

FMFPAC: SPECAT EXCLUSIVES, IN and OUT, Jun-Dec 1971

INDEX - See following pages identified as pages 2 & 3, Enclosure (1)
and
Pages 3 - 7, Enclosure (2)

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ORIG	DTG	CLASSIFICATION	SUBJECT
23. CINCPAC	200337Z Mar71	TS (Gp-4)	Southeast Asia Redeployments
25. CG FMFPAC	302041Z Mar71	TS (Gp-4)	Force Planning
26. CINCPACFLT	310428Z Mar71	TS (Gp-4)	Redeployment Increment VII
30. CINCPACFLT	090353Z Apr71	S (Gp-4)	Okinawa Reversion
33. ADMIN CINCPACFLT	122104Z Apr71	TS (Gp-4)	Nuclear Weapons Deploy- ment Plans
35. CG I MAF	140357Z Apr71	TS (Gp-1)	Amphibious Operations
40. CG III MAF	170732Z Apr71	TS (Gp-1)	Amphibious Operations
51. COMUSMACV	181143Z May71	TS (Gp-4)	Redeployment Increment VIII
53. CINCPAC	270336Z May71	TS (Gp-4)	Redeployment Increment VIII
66. SECDEF	152331 150045Z Jun71	S (Gp-4)	Removal of Navy/Marine Flying Activities - Naha
72. CINCPACFLT	292054Z Jun71	TS (Gp-1)	Relocation of PACOM Nuclear Weapons
76. CINCPAC	042132Z Jul71	C (Gp-4)	Cold Turkey II Program
77. ADMIN III MAF	060900Z Jul71	S (Gp-4)	Possible Deployment of Marine F-4 Squadron to Taiwan
94. ADMIN III MAF	180346Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	MACS-4
101. CINCPACFLT	182155Z Sep71	S (Gp-3)	Kadena AB Availability

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ORIG	DTG	CLASSIFICATION	SUBJECT
104. CINCPACREPRY	230800Z Sep71	S (Gp-1)	Weapons Dispersal
108. CG III MAF	140135 140316Z Oct71	S (Gp-4)	Naha VMFA Additional Deployment
CG III MAF	Oct71	S	Naha VMFA Additional Deployment
110. CG FMFPAC	160416Z Oct71	TS (Gp-4)	Senior Officer Requirements
113. CG III MAF	210633Z Oct71	S (Gp-4)	CTG 79.3 Readiness Posture
120. CG FIRST MAW	300323Z Oct71	S (Gp-4)	FMF Structure /MARCORBASE Support
121. CG FMFPAC	302218Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	WestPac Cadre for Blue Ridge
134. COMNAVFORJAPAN	100820Z Dec71	U	Conversion North Fuji Maneuver Area
135. CTF-79	110606Z Dec71	TS (Gp-4)	Pakistan Contingency Operations
136. CG FMFPAC	162001Z Dec71	S (Gp-3)	Counterintelligence Operations at MCAS Iwakuni
139. CG III MAF	210113Z Dec71	TS (Gp-1)	Contingency Operations
140. CG III MAF	210645Z Dec71	TS (Gp-4)	Contingency Operations

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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ORIG	DTG	CLASSIFICATION	SUBJECT
53. CG THIRD MAB	280547Z May71	<u>U</u>	Elimination of FLC Excesses
56. CG FMFPAC	282147Z May71	C (gp-4)	Use of Operation Freeze
57. CG THIRD MAB	312343Z May71	S (gp-4)	Deactivation of Third MAB Hq
58. CG FMFPAC	022219Z Jun71	<u>U</u>	FMFPAC Training Readiness Evaluation
59. CG THIRD MAB	030415Z Jun71	<u>U</u>	Retrograde of Butler Bldgs
60. CG I MAF	050001Z Jun71	S (gp-3)	I MAF Accomplishments
61. CG FMFPAC	052125Z Jun71	C (gp-4)	Status Report on First MarDiv
62. CG THIRD MAB	060425Z Jun71	C (since 1 Jul 71)	Summary of Recent Events
63. CG III MAF	091111Z Jun71	C (gp-4)	MO/MOA Management
64. CG FMFPAC	100205Z Jun71	C (gp-4)	Elimination of the Term Fraggings in Official Correspondence
65. CG FMFPAC	110442Z Jun71	<u>U</u>	I MAF Accomplishments, Projects and Planning Tasks
67. CG THIRD MARDIV	210825Z Jun71	C (gp-4)	Naha Port Work Force Replacements
68. CG FMFPAC	220522Z Jun71	<u>U</u>	Marine Leader Pub
69. CG III MAF	250719Z Jun71	S (gp-4)	Nuclear Wpns Trn
70. CINCPACFLT	261226Z Jun71	<u>U</u>	Msg of Appreciation from Adm Clarey

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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<u>ORIG</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>71.</u> CG III MAF	280510Z Jun71	S (<i>gp-4</i>)	NE Asia Coordinating Committee
<u>73.</u> CG I MAF	292320Z Jun71	C (<i>gp-4</i>)	Asg of CG 7th MAB for ROPEVAL 3-71
<u>74.</u> CG FMFPAC	300333Z Jun71	C (<i>gp-4</i>)	Naha Port Work Force Replacements
<u>75.</u> CG FMFPAC	032151Z ^(SIC) Jul71	<u>U</u>	FMFPAC Training Readiness Evaluation
<u>78.</u> ADMIN FMFPAC	090115Z Jul71	TS (<i>gp-4</i>)	Northeast Asia Coordinating Committee
<u>79.</u> CG FMFPAC	182115Z ^{31 605} Jul71	S (<i>gp-4</i>)	Readiness Posture
<u>80.</u> CG FMFPAC	222139Z Jul71	S (<i>gp-4</i>)	Chemical Weaponry
<u>81.</u> CG FIRST MAW	231209Z Jul71	S (<i>gp-4</i>)	Readiness Posture
<u>82.</u> CG THIRD MARDIV	252246Z Jul71	<u>U</u>	Occupation of Camp Hague
<u>83.</u> CG FIRST MAW	260613Z Jul71	C (<i>gp-4</i>)	A6A Readiness
<u>84.</u> CG THIRD MAW	292048Z Jul71	<u>U</u>	Carrier Quals
<u>85.</u> COMFIRSTFLT	310007Z Jul71	S (<i>gp-4</i>)	Airborne Mine Counter-measures
<u>86.</u> ADMIN FMFPAC	072222Z Aug71	C (<i>gp-4</i>)	A6A Readiness
<u>87.</u> CG FMFPAC	092212Z Aug71	C (<i>gp-4</i>)	CH-53D Assignment
<u>88.</u> CG I MAF	100500Z Aug71	C (<i>gp-4</i>)	Visit W/COMFIRSTFLT/ COMPHIBPAC
<u>89.</u> CG FMFPAC	152151Z Aug71	C (<i>gp-4</i>)	Visit to COMFIRSTFLT/ COMPHIBPAC

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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ORIG	DTG	CLASSIFICATION	SUBJECT
<u>90.</u> ADMIN FMFPAC	180329Z Aug71	C (Gp-4)	Utilization of Kadena AB by III MAF Forces
<u>91.</u> CG FMFPAC	212249Z Aug71	U	Aircraft Sound Suppression: MCAS Iwakuni
<u>92.</u> CG III MAF	241130Z Aug71	C (Gp-4)	Kadena AB Utilization by III MAF
<u>93.</u> CG THIRD MAF	012302Z Sep71	U	FMFPAC Annual Aviation Safety Awards
<u>94.</u> CG THIRD MARDIV	101111Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	Standardization of SOP's
<u>95.</u> CG III MAF	110313Z Sep71	C (Gp-4)	Combined MABLEX Planning
<u>96.</u> ADMIN III MAF	150201Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	III MAF Future Considera- tions
<u>97.</u> ADMIN III MAF	160214Z Sep71	C (Gp-4)	Special Landing Force Camp, Subic Bay
<u>98.</u> CINCPACFLT	170545Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	Amphibious Exercise Areas
<u>100.</u> CG FMFPAC	182138Z Sep71	C (Gp-4)	Combined MABLEX Planning
<u>102.</u> CG THIRD MARDIV	200130Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	Camp Fuji Training
<u>103.</u> COMNAVFOR JAPAN	210756Z Sep71	S (Gp-4)	Camp Fuji Training
<u>105.</u> CG FIRST MARDIV	271822Z Sep71	C (Gp-4)	ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71
<u>106.</u> CG I MAF	122231Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	WestPac Cadre for Blue Ridge (LCC-19)
<u>107.</u> CG III MAF IS CTE-79 132258Z Oct 71	140135Z Oct71	S (Gp-4)	Naha VMFA Additional Deployment

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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ORIG	DTG	CLASSIFICATION	SUBJECT
<u>109.</u> CG FMFPAC	160415Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71
<u>111.</u> CG FMFPAC	160432Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71
<u>112.</u> CG III MAF	190810Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	WestPac Cadre for Blue Ridge (LCC-19)
<u>114.</u> COMFIRSTFLT	232225Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	Fleet Exercises
<u>115.</u> CG III MAF	240115Z Oct71	TS (Gp-4)	Task Force Hq
<u>116.</u> CG III MAF	270722Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	OPCON WestPac FMF Resources
<u>117.</u> CG THIRD MARDIV	290739Z Oct71	<u>U</u>	M-16 Marksmanship
<u>118.</u> CG FMFPAC	302116Z Oct71	C (Gp-4)	Fleet Exercises
<u>119.</u> CG FMFPAC	302117Z Oct71	<u>U</u>	Materiel Readiness
<u>122.</u> CG III MAF	040618Z Nov71 300323 CG FIRST MAW 051319Z Nov71 OCT	S (Gp-4)	III MAF Responsibilities
		S	Determination of FME Structure and MARCORBASE Supporting Establishment FY73-FY77
<u>123.</u> CG THIRD MAW	052228Z Nov71	<u>U</u>	Carrier Qualifications
<u>124.</u> CG FMFPAC	062021Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	PHIBPAC/FMFPAC Exchange of Information
<u>125.</u> CG III MAF	160529Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	Planning Requirements for III MAF
<u>126.</u> CG FMFPAC	200207Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	Planning Requirements for III MAF

SECRET	ORIG	DTG	CLASSIFICATION	SUBJECT
<u>127.</u>	CG THIRD MAW	200247Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	SIOP Equipment Requirements
<u>128.</u>	CG FMFPAC	202217Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	Request for Temporary Adjustment to Amphibious Ready Group ALFA/MAU Posture
<u>129.</u>	CG FMFPAC	212225Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	III MAF Responsibilities
<u>130.</u>	CG FMFPAC	221915Z Nov71	<u>U</u>	FMFPAC Training Readiness Evaluation
<u>131.</u>	ADMIN FMFPAC	230332Z Nov71	S (Gp-4)	Proposed Adjustment of LPH Resources Assignment
<u>132.</u>	COMPHIBPAC	241836Z Nov71	C (Gp-4)	Amphibious Planning Responsibilities & Relationships
<u>133.</u>	CG FIRST MAW	090021Z Dec71	C (Gp-4)	TRE - 3-71
<u>137.</u>	CG FMFPAC	162004Z Dec71	<u>U</u>	Training Readiness Evaluation
<u>138.</u>	CG FMFPAC	180315Z	S (Gp-4)	WestPac Forward Basing

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TOR: 3JUN71 0029Z

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CONCURRED: G-3, DCS

RELEASED: CG

P 022219Z JUN 71
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUAOAJA/CG THIRD MARDIV
INFO RUAOAJE/CG III MAF
BT

UNCLAS //N00000// PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN METZER INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON
FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
FMFPAC TRAINING READINESS EVALUATION (TRE)

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE, READINESS HAS BEEN A MATTER OF
PRIME CONCERN TO ME. OUR PRESENT READINESS REPORTING
SYSTEM HAS PROVIDED ME A GOOD INSIGHT INTO WHAT
MEASURES NEED BE TAKEN TO ACHIEVE A C-1/C-2 STATUS.
ONE FACET OF THE PROBLEM HOWEVER LEFT UNCOVERED IS THE
ABILITY OF THESE UNITS TO PERFORM THEIR ASSIGNED
MISSION. TO THIS END, I HAVE RECENTLY APPROVED A
CONCEPT FOR CONDUCTING TRAINING READINESS EVALUATIONS
(TRE'S) OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS
IN ORDER TO DETERMINE A UNIT'S CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
ITS ASSIGNED MISSION. THE TRE IS TO BE CONDUCTED ON
A NO-NOTICE BASIS AND WILL EVALUATE ONLY THOSE UNITS

CG FMFPAC

P 022219Z/JUN71

ACTN: S/SEC
1-3

(58)

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0152 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
 IN A C-1 OR C-2 READINESS CATEGORY. IN VIEW OF THE
 PRESENT READINESS STATUS OF THE FIRST MARDIV AND THE
 FIRST MAREDE, THE THIRD MARDIV HAS BEEN SELECTED FOR
 THE INITIAL INFANTRY BATTALION EVALUATION.
 2. DURING THE PERIOD 5-12 JUN 71, A TRE TEAM FROM MY
 HEADQUARTERS WILL VISIT THE THIRD MARDIV TO CONDUCT
 THIS EVALUATION. THE TEAM WILL CONSIST OF SEVEN
 OFFICERS WITH LTCOL FRANK QUINN OF MY G-3 SECTION AS
 OFFICER-IN-CHARGE. UPON ARRIVAL, LTCOL QUINN WILL
 PROVIDE YOU A COPY OF MY LOI TO HIM CONCERNING THE
 SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCT OF THIS EVALUATION.
 IN KEEPING WITH THE NO-NOTICE CONCEPT OF THE TRE,
 LTCOL QUINN WILL DESIGNATE THE BATTALION TO BE
 EVALUATED THE DAY PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
 EVALUATION. AT THIS TIME, THE BROAD PARAMETERS OF
 THE EVALUATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER
 OF THE BATTALION SELECTED. ADDITIONALLY, LTCOL QUINN WILL
 DESIGNATE THE AREA TO BE USED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
 TIME AFTER HIS ARRIVAL. THIS MIGHT WELL RESULT IN A
 DISRUPTION OF PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED TRAINING. HOWEVER,

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0152 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
 I FEEL THIS IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE
 NO-NOTICE STATUS OF THE TRE AND CONSEQUENTLY OBTAIN
 A TRUE EVALUATION OF THE SELECTED UNIT'S READINESS.
 3. THE FORMAT OF THE TRE IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE
 TACTICAL INSPECTION TESTS WHICH YOU CONDUCT ANNUALLY
 FOR UNITS WITHIN YOUR COMMAND. FOR THIS EVALUATION,
 COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS AND
 AGGRESSORS, WILL BE CONSTRUCTIVE. HOWEVER, THERE WILL
 BE A REQUIREMENT FOR THE 3DMARDIV TO PROVIDE AN ARTIL-
 LERY LIAISON OFFICER FOR THE FSCC AND AN ARTILLERY FO
 FOR EACH RIFLE COMPANY ATTACHED TO THE BATTALION. THE
 SELECTED BATTALION WILL BE ISSUED AN ORAL ORDER AT 0600
 IN A DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY AREA. THIS ORDER, AND SUBSE-
 QUENT ORAL ORDERS, WILL BE DESIGNED TO EXERCISE THE
 BATTALION IN VARIOUS PHASES OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
 COMBAT FOR AN APPROXIMATE THIRTY HOUR PERIOD. THE TRE
 TEAM WILL PLACE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON EVALUATING STAFF
 FUNCTIONING AND PROPER USE OF TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES
 FROM BATTALION DOWN TO SQUAD LEVEL. UPON COMPLETION
 OF THE EVALUATION, APROPRIATE DEBRIEFINGS WILL BE PRO-

CG FMFPAC

P 022219Z/JUN71

2-3

(58)

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA0152 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
 VIDE BY THE TRE TEAM.

4. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING
 PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT/FACILITIES TO SUPPORT THE TEAM:

- A. THREE 1/4 TON VEHICLES.
- B. TWO MRC-109 RADIO JEEPS W/DRIVERS AND
 OPERATORS.
- C. SEVEN PRC-25 RADIOS W/OPERATORS PLUS ONE
 BACK-UP PRC-25 RADIO.
- D. SEVEN BINOCULARS 7X50.
- E. SEVEN LENSATIC COMPASSES.
- F. EIGHT MAPS 1X50,000 OF TRAINING AREA TO BE
 USED.
- G. TEN RUNNERS.
- H. ONE CLERK TYPIST W/TYPEWRITER.
- I. CANTEEN W/COVER, FLASHLIGHT, PONCHO, PISTOL
 BELT AND FIELD RATIONS FOR EACH MEMBER OF THE
 EVALUATION TEAM.
- J. WORKING SPACE FOR TEAM PLUS CLERK WHILE IN
 GARRISON.

5. I KNOW YOU WILL ENDORSE THE CONCEPT OF THE TRE AS

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA0152 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
 A MEANS OF DETERMINING WHAT REALLY IS A BREAD AND
 BUTTER ISSUE - CAN A UNIT PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION.
 IN THIS REGARD, MY INTENT IS SIMPLICITY - TO CAUSE AS
 LITTLE DISRUPTION AS POSSIBLE TO THE ORGANIZATION
 BEING EVALUATED BY FIELDING A SMALL EVALUATION GROUP
 WITH MINIMUM SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS THUS AVOIDING THE
 EXTRAVAGANZA ASSOCIATED WITH A HOST OF UMPIRES AND
 AGGRESSOR FORCES. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOU INFORMING
 YOUR STAFF AND COMMANDERS WHO WILL BE ASSOCIATED WITH
 THE EVALUATION OF ITS CONCEPT AND PURPOSE.

6. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR COMMENTS
 AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS PROGRAM DURING MY FORTH-
 COMING VISIT WITH YOU.

7. THE TRE TEAM'S ETA NAHA INT IS 050815I JUN 71 ON
 TWA FLT NO. 743. IT IS REQUESTED THAT TRANSPORTATION
 BE PROVIDED FOR THE TEAM AT NAHA INT. BILLETING
 ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY THIS HEADQUARTERS AT
 KADENA. WARM REGARDS.

BT

0152

CG FMFPAC

P 022219Z/JUN71

3-3

NNNN

58

MARDIS

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P 030415Z JUN 71
FM CG THIRD MAB
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

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TOR: 03JUN71 0555Z
CCN: 0301

UNCLAS E F T O MARDIS//NO11000//

RETROGRADE OF BUTLER BUILDINGS FROM REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
TO MARINE CORPS BASES PACIFIC

PERSONAL FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES FROM MAJOR GENERAL
ARMSTRONG. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

A. DEP COMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD) 030640Z FEB 71 (U)

B. COMUSMACV 010928Z FEB 71 (U)

C. COMUSMACV 251020Z MAY 71 (NOTAL) (U)

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE A FINAL
REPORT ON THE BUTLER BUILDING RETROGRADE PROGRAM THAT
III MAF AND 3D MAB HAVE BEEN INVOLVED ON OVER THE PAST
MONTHS. REFERENCE A PROVIDED RECOMMENDED SHIPPING
PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS FOR THE TWENTY-SIX BUTLER
BUILDINGS AUTHORIZED FOR REMOVAL FROM THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-
NAM BY REFERENCE B. FURTHER, REFERENCE A IDENTIFIED A
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS NEED FOR SIXTEEN
ADDITIONAL BUTLER BUILDINGS ON OKINAWA/JAPAN. FOLLOWING
CONSIDERABLE COORDINATION EFFORTS AND MESSAGE TRAFFIC,

CG THIRD MAB

P 030415Z JUN 71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

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PAGE TWO RUMULVA0157 UNCLAS E F T O

REFERENCE C PROVIDED FINAL APPROVAL FOR DISMANTLING AND RETROGRADING THE SIXTEEN ADDITIONAL BUILDINGS MAKING A GRAND TOTAL OF FORTY-TWO BUILDINGS AUTHORIZED FOR RETRO-GRADE.

2. THIRTY-FOUR BUILDINGS WERE DISMANTLED AND RETROGRADED DURING THE PERIOD FEBRUARY THROUGH MAY ON THE BASIS OF THE AUTHORITY GRANTED IN REFERENCE B. SOME END AND SIDE SHEATHING WAS MISSING FROM THESE BUILDINGS AS A RESULT OF COMBINED BUILDING CONFIGURATIONS.

3. THE SIXTEEN ADDITIONAL BUILDINGS HAVE BEEN TAKEN DOWN, Banded ON RORO TRAILERS AND DELIVERED TO TMO FOR SHIPMENT TO OKINAWA. ADDITIONALLY, ONE BUTLER BUILDING WAS FOUND AT THE UNITED STATES ARMY PROPERTY DISPOSAL OFFICE, TURNED IN AS EXCESS BY THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE. THIS BUILDING WAS RECOVERED AND IS BEING SHIPPED TO OKINAWA WITH THE SIXTEEN OTHER BUILDINGS.

4. IN SUMMARY, SINCE 1 FEBRUARY 1971, 51 BUTLER BUILDINGS HAVE BEEN DISMANTLED AND HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING SHIPPED AS FOLLOWS: (FIGURE IN PARENS FOLLOWING BUILDING NUMBER INDICATES THE NUMBER OF BUTLER BUILDINGS WITHIN A COMBINED CONFIGURATION) BUILDING NUMBERS:

	STATUS
A. B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-8, B-9, B-12, B-14, B-17(2) B-18, B-20, B-22, B-25, B-26(4) (TOTAL 21 BUILDINGS)	SHIPPED TO OKINAWA (FEB-MAY)
B. B-10(2), B-11, B-13, B-16, B-19 B-23, B-24 (4) (TOTAL 11 BUILDINGS)	SHIPPED TO IWAKUNI (MAR-MAY)
C. B-15, B-21 (TOTAL 2 BUILDINGS)	SHIPPED TO KANEOME (IAW G-4 PAC INST) (MAY)
D. B-27, B-28, B-29, B-30, B-31, B-32, B-33, B-34, B-35, (8), B-36 (TOTAL 17 BUILDINGS)	TO BE SHIPPED TO OKINAWA (JUNE)

5. THE MARINE ENGINEER UNITS ASSIGNED TO 3D MAB HAVE PERFORMED IN A TRULY EXTRAORDINARY AND HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL MANNER IN MARKING, DISMANTLING, AND PREPARING THESE LAST SIXTEEN BUILDINGS FOR RETROGRADE. SPECIFICALLY, THE ENGINEERS COMPLETED THIS ENTIRE PROJECT IN JUST ONE WEEK. THE EFFORTS OF COMPANY A, SEVENTH ENGINEER BATTALION; COMPANY A, FIRST ENGINEER BATTALION; AND COMPANY C, FIRST SHORE PARTY BATTALION IN PERFORMING THE BUTLER BUILDING TASK IS, I BELIEVE, TYPICAL OF THE OUTSTANDING ENGINEER SUPPORT PROVED MARINE UNITS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM THROUGHOUT THE PAST SIX YEARS.

BT

0157

CG THIRD MAB

P 030415Z JUN 71

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R 050001Z JUN 71

FM CG I MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

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TOR: 15JUN71 1505Z
CCN: 0571, 0573, 0578

S E C R E T //NO1000//SECT 1 OF 3

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

SUMMARY OF I MAF ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROJECTS, AND PLANNING TASKS (U)

1. (U) CG, FMFPAC 020333Z APR 71 REQUESTED THAT I PROVIDE BY 18 JUNE 1971 A LISTING OF MAJOR PLANNING TASKS AND EXPECTED COMPLETION DATES. ACTUALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND UPON THAT BY PROVIDING A SYNOPSIS OF WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE AND WHERE WE PLAN TO GO FROM HERE. FURTHER, SINCE WALLY HEYER IS LEAVING HERE TODAY TO RETURN TO YOUR HQTS, THIS APPEARS TO BE A MOST SUITABLE TIME FOR AN UPDATE.

2. (S) IT HAS BEEN 52 DAYS SINCE HQTS, I MAF WAS RELOCATED FROM WESTPAC TO CAMP PENDLETON, AND THOSE DAYS HAVE BEEN BOTH BUSY AND PROFITABLE. TO SUMMARIZE WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED OR IS CONTEMPLATED, THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED:

A. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

PAGE 2 RUWJNWA0605 **S E C R E T**

(1) FIRST OF ALL, I WOULD LIKE TO GO ON RECORD BY STATING THAT THE 28 PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED FOR THIS HQTS IS AN IDEAL SIZE FOR NOW - SMALL, COMPACT AND EFFICIENT. WE RATE 12 ENLISTED AND HAVE THEM ALL ON BOARD, 11 ARE PCS AND ONE TAD, AND ACTION HAS BEEN INITIATED TO HAVE HIM ASSIGNED ON A PCS BASIS. THESE ARE ALL EXTREMELY FINE MARINES. THE QUALITY OF OFFICERS ASSIGNED HAS BEEN EQUALLY IMPRESSIVE, BUT IN A NUMBER BASIS, THE PICTURE HAS NOT BEEN SO BRIGHT. ON THE AVERAGE, WE HAVE HAD NINE OF THE 16 BILLETS FILLED, AND ONLY THREE OF THESE HAVE BEEN PCS. IN FACT, IN SOME OF THE OFFICER BILLETS WE ARE NOW WORKING WITH THE SECOND GENERATION OF TAD MARINES. HOWEVER, WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS WE HAVE JOINED THREE ADDITIONAL PCS OFFICERS, INCLUDING ED RUOZIS, WHO WILL ACT AS CHIEF OF STAFF UNTIL CASS ARRIVES LATER THIS MONTH. IN ADDITION TO BEV, ONE OTHER OFFICER IS ON ORDERS TO JOIN HQTS, I MAF, AND WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DIVISION AND WING FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF SIX MORE OFFICERS. BY EARLY SEPTEMBER WE SHOULD HAVE 14 OFFICERS HERE PCS, WITH THE ONLY TWO VACANT BILLETS BEING AC/S G-1 AND ASST G-2. IT IS DESIR-

CG I MAF

R 050001Z JUN 71

ACTN: S/SEC

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ABLE THAT THESE REMAINING BILLETTS BE FILLED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, SINCE THE SERVICES OF THOSE OFFICERS WILL BE REQUIRED AS WE

PAGE 3 RUWJNWA0605 S E C R E T

BECOME MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN PLANNING AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES AND THE PREPARATION OF SOP'S.

(2) OF COURSE, IF WE WENT TO WAR, THE ENTIRE T/O MAF HQTS OF 166 MARINE AND NAVY PERSONNEL WOULD BE REQUIRED. IN THIS REGARD, WE HAVE RELEASED A MESSAGE TO YOUR HQTS RECOMMENDING THAT ACTIONS BE INITIATED TO PROVIDE FOR THE AUGMENTATION OF HQTS, I MAF TO FILL THE T/O ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS FOR EXERCISES AND COMBAT. SUCH PRIOR PLANS ARE ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF MEETING OUR ASSIGNED CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS.

(3) ANOTHER STAFFING AREA THAT WE ARE WORKING ON CONCERNS THE TEC. WHEN COMPLETED, WE WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE A NOTIONAL T/O FOR TEC'S TO HANDLE MAB AND MAF SIZE EXERCISES HERE IN EASTPAC, AND THE VARIOUS COMMANDS WILL BE INFORMED AS TO THEIR REQUIREMENTS FOR FILLING THE VARIOUS BILLETTS. THUS, THE FORMATION OF A TEC STAFF WILL BE AS ROUTINE AS THE ACTIVATION OF AN AIR-GROUND HQTS.

(4) THE PROBLEM OF PROVIDING REPLACEMENT DRAFTS IS ALSO OF CONCERN - CURRENTLY, A GROSS FIGURE OF 1500 MARINES FOR A REPLACEMENT DRAFT IS ALLOCATED TO A MAF. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO AVAILABLE BREAKOUT OF THIS FIGURE BY RANK AND OCCUPATIONAL FIELD TO ASSIST THE PERSONNEL EXPERTS IN PUTTING SUCH A UNIT TOGETHER ON A

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TIMELY BASIS. MY ACTING G-1 NOW HAS THE MATTER UNDER STUDY, AND A BREAKOUT OF THE STANDARD MAF (AND MAB) REPLACEMENT DRAFT WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOUR HQTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

(5) TWO FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS. FIRST, A SET OF STAFF REGULATIONS FOR HQTS, I MAF HAVE BEEN DRAFTED AND ARE IN ROUTING. I ANTICIPATE THAT THESE WILL BE PROMULGATED WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS. SECOND, OUR CENTRAL FILES HAVE BEEN BUILT UP FROM A HANDFUL OF PUBLICATIONS AND ORDERS TO ALMOST A COMPLETE SET OF REFERENCE MATERIAL, INCLUDING ORDERS AND PUBLICATIONS FROM SENIOR AND SUBORDINATE MARINE COMMANDS AS WELL AS FROM NAVY COMMANDS. UPON APPROVAL OF THE T/A THAT WE SUBMITTED TO CMC, OUR FILES SHOULD BE COMPLETE.

B. INTELLIGENCE

(1) ONE OF OUR MOST SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS IN THIS AREA HAS BEEN TO CONVINCE COMFIRSTFLT OF THE NEED TO ACTIVATE AN EXERCISE INTELLIGENCE CENTER (EIC) EARLY IN THE PLANNING PHASE FOR MABLEX 1-71. IN FACT, AT OUR REQUEST, AN EIC, CONSISTING OF NAVY AND MARINE PERSONNEL, WAS ACTIVATED ON 1 JUNE, WITH A DEADLINE OF PROVIDING A DETAILED AREA STUDY BY 23 JUNE. IF PROPERLY PREPARED, THIS STUDY SHOULD PROVIDE A SOLID BASIS

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FOR THE VARIOUS NAVY AND MARINE STAFFS WHO WILL PARTICIPATE IN MABLEX 1-71 TO COMMENCE REALISTIC PLANNING AROUND THE FIRST OF JULY WITH A MINIMUM OF TIME LOST SEEKING INFORMATION.

(2) YOUR HOTS HAS REQUESTED OUR VIEWS IN THE ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYST SECTION (CIAS) AND ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR THE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF ITTS. OUR REPORTS ON THESE SUBJECTS WILL BE PROVIDED BY 15 JUNE.

(3) OUR G-2 PERSONNEL SPEND MUCH OF THEIR TIME IN REVIEWING THE INTELLIGENCE FILES THAT WE INHERITED FROM 5TH MAB. THE OBSOLETE WILL BE DISCARDED AND ACTION WILL BE INITIATED TO FILL THE VOIDS. IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE NOW COMMENCING TO RECEIVE OUTT INITIAL ISSUE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING MAPS.

(4) WORK HAS COMMENCED ON THE I MAF INTELLIGENCE SOP, AND WE HOPE TO HAVE IT COMPLETED BY MID-JULY.

(5) WITH REGARD TO SECURITY CLEARANCES, WE ARE TAKING STEPS TO SEE THAT EVERY MEMBER OF THIS HOTS HAS A TS CLEARANCE, SINCE AT SOME TIME, EACH INDIVIDUAL WILL BE REQUIRED TO PREPARE OR HANDLE TS MATERIAL. ALSO, SINCE WE ARE COMMITTED TO TWO SEATO PLANS, STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO OBTAIN SEATO CLEARANCES FOR THE

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ENTIRE STAFF, AND FINALLY, WE WILL ENSURE THAT CERTAIN KEY MEMBERS HOLD AN SI CLEARANCE SO THAT WE CAN EXPLOIT THAT VALUABLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

C. PLANNING AND TRAINING

(1) ONE OF OUR MAJOR TASKS IS CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT MUCH NEEDS TO BE DONE IN THIS AREA. TO THIS END, THE STAFF HERE HAS PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING:

(A) PEACE TIME/COLD WAR OPERATIONS. WE ARE PREPARING I MAF OPORD 201-YR TO SUPPORT THE FMFPAC OPORD 201-YR, AND PLAN TO COMPLETE IT BY 15 JULY.

(B) CUBAN CONTINGENCIES. 5TH MAB HAD COMPLETED CONSIDERABLE WORK ON THIS PLAN, WHICH SUPPORTS CINCPACFLT PLANNING DIRECTIVE B-112, AND WE HAVE TAKEN IT OVER FROM THEM. AT THE MOMENT WE ARE REFINING THE MOUNT OUT AND EMBARKATION DATA. WE ESTIMATE COMPLETION OF OUR PLAN 45 DAYS AFTER COMFIRSTFLT ISSUES HIS PLAN, WHICH IS EXPECTED ABOUT 30 JUNE. ALSO, WE HAVE PROVIDED COMFIRSTFLT WITH A TIME PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST IN THE FORM OF 'A' AND 'B' CARD WORKSHEETS TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY THE JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS).

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(C) GENERAL WAR. WE HAVE RECEIVED FMFPAC'S RECENT CHANGE TO THE GENERAL WAR PLAN AND ARE NOW READY TO COMMENCE PREPARATION OF OUR PLAN, WITH A TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION BY 31 JULY. BY WAY OF PREPARATION FOR THIS, WE HAVE RECENTLY PROMULGATED A NOTIONAL MAF TROOP LIST TO THE EASTPAC FMFPAC COMMANDS FOR USE IN GENERAL WAR PLANNING.

(D) NORTHEAST ASIA CONTINGENCIES. WE HOLD SEVERAL CONTINGENCY COMMITMENTS TO KOREA, WITH OPLAN 27 AS THE PRINCIPAL PLAN. AT THE PRESENT WE ARE WAITING FOR NEW GUIDANCE TO COME DOWN THE CHAIN FROM CINCPAC, AND FOR PLANNING PURPOSES HAVE SET A TARGET DATE OF 30 SEPTEMBER FOR COMPLETION OF OUR PLAN.

(E) SOUTHEAST ASIA CONTINGENCIES. HERE, TOO, WE HOLD A SERIES OF CONTINGENCY COMMITMENTS IN SUPPORT OF BOTH

PAGE 2 RUWJNWA0606 S E C R E T

UNILATERAL US PLANS (OPLANS 5041 AND 5042) AND MULTILATERAL SEATO PLANS (OPLANS 4 AND 6). SINCE WE UNDERSTAND THAT CINCPAC WILL BE UPDATING HIS PLANS IN THIS AREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE, OUR PLANNING IS CURRENTLY IN SUSPENSE. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, HOWEVER, WE HAVE SET A TARGET DATE OF 18 NOVEMBER FOR COMPLETION OF OUR PLAN.

(F) NATO/WARSAW PACT CONTINGENCIES. WE ARE PREPARING OUR PLAN TO SEND I MAF TO EUCOM IN SUPPORT OF CINCPACFLT AND COMFIRSTFLT OPLANS 5043, AND PLAN TO COMPLETE OUR PLAN BY 31 DECEMBER. ACTUALLY, THIS PLAN SUPPORTS THE GENERAL WAR PLAN, SO THE WORK WE DO ON THAT PLAN WILL CARRY OVER INTO THIS PLAN.

(G) CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICA CONTINGENCIES. SINCE THE 5TH MAB PLANS FOR THESE CONTINGENCIES ARE REASONABLE CURRENT AND SINCE THE FUTURE OF THIS ENTIRE SERIES OF PLANS WILL DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME OF PENDING CHANGES TO THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN, WE ARE NOT PLANNING ANY UPDATE AT THIS TIME. WHEN NEW GUIDANCE IS RECEIVED ON THE 'LATIN' CONTINGENCIES, WE'LL TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IS REQUIRED.

(2) ANOTHER OF OUR MAJOR TASKS INVOLVES AMPHIBIOUS AND

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AIR-GROUND TRAINING. WE ARE INVOLVED IN THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES:
 (A) MABFEX 1-71. SINCE ROSS DWYER AND HIS STAFF

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HAVE BEEN PLANNING THIS MAB EXERCISE FOR SOME TIME, I AM LEAVING THE DIRECTION OF IT LARGELY IN HIS HANDS. HOWEVER, WE DID ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ACTIVATION OF THE MAB HQTS AND TEC, AND HAVE PROMULGATED THE LOI FOR THIS EXERCISE.

(B) MABLEX 1-71/ROPEVAL 3-71. THIS AMPHIBIOUS LAND-ING EXERCISE IS SCHEDULED FOR 3-17 SEPTEMBER. AS MENTIONED EARLIER, WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE EIC IN ACTION. FURTHER, COMFIRSTLT ACCEPTED OUR COMMENTS ON HIS INITIAL LOI AND HAS INCORPORATED ALL OF THEM IN HIS RECENTLY PUBLISHED LOI; ALSO, MCDEC HAS RESPONDED TO OUR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING NEW IDEAS FOR THE EXERCISE IN AN ENTHUSIASTIC MANNER, PROVIDING INFORMATION, DOCUMENTS, AND RECENTLY, FOR A FEW DAYS, A FIVE-MAN TEAM. THIS TEAM DEPARTED YESTERDAY, BUT ANOTHER THREE-MAN TEAM IS EXPECTED IN SUNDAY. ON 3 JUNE WE HOSTED A PLANNING CONFERENCE TO DETERMINE ATF/LF EXERCISE OBJECTIVES, MISSION AND PLANNING SCHEDULE. IN ATTENDANCE WERE REPS FROM COMPHIBGRU-3, INCLUDING CAPT ED ELLIS THE ACTING PHIBGRU COMMANDER, PHIBPAC, 1STMARDIV, 3DMAW, FORTRPS, 1STFSR, AND MCDEC. IT WAS A VERY PROFITABLE SESSION. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK AT FULL SPEED ON THIS EXERCISE TO ENSURE THAT IT IS A FIRST CLASS OPERATION IN EVERY ASPECT.

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(C) FUTURE AIR-GROUND EXERCISES - DURING FY72 THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF AIR-GROUND EXERCISES THAT WE WILL BECOME INVOLVED IN TO SOME EXTENT. THESE ARE:

DIVFEX 1-71	19-25 OCT 1971
ROPEVAL 5-71	29 NOV - 6 DEC 1971
PHIBLEX 1-72	11-14 JAN 1972
MAULEX 1-72	26 JAN - 8 FEB 1972
MAFCPX 1-72	13-17 MAR 1972
MAFLEX 1-72	3-12 APR 1972
MAF/PHIB CPX 1-72	MAY 1972

(D) ADP/ASIS/AFDS TRAINING. WE WILL PROVIDE REPRESENTATION TO THE ADP CONFERENCE HOSTED BY COMPHIBPAC DURING MID-JUNE AND WILL COORDINATE THE ASSIGNMENT OF QUOTAS TO ASIS AND AFDS COURSES THAT ARE BEING GIVEN BY COMTRAPAC.

(3) ANOTHER OF OUR ASSIGNED TASKS INDICATED THE PREPARATION OF AIR-GROUND SOP'S. I HAVE SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED THE STAFF HERE TO MAKE THESE SOP'S REALISTIC AND TO EMPHASIZE MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE. OUR TENTATIVE LIST OF SOP'S INCLUDE:

AIR-GROUND TASK FORCES ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES
 AMPHIBIOUS AND AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE TRAINING

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 EMBARKATION AND MOVEMENT PLANNING
 AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS
 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION
 INTELLIGENCE
 ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
 AIR OPERATIONS
 ENGINEER SUPPORT AND OPERATIONS

(4) WE HAVE ENTERED INTO THE OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM, AND HAVE PROVIDED OUR INITIAL FORSTAT REPORT AND COMMANDER'S COMBAT READINESS REPORT. IN ADDITION, THE STAFF IS PREPARING A LIST OF RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE FMFPAC ORDER REGARDING THE COMBAT READINESS REPORT. OUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS REGARD SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO YOU IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

(5) ONE FINAL TRAINING MATTER, WE ARE PREPARING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEXT EASTPAC SCHEDULING CONFERENCE (JUNE) AND ARE PREPARED TO ASSUME THE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPRESENTING THE MARINE CORPS AT FUTURE EASTPAC SCHEDULING CONFERENCES.

D. LOGISTICS

(1) ONE OF OUR PRIMARY CONCERNS IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CURRENT DATA BASE FOR MOUNT OUT, ADAPTED TO THE VARIOUS CONTINGENCY

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 FORCE PACKAGES, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOUNT OUT CONFIGURATIONS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE OUR CAPABILITY OF RESPONDING TO CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS ON A TIMELY BASIS. WE HAVE CONDUCTED DISCUSSIONS WITH ALL EASTPAC FMFPAC COMMANDS ON THIS SUBJECT, AND CURRENTLY WE ARE AWAITING NEW GUIDANCE FROM YOUR HQTS ON MOUNT OUT. ONCE THIS GUIDANCE IS RECEIVED, WE WILL SCHEDULE A CONFERENCE HERE OF THE VARIOUS EASTPAC FMFPAC COMMANDS TO DETERMINE THE PRECISE FOLLOW-ON STEPS THAT MUST BE TAKEN. I EXPECT THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO FULLY DEVELOP OUR MOUNT OUT PLANS BY MID-JULY.

(2) CLOSELY RELATED TO THIS MOUNT OUT PROBLEM IS THE PROBLEM OF UPDATING OUR EMBARKATION PLANNING. A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF EXISTING PLANS INDICATES THAT FACTORS SUCH AS EMBARKED LFORM OR THE PRELOADING OF VEHICLES AND CRAFT HAVE NOT BEEN CONSIDERED IN ALL CASES. ONCE THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING MOUNT OUT REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN RESOLVED, WE CAN THEN PROCEED TO UPDATE OUR EMBARKATION PLANS. ALSO RELATED TO THIS IS THE AMPHIBIOUS LIFT SHORTFALL WHICH DICTATES THE USE OF OTHER TRANSPORTATION MEANS SUCH AS MSC. IN THE PAST THIS SHORTFALL WAS FREQUENTLY BURIED UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT AVAILABLE SHIPPING WOULD BE AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, FOR OUR CONTINGENCY PLANS, WE WILL IDENTIFY THE EXACT

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REQUIREMENTS FOR MSC SHIPS, BY TYPE AND NUMBER, THE PORTS WE WANT THEM AT, AND THE TIME THAT THEY ARE TO BE THERE. THESE MSC REQUIREMENTS WILL THEN BE FED UP THE CHAIN TO CINCPAC FOR INCLUSION IN HIS PLANS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WILL BE PROBLEMS IN USING MSC SHIPS, PARTICULARLY IN UNLOADING THEM IN THE OPEN SEA. ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE REQUESTED THAT A TAK BE PROVIDED FOR USE IN MABLEX 1-71 TO GAIN EXPERIENCE IN THIS AREA. COMPHIBPAC AND COMFIRSTFLT HAVE SUPPORTED THIS REQUEST AND ARE TAKING STEPS TO OBTAIN THE SHIP.

(3) EARLIER I MENTIONED THAT WE HAD FORWARDED RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE AUGMENTATION OF I MAF FOR EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS. RELATED TO THIS IS THE NEED FOR THE T/E EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR HQTS I MAF TO DEPLOY AND OPERATE IN THE FIELD. USING THE T/E FOR T/O 4918, WE ARE DEVELOPING PLANS IN CONJUNCTION

PAGE 2 RUWJNWA0621 S E C R E T
WITH 1ST MARDIV TO ACQUIRE, STORE AND MAINTAIN THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT. I ANTICIPATE THAT WE'LL BE FORWARDING RECOMMENDATIONS TO YOU IN THIS MATTER IN EARLY JULY.

(4) MARINE CORPS BASE HAS BEEN MOST COOPERATIVE IN REFURBISHING OUR HQTS BUILDING, AS YOU WILL RECALL, PAINTING WAS UNDERWAY DURING YOUR LAST VISIT HERE. SINCE THEN THEY HAVE COMPLETED THE ENTIRE INTERIOR OF THE BUILDING. IN ADDITION WE HAVE SUBMITTED A WORK REQUEST TO CONSTRUCT A WAR ROOM OUT OF OUR PRESENT BRIEFING ROOM. WHEN COMPLETED, THE WAR ROOM WILL BE SUITED FOR THE CONDUCT OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND BRIEFINGS.

E. CEO

(1) WE ARE REVIEWING FMFPAC COMPLAN 8 AND COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY 8 JULY.

(2) THIS HQTS HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED THREE PHONES AS PART OF THE SECORD SYSTEM AND WE ARE COORDINATING WITH BASE REGARDING THE INSTALLATION OF THOSE PHONES.

F. MISCELLANEOUS

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(1) WE WERE REQUESTED BY YOUR HQTS TO PROVIDE COMPHIBPAC WITH THE TIME PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LISTS ('A' AND 'B' CARD

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WORKSHEETS) FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THREE MAF'S. THOSE WORKSHEETS WERE PROVIDED ON A TIMELY BASIS, AND COMPHIBPAC HAS PROVIDED A RESPONSE TO CINCPACFLT.

(2) ONE OF THE MAJOR PERSONAL PROJECTS THAT I HAVE UNDERTAKEN HERE IS TO ASSURE THAT EVERY SENIOR NAVY AND MARINE COMMAND IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IS AWARE THAT I MAF EXISTS AND ARE FAMILIAR WITH ITS MISSION, TASKS, AND ACTIVITIES. TO DATE WE HAVE HAD SPLENDID RESULTS WITH THE PROGRAM. USING THE BRIEFING THAT WALLY HEYER PRESENTED TO YOU AND GENERAL CHAPMAN, HE AND I ARE MAKING A TOUR OF MAJOR COMMANDS. V/ADM PEET AND HIS STAFF HAVE HEARD IT AS WELL AS PAUL GRAHAM AND HIS STAFF AT 29 PALMS, AND LES BROWN AND STAFF AT EL TORO. THE EL TORO VISIT ALSO INCLUDED A VISIT OF WING ACTIVITIES. AT EL TORO ED RUDZIS ACCOMPANIED US, AND WE WERE ALL DEEPLY IMPRESSED BY THE APPEARANCE, KNOWLEDGE, ENTHUSIASM AND CAPABILITY OF ALL RANKS THAT WE MET. NEXT TUESDAY (8 JUNE) WE WILL PRESENT THE BRIEFING TO V/ADM JOHNSON (COMPHIBPAC) AND HIS STAFF AT CORONADO. OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE NAVY HAVE BEEN JUST AS YOU WOULD DESIRE THEM. THEY HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY CORDIAL AND RECEPTIVE IN ALL OF OUR DEALINGS WITH THEM. ADDITIONALLY, I HAD A CHANCE TO VISIT DAVE RUEBEL ABOARD

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THE BLUE RIDGE PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON, AND TOOK A TOUR OF THAT SPLENDID SHIP.

