTRABAND BEING CARRIED OUT IN OUR VEHICLES AND CARGO. WE ARE INSPECTING INSPECTING INSPECTING. WE ARE ALSO OPENING AND REBANDING AN ENORMOUS NUMBER OF BOXES.

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CG THIRD MAB

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