3. (U) IN SUMMARY, I CAN SAY WITH GREAT ASSURANCE THAT HQTS I MAF IS IN BUSINESS. ALSO, I WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND MY SINCEREST THANKS TO YOU FOR WALLY HEYER'S ASSIGNMENT AS CHIEF OF STAFF; HIS PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN SUPERB.

4. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY AND BEST REGARDS. WIDDECKE.

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TO RUWJNWB/CG FIRST MARDIV
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DWYER FROM LTGEN JONES DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
STATUS REPORT ON FIRST MARDIV (U)

1. (U) I APPRECIATE YOUR RECENT OVERVIEW OF THE
STATUS OF THE DIVISION AND SHARE YOUR CONCERN IN
THE AREAS OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL. MY STAFF HAS
BEEN DIRECTED TO CLOSELY MONITOR THE PROGRESS
WE MUST MAKE IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS TO ACHIEVE
MAXIMUM READINESS IN THESE AREAS.

2. (C) PERSONNEL. YOUR FIELD GRADE OFFICER FORECAST,
BASED ON THE SLATE, AS YOU KNOW, IS SUBJECT TO
CHANGE, PARTICULARLY AS THE TURBULENCE FROM REDE-
PLOYMENTS EBBS AND THE RESULTS OF THE LTCOL PROMOTION
BOARD ARE KNOWN. I WILL CONTINUE TO RELY ON YOUR
GOOD JUDGEMENT IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF THESE OFFICERS.
THE OVERALL MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS FOR EASTPAC AND

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0473 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR MIDPAC FOR THE 1ST/2ND QTR FY-72 ARE STILL BEING FINALIZED AT HQMC. I AM ADVISED THROUGH ACTION OFFICER CONTACTS THAT CURRENT PROPOSALS INDICATE WE CAN EXPECT A M/L OF ABOUT 80 PERCENT OF T/O FOR MANNED ELEMENTS OF OUR INFANTRY BATTALIONS. HOWEVER, THERE WOULD BE A PROVISIO THAT ONE RIFLE COMPANY PER BN BE PLACED IN A CADRE STATUS. PLANS SHOULD BE FIRM BY MID-JUNE.

3. (U) MATERIEL. YES, THE OVERFLOW MAINTENANCE CONFERENCE WAS PRODUCTIVE. THE IMMEDIATE TASK AT HAND IS TO MOVE THE FIRST GROUP OF EQUIPMENT TO BARSTOW BY THE END OF THE MONTH WITH THE SUBSEQUENT INCREMENTS AS CLOSE BEHIND AS POSSIBLE. I SHARE YOUR CONFIDENCE IN THE PROGRAM AND GUARANTEE OUR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN CARRYING IT OUT.

4. (U) TRAINING. IT'S GOOD TO SEE YOUR TRAINING EMPHASIS IN THE COMING SUMMER MONTHS WILL BE ON PHYSICAL FITNESS AND FUNDAMENTAL TRAINING. I AGREE THAT THIS IS WHERE OUR EMPHASIS IS MOST NEEDED.

5. (U) FACILITIES

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0473 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR

A. AS FOR THE NEED FOR IMPROVED ARMORIES AT MARGARITA AND HORNO, AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION, YOU MAY WISH TO EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF HOLDING IN PROTECTED STOCKS AT 1ST FSR THOSE SMALL ARMS IN EXCESS OF THE CURRENT M/L AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. IF, UPON EXAMINATION, THIS PROPOSAL APPEARS ACCEPTABLE, REQUEST THE QUANTITY OF WEAPONS BY TYPE TO BE PLACED IN PROTECTED STOCK BE FORWARDED TO THIS HQ FOR APPROVAL.

R. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THIS PROPOSAL DOES NOT REDUCE NOR CANCEL THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE NEEDED ARMORIES; HOWEVER, IT MAY LESSEN THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT DURING THE PERIOD IN WHICH THE ARMORIES ARE BEING CONSTRUCTED AND UNTIL A MORE FAVORABLE PERSONNEL STATUS IS ACHIEVED. WE HERE ARE ATTEMPTING TO EXPEDITE APPROVAL OF THE NECESSARY FUNDING.

6. (U) IN ALL, FROM MY VIEWPOINT, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION, ALTHOUGH ON THE LEAN SIDE FOR AWHILE, WILL, AS ALWAYS, BE UP TO THE TASK AT HAND. CONTINUE TO KEEP ME INFORMED. WARM REGARDS.

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN ARMSTRONG
//DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
1. (U) INTENT THIS MESSAGE TO SUMMARIZE RECENT EVENTS.
TELEPHONES DO NOT WORK WELL FOR ME.
2. (C) WE WENT OUT OF THE REAL ESTATE BUSINESS ON 4 JUNE
WHEN USA SIGNED FOR CAMP BOOKS. AS INDICATED IN XXIV
CORPS MSG 041534Z WHICH WE READDRESSSED TO YOU 101 AB DIV
WILL ASSUME SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY FROM 1ST MP BN ON
7 JUNE.
3. (C) YESTERDAY'S 5 PM ROCKET SALVO JOLTED EVERYONE. WE
HAD CONVINCED OURSELVES THEY ONLY DID THAT AT NIGHT. WE
WERE FORTUNATE AGAIN. MAG-11 LOST A UTILITY SHED ABOUT
100 FT FROM COL AL POMMERENK'S HOUSE. HE HAD A GOOD
SCARE AND SHAKEUP. WITH 3 DAYS TO GO HE IS AT THE
NERVOUS STAGE ANYHOW.
4. (U) DID A TV FILM INTERVIEW FOR RAY MALONEY OF ABC
YESTERDAY. IT WAS REFLECTION ON MARINE OPERATIONS AND
PRESENCE IN RVN. I REQUESTED THAT IT NOT BE RELEASED PRIOR

CG THRID MAB

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PAGE TWO RUMULVA0344 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TO 27 JUNE. STAYED AWAY FROM CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS AND
HOPEFULLY OUT OF TROUBLE. DID NOT DISCUSS DRUGS.
5. (C) MAC SCHEDULE HAS CHANGED AGAIN. NOW APPEARS THERE
WILL BE A FLIGHT OUT OF HERE LATE 26 JUNE OR EARLY 27
JUNE. IF SO I WILL USE THAT AND AVOID SAIGON.
6. (U) TO INSURE THAT FITNESS REPORTS ON ED SIMMONS AND
JIM JONES GET TO SELECTION BOARD I PLAN TO HAVE THEM FOR
YOUR REVIEW HERE ON 17 JUNE AND AIRMAIL TO HQMC.
7. (U) JIM JONES WILL PUT HIS DEBRIEF IN MAIL TODAY. AN
UPDATE OF HIS REGULAR BRIEFING TO INCLUDE CHARTS IS
ATTACHED. SHOULD BE A USEFUL PACKAGE.
8. (U) CAN UNCOVER NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT III MAF WAS
RECOMMENDED FOR CIVIC ACTION AWARD BY CG I CORPS.
APPARENTLY FMAW AND FIRST MARDIV HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED.
FINDING OUT WHAT HAS ACTUALLY GONE ON OVER THERE IS NOT
EASY. OUR BEST CONTACT HAS JUST RETURNED FROM IAD AND
WE MAY BE ABLE TO UNRAVEL THE SITUATION.
9. (U) ASSUME THAT I WILL BE ATTACHED YOUR HQS ON RETURN.
HAVE SCHEDULED AN OVERDUE ANNUAL PHYSICAL FOR 1 JULY.
WOULD LIKE TO TAKE LEAVE OVER FOURTH OF JULY WEEKEND AT
KMC ON HAWAII.
DOWNGRADE TO UNCLAS ON 1 JUL 1971.

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CG THIRD MAB

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FM CG III MAF
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW
RUAOANA/THIRD FORSERVREGT
BT

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CCN: 005
TOR: 100038Z JUN 71

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES, INFO MAJGEN NETZGER, MAJGEN OWENS,
COL ROEDER, FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
MO/MOA MANAGEMENT (U)

1. (C) WITH COMMENCEMENT OF NEXT PHASE OF MO/MOA PROGRAM MANY CHANGES IN RANGE AND DEPTH OF STOCKS ARE EXPECTED. YOUR STAFF HAS ADVISED THAT NEW POLICY DIRECTIVE IS BEING DRAFTED DELINEATING RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALCON. I HAVE CONFERRED WITH MAJOR COMMANDERS OF III MAF AND HAVE PREPARED RECOMMENDATION FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOUR STAFF PLANS TO DISCUSS DRAFT PLAN IN CONFERENCE SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH DEVELOPED VERY SATISFACTORY KEYSTONE ROBIN LOG GUIDANCE.
2. (C) MORE THAN MGMT AND POSITIONING OF MO/MOA IS INVOLVED. WE CONSIDER THAT ENTIRE LOG SUPT STRUCTURE IS AFFECTED. ADMIN ACTIONS CAN IMPACT ON STRUCTURE AND INFLUENCE CAPABILITY OF FORCE TO PERFORM ITS COMBAT MISSION. RECOMMENDATIONS I OFFER ARE CONSIDERED TO BE ATTAINABLE AND WILL PRESERVE TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE OF MAF AIR-GROUND TEAM.
3. (C) FOL PARAMETERS GUIDED OUR THOUGHTS.
 - A. NO APPRECIABLE CHANGE IN PERS RESOURCES SHOULD BE EXPECTED.
 - B. BASE LOADING AND STORAGE FACILITIES AT IWAKUNI WILL REMAIN CRITICAL.
 - C. NO SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN EMBARKATION FAC AT IWAKUNI EXPECTED.
 - D. DOUBLE HANDLING AND SUBSEQUENT RELOCATIONS BE MINIMIZED.
 - E. CAPABILITY OF DIV/WING TO DEPLOY IN TRADITIONAL CONFIGURATION SHOULD BE PRESERVED UNLESS STRUCTURE IS FORMALLY MODIFIED.
 - F. COMMANDERS SHOULD PLAY ROLE IN DETERMINATION OF MO REQMTS.
 - G. RESPONSIVENESS TO CONTINGENCY REQMTS SHOULD BE BASIC OBJECTIVE.
4. (C) I AM PREPARED TO PROVIDE IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS AND RATIONALE TO SUPPORT THE FOL ACTIONS WHICH ARE RECOMMENDED TO BEST SERVE THE NEEDS OF III MAF AND THE ADMIN REQMTS OF YOUR HQ.
 - A. HOLD ALL WING MO AT FSR. PRIOR TO JULY RECOMP, FMAW FURNISH

CG III MAF

P 091111Z JUN 71

ACTN: S/SEC
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EQUIP DENSITY IAW CONTINGENCY TASK ORGS TO FSR. FSR MAINTAIN IN BLOCKS IAW FMAW WITHDRAWAL PLANS. COMPOSITION OF BLOCKS TO BE FURN FMAW FOR REVIEW AND VALIDATION. DESIRABILITY OF HOLDING MO BY WING SERVICE UNIT CONTRAINDICATED DUE TO FOL: (1) MAG-36 LOCATION AT FUTEMA NOT ACCESSIBLE TO MISG, (2) LACK OF FAC OR PERS AT FUTEMA TO HANDLE STOCK, (3) CURRENT STORAGE DEFICIENCY AT IWAKUNI WILL BE COMPOUNDED WHEN MO ADJUSTED TO INCLUDE SECTION "M" AND OTHER KNOWN ITEMS NOT INCL IN CURRENT COMPUTED REQMTS, (4) MANNING LEVEL DOES NOT INCL FSA PERS IN MWSG TO PERFORM WHSE FUNCTION, (5) STATION LOADING ALREADY CRITICAL AND WOULD BE STRAINED FURTHER IF ML WERE INCREASED TO PROVIDE FOR MO MGMT PERS, (6) SHORTER REACTION TIME IS EXPECTED BY EMBARKATION FROM OKINAWA PORTS VICE IWAKUNI, (7) TIME AND DISTANCE DETRACT FROM EFFECTIVENESS OF STOCK CONTROL MEASURES AND ACCTG EXERCISED BY 3D FSR, AND (8) DECENTRALIZATION TO GROUP LEVEL ENCOUNTERS SAME OBJECTIONS, PLUS LIMITING CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY "COMPOSITE" MAG. SINCE MISSION PERFORMANCE PRIMARILY RELATED TO AERONAUTICAL LOGISTICS, NO SIGNIFICANT RISK IS ENCOUNTERED BY SEPARATION OF USMC MO MATERIAL FROM UNIT AS LONG AS PERIODIC INFOR FLOW IS MAINTAINED. ULTIMATE GOAL SHOULD BE TO RETURN MO MANAGEMENT TO FMAW WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE TO PERMIT SUCH ACTION.

B. THIRD MARDIV WILL HOLD ITS OWN MO. FSR WILL CONTINUE TO ACCT, MANAGE, AND SUBMIT MGMT REPORTS AS REQ BY YOUR HQ. DIV MAY CREATE MULTIPLE LOCATIONS BUT ASSET CONTROL AND RECONCILIATION WILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED.

C. CO THIRD FSR WILL CONTINUE AS PROGRAM COORDINATOR MAINTAINING CENTRAL ASSET VISABILITY, COMPUTE REQMTS AND MANAGE ATTAINMENT PROGRESS. FSR WILL BE AUTH TO REQ INVENTORY MGMT ACTIONS OF DIV TO ENSURE ACCURACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF BLOCKS HELD BY DIV.

D. ESTABLISH PROCEDURE FOR UNIT COMMANDER INPUT FOR RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN RANGE AND DEPTH OF ITEMS HELD IN SUPPORT OF HIS UNIT. SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS SHOULD RECEIVE TECH REVIEW BY PWR SECTION AT FSR. IF ICP FACTOR DATA INVOLVED, APPROP RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE MADE TO ICP VIA YOUR HQ. SFA OR ASA FUNDING IMPACTS OF CHANGES WILL BE REFERRED TO YOUR HQ WITH RATIONALE SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATION.

E. THIRD MARDIV BE AUTH TO ACTIVATE MINI-FSA TO MANAGE 200-300 LINE ITEMS. PURPOSE WOULD BE TO DEVELOP SKILLS, PROCEDURES, AND PROGRAMS AS BASIS FOR ULTIMATE MANAGEMENT OF DEPLOYED STOCKS AND DIRECT SUPPLY SUPT IN OBJ AREA. PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES ARE AVAIL TO PRECLUDE NEEDLESS LAYERING AND DUPLICATIVE FUNCTIONS BETWEEN MINI-FSA AND FSA AT 3D FSR.

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CG III MAF

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CONFIDENTIAL MARDIS

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P 100205Z JUN 71
FM CG FMFPAC
TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
ZEN/CG THIRD MAW
RUMULVA/CG THIRD MAB
ZEN/CG FIRST MARBDE
ZEN/CG FORTRPS FMFPAC
ZEN/DEP COMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD)
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

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CONFIDENTIAL //N05800// MARDIS

ELIMINATION OF THE TERM QUOTE FRAGGING UNQUOTE IN OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE

1. (C) DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS I HAVE NOTED THE INCREASING USE OF THE WORD QUOTE FRAGGING UNQUOTE APPEARING IN OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE THROUGHOUT THE FORCE. I REALIZE THAT THIS TERM IS RELATIVELY DESCRIPTIVE. I AM CONCERNED HOWEVER THAT ITS WIDESPREAD USE IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES MAY ACTUALLY TEND SOMEHOW TO EITHER DOWNGRADE OR DISGUISE THE TERRIBLE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE ACTUALLY COMMITTED OR ATTEMPTED.

2. (C) WE ALL REALIZE ONLY TOO WELL THAT A QUOTE FRAGGING UNQUOTE IS NO HALLOWEEN PRANK. WHAT I AM CONCERNED ABOUT IS THAT IN THE MINDS OF SOME TERRIBLY MISGUIDED, IMMATURE AND DISGRUNTLED MARINES IT MAY BE REDUCED TO SOMETHING VERY NEARLY THAT WHEN OFFICERS AND MEN BOTH ORALLY AND IN WRITING USE THAT TERM SO FREQUENTLY. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, A TRULY SUCCESSFUL QUOTE FRAGGING UNQUOTE IS PREMEDITATED MURDER. AN UNSUCCESSFUL ONE IS ATTEMPTED MURDER. MY FEARS MAY BE GROUNDLESS BUT I HAVE NEVER HEARD A JOKE ABOUT MURDER AND I HAVE HEARD QUOTE FRAGGING JOKES UNQUOTE.

3. (C) IT IS MY BELIEF THAT OUR COMMANDERS SHOULD GO BACK TO DEFINING THESE TRULY REPREHENSIBLE ACTS AS EXACTLY WHAT THEY ARE-MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER. IF, PLACING SUCH EMPHASIS ON THE ACTUAL ACT COMMITTED OR ATTEMPTED, HAS THE EFFECT OF DETERRING EVEN ONE POTENTIAL CRIMINAL FROM THE COMMISSION OF SUCH A TERRIBLE ACT, IT WILL BE WELL WORTH THE EFFORT.
LTJEN JONES SENDS.

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P 100205Z JUN 71

ACTN: S/SEC

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PERSONAL FOR**CG HAS SEEN****C/S HAS SEEN**

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TOD: 11JUN71 0642Z

P 110442Z JUN 71
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUWJNWA/CG I MAF
BT

UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN WIDDECKE FROM LTGEN JONES.
//N00000// DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

I MAF ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROJECTS, AND PLANNING TASKS

A. CG I MAF 050001Z/JUN71 (PERSONAL) (S)

1. I HAVE READ REF A WITH GREAT INTEREST AND AM
INDEED PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS ACHIEVED IN SO SHORT
A TIME. YOUR CURRENT PROGRESS CERTAINLY IS TESTI-
MONY TO A HARD WORKING AND RESOURCEFUL STAFF AND,
BY SEPARATE MESSAGE, I AM COMMENDING THEM FOR THEIR
PROFESSIONAL EFFORT.

2. ADDITIONALLY, I WISH TO CONVEY TO YOU MY SINCERE
APPRECIATION FOR MAKING HQ I MAF A VIABLE ORGANIZA-
TION. I HAVE LONG BEEN CONCERNED WITH BRIDGING THE
GAP BETWEEN THE WEST COAST FMFPAC UNITS AND FIRST
FLEET IN ORDER THAT WE MAY ONCE AGAIN ESTABLISH THE
AMPHIBIOUS RELATIONSHIPS SO NECESSARY TO OUR MANDATE.

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0971 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
YOUR EFFORTS IN EXPLAINING AND SELLING I MAF ALONG
THE COAST OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WILL GO A LONG WAY
IN ACHIEVING THAT END.

3. I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR A JOB SPLENDIDLY DONE.
WARM REGARDS.

BT

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CG FMFPAC

P 110442Z/JUN71

ACTN: S/SEC

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TOD:16JUN71 0902Z

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P 152331Z JUN 71 ZFF-1
FM ADMIN FMFPAC
TO RUAOAJA/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MAJGEN
ADAMS. DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS. //N00000// AM 007 IMI AM 007
1. (S) THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR
INFORMATION.

NOTE:

P 150045Z JUN 71
FM SECDEF
TO ZEN/JCS
INFO RUEADWD/OSA
RUENAAA/SECNAV
RUEFHQA/OSAF
RUEOFIA/CMC
RUEADWD/CSA
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEFHQA/CSAF
RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
RUAOADA/HICOMRY NAHA RYIS
RUEHC/STATE DEPT WASH DC
RUEIKO/AMEMB.TOKYO

BT

SECRET 1095
FROM OSAD:IL

SUBJECT: REMOVAL OF NAVAL/MARINE FLYING ACTIVITIES. NAHA AIR BASE,
OKINAWA

REFERENCE: TOKYO 5317 (NOTAL)

1. A USG DECISION, AS INDICATED IN ABOVE REFERENCE, HAS BEEN MADE
ADMIN FMFPAC P 152331Z/JUN71 ACTN:SSEC 1-2

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TO REMOVE ALL NAVAL/MARINE FLYING ACTIVITIES FROM NAHA AIR BASE, OKINAWA PRIOR TO REVERSION. THE GOJ HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY GOODS AND SERVICES TO THE EXTENT OF \$20.0 MILLION TO ACCOMPLISH THESE RELOCATIONS PRIOR TO REVERSION. IT IS THE DOD INTENT TO ACCOMPLISH THESE RELOCATIONS AT THE LEAST POSSIBLE COST AND USE ANY FUNDS REMAINING FROM THE \$20.0 MILLION TO OFFSET DOD BUDGET EXPENDITURES FOR IMPROVEMENT TO TROOP FACILITIES ON OKINAWA AND IN JAPAN.

2. ACCORDINGLY, THE VIEWS OF THE JCS ARE REQUESTED AS TO RECOMMENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS (OKINAWA, JAPAN OR OTHER) FOR RELOCATION OF THE NAVAL/MARINE FLYING ACTIVITIES PREVIOUSLY PLANNED TO BE LOCATED AT NAHA AIR BASE AFTER REVERSION. PLEASE PROVIDE FOR EACH ACTIVITY/UNIT THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL TO BE RELOCATED BY CATEGORY (OFFICER, EM, CIVILIAN), RECOMMENDED RELOCATION AREA(S) WITH ALTERNATIVES, IF APPROPRIATE, AND DETAILED REASONABLE FOR AREA SELECTION. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT SHOULD ANY OF THE FLYING ACTIVITIES BE RECOMMENDED FOR RELOCATION FROM OKINAWA TO A LOCATION OTHER THAN JAPAN, ADEQUATE OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORT FACILITIES WILL HAVE TO BE AVAILABLE SINCE FUNDS TO BE PROVIDED BY THE GOJ CAN ONLY BE USED TO MEET REQUIREMENTS IN A YEN AREA AND NO, REPEAT NO, U.S. APPROPRIATED FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THESE RELOCATIONS.

3. UPON RECEIPT AND APPROVAL OF THE JCS AREA RELOCATION RECOMMENDATIONS, WE WILL WORK THROUGH SECRETARIAL CHANNELS TO DETERMINE HOW BEST TO BEDDOWN THE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA(S). THE JCS WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF THE STATUS OF THIS ACTION AND REPRESENTATION WILL BE INVITED TO ANY TASK FORCE WHICH MAY BE FORMED TO RESOLVE THE FACILITIES AND RESOURCES ISSUES.

4. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE REQUESTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT NOT LATER THAN JUNE 30, 1971.

GP-4

UNQUOTE:

2. (U) PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE. WARM REGARDS.

3. (U) SIX AM NUMBERS HAVE BEEN SENT SINCE YOUR DEPARTURE.

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ADMIN FMFPAC

P 152331Z/JUN71

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FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG MCB CP BUTLER
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CCN: 178
TOR: 21JUN71 1117Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L //N03050//

PERSONAL FOR LTJEN JONES, INFO OF LTGEN ROBERTSON AND BGEN BARROW,
FROM MGEN METZGER. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
NAHA PORT WORKFORCE REPLACEMENTS (C)

A. CG 3D MARDIV 020211Z JUN 71 (C)

1. (C) BY REFERENCE (A) CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED OVER THE CONTINUING
REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE LABOR FORCES AT THE NAHA PORT. YOU RECALL
THAT WE DID DISCUSS THIS IN SOME DETAIL DURING YOUR VISIT AND IT
WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT YOU CONCURRED IN WHAT I HAD PROPOSED. HOWEVER
PRIOR TO BOB BARROW DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE JOINT AREA COMMANDERS,
BOTH HE AND I WOULD LIKE SOME ASSURANCE THAT YOU DO SUPPORT WHAT I
PROPOSE. I BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE AIRED HERE ON OKINAWA
AND THAT YOU SHOULD TAKE IT UP WITH USARPAC ONLY AFTER WE EXHAUST
ALL POSSIBILITIES ON ISLAND.

CG THIRD MARDIV

P 210825Z/JUN71

ACTN: S /SEC -
1-2

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PAGE TWO RUAOAJA2737 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR
 2. (C) IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT THE MARINE POSITION BE THAT:
 (A) THE NEED TO PROVIDE RIOT CONTROL, WORK FORCE AUGMENTATION
 AND WORK FORCES TO CONTINUE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS DURING WORK STOPPAGES
 AND STRIKES ON OKINAWA IS FULLY APPRECIATED. HOWEVER, WHEN THE
 REQUIREMENT IS LEVIED, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WILL BE FOR
 MINIMUM PERIODS OF TIME AND THAT IT WILL BE UP TO THE SERVICE
 CONCERNED TO TAKE REMEDIAL ACTION SO THAT THE NEED FOR MARINES WILL
 BE MINIMIZED. THEREFORE IT IS DESIRED THAT:
 (1) IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, THE DEPARTMENT OF
 THE ARMY TAKE EXPEDIOUS ACTION TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENTS FOR MARINES
 WHO HAVE BEEN IN SUPPORT OF THE NAHA PORT SINCE 9 MAY.
 COMMENT: THERE IS NO INDICATION OF A TERMINAL DATE OF THE STRIKE OR
 THE REQUIREMENT FOR MARINE FORCES.
 (2) THAT IN ALL FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR MARINES THAT AT THE TIME
 OF THE REQUEST THERE WILL BE INFORMATION AS TO HOW LONG THE
 REQUIREMENT WILL EXIST AND WHAT PLANS THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE
 RYUKYUS HAS TO RELIEVE THE MARINE CORPS OF THIS REQUIREMENT.
 3. (C) LET ME REITERATE. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT THIS DIVISION MUST
 SUPPORT EVERY LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENT. HOWEVER, I AM CONSTANTLY TORN
 BETWEEN MEETING THE READINESS STANDARD WHICH YOU EXPECT AND WHICH

PAGE THREE RUAOAJA2737C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR
 IS OUR MAIN STAY AND THE CONSTANT SERIES OF REQUIREMENTS, WHICH IN
 TOTO CAN ONLY HAVE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON OUR READINESS TO CARRY OUT
 OUR PRIMARY MISSION.

4. (C) YOUR APPROVAL OF WHAT IS PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE
 WILL BE APPRECIATED.

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CG THIRD MARDIV

P 210825Z/JUN71

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O 220522Z JUN 71
FM CG FMFPAC
TO ADMIN FMFPAC
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CCN; 588
TOR: 22JUN71 1416Z

UNCLAS //N05700//
MARINE LEADER PUBLICATION

PERSONAL FOR BGEN HOUGHTON ~~FOR~~ LTGEN JONES

1. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE INTENDED FOR USE IN THE LOOKING AHEAD SECTION OF THE NEXT EDITION OF THE MARINE LEADER BOOKLET. I PREFER THAT THE TEXT NOT BE MODIFIED BUT INCLUDED AS IT APPEARS HEREIN. PLEASE INSTRUCT THE HUMAN AFFAIRS BRANCH TO EXPEDITE.

TEXT FOLLOWS:

ONE GOOD WAY TO JUDGE THE WORTH OF A MAN IS TO FIND OUT HOW WELL HE LIVES UP TO WHAT HE SAYS HE BELIEVES IN. THERE ARE TOO MANY OFFICERS AND SNCO'S WHO ARE FAILING TO DO JUST THAT. MOST OF YOU HAVE HEARD THE OLD EXPRESSION "DO AS I SAY AND NOT AS I DO". UNFORTUNATELY TOO MANY OF OUR OLD TIMERS HAVE ACCEPTED THIS PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE AND A PRIVILEGE THAT THEIR RANK AND YEARS OF SERVICE HAVE ENTITLED THEM TO. IT IS THIS TYPE OF CONFUSED THINKING THAT RESULTS IN DOUBLE STANDARDS WHICH DESTROY BOTH CREDIBILITY AND RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY. THIS IN TURN

CG FMFPAC

O 220522Z/JUN71

ACTN: S/SEC
1-2

(68)

PAGE TWO RUMMWUA0629 UNCLAS

OBSTRUCTS MANY OF OUR YOUNG MARINES WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE FIND PURPOSE AND IDENTITY IN OUR CORPS.

IT IS DOUBLE STANDARDS WHICH HAVE CAUSED MUCH OF THE RACIAL TENSION WHICH CURRENTLY EXISTS IN OUR CORPS, AND FOR THAT MATTER IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. TOO MANY OF OUR SENIOR MARINES ARE ONLY SUPERFICIALLY SUPPORTING AND IMPLEMENTING MARINE CORPS POLICIES REGARDING RACIAL EQUALITY. THESE INDIVIDUALS PUBLISH ORDERS, HOLD MEETINGS AND SEMINARS, GIVE LECTURES AND COUNSEL THEIR JUNIORS TO BE EMPATHETIC TO THE NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS OF ALL MARINES REGARDLESS OF RACE. THIS OF COURSE IS WELL AND GOOD, BUT THERE ARE TOO DAMN MANY OF THESE SAME BIRDS WHO DON'T PRACTICE WHAT THEY PREACH. THE LACK OF SINCERITY IS READILY PERCEIVED AND FRUSTRATIONS MOUNT.

WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOU HEARD AN OFFICER OR NCO MAKE A RACIST STATEMENT OR TOLERATE A RACIAL SLUR MADE BY ANOTHER IN HIS PRESENCE. IF YOU DID, IT WAS PROBABLY DURING OFF DUTY HOURS, PERHAPS AT THE CLUB, IN SOMEONE'S HOUSE, OR MAYBE IN YOUR CAR POOL ON THE WAY HOME FROM WORK. MOST LIKELY THE STATEMENT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE "UNOFFICIAL" OR "OFF THE RECORD" AND INTENDED ONLY FOR THE EARS OF CLOSE FRIENDS OR CONTEMPORARIES.

PAGE THREE RUMMWUA0629 UNCLAS

THIS MISGUIDED RATIONAL PUZZLES ME. WE ALL CONSIDER THE BUSINESS OF LEADING MARINES TO BE A PROFESSION AND THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A PART TIME PROFESSIONAL.

WE CAN ALL SEE THE ADVERS AFFECTS OF RACIAL TENSION WHICH EXISTS WITH IN OUR RANKS, BUT MANY PERSIST IN ALLOWING THEIR PERSONAL PREJUDICES TO PREVAIL OVER THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS MARINE LEADERS. SOMETIMES WE FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THIS FLAW IN OUR OWN CHARACTER WHILE IT IS READILY APPARENT TO US, AND TOLERATED, IN OTHERS.

WE CAN LICK THIS PROBLEM IF WE SINCERELY WANT TO AND CAN START BY OWNING UP TO OUR PREJUDICES. YOU MAY NOT UNDERSTAND THEM AND THEY WILL BE HARD TO CHANGE, BUT AFTER ALL, WHO EVER SAID THAT LEADING MARINES IS AN EASY JOB.

IF WE CANNOT BE WHOLLY HONEST WITH ONE ANOTHER HOW CAN WE BE TRUE TO OURSELVES AS INDIVIDUALS. IF WE CANNOT BE TRUE TO OURSELVES AS INDIVIDUALS. HOW CAN WE BE TRUE TO THE GROUP--"THE BAND OF BROTHERS". IF WE CANNOT BE A MEMBER OF THE BAND OF BROTHERS, HOW CAN WE MAKE THE PROUD STATEMENT "I, GENTLEMAN, AM A UNITED STATES MARINE".

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P 250719Z JUN71
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
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CCN: 0538
TOR: 251326Z JUN 71

S E C R E T //N00000//
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRAINING (U)

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR INFO.

QUOTE:

P 050219Z JUN71
FM CTF 79
TO COM 7TH FLT
INFO CTF 72
CTG 79.3
BT

S E C R E T //N00000//

PERSONAL FOR VADM WEISNER INFO MAJGEN OWENS AND RADM FOWLER//
FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON.

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

PAGE TWO RU00AJA3563 S E C R E T

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRAINING (U)

- A. ANNEX E, COMSEVENTHFLT OPORD 201
- B. CINCPACFLT 300041Z APR71 (TS)
- C. CG FMFPAC 200542Z MAY71 (TS)
- D. AMEMBASSY TOKYO 080520Z MAY71 (C)(PASEP)
- E. CINCPACREP RY 010145Z JUN71 (U)(PASEP)
- F. OPNAVINST 005721.1B

1. (S) PAR 4E TO TAB B, APPENDIX II OF REF A CLEARLY INDICATES OVERALL CONCERN WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS LOADING DRILLS OR OTHER NUCLEAR TRAINING EXERCISES BY UNITS BASED ASHORE IN JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES. THE BASIC PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING THE CONDUCT OF SUCH DRILLS IS TO NOT GENERATE CONJECTURE ON THE PART OF INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL.

2. (S) JUST PRIOR TO ARMED FORCES DAY, BOB OWENS AT IWAKUNI WAS CONFRONTED WITH INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING SEVERAL INCIDENTS INVOLVING ATTEMPTS TO GAIN INFO REGARDING NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AT IWAKUNI. THESE ATTEMPTS WERE MADE BY INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS VICE THE USUAL PEACENIK ACTIVITIES. BASED ON THIS INFORMATION, BOB ORDERED CG III MAF

P 250719Z JUN 71

ACTN:S/SEC 1-3

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THE THREE BOMB DUMMY UNITS (BDU'S) IN HIS INVENTORY MOVED QUIETLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY TO NAF, NAHA, AND PLACED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE

PAGE THREE RUA0AJA3563 S E C R E T

MARINE WING WEAPONS UNIT (MWWU) NOW PERMANENTLY BASED THERE IN SUPPORT OF THE SIOP COMMITMENT OUTLINED IN CINCPACFLT'S LOI, REF B. 3. (S) BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE PROBLEM AT IWAKUNI, DICK FOWLER ALSO DIRECTED THAT NUCLEAR LOADING TRAINING THE FAW-6 BE HELD IN ABEYANCE AND THE BDU'S FOR THE P3'S MOVED TO NAHA. THIS DECISION WILL PLACE AN INCREASED TRAINING BURDEN ON DICK IN THAT THE IWAKUNI BASED VPRON WILL BE FORCED TO DEPLOY AIRCRAFT, CREWS AND LOADING TEAMS TO NAHA IN ORDER TO FULFILL THE QUARTERLY LOADING DRILL REQUIREMENTS. ANY RESTRICTION ON THE USE OF TRAINING WEAPONS AT IWAKUNI WILL ALSO EFFECT THE MARINE DELIVERY SQUADRONS BASED THERE IN THE SAME MANNER, I.E., THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO DEPLOY TO NAHA FOR THEIR ROUTINE LOADING EXERCISES.

4. (S) AS YOU KNOW, IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO DEPLOY ONE OF BOB'S A4 SQUADRONS (VMA-211) TO NAF, NAHA, FOR APPROXIMATELY NINETY DAYS TO EASE THE BASE LOADING AT IWAKUNI. THIS SQUADRON IS ONE OF TWO FMAW SQUADRONS SCHEDULED TO ASSUME A SIOP POSTURE ON 1 JUL. 5. (S) IN ORDER TO ENSURE CTF 72 AND CTG 79.3 FORCES ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ASSIGNED NUCLEAR MISSIONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS LOADING DRILLS UTILIZING BDU'S ARE NECESSARY. IN ADDITION, PLANS CALL FOR TWO CTG 79.3 NUCLEAR EXERCISES DURING THIS MONTH. THE FIRST

PAGE FOUR RUA0AJA3563 S E C R E T

WILL BE A TIMING EXERCISE AND THE SECOND WILL BE A FULL NOREX CONDUCTED BY CG FMFPAC AS OUTLINED IN REFERENCE C.

6. (S) REFERENCE D INDICATES JAPANESE SOCIALIST PARTY CRITICISM OF GOJ REMARKS CONCERNING US VESSELS VISITING JAPANESE PORTS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD.

7. (S) THESE RECENT DIET HEARINGS PROMPTED LTGEN GRAHAM TO QUERIE BOB OWENS ON WHY THE 1967 US FORCES JAPAN TELEPHONE DIRECTORY LISTED AN 'NBC OFFICE AND NBC WEAPONS SECTION ONE' AT IWAKUNI. SUCH A LISTING INFERRED THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN JAPAN. SUBSEQUENT LISTINGS IN THE 1970 DIRECTORY SHOW THIS UNIT AS 'HQ AND MAINTENANCE SQD 15, SUB UNIT 2.' GRAHAM'S REQUEST WAS FOR INFORMATION ON WHICH TO PREPARE AN UNCLASSIFIED RESPONSE TO UNFAVORABLE ALLEGATIONS.

8. (S) BOB'S ANSWER, IN WHICH I FULLY CONCUR, GAVE THE HISTORY OF THESE PARTICULAR UNITS AT IWAKUNI AND THE REDESIGNATION OF THE REFERENCED UNIT (MARINE WING WEAPONS UNIT - MWWU) AS SUB-UNIT 1, H&HS-17, WITH THE UNCLASSIFIED MISSION OF TRAINING IN NBC DEFENSE FOR ALL FMF PERSONNEL ORGANIC TO THE WING AND CONVENTIONAL TRAINING FOR ORDNANCEMEN AND AIRCREWS. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE UNIT WAS DEPLOYED TO OKINAWA ALONG WITH VMA-211 TO EASE THE OVER-CG III MAF

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2-3

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PAGE FIVE RU00AJA3563 S E C R E T

CROWDED CONDITIONS AT IWAKUNI CAUSED BY INCREMENT VII REDEPLOYMENTS.

9. (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION AND THE APPARENT INTENSIFIED INTEREST REGARDING SUCH WEAPONRY AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOJ, IT APPEARS THAT THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT QUERIES WILL BE MADE BY THE NEWS MEDIA AS WELL AS POSSIBLE ATTEMPTS TO PHOTOGRAPH VMA-211 AND VMA (AW)-533 OPERATIONS IN AND AROUND THE 'EASY' AREA ON NAHA. AB. REF E IS AN INDICATION OF INCREASED JAPANESE INTEREST REGARDING US MILITARY OPERATIONS ON OKINAWA.

10. (S) IN SUMMARY, THERE HAS DEVELOPED AN URGENT REQUIREMENT TO CLARIFY THE ENTIRE SUBJ. OF TRAINING WEAPONS AND TRAINING SHAPES ON SEVENTHFLT AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM BASES IN JAPAN, OKINAWA AND THE PHILIPPINES. ALTHOUGH THE BROAD GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFERENCES A AND F HAS BEEN ADEQUATE IN THE PAST, INCREASED SENSITIVITY TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN THESE THREE PARTICULAR LOCATION HAS BECOME A MATTER OF DEEP CONCERN TO ALL OF US.

11. (S) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I RECOMMEND THAT THE SUBJ OF TRAINING WEAPONS, TRAINING SHAPES AND NUCLEAR EXERCISES AS A WHOLE BE ADDRESSED AND DEFINITIVE GUIDANCE PROVIDED CONCERNING SUCH

PAGE SIX RU00AJA3563 S E C R E T

TRAINING/OPERATIONS IN JAPAN, OKINAWA AND THE PHILIPPINES. I AM SURE THAT COMNAVFORJAPAN AND COMUSJAPAN ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED REGARDING THIS OVERALL PROBLEM.

12. (S) UNTIL SUCH TIME AS YOUR POLICY GUIDANCE IS RECEIVED, IT WOULD APPEAR PRUDENT TO CONDUCT ALL CTF 72 AND CTG 79.3 NUCLEAR WEAPONS LOADING DRILLS AT NAHA VICE IWAKUNI. QUERIES ADDRESSED TO CTF 79 AND OR CTF 72 REGARDING TRAINING AT NAHA WILL CONTINUE TO BE ANSWERED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REF F.

13. (U) BOTH BOB OWENS AND DICK FOWLER CONCUR IN THE CONTENT OF THIS MESSAGE.

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2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

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CG III MAF

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UNCLAS E F T O//N00000//
 ADMIN CINCPACFLT TAKE AS HOTEL TWENTY
 PERSONAL FOR MGEN METZGER INFO LTGENS JONES AND ROBERTSON, AND VADM
 DXICHARDSON FROM CLAREY.

1. YESTERDAY'S DEMONSTRATION OF THE CAPABILITIES AND READINESS OF
 THIRD MARINE DIVISION PERSONNEL WAS MOST IMPRESSIVE IN EVERY RESPECT.
 EACH EVOLUTION FROM THE LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS TO THE TANK RIDE WAS
 INFORMATIVE AND EXPERTLY COORDINATED. I PARTICULARLY COMMEND THE RIOT
 CONTROL SQUAD FOR THEIR PROFESSIONALISM AND SPIRIT. THE INDIVIDUAL RE-
 STRAINT REQUIRED IN AN OPERATION OF THIS KIND CAN ONLY BE ASSURED BY
 RIGID TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE. YOUR MEN DEMONSTRATED THESE QUALITIES
 TO THE HIGHEST DEGREE.

2. PLEASE CONVEY MY SINCERE THANKS AND A HEARTY WELL DONE TO YOUR OF-

PAGE TWO RUHGPTA0146 CUNCLAS E F T O
 FICERS AND MEN FOR A SUPERB PERFORMANCE ACCOMPLISHED IN TRUE
 MARINE FASHION. MRS. CLAREY AND I ARE DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE
 COURTESIES SHOWN TO US BY YOU AND ALL OF YOUR PERSONNEL IN EVERY
 INSTANCE.

3. WARM REGARDS.

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO MAJGEN OWENS FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON.
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

NORTHEAST ASIA COORDINATING COMMITTEE (NEACC) (U)

A. CG I MAF 230053Z MAR 71 (S) (PERSONAL)

B. CG III MAF 180049Z MAY 71 (C)

1. (S) AS YOU RECALL, LOU METZGER IN REF A, INDICATED DEEP CONCERN REGARDING BROAD POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN THE THEN CURRENT BASIC MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN 5AF AND 7TH FLT. THESE PROBLEMS WERE SURFACED BY FMAW(R) REPS WHO ATTENDED NEACC CONF IN MARCH.
2. (S) SUBSEQUENTLY, WITH YOUR APPROVAL, COMSEVENTHFLT WAS INFORMED OF CTF 79 CONCERN AND DURING THE LAST 7TH FLT QUARTERLY SCHEDULING CONFERENCE, A FIRM NAVY/MARINE POSITION WAS ESTABLISHED REGARDING THIS BASIC MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT UTILIZING ALMOST EN TOTO FMAW COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. REF B REFERS.

CG III MAF

P 263510Z JUN 71

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PAGE TWO RUAOAJA3804 S E C R E T

3. (S) NEACC CONFERENCE HELD YOKUSKA DURING PD 21-25 JUN DID IN FACT REWRITE THE BASIC MEMO OF AGREEMENT AND ANNEXES UTILIZING THE 7TH FLT PROPOSAL AS RECOMMENDED BY III MAF AND FMAW. WITH BUT A FEW MINOR EXCEPTIONS, ALL MARINE CORPS RECOMMENDATIONS WERE ADOPTED AND THE DOCUMENT NOW REFLECTS A SOLID 7TH FLT POLICY. SAF REPS AT THE CONFERENCE FORESEE NO DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING SAF CONCURRENCE.

4. (S) THE ONLY REMAINING PROBLEM AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED, IS THAT CONTAINED IN APPENDIX II TO ANNEX A OF BOTH THE NEW AND FORMER MEMORANDUM. THIS HAS TO DO WITH FOLLOW ON CONVENTIONAL WARFARE DURING ANY FUTURE KOREAN HOSTILITIES. IN THE REVISED AGREEMENT, SAF IN FACT CONTROLS ALL AIR OPERATIONS IN KOREA INVOLVING AIR FORCE AND NAVY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. III MAF REP TO THIS CONF DID NOT CONCUR AND PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING CAVEAT: QUOTE 'UTILIZATION AND COORDINATION OF CTF 79 FIXED WING AVIATION ASSETS WILL BE DETERMINED SUBSEQUENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMAND RELATIONS FOR CTF 79 PARTICIPATION IN KOREAN OPERATIONS.' UNQUOTE. THIS CAVEAT WILL PROVIDE US WITH THE NECESSARY TIME TO ESTABLISH A FIRM MARINE CORPS POLICY AS IT PERTAINS TO CONTINGENCY OPS

PAGE THREE RUAOAJA3804 S E C R E T

IN KOREA. IT IS MY INTENT TO EXAMINE THIS PROBLEM IN DETAIL WITH THE PROBABLE FALL BACK POSITION SIMILAR TO THAT FOUND IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 THAT GENERAL MCCUTCHEON FOUGHT SO HARD TO OBTAIN IN VIETNAM.

5. (S) PRIOR TO THE NEXT NEACC CONF, I WILL PREPARE AN AGENDA ITEM ADDRESSING THIS SUBJECT AND FORWARD IT TO YOU FOR COMMENT.

6. (S) AS OF NOW, THE NEACC BASIC MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE TO ME AND IN FACT IS A MUCH NEEDED COORDINATING DOCUMENT THAT HAS THE CONTINUING PERSONAL ATTENTION OF COMSEVENTHFLT.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM CLAREY.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

1. (TS) FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE.
PRIORITY

P 282050Z JUN 71
FM CINCPACAF
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
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T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN, INFO ADMIRAL CLAREY, FROM GENERAL
NAZZARO. CC. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

SUBJECT: RELOCATION OF PACOM NUCLEAR WEAPONS (U)
REF: CINCPAC (TS/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/FRD) 090550Z MAY 71.

1. REF REQUESTED VIEWS/COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS
ON THE USE OF CCK AB BY USMC SIOP FORCE IN AN ATTEMPT
TO CLARIFY THE FUTURE STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON
TAIWAN.

2. UNDERSTAND THAT THE FY 72 NUCLEAR WEAPON DEPLOY-
MENT PLAN RECENTLY FORWARDED FOR PRESIDENTIAL
APPROVAL ADVOCATES CLOSURE OF TAINAN AB FOR ACTIVE
OPERATIONS AND STORAGE OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON
TAIWAN AT CCK AB. FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THIS
NUCLEAR WEAPON DEPLOYMENT PLAN INCLUDES THE

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ADDITION OF TWO NEW NUCLEAR STORAGE SITES IN KOREA-- ONE AT KWANG-JU AB AND ONE AT TAEGU AB. SINCE THERE WILL BE ONLY ONE NUCLEAR STORAGE SITE ON TAIWAN AT CCK AB AND SINCE USAF FORCES ARE PROGRAMMED TO REMAIN THERE IN RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBERS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, IT APPEARS THAT IT MIGHT BE MORE DESIRABLE TO SUPPORT THE MARINE SIOP COMMITMENT FROM ANOTHER LOCATION. IN THIS REGARD, USAF FORCES WILL BE MINIMAL AT KWANG-JU AB DURING NORMAL PERIODS. ACCORDINGLY, SUGGEST THE PACFLT NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE STORED ALONG WITH PACAF WEAPONS IN THE USAF FACILITY TO BE CONSTRUCTED AT KWANG-JU AB. THIS WOULD PERMIT MARINE SIOP STAGING THROUGH KWANG-JU AB AND RELIEVE AIRCRAFT CONGESTION THAT WOULD LIKELY OCCUR AT CCK AB UNDER CRISIS CONDITIONS.

3. UPON YOUR CONCURRENCE, PACAF REPRESENTATIVES WILL NEGOTIATE THE APPROPRIATE ISSA WITH PACFLT.

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2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L //N03121//

PERSONEL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN WIDDECKE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

ASSIGNMENT OF CG 7TH MAB FOR ROPEVAL 3-71 (MABLEX 1-71)

A. CG I MAF 261751Z JUN71 (C)

1. (C) REF A PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR MARINE PARTICIPATION IN ROPEVAL 3-71 (MABLEX 1-71) AND DELINEATES RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PRE-EXERCISE PLANNING. UP TO NOW THE I MAF STAFF, WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE DIVISION, WING, AND FORTRPS HAS BEEN PROVIDING THE PLANNING FUNCTIONS TO SUPPORT LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS. ON 1 JULY, THIS RESPONSIBILITY WILL SHIFT TO A SMALL PLANNING STAFF COMPOSED OF DIV/WING/ FORTRPS PERSONNEL WHO WILL CONSTITUTE THE NUCLEUS OF THE 7TH MAB STAFF TO BE ACTIVATED FOR THE EXERCISE.

2. (C) UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR CG I MAF THROUGH MUTUAL AGREEMENT WITH THE DIVISION AND WING

CG I MAF

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PAGE 2 RUWJNWA2798 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 COMMANDERS TO DESIGNATE EITHER THE DIVISION OR WING ADC/AWC (BGEN) AS THE EXERCISE BRIGADE COMMANDER, BUT NOW NEITHER HAS SUCH AN ASSISTANT COMMANDER. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO NAME A BRIGADE COMMANDER AT THIS TIME IN ORDER TO PROVIDE STABILITY AND CONTINUITY, AND TO FACILITATE PLANNING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE COMPHIBGRU ONE (CATF/CTF 176) STAFF.

3. (C) TWO OPTIONS APPEAR FEASIBLE: FIRST, CG 7TH MAB COULD BE DESIGNATED FROM AMONG AVAILABLE BGEN'S WITHIN FMFPAC: OR, SECOND, IF PROJECTED AVAILABILITY OF GENERAL OFFICERS WITHIN FMFPAC DURING SEPT DOES NOT MAKE THIS DESIRABLE, A SENIOR COLONEL COULD BE ASSIGNED AS BRIGADE COMMANDER. AN ALTERNATIVE TO EITHER OF THE FOREGOING IS TO DEFER NAMING THE BRIGADE COMMANDER UNTIL MID JULY AFTER THE BGEN'S BOARD HAS BEEN APPROVED. HOWEVER, A BRIGADE COMMANDER TAKING OVER AT THAT LATE DATE WOULD BE DISADVANTAGED BY BEING LOCKED INTO A PLAN WITHOUT HAVING HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE IT'S DEVELOPMENT.

4. (C) ACCORDINGLY, IN VIEW OF THE NEW CONCEPTS TO BE TESTED DURING THE EXERCISE AND CONSEQUENT IMPORTANCE TO

PAGE 3 RUWJNWA2798 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 BOTH THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS RECOMMEND THAT A BGEN BE ASSIGNED AS CG 7TH MAB AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY IN TIME TO SIT IN ON THE CATF/CLF CONCEPT BRIEF FOR ADM PEET ON THE 6TH OF JULY. IF SUCH IS DONE, PAUL GRAHAM WOULD BE A FINE CHOICE, ON AN ADDITIONAL DUTY BASIS.

5. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY AND BEST REGARDS. WIDDECKE.
 DECLASSIFY 18 SPET 1971.

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CG 1 MAF

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RUAOAJA/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER
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CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN METZGER AND
BGEN BARROW, INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON, FROM LTGEN JONES.
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS. //N00000//

NAHA PORT WORK FORCE REPLACEMENTS (U)

A. CG 3D MARDIV 210825Z JUN71 (C) (PERS)

1. (C) LOU, I APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN EXPRESSED IN
REF A RELATIVE TO THE EXTENDED UTILIZATION OF MARINE
LABOR FORCES ON OKINAWA. AS WE DISCUSSED DURING MY
RECENT VISIT, I DO CONCUR IN THE PROPOSED MARINE
POSITION WHICH YOU REITERATED IN REF A.

2. (C) I ALSO AGREE THAT YOU AND BOB
BARROW SHOULD MAKE EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO SOLVE
THE PROBLEM ON OKINAWA: HOWEVER, IF AN ADEQUATE
SOLUTION IS NOT FORTHCOMING IN A REASONABLE TIME,

CG FMFPAC

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PAGE TWO RUHHFM2661 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR
I HAVE NO RESERVATIONS ABOUT MAKING APPROPRIATE
REPRESENTATION TO CINCUSARPAC THROUGH CINCPACFLT TO
OBTAIN ADDITIONAL ARMY TRANSPORTATION CORPS ASSISTANCE.
PLEASE KEEP ME POSTED.

3. (C) BOB, IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JOINT AREA
COMMANDERS, THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR READINESS POSTURE
IS THE KEY FACTOR AND MUST CONTINUALLY BE STRESSED.
WE PUT OURSELVES IN AN EXTREMELY TENUOUS POSITION IF
WE PERMIT ANY DIMINUTION OF OUR CONTINGENCY RESPONSE
CAPABILITY. REQUIREMENTS NOT RELATED TO OUR PRIMARY
MISSION AND WHICH CANNOT BE SHED ON SHORT NOTICE
MUST BE AVOIDED. WARM REGARDS.

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CG FMFPAC

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 TO RUWJGFB/CG THIRD MAW
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PERSONAL FOR BGEN BROWN FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING
 WORKING HOURS.

FMFPAC TRAINING READINESS EVALUATION (TRE)

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE, READINESS IS A MATTER OF PRIME CONCERN
 TO ME. OUR PRESENT READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM HAS PROVIDED ME
 A GOOD INSIGHT INTO WHAT ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE A
 C-1/C-2 STATUS. ONE FACET OF THE PROBLEM UNCOVERED IS THE
 QUALITY OF THE TRAINING BEING ACCOMPLISHED AND CONSEQUENTLY THE
 ABILITY OF OUR UNITS TO PERFORM THEIR ASSIGNED MISSION. TO THIS
 END, I HAVE RECENTLY INITIATED A CONCEPT FOR CONDUCTING TRAINING
 READINESS EVALUATIONS (TRE'S) OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND
 AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS. THE INITIAL TRE WAS CONDUCTED ON A THIRD
 MARDIV BATTALION AND THE RESULTS OF THIS EVALUATION HAVE
 REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT THIS CONCEPT IS A VALUABLE TOOL FOR
 ME TO MONITOR UNIT READINESS. THE TRE IS TO BE CONDUCTED ON A

CG FMFPAC

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0379 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR NO-NOTICE BASIS AND WILL EVALUATE ONLY THOSE UNITS REPORTING A COMPOSITE READINESS OF C-2X OR BETTER.

2. DURING THE PERIOD 12-16 JUL 71, A TRE TEAM FROM MY HEADQUARTERS WILL CONDUCT AN EVALUATION OF A THIRD MAW SQUADRON. COL HAL VINCENT, WHO HEADS MY G-4 AVIATION MAINTENANCE/MANAGEMENT UNIT, WILL BE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THIS TRE. LTCOL CLIFF WARFIELD, WHO HEADS MY G-3 AVIATION OPERATIONS/TRAINING UNIT, WILL BE COL VINCENT'S PRIMARY ASSISTANT. OTHER TRE TEAM MEMBERS FROM HAWAII WILL INCLUDE FOUR OFFICERS AND TWO SNCO'S. IT IS DESIRED THAT AUGMENTATION FOR THE TEAM BE PROVIDED FROM MAWTUPAC IN ORDER THAT THE REQUIRED CURRENT OPERATIONAL FLIGHT AND ORDNANCE LOADING/HAWLING EXPERIENCE WILL BE AVAILABLE. SELECTION BY COL VINCENT OF MAWTUPAC PERSONNEL FOR THE TRE TEAM WILL OF NECESSITY BE DELAYED UNTIL DESIGNATION OF THE TYPE AIRCRAFT SQUADRON TO BE EVALUATED. UPON ARRIVAL AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON 12 JUL 71, COL VINCENT WILL PROVIDE YOU A COPY OF MY LOI TO HIM CONCERNING THE PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCT OF THIS TRE. IN KEEPING WITH THE NO-NOTICE CONCEPT OF THE TRE, COL VINCENT WILL NOT DESIGNATE THE SQUADRON TO BE EVALUATED UNTIL THE DAY PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FLIGHT PORTION OF THE EVALUATION. AT THIS TIME, THE TRE "FRAG" AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0379 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR SUBMITTED TO YOU OR YOUR DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. IT IS REALIZED THAT THIS CONCEPT MIGHT WELL RESULT IN A DISRUPTION OF PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED TRAINING. HOWEVER, I CONSIDER THIS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE NO-NOTICE STATUS OF THE TRE AND CONSEQUENTLY OBTAIN A BETTER EVALUATION OF THE SELECTED UNIT'S READINESS.

3. THE TRE TEAM WILL EVALUATE AN AIRCRAFT SQUADRON WHILE IT IS PREPARING FOR AND CONDUCTING FLIGHT OPERATIONS. SIMULATED COMBAT CONDITIONS WILL BE INTRODUCED WHEN FEASIBLE. READINESS TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSION WILL NATURALLY BE OF MAJOR CONCERN; HOWEVER, IT IS REALIZED THAT BECAUSE OF LIMITED ASSETS THE UNIT MIGHT NOT BE CAPABLE OF CERTAIN TASKS SUCH AS CARRIER OPERATIONS. THEREFORE, THE TRE TEAM WILL NOT EVALUATE TASKS FOR WHICH YOUR UNITS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TRAIN DUE TO THE NON-AVAILABILITY OF REQUIRED ASSETS. FLIGHT OPERATIONS REQUIRED FOR THE TRE WILL VARY FROM TWO TO THREE DAYS DEPENDING ON THE TYPE UNIT BEING EVALUATED. STAFF FUNCTIONS (I. E., OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AVIONICS, SUPPLY, ORDNANCE AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE) WILL BE EVALUATED DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE UNIT BEING EVALUATED AND TERMINATION OF THE TRE.

CG FMFPAC

R 032151Z JUL 71

2-3

(75)

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA0379 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
REQUIRED TRAINING AREAS/TARGETS NOT UNDER YOUR CONTROL HAVE
BEEN RESERVED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. IT IS REQUESTED THAT
SUPPORT ASSETS AVAILABLE WITHIN THIRD MAW (E.G., AERIAL
REFUELING, FAC(A) AIRCRAFT, EVALUATOR AIRCRAFT, BOGEY AIRCRAFT)
BE PROVIDED AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE TRE. SUPPORTING
UNITS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH TASKS BEING EVALUATED SUCH AS
H&MS AND MASS WILL ALSO BE EVALUATED ON THE SUPPORT PROVIDED.
UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE EVALUATION, A DEBRIEFING WILL BE
PROVIDED BY THE TRE TEAM.

4. IN ADDITION TO THE SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE
TRE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING FOR THE
TEAM:

A. ON-BASE TRANSPORTATION.

B. WORKING SPACE PLUS ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE. COL
VINCENT WILL PROVIDE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS UPON HIS ARRIVAL.

5. BILLETING FOR THE TRE TEAM HAS BEEN ARRANGED BY THIS HQ.

6. I KNOW YOU WILL ENDORSE THE CONCEPT OF THE TRE AS A MEANS
OF DETERMINING WHAT REALLY IS A BREAD-AND-BUTTER ISSUE - CAN
A UNIT PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION. IN THIS REGARD, I AM
PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH THE EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF ALL
AVAILABLE TRAINING ASSETS. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOU INFORMING

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA0379 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
YOUR STAFF AND COMMANDERS, WHO WILL BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE
EVALUATION, OF THE TRE CONCEPT AND PURPOSE. WARM REGARDS.

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R 032151Z JUL 71

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P 042132Z JUL 71
FM CINCPAC
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RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
RUHHFMA/CGFMFPAC
RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV
RHMFMIA/COMUSMACTHAI
RUADJKA/COMUSJAPAN
RUHKJAA/COMUSKOREA
RUHKTDC/COMUSTDC
RUAQADA/CINCPACREP RY
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RUHJOSA/CINCPACREP GUAM/ITPI
RUADSSA/E-I-C PS&S TOKYO

BT

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL ROSSON, ADMIRAL CLAREY
GENERAL NAZZARO, LT GEN JONES, GENERAL ABRAMS, MAJ GEN
EVANS, LT GEN GRAHAM, GENERAL MICHAELIS, VADM BAUMBERGER

CINCPAC

P 042132Z JUL 71

ACTN: S/SEC
1-3

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PAGE 2 RUHHHQA0393 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 LT GEN LAMPERT, RADM MUSE, RADM PUGH AND COL KOCH FROM
 ADMIRAL MCCAIN

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

"COLD TURKEY II" PROGRAM

1. (U) RECENT DETERMINED MOVES BY THE PRESIDENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND VARIOUS COMMANDERS IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND TO STEM THE RISING TIDE OF HARD DRUG ABUSE HAVE MY FULL AND UNLIMITED SUPPORT. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THESE MEASURES, PLUS OTHERS IN THE PLANNING STAGES OF WHICH I HAVE BEEN INFORMED, WILL ULTIMATELY SOLVE THIS MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM.
2. (U) IN THIS REGARD, I HAVE DIRECTED THE REINSTITUTION OF THE "COLD TURKEY" PROGRAM WHICH RECENTLY PROVED TO BE SO EFFECTIVE IN REACHING AND EDUCATING A LARGE NUMBER OF OUR YOUNG MEN AND DEPENDENTS.
3. (U) THIS NEW CAMPAIGN, TO BE INSTITUTED ABOUT 1 AUG 71, WILL BE AIMED SPECIFICALLY AT THE YOUNG SOLDIER, SAILOR, AIRMAN, AND MARINE WHO IS MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE DRUG PROBLEM. IT WILL BE PRIMARILY DIRECTED AT HARD DRUGS. THE PROGRAM WILL INITIALLY CONSIST OF AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER

PAGE 3 RUHHHQA0393 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 OF FACTUAL NEWS ARTICLES, EDITORIALS, FEATURES, INTERVIEWS,
 AND PHOTOS CONCERNING ALL ASPECTS OF THE DRUG PROBLEM IN
 THE PACIFIC COMMAND.

4. (U) A SPECIAL FOUR-PAGE SUNDAY SUPPLEMENT WILL BE INITIATED IN PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES WHICH WILL BE DEVOTED TO DRUG ABUSE. A SPECIAL SECTION WITHIN THIS DRUG EDUCATION SUPPLEMENT WILL ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE BETWEEN SERVICEMEN AND THE EDITOR ON DRUG ABUSE THROUGH A "LETTER TO THE EDITOR" COLUMN FORMAT. THE BEST MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND RELIGIOUS ADVICE AVAILABLE WILL BE UTILIZED TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS POSED BY READERS. THE SUPPLEMENT WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR BULK DISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE COMMAND WITHOUT COST.
5. (U) A SPECIAL EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO COLLECT FROM ALL SOURCES THE PAMPHLETS, BROCHURES, POSTERS AND VISUAL AIDS CLEARED BY THE NATIONAL CLEARING HOUSE FOR DRUG ABUSE LITERATURE FOR USE IN THIS NEW CAMPAIGN.
6. (U) THIS "COLD TURKEY II" PROGRAM WILL ONLY BE IDENTIFIED WITH THIS NAME FOR ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTIVE PURPOSES.

CINCPAC

P 042132Z JUL 71

2-3

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PAGE 4 RUHHHQA0393 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 7. (U) I ENVISION THE FULL USE OF ALL INTERNAL INFORMATION MEDIA AND ASSETS IN THE THEATRE. PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES, ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICES, PREPRINTED POSTERS AND HANDOUTS, REPRINTS OF FEATURE ARTICLES, STATION AND UNIT NEWSPAPERS WILL ALL MAKE A COORDINATED AND COMBINED EFFORT TO PLACE THE FULL STORY BEFORE OUR FORCES OVER A TWO-MONTH PERIOD BETWEEN 1 AUGUST AND 1 OCTOBER.

8. (C) I ALSO AM PREPARED TO UTILIZE AN INVITATIONAL FLYER IN EACH SUNDAY SUPPLEMENT DURING THE CAMPAIGN ENCOURAGING PERSONNEL TO ENTER THE EXISTING DRUG REHABILITATION PROGRAM AND EXPLAINING THE GUIDELINES OF SUCH PROGRAMS. THE TERM "AMNESTY" WILL NOT BE USED IN RESPECT TO THIS CERTIFICATE.

9. (U) TO ENSURE THAT THIS NEW EFFORT IS FULLY COORDINATED, I WILL CONVENE A MEETING IN TOKYO ON 21 JULY OF YOUR MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE INTERNAL INFORMATION OFFICERS ON DRUG ABUSE, TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH AFRIS NETWORK MY DEPUTY PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER, CAPT LOOMIS, USN; MY DRUG ABUSE STAFF OFFICER, COL SUDDABY, USA; THE EDITOR-IN-

PAGE 5 RUHHHQA0393 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 CHIEF, PS&S, COL KOCH; AND LCOL LAFOLLETTE OF AFRIS, LOS ANGELES, WILL MEET WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES. MORE INFORMATION WILL FOLLOW CONCERNING THIS MEETING, BUT EACH REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD COME PREPARED TO DISCUSS AND COORDINATE INDIVIDUAL SERVICE AND COMMANDER'S PLANS WITH "COLD TURKEY II."

10. (U) I FEEL STRONGLY THAT THIS CAMPAIGN WILL COMPLEMENT THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL PROGRAM ON DRUGS. EVERY EFFORT THAT CAN PRECLUDE A SERVICEMAN'S ADDICTION OR ENABLE HIM TO BREAK HIS DRUG HABIT MUST BE MADE. I CORDIALLY INVITE YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS NEW PROGRAM.

12. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4.

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P 042132Z JUL 71

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FM ADMIN III MAF
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW
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CCN:0222
TOR:061329Z JUL 71

SECRET //SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN ADAMS AND MGEN OWENS FROM
MGEN MEIZGER. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF MARINE F4 SQUADRON TO TAIWAN. (S)

A. CINCPACFLT 030342Z JUL 71 (S)

1. (S) IN ORDER TO KEEP YOU ADVISED OF CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH
COMSEVENTHFLT CONCERNING POSSIBLE FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF AN F4 SQUAD-
RON TO TAINAN, AB, TAIWAN, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED.

A. ON 1 JULY, WITH CONCURRENCE OF COMSEVENTHFLT AND COMUSTDC, A
CONFERENCE WAS HELD IN COMUSTDC Hqs WITH REPS FROM III MAF, FMAW, AND
COMUSTDC IN ATTENDANCE. THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE WAS TO
EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING A MARINE F4 SQUADRON TO TAINAN
FOR TRAINING.

B. COMUSTDC REPS INDICATED THAT SUCH A DEPLOYMENT WOULD PROBABLY
BE MOST WELCOME BY THE GRC. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATIONS, IT DOES NOT APPEAR PRUDENT AT THIS TIME TO ADDRESS THE
SUBJECT TO U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT OR GRC.

C. THERE ARE SOME SERIOUS AVIATION LOGISTIC DEFICIENCIES AT TAINAN
WHICH WOULD PROBABLY NECESSITATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF A FULL MABS TO
SUPPORT ANY SQUADRON DEPLOYMENT. THESE DEFICIENCIES INCLUDE LACK OF
FACILITIES TO BILLET AND MESS A TRANSIENT SQUADRON, LIMITED HANGAR
SPACE, LIMITED LOX, INSUFFICIENT 400 HZ POWER AND LACK OF JP5.

D. OPERATIONALLY, THERE IS SOME QUESTION AS TO WHETHER GRC WOULD
APPROVE USMC MISSILE FIRING WITHIN ANY OF THE FIVE AVAILABLE AIR-AIR
RANGES. THERE WAS NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE REGARDING ANY AGREEMENT
BETWEEN US AND GRC CONCERNING JOINT USE OF SUCH RANGES.

ADMIN III MAF

P 060900Z JUL 71

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2. (S) KNOWLEDGEABLE TDC PERSONNEL INDICATE THAT TAINAN AB IS THE ONLY AIRFIELD PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF HANDLING TDY DEPLOYMENTS. ALL OTHER JET CAPABLE CAF AIRFIELDS IN OPERATIONAL STATUS FULLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORT OF CAF AIR DEFENSE OR UTILIZED AS TRAINING BASES.

3. (S) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE LOGISTIC AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH ARE EXTENSIVE BUT NOT INSURMOUNTABLE, AND THE CURRENT U.S. POLITICAL CLIMATE AS IT PERTAINS TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH GRC AND PRC, SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE INTEND TO INFORM COMSEVENTHFLT OF THE RESULTS OF THIS CONFERENCE IN THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE.

QUOTE

FROM: CTF SEVEN NINE

TO: COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO: COMUSTDC

CTG SEVEN NINE POINT THREE

S E C R E T //SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM MACK, INFO VADM BUAMBERGER AND MGEN OWENS, FROM MGEN MEIZGER. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF MARINE F4 SQUADRON TO TAIWAN (S)

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 040636Z JUN71 (S) SPECAT

B. CINCPACFLT 030342Z JUL71 (S)

1. (S) IAW REF A, CONFERENCE HELD COMUSTDC 1 JUL WITH CTF-79, CTG-79.3 AND COMUSTDC REPS IN ATTENDANCE INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH GRC WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME USMC F4 SQUADRON DEPLOYMENT THERE ARE CERTAIN LOGISTICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEM AREAS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED PRIOR TO SUCH DEPLOYMENT.

A. TAINAN HAS NO BILLETING OR MESSING FACILITIES FOR TDY SQUADRON DEPLOYMENTS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS ADEQUATE RAMP SPACE, LIMITED HANGAR FACILITIES, INSUFFICIENT 400HZ POWER TO MEET F4 MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS, LIMITED LOX AND LACK OF JPS AND ASSOCIATED REFUELERS WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE THE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF A MABS TO SUPPORT ANY F4 SQUADRON DEPLOYMENT.

B. THERE ARE SUFFICIENT AIR-AIR RANGES. HOWEVER, NO INFO AVAILABLE REGARDING ANY US/GRC JOINT RANGE USE AGREEMENT. ADDITIONALLY, MISSILE FIRING WITHIN ANY OF THE AVAILABLE RANGES WOULD PROBABLY BE FULLY MONITORED BY PRC EW/GCI SITES.

2. (S) IN VIEW OF ABOVE LOGISTIC AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH ARE EXTENSIVE BUT NOT INSURMOUNTABLE; CURRENT U.S. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS; PLANS FOR FUTURE SIOP LAUNCH RECOVERY SITE FMAW FORCES; AND ONGOING WESTPAC PLANS FOR USN/USMC BASING AND DEPLOYMENTS ON OKINAWA OUTLINED REF B, RECOMMEND FUTURE PLANNING FOR ANY MARINE F4 DEPLOYMENTS BE HELD IN ABEYANCE. UNQUOTE.

4. (S) CONSIDERING REF A, FMAW COMMENTS CONCERNING FUTURE F4 SQD TAIWAN DEPLOYMENTS AND RATIONALE EXPRESSED ABOVE ARE SOLICITED.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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ADMIN III MAF

P 060900Z JUL 71

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PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN METZGER FROM MAJGEN ADAMS. DELIVER
DURING DUTY HOURS.//N03010//
NORTHEAST ASIA COORDINATING COMMITTEE (NEACC) (U)

- A. CG III MAF 230510Z/JUN71 (S) (PERSONAL)
- B. ADMIN III MAF 060345Z/JUL71 (S) (MARDIS)
- C. CINCPAC OPLAN 5027 (TS)

1. (U) LIGEN ROBERTSON'S REPORT ON THE JUNE NEACC
PROCEEDINGS (REF A) IS MUCH APPRECIATED. IT APPEARS
THAT WE NOW HAVE SOLID REPRESENTATION FOR SUBSEQUENT
PROCEEDINGS.

2. (TS) I SHARE HIS CONCERN REGARDING THE FACT THAT
THE REVISED AGREEMENT GIVES 5AF CONTROL OF ALL AIR
OPERATIONS INVOLVING AIR FORCE AND NAVY FIXED WING
AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, AS YOU HAVE CORRECTLY STATED
IN REF B, ANNEX C TO REF C HAS EFFECTIVELY GIVEN CG

ADMIN FMFPAC

P 090115Z JUL 71

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78
TOP SECRET

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0719 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
III MAF CONTROL OF HIS AVIATION ASSETS IN THE EVENT
III MAF IS PLACED UNDER THE OPCON OF COMUSKOREA. THIS
DIFFERS FROM THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT EXISTED IN RVN SINCE
1963 WHEN 7AF WAS GIVEN MISSION DIRECTION AUTHORITY
OVER 1ST MAW. ANNEX C TO REF C IS PREFERABLE IN THAT
IT PROVIDES THE MARINE COMMANDER WITH THE AUTHORITY TO
DETERMINE HIS OWN SORTIE REQUIREMENTS AND TO MAKE ANY
EXCESS SORTIE CAPABILITY AVAILABLE TO COMUSKOREA FOR
USE, AS MAY BE REQUIRED.

3. (TS) IN ADDITION TO BEING ASSIGNED TO THE OPCON
OF COMUSKOREA, THERE ARE TWO OTHER SITUATIONS IN WHICH
MARINE AIR MAY BE EMPLOYED IN KOREA, I.E., AMPHIBIOUS
OPERATIONS, OR AIR AND NAVAL OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH
KOREA AND CHINA. THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR THESE
SITUATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. ANNEX C TO REF C ALSO
STATES THAT U.S. MARINE FORCES EMPLOYED IN AMPHIBIOUS
OPERATIONS WILL BE IN THE OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND
OF CINCPACFLT. THEREFORE, CAIF (CTF 76) WOULD EXERCISE
OPCON OF TF 79 FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN KOREA AND

ADMIN FMFPAC

P 090115Z JUL 71

2-3

78
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PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0719 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
THE DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS WILL APPLY,
INCLUDING CONTROL OF AIR.

B. AIR AND NAVAL OPERATIONS. CINCPAC HAS RETAINED
THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIRECTING AND CONTROLLING
AIR AND SEA ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH KOREA
(EXCEPT FOR AREAS ASSIGNED TO COMUSKOREA) AND COMMUNIST
CHINA. CINCPAC HAS DESIGNATED CINCPACAF AS THE
COORDINATING AUTHORITY FOR AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH
KOREA AND COMMUNIST CHINA AND HAS DIRECTED CINCPACAF
TO ESTABLISH A JOINT AIR OPERATIONS CENTER FOR THE
KOREAN AREA (JAOCK). CINCPACAF HAS SUBSEQUENTLY TASKED
SAF WITH PROVIDING THE JAOCK. HOWEVER, THE JCS, IN
APPROVING CHANG 4 TO CINCPAC OPLAN 5027, CHANGED
CINCPAC'S WORDS REGARDING THE JAOCK TO BE CONSISTENT WITH
THE UNAAF DESCRIPTION OF COORDINATING AUTHORITY.
ACCORDINGLY, THE JAOCK IS ONLY A COORDINATING AGENCY
WITH NO COMMAND OR CONTROL AUTHORITY. ANNEX C TO REF
C FURTHER STATES THAT CINCPACAF AND CINCPACFLT WILL
RETAIN OPCON OF ALL FORCES NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED
TO ANOTHER COMMANDER. ACCORDINGLY, IF MARINE AIR UNITS

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA0719 T O P S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
IN WESTPAC (NOT ASSIGNED TO COMUSKOREA) WERE TASKED
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH KOREA AND
CHINA, THEY WOULD REMAIN UNDER OPCON OF COMSEVENTHFLT.
4. (TS) AS INDICATED BY THE FOREGOING, THE MAINRE
CORPS POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE CONTROL OF AIR IS
CLEARLY STATED IN CINCPAC OPLAN 5027. THIS IS
THE RESULT OF A BITTER, BUT SUCCESSFUL
STRUGGLE CONDUCTED BY THE NAVY AND MARINE STAFFS,
BOTH HERE AND IN WASHINGTON. ACCORDINGLY, YOUR
REPS TO ANY SUBSEQUENT NEACC MEETINGS SHOULD INSIST
THAT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND CONTROL OF AIR FOR
OPERATIONS IN KOREA AND CONSONANT WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF ANNEX C TO REF C.

5. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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ADMIN FMFPAC

P 090115Z JUL 71

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P 152131Z JUL 71

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW

BT

SECRET PERSONAL FOR MGEN OWENS FROM LTGEN JONES.

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //N03500//

READINESS POSTURE (U)

A. ADMIN FMFPAC 240423Z APR71 (S)

B. CG FIRST MAW 290157Z APR71 (S)

C. CG FIRST MAW 090929Z JUL71 (C)

1. (S) REF A VOICED CONCERN REGARDING TRNG READINESS OF MACS-8 (NOW REDESIGNATED MACS-4) AND REQUESTED INFO RELATIVE TO ACTIONS UNDERWAY OR ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO ELIMINATE THE DEFICIENCY. REF B STATED MACS-8 TRNG READINESS WAS DEPENDENT ON SUPPORT FROM F-4 COMMUNITY AND SUCH SUPPORT SHOULD BE AVAILABLE IN FIRST QTR FY-72. REF C PROVIDED REPORT OF RECENT EFFORTS TO RELOCATE MACS-4 AND THEREBY ENHANCE TRNG OPPORTUNITIES.

2. (S) WHILE THE PROBLEMS OUTLINED IN REF B AND RELOCATION EFFORTS SET FORTH IN REF C ARE ACKNOWLEDGED, THE FACT REMAINS

CG FMFPAC

P 182131Z JUL 71

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1550 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR .
THAT THE TRNG READINESS OF MACS-4 HAS NOT IMPROVED. I
NOTE THAT THE F4 COMMUNITY WITHIN FMAW HAS SHOWN CONSIDERABLE
READINESS IMPROVEMENT IN THE LAST NINETY DAYS AND IT IS
DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY A SIMILAR IMPROVEMENT HAS NOT BEEN
ATTAINED BY MACS-4. IT IS NOTED THAT AS OF 1 JULY 71, THE
PROJECTED CHANGE DATE OF 30 JUNE 71 WAS CHANGED TO SHOWN AN
IMPROVEMENT DATE OF 23 SEP 71. IN MANY CASES DEGRADED UNIT
READINESS MUST BE ACCEPTED BECAUSE PERSONNEL OR LOGISTIC
ASSETS ARE SIMPLY NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, IF THOSE ASSETS
ARE AVAILABLE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE MACS-4 AND THE F-4
COMMUNITY, A CONTINUED DEGRADED TRNG READINESS CANNOT BE
ACCEPTED.

3. (S) YOUR COMMENTS AND STATEMENT OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO
ELIMINATE THE MACS-4 TRNG READINESS DEFICIENCY ARE REQUESTED
NLT 23 JUL 71. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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FM CG FMFPAC.
TO RUAOAJA/CG THIRD MARDIV
INFO RUAOAJE/CG III MAF
RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW
RUAOAJA/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER
RUAOANA/THIRD FORSERVREGT
RUAOBMA/MCAS (H) FUTEMA
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TOD: 222246Z JUL 71

SECRET //NO0000// PERSONAL FOR MGEN METZGER, INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON, MGEN OWENS, BGEN BARROW, COL ROEDER, AND COL LAMAR FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

CHEMICAL WEAPONRY

- A. CG FMFPAC LTR 8/RLS SERIAL 00508 OF 25JUN71 (S) (NOTAL)
- B. CG THIRD MARDIV 080146Z/JUL71 (S) (SPECAT) (NOTAL)
- C. DRAFT TECHNICAL MANUAL DTM 3-1365-203-10 OF JUL69 (NOTAL)
- D. CMC 212359Z/MAY71 (U) (NOTAL)

1. (S) THE USE OF CS AGENT HAS BEEN THE SUBJ OF INTEREST AND DISCUSSION WITH MY STAFF. RECENTLY, I FORWARDED A STUDY, REF A, TO CMC CONCERNING THE USE OF CS IN SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPNS.

CG FMFPAC

P 222139Z JUL 71

ACTN:S/SEC 1-2

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1862 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 ONE RECOMMENDATION OF THE STUDY WAS THE NEED FOR CMC GUIDANCE/
 POLICY ON THE USE OF CS AGENTS. I WAS, THEREFORE, INTERESTED
 IN YOUR COMMENT IN REF B WHICH TOUCHED ON THE SAME POINT.
 2. (S) DURING MY RECENT WASHINGTON VISIT I WAS PROVIDED A
 POINT PAPER ON THE XM32 WHICH STATES THAT EDGEWOOD ARSENAL DOES
 NOT PLAN TO PRODUCE THE XM32 AT THIS TIME. THIS DECISION WAS
 BASED UPON AN EVALUATION CONDUCTED BY CONARC IN WHICH THE XM32
 DID NOT PROVIDE THE DESIRED RESULTS. EDGEWOOD ARSENAL IS WILL-
 ING TO MAKE LIMITED QUANTITIES FOR THE MARINE CORPS AT A UNIT
 COST OF \$15.00 WITH DELIVERY TWO MONTHS FROM ORDER DATE. IN
 ADDITION THE ARMY IS EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN THE EVALUATION OF
 THE 48 DISPERSERS RECEIVED BY YOU.
 3. (S) I WAS ASSURED THAT MONEY COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR
 AN ADDITIONAL QUANTITY OF DESPERSERS. ACCORDINGLY, ON 13 JULY
 I ORDERED 36 XM32'S THRU THE G-4 HQMC, TO BE DISTRIBUTED AS
 FOLLOWS: 12 TO 1STMAW, 12 TO CAMP BUTLER, 6 TO 3DFSR, AND 6
 TO FUTEMA. MY STAFF HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH YOUR ORDNANCE
 SECTION AND ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO REPRODUCE AND DIST-
 RIBUTE THE REF C OPERATORS MANUAL TO THE UNITS LISTED ABOVE.
 UPON RECEIPT OF THE ADDITIONAL DESPERSERS MENTIONED HEREIN,

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1862 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 THE 6 EACH UNITS LOANED TO 1STMAW AND MCAS FUTEMA SHOULD BE
 RETURNED TO YOU, IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN USED.
 4. (S) SHOULD YOU CONCLUDE UPON COMPLETION OF THE EVALUATION
 THAT THE XM32 DISPERSERS ARE EFFECTIVE, I WILL RECOMMEND THAT
 AN ALLOWANCE BE ESTABLISHED FOR FMFPAC AND THAT DISTRIBUTION BE
 EFFECTED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. HOPEFULLY, THE EVALUATION
 WILL BE COMPLETED WELL BEFORE THE 180 DAYS ESTABLISHED BY REF
 D, SO THAT EARLY ACTION CAN BE INITIATED BY CMC TO OBTAIN AN
 ACCEPTABLE CS DESPERSER. WARM REGARDS,
 GP-4.

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CG FMFPAC

P 222139Z JUL 71

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PAGE TWO RUADKUA6921 S E C R E T

B. THE PLAN TO DEPLOY AN F-4 SQDN TO NAHA FOR SYLLABUS AND INTERCEPT TRNG WAS CANCELLED WHEN IT BECAME NECESSARY TO DEPLOY VMA 211 BECAUSE OF THAT SQDN'S OVER RIDING COMMITMENT TO THE SIOP. BASE LOADING RESTRICTIONS AT NAHA HAS NEGATED MORE THAN ONE MARINE SQDN DEPLOYED THERE AT ONE TIME.

C. THE NECESSITY TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED INTERCEPT TRNG IS BEING ADDRESSED AND A REQUEST TO RE-EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING TWO SQUADRONS AT NAHA IS UNDERWAY. IN ADDITION TO BASE LOADING, PART OF THE RATIONALE FOR ONE SQUADRON AT NAHA CONCERNS THE USE OF KADENA. THE AIR FORCE HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN CURTAILING MARINE OPERATIONS THERE. THE NAVY HAS INDICATED THAT MORE THAN ONE SQUADRON AT NAHA COULD WEAKEN THE CASE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SPACE AT KADENA. HOWEVER, IN MY VIEW, IT IS STRENGTHENED. WHEN NAHA IS REVERTED ON 1 JUL 72 MARINE UNITS WILL HAVE TO BE RELOCATED. THIS PROBLEM TAKES ON ADDED SIGNIFICANCE WITH TWO SQNS VICE ONE TO RELOCATE AND A GOOD CASE CAN BE MADE FOR KADENA.

D. BECAUSE THE FUTURE AVAILABILITY OF NAHA IS IN DOUBT, AN ALTERNATE MEANS OF ACQUIRING REQUISITE TRNG IS BEING CONSIDERED. THIS ALTERNATIVE IS TO DEPLY THE MACS TO A SITE WITHIN THE IWAKUNI LOCAL FLYING AREA FOR 30-60 DAYS OF CONCENTRATED TRNG. THE FEASIBILITY OF SEMI ANNUAL OR ANNUAL MACS DEPLOYMENTS IS CURRENTLY UNDER STUDY. A POSSIBLE SITE LOCATED WITHIN THE HAKATA/GONNOSU AREA OF JAPAN CONTROLLED BY COMUSFORJAP IS BEING CONSIDERED. AN INITIAL SURVEY OF THIS SITE WAS CONDUCTED 7-9 JULY BY REPS FROM THIS COMMAND. AN RFI STUDY IS CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE IF THE MACS RADAR/RADIO EQUIP WOULD INTERFERE WITH A PERMANENT U.S. MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY IN THE AREA. DEPLOYING THE MACS TO JAPAN AND COMMITTING AVAIL F-4 ASSETS TO MACS TRNG COULD PROVIDE THE SQDN WITH THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF INTERCEPTS TO ATTAIN A SATISFACTORY READINESS POSTURE.

E. OTHER ACTIONS PLANNED/UNDERWAY TO PROVIDE INTERCEPT TRNG:
 (1) A PROGRAM IS IN THE PLANNING STAGE FOR ATTACHING CONTROLLERS TO DEPLOYING F-4 SQDNS ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS TO WORK WITH AIR FORCE TACTICAL CONTROL GROUPS.
 (2) TWO TRIAL PERIODS OF ASSIGNING CONTROLLERS TO TASK GROUP 70.8 FOR SHIPBOARD CIC EXPERIENCE AND INTERCEPT TRAINING WERE COMPLETED ON 15 JULY. EXCELLENT RESULTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED AND THIS PROGRAM IS CONTINUING.

F. A REVIEW OF THE T & R MANUAL FOR THE NUMBER OF INTERCEPTS REQUIRED FOR QUALIFICATION AND PROFICIENCY IS UNDER CONSIDERATION
 PAGE FOUR RUADKUA6921 S E C R E T

AND IS A POSSIBLE AGENDA ITEM FOR THE NEXT REVIEW CONFERENCE.
 G. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING F-4 A/C FOR MACS CONTROLLER TRNG, THE ACQUISITION OF A 15A19 MTDS TRAINER, POSITIONED AT FUTEMA, WOULD ENHANCE THE TRNG READINESS OF THE SQDN. ALTHOUGH THIS DEVICE WOULD NOT ELIMINATE THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONTROL OF ACTUAL A/C, IT WOULD SUPPLEMENT AND COMPLIMENT ACTUAL GCI TRNG. THE CAPABILITY AND VERSATILITY OF THIS TRAINER WOULD PROVIDE THE ESSENTIAL TRNG IN AN ECM ENVIRONMENT. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THE SQDN WITH A VEHICLE FOR MAINTAINING CONTROLLER AND CREW PROFICIENCY WHEN AIRCRAFT CANNOT BE MADE AVAILABLE. (REF (C) APPLIES) MGEN OWENS.

GP-4

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CG 1ST MAW

P 231209Z JUL 71

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SECRET//NO3500//PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN OWENS.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
READINESS POSTURE (U)

- A. CG FMFPAC 182131Z JUL 71 (S)
- B. CG 1ST MAW 290157Z APR 71 (S)
- C. CG 1ST MAW 010419Z MAY 71 (C)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO
REFERENCE (A), RELATIVE TO ACTIONS TAKEN AND PLANNED FOR
INCREASING THE TRAINING READINESS OF MACS-4:

A. REFERENCE (B), OUTLINED PLANS FOR PROVIDING F-4 SQDN/DETS
TO OKINAWA FOR MACS-4 TRNG. DURING THE PERIOD 29 APR - 7 MAY 71
A FOUR PLANE F-4 DET DEPLOYED TO NAS NAHA FOR PURPOSE OF PROVIDING
TRNG FOR MACS-8 (4). A TOTAL OF 101 INTERCEPTS WERE CONTROLLED BY
MACS-8 (4) RESULTING IN A TRNG READINESS INCREASE FROM C-4 TO C-3.
DURING JUNE 71 MACS-4 CONTROLLED A TOTAL OF 45 GCI'S WITH VMFA 115
AND VMFA 232 DURING TWO AIM-7 MISSEXS CONDUCTED IN OKI AREA.

CG 1ST MAW

P 231209Z JUL 71

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F/ENGR 1

R 252246Z JUL 71
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER
 RUAOANA/THIRD FORSERVREGT
 BT

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UNCLAS //N011000//
 PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES, INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON, BRIG GEN BARROW AND
 COL ROEDER FROM MAJGEN METZGER
OCCUPATION OF CAMP HAUGE

1. YOU HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE OVER CROWDED CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE
 PERSONNEL OF THIRD MARDIV HAVE EXISTED DURING THE PAST YEAR. WITH THE
 DEACTIVATION OF THE CAMP BUTLER TRANSIENT FACILITY, CAMP HAUGE HAS
 BECOME AVAILABLE FOR PRIMARY USE BY THE 3D MARDIV. TO BEST EVALUATE
 THE LONG RANGE USE OF CAMP HAUGE A JOINT ADHOC COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF
 REPS FROM MCB, CAMP BUTLER, 3D MARDIV AND 3D FORSERVREGT WAS FORMED.
 THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED TWO COURSES OF ACTION. THE
 PLAN WHICH BOB BARROW AND I HAVE DECIDED ON MOVES THE ENTIRE 12TH
 MAR REG TO CAMP HAUGE WITH THE AMMO CO OF THIRD FORSERVREGT REMAINING
 IN A PORTION OF THE CAMP. THE 3D SPBN (-) AND THE DIVISION RECEPTION
 CENTER WILL MOVE TO CAMP HANSEN, AS WILL 7TH COMM BN FROM CAMP SCHWAB.

CG THIRD MARDIV

R 252246Z JUL 71

ACTN: S/SEC
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PAGE TWO RUAOAJA2389 UNCLAS

SEVERAL SMALLER UNITS AND SECTIONS WILL ALSO BE MOVED AS A RESULT OF THE MAJOR UNIT RELOCATIONS.

2. THIS MOVE OF UNITS WILL ENABLE BOTH CAMPS SCHWAB AND HANSEN TO IMPROVE THEIR SQ FT ALLOCATION PER MAN FROM 50 TO 57 BASED ON CURRENT M/L STRENGTH. AN ADDITIONAL, BENEFICIAL FEATURE OF THIS PLAN ALSO MAKES THE BEST USE OF CAMP HAUGE, IN THAT ONE LARGE UNIT WILL PROVIDE UNIT INTEGRITY TO THE CAMP AND ALSO HAS THE BUILT IN STAFF CAPABILITY TO HANDLE THE RELATED CAMP FUNCTIONS MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN SEVERAL SMALL UNITS. IT WILL ALSO REDUCE OUR FAP LOAD.

3. THE DETAILS OF THE MOVE HAVE BEEN PLANNED AND THE TIME TABLE, ALTHOUGH DEPENDENT ON SOLVING SOME MAINTENANCE AND FUNDING PROBLEMS, IS TENTATIVELY ESTABLISHED AS FOLLOWS: 3/12 TO HAUGE BY 10 AUGUST; 3RD SHORE PARTY BN (-) TO HANSEN BY 30 AUG; 4/12 TO HAUGE BY 10 SEPT; DIVISION RECEPTION CENTER TO HANSEN 1-10 SEPT; 7TH COMM BN TO HANSEN BY 1 OCT; 12TH MARINES HQ (-) BY 30 OCT. REMAINDER OF 12TH MARINES HQ BY 15 NOV AND 2/12 TO HAUGE BY 1 DEC 1971. AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MOVE INVOLVES RELOCATIONS OF TWO 3D FORSERVREGT UNITS (VEHSTOR AND MT PLTS) FROM HAUGE TO CAMP FOSTER.

MT PLT MOVES WILL COMMENCE APPROX 1 AUGUST; HOWEVER, THE BULK OF THESE TWO UNITS CANNOT MOVE UNTIL MAINT FACILITIES ARE CONSTRUCTED CAMP FOSTER.

4. OTHER ESSENTIAL ITEMS INCIDENT TO THE MOVE ARE A LARGE CONSTRUCTION EFFORT TO DEVELOP AN ARMORY WHICH WILL MEET PRESENT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AS WELL AS MODIFICATION TO A NUMBER OF BUILDINGS TO BILLET

PAGE THREE RUAOAJA2389 UNCLAS

ADEQUATELY SNCO'S AND OFFICERS. CONSTRUCTION EFFORT IS ALSO NEEDED TO CONFIGURE SOME BUILDINGS INTO ADMIN SPACES ALONG WITH CONSTRUCTION OF SECURE AREAS FOR S&C MATERIAL AND MESSAGE CENTER OPERATIONS. REQUIRED MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION EFFORTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. NO UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS EXIST IN MAINTENANCE AREA, ALTHOUGH SOME ADDITIONAL FUNDING MAY BE REQUIRED, AND SOME REQUIRED MAINTENANCE MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING OR AFTER THE MOVE DATES INDICATED ABOVE. SOME PROBLEM

AREAS WITH CONSTRUCTION REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

5. OBVIOUSLY, MUCH OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS CAMP BUTLER BUSINESS AND HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY BOB BARROW. WITH RESPECT TO THE MOVES EFFECTING 3D FORSERVREGT RAY ROEDER CONCURS. WARMEST REGARDS.

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CG THIRD MARDIV

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TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
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CONFIDENTIAL//N04700//PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM
MGEN OWENS DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
ASA READINESS (U)

A. ADMIN FMFPAC 100335Z JUL 71 (C)

B. CG FMAW 280309Z MAY 71 (C)

C. POINT PAPER ON READINESS REPORTING CRITERIA

1. (C) I AM USING A PERSONAL MESSAGE IN ORDER TO MORE FULLY
EXPLAIN MY POSITION ON THE SUBJECT.

2. (C) REF A. REQUESTED THAT YOUR HEADQUARTERS BE ADVISED OF ANY
EXISTING PROBLEMS WHICH PRECLUDE THE ATTAINMENT OF MILESTONES
ADDRESSED IN PARA 9 OF REF B. REF B. WAS RELEASED PRIOR TO THE
TIME I HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO FULLY ACQUAINT MYSELF WITH A6
PROBLEMS. (YOU WILL RECALL I WAS JUST GETTING STARTED IN THE
A6 BUSINESS IN 3D MAW). REF C. WAS PROVIDED YOU ON YOUR MAY
VISIT. AND WHILE I AM NOT NOW IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH IT,
REF C. IS AN EXCELLENT BACKGROUND DOCUMENT.

CG 1ST MAW

P 260613Z JUL 71

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PAGE TWO RUADKUA7025 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. (C) FIRST I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE ATTAINMENT OF THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF A10 AIRCRAFT IS A PRIMARY GOAL OF FMAW AND ALL FEASIBLE EFFORT IS BEING AND WILL BE EXPENDED TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL. IN EARLY JUNE I DESIGNATED VMFA-533 AS THE TOP PRIORITY SQUADRON TO RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF MY HEADQUARTERS.

4. (C) I CONSIDER PRESENT SUPPLY SUPPORT ADEQUATE. AT MY LAST BRIEFING ON THE SQUADRON A FEW DAYS AGO WE HAD ONLY 17 NORS REQUISITIONS OUTSTANDING AGAINST A6 AIRCRAFT. THE AVERAGE TIME TO FILL NORS REQUISITIONS IS RUNNING FROM SIX TO TEN DAYS.

5. (C) WE HAVE BEEN AVERAGING 2.2 AIRCRAFT IN AN A10 STATUS AS INDICATED IN REF A., BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE CANNOT CARRY OUT OUR MISSIONS AND QUITE EFFECTIVELY, CONSIDERING THE NUMBER OF SYSTEMS AND BUILT-IN REDUNDANCY. MAINTAINING SIX AIRCRAFT READY-TO-GO AT ALL TIMES AND CREWS PROFICIENT TO MEET THEIR TOP PRIORITY MISSION KEEPS 533 HUMMING. THIS MISSION, IN ESSENCE, DENIES ME THE OPTION OF DIRECTING THAT ONLY FULL SYSTEMS AIRCRAFT BE FLOWN OR TO MOVE SYSTEMS FROM ONE AIRCRAFT TO ANOTHER IN ORDER TO REFLECT A SOMEWHAT BETTER FULL SYSTEMS REPORT. OF COURSE, THE LATTER IS DONE WHEN REQUIRED.

6. (C) BASICALLY THE PROBLEM CENTERS AROUND TWO COMPONENTS, THE

PAGE THREE RUADKUA7025 C O N F I D E N T I A L

BALLISTICS COMPUTER (ASQ-61) AND THE TRACK RADAR (APQ-112). MY TECHNICAL EXPERTS TELL ME THAT THE COMPUTER CAN BE MADE TO WORK RELIABLY IF WE, CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR FULL SYSTEMS AUTOMATED PERFORMANCE; MAINTAIN A STABLE AIRCRAFT INVENTORY; AND DEVELOP THE NECESSARY EXPERTISE AMONG OUR TECHNICIANS. THIS EXPERTISE WILL ONLY BE ACQUIRED IF WE CONTINUE TO PUSH FULL SYSTEMS, THROUGHOUT THE MARINE CORPS. OPERATORS POINT OUT THAT A GOOD R.O. CAN MANUALLY CRANK IN DATA FROM OTHER SYSTEMS AND ACHIEVE COMPARABLY EFFECTIVE RESULTS. THE PICTURE ON THE TRACK RADAR IS NOT NEARLY SO BRIGHT. HISTORICALLY SINCE THE AGA HAS BEEN IN THE NAVAL INVENTORY, THE TRACK RADAR HAS NOT EXCEEDED A 30 PER CENT UP RATE. NAVY HAS APPARENTLY VACILLATED ON USING IT OR TAKING IT OUT. UNDERSTAND THE FOLLOW-ON AGE WILL NOT HAVE TRACK RADAR INSTALLED.

7. (C) BASED ON THE ABOVE, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT ESTABLISHING MILESTONES FOR SIX FULL SYSTEMS AIRCRAFT IS NOT REALISTIC. HOWEVER, I DO NOT RECOMMEND THAT WE CHANGE OUR GOAL FOR ALL FULL SYSTEMS. THE READINESS REPORTING CRITERIA FOR MARES-FORSTAT GIVES YOU A TRUE PICTURE OF THIS UNIT'S COMBAT READINESS POSTURE.

8. (C) I WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE VMFA-533 MY CLOSE PERSONAL ATTENTION. WARM REGARDS.

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CG 1ST MAW

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UNCLAS //N01500//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM BGEN BROWN-DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
ONLY CARRIER QUALIFICATIONS (CQ)

1. WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY AND THE NEED TO GET MARINE AVIATORS BACK INTO THE CARRIER PROGRAM AND REINSTITUTE CARRIER OPERATIONS AS A NORMAL PART OF OUR SQUADRON OPERATIONS. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF OUR TWO STAFFS AND WITH THE COOPERATION OF COMNAVIAIRPAC WE WILL BE ABLE TO TEST OUR SEA LEGS ABOARD CARRIERS AGAIN IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF FY-72. THOSE READY PILOTS OF VMA-214 AND VMFA-531 (ABOUT 25 TOTAL) WILL BE ABLE TO RECEIVE DAY QUALIFICATION BASED ON THE PRESENTLY PLANNED CV PERIODS AND NUMBER OF CARRIER LANDINGS AVAILABLE.
2. THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE BETWEEN CNAP PERSONNEL (INCLUDING YOUR CNAP REPRESENTATIVE, JOHN DOERING) AND MY STAFF TOOK PLACE THIS WEEK AND THE PROGRAM SHOULD PROCEED SATISFACTORILY BARRING SOME UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCE ARISING. THE SQUADRONS WILL START FIELD PRACTICE IN THE IMMEDIATE

THIRD MAW

P 292048Z JUL 71

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PAGE TWO RUWJGFB2784 UNCLAS

FUTURE AS TRAINING AND CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT. WE WILL HAVE A CONCENTRATED PERIOD PRIOR TO EACH DECK PERIOD TO 'PEAK' THEIR TECHNIQUES.

3. THE WORD HAS ALREADY GOTTEN TO THE TACTICAL SQUADRONS AND THE ENTHUSIASM IS EVIDENT. CARRIER QUAL FOR PILOTS IS SORT OF THE FINISHING TOUCH AND CERTIFICATION OF ONES AERONAUTICAL ABILITY.

4. AS A RELATED ITEM, THIS WEEK WE ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN DAY AND NIGHT QUALIFICATION/REQUALIFICATIONS FOR OUR HELICOPTER PILOTS. SO FAR (THROUGH TUESDAY) WE HAVE COMPLETED 62 DAY AND 21 NIGHT QUALIFICATIONS. BY THE END OF THE WEEK WE SHOULD HAVE AN EXCELLENT START IN MAG-16 FOR CARRIER QUALIFICATIONS OF OUR HELO PILOTS AND PREPARATION FOR LPH

OPERATIONS IN THIS FALL'S MABLEX. THE TOTAL EFFECT OF BOTH FIXED WING AND CARRIER QUALS REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT AND IMPORTANT IMPROVEMENT IN READINESS.

5. I WILL KEEP YOU APPRISED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND I'M LOOKING FORWARD TO WELCOMING YOU BACK TO EL TORO AROUND THE MIDDLE OF AUGUST. WARM REGARDS.

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CG THIRD MAW

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S C R E T //N03435//
PERSONAL FOR ADM CLAREY, INFO LGEN JONES, RADM DARE.
FROM VADM PEET

AIRBORNE MINECOUNTERMEASURES

- A. COMNAVAIRPAC 262107Z JUL 71
- B. COMINELANT 312130Z MAR 71 (NOTAL)
- C. CG I MAF 230012Z JUL 71

1. (S) BY REF A COMNAVAIRPAC HAS ASKED IF A REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR USMC ASSETS IN THE AIRBORNE MINECOUNTERMEASURES MISSION. THIS QUERY SURFACES ONLY A PORTION OF THE MUCH LARGER PROBLEM WHICH IS OUR DIMINISHING CAPABILITY TO COUNTER THE ANTICIPATED MINE THREAT WITHIN PACFLT. BECAUSE OF MY CONCERN OVER THE LOSS OF OCEAN MINESWEEPERS WITHOUT EFFECTIVE REPLACEMENT I HAVE HAD MY STAFF STUDY THE MCM PROBLEM FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS WITH A VIEW TOWARDS

COMFIRSTFLT

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PAGE TWO RUWJMU5476 S E C R E T

FINDING SUITABLE ALTERNATIVES. MY PURPOSE HERE IS TO SUMMARIZE THESE EFFORTS FOR YOUR POSSIBLE USE IN ADDRESSING MCM MATTERS.

2. (S) THE AIRBORNE MCM PROGRAM CURRENTLY UNDER DEVELOPMENT ON THE EAST COAST HAS BEEN ADVERTIZED AS AN EFFECTIVE REPLACEMENT FOR THE MSO. CNO HAS REQUESTED FY-71 PROCUREMENT OF CH-53D MODEL HELICOPTERS FOR THE MISSION AND HAS TERMINATED CURRENT MSO REHABILITATIONS. FUTURE MSO REHABILITATIONS HAS NOT BEEN REQUESTED. IT IS APPARENT THAT THE NAVY MCM PROGRAM IS NOW DEPENDENT ON THE AIRBORNE MCM SYSTEM. REF B CONTAINS AN INITIAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS PROPOSAL.

3. (S) IN ORDER TO DEVELOP AN INITIAL CAPABILITY HM-12 WAS COMMISSIONED AT NORFOLK ON 1 APR 71 WITH 15 CH-53A MODELS ON LOAN FROM THE MARINES. THE ALFA MODEL IS UNDER POWERED FOR THE MCM MISSION AND MUST BE CONVERTED INTO THE DELTA MODEL. THIS REWORK IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY AT THE SIKORSKY PLANT ON THE 15 CH-53A MODELS PROCURED FROM THE MARINES. COMINELWARFOR HAS BEEN PUSHING A DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAM WHICH AIMED AT GETTING A 4 HELO DETACHMENT TO THE MED THIS MONTH. THAT HAS SLIPPED TO THE SEP/OCT TIME FRAME FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. THE FIRST TEST CONDUCTED IN MAR 71 FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE MAGNETIC/ACOUSTIC SWEEP CAPABILITY. PILOT AND CREW TRAINING HAS LAGGED DUE TO THE REWORK REQUIRED TO CONVERT THE A MODELS AT THE FACTORY

PAGE THREE RUWJMU5476 S E C R E T

AND THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH PROTOTYPE EQUIPMENTS. COMSIXTHFLT IS LUKE WARM TOWARD A DEPLOYMENT OF THESE UNITS TO THE MED UNTIL SATISFACTORY FLEET EVALUATIONS ARE COMPLETED.

4. (S) FOR THE REASONS CITED ABOVE LANTFLT WAS NOT ABLE TO SUPPORT MY REQUEST FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF AIRBORNE MCM UNITS IN ROPEVAL 3-71. I THEN TURNED TO THE MARINES WHO HAVE AN EMERGENCY CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT WHICH CNO HAS DEFINED AS LIMITED TO OCCASIONS WHEN THE MINE THREAT EXCEEDS LIMITS OF MEDIUM THREAT AS PROSECUTED IN MCM 72 STUDY. INFORMAL LIAISON WITH HQMC STAFF INDICATES THAT CMC HAS NOT BEEN FORMALLY TASKED TO MAINTAIN AN AIRBORNE MCM CAPABILITY AND THAT NO CHARTER EXISTS BETWEEN CNO AND CMC COVERING THE SUBJECT. FURTHER, THAT A CHARTER HAS BEEN VERBALLY REQUESTED OF OP-32 WHICH WOULD DEFINE THE USMC MISSION, ROLE AND TASKS.

5. (S) FOR THE PRACTICAL REASONS STATED IN REF C EASTPAC MARINE AVIATION CANNOT PRESENTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE MCM MISSION. THE MISSION CAPABLE CH-53D MODELS ARE IN WESTPAC AND THE ALFA MODELS ON THIS COAST WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER EXTENSIVE MODIFICATIONS TO PERFORM AS DELTA MODELS IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT COMINELWARFOR HAS, READY FOR ISSUE TO THE MARINES, A STOCKPILE OF MK 103 (MECHANICAL) AND MK 104 (ACOUSTIC) KITS IN CHARLESTON.

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PAGE FOUR RUWJMUA5476 S E C R E T

6. (S) DESPITE A GREAT DEAL OF INITIAL OPTIMISM THE AIRBORNE MCM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IS BEHIND SCHEDULE PROBABLY FOR VALID REASONS. ADMIRALS COX AND DARE HAVE VISITED WITH ME IN SAN DIEGO AND ASSURE ME THAT A VIGOROUS PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE. PROVIDING THE FLEET EVALUATIONS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY AND THE MED EMPLOYMENT ARE SUCCESSFUL TENTATIVE PLANS ARE TO EMPLOY AN HM-12 DET IN THE PACIFIC IN 3RD QUARTER FY 72. THIS WOULD FIT IN NICELY WITH ROPEVAL 1-72 SCHEDULED IN FEB 72.

7. (S) USMC MISSION REQUIREMENTS ARE VAGUE AND WILL REQUIRE FURTHER COORDINATION BETWEEN CMC AND CNO. MY STAFF LIAISON WITH THE HOMC DIVISION OF AVIATION INDICATES THAT THE MARINES DESIRE TO RETAIN THIS MISSION ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS BUT WILL NOT INCORPORATE MCM TRAINING IN THEIR SCHEDULES UNTIL THE MARINE MISSION, ROLE AND TASKS ARE CLARIFIED AND FORMALIZED.

(S) THE MSO INVENTORY WILL DWINDLE TO FIVE UNITS IN PACFLT BY THE END OF FY-73. AS I PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED THE AIRBORNE MCM PROGRAM IS THE ONE ALTERNATIVE PRESENTLY AVAILABLE. I RECOMMEND THAT WE IN PACFLT CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR HM-12 SUPPORT IN OUR FLEET TRAINING EXERCISES AND SEEK MARINE SUPPORT WHEN THEIR ROLE IS ESTABLISHED. UNTIL THE MARINE PICTURE IS CLEAR I FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT SCHEDULED PAR REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONVERSION OF CH-53A MODELS BE HELD IN ABEYANCE.

VERY RESPECTFULLY, RAY PEET.

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FM ADMIN FMFPAC
TO RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW
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PERSONAL FOR MGEN OWENS FROM MAJGEN ADAMS
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY

AGA READINESS (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 260613Z/JUL 71 (C) (PERSONAL)

B. CMC 062043Z/NOV 70 (U)

1. (U) I APPRECIATE THE COMMENTS AND PERSONAL ATTENTION PRESENTED IN REF A AND ASSURE YOU THAT WE SHARE A COMMON GOAL OF ATTAINING THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE STATE OF READINESS. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL, MY HEADQUARTERS IS PREPARED TO ASSIST YOU WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

2. (C) ALSO I CAN APPRECIATE THAT THE REDUNDANCY EXHIBITED IN THE A6 AIRCRAFT DOES ALLOW FOR CERTAIN QUALIFIED AIRCREWS TO PERFORM A SPECIFIC MISSION WITH AN ACCOMPANYING LOSS OF ACCURACY. HOWEVER MOST OF OUR PROBLEMS TODAY STEM FROM PRIORITY MISSIONS AND DEGRADATION OF LESSER USED SUB SYSTEMS TO THE POINT THAT

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0529 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR
A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED TRYING TO MEET
ALL CONTINGENCIES WITH A SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYS.

3. (C) THE PARALLEL CONCEPT UTILIZED IN THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM
PRESENTLY IN USE IN THE "MULTI-MODE" OPERATION OF AGA AIRCRAFT
DOES TEMPT A COMMANDER, UNDER THE GUISE OF OPERATIONAL READI-
NESS OF A SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED PRIMARY MISSION, TO DELETE
THIS SO CALLED REDUNDANCY. SPECIFICALLY, THE TRACK RADAR PRO-
VIDES AZIMUTH ELEVATION, AND RANGE SIGNALS TO THE COMPUTER TO
SOLVE WEAPONS RELEASE PARAMETERS. A SECONDARY, BUT MOST IM-
PORTANT, FUNCTION IS TO PROVIDE SIMULTANEOUS/BACK-UP VERTICAL
AND HORIZONTAL TERRAIN CLEARANCE INFO IN CONCERT WITH SRTC.
THIS IS ESPECIALLY USEFUL IN SIOP MISSION OPERATION AND OF
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE FOR SUCCESSFUL DELIVERY OF ALL WEATHER CLOSE
AIR SUPPORT WEAPONS. THE BALLISTIC COMPUTER YIELDS THE
IMPROVED DEGREE OF ACCURACY NEEDED TO PERFORM ALL ASSIGNED
MISSIONS.

4. (C) FULL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS CAN BE PAINFUL, BUT IN THE
BUILDUP PHASE, NON-RADAR TRAINING SORTIES ARE NECESSARY AND
RECOGNIZED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS IF, AND ONLY IF, SUCH FLIGHTS DO
NOT DEGRADE THE MAINTENANCE EFFORT TO IMPROVE SYSTEM RELIABILITY.

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0529 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR
5. (U) AS REQUESTED BY THE FIRST WING AMO, TWO 373 SERIES RE-
PLACEMENT AIRCRAFT COMPLETING PAR WILL BE ASSIGNED ON ATO'S TO
MAINTAIN THE SQUADRON AT FULL AIRCRAFT STRENGTH DURING THE
FORTHCOMING SCHEDULED PAR PERIODS FOR ASSIGNED SQUADRON AIR-
CRAFT.

6. (U) RECORDS HELD BY THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR THE MONTH OF MAY
AND JUNE REVEALED A TOTAL OF 152 AGA NORS/NFE GENERATIONS.
REPORTS 1 JUL INDICATE 25 OUTSTANDING REQUISITIONS. THIS FIGURE
EQUATES TO A 83 PERCENT COMPLETION RATE. THIS SUPPLY RESPONSE SHOULD
HAVE ENHANCED AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY, HOWEVER, CURRENT REPORTS
INDICATE LITTLE IF ANY IMPROVEMENT.

7. (C) THE POLICY STATED REF B AND ENDORSED BY THIS HEAD-
QUARTERS IS FULL SYSTEM AIRCRAFT. THE STATED GOALS AND MILE-
STONES FOR AS FULL SYSTEM ACFT OBVIOUSLY HAVE SLIPPED DUE TO
PROBLEMS STATED IN REF A, SUPPLY NORS/NFE DEFICIENCIES,
AND THE VMA(AW) 533 COMMANDING OFFICER'S COMMENTS IN THE JUNE
3M SUMMARY. FURTHER DOCUMENTATION IN THE FMFPAC READINESS 3M
SUMMARY POINTS TOWARD AN ABNORMALLY HIGH NORS RATE FOR MAY AND
JUNE (36.4 - 37.8PERCENT) AND INFORMALLY STILL HIGH IN JULY. IF IT
IS STILL YOUR FEELING THAT, LOCALLY, SUPPLY IS NOT A MAJOR PRO-

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA0529 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BLEM, THEN THE MAINTENANCE/MANAGEMENT TEAM SUPPLIED BY CNAP,
AND DUE TO ARRIVE IWAKUNI 4 SEP SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO THE MAX-
IMUM TO TRAIN SQUADRON SUPERVISORS IN MANAGEMENT AREAS AND
ASSIST IN THE DETERMINATION OF NEW MILESTONES FOR FULL SYSTEM
OPERATIONS OF SQUADRON AIRCRAFT. THE SCHEDULED TEAM DATE FOR
VMA(AW) 533 IS 13-17 SEP. WARM REGARDS.

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PERSONAL FOR BGEN BROWN INFO BGEN DWYER FROM LTGEN JONES
CH-53D ASSIGNMENT {U}.

A. CG THIRD MAW 062315Z/JUL71 {C}

1. {C} REF A REQUESTED THAT THIS HQ EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF ASSIGNING THE CH-53D TO THIRD MAW. FURTHER, REF A REQUESTED, THAT IF THIS COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO MABLEX 1-71, THE FEASIBILITY OF BORROWING SIX CH-53D'S FROM FMFLANT BE EXPLORED.

2. {C} YOUR DESIRE TO INCREASE THIRD MAW COMBAT AND AIR/GROUND TRAINING CAPABILITY IS APPRECIATED. AS YOU KNOW THE CURRENT FMFPAC INVENTORY OF CH-53D'S INCLUDES ONLY TWO SQUADRONS, ONE

IS LOCATED IN WESTPAC AND THE SECOND IN HAWAII. BECAUSE OF A CONTINUING OPERATIONAL COMMITMENT, {I.E., MAU OPERATIONS}, THE REASSIGNMENT OF OUR WESTPAC CH-53D ASSETS

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WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL. REGARDING THE REASSIGNMENT OF THE DELTAS FROM FIRST MARBDE TO THIRD MAW, THE FOLLOWING IS CONSIDERED GERMANE:

A. YOUR CONCERN FOR TRAINING RESTRICTIONS RESULTING FROM THE INABILITY OF THE CH-53A TO LIFT FIRE BASE SUPPORT ITEMS INTO POSITIONS DUE TO ALTITUDE AND TEMPERATURE OF THE OPERATING SITES IS RECOGNIZED; HOWEVER, SIMILAR PROBLEMS WOULD PREVAIL FOR THE FIRST MARBDE IF WE WERE TO REPLACE THEIR CH-53D'S WITH CH-53A'S SINCE A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF THE BRIGADE'S TRAINING IS CONDUCTED AT THE HIGH ALTITUDE SITES ON THE ISLAND OF HAWAII.

B. THE REASSIGNMENT OF A DETACHMENT OF CH-53'S BETWEEN FIRST MARBDE AND THIRD MAW HAS BEEN CONSIDERED; HOWEVER, WE WOULD THEN BE CREATING THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS PLUS TRAINING AND SUPPLY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH A MIX IN BOTH FIRST BRIGADE AND THIRD MAW.

C. THE PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION MONIES/EFFORT NECESSARY FOR THE REASSIGNMENT ARE CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT FACTORS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF OUR CURRENT AUSTERE FUNDING.

D. HQMC'S POSITION REGARDING THE AIRBORNE MINESWEEPING ROLE IS THAT THE MARINE CORPS SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE UNTIL THE MISSION AND TASK REQUIREMENTS ARE RESOLVED. AS YOU KNOW, VADM PEET HAS ASKED FOR THE PARTICIPATION, IN MABLEX 1-71, OF THIRD MAW CH-53'S IN THIS ROLE. THIS WEEK, BASED ON A RECOMMENDATION BY THIS HQ, COMNAVAIRPAC HAS REQUESTED FROM

CG FMFPAC

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NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ THE CANCELLATION OF THE REQUIREMENT FROMHMM TO
 INCORPORATE IN THE CH-53A'S THE ~~SIX~~ ^{MODIFICATION} NECESSARY TO MAKE THEM
 CAPABLE OF MINESWEEPING OPERATIONS. THIS PRECLUDES ANY
 FURTHER ATTEMPT TO UTILIZE YOUR CMMCURRENT CH-53 INVENTORY FOR
 MINESWEEPING; HOWEVER, THIS ADVANTAGE, WHICH CAN BE USED TO
 SUPPORT HQMC POLICY, WOULD BE NEGATED BY THE TRANSFER OF CH-53D'S
 TO THIRD MAW.

3. {U} IN VIEW OF THE CONSIDERATIONS NOTED IN PAR 2, THE CH-53D
 REASSIGNMENT REQUESTED IN REF A CANNOT BE APPROVED AT
 THIS TIME.

4. {C} ADDITIONALLY, THE REQUEST TO BORROW SIX CH-53D'S
 FROM FMFLANT FOR USE IN MABLEX 1-71 CANNOT BE ACCOMMODATED DUE
 TO CONTINGENCY/OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS. WARM REGARDS.

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM RGEN DWYER
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
VISIT WITH COMFIRSTFLT/COMPHIBPAC(U)

- A. CG FMFPAC 290513Z JUL 71 (C)
- B. CNO 272125Z JUL 71(C)
- C. NAVAIRPAC 262107Z JUL 71(U)
- D. I MAF 292342Z JUL 71(C)
- E. COMFIRSTFLT 070020Z AUG 71(C)
- F. FMFPAC 03120.3H(C)

1. (U) EARLY LAST WEEK I CALLED ON VADM JOHNSON AND VADM PEET TO MAKE MY MANNERS UNDER THIS HAT AND TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN. HIGHLIGHTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW.

2. (C) FIRST FLT.

A. AS YOU REQUESTED IN REF A CMC'S POLICY ON USE OF CH-53'S IN THE MCM ROLE WAS REVIEWED WITH RAY PEET. HE THOROUGHLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION AND STATED CANDIDLY THAT HE WAS NOT TOO CONCERNED ABOUT USMC PARTICIPATION. RATHER, HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO STIMULATE IN HOUSE NAVY INTEREST IN SOLVING THE MINE PROBLEM. FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS IT IS EVIDENT THAT HE IS NOT ATTEMPTING TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF THE SUPJ. IN FACT, HE WAS EMBARRASSED SOMEWHAT OVER THE CONTENTS OF REF C WHICH WAS TRANSMITTED WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE. IN GOOD FAITH I TOLD HIM THAT THE DOOR WAS NOT SHUT, AND WHEN FEASIBLE, CONSIDERATION WOULD BE GIVEN TO MARINE CH-53 PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE EXERCISES.

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B. WE DISCUSSED THE DESIREABILITY OF INCLUDING AN MSC TAK OUR EXERCISES (REF D). HE INDICATED THAT HE PLANNED TO CALL PACFLT TO RECLAMA THEIR EARLIER DECISION BUT WAS NOT HOPEFUL BECAUSE OF FUNDING CONSTRAINTS. REF E APPLIES. WE BOTH AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO DEVELOPE LONG RANGE AMPH TRNG RQMTS FOR MSC SHIPPING OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS SO THAT THEY COULD BE PROGRAMMED AND SUGGETED FOR. IF YOU CONCUR WE WILL SUBMIT TO YOUR HQTRS I MAF MSC SHIPPING RQMTS TO SUPPORT FUTURE EXERCISES.

C. RAY WAS HIGHLY RECEPTIVE TO MY REQUEST TO JOINTLY DEVELOP WITH HIS STAFF A COORDINATED, LONG RANGE EXERCISE SKED WHICH WOULD OPTIMIZE PROGRESSIVE TRNG FOR BOTH NAVY AND MARINE COMMANDS- A SKED TAILORED TO OUR CURRENT STRUCTURE, TRAINING NEEDS AND PERSONNEL SITUATION. HE CONCURRED THAT EXERCISES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED BETWEEN OCTOBER-MAY IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE IN THE FUTURE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED IN PLANNING FOR ROPEVAL OCCASIONED BY EXTENSIVE SUMMER TRANSFERS AND STAFF UNDERLAPS. DURING OUR DISCUSSION HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE WAS IN THE EARLY PLANNING STAGES FOR THE NEXT FIRST FLEET EXERCISE TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS AREA IN FEB 72 AND ASKED IF WE'D LIKE TO PARTICIPATE. MY TENTATIVE ANSWER WAS AFFIRMITIVE SUBJ TO YOUR CONCURRENCE. WE SHOULD HAVE THE FIRST MARINES UP TO SPEED BY THEN PLUS THE NORMAL SUPPORTING UNITS. HOWEVER, YOU MAY PREFER TO USE VIC ARMSTRONG'S UNIT. BELIEVE WE SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ALL MAJOR FLEET EXERCISES IF ONLY ON A TOKEN BASIS. WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE FEB EXERCISE DURING YOUR FORTH COMING VISIT.

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3. (C) PHIBPAC.

Yes! A. THE DESIRABILITY OF A WELL COORDINATED EXERCISE SKED WAS ALSO DISCUSSED WITH VADM JOHNSON. HE, TOO, CONCURRED IN THE NEED FOR A SKED THAT WAS DRIVEN BY TRNG RQMTS AND NOT DICTATED SOLELY BY YARD AVAILABILITY AND SHIP OVERHAULS. DURING THIS DISCUSSION HE MENTIONED AN ONGOING PHIBPAC-FMFPAC DIALOGUE ON UP DATING AN OLD NAVY/MARINE AGREEMENT ON AMPH EXERCISE SCHEDULING. IF DESIRED WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO FORWARD TO YOUR HQIRS AN I MAF INPUT ON HOW WE SEE THE EASTPAC MAJOR EXERCISE RQMTS. IN ANY EVENT, THERE IS A NEED NOW TO UPDATE REF F.

B. HE EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN AS TO HOW MUCH TESTING OF THE SMLS CONCEPT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE FORTHCOMING EXERCISE. WHILE AGREEING THAT THE DURATION WAS LIMITED IT WAS MY VIEW THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO PLOW SOME NEW GROUND IN DEVELOPING STRUCTURE, TECHNIQUES, PROCEDURES, ETC... ONE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT ADM JOHNSON MAY HAVE MERGED SMLS AND RADM AURAND'S STUDY ON THE SEA BASING CONCEPT. WILL ASK HIS SENIOR MARINE TO BRING HIM UP TO SPEED ON THE SALIENT POINTS OF SMLS.

C. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY AS TO WHAT ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON FIRST MARDIV RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BLUE RIDGE, HE WAS NOT FULLY AWARE OF HOW MUCH, IF ANY, HAD BEEN DONE OR OFFERED TO ARRANGE A JOINT BRIEFING FOR BOTH OF US ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH I ACCEPTED.

4. (C) OVERALL, THE VISITS WERE MOST BENEFICIAL. THE DISCUSSIONS AT ALL TIMES WERE ON A WARM, FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE BASIS. THEY, TOO, ARE ANXIOUS TO SHARPEN OUR AMPHIBIOUS SKILLS. WE SHALL CERTAINLY WORK WITH THEM TO THAT END. RESPECTFULLY ROSS.

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CONFIDENTIAL MARDIS//N00000//. PERSONAL FOR BGEN
 DWYER FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
 VISIT TO COMFIRSTFLT/COMPHIBPAC (U)
 A. CG I MAF 100500Z/AUG71 (C) (MARDIS)(PERSONAL)
 B. CG FMFPAC 131001Z/AUG71 (S)
 C. OPNAVINST 3000.11/MCO 3000.3
 D. FMFPACO 03120.3H (C)
 E. CG FMFPAC 110043Z/AUG71 (C)
 F. ADMIN FMFPAC 140424Z/JUL71 (C)
 1. (U) YOUR COMMENTS (REF A) CONCERNING YOUR RECENT
 VISIT WITH VADM'S JOHNSON AND PEET ARE APPRECIATED.
 AS YOU KNOW, ROSS, I FULLY SUPPORT A CLOSE WORKING
 RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR NAVY COUNTERPARTS. VISITS
 SUCH AS YOURS DO A GREAT DEAL TO ENHANCE THE RETURN
 TO OUR TRADE, AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.
 2. (C) I AGREE WITH YOUR REMARKS TO RAY PEET.

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REGARDING THE USE OF THE CH-53'S IN THE MCM ROLE.
WE CERTAINLY DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR NEGATIVE IN
SUPPORTING THE NAVY IN WHAT THEY CONSIDER LEGITIMATE
REQUESTS. RAY PEET UNDOUBTEDLY APPRECIATED YOUR
COMMENTS.

3. (C) THE DESIRABILITY OF MSC SHIPPING IN SUPPORT
OF AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES IS HEARTILY CONCURRED IN.
YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT *will come*
BE MOST WELCOME AND I AM SURE WILL BE OF ASSISTANCE *AMU*
~~RANGE~~ TO MY STAFF. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE GONE TO
CINCPACFLT IN SUPPORT OF YOUR RECLAMA FOR A TAK FOR
MABLEX 1-71. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THE NECESSITY OF
INCLUDING MSC SHIPPING IN ALL AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES OF
MAB SIZE OR LARGER (REF B REFERS).

4. (U) I AM IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH YOU CONCERNING
A LONG RANGE, REALISTIC TRAINING AND EXERCISE PROGRAM.
THIS HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE ONE OF OUR MAJOR
GOALS. REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE MAJOR FLEET
EXERCISES, WE HAVE INDICATED PREVIOUSLY TO COMFIRSTFLT
THAT WE WOULD BE ANXIOUS TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL FLEET
EXERCISES. TENTATIVELY, WE HAVE COMMITTED A MAU FOR
FEBRUARY
THE ~~NEXT~~ EXERCISE AND, IF IT IS HELD IN HAWAII, THE
USE OF VIC'S FORCES WOULD APPEAR APPROPRIATE.

5. (U) AS STATED BY ROY JOHNSON, MY STAFF IS WORKING

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WITH ^{THE} COMPHIBPAC STAFF TO UPDATE REF C. ~~I~~ WOULD WELCOME ^{WMMU} ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ALONG THIS LINE. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVIDE FOR A MORE REALISTIC AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING PROGRAM BASED ON AVAILABLE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING ASSETS WHICH WILL FULLY SATISFY OUR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. ADDITIONALLY, REF D HAS BEEN UPDATED BY MY STAFF AND WILL BE GOING TO THE PRINTERS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

6. (C) AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN ON THE WIRE (REF E) WITH OUR COMMENTS ON TESTING THE SMLS CONCEPT. THE CONCEPT FIRST NEEDS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AND THEN ADEQUATELY TESTED IF WE ARE TO DETERMINE ITS FEASIBILITY AND APPLICABILITY FOR FUTURE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. I AM SURE THAT THE TESTING OF THE SMLS CONCEPT DURING MABLES 1-71, EVEN THOUGH ON A LIMITED SCALE, WILL PROVIDE US WITH VALUABLE INFORMATION.

7. (C) ~~REDACTED~~ A NEW BUT RELATED SUBJECT, ^{MARINE} ~~NAIRNE~~ PRESENCE ABOARD LCC 19. PAUL GRAHAM HAS INFORMED ME THAT RADM GADDIS, ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS, MENTIONED THAT MARINES SHOULD MAINTAIN A PRESENCE ABOARD THE LCC 19 AS COMFIRSTFLT HAS BEEN CASTING A COVETOUS EYE ON HER. AS YOU ARE AWARE, IN ^{JULY} ~~ONE~~; I TASKED CG, I MAF TO DEVELOP, DURING THE AUG LCC CPX AND ROPEVAL 3-71, A RECOMMENDED CADRE STAFF WHICH

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COULD FORM THE TRAINED NUCLEUS, IN OPERATION OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FLAGSHIP DATA SYSTEM (AFDS), OF A MAB AND MAF STAFF. THIS STAFF WOULD BE CAPABLE OF EMBARKING WITH THE PHIBGRU STAFF WHEN REQUIRED AND TO ACT IN COORDINATION WITH THEM IN DEVELOPING AND REFINING AFDS REQUIREMENTS (REF F REFERS). WHILE A PERMANENT MARINE STAFF ABOARD THE LCC 19 MAY BE DESIRABLE, THE PERSONNEL SITUATION AT THIS TIME PRECLUDES THIS COURSE OF ACTION. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO MAKE OUR PRESENCE AND INTEREST KNOWN. SOME THOUGHTS ALONG THIS LINE ARE:

- A. QUARTERLY CPX'S.
 - B. ORIENTATION/FAMILIARIZATION TRIPS WHILE THE SHIP IS UNDERWAY.
 - C. FAMILIARIZATION TOURS FOR JUNIOR OFFICERS, BOTH AIR AND GROUND. THESE YOUNG OFFICERS SELDOM GET A CHANCE TO GO ABOARD A COMMAND AND CONTROL SHIP AND IT WOULD PROVIDE THEM WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET ACQUAINTED WITH THE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN CONTROLLING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.
 - D. WORKING SESSIONS WITH SCHOOL TRAINED PERSONNEL TO STAY CURRENT WITH THE SYSTEMS.
8. (U) THESE ARE BUT A FEW IDEAS. I AM SURE YOU WILL HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS IN THIS AREA. WARM REGARDS.

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CONFIDENTIAL MARDIS//NO0000//. PERSONAL FOR LTGEN
ROBERTSON INFO MGEN OWENS AND MGEN ~~NEZZER~~ METZGER FROM MGEN
ADAMS. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

UTILIZATION OF KADENA AB BY III MAF FORCES (U) ^R

A. CG III MAF 220411Z/JUN 71 (S) (SPECAT)(NOTAL) ^W

B. CG FIRST MAW 302341Z/JUN 71 (C) (NOTAL)

1. (C) IN VIEW OF THE INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE OF 5TH
AF REFLECTED IN YOUR ADDRESSAL OF THE STATIC AIR
MOVEMENT PROBLEM IN REF A AND IN BOB OWEN'S REPORT
IN REF B, WE HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING A DIALOGUE WITH
BOTH CINCPACFLT AND CINCPACAF IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE
THE PROBLEM RELATING TO OUR UTILIZATION OF KADENA.

2. (C) IN THIS REGARD, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF
YOU COULD PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

A. FOR THE PERIOD 1 JAN 70 TO THE PRESENT:

(1) ALL INSTANCES IN WHICH KADENA HAS BEEN

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←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

CONFIDENTIAL MARDIS//N00000//
 UTILIZED BY EITHER FIRST MAW (FIRST MAW (REAR)) OR
 THIRD MARDIV.

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(2) ALL INSTANCES IN WHICH THE UTILIZATION
 OF KADENA HAS BEEN DENIED, OR REQUESTED UTILIZATION
 HAS BEEN REDUCED, BY 5TH AF/313TH AD.

(3) EACH INSTANCE CITED SHOULD INCLUDE
 DATES AND SPECIFICS OF THE DESIRED UTILIZATION.

B. PRE-RVN UTILIZATION OF KADENA BY FIRST MAW
 AND THIRD MARDIV UNITS. REQUEST THAT THIS INFO
 INCLUDE DATA WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
 PREVIOUS KADENA UTILIZATION BY THE MARINE CORPS.

3. (C) THE COMMANDING GENERAL DESIRES TO DISCUSS
 THE ABOVE WITH CINCPACFLT ON RETURN FROM HIS EASTPAC
 VISIT. ACCORDINGLY, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REPLY
 BY 23 AUG 71 OR EARLIER IF POSSIBLE. WARM REGARDS.

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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P 212249Z AUG 71
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 TO RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO RUADAJE/CG III MAF
 RUADKUA/MCAS IWAKUNI
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TOT: 220052Z AUG 71

UNCLAS //N11000// PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN OWENS FROM LTGEN JONES.
 INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON AND COL VAN CAMPEN. DELIVER DURING WAKING
 HOURS.

AIRCRAFT SOUND SUPPRESSION: MCAS IWAKUNI

1. ON 10 AUGUST I MET WITH DEPUTY MAYOR SHOICHI ITO OF IWAKUNI.
 AS YOU KNOW HE WAS IN HAWAII TO VISIT ADMIRAL CLAREY AND DELIVER
 A LETTER FROM THE MAYOR REGARDING THE ABATEMENT OF AIRCRAFT
 GENERATED NOISE AT IWAKUNI TO THE ADMIRAL AS WELL AS A SIMILAR
 LETTER TO ME.

2. AS A RESULT OF OUR CONVERSATION, DEPUTY MAYOR ITO CONSENTED
 TO LET ME PRESENT THE LETTER ON HIS BEHALF TO ADMIRAL CLAREY. IN
 ADDITION, I ALSO ARRANGED FOR DEPUTY MAYOR ITO TO RECEIVE
 A TOUR OF MCAS KANEHOE IN AN ATTEMPT TO FAMILIARIZE HIM WITH
 SIMILAR PROBLEMS AT OTHER STATIONS. I BELIEVE MR ITO'S EXPOSURE

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P 212249Z AUG 71

ACTN: S/SEC.
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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1550 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
AT KANEOHE WAS HELPFUL. HE SEEMED SUPRISED THAT SIMILIAR
PROBLEMS EXIST IN BASES IN THE STATES.

3. THE PROBLEM OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, WHILE PREVIOUSLY
RECEIVING SIGNIFICANT ATTENTION AT CONUS ACTIVITIES, IS NOW
BECOMING A MATTER OF INCREASING CONCERN AT OUR ACTIVITIES
LOCATED OUTSIDE OF CONUS. I AM CERTAIN THAT WE WILL BE DEDICA-
TING MORE OF OUR EFFORTS TO THIS SUBJECT IN THE FUTURE. I KNOW
THAT YOU ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THIS AND SIMILAR
PROBLEMS ON THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY SURROUNDING THE AIR STATION;
HOWEVER, I FEEL THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL AREAS WHICH REQUIRE SOME
FURTHER CLARIFICATION CONCERNING THIS PROBLEM:

A. DEPUTY MAYOR ITO ALLUDED TO THE FACT THAT THE HOUR
OF 2200 HAD BEEN UTILIZED FOR ENGINE TURN-UPS AT IWAKUNI SHORTLY
BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. IF THIS IS NORMAL ROUTINE, IS IT NECESSARY
OR COULD SCHEDULING RESULT IN ENGINE TESTING AT OTHER TIMES TO
MINIMIZE IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY WITH REGARD TO SOUND
AGGRAVATION?

B. I ALSO FEEL THAT A THOROUGH ANALYSIS SHOULD BE MADE
CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE RELOCATION OF AREAS DESIGNATED FOR
AIRCRAFT ENGINE TURN-UPS.

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1550 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR

C. ADDITIONALLY, I REQUEST THAT YOU LOOK CLOSELY INTO
THE MATTER OF NIGHT OPERATIONS WITH THE INTENT OF LIMITING
THEM TO THE MINIMUM DEGREE CONSISTENT WITH YOUR TRAINING
MISSION. IF INTENSIVE NIGHT TRAINING IS REQUIRED, IT WOULD
APPEAR TO BE PRUDENT TO ANNOUNCE SUCH OPERATIONS IN ADVANCE,
INsofar AS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WILL ALLOW. A PUBLIC AFFAIRS
TYPE APPROACH IN THIS REGARD WOULD APPEAR TO BE VERY BENEFICIAL.

4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, MCAS KANEOHE HAS APPROACHED THE PRO-
BLEM OF NOISE AGGRAVATION THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NOISE
ABATEMENT COMMITTEE HEADED BY THE STATION EXECUTIVE OFFICER.
THIS COMMITTEE SERVES AS A CENTER TO PROCESS COMPLAINTS AND MAKES
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING SUCH MATTERS AS SOUND SURVEYS, FLIGHT
PATTERN/HOURS CHANGES, TAKE OFF MODES, AND TEST CELL OPERATIONS.
KANEOHE ALSO HAS A VERY AGGRESSIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAM
WHICH APPEARS TO BE WORKING AND IN WHICH MR ITO WAS QUITE IN-
TERESTED. THIS INCLUDES A MONTHLY NEWSLETTER ADDRESSED TO
SELECTED COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES TO KEEP THEM ADVISED OF PLANS
AND OPERATIONAL TRENDS. THEY ALSO USE A "TELEPHONE LIST OF CON-
CERNED CITIZENS" (NOW ABOUT 100) WHO ARE NOTIFIED 24 HOURS IN
ADVANCE OF UNUSUAL OPERATIONS. LOCAL NEWS RELEASES OVER

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P 212249Z AUG 71

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PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA1550 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
COMMUNITY PRESS AND RADIO ALSO PASS THIS SAME INFORMATION. THEY
HAVE ALSO ORGANIZED A MILITARY-CIVILIAN COMMITTEE TO TRY TO KEEP
BOTH SIDES TALKING AND MUTUALLY ADVISED OF PROBLEMS AND MEANS OF
DIMINISHING AGGRAVATION. ALTHOUGH ALL OF THESE MAY NOT APPLY
AT IWAKUNI, THEY ARE OFFERED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.
5. IN SHORT, I AM REQUESTING YOUR CONTINUOUS ATTENTION IN THE
MATTER OF NOISE ABATEMENT AT IWAKUNI. MY STAFF IS ALSO DI-
RECTLY CONCERNED WITH THIS PROBLEM AND IS PRESENTLY INVESTIGATING
SEVERAL AREAS TO SUPPORT YOUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.
OF PRIME IMPORTANCE IS THE RESEARCH OF AVAILABILITY, COST, AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF A PORTABLE AIRCRAFT GROUND RUN-UP NOISE
SUPPRESSOR SYSTEM, TYPE A/S32A-5 (FSN 4920-893-0724). PLEASE
KEEP ME APPRISED OF ANY NEW ACTIONS INITIATED TO HELP IN
ELIMINATING OR SUPPRESSING NOISE AGGRAVATION ON THE LOCAL
COMMUNITY. WARM REGARDS.
BT

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COMMARCORBASESPAC

P 212249Z AUG 71

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FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
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KADENA AB UTILIZATION BY III MAF.

A. ADMIN FMFPAC 180329Z AUG 71 (C)

1. (C) INFORMATION REQUESTED BY REF A IS SUBMITTED FOR THE
FIRST MAW AND THIRD MARDIV:

A. FIRST MAW UTILIZATION:

(1) DATA SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENTATION REQUESTED NOT READILY
ATTAINABLE. REVIEW OF FILES, HISTORICAL REPORT AND SQUADRON
SCRAP BOOKS PROVIDED SKETCHY DATA. IN MOST INSTANCES THE SPECIAL
USE OF KADENA BY SMALL DETACHMENTS OF FIXED WING (2 TO 6
AIRCRAFT) WERE USUALLY REQUESTED INFORMALLY FROM FIFTH AF. THESE
REQUESTS WERE USUALLY NORMALLY MET WITH UNENTHUSIASTIC
RESPONSES AND THUS NOT PURSUED BEYOND THE TELCON/PERSONAL
LIAISON STAGE. HOWEVER, WHEN MARINES ARE PARTICIPATING IN AIR
DEFENSE EXERCISES, STAGING THROUGH KADENA IS PERMITTED. THE
LAST AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE WAS CAPITALIZED ON BY AGREEMENT TO
PARTICIPATE WITH A PROVISION THAT DURING THREE DAY PRIOR TO
THE EXERCISE, MARINE F-4 AIRCRAFT WOULD BE CLEARED FOR
TURNAROUND AT KADENA IN CONNECTION WITH USE OF THE OKINAWA
MISSILE RANGES. ALTHOUGH NOT DOCUMENTED, THERE IS AN INFERENCE
THAT KADENA IS AVAILABLE WHEN MUTUAL BENEFITS ARE INVOLVED.

(2) DOCUMENTATION AVAILABLE CONCERNING FIXED WING USE OF KADENA
IS AS FOLLOWS:

CG III MAF

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ACTN:SSEC 1-4

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(A) A 4A-4 SPACE A/C DEPLOYMENT WAS REQUESTED ON 16 OCT 70 FOR THE PERIOD OF 22-24 OCT 70. FIFTH AF STATED BY MSG ON 22 OCT THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE A-4 SPACE A/C TO KADENA COULD NOT BE ACCOMMODATED. THIS MESSAGE WHICH QUOTES A FIRST MAW MESSAGE AND THE FIFTH AF REPLY IS QUOTED IN PART AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE O 220712Z OCT 70
FM AF SSO FIFTH AF
TO CG FIRST MAW (REAR)

UNCLAS E F T O

YOUR 160713Z OCT 70 IS QUOTED.

FIXED WING SUPPORT REQUEST.

A. FONECON MAJ LACROIX G-3 OPS/COL HADDER FIFTH AF CC DUTY DIRECTOR OF 16 OCT 70

1. IAW REF A REQ OPERATE 4A-4 ACFT 22-24 OCT 70 FROM KADENA IN SUPPORT THIRD MARINE DIVISION EXERCISE. APPROX 3 SORTIES PER DAY OF HELO ESCORTS, SIMULATED CAS.
2. REQ MESSING/BILLETING 4 OFFICERS AND 12 ENLISTED FROM 21-24 OCT 70 PLUS SEDAN AND SIX PAC VEHICLE FOR DURATION OF STAY. ALSO REQ 2 TRACTOR MD3 ELEC UNIT AND NORMAL PCL ITEMS. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED FROM FIRST MAW (REAR) ASSETS. UNQUOTE.

(3) THE FIFTH AF MESSAGE CONTAINED, QUOTING THE FIFTH AF REPLY TO THE ABOVE QUOTED FIRST MAW MSG.

QUOTE SUBJECT: FIXED WING SUPPORT REQ REF YOUR MSG 160713Z OCT 70.

1. AN OPERATION OF A-4 SPACE A/C FROM KADENA AF DURING PERIOD 22-24 OCT 70. IAW REF NOT CONSIDERED TENABLE. AIR TRAFFIC AT KADENA IS CURRENTLY WELL ABOVE ACCEPTABLE LIMITS DUE TO OVERFLOW NAHA AS A RESULT OF RUNWAY CONSTRUCTION, CLOSURE AND ABNORMALLY HIGH NUMBER OF PRIORITY OPERATIONS AT KADENA. HIGH PROBABILITY OF CLOSURE TO INSURE REPAIR AT KADENA IS IMMEDIATE THREAT TO FURTHERING THE EXISTING TRAFFIC PROBLEMS.
 2. USABLE RUNWAY AT NAHA IS 6420 FEET UNTIL COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION. ESTIMATE FULL RUNWAY USE AFTER 24 OCT 70. NOT WITHSTANDING MY MSG, 4 A 4 A/C ARRIVED AT KADENA ON 21 OCT 70. WHEN QUERIED, THE PILOT IN CHARGE CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE RESTRICTION BUT THE A/C PROCEEDED TO KADENA AND HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO FLY THEIR PROGRAMMED SORTIES. THE TRAFFIC SITUATION AT KADENA IS OF GRAVE CONCERN TO ME. I CANNOT DO SO IF MANAGEMENT IS DISREGARDED SUCH AS OCCURED IN CASE. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD LOOK INTO MATTER.
- BT UNQUOTE

CG III MAF

O 241130Z/AUG71

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(C) 23-25 JUN 6 F4 A/C FMAW DEPLOYED 4 F4 A/C ON 23 JUN 71 FOR TURNAROUND DURING MISSILE. A TELEPHONE CALL FROM FIFTH AF THROUGH SEVENTH FLEET OPS, STATED THAT 313TH AD HAD EXCEEDED THEIR AUTHORITY TO APPROVE 4 MARINE F4 A/C AND ONLY 2 F4 A/C WOULD BE PERMITTED TO USE KADENA AB FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE SCHEDULE.

(D) 26 JUN 71 5 F4 A/C AIRCRAFT WERE GRANTED LANDING AND RON PERMISSION AT KADENA FOR PARTICIPATION IN AN OKINAWA AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE.

(3) MAG-36 HAS ENCOUNTERED NO PROBLEMS IN REGARDS TO AIR OPERATIONS AT KADENA. MAG-36 HELICOPTERS HAVE LANDED AT KADENA AB APPROXIMATELY 50 TIMES IN THE LAST 18 MONTHS. ALL OF THESE OPERATIONS WERE IN CONJUNCTION WITH VIP FLIGHTS.

(4) THERE IS NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE CONCERNING PRE-RVN UTILIZATION HOWEVER IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT PRE-RVN UTILIZATION OF KADENA WOULD PROVE SIGNIFICANT AS FMAW UNITS HAVE TRADITIONALLY USED NAF NAHA AS A DEPLOYMENT BASE.

(5) WITH ONLY 1 YET CAPABLE FIELD ON OKINAWA AFTER TURNOVER OF NAHA AND IN VIEW SUPERIOR TRAINING RANGES AND FACILITIES, A FAIR SHARE USE OF KADENA MUST BE ESTABLISHED.

B. THIRD MARDIV UTILIZATION

(1) THERE IS NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS HQ CONCERNING PRE-RVN USE OF KAB BY THIRD MARDIV.

(2) 1 JAN 70 TO PRESENT:

(A) DURING THE PERIOD 16-26 OCT 70, BLT 1/4 CONDUCTED AIR MOVEMENT TRAINING FROM KADENA AB TO CUBI POINT. A TOTAL OF 1201 PERS AND SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT WAS TRANSPORTED BY THE 374 TH TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING, 313 AIR DIV USAF. THE AIRLIFT TO CUBI COMMENCED 16 OCT AND TERMINATED 19 OCT 70. RETURN AIRLIFT TO OKI COMMENCED 23 OCT AND WAS COMPLETED 26 OCT 70.

(B) BETWEEN OCT 70 AND MAY 71, BECAUSE OF NON-AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT, NO AIRMOVEMENT EXERCISE, NOR AIRCRAFT LOADEXS WERE CONDUCTED.

(C) ON 11 MAY, CG THIRD MARDIV REQUESTED USE OF A C 141 TO CONDUCT LOADEX TRAINING. A TRAINING SITE WAS NOT REQUESTED. HOWEVER, IN RESPONSE TO THIRD MARDIV REQ FOR AIRCRAFT, CG III MAF INDICATED THAT KADENA AFB WOULD BE UTILIZED SHOULD A C 141 BE MADE AVAILABLE.

(D) CONCURRENTLY, CG THIRD MARDIV IN A MESSAGE TO 313TH AIRDIV EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A BRIEF TRAINING COURSE AT KAB TO TEACH MARINES LOADING/UNLOADING TECHNIQUES FOR USAF A/C. 313TH AIRDIV HOSTED A CONFERENCE DURING EARLY

CG III MAF

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JUNE AT WHICH REPS OF THIRD MARDIV AND III MAF EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH 313TH AIRDIV AND 603 RD MASS REPS CONCERNING ASSISTENCE WHICH COULD BE PROVIDED BY USAF. THE MEETING WAS VERY CORDIAL AND ALTHOUGH OVERRIDING COMMITMENTS PRECLUDED SETTING UP A FORMAL COURSE OF INSTRUCTION THE 603 RD MASS REPS INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO TRAIN MARINES ON AN OJT BASIS. THIS APPROACH WAS CONSIDERED TO BE VERY SATISFACTORY AS FAR AS THIRD MARDIV WAS CONCERNED. DURING THIS SAME CONFERENCE, USE OF KAB WAS DISCUSSED WITH RESPECT TO THE C 141 LOADEX TRAINING. 313TH AIRDIV REP INDICATED NO PROBLEM IN ASSIGNING A STAGING AREA FOR THE MARINES SHOULD AN AIRCRAFT BECOME AVAILABLE FOR USE. IN FACT, PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE AT THIS TIME TO HAVE APPROPRIATE GATES OPENED FOR USE OF CONVOYS. MP ESCORT BY KAB WAS ALSO TENTATIVELY AGREED UPON.

(E) ON 10 JUN 71, THIRD MARDIV WAS ADVISED THAT A C 141 WAS NOT AVAILABLE AND BLT 1/4 EVENTUALLY CONDUCTED A SMALL SCALE LOADE AT MCAS FUTEA UTILIZING A KC-130 FROM VMGR 152.

(F) FINALLY, THE FIFTH AF ON 18 JUNE STATED THEIR OPPOSITION TO USE OF KADENA FOR MARINE STATIC AIR MOVEMENT TRAINING. 313TH AIRDIV DID NOT REPLY TO FOUR JUNE REQUEST FOR TRAINING.

2. (C) THIS HQ HOLDS BACKUP MESSAGES TO SUBSTANTIATE ALL ITEMS REPORTED. WILL TRANSMIT IF DESIRED.

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CG III MAF

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UNCLAS //N03590//
PERSONAL FOR BGEN HOUGHTON FROM MAJGEN BROWN
DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS ONLY
FMFPAC ANNUAL AVIATION SAFETY AWARDS

1. ELEVEN THIRD MAW SQUADRONS RECEIVED SUBJECT AWARD FOR ACCIDENT-FREE OPERATIONS IN FY-70. FOR FY-71, DESPITE HAVING FLOWN MORE HOURS WITH FEWER ACCIDENTS AND HAVING ACHIEVED A TWENTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE WING RATE, WE RECEIVED FMFPAC ANNUAL AVIATION SAFETY AWARD CERTIFICATES FOR ONLY THREE SQUADRONS: VMA(AW)-242, H&MS-37, AND H&MS-30. THE SELECTION CRITERIA UTILIZED IN DETERMINING RECIPIENTS OF THIS AWARD ARE OF COURSE DELINEATED IN FMFPAC ORDER 3590.5. PARAGRAPH 3 STATES THAT THE UNIT MUST BE FLIGHT AND GROUND ACCIDENT FREE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR. IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THESE CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED BY YOUR STAFF. THE CRITERIA UTILIZED BY CNO AND CNAP EACH YEAR FOR THEIR ANNUAL AWARD (AND BY YOUR HEADQUARTERS IN FY-70) HE NEVER PENALIZED A SQUADRON FOR REPORTING LIMITED

CG THIRD MAW

R 012302Z SEP 71

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DAMAGE 'GROUND ACCIDENTS' (I.E., LESS THAN MINOR DAMAGE), SUCH AS WOULD OTHERWISE BE REPORTED AS AN AIRCRAFT 'INCIDENT' WERE INTENT FOR FLIGHT PRESENT.

2. ELEVEN THIRD MAW SQUADRONS HAVE COMPLETED FY-71 WITHOUT THE OCCURANCE OF A MAJOR OR MINOR DAMAGE AIRCRAFT OR GROUND ACCIDENT. FOR ME TO PRESENT ONLY THREE AWARDS WOULD HAVE THE APPEARANCE OF A PROFESSIONAL INSULT TO THE OTHER EIGHT SQUADRONS WHO HAVE CONSCIENTIOUSLY AND ACCURATELY REPORTED ALL LIMITED DAMAGE GROUND ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS. THE AWARDS ARE IMPORTANT INCENTIVES TO CONTINUED EXCELLENCE IN FLYING SAFETY AND REQUEST YOU CONSIDER RECOGNIZING ALL ELEVEN SQUADRONS AS DESERVING RECIPIENTS, TO INCLUDE: HMMT-302, HMM-163, HMH-361, HMH-363, VMFAT-101, VMA-223, VMFA-334, AND VMA(AW)-225.

3. NEW SUBJECT: IN REGARDS TO THE REPORTED INADEQUACIES IN THE AVIATION SAFETY AND NATOPS PROGRAMS IN VMA-214, AS WE DISCUSSED ON THE PHONE, MY STAFF HAS JUST INSPECTED THE SQUADRON AND FOUND THEIR PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATIVELY SOUND. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ACTIVELY AND PERSONALLY MONITOR THEIR OPERATION WITH ATTENTION TO THOSE AREAS WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WERE REPORTED DEFICIENT BY YOUR ASO SUBSEQUENT TO HIS VISIT TO THIS COMMAND. WARM REGARDS.

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CG THIRD MAW

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FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
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SECRET//NO0000//PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON
FROM MGEN METZGER -- DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY
STANDARDIZATION OF SOPS

A. CG FMFPAC 190417Z JUN 71 (TS)

B. CG FMFPAC 062237Z SEP 71 (S)

1. (S) REFERENCE (A) ADDRESSES CONTINGENCY FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND INDICATES UNITS NOT NOW ORGANIC THIS COMMAND WILL BE ASSIGNED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS DIVISION IS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A FAMILY OF SOPS TO COVER A WIDE VARIETY OF TACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS. REFERENCE (B) ADDRESSES CERTAIN SOPS AS THEY APPLY TO AN AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE BUT IS LIMITED TO III MAF. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT IN THE EVENT THE ACTIONS ADDRESSED IN REFERENCE (A) ARE IMPLEMENTED IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL FOR ALL FMFPAC UNITS TO OPERATE UNDER THE SAME TACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SOPS. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THE STANDARDIZATION OF THESE SOPS IS

CG THIRD MARDIV

P 101111Z SEP 71

ACTN: S/SEC

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PAGE TWO RU40AJA1251 S E C R E T

NOT NOW REQUIRED. I BELIEVE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE AND PROPOSE THAT CG FMFPAC TAKE SUCH ACTION AS TO INSURE THAT THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED. IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT THE NEEDS AND VIEWS OF ALL COMMANDS ARE CONSIDERED IT IS SUGGESTED THAT:

A. A MASTER LIST OF ALL REQUIRED SOPS BE REQUESTED FROM CONCERNED COMMANDS.

B. A SCHEDULE FOR PREPARATION OR REVISION OF EXISTING SOPS BE DEVELOPED. AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THIS AND TO EXPEDITE PERHAPS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRODUCING THE APPROPRIATE SOPS COULD BE ASSIGNED TO SPECIFIC COMMANDS. THESE DRAFT SOPS SHOULD BE ROUTED TO OTHER COMMANDS FOR COMMENTS AND CONCURRENCE.

C. THAT THE STANDARD SOPS THEN BE PROMULGATED FOR USE THROUGHOUT FMFPAC.

2. (U) RESPECTFULLY.

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CG THIRD MARDIV

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CONFIDENTIAL//NO0000//PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES
FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS ONLY
COMBINED MABLEX PLANNING, APR 72

- A. COMNAVFOR KOREA 190641Z AUG71(C) (PASEP)
- B. COMSEVENTHFLT 250654Z AUG71(C) (PASEP)
- C. CTF 76/CTF 79 050310Z SEP71(C) (PASEP)

1. (U) REFS A THROUGH C HAVE BEEN PASSED TO PROVIDE
BACKGROUND FOR ON-GOING PLANNING ARRANGEMENTS
CONCERNING SUBJECT MABLEX.

2. (C) AS ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND, III MAF REPS MET WITH
CTF 76 STAFF ON 4 SEP TO PRODUCE REF C. DURING THE MEETING
THE SUBJECT OF MSC SHIPPING WAS BROACHED WHEN IT BECAME
OBVIOUS THAT THE USMC/ROKMC SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS FOR
PERSONNEL FAR EXCEEDED USMC/ROKMC CAPABILITIES. THE PRESENT
CTF 76 STAFF WAS RELUCTANT TO COMMIT THE INCOMING
PHIDGROUP TO ACTIONS IT WAS INCAPABLE OF PERFORMING,
THUS THE WORDING OF REF C IS SUCH THAT FLEXIBILITY IS
GUARANTEED. IT REMAINS APPARENT, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE
FORCES III MAF AND THE ROKMC WANT TO PUT IN THE
EXERCISE ARE ACCEPTED, SHIPPING WILL BE INADEQUATE.

3. (C) A RELAXATION IN RESPONSE TIMES WOULD BE
REQUIRED FOR III MAF TO COMMIT CTG 79.4 AND CTG 79.5
TO THE MABLEX. CTF 76 WAS RELUCTANT TO SUGGEST
THIS TO SEVENTHFLT BUT AGREED TO INCLUSION OF MAU AND
THE BLT IN THE TROOP LIST ON THE BASIS THAT MUCH COULD HAPPEN
IN SIX MONTHS TO CHANGE RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS AND THAT NO
HARM COULD OCCUR FROM LISTING BOTH ELEMENTS NOW.
OUR REASONING FOR FORCING THIS ISSUE IS TO DRIVE A
REQUIREMENT FOR MSC PARTICIPATION AND TO EXERCISE
AS MANY FORCES AS POSSIBLE.

4. (C) DURING OUR RECENT TRIP TO KOREA WE HAD

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ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO INFORMALLY DISCUSS CONDUCT OF A COMBINED EXERCISE WITH KOREAN MARINES FROM THE COMMANDANT DOWN TO THE INFANTRY, ARTILLERY AND SERVICE COMMANDERS WHO WOULD FURNISH TROOPS TO SUCH

PAGE THREE RUAOAJA1295 C O N F I D E N T I A L
AN EXERCISE. SUFFICE TO SAY THE REACTION WAS POSITIVE AT ALL ECHELONS WITH MANY REFERENCES TO GOLDEN DRAGON 70. WHEN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ARE AUTHORIZED BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE WHOLE HEARTED COOPERATION.

5. (C) OUR AIMS ARE TO RESTRICT OUR OBJECTIVES TO THOSE CAPABLE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT WITHOUT GETTING INVOLVED IN TOO MUCH SOPHISTICATION. WE BADLY NEED MAB LEVEL TRAINING STARTING FROM SCRATCH AND PLAN TO BE AT A LEVEL SIX MONTHS FROM NOW WHICH WILL ENSURE AMPLE RETURN FOR THE INVESTMENT IN A COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE, WHICH IN ITSELF IS QUITE SOPHISTICATED.

6. (S) YOU HAVE STATED A DESIRE TO DISCUSS MSC SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS AT THE 7TH FLT CONF. SUBJ EXERCISE WOULD PROVIDE THE VEHICLE FOR SUCH DISCUSSION, AS IT IS THE ONLY EXERCISE IN THE NEAR FUTURE JUSTIFYING MSC PARTICIPATION. AMPLIFYING THIS IS THE REQUIREMENT TO 'LOAD AROUND' THE CONTINGENCY MAU AND BLT WHEN THEY PARTICIPATE AS PART OF A LARGER FORCE. THIS NECESSITY MEANS THAT ACTUAL LOADING WILL BE

PAGE FOUR RUAOAJA1295 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INEFFICIENT, DRIVING UP SHIP REQUIREMENTS. COUNTER TO THIS ARE THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY PHIRPAC TO KEEP MSC SHIPS AS DELIVERY AGENTS ONLY, I.E., JOIN IN THE AOA, OFFLOAD, AND GET OUT OF THE PROBLEM. WHILE THE COST CONSTRAINTS ARE ACKNOWLEDGED, THIS WILL CERTAINLY NOT SUPPORT SMLS, OR ALLOW MUCH REALISM IN ANY EXERCISE. WHAT CAN YOU PUT IN SUCH A SHIP WHEN THE EXERCISE IS TAKING PLACE SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES FROM HOME BASE AND YOU HAVE TO BRING HOME WHAT YOU TAKE OVER? WE THINK A TAP COULD TAKE TROOPS OVER AND MAC COULD BRING THEM BACK, THUS EXERCISING BOTH FRIENDLY SUPPORTING FORCES WITHOUT INCURRING EXORBITANT COSTS AND WITHOUT BEING TOO UNREALISTIC.

7. (C) IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, WE WILL AGAIN REQUIRE ANGLICO PARTICIPATION AND REQUEST YOUR REP TO 7TH FLT CONFERENCE BE CONVERSANT WITH REQUEST TIMES, BUDGET

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SITUATION, AVAILABILITY OF ANGLICO, AND PERSONNEL/
EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS BASED ON GOLDEN DRAGON 70. WE
FORESEE NO CHANGE IN LEVEL OF ROK PARTICIPATION OVER
THAT IN 1970.

PAGE FIVE RU00AJA1295 C O N F I D E N T I A L

8. (C) WHILE THE ABOVE IS WINDY AND SOMETIMES PHILOSOPHICAL
- ALWAYS PAROCHIAL, HOPE IT PROVIDES BACKGROUND TO THE
LARGEST EXERCISE WE WILL BE ABLE TO RUN IN FY 72. YOU
ARE WELL AWARE OF THE PAUCITY OF TRAINING AREAS AND
MOBILITY MEANS. REST ASSURED WE WOULD LIKE A MABLEX
EVERY SIX MONTHS AND A MAFLEX EVERY OTHER YEAR AND WOULD
PREFER A UNILATERAL BEFORE A COMBINED MABLEX. WE HAVE TO
ACCEPT COMBINED TRAINING TO GET THE AREAS TO RUN
ANYTHING ABOVE A MAU. NOT THAT THIS IS BAD BUT IT DOES
FORCE A RUN BEFORE WALKING SITUATION.

9. (C) WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS THE NEW PHIBGROUP AND
PHIBRON TAKE OVER THE NAVY HALF OF PLANNING.

WARM REGARDS,

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MAJGEN ADAMS
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
III MAF FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS (U)
A. CG FMFPAC 062237Z SEP 71 (S)

- (U) AS INDICATED IN MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LAST FRIDAY, DONN ROBERTSON AND I DISCUSSED CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON III MAF FUTURE. DONN CONCURRED IN SENDING THIS MESSAGE AND THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED HEREIN, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SEE THE TEXT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE PROBABLY WELL AWARE OF MOST OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. PLEASE CONSIDER THE CONTENTS AS A RECAP OF INFORMATION WITH EMPHASIS AND PRIORITIES AS SEEN FROM THIS ECHELON.
- (S) THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS BEARING ON THE FUTURE OF III MAF AND THE ROLE IT WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY IN WESTPAC FORCE POSTURE. THESE FACTORS ALSO BEAR ON THE COMPOSITION AND LOCATION OF HQ III MAF AND ARE DISCUSSED AS FOLLOWS:

ADMIN III MAF

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A. THE REQUIREMENT FOR A WESTPAC MAF INCLUDING A SEPARATE COMMANDER, HQ, AND STAFF WAS FORESEEN LAST YEAR DURING PLANNING FOR POST-VIETNAM. THIS REQUIREMENT APPEARS TO BE VALID FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. III MAF CONSTITUTES THE ONLY BALANCED PACOM FORCE IN WESTPAC NOT PRESENTLY COMMITTED TO MEET CONTINGENCIES AND WHATEVER ADDITIONAL MISSIONS MAY BE ASSIGNED. THIS FACT BECOMES MORE SIGNIFICANT AS THE PHASEDOWN IN U. S. FORCES IN VIETNAM AND SEA PROGRESSES AND THE OVERALL U. S. MILITARY FORCE POSTURE IN WESTPAC DEGRADES.

B. THE NIXON DOCTRINE WILL DRIVE OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE IN WESTPAC FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES INHERENT IN III MAF, SUPPORT THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE. THERE IS NO BASIS TO ANTICIPATE A MAJOR REDUCTION IN III MAF REQUIREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THIS DOCTRINE. THE COMMUNIST BLOC THREAT IN ASIA WILL CONTINUE DESPITE THE POSSIBLE NORMALIZING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA, INCLUDING THE PROBABLE ADMISSION OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO THE UN THIS FALL.

C. AS TO OUR ALLIES, EXISTING BASING OF III MAF UNITS IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO JAPANESE MILITARY POSTURE. SOME STRENGTHENING IN JAPANESE MILITARY FORCE POSTURE IS PREDICTABLE AS A LONG - TERM PROPOSITION. THIS WILL HAVE LITTLE IF ANY EFFECT ON REDUCTION OF III MAF FORCE REQUIREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE; HOWEVER, THE INCREASE IN SIZE OF THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES PLUS ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATIONS MAY WELL RESULT IN EVENTUAL LOSS OF JAPANESE AND OKINAWA BASES FOR III MAF UNITS AFTER REVERSION. THIS IS NOT NEW TO YOU, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT MID-RANGE PLANS FOR III MAF FORCES MUST INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THIS POTENTIAL LOSS OF JAPAN/OKINAWA BASES AND THE NECESSARY RELOCATION ASSOCIATED THEREWITH.

D. ON 1 JANUARY 1972, WHEN THE REVISED UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN BECOMES EFFECTIVE, CINCPAC'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY WILL THEN INCLUDE EXISTING AREAS PLUS THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. THIS WILL ENCOMPASS VAST NEW AREAS OF THE SUB-ASIAN LITTORAL WHICH HAVE BEEN EYED BY BOTH COMMUNIST CHINA AND RUSSIA. RUSSIAN INFLUENCE HAS BEEN EXTENDED ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT BY THE RECENT 20-YEAR RUSSIAN FRIENDSHIP PACT WITH INDIA, THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID PROVIDED TO SEVERAL NATIONS IN THIS AREA, AND MOST IMPORTANT MILITARILY, THE INCREASED PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN SEAPOWER IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND WESTPAC AREAS INCLUDING SINGAPORE. THIS VAST NEW AREA OF CINCPAC RESPONSIBILITY BECOMES A LOGICAL AREA FOR EXTENSION OF OPERATIONS FOR THE SEVENTH FLEET, INCLUDING THE MOST USEFUL TOOL FOR THESE EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS, THE SEVENTH FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCES.

E. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIGHER AUTHORITIES EARLIER THIS YEAR REGARDING FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS OF OUR FORCE POSTURE, YOU WERE MOST PERCEPTIVE IN IDENTIFYING STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS AS CHOKE POINTS. TWO OF THESE WOULD BE THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND THE MACASSAR STRAITS. THESE VITAL LOCATIONS ARE SURR-

ADMIN III MAF

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OUNDED BY STRATEGIC LAND AREAS INCLUDING THE MALAY PENINSULA AND THE ISLANDS OF SINGAPORE, SUMATRA AND THE WESTERN PART OF INDONESIA. THE BAY OF BENGAL AND ANDAMAN SEA PLUS THE INDIAN POSSESSED ANDAMAN ISLANDS ARE ALSO PART OF THIS LAND/SEA AREA OF NEW AND VITAL SIGNIFICANCE TO CINCPAC. THIS CONSTITUTES THE MAIN LINK IN THE WESTWARD EXTENSION OF CINCPAC'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. EXAMINATION OF THIS AREA MAKES IT A NATURAL FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND CLEARLY INDICATES THE ABSOLUTE ESSENTIALITY FOR AMPHIBIOUS FORCES OF OUR SEVENTH FLEET IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THESE LOCATIONS. WHILE YOU RECOGNIZE ALL OF THIS OF COURSE, I BELIEVE THESE LOCATIONS TAKE ON EVEN GREATER SIGNIFICANCE TO CINCPAC AFTER 1 JAN 72

F. RECENT WHITE HOUSE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF INCREASED U. S. PRESENCE IN SINGAPORE IS EVIDENT BY SUCH ACTIONS AS THE SHIFT OF OUR KC-130 CORROSION CONTROL AND PAR PROGRAM TO THE LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT SERVICES SINGAPORE FACILITY. WHILE THIS IS A SMALL INDICATOR, IT WAS DIRECTED, DESPITE GREATER COSTS, TO INSURE THAT THIS COMPANY HAS ENOUGH BUSINESS TO MEET ITS LOCAL LABOR HIRING COMMITMENTS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SINGAPORE UPON WHICH OPTIONS FOR USE OF FACILITIES DEPEND. PAST VISITS BY U. S. NAVY UNITS AND THE VISITS OF THE USS ENTERPRISE TO SINGAPORE PLUS OTHER ACTIONS NOT YET EVIDENT, ALL INDICATE U. S. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NECESSITY TO COMPETE WITH INCREASED RUSSIAN FLEET INTEREST IN SINGAPORE FACILITIES. IT IS ENTIRELY CONCEIVABLE THAT WITHIN THE MIDRANGE PERIOD, SINGAPORE COULD BECOME EQUALLY AS IMPORTANT TO THE SEVENTH FLEET AS SUBIC BAY AND OUR OKINAWA/JAPAN COMPLEXES. THIS COULD ALSO LOGICALLY BE ASSUMED TO INCLUDE PONTENTIAL RELOCATION, BASING, AND TRAINING FACILITIES FOR UNITS OF III MAF IN THE SINGAPORE AREA, INDONESIA OR AUSTRALIA.

G. THE SEABASED MOBILE LOGISTICS SYSTEM (SMLS), AS A DEVELOPMENTAL CONCEPT, DOVETAILS NICELY WITH THE NIXON DOCTRINE. SMLS MUST BE THOROUGHLY TESTED AND EVALUATED. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MARINES MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SMLS REQUIRES MORE DEDICATED SHIPPING THAN DOES OUR PRESENT CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT. ALTHOUGH SOME UPGRADING IS IN PROGRESS, THE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING ASSETS OF THE NAVY ARE UNLIKELY TO GROW, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE APPARENT LOW PRIORITY ASSIGNED TO AMPHIBIOUS FORCES BY THE CNO.

H. AFTER 1 JAN 72, OUR PROSPECTIVE FLEET MARINE FORCES MISSIONS WILL INCLUDE THE REQUIREMENT TO OPERATE ON THE SHORES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE REMOTENESS OF THIS AREA FROM OUR BASES AND FROM CONUS INCREASES THE LENGTH OF OUR PIPELINE TO AN EXTREME POINT AND ADDS THE HAZARD OF TRANSIT OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA OR MACASSAR STRAITS. ATTENTION HAS ALREADY BEEN DRAWN TO SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA AS POTENTIAL BASES FOR THE MID-RANGE PERIOD. THE MARINE CORPS SHOULD TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ENCOURAGE MORE ACTIVE CONSIDERATION OF FORWARD BASING IN THAT REGION OF THE WORLD.

3. (C) WHILE RATHER LENGTHY, THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS INDICATE AN INCREASED POTENTIAL DEMAND FOR III MAF FORCES IN CINCPAC'S EXPANDING AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. THE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTINGENCIES, RELOCATION AND POSTURING, DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ADMIN III MAF

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EXERCISE AREAS, AND OTHER RELATED TASKS ARE INHERENT IN THE III MAF MISSION. THESE CONSIDERATIONS ADDED TO THE JUSTIFICATION WHICH PROVIDED FOR III MAF IN THE POST-VIETNAM WESTPAC FORCE POSTURE MAKES OUR EXISTING STRUCTURE EVEN MORE LOGICAL. AS YOU RECOGNIZE, THE PRESENT HQ, III MAF LOCATION IS UNTENABLE IF IT IS TO CONTINUE AS A SEPARATE STAFF UNDER A SEPARATE COMMANDER. RELOCATION TO MCAS FUTEMA WOULD SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. THE SOONER THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED THE BETTER, PARTICULARLY WITH REVISION OF OKINAWA TO JAPANESE CONTROL ANTICIPATED LESS THAN A YEAR FROM NOW. OTHER THAN RELOCATION OF THE HQ TO FUTEMA AND POSSIBLE REVISION OF T/O WITHIN EXISTING PERSONNEL ALLOWANCES, THERE ARE NO OTHER CHANGES APPARENT AT THIS TIME WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED. AS THE THE RANK OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO REASON TO VOLUNTARILY REDUCE THE PRESENT 3-STAR STATUS. III MAF IS A FORCE LEVEL ORGANIZATION AND SHOULD BE COMMANDED BY A 3-STAR GENERAL OFFICER. IN THE EVENT APPROVAL FOR RETENTION OF A 3-STAR BILLET FOR CG III MAF IS IMPOSSIBLE, THEN A SENIOR 2-STAR BILLET SHOULD BE THE FALLBACK POSITION. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD CG III MAF REVERT TO THE "DOUBLE-HATTED" ARRANGEMENT OF THE PRE-VIETNAM DAYS.

4. (S) THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE:

A. III MAF SHOULD BE RETAINED AS A FORCE LEVEL ORGANIZATION AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED UNDER A LTGEN. IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, A SENIOR MGEN SHOULD BE IN COMMAND.

B. HQ, III MAF SHOULD REMAIN SEPARATELY CONSTITUTED AND BE GEOGRAPHICALLY LOCATED IN SEPARATE FACILITIES.

C. HQ, III MAF SHOULD BE RELOCATED TO MCAS FUTEMA AS WAS ORIGINALLY PLANNED WHEN UNITS RELOCATED TO OKINAWA FROM VIETNAM WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION. DETAILS OF THIS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO INSURE MOVEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT NO LATER THAN EARLY FOURTH QUARTER, FY-72.

D. CINCPACFLT SHOULD BE ADVISED OF RECOMMENDATIONS A AND B ABOVE. FROM AN OPERATIONAL STANDPOINT, SUPPORT OF CINCPACFLT AND ULTIMATELY CINCPAC SHOULD BE OBTAINED IN A UNIFIED COMMANDERS STATEMENT OF A REQUIREMENT TO JCS TO CONTINUE THE EXISTING III MAF STRUCTURE AND RANK OF ITS COMMANDER.

5. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WITH WARM REGARDS.

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN ADAMS. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

1. (C) THE FOLLOWING MSG FROM VADM SCHNEIDER, COMSERVPAC, IS QUOTED
FOR YOU INFO:

QUOTE

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FM COMNAVBASE SUBIC
INFO /CG III MAF
P 052038Z SEP 71
FM COMSERVPAC
TO COMNAVBASE SUBIC
INFO CINCPACFLT
NAVSTA SUBIC
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PAGE TWO RUAOAJA1852 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECIAL LANDING FORCE (SLF) CAMP, SUBIC BAY (U)
 PERSONAL FOR REAR ADMIRAL MUSE, INFO ADMIRAL CLAREY AND CAPTAIN
 MURRAY FROM VICE ADMIRAL SCHNEIDER

- A. YOUR 010824Z SEP 71
- B. OPNAVINST 4040.22C (TABLE OF ADVANCED BASE FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS
- C. CINCPACFLT INST 5450.36 OF 13 MAY 1970
- D. CG III MAF 152300Z AUG 71 PASEP
- E. YOUR 270933Z AUG 71 PASEP
- F. NAVCOMPT 075120
- G. CINCPACFLT INST 11000.3
- 1. REF A ADVISED THAT NAVSTA SUBIC MAY HAVE A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR SLF CAMP SUPPORT AND FURTHER REQUESTS GUADANCE CONCERNING LEVELS OF HABITABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE SLF CAMP BY NAVSTA SUBIC.
- 2. ADVANC BASE FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS (ABFC) ARE PRE-ENGINEERED DESIGNS OF FACILITIES, EQUIPEMENT, MATERIAL AND ESTIMATES OF MANPOWER NEEDED TO PERFORM SPECIFIC TASKS AT ADVANCED BASES, REF B CONTAINS A BRIEF DISCRIPTION OF EACH COMPONENT AND IDENTIFIES THE MAJOR MATERIAL ITEMS AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FUNCTION TO BE PERFORMED. IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT THE USE OF COMPLETE STAN-

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DARD UNITS IS NOT IN ANY WAY MANDATORY. THE STANDARD UNITS ARE A CON-
 VENIENT AID FOR THE AREA COMMANDERS WHO SHOULD REQUEST MODIFICATIONS
 FOR ANY UNIT OR COMPONENT AS NECESSARY TO MEET INDIVIDUAL REQUIRE-
 MENTS.

- 3. REF C TASKS NAVSTA SUBIC TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO FLEET MARINE FORCES DURING INPORT PERIODS AT SUBIC BAY, TO INCLUDE ADVANCE BASE TYPE BILLETING, ADMINISTATIVE AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES ASHORE. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE ALF CAMP, AS ORIGINALLY CONSTRUCTED IN 1966 MET THESE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS.
- 4. THE DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE MARINES TO UPGRADE THE FACILITIES AS STATED IN PARA 5 REF D IS RECOGNIZED. HOWEVER, PERTINENT BACKGROUND FUNDING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CINCPACFLT COMPTROLLER PERSONNEL INDICATES THAT OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING SUPPORT FOR THE MARINE ASSAULT UNITS (MAU) IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MARINE CORPS NOT CINCPACFLT. THIS BEING THE CASE, MAU'S ARE TO BE SUPPORTED BY NAVSTA SUBIC IN THE SAME MANNER AS ARE OTHER TENENTS WHICH ARE OUTSIDE THE PACFLT FORCES AFLOAT-STAFF ASHORE FUNDING CHAIN.
- 5. NAVSTA SUBIC, IN THE ROLE OF THE HOST ACTIVITY, HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE ON A NON REIMBURSABLE BASIS NORMAL CYCLICAL

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 STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR FOR THOSE SLF CAMP BUILDINGS WHICH ARE ON NAVSTA SUBIC'S PLANT ACCOUNT. NAVSTA SUBIC HAS NO FUNDING RESPONSIBILITY FOR BUILDINGS NOT ON ITS OWN PLANT ACCOUNT. BUILDING IMPROVEMENTS, ALTERATIONS, REHABILITATION, ETC., FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE TENANT, SUCH AS THOSE ITEMS ADDRESSED IN PARA 2A, C, D, E, F, H, AND I OF REFS D AND E ARE THEREFORE THE FUNDING RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TENANT. REF F APPLIES.

6. NAVSTA SUBIC, AS THE HOST ACTIVITY, SHOULD CERTAINLY COORDINGATE, ADVISE AND ASSIST OTHER THAN FUNDING TENANTS IN OBTAINING SERVICES AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. SLF COMP REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS UTILITIES, TELEPHONE, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, LAUNDRY, ETC., ARE TO BE FUNDED BY THE MARINES. PARA 2B OF REF F AND PARA 4B OF REF G ARE QUITE EXPLICIT IN DELINEATING THE VARIOUS FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN A HOST AND TENANT AND SHOULD BE FOLLOWED WHENEVER REASIBLE IN NEGOTIATING HOST TENENT AGREEMENTS.

7. COMSERVPAC IS NOT AWARE OF THE DETAILS CONCERNING COMMITMENTS MADE TO THE MARINES, NAVSTA SUBIC TO CORRECT THE DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED IN REFS D AND E. HOWEVER, COMSERVPAC WILL SUPPORT THE SUPERVISORS CAN BE PROVIDED TO ASSIST IN UPGRADING THESE FACILITIES IF DESIRED. POSITIVE ASSURANCE CANNOT BE GIVEN AT THIS TIME THAT

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ADDITIONAL FUNDS WILL BE PROVIDED BY COMSERVPAC TO NAVSTA SUBIC FOR SLF COMP SUPPORT. CAPTIAN MURRAY CAN CERTAINLY ADDRESS THIS REQUIREMENT IN THE MID YEAR REVIEW AND ATTEMPTS WILL BE MADE TO SUPPLEMENT NAVSTA SUBIC'S APF FOR THE FUNDS EXPENDED.

8. BY SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE, COMSERVPAC WILL REQUEST CINCPACFLT TO ADVISE US OF THE PROJECTED SLF CAMP UTILIZATION AND GOALS CONCERNING HABITABILITY LEVELS IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE CURRENT FACILITY MANAGEMENT AND PROVIDE FOR FUTURE BASE PLANNING.

9. BEST REGARDS

GP-4

UNQUOTE.

2. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WITH WARM REGARDS.

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PERSONAL FOR LGEN JONES FROM ADM CLAREY
AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE AREAS (U)

A. ACTING CG FMFPAC MEMO 0627 OF 20 AUG 71

1. REF A PRESENTED VERY COGENT POINTS REGARDING THE NEED FOR INCREASING THE NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE AREAS AVAILABLE FOR OUR USE AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE DESIRABILITY OF SCHEDULING AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES IN TAIWAN. I AM IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THE NEED TO EXPOSE OUR NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM TO THE BROADEST SPECTRUM OF EXERCISE CONDITIONS AND AREAS.

2. (S) BY SEPARATE MESSAGE I AM APPRISING ADM MCCAIN OF RECENT INDICATIONS OF RAN SUPPORT FOR AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA, OUR DESIRE TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES THROUGHOUT PACOM (SPECIFICALLY TAIWAN) AS FEASIBLE, AND REQUESTING HIS VIEWS AND SUPPORT. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

3. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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CINCPACFLT

P 170545Z SEP 71

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P 180346Z SEP 71
FM ADMIN III MAF
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW
BT

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CCN: 294
TOR: 18SEP71 0625Z

SECRET SPECAT//N05440// PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES
FROM MAJGEN ADAMS INFO MAJGEN OWENS - DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS

MACS FOUR (U)

- A. ADMIN III MAF 140750Z SEP71 (S)
- B. COMSEVENTHFLT 070823Z SEP71 (C) (PASEP)
- C. NAVSEEACT JAPAN 140712Z SEP71 (C)
- D. CG FMFPAC 160006Z SEP71 (S)

1. (U) DURING MY RECENT VISIT TO THE FIRST MAW IN CONNECTION
WITH COMSEVENTHFLT VISIT TO IWAKUNI, I HAD A LONG DISCUSSION
WITH BOB OWENS ON MACS-4. MY OBSERVATIONS IN THIS MESSAGE
SUPPLEMENT THE POSITION TAKEN BY REF A.

2. (S) I AM CONCERNED AT THE VERY REAL POSSIBILITY THAT
WE MIGHT LOSE MACS-4. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, WE HAVE FOR ALL
PRACTICAL PURPOSES, LOST OUR AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY. THE FIRST

ADMIN III MAF

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MAW F-4'S WILL NOT BE ABLE TO OPERATE AS FIGHTERS IN AN ADVANCED BASE SITUATION WITH ANY DEGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS, WITHOUT THE CONTROL PROVIDED BY MACS-4. HALF AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IS ABOUT THE SAME AS NO AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. OF COURSE THE LAAM BN, WHEN IT ARRIVES IN THE FORWARD AREA, MUST ALSO RELY ON INFORMATION AND CONTROL PROVIDED BY THE MACS TAOC. UNLESS WE HAVE AN ADEQUATE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM READY TO DEPLOY, WE WILL IMMEDIATELY BE FACED WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF OPCON OF AT LEAST A PORTION OF OUR AIR ASSETS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY PERTINENT IN THE 5027 PLAN WHICH AS YOU KNOW HAS BEEN DEBATED FOR SOME TIME AND WAS FINALLY RESOLVED IN OUR FAVOR AT THE JCS LEVEL.

3. (S) BOB MENTIONED SOME OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MACS-4 WHICH ARE ENUMERATED BELOW:

A. VC-5 RELIES HEAVILY ON MACS-4 FOR CONTROLLING MISSILE SHOTS AND MONITORING DRONE OPERATIONS. IN FACT VC-5 USED THE MACS-4 PRESENCE AS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR VC-5 REMAINING IN OKI. SINCE JANUARY 1971, MACS-4 HAS CONTROLLED THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE (335) VC-5 INTERCEPTS.

B. MACS-4 CONDUCTS LINK 4A AND LINK-11 TDS OPS WITH SEVENTHFLT UNITS TRANSITING OKINAWA WATERS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVENTEEN (17) EXERCISES SINCE JANUARY, WITH INDICATIONS THAT SUCH OPS WILL INCREASE IN FREQUENCY. DURING THE MACS-4 BRIEFING FOR COMSEVENTHFLT AND HIS ACCOMPANYING STAFF MEMBERS, BILL MACK WAS MOST POSITIVE IN HIS APPRAISAL OF THESE OPERATIONS. HE OFFERED TO ALTER SEVENTHFLT SCHEDULES, IF NECESSARY, TO IMPROVE FREQUENCY AND SCOPE OF THESE OPERATIONS. REF B ALSO ILLUSTRATES THAT BILL HAS BEEN PLACING EMPHASIS ON TDS OPS WITH MACS-4.

C. YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE MARINE AIR CONTROLLER AUGMENTATION PROGRAM WITH CTF 77. MACS-4 HAS TWO CONTROLLERS ABOARD EITHER THE PIRAZ OR NORTHERN SAR SHIP IN YANKEE STATION ON A CONTINUING BASIS. CONTROLLERS ARE ROTATED EVERY MONTH. THIS PROGRAM IS A VALUABLE ASSIST FOR TF 77 AND PROVIDES EXCELLENT TRAINING FOR OUR CONTROLLERS. SINCE 15 MAY 1971, EIGHT MACS-4 CONTROLLERS HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THIS PROGRAM.

D. SINCE 1 MARCH, MACS-4 HAS CONDUCTED TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (271) INTERCEPTS WITH FIRST MAW AIRCRAFT IN ADDITION TO CONTROLLING FOURTEEN SPARROW SHOTS. BOB INDICATES THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO PLACE EMPHASIS ON THIS

ADMIN III MAF

P 180346Z SEP 71

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RAINING. WHEN WE GET APPROVAL FOR TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS OF VMFA TO EITHER NAHA OR KADENA, THE EXTENT OF THIS AIR CONTROLLED TRAINING IN THE OKINAWA AREA WILL INCREASE.

4. (S) BOB OWENS IS MOST ANXIOUS TO MOVE A MACS-4 TPS-22 TO IWAKUNI IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR POSITIVE CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT IN THE LOCAL FLYING AREA. THE TPS-22 WILL PROVIDE THE MUCH NEEDED SURVEILLANCE AFTER THE WING AIRCRAFT DEPART THE IWAKUNI AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AREA. REF C PROVIDES PRELIMINARY DATA ON THE UPS-ID AND A TPS-22 RADIATION HAZARDS STUDY FOR IWAKUNI. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE HERO ON SITE SURVEY IN EARLY OCTOBER, WE SHOULD KNOW WHAT CONSTRAINTS WILL HAVE TO BE OBSERVED IN UTILIZING THE TPS-22. I CONCUR WITH BOB'S DESIRE TO GET THE TPS-22 IN OPERATION AT IWAKUNI AND RECOMMEND SUPPORT FOR THIS EFFORT. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MACS-4 UPS ID TO IWAKUNI HAS ALREADY BEEN OF CONSIDERABLE HELP TO FIRST MAW IN PROVIDING POSITIVE CONTROL AND HAS PROVIDED SOME INCREASE IN AIR CONTROLLER TRAINING. IF IT DEVELOPS THAT THE TPS-22 CAN BE ACCOMMODATED AT IWAKUNI AS IT NOW APPEARS, FURTHER CONTROLLER TRAINING IMPROVEMENT WILL RESULT. BOB IS FULLY CONFIDENT THAT WITH OR WITHOUT THE TPS-22 DEPLOYMENT MACS-4 WILL BE AT C-2 TRAINING IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

5. (S) I BELIEVE THAT OKINAWA IS THE BEST LOCATION FOR MACS-4 FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE FLEXIBILITY THAT NOW EXISTS IN THE INCREMENTAL DEPLOYMENT OF MACS-4 PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO IWAKUNI, AS REQUIREMENTS DICTATE, IS MOST BENEFICIAL AND FULFILLS

BOB OWENS' NEEDS. IT PERMITS ROTATION OF PERSONNEL AS REQUIRED, FULFILLS CONTROLLER TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND ADDS TO BOB'S ABILITY TO MEET POSITIVE AIR CONTROL REQUIREMENTS IN HIS SPECIAL USE AIR SPACE AREAS. IT ALSO PROVIDES OPTIMUM SUPPORT FOR SEVENTHFLT IDS OPS, VC-5 OPS AND FIRST MAW MISSILE SHOOT.

6. (S) AS THE ACTING CG III MAF, I FEEL THAT THE PRESENCE OF A MACS SQUADRON IN WESTPAC IS ESSENTIAL TO THE OPERATIONAL READINESS OF III MAF. WE SHOULD RESIST ALL EFFORTS TO REDUCE SUCH VITAL UNITS IN WESTPAC. I CANNOT AGREE WITH THE EFFICACY OF PLACING SUCH HEAVY RELIANCE ON DEPLOYING UNITS FROM MIDPAC AND EASTPAC WHEN NEEDED, ESPECIALLY AS WE SEE MORE AND MORE OF OUR SURFACE LIFT CAPACITY DEACTIVATED. WE MUST MAINTAIN A FORWARD DEPLOYED CAPABILITY TO FIELD A BALANCED AIR-GROUND TEAM ON SHORT NOTICE.

7. (C) SINCE PREPARING THIS, I HAVE RECEIVED REF D WHICH EFFECTIVELY STATES THE REQUIREMENT FOR MACS-4 IN WESTPAC. NONETHELESS, I FEEL THESE OBSERVATIONS MAY BE OF SOME VALUE TO YOU IF CMC REQUIRES FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE MACS POSTURE IN FMFPAC. VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WITH WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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ADMIN III MAF

P 180346Z SEP 71

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R 182138Z SEP 71
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUAOAJA/CG III MAF
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CONFIDENTIAL//N00000// PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN ADAMS FROM
 LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

COMBINED MABLEX PLANNING, APR 72 (U)

A. CG III MAF 110313Z SEP 71 (C) (PERS)

B. CG FMFPAC 131001Z AUG 71 (S)

C. CINCPACFLT 012038Z SEP 71 (S) (PASEP)

1. (U) I APPRECIATE THE COMPLETE AND INFORMATIVE
 UPDATE DONN PROVIDED IN REF A CONCERNING THE
 PLANNING FOR THE SUBJ MABLEX.

2. (C) ART, AS YOU ARE AWARE, I FULLY CONCUR IN THE
 REQUIREMENT FOR MSC SHIPPING IN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES,
 AS STATED IN REF B. FURTHER, I CONSIDER IT ADVISABLE
 FOR US TO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR INCLUSION OF MSC
 SHIPPING IN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES AT THE EARLIEST

CG FMFPAC

R 182138z SEP 71

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POSSIBLE TIME. THUS, I WHOLEHEARTEDLY ENDORSE THE III MAF EFFORTS IN SURFACING THIS ISSUE EARLY IN THE PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1441 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR PLANNING FOR GOLDEN DRAGON. EVEN THOUGH THE FUNDING CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE BUDGET, AS STATED IN REF C, MAY PRECLUDE OBTAINING MSC SHIPPING DURING THE REMAINDER OF FY-72, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD SURFACE THIS ISSUE AT THE 7TH FLT SKED CONF IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUBJ EXERCISE. OUR EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD INITIATION OF ACTION BY 7TH FLT TO EXPLORE ALL POSSIBILITIES REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY OF MSC SHIPPING FUNDS TO INCLUDE THE FORTHCOMING FY-72 MID-YEAR BUDGET REVIEW. FURTHER, WE MUST STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF 7TH FLT FOLLOW-ON ACTION TO ENSURE THAT FUNDS FOR MSC SHIPPING ARE INCLUDED IN FUTURE EXERCISE PLANNING.

3. (C) DONN'S PROPOSAL THAT THE TROOPS MOVE TO THE EXERCISE AREA ON A TAP AND RETURN VIA AIRLIFT IS VERY INTERESTING. WE ARE STUDYING ALL FACETS OF THIS PROPOSAL TO DETERMINE THE MOST ECONOMICAL AND FEASIBLE COURSE OF ACTION. MY REPS TO THE 7TH FLT CONFERENCE WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE COMPARATIVE COSTS OF AN MSC LIFT BOTH WAYS AND A COMBINATION MSC LIFT/AIRLIFT FOR THIS AND SUBSEQUENT EXERCISES. ADDITIONALLY, THE FMFPAC

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR REPS WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE YOU THE INFORMATION REQUESTED REGARDING 1ST ANGLICO PARTICIPATION IN THE SUBJ EXERCISE. A SEPARATE MESSAGE WILL ADDRESS ADDITIONAL ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE CONFERENCE.

4. (C) IN SUMMARY, TO ACHIEVE OUR GOAL, WE MUST CONTINUALLY STRESS THE NEED TO EXERCISE MSC LIFT CAPABILITY AND FOR THE ASSOCIATED FUNDING REQUIREMENT. I CONSIDER THE FLEET SCHEDULING CONFERENCES TO BE APPROPRIATE PLATFORMS FOR OBTAINING SUPPORT IN THIS EFFORT FROM THE NAVY HALF OF OUR AMPHIBIOUS TEAM. WARM REGARDS.

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CG FMFPAC

R 182138z SEP 71

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P 182155Z SEP 71
FM CINCPACFLT
TO RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
P 160155Z SEP 71
FM CINCPACFLT
TO RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
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TOR: 190654Z SEP 71

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE //N00000//
KADENA AB AVAILABILITY (U)

A. CINCPACAF 082046Z MAR 71

1. (S) REF A IS YOUR RESPONSE TO AN FMFPAC REQUEST FOR PACAF SUPPORT OF WESTPAC MARINE AIR MOVEMENT TRAINING ON OKINAWA. WHILE ENDORSING JOINT AIR MOVEMENT TRAINING AS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AND RECOGNIZING THE REQUIREMENT TO PROPERLY PREPARE PARTICIPANTS FOR POSSIBLE EXECUTION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS, REF A ADVISED THAT HIGHER PRIORITY COMMITMENTS FOR PACAF ACFT ASSETS PRECLUDED APPROVAL FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE AND RECOMMENDED JOINT ACTIVITIES SUCH AS LOAD PLANNING AND LOADING/UNLOADING EXERCISES USING STATIC ACFT AS NEAR TERM SOLUTIONS.

2. (S) PURSUANT TO REF A, COMSEVENTHFLT REQUESTED FIFTH AIR FORCE CONCURRENCE FOR THE CONDUCT OF THIS RECOMMENDED TRAINING IN USAF ACFT AT KADENA AB. IN REPLY, FIFTH AIR FORCE DISAPPROVED BASED ON PRESENT AND PROJECTED FACILITY COMMITMENTS AND THE NEED FOR OTHER BASES TO SHARE THE CONTINGENCY SUPPORT LOAD. IN CONCLUSION,

CINCPACFLT

P 182155Z SEP 71

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PAGE TWO RUHHBRA7710 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FIFTH AIR FORCE RECOMMENDED THE USE OF MCAS (H) FUTEMA FOR SEVENTH FLEET STATIC AIR MOVEMENT TRAINING AND RESTUDY OF ANY CONTINGENCY PLAN NOT ALREADY APPROVED WHICH CONTEMPLATES UPLOAD OF KADENA FACILITIES FOR COMMITMENT TO FUTEMA.

3. (S) THE BULK OF THE WESTPAC MARINE FORCES ARE POSITIONED ON OKINAWA. FOR THIS FORCE TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE REACTION POSTURE, AIRLIFT TRNG/MOVEMENT CAPABILITY MUST BE MAINTAINED. CINCPAC CURRENTLY HAS SEVERAL CONTINGENCY PLANS IN BEING (FRESH MANDATE, OPLAN 5041 AND VARIOUS EVACUATION PLANS) THAT CALL FOR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE BY THE FLEET MARINE FORCE TO INCLUDE AIRLIFT BY PACAF/MAC ASSETS. FOR THIS FORCE TO BE RESPONSIVE, DESIGNATED MARINE UNITS MUST PERIODICALLY EXERCISE PORTIONS OF THOSE PLANS THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED AND/OR SIMULATED TO MAINTAIN THEIR AIRLIFT PROFICIENCY. TO BE EFFECTIVE, THIS TRAINING SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AT THE SAME SITE WHERE THE ACTUAL CONTINGENCY EMBARKATION WILL BE DONE AND SHOULD EXERCISE ALL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN INCLUDING MOTOR CONVOY ROUTES AND STAGING/MARSHLLING POINTS.

4. (S) THE REVERSION OF NAHA TO CIVILIAN CONTROL AND THE RELOCATION OF NAHA BASED U.S. UNITS PRECLUDE UTILIZATION OF THIS FACILITY FOR TRNG OR CONTINGENCY PLANS.

5. (S) THE FACTORS WHICH MILITATE AGAINST USE OF MCAS (H) FUTEMA ARE:

A. EXTENSIVE CIVILIAN ENCROACHMENT AROUND FUTEMA DICTATES AGAINST JET OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY BY LARGE, FOUR-ENGINE JETS SUCH AS THE C141: WE HOPE TO AVOID PRECIPITATING AN UNDESIRED POLITICAL REACTION BY HOLDING NOISE LEVELS DOWN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

B. FUTEMA HAS ONLY A LIMITED ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY DUE TO CONFLICT WITH NAHA/KADENA AIRSPACE REQUIREMENTS.

C. FUTEMA MAY WELL BE CLOSED TO FIXED WING OPERATIONS FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD IN THE FUTURE. AS YOU KNOW, THE ROGNER AD HOC GROUP IS CONSIDERING A \$1.3M PLAN TO UPGRADE FUTEMA'S RUNWAY TO PROVIDE A SECOND AIRFIELD UNDER U.S. CONTROL AS A BACK-UP TO KADENA.

6. (S) KADENA AB REMAINS THE ONLY ALL-WEATHER STATION CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION TO POSSESSING A MAC TERMINAL, IT IS ALSO THE PROGRAMMED HOME PORT OF A PACAF C-130 WING.

7. (S) CINCPACFLT SHARES FIFTH AIR FORCE CONCERN OVER THE NEED TO EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTE THE WORKLOAD ON OKINAWA AS WE CONSOLIDATE AND RELOCATE OUR FORCES BUT CONSIDERS, FOR THE REASONS CITED ABOVE, THAT KADENA AB SHOULD BE TASKED TO PROVIDE PACOM CONTINGENCY AIRLIFT SUPPORT. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE AND ASSISTANCE IN

PAGE FOUR RUHHBRA7710 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

OBTAINING ACCESS TO KADENA FOR SEVENTHFLT STATIC AIR MOVEMENT TRAINING AND QUARTERLY AIR MOVEMENT EXERCISES.

GP-3

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#7766 CINCPACFLT

P 160155Z SEP 71

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P 200130Z SEP 71
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO RUADLBA/COMNAVFORJAPAN
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG MARCORB CAMP BUTLER
RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

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TOR: 200604Z SEP 71

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PERSONAL FOR RADM BURKE INFO LTGEN JONES MGEN ADAMS AND BGEN BARROW
FROM MGEN METZGER

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
CAMP FUJI TRAINING (U)

A. COMUS JAPAN 130320Z SEP 71(S)

1. (S) I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SIGHT THE MESSAGE CONCERNING CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN JSO AND COMUS JAPAN RELATIVE TO THE NIXON 'DOUBLE SHOCK.' I CONCUR WITH THE COMMENTS MADE ABOUT NORTH FUJI AND AM PREPARED TO ADJUST OUR PLANS ACCORDINGLY FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS.

2. (S) I WILL HAVE A BLT IN TRAINING AT FUJI DURING THE OCT-NOV PERIOD. I INTEND TO SEND A BATTERY OF 155MM HOWITZERS WITH THEM IN ADDITION TO THE 105MM BATTERY NORMALLY ACCOMPANYING THE BLT TO JAPAN. THIS SECOND ARTILLERY BATTERY WOULD INCREASE THE USAGE OF NFMA IN OCT-NOV AND I'M WILLING TO DELETE THEM FROM THE TASK ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPLOYING BATTALION IF IT WILL HELP MATTERS. OF COURSE WE DON'T HAVE TO USE NFMA FOR THE 155MM HOWITZER BATTERY AND IF THERE ARE SUFFICIENT RANGES AVAILABLE IN EAST FUJI I WOULD LIKE TO SEND THIS EXTRA ARTY UNIT. WE DO NEED THE TRAINING. ALTHOUGH JSO SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED NFMA I WONDER IF THE MERE PRESENCE OF THIS ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY UNIT AT FUJI WOULD CONSTITUTE ESCALATION? I'LL DEFER TO YOUR JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER AND AGAIN, I WILL KEEP THEM HERE AT OKINAWA IF YOU THINK THEIR PRESENCE IN JAPAN WILL COMPLICATE THE SITUATION. YOU UNDERSTAND THAT WE STILL CONSIDER NFMA VITAL TO OUR TRAINING AND HOPE THAT AFTER THIS CURRENT CRISIS IS OVER WE CAN RESUME USING NORTH FUJI WITHOUT RESTRICTION. YOUR JUDGMENT ON THIS MATTER IS REQUIRED EARLIEST IF WE ARE TO PRECLUDE UNNECESSARY PREEMBARKATION OPERATIONS

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

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#2221 CG THIRD MARDIV

P 200130Z SEP 71

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P 210756Z SEP 71
FM COMNAVFORJAPAN
TO RUACAJA/CG THIRD MARDIV
INFO RUACAJA/CG III MAF
RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUACAJA/CG MCB CP BUTLER OKINAWA
BT

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TOR: 210850Z SEP 71

S E C R E T XNOFORN//N00000//

PERSONAL FOR MGEN METZGER INFO LTGEN JONES, MGEN ADAMS AND
BGEN BARROW FROM BURKE DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
CAMP FUJI TRAINING (U)

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 200130Z SEP 71

B. COMUSJAPAN 130320Z SEP 71 (NOTAL)

C. COMNAVFORJAPAN 200830Z SEP 71

1. (U) INFORMATION AND COMMENTS CONTAINED REF A MOST APPRECIATED.

2. (SNF) IN SPITE OF PICTURE DESCRIBED IN REF B DO NOT CONSIDER
ARRIVAL OF 155MM BATTERY IN ADDITION TO 105MM BATTERY TO BE
A PROVOCATIVE ESCALATION.

3. (SNF) AS WITNESSED BY PAST RECORD, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE
THAT FIRING DATES RECOMMENDED REF C WILL BE REALIZED, BUT
THINK WE SHOULD KEEP THE PRESSURE ON FOR THE TIME BEING.
UNDERSTAND THAT EAST FUJI WOULD BE AVAIL FOR SOME FIRING
SUBJECT TO COORDINATION WITH GSDF BUT WITH THE LIMITATION
OF PRACTICALLY DIRECT FIRE FOR 155MM.

4. (SNF) THERE IS NO QUESTION AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF NFMA
TO MARINE CORPS TRAINING. YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT WE WILL
PRESS ON WITH EFFORTS TO NORMALIZE NFMA AS QUICKLY AS THE
POLITICAL SITUATION PERMITS.

5. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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7758 COMNAVFORJAPAN

P 210756Z SEP 71

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TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
RUHHFMA/CG FMF PAC
RUADKEA/313TH AD
RUAOAJA/CG MARCORB CP BUTLER RYIS
RUYSAA/COMFLEACTS RY
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SECRET NOFORN SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM MCCAIN, GEN
ROSSON, ADM CLAREY, GEN CLAY, LTG JONES, MG TANBERG, BG BARROW,
CAPT BROWN, FROM LTG LAMPERT. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

RID-PO

SUBJECT: WEAPONS DISPERSAL (U) **ATT**

A. CINCPACREP RY 230530Z SEP 71, SUBJ AS ABOVE

1. (SNF) BY REFERENCE A I HAVE ASKED THAT URGENT CONSIDERATION
BE GIVEN TO AUTHORIZE ALL SERVICES TO BEGIN REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

PAGE 2 RUAOADA2179 SECRET NOFORN SPECAT

2. (SNF) I CONSIDER THIS TO BE OF THE UTMOST URGENCY IN VIEW OF
THE TASK AHEAD OF US AND THE NEED TO PLAN FOR CONTINGENCY OF 1 APR
72 REVERSION.

3. (U) WITH RESPECT AND BEST WISHES.

GP-1

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CINCPACREP RY

P 230800ZSEP71

COG:S/SEC

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P 271822Z SEP 71
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

TOR:280949ZSEP71

CONFIDENTIAL MARDIS
PERSONAL FOR LIGEN JONES FROM MGEN DWYER.
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71

A. CG SEVENTH MAB 212349Z SEP 71.

1. REF A IS PAUL GRAHAM'S QUICK REP WHICH GIVES A GOOD RUN DOWN ON THE EXERCISE.

2. I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS SOME THOUGHTS ON THE EXERCISE AS VIEWED FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, BASED UPON PERSONAL OBSERVATION, CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS COMMANDERS/UMPIRES, OBSERVER REPORTS, FIRST FLEET CRITIQUE NOTES AND A REVIEW OF OTHER QUICK REPS.

3. PLANNING

A. PLANNING PROGRESSED IAW ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE AND NO MAJOR DIFFICULTY WAS ENCOUNTERED. HOWEVER, THE FORMATION OF THE MAB/TEC STAFFS AT A TIME WHEN ALL CONTRIBUTING COMMANDS WERE SUFFERING FROM SEVERE PERSONNEL SHORTAGES DUE TO SUMMER TRANSFERS WAS A PROBLEM FOR ALL. WHILE WE SHOULD ALWAYS JUMP AT AN OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN AN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE, BELIEVE EXERCISES OF THIS SCALE SHOULD BE HELD NO LATER THAN EARLY JUNE OR EARLIER THAN LATE OCTOBER (ASSUMING CONTINUED PERSONNEL AUSTERITY IN THE SUMMER MONTHS).

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B. THE LANDING FORCE PLAN PROPERLY PROVIDED FOR A NUMBER OF ALTERNATE LANDING PLANS. CORRECTLY THEY ALL WERE GEARED TO EXERCISE SMLS. WITH THE BAD WEATHER A VARIATION WAS EXECUTED, HIGHLIGHTING THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE NAVY/MARINE STAFFS INVOLVED. IN THIS CASE, A SPECIFIC FOUL WEATHER PLAN WAS NOT DEVELOPED BECAUSE OF THE DESIRE TO TEST SMLS. IN AN ACTUAL CONTINGENCY SITUATION, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZE FOUL WEATHER PLANS ARE A MUST IN THE EVEN RAPID ENTRY OF LANDING FORCE ELEMENTS IS DICTATED. LANDING OF TROOP UNITS BY WATERBORNE MEANS FROM AN LPH IS NOT EASY. IN A CRITICAL SITUATION IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY. AN OLD LESSON.

C. OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO A 90 DAY PLANNING CYCLE. IN MOST CRISIS SITUATIONS WE SELDOM HAVE THAT LUXURY. BELIEVE IT BEHOOVES US ALL TO UPGRADE OUR MOUNT OUT AND EMBARKATION READINESS SO THAT WE CAN EMBARK A MAB WITHIN 72 HOURS PREPARED TO CONDUCT AN AMPH ASLT WITHIN TIME NECESSARY TO TRANSIT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA. TO THIS END RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION OF MINIMUM NOTICE EXERCISE. WE'D LIKE TO TRY IT HERE IN THE SPRING OF 72 (IF WE CAN OBTAIN SHIPPING).

4. EMBARKATION

A. OPERATIONS PROGRESSED SMOOTHLY DURING ACTUAL EMBARKATION. PLANNING PROBLEMS WERE OCCASIONED BY THE INITIAL UNCERTAINTY OF AVAILABILITY OF ONE LPH AND THE LOSS OF ONE SHIP AFTER LOAD PLANS WERE COMPLETED. SOME SHIPS CHARACTERISTICS WERE OUT OF DATE. THE USE OF ONE SHIP IN THE DH ROLE FURTHER REDUCED SHIPPING AVAILABILITY. SOME OF OUR OWN LOAD PLANS COULD HAVE BEEN MORE TIMELY AND ACCURATE, REFLECTING THE NEED FOR CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON EMBARKATION PLANNING. B. ONLY ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF THE MAB WAS EMBARKED, HIGHLIGHTING ONCE AGAIN THE NEED FOR MAXIMUM AVAILABILITY OF AMPH SHIPS IN THEIR PRIMARY ROLE AND FOR PARTICIPATION OF MSC SHIPPING IN THESE EXERCISES AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE.

C. TOO OFTEN EXERCISES ARE DRIVEN BY HARD AVAILABILITY PERIODS, DEPLOYMENT SKEDS AND NOT BY OUR RQMTS. WHILE RECOGNIZING NAVY RQMTS BELIEVE WE SHOULD KEEP PRESSURE ON FOR MAXIMUM NAVY AMPH SHIPPING AVAILABILITY. AS A CASE IN POINT UNDERSTAND NO LPHS WILL BY AVAIL- ABAVAILABLE FOR THE FEB/MAR 72 EXERCISE. ?

5. ASSAULT OPNS

A. IN GENERAL, THE WATERBORNE ASSAULT WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS. INITIAL WAVES TOUCHED DOWN FOUR MINUTES LATE.

FORMATION OF THE LVT WAVES WAS DELAYED DUE TO ONE LVT HANGING UP FOR ABOUT 90 SECONDS IN THE COURSE OF THE HIGH SPEED LAUNCH.

B. WE USED THE HIGH SPEED LAUNCH FOR TRAINING. HOWEVER, BELIEVE

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WE SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY USE THIS TECHNIQUE AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE. RATHER IT SHOULD BE EMPLOYED WHEN TACTICAL SURPRISE IS DESIRED. IN SOME SITUATIONS IT WILL BE JUST AS EFFICIENT-AND SAFER-TO LAUNCH FROM SHIPS LYING TO OR AT ANCHOR. I'M REFERRING TO SITUATIONS WHEN OTHER BOATING MUST BE LAUNCHED WILL PRIOR TO H-HOUR.

C. AGGRESSORS HAD CONSTRUCTED A RATHER FORMIDABLE ANTI-VEHICLE BARRIER AT THE BEACH LINE. THIS WAS PENETRATED AND BEACH CONGESTION CLEARED IN LESS THAN AN HOUR AFTER LANDING. LANDING FORCE HAD PLANNED FOR THE CONTINGENCY AND SUFFICIENT DOZERS WERE READILY AVAILABLE TO CUT ROUTES OF PROGRESS. OTHER THAN THE INITIAL CONGESTION OF LVTS IT WAS WELL HANDLED.

D. THE HELO LANDING ON D PLUS ONE DURING A WEATHER BREAK LANDED BOTH BNS IN ABOUT SEVEN HOURS. IN THE MAIN THE OPNS WENT WELL. HOWEVER, HDC OPERATIONS WERE LESS THAN EFFICIENT. THERE IS A DEFINITE REQMT FOR USMC PARTICIPATION IN THE HDC AND A NEED FOR MORE PRACTICE WITH THE NAVY. ON THE MARINE SIDE WE NEED TO EXERCISE MORE CARE IN SELECTION OF LZS AND ALTERNATE LZS AND MORE PRECISION IN HELICOPTER ASSAULT PLANNING.

E. AS IT TURNED OUT WEATHER FORCED THE LANDING OF THE BULK OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT OVER THE BEACH. THE TWO YOUNG SHORE PARTY OFFICERS INVOLVED MET THE CHALLENGE ADMIRABLY AND LEARNED A GREAT DEAL IN THE PROCESS. NAVAL BEACH GROUP PERSONNEL DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY KNOW THEIR BUSINESS.

F. AN INABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH SUPPORTING NGF SHIPS WAS A SERIOUS DEFICIENCY WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CORRECTED. THE PROBLEM AROSE FROM DIFFERENT TERMINOLOGY AND PROCEDURES. IT WAS A VALUABLE LESSON RE-LEARNED.

6. TACTICAL OPNS ASHORE. DESPITE THE CHANGES DICTATED BY THE CONTINUED BAD WEATHER, TACTICAL OPNS ASHORE PROGRESSED WELL, EXERCISING ALL CONCERNED IN A WIDE RANGE OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS. TO THIS END THE EXERCISE WAS MOST VALUABLE. I OBSERVED SOME EFFECTIVE STAFF WORK AND, IN SOME INSTANCES, A NEED FOR BETTER STAFF COORDINATION. MANY YOUNG STAFF OFFICERS AND COMMANDERS RECEIVED A GOOD WORK OUT AND LEARNED SOME VALUABLE LESSONS. IN THE FUTURE, OPNS ASHORE SHOULD LAST AT LEAST FIVE DAYS TO ENSURE FULL EXERCISE OF ALL ELEMENTS PARTICIPATING.

7. MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS

A. SMLS DID NOT RECEIVE AN ADEQUATE TEST. NEVERTHELESS, SOME VARY VALUABLE EXPERIENCE WAS GAINED IN DEVELOPING PROCEDURES, STRUCTURE, COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNIQUES. DETAILS WILL BE INCLUDED IN PAUL'S AFTER ACTION REPORT. I WILL FORWARD COPIES OF EVERYTHING WE HAVE TO LOU METZGER. AS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WE NEED TO CONDUCT AT LEAST

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A 10 DAY EXERCISE DEVOTED TO SMLS. I WOULD POINT OUT HERE THAT NEITHER VADM JOHNSON NSF RADM WALT GADDIS ARE ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTERS OF SMLS. TO QUOTE ADM JOHNSON: "A POOR MAN'S SUBSTITUTE TO ELIMINATE HEAVY LOGISTICS SPT ON THE BEACH". GADDIS HAS A VARIETY OF REASONS WHY NAVY SHIPS CAN'T STAY IN AN OBJECTIVE AREA OVER 10 DAYS. THE CONCEPT WAS DEBATED AT SOME LENGTH ABOARD BLUE RIDGE WHEN LTGEN THRASH AND LARRY SNODDY WERE ABOARD. WE NEED TO DO SOME EDUCATING TO GAIN COMPLETE ACCEPTANCE AT THE NAVY OPERATING LEVEL. WE'LL CONTINUE TO WORK ON THIS HERE AND MENTION IT AS AN ALERT TO THE FOLKS IN III MAF WHO WILL BE WORKING WITH GADDIS AFTER JANUARY.

B. BLUE RIDGE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED ITS IMPROVED CAPABILITIES. WE NEED TO WORK CONTINUALLY WITH THIS SHIP TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EMBARKED CAPABILITIES AND TO ENSURE THAT HER SYSTEMS ARE BROUGHT TO PEAK EFFICIENCY. THIS EXERCISE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THE SHORTFALL OF COVERED CIRCUITS FOR MARINE USE. PAUL MADE FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE USE OF ASIS. MORE WORK WITH THE SYSTEM IS NEEDED. RECOMMEND III MAF SEND A SMALL CADRE BACK HERE A MONTH PRIOR TO BLUE RIDGE'S SAILING FOR WESTPAC TO RIDE OUT WITH THE SHIP; FURTHER, THAT A CADRE BDE STAFF BE CONTINUALLY EMBARKED IN THE SHIP.

C. SENSOR PLAY EXCELLENT ON D-DAY AND D PLUS ONE UNTIL THE NAVY AIRBORNE RELAY A/C WAS LOST WHEN THE CARRIER TASK FORCE WAS CHOPPED FROM THE AIF ON D PLUS ONE. A MAJOR EFFORT TO OBTAIN ITS RETURN WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL. FROM CONVERSATIONS AT THE FLEET CRITIQUE DON'T BELIEVE WE'LL HAVE THIS PROBLEM IN THE FUTURE.

D. SURGICAL TEAMS EMBARKED WERE GIVEN A GOOD WORKOUT WITH SIMULATED CASUALTY ACTORS.

E. COMSEC IN THE LANDING FORCE WAS GENERALLY GOOD, BECAUSE OF PRE-EXERCISE TRAINING. THE MAJORITY OF THE NOTED VIOLATIONS WERE IN UNCOVERED UMPIRE COMMUNICATIONS WHICH ALSO HANDLED ADMIN TRAFFIC, INCLUDING VIP VISITS. THIS WAS AN EXERCISE ARTIFICIALITY AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY WOULD NOT SUPPORT COVERED CIRCUITRY FOR UMPIRE NETS.

F. ALTHOUGH GIVEN ONLY A LIMITED TEST AT BEST, THE 14-6-4 HELO MIX ABOARD AN LPH APPEARS WORKABLE. IT NEEDS MORE TESTING. THE MULTI DECK LAUNCH WAS SUED TO SUPPORT THE LANDING OF ONE BLT FROM ONE LPH AND THEN ANOTHER OFF THE TWO DLPH. OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE TRIED SIMULTANEOUS BLT LANDINGS AND LANDING IN SEQUENCE. THERE ARE GOOD ARGUMENTS FOR BOTH TECHNIQUES. THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD

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STUDY PROJECT FOR THE FORCE OPS ANALYSIS SECTION: TO DETERMINE THE MOST EFFICIENT MEANS OF EMPLOYING HELOS IN AMPHIBIOUS ASLT WHEN OPERATING FROM MULTI DECKS. THE SUBJECT NEEDS RE-EXAMINATION.

G. THE TEST OF REDEYE WAS ALSO LIMITED BY WEATHER. NEVERTHELESS, AFTER TALKING WITH MCDEC OBSERVER, I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST TAKE A HARD LOOK AT OUR CURRENT FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING TACTICS WHEN OPERATING IN A REDEYE TYPE THREAT ENVIRONMENT. WE'RE STILL UTILIZING RVN TACTICS WHICH ARE HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO THE HEAT SEEKING MISSILE. THE ARMY HAS STUDIED THE PROBLEM AND IS REVISING THEIR ASSAULT TACTICS. IF THE DEVELOPMENT CENTER HAS NOT DEVELOPED STUDIES IN THIS AREA THIS, TOO, MIGHT BE A LIKELY SUBJECT FOR FORCE OPS ANALYSIS SECTION; TO DETERMINE OPTIMUM HELO ASLT TACTICS IN THE HIGH THREAT MISSILE ENVIRONMENT.

H. TWAES (TACTICAL WARFARE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION SYSTEM) WAS EMPLOYED TO ADVANTAGE BY TEC. PRESENT LIMITATION IS ONE WAY COMMUNICATION. RECOMMEND CONTINUED USE IN FUTURE EXERCISES.

I. RAY PEET ANNOUNCED AT HIS CRITIQUE THAT HE HAD FORMED A SPECIAL GROUP TO TEST THE FLEET'S OPERATIONAL SECURITY. THIS GROUP PENETRATED BRIEFING, ARRANGED TO GET ON MAILING LIST AND OBTAINED THE FULL ORDER OF BATTLE AND PLAN OF TARGET WELL BEFORE SORTIE. HE DID NOT ELABORATE BUT MADE THE POINT THAT OPERATIONAL SECURITY WAS POOR. IT IS A LESSON FOR US ALL AND A SUBJECT THAT IS DESERVING OF EMPHASIS AT EVERY ECHELON.

J. ALTHOUGH I HAVE MENTIONED A NUMBER OF SHORTCOMINGS THE EXERCISE WAS EXTREMELY VALUABLE AND SUCCESSFUL DESPITE THE POOR WEATHER. NAVY/MARINE RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT. THE MAB DID A FINE JOB AS DID THEIR NAVY PARTNERS. THEY ACCOMPLISHED MUCH, PLOWED SOME NEW GROUND AND RELEARNED SOME OLD LESSONS. A LARGE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL RECEIVED THEIR BAPTISM IN AMPHIBIOUS OPNS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT OUR BASIC DOCTRINE AND TECHNIQUES ARE SOUND. WE NEED MORE AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES TO PROVIDE NEEDED EXPERIENCE AT THE LOWER ECHELONS (NAVY AND MARINE) IF WE ARE TO KEEP OUR CAPABILITY HONED TO THE DESIRED LEVEL. RESPECTFULLY. ROOS

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FMFPAC FOR G-3

WESTPAC CADRE FOR BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19) (U)

1. (C) AFTER ACTION REPORTS SUBMITTED BY PARTICIPANTS IN ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71 AGREE ON RECOMMENDATION THAT SMALL CADRE STAFF FROM WESTPAC UNITS JOIN BLUE RIDGE ON WEST COAST PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT TO WESTPAC AND RIDE OUT WITH SHIP.

2. (C) THIS PROCEDURE WILL PROVIDE TWO IMPORTANT BENEFITS. IT WILL PROVIDE THE OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITY FOR FAMILIARITY OF III MAF/THIRD MARDIV PLANNERS WITH LANDING FORCE FACILITIES AND THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS ABOARD THE BLUE RIDGE. OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE IS THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A MARINE PRESENCE ABOARD THE AMPHIBIOUS FLAGSHIP, IF ONLY AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE AS RECOMMENDED IN THIS CASE.

3. (C) RECOMMEND THIS WESTPAC CADRE CONSIST OF PERSONNEL WITH THE FOLLOWING EXPERTISE: PLANS OFFICER, OPS OFFICER (SUPPORTING ARMS), NAVAL AVIATOR (AIR OPS), OPS CHIEF, LOGISTICS OFFICER, EMBARKATION OFFICER, OPERATIONAL COMM CHIEF, ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR FAMILIARIZATION ASIS TRAINING THROUGH COMTRAPAC PRIOR TO DEPARTURE OF BLUE RIDGE FOR WESTPAC.

4. (C) AS AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL TO RETURNING CADRE STAFF FROM WESTPAC, PERS WITH QUALIFICATIONS AS SET FORTH ABOVE, UNDER ORDERS FOR WESTPAC IN THIS TIME FRAME, COULD BE DIVERTED TO BLUE RIDGE FOR TRANSPORTATION AND ACCOMPLISH THE SAME FAMILIARIZATION DESIRED.

5. (C) INFORMATION AVAILABLE INDICATES BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19) DEPLOYMENT FROM SAN DIEGO TO WESTPAC ON OR ABOUT 7 JAN 72.

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P 140210Z OCT 71
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC (PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES)
P 132258Z OCT 71
FM CTF SEVEN NINE
TO RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUADJVA/COMFAIRWESTPAC
RUADKUA/CTF SEVEN NINE PT THREE
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S E C R E T //N00000//

PERSONAL FOR VADM MACK, RADM RIERA, MGEN OWENS FROM MGEN ADAMS.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

NAHA VMFA ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT

A. CINCPACFLT 080155Z OCT 71

1. (S) IN CONVERSATION WITH LTGEN LAMPERT WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON FOLLOWING MY RETURN TO OKINAWA HE AGREED TO CONCUR IN MESSAGE FROM CTF 79 TO COMSEVENTHFLT AND COMFAIRWESTPAC INDICATING NO PROBLEM FROM HIS STANDPOINT AS HICOM/CINCPACREPRYIS WITH VMFA ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT TO NAHA.
2. (S) CTF 79 MESSAGE IN PREPARATION AND WILL BE DELIVERED TO LTGEN LAMPERT FOR CONCURRENCE A.M., 14OCT. HE HAS FULL SCHEDULE 14 OCT, BUT WILL GIVE THIS MESSAGE HIS ATTENTION ASAP AFTER HIS OFFICE HAS IT IN HAND. ANTICIPATE MINIMUM DELAY, BUT IT MAY BE 15OCT BEFORE IT IS RELEASED. WILL GIVE DONN ROBERTSON COMPLETE UPDATE ON THIS AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AND PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE 15OCT.
3. (S) LTGEN LAMPERT INTENDS TO ADDRESS SEPARATE MESSAGE TO CG, 5TH AF STATING HIS CONCURRENCE WITH OUR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL VMFA NAHA DEPLOYMENT AFTER HE CONCURS WITH OUR MESSAGE. I AGREED TO THIS AS IT KEEPS EVERYTHING ABOVE BOARD FOR HIM WHICH HE FEELS ESSENTIAL. THIS MAY FOREWARN CG, 5TH AF OF OUR OBTAINING LTGEN LAMPERT'S SUPPORT, BUT I SEE NO OBJECTION TO THIS.
4. (S) AS WILL BE STATED IN CTF 79 MESSAGE, BELIVE CINCPACFLT'S POSITION STATED REF A BASED ON INCOMPLETE FACTS, ESPECIALLY LTGEN LAMPERT'S SUPPORT. SUGGEST IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO INFORM CINCPACFLT THAT CG, 5TH AF OBJECTION BASED ON SENSITIVITY OF REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS NOT CONCURRED IN BY LTGEN LAMPERT. I BELIEVE IT IS PROBABLE THAT CG, 5TH AF MAY REFER THIS PROBLEM TO CINCPACAF HENCE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL CINCPACFLT HAS ALL FACTS SOONEST. WARM REGARDS.

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BT CTF SEVEN NINE

P 132258Z OCT 71

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S E C R E T //N000000//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES, INFO MGEN OWENS FROM MGEN ADAMS.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
NAHA VMFA ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT

A. CTF 79 132258Z OCT 71 (PASEP) (PERSONAL)

B. CINCPACFLT 080155Z OCT 71

1. (S) DURING 7TH FLT SCHEDULING CONFERENCE THIS SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED WITH BOB OWENS, EMMETT RIERA, AND BILL MACK. IT WAS AGREED THAT I SHOULD FORMALIZE SUPPORT OF JIM LAMPERT TO SUBJECT DEPLOYMENT TO WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED TO ME HE SAW NO OBJECTION. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED AS SET FORTH IN REF A. GENERAL SERVICE MESSAGE WHICH INDICATES HICOM/ CINCPACREPRYIS CONCURRENCE IN PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT FORTHCOMING AND WILL BE READDRESSSED TO CG, FMFPAC.

2. (S) AS INDICATED IN REF A I DO NOT BELIEVE CINCPACFLT POSITION STATED IN REF B WAS BASED OF FULL KNOWLEDGE OF

CG III MAF

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FACTS, PARTICULARLY HICOM/CINCPACREPRYIS SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION.

3. (S) IN ADDITION TO IMPORTANCE OF WINNING THIS ROUND WITH 5TH AF, I BELIEVE FUNDAMENTAL POST REVERSION REQUIREMENT FOR OKINAWA DEPLOYMENTS FOR 1ST MAW VMFA/VMA SQUADRONS IS ALSO AT ISSUE. WE MUST MAINTAIN SOLID POSITION THAT OKINAWA ROTATIONAL TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS OF 1ST MAW VMFA/VMA SQUADRONS ESSENTIAL FOR AIR-TO-AIR TRAINING, TRAINING WITH 3D MARDIV GROUND UNITS, AND MACS-4 AND IS ONLY SOLUTION. 5TH AF ATTEMPTS TO DIVERT THESE DEPLOYMENTS TO MISAWA OR ELSEWHERE, OR DENY THEM ON OKINAWA, DOESN'T FILL THE BILL FOR BOB OWENS.

4. (S) I RECOGNIZE YOU CANNOT ADDRESS CINCPACFLT ON THIS UNTIL COMSEVENTHFLT REQUESTS RECONSIDERATION OF REF B POSITION. BILL MACK INDICATED HE WOULD DO THIS AFTER RECEIVING CTF 79 GENERAL SERVICE MESSAGE GIVING HICOM/CINCPACREPRYIS CONCURRENCE. HAVE GUT FEELING 5TH AF WILL SEEK PACAF GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT OF THEIR POSITION ON THIS MATTER AS THEY TOO PROBABLY RECOGNIZE THIS AS A PRECEDENT DECISION WHICH WILL IMPACT IN POST REVERSION REQUIREMENT FOR KADENA BASING OF VMFA/VMA SQUADRONS OF 1ST MAW. WE MUST ALSO BE WARY OF NAVY URGING US TO ACCEPT MISAWA FOR ROTATIONAL TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS AS A MEANS OF BUYING TIME ON ANY FUTURE DECISION TO USE MISAWA FOR ULTIMATE VP BASING AS RESULT OF ROGNER RESHUFFLE. THIS DISCUSSED WITH BOB OWENS AND HE CONCURS.

5. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WARM REGARDS.

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TO RUWNCMA/COMFIRSTFLT
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DRAFTED: G-3
CONCURRED: G-3, C/S, DC/S
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CONFIDENTIAL//N00000//. PERSONAL FOR VADM PEET FROM
LIGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71 (U)

1. (U) I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PASS
ON TO YOU SOME THOUGHTS AND COMMENTS I HAVE REGARDING
THE RECENTLY COMPLETED ROPEVAL 3-71 AND FUTURE EXERCISES.

2. (C) I BELIEVE ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71 WAS OF
GREAT BENEFIT TO ALL THE MARINE FORCES INVOLVED.
ALTHOUGH MANY OF THE LESSONS LEARNED WERE OLD ONES,
THE EXERCISE DID SERVE AS A VERY FINE TEACHING
VEHICLE FOR OUR YOUNGER MARINES AND, TO BE PERFECTLY
HONEST, AN EXCELLENT REORIENTATION FOR THE OLDER
OFFICERS AND MEN. WHILE THE WEATHER DID NOT COOPERATE,
I BELIEVE WE DID ACHIEVE AT LEAST AN ACQUAINTANCE
WITH THE SMLS CONCEPT. ADDITIONALLY, WE ADDED TO OUR
KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE 14-6-4 HELO MIX. ALL

CG FMFPAC

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PAGE TWO RUHHMA1067 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR CONCERNED PROVIDED GLOWING REPORTS ON THE CAPABILITY OF BLUE RIDGE. I BELIEVE SHE WILL ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO OUR AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR POSITIVE OPERATIONAL SECURITY WAS IMPRESSED ON ALL PARTICIPANTS BY YOUR IMAGINATIVE HIGHLIGHTING OF THIS SENSITIVE AREA.

3. (C) VIC ARMSTRONG'S FORCES ARE ALREADY LOOKING FORWARD TO ROPEVAL 1-72, AS IT WILL GIVE THE FIRST MARINE BRIGADE, HERE IN HAWAII, ITS FIRST WORKOUT IN MANY YEARS IN PLANNING FOR, AND CONDUCTING AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION.

4. (C) REGARDING FLEET EXERCISES, RAY, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL FROM MY VIEWPOINT IF EXERCISES COULD BE SCHEDULED DURING THE LATE OCTOBER THROUGH MAY TIME FRAME. THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A SMOOTH SUMMER TRANSITION OF PERSONNEL AND PROVIDE MARINE RESERVE FORCES THEIR NEEDED SUPPORT DURING THEIR ANNUAL SUMMER TRNG PRIOR TO THE REGULAR FORCES GETTING UNDER FULL SAIL FOR THE FIRST FALL EXERCISE.

5. (C) I APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT IN ATTEMPTING TO PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1067 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR PROVIDE MSC SHIPPING FOR ROPEVAL 3-71 AND FURTHER LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF MSC PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE EXERCISES. WITH THE INCREASING PAUCITY OF AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING IN PACFLT, THE NECESSITY TO TRAIN, UTILIZING MSC SHIPPING, BECOMES ALL THE MORE CRITICAL. AS YOU ARE AWARE, WHEN A MAB OR MAF EXERCISE IS SCHEDULED, MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION OF AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING IS REQUIRED TO ADEQUATELY EXERCISE THE LOADING OF THIS SIZE FORCE.

6. (C) ONE PARTICULAR AREA I WOULD LIKE TO SEE STRESSED DURING FUTURE EXERCISES IS NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. DURING ROPEVAL 3-71 THE NAVAL GUNFIRE SHIPS WERE INVOLVED IN REQUALIFICATIONS FIRING, THUS REQUIRING THAT COMPHIBOPSUPPAC SPOTTERS CALL ALL LIVE FIRE MISSIONS ON SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND. THIS PRECLUDED THE LANDING FORCE SHORE FIRE CONTROL PARTIES FROM CALLING LIVE FIRE MISSIONS DURING THE EXERCISE, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF VALUABLE TRAINING TO A PORTION OF THE LANDING FORCE. IN FUTURE EXERCISES, IT WOULD BE MOST DESIRABLE IF ALL LIVE FIRING WAS CONTROLLED BY LANDING FORCE SPOTTERS.

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA1067 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR 7. (C) THE PAST EXERCISE WAS THE FIRST TIME THE I MAF STAFF WAS EXPOSED TO COORDINATING EASTPAC MARINE EFFORTS AND, ALL INDICATIONS ARE, IT DID A COMMENDABLE JOB. OF COURSE THIS ONLY PROVES OUR POINT IN SUPPORTING THE NECESSITY OF I MAF PROVIDING A VIABLE COMMAND ON THE WEST COAST TO COORDINATE CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND EXERCISES WITH YOUR STAFF. I'M CERTAINLY GLAD WE WON THAT BATTLE WITH HQMC.

8. (U) IN SUMMARY, THE CONTINUATION OF EASTPAC/MIDPAC MARINE FORCE PARTICIPATION IN FLEET EXERCISES CAN ONLY FURTHER THE CLOSE PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF OUR FORCES THEREBY INCREASING FLEET READINESS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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R 160415Z OCT 71

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FOR ADM CLAREY FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
SENIOR OFFICER REQUIREMENTS (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 140505Z/OCT71 (TS) (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE)

B. COMUSMACV 051040Z/OCT71 (TS) (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE) (PASEP)

1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED VIEWS AND COMMENTS CONCERNING THE
REF B PROPOSAL WHICH RECOMMENDED GENERAL/FLAG OFFICER REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENT IN HQ, VIETNAM ASSISTANCE COMMAND
(VAC). THESE REDUCED REQUIREMENTS REFLECTED THE ELIMINATION OF
THE DEP AC/S, OPERATIONS, J3 WHICH IS THE ONLY MARINE CORPS
GENERAL OFFICER BILLET ON COMUSMACV STAFF.

2. (TS) FULLY APPRECIATE THAT PRESENT BILLET OF MARINE GENERAL
IN J3, OPERATIONS WILL NOT REMAIN A VIABLE ASSIGNMENT AS TROOP
REDUCTION PROGRESSES. ACCORDINGLY, I CONCUR IN THE
PLANNED DELETION OF MARINE GENERAL FROM COMUSMACV STAFF. VERY
RESPECTFULLY AND WITH WARM REGARDS. GP-4

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Dwyer FROM LTGEN JONES. MARDIS. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS. N

ROPEVAL 3-71/MABLEX 1-71 (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 271822Z/SEP 71 (C) (PERSONAL)

B. CG SEVENTH MAB 212349Z/SEP 71 (C)

1. (U) YOUR COMMENTS (REF A) CONCERNING THE SUBJECT
ROPEVAL/MABLEX HAVE BEEN NOTED WITH INTEREST AS WERE
PAUL'S COMMENTS CONTAINED IN HIS REPORT (REF B).

2. (C) I AGREE THAT, IF POSSIBLE, WE SHOULD AVOID A
MAJOR AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE DURING THE JUNE-SEPTEMBER
TIME FRAME. I UNDERSTAND THAT RAY PEET, AT THE LAST
COMFIRSTFLT SCHEDULING AND SERVICES CONFERENCE,
MENTIONED HOLDING HIS FLEET EXERCISES DURING THE
EARLY SPRING/LATE FALL TIME FRAME. AS YOU KNOW ROSS,
THE NEXT ROPEVAL IS SCHEDULED FOR THE MARCH/APRIL
PERIOD WITH THE AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE TO BE CONDUCTED

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IN MIDPAC. VIC IS LOOKING FORWARD TO THIS EXERCISE
AND IS PRESENTLY LOOKING FOR SOME GOOD LANDING BEACHES.

3. (C) THE ABILITY TO MOUNT OUT A MAB SIZE FORCE
WITHIN 72 HOURS IS CERTAINLY A GOAL WORTH STRIVING FOR,
WITH I MAF NOW ESTABLISHED ON THE WEST COAST AND
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COORDINATION OF AIR/GROUND TRAINING,
AS WELL AS CONTINGENCY PLANNING, OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND
TO POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS SHOULD BE ENHANCED.

4. (U) THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH INACCURATE SHIP
LOADING CHARACTERISTICS PAMPHLETS (SLCP) ARE APPRECIATED.
THE FMFPAC EMBARKATION SOP DIRECTS THE SUBMISSION OF
REPORTS SETTING FORTH INSTANCES IN WHICH SHIP'S
CHARACTERISTICS ARE OTHER THAN AS STATED IN ITS SLCP.
UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH REPORTS LISTING SPECIFIC DISCREP-
ANCIES, MY HQ WILL NOTIFY COMPHIBPAC THAT THE SLCP
REQUIRES CORRECTION.

5. (C) I REALIZE THAT MANY TIMES WE HAVE TO ADJUST
OUR REQUIREMENTS TO THE NAVY'S DEPLOYMENT AND AVAIL-
ABILITY SCHEDULE. HOWEVER, AS YOU KNOW, DEPLOYMENTS
ARE BASED ON SUPPORT OF CINCPAC REQUIREMENTS AND WE

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MUST ADJUST IN THIS CASE: I UNDERSTAND THAT, WHILE THERE WILL NOT BE AN LPH AVAILABLE FOR ROPEVAL 1-72, THERE WILL BE AN LPH AVAILABLE IN EASTPAC FOR CARRIER QUALS AND SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT TRAINING FOR PHIBLEX 1-72 SCHEDULED 11-13 JAN AND ALSO ONE FOR PHIBLEX 2-72/ MAULEX 1-72 SCHEDULED 10-17 FEB. WITH THE LOSS OF THE IWO JIMA AT THE END OF FY-72, WE WILL HAVE TO PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON THE LPD'S FOR THIS TYPE TRAINING. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FROM THIS END FOR THE BEST AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT AVAILABLE.

6. (U) YOUR OBSERVATIONS, AS WELL AS PAUL'S, ON THE ASSAULT OPERATIONS AGAIN POINT OUT THAT WE RELEARN MANY OLD LESSONS. I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE REPRESENTATION IN THE HDC AND, AS NOTED IN NWIP 22-3(B), THE EMBARKED HELICOPTER GROUP/SQUADRON SHOULD PROVIDE ADVICE TO THE HDC ON EMPLOYMENT AND AVAILABILITY OF THE UNIT'S AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. LANDING FORCE REPRESENTATION IN THE HDC SHOULD BE NO DIFFERENT THAN IN THE SACC OR TACC. PERHAPS, WEARING YOUR I MAF HAT, YOU MIGHT WANT TO

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DISCUSS THIS WITH LES BROWN.

7. (U) MY OBSERVERS INDICATED, AS YOU DID, THAT THE SMLS TEST DURING THE EXERCISE PROVIDED LITTLE CONCLUSIVE DATA. ALSO, IT WAS NOTED THERE IS A NEED FOR EDUCATING PERSONNEL ON THE SYSTEM TO IMPROVE ITS ACCEPTANCE AT THE NAVY OPERATING LEVEL, AS WELL AS TO DEFINE DOCTRINAL PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF SMLS. HOWEVER, A TEN DAY SMLS EXERCISE AT THIS TIME, WITHOUT SOME OF THE BASICS DEFINED, MIGHT DO MORE TO UNDERMINE THE CONCEPT THAN GAIN ACCEPTANCE.

8. (U) I AM VERY MUCH IMPRESSED WITH THE CAPABILITIES OF THE BLUE RIDGE, BUT IT DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN THE FACT THAT SELDOM WILL A COMPLEX SYSTEM OPERATE ANYWHERE NEAR PEAK EFFICIENCY UNLESS IT IS EXERCISED CONTINUOUSLY. MY OBSERVERS PRESENT DURING THE EXERCISE FEEL THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF POTENTIAL IN ASIS AND REPORT THAT THE NAVY WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE EXPERTISE ATTAINED BY THE SEVENTH MAB STAFF IN SUCH A SHORT TIME. HOWEVER, THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN ABOUT THE LACK OF DIRECTION AND CONTINUITY ON BOTH SIDES. THE NAVY APPEARS TO BE TAKING ACTION TO PROVIDE BETTER DIRECTION AND COORDINATION FOR THE SYSTEM AND MY STAFF

IS TAKING APPROPRIATE ACTION TO PROVIDE THE PROPER

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DIRECTION FOR FMFPAC.

9. (C) I SHARE YOUR INTEREST IN EMBARKING A CADRE
STAFF ABOARD BLUE RIDGE ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS; HOWEVER,
AS I MENTIONED IN MY 152151Z/AUG 71 (C) (PERSONAL) TO
YOU, I'M NOT SURE OUR MAF AND SUBORDINATE STAFFS CAN
AFFORD THIS PERMANENT DRAWDOWN.

I HAVE INSTRUCTED MY REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
SEVENTHFLT CONFERENCE TO INFORM CG III MAF OF MY DESIRES
TO KEEP AS MUCH OF A PRESENCE ABOARD BLUE RIDGE AS
POSSIBLE. WE HAVE JUST RECENTLY ACQUIRED FIFTEEN
ADDITIONAL QUOTAS TO THE ASIS COURSE IN NOV, WHICH
PERSONNEL ON THEIR WAY TO WESTPAC UNITS WILL ATTEND.
THUS, III MAF UNITS WILL BE PROVIDED A TRAINED NUCLEUS
OF ASIS PERSONNEL PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF THE BLUE RIDGE
IN WESTPAC.

10. (C) I SHARE YOUR CONCERN WITH THE INSUFFICIENCY OF
SECURE VOICE CIRCUITS ON THE LCC. THIS SUBJECT
~~IS BEING~~ ^{WAS} ADDRESSED AS AN AGENDA ITEM AT THE
AMPHIBIOUS COMMUNICATIONS SEMINAR HELD BY NAVELECTSYS COM
HQ IN WASHINGTON. THE AVAILABILITY OF COVERED VOICE

EQUIPMENT FOR THE UMPIRE NETS WOULD ALSO ENHANCE THE

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PROBLEM PLAY. I AGREE THAT, IN ADDITION TO COMSEC, WE MUST ALWAYS BE AWARE THAT PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIRES CONSTANT ATTENTION, ESPECIALLY ~~SO~~ DURING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. THIS HAS LONG BEEN A PROBLEM AREA AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE WITHOUT PROPER AND CONSTANT MANAGEMENT. THE G-2 SECTION IS PRESENTLY PREPARING A FORCE BULLETIN REEMPHASIZING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY DURING ALL PHASES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, FROM PLAN-
NING THROUGH EXECUTION.

11. (U) YOUR COMMENTS REGARDING THE 14-6-4 HELO MIX WERE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION OFFERED BY THE DATA COLLECTION TEAM FROM THIS HQ. ALTHOUGH SOME ANALYSIS OF MULTIDECK HELO OPERATIONS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE PAST, AN EVALUATION WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF DETERMINING THE MOST EFFICIENT EMPLOYMENT WOULD BE INVALUABLE. SUCH AN EVALUATION IS A SUBSTANTIAL UNDERTAKING; HOWEVER, THE CONDUCT OF SUCH A STUDY IS CONTEMPLATED.

12. (C) THE DESIRABILITY OF A STUDY TO EVALUATE FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING TACTICS WHEN OPERATING IN AN IR/SAM ENVIRONMENT IS RECOGNIZED. THE LIMITED CAPABILITY OF THE FORCE OA BRANCH COMBINED WITH THE FACT THAT MCDEC HAS ALREADY ACQUIRED EXPERTISE IN THIS AREA MAKES THE

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DEVELOPMENT CENTER THE LOGICAL ORIGINATOR OF SUCH A STUDY.

13. (U) I BELIEVE, AS WE RETURN TO OUR PEACETIME STRUCTURE, AND THE PERSONNEL SITUATION IS STABILIZED, OUR EXPERTISE IN PLANNING FOR AND CONDUCTING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS SHOULD VASTLY IMPROVE. WARM REGARDS.

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TO CG FMFPAC
INFO CG I MAF
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WESTPAC CADRE FOR BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19) (U)

A. CG I MAF 122231Z OCT 71 (C)

B. CG FMFPAC 140016Z OCT 71 (U)

1. (U) CONCUR WITH SUBSTANCE OF PROPOSAL CONTAINED REF A.
2. (C) THE BENEFITS OF AGIS FAMTRNG AND JOINING THE SHIP AT SAN DIEGO ARE RECOGNIZED. THE PRESENCE OF AN ORGANIZED STAFF/CADRE TAILORED FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES IS PREFERRED OVER A-CONGLOMERATE GROUP CREATED BY DIVERTING INDIVIDUALS ON PCS ORDERS. THIS RATIONALE IS CONSIDERED VALID EVEN IF CIRCUMSTANCES OF PERSONNEL AVAILABILITY AND FUNDING REQUIRE EMBARKATION OF THE STAFF/CADRE AFTER THE SHIP ARRIVES IN WESTPAC.

3. (C) EXPERIENCE GAINED BY NINTH MAB STAFF NEARING COMPLETION OF A TOUR ABOARD ELDORADO WILL BE EVALUATED TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR CONTINUED UTILIZATION OF ELDORADO AS WELL AS FUTURE UTILIZATION OF BLUE RIDGE. ANTICIPATE COMPLETION OF THE OVERALL PLAN DURING MID NOVEMBER 1971.

4. (C) IT IS EVIDENT HOWEVER, THAT CONTINUITY MUST BE MAINTAINED IN AN ASSIGNED MAB STAFF NUCLEUS. A STAFF/CADRE SIMILAR TO THAT PROPOSED IN REF A, WHEN DIRECTED BY A CHIEF OF STAFF, WOULD SERVE TO MEET THE MAB REQUIREMENT AS WELL AS THE BLUE RIDGE REQUIREMENT. ACCORDINGLY, INTEND TO RETAIN A MAB STAFF NUCLEUS ABOARD ELDORADO WHICH WILL THEN TRANSITION TO BLUE RIDGE. WHETHER THE TRANSITION WILL OCCUR IN EASTPAC, MIDPAC OR WESTPAC WILL BE DECIDED BY MID NOVEMBER.

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CG III MAF

R 190810Z OCT 71

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SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE //NO0000// FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON. DELIVR DURING WORKING HOURS.

CTG 79.3 READINESS POSTURE

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR INFO

P 200612Z OCT 71

FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTF SEVEN NINE
COMFAIRWESTPAC
COMNAVFORJAPAN
CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE //NO0000//

FOR LGEN ROBERTSON, RADM RIERIA, RADM BURKE AND MGEN OWENS FROM MACK
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

CTG 79.3 READINESS POSTURE

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

CG III MAF

R 210633Z OCT 71

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PAGE TWO RUAOAJA1961 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

QUOTE

O 190156Z OCT 71

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO CINCPACFLT

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE //N00000//

FOR VADM CLAREY FROM MACK

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

CTG 79.3 READINESS POSTURE

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 140830Z OCT 71

B. CTG 79 150930Z OCT 71 (PASEP)

C. ADMIN COMFAIRWESTPAC 152303Z OCT 71 (PASEP)

1. REF A PROVIDED UPDATE ON MARINE FIGHTER DEPLOYMENTS TO NAHA AND ADVISED THAT A CONFERENCE BETWEEN 5 AF AND COMFAIRWESTPAC WAS FORTHCOMING. REF A FURTHER ADVISED THAT A REPORT OF THIS CONFERENCE WOULD BE PROVIDED. REF B IS COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF MARINE POSITION AND 5 AF ACTIONS TO DATE. ADDITIONALLY IT PROVIDES CINCPAC REP RYIS POSITION THAT HE SAW NO UNMANAGEABLE LOCAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD PREVENT MARINE FIGHTERS FROM DLING TO NAHA FOR TRAINING. REF C IS REPORT OF CONFERENCE WITH

PAGE THREE RUAOAJA1961 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

5 AF, FIRST MAW AND COMFAIRWESTPAC REPS WHICH INDICATED THAT COMUSJAPAN WAS OPPOSED TO ANY INCREASE IN THE PROFILE OF U. S. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AT NAHA DUE TO POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH REVERSION AND 5 AF DESIRES TO REDUCE OM&N EXPENDITURES AND IMPROVE GOJ MILITARY POSITION AT NAHA THROUGH PACKAGE FACILITY TRANSFER ASAP.

2. REFS A AND B PROVIDE A DETAILED UPDATE OF ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE CTG 79.3 FIGHTER TRAINING DILEMMA. THE MANY PROBLEMS INVOLVED ARE APPRECIATED, HOWEVER IT APPEARS THAT OUR EFFORTS ARE BEING THWARTED MAINLY ON THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL SENSITIVITY. 5 AF AND COMUSJAPAN CITE THIS AS THE REASON THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS CANNOT BE APPROVED. ON THE OTHER HAND, CINCPAC REP RYIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE A DEBILITATING FACTOR.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE IT IS REQUESTED THAT CINCPACFLT MAKE REPRESENTATION TO CINCPACAF FOR AN EIGHT AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT TO NAHA FOR A PERIOD OF THREE WEEKS. THE MAJOR PURPOSE OF THIS DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE TO IDENTIFY AND ISOLATE ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND FURTHER TO DETERMINE ACTUAL LOCAL SENSITIVITY TO SUCH DEPLOYMENTS. IN THE EVENT OF SEVERE NEGATIVE REACTIONS, THE DETACHMENT COULD BE WITHDRAWN. HOWEVER AS MARINE AIRCRAFT ARE ALREADY OPERATING FROM NAHA, THE ADDITION OF EIGHT F4 AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE PROFILE AT NAHA.

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PAGE FOUR RUAOAJA1961 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SOLUTIONS TO MESSING, BERTHING AND SUPPORT PROBLEMS ARE ADDRESSED IN
REF B AND ARE WELL WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF CTF 79 TO OVERCOME.

4. THE MARINE F4 AIRCRAFT THAT WOULD BE TRAINING AT NAHA ON A
ROTATIONAL BASIS CONSTITUTE APPROX ONE THIRD OF THE ENTIRE SEVENTH
FLEET FIGHTER ASSETS. DUE TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CAPABILITY,
I CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE THIS AIR TO AIR TRAINING
CAPABILITY FOR CTG 79.3.

5. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

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2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM RAY PEET. DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

FLEET EXERCISES (U)

A. YOUR 160415Z OCT 71

1. YOUR THOUGHTS AND COMMENTS ON ROPEVAL 3-71/MARLEX 1-71 EXPRESSED IN REF A WERE MOST HELPFUL, AS WELL AS BEING FOOD FOR THOUGHT ABOUT MUTUAL OPERATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

2. OUR THINKING HERE ABOUT THE TIMING OF EXERCISES IS PARALLEL TO YOURS RE THE OCTOBER THRU MAY TIMEFRAME. ROPEVAL 1-72 (18-28 APR) FITS THE BILL, AND ROPEVAL 2-72 IS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 72. WE TOO DESIRE TO AVOID THE SUMMER MONTHS SINCE WE HAVE A MAJOR MIDSHIPMEN TRAINING REQUIREMENT THEN, IN ADDITION TO THE SUMMER TURN-OVER PROBLEM.

3. I CONCUR THAT ROSS DWYER AND HIS STAFF DID A COMMENDABLE JOB IN PUTTING TOGETHER THE MARINE EFFORT FOR ROPEVAL 3-71, AND THAT BLUE RIDGE IS A SIGNIFICANT ADDITION TO OUR AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY. I

COMFIRSTFLT

R 232225Z OCT 71

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PAGE TWO RUWNCMA3770 C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNDERSTAND THAT ROSS DWYER'S STAFF IS PREPARING A LETTER TO COMPHIBPAC RECOMMENDING DESIREABLE MODIFICATIONS TO BLUE RIDGE FROM THE USMC VIEWPOINT. AS TO MSC SHIPPING, I CONCUR THAT THE PAUCITY OF PACFLT LIFT CAPABILITY REQUIRES MORE UTILIZATION OF SUCH SHIPPING. WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TOWARD INCLUSION OF THOSE ASSETS IN FUTURE EXERCISES. OUR OPSEC EFFORTS IN ROPEVAL 3-71 WERE A START TOWARD IMPROVEMENT IN THIS LONG NEGLECTED AREA. I HAVE INFORMALLY BRIEFED ROSS DWYER ON THE RESULTS OF OPSEC EFFORTS IN THE EXERCISE. A WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE ISSUED SHORTLY, AND WE WILL INSURE YOU RECEIVE A COPY.

4. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, THE ANTICIPATED AVAILABILITY OF AMPHIB SHIPPING FOR MIDPAC MARINE PARTICIPATION IN ROPEVAL 1-72 IS A DIM PICTURE. I APPRECIATE THE NEED FOR THE WORKOUT TO WHICH YOU ALLUDE, BUT A HARD LOOK AT ASSETS AVAILABLE IN THE 18-28 APRIL TIMEFRAME PRECLUDES AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IN THE MIDPAC AREA. WE WILL NOT HAVE AN LPH, AND THE SHIPPING AVAILABLE WILL CONSIST OF TWO LPD'S, AN LSD, AND TWO OR THREE LST'S. WE MAY LOSE THE LPD'S TO APOLLO 16 OPERATIONS. THE EASTPAC LOCATION OF THE ASSETS WOULD NECESSITATE ABOUT TWO WEEKS OF TRANSIT TIME TO AND FROM HOMEPORT, IN ADDITION TO EXERCISE TIME, WHICH PRESENTS A TEMPO OF OPS PROBLEM. ALSO,

PAGE THREE RUWNCMA3770 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SERVICES AND SUPPORT FORCES ARE MORE READILY AVAILABLE IN EASTPAC DURING THE ROPEVAL 1-72 PERIOD. HOWEVER, WE DO ENVISION SURFACE FORCE OPERATIONS IN MIDPAC DURING ROPEVAL 1-72, AND THESE FORCES COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR A PERIOD OF NGF TRAINING. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO MIDPAC OPNS FOR YOUR HAWAII FORCES MIGHT BE TO AIRLIFT ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST BRIGADE TO CAMP PENDLETON FOR PARTICIPATION AT THIS END. ALSO, I'M SURE YOUR AIR FORCES AT KANEOHE CAN PARTICIPATE IN MIDPAC PORTIONS ROPEVAL 1-72.

5. CAPT'S MULIHAN AND FOSTER OF MY STAFF WILL BE IN HAWAII ON 26 AND 27 OCT TO CONFER WITH CINCPACFLT STAFF OFFICERS. CAPT FOSTER IS MY PRINCIPAL ROPEVAL PLANNER AND CAN DISCUSS WITH YOUR STAFF ANY OF THE ABOVE OR OTHER SUGGESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE FOR ACHIEVING MORE AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING IN MIDPAC. ADDITIONALLY, I PLAN TO BE IN HAWAII IN LATE NOVEMBER AND WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH YOU.

6. IN SUMMARY, I HEARTILY AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT CONTINUED EASTPAC-MIDPAC MARINE FORCE PARTICIPATION IN FLEET EXERCISES IS OF VALUE AND CAN ONLY FURTHER THE CLOSE PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS OF OUR FORCES. I WILL BE PUSHING FOR MIDPAC AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AT THE FY 73 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE WHICH WILL OCCUR

PAGE FOUR RUWNCMA3770 C O N F I D E N T I A L

IN DECEMBER HERE AT NORTH ISLAND. HOPEFULLY, WE WILL BE ABLE TO INCLUDE SUCH OPS IN ROPEVAL 2-72. WARM REGARDS.

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#3770

COMFIRSTFLT

R 232225Z OCT 71

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T O P S E C R E T //N05400//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON. DELIVER DURING
DUTY HOURS ONLY

TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

1. (C) IN OUR DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO MY RETURN TO OKINAWA
UTILIZATION THE USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19) AROSE AS A TOPIC
FOR FURTHER STUDY ON THIS END. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE HAVE HAD
MEETINGS WITH THE PHIBGRU-ONE STAFF WHO HAS JUST COMPLETED
A TOUR ON BLUE RIDGE, REQUESTED THE THIRD DIVISION TO
PROVIDE AN ANALYTICAL STUDY BY THEIR OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
GROUP, OBTAINED INPUT FROM OFFICERS OF THIS STAFF WHO HAVE
OBSERVED CPX OR ROPEVAL EVOLUTIONS ABOARD BLUE RIDGE AND
ASKED THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE, 9TH MAB, TO PROVIDE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A CADRE FOR BLUE RIDGE DURING HER
WESTPAC TOUR. THE INPUT FROM I MAF IS
INVALUABLE BUT IT MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST 9TH MAB'S PLANNING

CG III MAF

P 240115Z OCT 71

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PAGE TWO RU00AJA2318 T O P S E C R E T
 AND EXERCISE SCHEDULE AND AGAINST THE SCHEDULE FOR BLUE
 RIDGE, WHICH WAS ONLY PARTIALLY DEVELOPED DURING THE
 7TH FLT CONFERENCE. BLUE RIDGE WILL MAKE HER TRANSIT WITHOUT
A NAVY STAFF EMBARKED THUS PRESENTING SOME PECULIAR PROBLEMS.
 2. (S) ALL OF THE ABOVE IS CONSIDERED IN CONCERT WITH AN ON-
 GOING ANALYSIS OF OUR NEED TO MAINTAIN A MAB STAFF CADRE.
 EARLY ON, IT BECAME PATENTLY CLEAR THAT A PRIORITY NEED
 EXISTED TO ACTIVATE A MAB STAFF TO PROVIDE THE BASIC PLANS
 AND SOPS REQUIRED TO BE PREPARED FOR COMMITMENT. EAR-
 MARKING OF EQUIPMENT, DETERMINATION OF PRIORITIES AND REQUIRE-
 MENTS, AND SURFACING OF ITEMS REQUIRING RESOLUTION ALL HAD
 TO BE DONE BEFORE WE COULD FIELD A MAB.
 3. (C) GOLDEN DRAGON 72 APPEARED TO BE THE OPPORTUNITY
 WE WERE LOOKING FOR TO ACHIEVE THESE NECESSITIES WHILE
 PLANNING AN EXERCISE. A DECISION BY LOU METZGER TO OFFER
 A SCHEDULED DIVISION AMPHIBIOUS CPX IN DEC ABOARD ELDORADO
 TO III MAF FOR A MAB CPX RESULTED IN A 4 MONTH ADVANTAGE
 OVER GOLDEN DRAGON. WE ACTIVATED NINTH MAB STAFF NUCLEUS AND
 PUT THEM ABOARD ELDORADO TO COMMENCE PLANNING WITH THE NEW
 TF 76 STAFF WHILE ENROUTE YOKOSUKA FOR THE SEVENTHFLT CONF.

PAGE THREE RU00AJA2318 T O P S E C R E T
 WHILE THERE, THE NINTH MAB STAFF WAS ALSO ABLE TO PARTICIPATE,
 AT THE OUTSET, IN GOLDEN DRAGON PLANNING. THE 76/79.1 TEAM
 IS NOW BACK ON OKINAWA AND I INTEND TO KEEP THEM AS CLOSE
 TOGETHER AS PRUDENTLY POSSIBLE.
 4. (TS) MUCH OF THIS DECISION IS BASED ON 'NORMAL' CON-
 TINGENCY REQUIREMENTS BUT IS CONFIRMED BY THE IMMINENCE OF
 THE PAKISTAN-INDIA SITUATION AND OUR POTENTIAL COMMITMENT
 THERE AS A NEMVAC FORCE. WE WOULD MOST LIKELY DRAW THE
 AIRLIFT HEADQUARTERS FOR THE MAE, MAU, OR MAB FROM THE NINTH
 MAB FOR SUCH AN OPERATION. THERE IS A CONCERN ABOUT OUR
 ABILITY TO APPLY A 'PICK UP TEAM' TO SOMETHING AS SOP-
 HISTICATED AS THE BLUE RIDGE. WE SEEM TO HAVE THE REPUTATION
 OF FORMING STAFFS FROM WIDELY SEPARATED COMMANDS AND THE
 NAVY FINDS IT INTERESTING TO WATCH MARINES MEET FOR THE FIRST
 TIME ABOARD SHIP. SEVERAL OF THE NAVAL OFFICERS NOW IN
 WESTPAC HAVE SERVED WITH BLUE RIDGE SINCE HER ARRIVAL IN
 PACOM AND HAVE COMMENTED, CONSTRUCTIVELY, ON THE CYCLIC
 LEARNING CURVE OF MARINE MAB STAFFS, I.E, WE RETURN TO ZERO
 AFTER EACH EVOLUTION. THAT CERTAINLY IS THE CASE HERE. LITTLE
 EVIDENCE CAN BE FOUND OF ALL THE WORK PUT INTO GOLDEN

CG III MAF

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PAGE FOUR RUAOAJA2318 T O P S E C R E T

DRAGON 70, WHICH REPRESENTED THE LAST ACTIVE MAB EFFORT IN WESTPAC OUTSIDE VIETNAM.

5. (TS) THE ASSESSMENT OF PLANS, MENTIONED EARLIER, HAS CONVINCED ME THAT WHEN AVAILABLE TRANSPORTATION IS CONSIDERED, THE MOST LIKELY FORM OF AMPHIBIOUS COMMITMENT CAPABILITY FOR III MAF IS THE 31ST MAU FOLLOWED BY BLT BRAVO AND A SUPER-IMPOSED MAB STAFF TO BE FOLLOWED, AS NECESSITY DICTATES, BY REMAINING MAB ELEMENTS, AND AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, THE BALANCE OF THE MAF. AS YOUR PLANS PEOPLE HAVE POINTED OUT TO US ON THEIR QUARTERLY VISITS, WE MUST BE 'THERE' WITH A MAF IN 30 DAYS. IT WOULD APPEAR TO ME THEREFORE, WE MUST COUNT HEAVILY ON A MAB STAFF IN THE VERY EARLY DAYS AND CANNOT AFFORD TO DEPEND ON A PICK-UP TEAM.

6. (C) I VIEW BLUE RIDGE AS A MEANS TO AN END. IF HER INCREASED CAPABILITIES WILL HELP OFFSET THE PAUCITY OF ASSETS WE ARE ACCUSTOMED TO, THEN I THINK IT WORTHWHILE TO EXPEND PEOPLE OVER THE LONG HAUL TO ENSURE WE DON'T CYCLICLY

RETURN TO ZERO. FORTUNATELY, THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN ACTIVEMAB STAFF NUCLEUS AND 'BLUE RIDGE QUALIFIED' PERSONNEL CAN BE SERVED BY THE SAME INDIVIDUALS. UNFORTUNATELY, BLUE RIDGE'S

PAGE FIVE RUAOAJA2318 T O P S E C R E T

HOME PORT IS NOT WESTPAC. THEREFORE, WHAT WE LEARN ABOUT HER WILL BE LOST TO THE NEXT GENERATION OF III MAF MARINES WHO WILL BE HERE ON HER SECOND CRUISE IN THESE WATERS. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY FOR ME TO FORM AN OPINION ABOUT PRESSING FOR WESTPAC HOME PORTING OF BLUE RIDGE, YOUR STAFF MIGHT WANT TO LOOK AT TRAINING COSTS AND LOSSES INVOLVED IN HAVING HER OSCILLATE BETWEEN EAST AND WESTPAC.

7. (U) I MIGHT ADD THAT THE NAVY WE DEAL WITH IS NOT ONLY AMENABLE TO OUR KEEPING MARINES ABOARD THE CTF 76 FLAGSHIP BUT ACTIVELY ENCOURAGES IT. WE WILL FOSTER THIS WILLINGNESS. WARM REGARDS.

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CG III MAF

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PERSONAL FOR LIGEN JONES FROM LIGEN ROBERTSON.
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

OPCON WESTPAC FMF RESOURCES (U)
A. CG FMFPAC 232242Z OCT 71 (U) — *14*

1. (U) REF A TASKED FIRST MAW TO PROVIDE AERIAL REFUELING SUPPORT FOR KEY RESET TRANSPAC OF F4B'S ON 27 OCT 71.
2. (C) I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE WAY THIS TASKING WAS HANDLED. IN THE FIRST INSTANT, CG III MAF WAS NOT AN ADDEE ON REF A. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT I SHOULD BE INVOLVED WHEN COMMANDS UNDER MY OPCON ARE TASKED. SECONDLY, INDICATING THAT COMSEVENTHFLT CONCURRENCE IN SUCH TASKING WAS ASSUMED UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED CAN IMPLY THAT COMSEVENTHFLT IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE OPCON OF WESTPAC FMF RESOURCES AT ALL TIMES. I HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED GIVING THIS IMPRESSION AND HAVE, WITHOUT MAKING AN ISSUE OF IT, INDICATED THAT COMSEVENTHFLT HAS OPCON OF SPECIFIC MARINE ASSETS ONLY WHEN SUCH ASSETS ARE TASKED IN SUPPORT OF SEVENTHFLT OPERATIONS. AT ALL OTHER TIMES, CG III MAF MUST RETAIN OPCON OF ASSIGNED FORCES.
3. (C) I SUGGEST THAT COMSEVENTHFLT NOT BE INCLUDED AS AN ACTION ADDEE ON FUTURE TASKINGS OF THIS TYPE. SHOULD SUCH SHORT FUSE REQUIREMENTS DEVELOP IN THE FUTURE, THEN A MORE APPROPRIATE APPROACH MIGHT BE TO GO DIRECT TO CG FIRST MAW ASSUMING CG III MAF CONCURRENCE UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED. AT THAT POINT, I CAN DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT OTHER ON GOING OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS WOULD NECESSITATE COMSEVENTHFLT INVOLVEMENT.
WARM REGARDS.

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CG III MAF

P 270722Z OCT 71

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CCN: 0508
TOR: 291432Z OCT 71

UNCLAS //NO0000// PERSONAL FOR MGEN SNODDY INFO FOR LTGEN JONES
FROM MGEN METZGER -- DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
1. THIS DIVISION, ALTHOUGH DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE COMMAND
ATTENTION TO REQUALIFICATION AND CREATING A MARKSMANSHIP
TRAINING UNIT, HAS BEEN UNABLE TO REACH THE COMMANDANT'S GOAL
OF 93 PERCENT RIFLE REQUALIFICATION.
2. I SUSPECT THAT OUR PROBLEM MAY BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE
ARE ARMED WITH THE M-16 RIFLE. IF MY MEMORY IS CORRECT, AN
INTENSIVE SMALL ARMS STUDY WAS MADE BY THE DEVELOPMENT CENTER
JUST BEFORE HUNTER HURST DEPARTED. I BELIEVE THIS STUDY WAS TO
PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE MARINE CORPS POSITION ON THE PROCUREMENT
OF FUTURE SMALL ARMS. IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF YOU HAVE
ANY INFORMATION ON THE RELATIVE ACCURACY BETWEEN THE M-14
AND THE M-16. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WOULD BE FINDINGS RELATIVE TO
THE IMPACT OF BORE DESIGN/CONDITION AND WIND ON ACCURACY OF THE

PAGE TWO RUAOAJA2866 UNCLAS
M-16.

IF MY SUSPICIONS ARE CORRECT, I INTEND TO RECOMMEND THAT SEPARATE
STANDARDS FOR REQUALIFICATION BE SET FOR THE TWO RIFLES.
WARM REGARDS
BT
#2866

CG THIRD MARDIV

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PERSONAL FOR VADM PEET FROM LIGEN JONES. DELIVER
DURING DUTY HOURS.

FLEET EXERCISES (U)

A. COMFIRSTFLT 232225Z/OCT 71 (C) (PERSONAL)

1. (C) I APPRECIATE YOUR QUICK RESPONSE AND COMMENTS
CONTAINED IN REF A REGARDING FLEET EXERCISES.
2. (C) YOUR REMARKS IN REF A AND THOSE OF CAPTAINS
HULIHAN AND FOSTER TO REPS OF MY STAFF DURING THEIR
VISIT TO MY HEADQUARTERS ON 27 OCT, REGARDING THE
PESSIMISTIC OUTLOOK FOR CONDUCTING THE AMPHIBIOUS
PORTION OF ROPEVAL 1-72 IN MIDPAC, IS INDEED DISHEART-
ENING. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF
THE AMPHIBIOUS PORTION OF ROPEVAL 1-72 COULD BE HELD IN
MIDPAC VICE EASTPAC. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE FIRST
MARINE BRIGADE IS ALREADY PLANNING FOR THE EXERCISE
AND IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN SECURING LANDING AREAS.

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1960 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR
ADDITIONALLY, EASTPAC MARINE FORCES HAVE AN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE
SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY, THUS, CONDUCTING THE AMPHIBIOUS PORTION
OF ROPEVAL 1-72 IN MIDPAC PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO
IMPROVE THE OPERATIONAL READINESS OF OUR MIDPAC MARINES
WHICH I CONSIDER MOST IMPORTANT.

3. (C) I RECOGNIZE AND APPRECIATE THE PROBLEM OF
TRANSIT TIME AND PAUCITY OF AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING.
HOWEVER, WHEN WEIGHED AGAINST OPERATIONAL NEEDS PLUS
THE PROHIBITIVE COST OF FLYING A BLT TO THE WEST COAST
ON MAC CHARTER, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE REQUIRED
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS (THREE TO FIVE DEPENDING ON TYPE) TO
CONDUCT THE EXERCISE IN MIDPAC PROVIDES THE MOST
ECONOMICAL SOLUTION.

4. (U) I REGRET THAT I MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE DURING THE
PERIOD YOU ARE PLANNING ON VISITING HAWAII AS I HAVE
TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED A WESTPAC TRIP DURING THE SAME
PERIOD: HOWEVER, ART ADAMS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR
DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL AREAS OF CONCERN. WARM REGARDS.

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 RUWJGFB/CG THIRD MAW
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UNCLAS //N000000//PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN DWYER, MAJGEN BROWN, BGEN ARMSTRONG, BGEN GRAHAM, COL REED FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

MATERIEL READINESS

1. THE PROGRAMS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT TO BRING EASTPAC /MIDPAC UNITS TO A COMBAT READY STATUS IN THE AREAS OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIP ON HAND AND READINESS OF EQUIP CAN BE SERIOUSLY INHIBITED BY REDUCED PERS AVAIL UNLESS EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS ARE UNDERTAKEN. SINCE EACH OF YOUR COMMAND'S PROBLEMS ARE DIFFERENT BECAUSE THEY ARE INFLUENCED BY ON BOARD AND ANTICIPATED PERS AVAILABILITIES, FACILITY CONSTRAINTS AND CURRENT STATUS IN THE VARIOUS LOGISTIC READINESS PROGRAMS, OUR APPROACH TO MAXIMIZING EFFICIENCY IN ACHIEVING LOGISTIC COMBAT READINESS MUST BE

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1061 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR FLEXIBLE AND ADAPTABLE TO EACH LOCAL SITUATION.

2. ACD, I AUTH THE FOL ACTIONS TO BE IMPLEMENTED TO THE DEGREE YOU DEEM NEC TO MEET YOUR LOCAL NEEDS.

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRALIZED ADMIN DEADLINE POOLS. VIC HAS ALREADY INITIATED A PROGRAM IN THIS RESPECT AND THE

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ECONOMIES IN PERS AND FUNDS ANTICIPATED THROUGH CENTRALIZATION AND SPECIALIZATION ARE PROMISING. WHILE THE BRIGADE PROGRAM HAS BEEN LIMITED TO THE EQUIP OF CADRE UNITS AND MO EQUIP, THE CONCEPT CAN BE EXPANDED IN CHARACTER AND SCOPE TO MEET YOUR LOCAL SITUATION. AS A FURTHER ASSIST IN THIS CONCEPT, I AM PREPARED TO TAKE STEPS, AS NECESSARY, TO RELAX REQUIREMENTS FOR RECURRING MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY PM'S ON ADMINISTRATIVELY DEADLINED EQUIP.

B. STANDDOWN FROM ROUTINE TRAINING NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO MISSION ACCOMP FOR COMBAT SPT AND COMBAT SERVICE SPT UNITS. I PREVIOUSLY AUTH THIS FOR WEST COAST UNITS DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE OVERFLOW MAINT PROGRAM. HERB REED'S IMPLEMENTATION RESULTED IN A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN MANHOURS AVAIL FOR PRODUCTIVE EFFORT IN HIS SHOPS. OBVIOUSLY, WE MUST BE VERY SELECTIVE IN THIS AREA, WEIGHING THE GAINS TO BE REALIZED IN

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1961 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
PRODUCTIVE EFFORT AGAINST THE IMPACT ON THE IND MARINE AND HIS UNIT'S TRAINING READINESS. HOWEVER, WE MUST MAXIMIZE THE PRODUCTIVITY OF OUR TECHNICALLY SKILLED PERS TO COMPENSATE FOR EXISTING AND ANTICIPATED SHORTFALLS IN THEIR AVAIL.
3. IN ADD, I ENCOURAGE YOUR CONTINUED COMD ATTENTION TO FOUR OTHER AREAS WHICH CAN PROVIDE RELIEF TO THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN MAINTAINING MATERIEL READINESS.

A. SELECTIVE CALL FORWARD OF EQUIP FROM THE OVERFLOW MAINT PROGRAM. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS PROGRAM PERMIT US TO DELAY UP TO 60 DAYS IN THE SKED DATE OF THE RETURN OF COMPL EQUIP FROM BARSTOW WITHOUT INCURRING ADD CHARGES FOR MAINT. WHILE THIS ACTION IS SHORT TERM IN NATURE SINCE THE PROGRAM TERMINATES ON 31 DEC, IT DOES PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR TIME TO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES FOR CENTRALIZED ADMIN DEADLINE POOLS AND TO OFFSET CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN SPECIFIC TECHNICAL SKILLS.

B. EXPEDITIOUS DISPOSITION OF EXCESS EQUIP. THE FMFPAC REDISTRIBUTION SCREEN OF EXCESS ASSETS WILL BE COMPL IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. WITH POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ASSETS EXCESS TO FMFPAC, WE SHOULD MOVE RAPIDLY TO DISPOSE OF THEM IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE OUR LIMITED CAPABILITIES ON THE MATERIEL

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA1961 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
THAT IS IN FACT ESSENTIAL TO OUR NEEDS.

C. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF CURRENT ALW WITH A VIEW TOWARDS RECOM REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF ITEMS NO LONGER ESSENTIAL TO YOUR NEEDS. I AM FULLY AWARE THAT THIS IS A CONTINUOUS PROCESS BUT IT IS ONE THAT REQR YOUR PERSONAL SPT TO ACHIEVE THE MOST PRODUCTIVE RESULTS.

CG FMFPAC

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D. REVIEW OF PERS ASG, PARTICULARLY TECHNICIANS, TO ENSURE THAT THEIR SKILLS ARE FULLY UTILIZED. VERY OFTEN, THE TALENTS THAT MAKE AN IND MARINE SUCCESSFUL IN HIS TECHNICAL FIELD MAKE HIM A VALUABLE PERFORMER IN OTHER BILLET ASG. HOWEVER, IN THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT, WE MUST PLACE HIM WHERE HE CAN MAKE THE MAX CONTRIBUTION TO THE READINESS OF THE COMD.

4. I HAVE DIRECTED MY STAFF TO FURTHER REVIEW THE R AND E PROGRAM WITH HOMC TO EXTEND ACROSS THE BOARD A MOD REQ BY ROSS TO COORD DELIVERIES OF TANKS AND LVT'S WITH HIS CAPABILITY TO RECEIVE, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THEM. DEFINITION OF AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADD STORAGE/HANDLING CHARGES ACCRUING TO A MODIFICATION OF THE R AND E PROGRAM MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE BLANKET AUTH FOR CHANGES CAN BE MADE. I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF DEV IN THIS SPHERE.

5. THE ACTIONS OUTLINED HEREIN ARE DESIGNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA1961 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
GOAL OF GETTING THE MOST IN MATERIEL READINESS WITH THE MINIMUM INVESTMENT IN PERS AND MONEY. WE MUST CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNDER AUSTERE PERS AND FUNDING CONSTRAINTS THROUGH THE 3D QTR FY-72. AND POSSIBLY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FISCAL YEAR WHICH WILL REQR OUR PROGRAMS TO BE DESIGNED ACD. I STRONGLY ENCOURAGE YOUR CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE AND INNOVATIVE ACTIONS IN THIS EFFORT. PLEASE KEEP ME ADVISED OF YOUR PLANS IN THIS REGARD. I WILL WELCOME ANY RECOM YOU MAKE IN FURTHER EXTENSION OF IMPROVING THE MATERIEL COMBAT READINESS OF THIS COMD. WARM REGARDS.
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SECRET MARDIS //NO3930//
FOR DEVGEN SPECIAL STUDY GROUP
DETERMINATION OF FMF STRUCTURE AND MARCORPS BASE SUPPORTING
ESTABLISHMENT FY73-FY77 (U)
A. CG MCDEC LTR 46/LD/RWK:GHL SER: 0046A27071 OF 27
SEPTEMBER 71

1. (S) IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 5 OF REFERENCE A,
THE PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND IS
CONCURRED IN SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS:

ADMIN FIRST MAW

P 300323Z OCT71

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A. PARAGRAPH 5B. A PROPOSED T/O AND T/E FOR PERMANENT MAF/MAB/MAU HEADQUARTERS. COMMENT: A PERMANENT MAF STRUCTURE IS IN BEING. THE MAB AND MAU ARE TASK ORGANIZED ACCORDING TO THEIR ASSIGNED MISSION, AVAILABLE SHIPPING AND AREA OF OPERATION. THE NECESSARY HEADQUARTERS ARE ORGANIZED FROM FMF ASSETS AVAILABLE WITHIN THE MAF DIRECTING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MAB OR MAU. MANNING THESE STAFFS WHEN NOT ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN PLANNING EXERCISES/OPERATIONS GENERATES PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS WHICH COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED IN BASE LINE UNITS. THE PARENT MAF SHOULD MAINTAIN FILES, ORDERS, SOP'S ETC. FOR THEIR MAB'S/MAU'S WHEN THEY ARE NOT ACTIVATED. TE'S FOR THE MAB'S/MAU'S SHOULD BE PUBLISHED AND THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO THE PARENT MAF FOR STORAGE UNTIL NEEDED. THE MAF SHOULD ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR STORAGE AND MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT OF INACTIVE MAB'S/MAU'S. RECOMMENDATION: MAINTAIN MAF'S IN ACTIVE STATUS; PUBLISH TE'S FOR MAB'S/MAU'S BASED ON TO'S DEVELOPED BY MAF'S AND PROVIDE MAB'S/MAU'S EQUIPMENT TO MAF'S FOR RETENTION. MAN THE MAB'S AND MAU'S ONLY WHEN REQUIRED FOR PLANNING, TRAINING OR OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED BY PARENT MAF.

B. PARAGRAPH 5D. AN IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS AND TASKS THAT COULD OR SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. COMMENT: 1. LIMIT THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMBAT READINESS TRAINING FLIGHTS TO THOSE AIRCREW MEMBERS IN THE FIRST TWELVE YEARS OF DESIGNATED SERVICE. ELIMINATE FROM THE FORCE STRUCTURE THE AIRCRAFT, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL THAT HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING THIS FUNCTION BEYOND THE PARAMETERS LISTED ABOVE. RATIONALE: 1. (S) THE IMPORTANT BENEFITS OF CRT FLYING ARE CONFIDENCE, AIR SENSE AND JUDGEMENT; THE DIRECT FLYING SKILL MAINTENANCE/TRANSFERRED ACHIEVED IS SLIGHT. THE MARGINAL UTILITY OF CURRENT COMBAT READINESS TRAINING PROGRAMS IS TACITLY RECOGNIZED IN THE PRACTICE OF ASSIGNING REFRESHER TRAINING IN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT ENROUTE FROM NON-TACTICAL TO TACTICAL BILLETS. 2. (S) RESTRICTION OF THE CRT REQUIREMENT WOULD RESULT IN DIRECT REDUCTION OF AIRCRAFT, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL. THE REDUCTION COULD BE ACCEPTED AS SUCH OR COULD BE TRADED FOR RETENTION OF SOME OF THE PROPOSED CUTS OF ALTERNATIVE ALPHA. RETAINING COMBAT-CAPABLE EQUIPMENT IN LIEU OF THE OBSOLETE AIRCRAFT NOW ASSIGNED TO THE CRT ROLE WOULD ENHANCE THE COMBAT/TRAINING POTENTIAL OF THE MAW'S AND MCCRTG'S AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE POOL OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR A LATER MOBILIZATION. ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE, THE LEAD-TIME REQUIRED TO ACQUIRE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MILITATES AGAINST EVER REDUCING THE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT FORCE LEVELS MERELY TO RETAIN SOME MARGINALLY USEFUL TRAINING/TRANSPORT AIRFRAMES.

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C. PARAGRAPH 5F. A PROPOSAL TO RETURN TO PHASE TRAINING IN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT UNITS IN LIEU OF THE MCCRTG'S/MHTG'S, THE LATTER TO BE ELIMINATED. COMMENT: A RETURN TO PHASE TRAINING FOR TACTICAL AIRCRAFT WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE COMMANDANT'S STATED OBJECTIVE (PARAGRAPH 1A(1), TAB F, ENCLOSURE (1)) OF C-2 READINESS FOR MARINE AIRCRAFT WINGS. PAST EXPERIENCE HAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT PHASE TRAINING HAS UNACCEPTABLE PEAKS AND VALLEYS INHERENT IN THE CONCEPT. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS OF COMBAT READY SQUADRONS CONUS UNITS WOULD BE DEGRADED TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF READINESS. THEREFORE, PHASE TRAINING CANNOT BE SUPPORTED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MCCRTG'S/MHTG'S. THE TRAINING GROUPS SHOULD BE RETAINED FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

- (1) EASILY CENTRALIZE BEST AVAILABLE TALENT AS INSTRUCTORS IN TRAINING GROUPS, MAWU'S. CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO TO ENSURE LATEST TECHNIQUES TAUGHT.
- (2) ENSURE STANDARDIZATION AND COMPLIANCE WITH NATOPS DURING FORMATIVE STAGE OF AN AVIATOR'S CAREER.
- (3) ENHANCES SAFETY AS ALL INSTRUCTORS ARE PROFESSIONALS.
- (4) CAN HANDLE PHASE I AND II TRAINING MORE RAPIDLY, EFFICIENTLY, AND ECONOMICALLY.
- (5) PROVIDES STABILIZED TRAINING BASE IN EVENT OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT.
- (6) DOES NOT DETRACT FROM COMBAT READINESS OF TACTICAL UNIT. NEWLY JOINED AVAITORS COME INTO TACTICAL SQUADRON AS PHASE II QUALIFIED QUOTE COMBAT CAPABLE UNQUOTE. SQUADRON CAN CONCENTRATE ON PHASE III TRAINING, QUOTE COMBAT QUALIFIED UNQUOTE.
- (7) ENHANCES UNIT ROTATION CONCEPT. PHASE TRAINING IS A LONG PROCESS WHICH NORMALLY REQUIRES FREEZING A SQUADRON ANYWHERE FROM SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT TO UPGRADE TO PHASE III STATUS. EITHER THIS HAPPENS OR WHOLESALE ROBBERY OF THE BEST TALENT IN OTHER SQUADRONS TAKES PLACE.
- (8) IN ADDITION, IT PROVIDES THE NUCLEUS FOR EXPANSION OF THE TRAINING REQUIRED BY EXPANSION OF MARINE CORPS AVIATION IN EVENT OF ALL OUT MOBILIZATION. RECOMMENDATION: THAT PHASE TRAINING NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE. RECOMMEND RETAIN TRAINING GROUP CONCEPT EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF VERTICAL CUTS IN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT.

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D. PARAGRAPH 5G. A PROPOSED RETURN TO UNIT ROTATION SYSTEM. COMMENT: UNIT ROTATION OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS WOULD PROVIDE THE DESIRED HIGH LEVELS OF COMBAT READINESS. IN PARTICULAR PERSONNEL STABILIZATION WOULD BE ASSURED IN DEPLOYED UNITS, A KEY FACTOR IN MAINTAINING COMBAT READINESS. PERSONNEL CHANGES CAUSED BY EXPIRING RTD'S CREATE UNDESIRABLE PERSONNEL TURBULENCE IN DEPLOYED SQUADRONS PARTICULARLY BY THOSE PERSONNEL IN A SUPERVISORY ROLE. THE UNIT ROTATION CONCEPT IS COMPLEMENTARY TO THE TRAINING GROUP CONCEPT AND WOULD FUNCTION HAND-IN-GLOVE FOR MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY IN TRAINING AND READINESS. SEE COMMENTS ON ADVANTAGES OF TRAINING GROUPS ABOVE. RECOMMENDATION: INSTITUTE UNIT ROTATION FOR TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS.

E. PARAGRAPH 5H. A NEW APPROACH TO READINESS REPORTING. COMMENT: BROAD COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE CURRENT READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM USUALLY CENTER ON THE IDEA THAT THE CURRENT JCSFORSTAT SYSTEM DOES NOT PROVIDE A REALISTIC EVALUATION OF A UNITS COMBAT READINESS. TO THE CONTRARY, THE PRESENT SYSTEM PROVIDES A COMMON BASE AGAINST WHICH ALL UNITS IN THE ARMED FORCES CAN BE EVALUATED. FURTHER MORE, INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE FORSTAT DATA BASE DOES PROVIDE JCS AND INDIVIDUAL SERVICES WITH VALID STATUS OF FORCES INFORMATION. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT FORSTAT IS A JCS LEVEL SYSTEM WHICH HAS BEEN SPONSORED, DESIGNED AND MAINTAINED AT THE LEVEL. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SYSTEM IS TO PROVIDE THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH INFORMATION ABOUT ALL U. S. ARMED FORCES. IN ORDER TO DO THIS, THE CRITERIA DEVELOPED FOR EVALUATING UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES MUST BE VERY GENERAL. THIS IS BECAUSE AREAS OF COMMONALITY BETWEEN DIVERSE UNITS OF THE SEVERAL SERVICES ARE LIMITED. THE PRESENT FORSTAT SYSTEM HAS EXPLOITED THESE FEW AREAS OF COMMONALITY TO PROVIDE STATUS OF FORCES/INFORMATION ON PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES/ EQUIPMENT ON HAND, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING READINESS. ERROR RATES IN REPORTING DATA ARE ACCEPTABLY LOW IN THE MARINE CORPS AND DATA SUBMISSIONS ARE TIMELY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION TO CONSIDER A NEW APPROACH TO READINESS REPORTING IN THE FY73-FY77 TIME FRAME. RECOMMENDATION: CONTINUE TO EVALUATE PRESENT READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM.

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MARDIS.

INFO MAJGEN DWYER FROM LTGEN JONES. ^A DELIVER DURING
DUTY HOURS.

WESTPAC CADRE FOR BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19) (U)

A. CG III MAF 190810Z/OCT 71 (C) (MARDIS)

B. CG III MAF 240115Z/OCT 71 (TS) (PERSONAL) (NOTAL)

1. (C) YOUR COMMENTS CONTAINED REFS A AND B ARE

APPRECIATED. ACTIONS INDICATED THEREIN TO KEEP A

STAFF ABOARD THE WESTPAC LCC ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH

MY DESIRES. I ALSO CONCUR IN YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE

DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING A CADRE MAB STAFF THAT IS

PERMANENT IN NATURE. IN THIS REGARD, I TASKED CG I MAF

TO RECOMMEND, UPON COMPLETION OF ROPEVAL 3-72, A CADRE

STAFF THAT COULD TRAIN WITH AND EMBARK WITH A PHIBGRU

STAFF. I UNDERSTAND THIS PROJECT IS IN FINAL

STAFFING AND WILL BE SUBMITTED TO MY HQ IN THE NEAR

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CONFIDENTIALSUBSEQUENT PAGES TO
OUTGOING UNCLASSIFIED SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

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FUTURE. I WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY.

2. (C) CONSIDERING THE COVETOUS EYE BEING CAST BY FLEET COMMANDERS ON THE NEW CLASS LCC, IT IS DEEMED PRUDENT TO HAVE AN EMBARKED MARINE STAFF ABOARD THE BLUE RIDGE WHEN SHE DEPARTS THE WEST COAST APPROX 7 JAN 72, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. EVEN THOUGH THERE WILL NOT BE A NAVY STAFF ABOARD, THIS ^{WOULD} ~~WILL~~ PROVIDE YOUR STAFF AN OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE SHIP AND ITS EQUIPMENT PRIOR TO BLUE RIDGE'S ARRIVAL AND EMBARKATION OF THE PHIBGRU ONE STAFF IN WESTPAC. IT ^{WOULD} ~~WILL~~ ALSO INDICATE TO OUR NAVY COUNTERPARTS THAT WE HAVE A SINCERE DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE ABOARD THE LCC. SHOULD TRANSPORTATION FOR THE CADRE STAFF TO THE WEST COAST BY OPPORTUNE AIRLIFT BECOME AVAILABLE, THE COST OF THIS ENDEAVOR COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. THIS HQ WILL PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE.

3. (C) I AM SURE THAT ROSS DWYER WILL BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE YOU WITH ANY ASSISTANCE AND PLANNING INFORMATION THAT MAY BE REQUIRED REGARDING EMBARKATION OF THE CADRE STAFF ON THE WEST COAST. WARM REGARDS.

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FM CG III MAF
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON.
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

III MAF RESPONSIBILITIES (U)

- A. CG III MAF LTR 3120 SER NR 00179-71 OF 28JUN71 (S)
- B. CG FMFPAC 062237Z SEP71 (S)
- C. CG FMFPAC 260233Z SEP71 (TS)
- D. FMFPACO P4630.2C (U)
- E. FORCE O 1540.1B (U)
- F. FMFPAC OP ORDER 201-71 (S)
- G. FMFPACO 5440.22 (U)

1. (C) REF A, IN DISCUSSING III MAF RESPONSIBILITIES,
INDICATED A REQUIREMENT FOR CG FMFPAC TO CLARIFY IN DETAIL
THE MISSION OF III MAF IN THE CURRENT EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENT
AND THEN EARMARK FOR III MAF SUFFICIENT ASSETS TO ACCOMPLISH
THAT MISSION. REF B EFFECTIVELY RESPONDED TO THIS REQUEST

CG III MAF

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ACTN: S/SEC
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PAGE TWO RUAOAJA0506 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 BY INDICATING ACTIONS WHICH SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY III MAF,
 WHILE IN GARRISON, TO ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES OF MARINE
 FORCES POSTURED IN WESTPAC TO DEPLOY AND MEET ANY CONTINGENCY
 REQUIREMENT THAT MAY BE ASSIGNED. REF C PROVIDED NECESSARY
 GUIDANCE FOR EARMARKING ASSETS FOR III MAF.

2. (C) ALTHOUGH I NOW CONSIDER THAT REF A WAS AN OVER-
 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS, IT DID PROMPT THE INTERCHANGE OF
 IDEAS BENEFICIAL TO RESOLVING THE ROLE OF III MAF IN
 WESTPAC AND TRIGGERED PREPARATION OF REF B, WHICH IS AN
 EFFECTIVE ARTICULATION OF THE ACTIONS WHICH HAVE ALWAYS BEEN
 CONSIDERED AS APPROPRIATE III MAF RESPONSIBILITIES AT THIS
 HQ. DURING OUR CONVERSATIONS IN HAWAII, WE DISCUSSED III
 MAF RESPONSIBILITIES AND YOU INDICATED THAT YOU WOULD BE
 TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROBLEM. I WANT TO GET MY IDEAS
 TO YOU SO THAT WE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THEM
 DURING YOUR 1 DEC VISIT. IN THIS MESSAGE I COVER SOME OF
 THE THINGS III MAF HAS BEEN TASKED TO DO, SOME OF THE THINGS
 WHICH III MAF HAS BEEN DOING WHICH ARE SOMETIMES INTERPRETED
 AS NOT PURELY OPERATIONAL AND FINALLY A BRIEF MENTION OF
 AREAS IN WHICH III MAF SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN ORDER TO

PAGE THREE RUAOAJA0506 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 CARRY OUT MY RESPONSIBILITIES TO YOU AND COMSEVENTHFLT.
 3. (C) AS BACKGROUND FOR WHAT FOLLOWS, I EMPHASIZE THAT
 NEITHER MY STAFF NOR I DESIRE TO TAKE ON ANY FUNCTIONS WHICH
 WILL REMOVE III MAF FROM THE CATEGORY OF AN AUSTERE PLANNING
 AND TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS. HOWEVER, AS EVIDENCED BY
 TASKINGS PERIODICALLY RECEIVED FROM YOUR HQ, THERE ARE
 CERTAIN AREAS, WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED ADMINISTRATIVE,
 OVER WHICH III MAF EXERCISES COORDINATION CONTROL AS THE
 SENIOR FMF COMMAND IN WESTPAC. EXAMPLES OF THESE ARE:
 EGRESS-RECAP, REDISTRIBUTION OF EXCESS EQUIPMENT, CLASS VI
 MOUNT-OUT REQUIREMENTS, TRANSFER OF MRC 62A/63A AND PRC-25'S
 TO VMMC, EVALUATION OF WET WEATHER TROUSERS AND PARKAS,
 ISSUE OF M274A2 MECH MULES, COMREL AND ORGANIZING AND
 ARRANGING HOSTING OF FORCE WIDE CONFERENCES SUCH AS THE
 WESTPAC TACTICAL SYMPOSIUM. I CONSIDER SUCH TASKING APPROPRIATE
 AND AM MENTIONING THESE EXAMPLES ONLY TO POINT OUT HOW
 DIFFICULT IT IS TO DRAW A FINE LINE BETWEEN PURELY
 OPERATIONAL MATTERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS WITH
 OPERATIONAL ANNOTATION. HOWEVER, I DO SUGGEST THAT CAUTION
 BE EXERCISED TO INSURE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE TASKINGS ARE NOT

CG III MAF

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PAGE FOUR RUAOAJA0506 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 LEVIED ON III MAF PURELY BECAUSE OF ITS LOCATION, WHEN SUCH
 COORDINATION COULD BE HANDLED EQUALLY WELL FROM HAWAII. I
 AM STRIVING TO AVOID HAVING IT APPEAR THAT III MAF IS ANOTHER
 ECHELON IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND FROM THE DIV/WING/FSR TO CG FMFPAC
 ON ALL MATTERS AND FEEL THAT BOTH OUR STAFFS MUST CONTINUALLY
 ANALYZE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF EACH ACTION OR TASKING
 TO MINIMIZE INTERPOSITION OF III MAF BETWEEN FMFPAC AND THE
 DIV/WING/FSR.

4. (C) THERE IS LITTLE CONTROVERSY AS TO MY RESPONSIBILITIES
 AS CTF 79 TO EXECUTE SUCH TRAINING AS IS NECESSARY TO
 PREPARE THE FORCE TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. I INCLUDE
 TASK GROUP COMMANDERS AND SELECTED MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFF IN
 CTF SEVEN NINE REPRESENTATION AT THE SEVENTHFLT SCHEDULING
 CONFERENCE. THIS ENABLES THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN EXERCISE
 PLANNING AND BECOME FULLY AWARE OF THE SCHEDULING PROBLEMS
 AND SEVENTHFLT PLANS. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A TENDENCY TO FEEL
 THAT III MAF TASKING TO PROVIDE ASSETS TO SUPPORT SUCH
 EXERCISES INTERFERES WITH THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE COMMAND
 INVOLVED. THIS IS AN INTERNAL PROBLEM WHICH WILL BE
 ALLEVIATED AFTER ALL COMMANDERS GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING

PAGE FIVE RUAOAJA0506 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 OF HOW THEIR ASSIGNED FORCES ARE LIKELY TO BE EMPLOYED.
 5. (U) REF D DELINIATES MY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROCESSING
 AIR LIFT REQUESTS. I HAD BEEN DOING THIS BEFORE RECEIPT OF THE
 REVISED REF D AS HAD I MAF, 9TH MAB AND FMFPAC (FWD) BEFORE
 ME. THIS HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF SOME FRICTION, BUT SINCE
 PUBLICATION OF REF D, IT IS NOW CLEARLY SPELLED OUT AND
 THE PROCEDURES CONTAINED THEREIN ARE CONSIDERED MOST APPRO-
 PRIATE. THERE MUST BE A ON-SCENE-COORDINATOR WHO CAN ESTABLISH
 PRIORITIES WHEN SUBORDINATE COMMANDS ARE COMPETING FOR ASSETS;
 AND WHO CAN FUNCTION AS A SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT FOR NON-
 MARINE CORPS SUPPORT AGENCIES. RELATED TO THIS IS THE
 MANAGEMENT OF HELICOPTERS. REQUESTS FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT
 ON OKINAWA ARE PROCESSED THROUGH THE THIRD MARDIV AIR OFFICER,
 SINCE THE DIVISION IS THE PRIME USER OF HELOS ON ISLAND AND
 THERE IS NO ALLOCATION PROBLEM. THE DIV THEN GOES DIRECTLY
 TO THE WING, WHO FRAGS HELOS TO SUPPORT ON-ISLAND LIFT RE-
 QUIREMENTS. ANY REQUEST FOR LIFTS TO OUTLYING ISLANDS ARE
 TREATED AS SPECIAL AND DIRECTED FROM THIS HQ. THIS ILLUSTRATES
 THE FLEXIBILITY BEING APPLIED WITHIN THE FORCE TO INSURE
 REQUIRED SUPPORT IS PROVIDED WITH MINIMAL INTERVENTION UNTIL

CG III MAF

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PAGE SIX RUAOAJA0506 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
SUCH TIME AS AN ALLOCATION OR POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
ARISE.

6. (U) I FORMERLY EXERCISED MORE CONTROL OF AIR-GROUND
TRAINING AT CAMP FUJI THAN WAS ACTUALLY NECESSARY. SINCE
CURRENT POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS PRECLUDE EMPLOYMENT OF FIXED
WING VF/VA AIRCRAFT IN THE FUJI MANEUVER AREA, I HAVE REWRITTEN
REF E TO DESIGNATE THE CG THIRD MARDIV AS THE OCE FOR TRAINING
AT CAMP FUJI. THIS HAS REMOVED A SOURCE OF IRRITATION AND
HAS PROVIDED FOR A MORE EFFICIENT OPERATION. I AM CONTINUING
TO REVIEW ALL AREAS IN WHICH III MAF IS NOW INVOLVED WITH AN
EYE TO INSURING THAT MY STAFF IS NOT ACCOMPLISHING UNNECES-
SARY FUNCTIONS WHICH TAKE IT OUT OF THE CATEGORY OF A PLANNING
AND TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS.

7. (U) I DO MONITOR ACTIVITIES AT FUJI, WHICH ENABLES ME
TO STEP IN WHEN ACTIONS, SUCH AS THE RECENT REQUEST ON
HELICOPTER TRANSPORTATION FOR JAPANESE POLICE/JDA PERSONNEL
TO EXPEDITE CLEARANCE OF DEMONSTRATORS FROM THE FIRING RANGES,
REQUIRE HIGHER LEVEL COORDINATION.

8. (S) ALTHOUGH NOT IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE SIOP,
AS IS APPROPRIATE, I HAVE MONITORED FIRST MAW'S PROGRAM,
S E C R E T //N03120//FINAL SECTION OF TWO
PERSONAL FOR LIGEN JONES FROM LIGEN ROBERTSON.
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

PROVIDED FOR SECURITY AUGMENTATION FROM OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE
FORCE AND ASSISTED THE FIRST MAW IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS FOR
STAGING BASES AND THE ASSOCIATED REQUIRED SUPPORT. IT IS
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE A SINGLE POINT OF
CONTACT FOR NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS SORT WITH USN, USA AND
USAF COMMANDS IN WESTPAC. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS IS NEGOTIATIONS
TO DEPLOY A VMFA SQUADRON TO NAHA FOR ROTATIONAL TRAINING.
AFTER COMFAIRWESTPAC HAD CLOSED OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS
AS FAR AS FIRST MAW WAS CONCERNED, UNDER MY CTF 79 HAT, I
WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE COMFAIRWESTPAC THAT NEGOTIATION SHOULD
BE CONTINUED. ALTHOUGH THE ULTIMATE RESULTS ARE NOT YET
KNOWN, OUR MARINE REQUIREMENTS WERE KEPT IN THE FOREFRONT
AND THE REQUEST TO UTILIZE NAHA FACILITIES WAS REFERRED TO

CG III MAF

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PAGE TWO RUAOAJA0507 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR THE PACFLT-PACAF LEVEL FOR RESOLUTION. AT THESE TIMES WHEN THE MARINE CORPS RESPONSIBILITIES IN WESTPAC ARE INCREASING VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER SERVICES, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR YOUR SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE AND THE SENIOR MARINE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER IN THE AREA TO EXERCISE THE AUTHORITY AND PRESTIGE OF HIS POSITION TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITY OF FMF FORCES IN WESTPAC.

9. (S) MY TASKING FROM COMSEVENTHFLT TO DEVELOP A CAPABILITY TO LIFT NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM STORAGE SITES ON OKINAWA TO THE APOE, ALTHOUGH STRICTLY AN OPERATIONAL MATTER, IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF OPERATION WHICH REQUIRED COORDINATION WITH THE ARMY (USARYIS) AND THE AIR FORCE (313TH AIR DIVISION) WHICH WAS MOST EXPEDITIOUSLY ACCOMPLISHED AT THE III MAF LEVEL WHERE NECESSARY DECISIONS COULD BE MADE. AS A CONSEQUENCE IMPLEMENTING ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED WELL AHEAD OF SCHEDULE.

10. (U) IN JULY 1971, I ARRANGED A READINESS EXERCISE FOR THE 30TH NCR WHICH INVOLVED SHORT NOTICE AIR MOVEMENT OF A NCB AIR MOBILE DET FROM OKINAWA TO CAMP FUJI. WHILE AT FUJI THE DET PROVIDED CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT FOR THE ON-GOING QUONSET

PAGE THREE RUAOAJA0507 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR HUT PROJECT. THIS WAS APPROPRIATE III MAF ACTION FOR EXERCISE OF A NAVY UNIT, ONE OF WHOSE MISSIONS IS THE SUPPORT OF FMF OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD. III MAF ACTION IS ALSO CONSIDERED MOST APPROPRIATE FOR ANY EFFORT REQUESTED FROM THE 30TH NCR IN SUPPORT OF WESTPAC FMF UNITS.

11. (U) I HAVE WORKED VERY CLOSELY WITH CG, MCB, CAMP BUTLER IN COORDINATING ON-ISLAND FMF SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS CIVIL DISTURBANCE FORCES AND DISASTER ASSISTANCE SUPPORT REQUIRING USE OF FMF ASSETS. THIS HAS BEEN A MOST SATISFACTORY WORKING RELATIONSHIP AND III MAF HAS PROVIDED THE NECESSARY COORDINATION BETWEEN FMF AIR AND GROUND ELEMENTS ON OKINAWA IN SUPPORT OF BOB BARROW'S ON-ISLAND MARINE CORPS REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES.

12. (U) I HAVE PREVIOUSLY INDICATED THE III MAF SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE MAC AFFILIATION PROGRAM. I REALIZE THAT THIS PROGRAM WAS ESTABLISHED TO IMPROVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE USER AND MAC. HOWEVER, SINCE THE USERS IN THE WESTPAC MARINE FORCES ARE THE DIVISION, WING AND FSR, III MAF SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THIS PROGRAM IN A COORDINATION ROLE.

13. (U) AS TASKED IN REFS F AND G, III MAF HAS ACCOMPLISHED,

CG III MAF

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PAGE FOUR RUAOAJA0507 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR CERTAIN FUNCTIONS RELATIVE TO MAP TRAINING CONDUCTED BY MARINE UNITS ON OKINAWA. AS YOU KNOW, THIS TASK IS NOW UP IN THE AIR WITH THE IMPENDING REVERSION OF OKI TO JAPAN AND APPLICATION OF THE SOFA TO OKINAWA. MY ACTION OFFICER MAKES FIVE OR SIX TELEPHONE CALLS A WEEK TO THE VARIOUS MAAGS, FROM THAILAND TO KOREA, IN COORDINATING THE TRAINING CONDUCTED BY THE DIV/WING/FSR.

14. (U) I HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THE OBVIOUS OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS ACCOMPLISHED BY III MAF/TF 79 ON A DAILY BASIS. SOME OF THE THINGS MENTIONED ARE THE BORDERLINE, NOT PURELY OPERATIONAL AND NOT STRAIGHT ADMINISTRATIVE, AREAS WHICH WE WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO SEPARATE IN A CUT AND DRIED MANNER. THERE ARE REALLY NO MAJOR PROBLEMS RELATIVE TO III MAF RESPONSIBILITIES BUT THERE HAVE BEEN AREAS OF SENSITIVITY WHICH I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO LOOK AT FROM BOTH LEVELS AND MADE CORRECTIONS AT MY LEVEL WHERE INDICATED. SOME OF THE SENSITIVENESS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE DYNAMIC PERSONALITIES OF THE COMMANDERS INVOLVED. I APPRECIATE THE STRONG OPINIONS AND FORCEFUL APPROACH TAKEN BY THE III MAF OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS AND WOULD NOT WANT TO SERVE WITH COMMANDING GENERALS WHO DID
PAGE FIVE RUAOAJA0507 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR NOT EXHIBIT SUCH CHARACTERISTICS.

15. (U) WITHIN THE WESTPAC MILITARY COMMUNITY ALL MAJOR US AND FOREIGN MILITARY COMMANDS ARE BECOMING MORE AND MORE AWARE THAT III MAF IS IN BEING, IS THE SENIOR MARINE HQ IN THE AREA AND IS CAPABLE OF IMMEDIATELY FIELDING A BALANCED COMBAT READY FORCE. THE MARINE CORPS CAN GAIN A GREAT DEAL BY EXPLOITING THIS POSITION AND TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE HORSEPOWER INVOLVED BY INSURING THAT III MAF IS THE POINT OF CONTACT AND PRIMARY SPOKESMAN WITH THE OTHER MAJOR U.S. AND FOREIGN COMMANDS IN WESTPAC.

16. (U) I FIND THAT SINCE REFERENCE A WAS WRITTEN, III MAF HAS DEVELOPED A FIRM UNDERSTANDING OF ITS ROLE AND AN AWARENESS OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. THE PROBLEM AREAS DISCUSSED IN REF B, TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, HAVE BEEN RESOLVED TO A MANAGEABLE LEVEL. THE MAF HQ WAS OPERATING IN CONSONANCE WITH REF B PRIOR TO ITS RECEIPT. I CAN THEREFORE FIND NO BASIS TO RECOMMEND CHANGES TO REFS F AND G. HOWEVER, SUGGEST REF G BE CANCELLED SINCE MISSION AND TASKS ARE CONTAINED IN REF F. A MORE DETAILED TASKING THAN ALREADY CONTAINED REF F WOULD UNDULY RESTRICT ME IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
PAGE SIX RUAOAJA0507 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR MY DUTIES AND MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR ME AND MY SUCCESSOR TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY AS YOUR SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE AND THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER IN WESTPAC.

18. (U) I AM ADDRESSING SUGGESTED PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF III MAF ELEMENTS BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

CG III MAF

P: 040618Z NOV 71

6-6

SECRET

(122)

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TOR: 6NOV71 1429Z

R 052228Z NOV 71
FM CG THIRD MAW
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

UNCLAS//N00000//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN BROWN. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY

CARRIER QUALIFICATIONS (CQ)

1. MY 292048Z JUL 71

1. WEDNESDAY WE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED CARRIER QUALIFICATION OF VMA-214 ON BOARD USS HANCOCK. THIS IS THE FIRST 3D MAW FIXED WING SQDN TO CARQUAL SINCE PRE-VIETNAM DAYS AND WE CONSIDER THIS ANOTHER FIRM STEP IN OUR CONTINUING PROGRAM TO UPGRADE OUR COMBAT READINESS.

2. NECESSARY MAINT SUPPORT EQUIP AND A FEW VMA-214 MARINES SAILED WITH THE SHIP FROM ALAMEDA ON 27 OCT. AIRCRAFT, PILOTS AND THE MAIN BODY OF MAINT PERSONNEL REMAINED AT EL TORO FOR FINAL POLISHING. ON THE 30TH, 10 ACFT FLEW OUT, AND WE PUT THE MAIN BODY ABOARD BY HELICOPTER WITH THE SHIP JUST SOUTHWEST OF SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND. BY WEDNESDAY MORNING WE HAD DAY QUALIFIED 25 PILOTS, 3 OF WHOM ALSO NIGHT QUALIFIED. WE ALSO REQUALIFIED 2 LSO'S AND QUALIFIED 1 LSO. OUR GOAL WAS TO QUALIFY

25 OF THE 30 NA'S IN THE SQDN AND THIS WAS ACHIEVED. AS A BONUS WE ACHIEVED SOME VERY VALUABLE TRAINING FOR THE SQDN MAINT CREWS IN SHIP BOARD MAINT WORK, GOT OUR LSO'S UP TO SPEED AND MADE SIGNIFICANT GAIN IN COMBAT READINESS.

3. THE QUALIFICATION PERIOD WAS MARRED BY ONLY ONE MINOR INCIDENT. ONE A-4 ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE TO THE NOSE WHEEL STRUT FROM AN INFLIGHT ENGAGEMENT ON AN ATTEMPTED WAVE-OFF. THERE WAS NO INJURY TO PERSONNEL.

4. THE SHIP'S CREW COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE COOPERATIVE OR ENTHUSIASTIC AND I WILL SO INFORM ADM TOM WALKER.

5. WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE CARRIER QUALIFICATION PERIOD FOR VMFA-531 LATER THIS QUARTER.

WARM REGARDS

BT

40739

CG THIRD MAW

R 052228Z NOV 71

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SSN: 0443
TOD: 06 NOV 71 2112Z

P 062021Z NOV 71
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUAOAJA/CG III MAF
RUWJNWA/CG I MAF
BT

SECRET //N00000//
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON AND MAJGEN DWYER FROM LTGEN JONES.
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
QUOTE:

P 050418Z NOV 71
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC
INFO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
BT

SECRET //N00000//
PERSONAL FOR VADM JOHNSON INFO ADM CLAREY FROM LTGEN JONES.
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PHIBPAC/FMFPAC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
1. (U) I WOULD FIRST LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION

CG FMFPAC

P 062021Z NOV 71

ACTN: S/SEC
1-4

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(124)

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0443 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
FOR YOUR RECENT VISITS TO THIS HQ. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AN
INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IS ALWAYS WELCOME, INFORMATIVE, AND
PRODUCTIVE.

2. (S) DURING YOUR VISITS, THE SUBJECT OF A MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION RELATED TO READINESS WAS DISCUSSED AND, AS WE AGREED,
I WAS TO SUMMARIZE AND FORWARD AN OUTLINE OF OUR DISCUSSION.
THIS FOLLOWS:

A. MOST OF OUR PLANS FOR MAJOR CONTINGENCIES CALL FOR UP
TO THREE MAFS BEING EMPLOYED IN A 30-60-90 DAY TIME FRAME.
OTHER PLANS CALL FOR MAB/MAU COMMITMENTS IN A MATTER OF DAYS.
ONE OF THE PRIMARY PROBLEMS THAT WE FACE IN RESPONDING TO THESE
CONTINGENCIES IS THE ASSEMBLING AND MOVEMENT OF THE FORCES.

(1) LIFT. FMFPAC HAS TWO MAFS AVAILABLE, WHILE PHIBPAC
CAN LIFT ONLY 2/3 THE ASSAULT ECHELON OF ONE MAF. EVEN WITH
LANTCOM AUGMENTATION, THE COMBINED CAPABILITY WOULD LIFT LITTLE
MORE THAN THE ASSAULT ECHELON OF ONE MAF. THIS MEANS THAT NOT
ONLY MUST WE DEPEND ON MSC AND MAC LIFT TO MOVE THE SHORTFALL,
BUT ALSO WE MUST BE EXTREMELY SELECTIVE IN DETERMINING WHICH
ELEMENTS OF THE MAF'S GO BY AMPHIBIOUS LIFT.

(2) POSTURE. FMFPAC FORCES ARE DISPOSED WITH 6/9

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0443 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
DIVISION/WING TEAM (DWT) IN WESTPAC, 2/9 DWT IN MIDPAC AND 1 1/9
DWT IN EASTPAC. THEREFORE, WHILE NEARLY 1/2 OF THE FMFPAC
ASSETS ARE DEPLOYED TO WESTPAC/MIDPAC, ONLY 1/4 PHIBPAC ASSETS
ARE SO DEPLOYED. THEREFORE, FOR PACOM CONTINGENCIES, CONSIDER-
ABLE PRE-EMBARKATION REPOSTURING OF AMPHIBIOUS LIFT WOULD BE
REQUIRED.

B. ACCORDINGLY, ONE OF THE MOST ESSENTIAL "CROSS-TELLS"
BETWEEN FMFPAC AND PHIBPAC WOULD BE FOR THIS HQ TO
KEEP YOU INFORMED OF OUR EMBARKATION PLANS, TO INCLUDE THE NUM-
BER AND TYPE OF SHIPS REQUIRED FOR EACH OF THE PORTS OF EMBARKA-
TION THROUGHOUT PACOM. YOUR HQ IN TURN WOULD KEEP US INFORMED
OF PHIBPAC CAPABILITIES AND THE TIME FACTORS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE
THE SHIPS. THE RESULT WOULD BE THAT BOTH FORCES COULD READILY
IDENTIFY SHORTFALLS AND DETERMINE COURSES OF ACTION TO CORRECT
OR LESSEN THEIR IMPACT.

C. IN THIS REGARD, STEPS HAVE BEEN INITIATED WITH III MAF
TO COMMENCE THE PREPARATION OF DATA THAT WOULD ULTIMATELY LEAD
TO OUR BEING ABLE TO KEEP PHIBPAC ADVISED AS TO OUR SPECIFIC
SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS. A SIMILAR PROGRAM WILL BE COMMENCED
WITH I MAF.

CG FMFPAC

P 062021Z NOV 71

2-4

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PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA0443 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR

D. A RELATED MATTER INVOLVES THE EXERCISE AND TRAINING OF ATF/LF HQ. WHILE NOT, PER SE, AN ELEMENT OF THE "CROSS-TELL" PROGRAM, IT IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CAPABILITY OF THE NAVY-MARINE TEAM TO RESPOND TO CONTINGENCIES IN A TIMELY, EFFICIENT, AND EFFECTIVE MANNER. SINCE AT THE MAB/MAU LEVEL (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 31ST MAU IN WESTPAC) HEADQUARTERS ARE ACTIVATED ONLY FOR EXERCISES OR OPERATIONS, THERE IS LIMITED OPPORTUNITY TO ENHANCE THEIR OVERALL READINESS FOR COMBAT. FURTHER, FOR EXERCISES, THE HQ USUALLY ACTIVATES AND COMMENCES PLANNING FOR THE EXERCISE OVER A 2-3 MONTH PERIOD; WHEREAS IN ACTUAL CONTINGENCIES, THE HQ MAY HAVE TO COMPLETE PLANNING AND DEPLOY IN A PERIOD OF DAYS. SIMILARLY, THE NAVY STAFFS, PARTICULARLY AT THE ARG/PHIBRON LEVEL, MAY NOT HAVE MANY OCCASIONS TO CONDUCT CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON A CRASH BASIS. ACCORDINGLY, THERE IS A REQUIREMENT TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM TO PROVIDE FOR THE TESTING AND TRAINING OF THE ATF/LF STAFFS IN AN EMERGENCY TYPE SITUATION. SUCH A PROGRAM IS ENVISIONED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) CONCEPTUALLY, THE EXERCISE WOULD BEGIN WITH A NO-WARNING EXERCISE INITIATING DIRECTIVE PUBLISHED BY THE APPROPRIATE NUMBERED FLEET COMMANDER. THE MAF CG WOULD ACTIVATE

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA0443 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR

AN APPROPRIATE LF STAFF AND THE PHIBGRU COMMANDER WOULD DESIGNATE THE ATF STAFF. ONCE ASSEMBLED (WITHIN 24-36 HOURS AND HOPEFULLY ON THE ATF FLAG SHIP), THE ATF/LF STAFFS WOULD BE GIVEN A TROOP LIST, SHIPPING LIST, OBJECTIVE AREA, MISSION, INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER INPUT NECESSARY TO PREPARE OPERATION, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND EMBARKATION ORDERS, ALL WITHIN 96 HOURS OR LESS, DEPENDING ON THE PARTICULAR SITUATION. THE ATF/LF STAFFS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DEVELOP MUTUALLY SUPPORTING PLANS CONCURRENTLY. SMALL MOBILE TEMAS PROVIDED BY LFTC AND THE NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS SCHOOL (NAMS) WOULD OVERSEE THE EFFORT AND PROVIDE ASSISTANCE/INSTRUCTION, AS REQUIRED. FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE EXERCISE, A CRITIQUE WOULD BE CONDUCTED BY THE LFTC/NAMS TEAMS AND SALIENT TEACHING POINTS WOULD BE DRIVEN HOME. EMPHASIS WOULD BE ON EMPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE TIME, STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES, AND AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE.

(2) THE GENERAL EXERCISE PACKAGE COULD BE WORKED UP AT THIS HEADQUARTERS IN COORDINATION WITH PHIBPAC AND CINCPACFLT, AND SEVERAL EXERCISE SCENARIOS COULD BE PROVIDED BY LFTC/NAMS. THE PHIBGRU AND MAF COMMANDERS WOULD SUPERVISE AND COORDINATE THE CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE AND WOULD COORDINATE WITH THE FLEET

CG FMFPAC

P 062021Z NOV '71

3-4

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124

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PAGE SIX RUHHFMA0443 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 COMMANDER. OTHER THAN THE STAFFS, NO FORCES WOULD BE INVOLVED.
 CONSIDERING THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS, THE EXERCISE WOULD BE MOST
 ECONOMICAL IN MANPOWER AND TIME AND SHOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING
 ADVANTAGES:

(A) DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSER WORKING RELATIONS BETWEEN
 OUR COMMANDS.

(B) ENHANCEMENT OF OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO
 CONTINGENCIES.

(C) TRAINING AND EVALUATION IN AN AREA OF CRITICAL
 IMPORTANCE--AMPHIBIOUS STAFF PLANNING ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS.

(D) ENHANCEMENT OF OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE AIR-
 GROUND HEADQUARTERS ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS.

(E) EXTENSION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LFTC AND
 NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS SCHOOL.

E. IN SUMMARY, WE AGREED TO PURSUE FURTHER:

(1) AN INFORMATION EXCHANGE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED BETWEEN
 FMFPAC AND PHIBPAC REGARDING DETAILED SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS AND
 SHIPPING CAPABILITIES.

(2) THE CONDUCT OF AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING EXERCISES BY
 FMFPAC AND PHIBPAC TO TEST AND TRAIN AIF/LF HEADQUARTERS.

PAGE SEVEN RUHHFMA0443 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
 3. (U) I CONSIDER THAT THIS GENERALLY OUTLINES OUR DISCUSSION
 DURING YOUR VISITS, AND FULLY APPRECIATE THE MANY QUESTIONS AND
 UNRESOLVED ISSUES WHICH THESE PROPOSALS GENERATE. AS YOU
 SUGGESTED, PROBABLY THE BEST TECHNIQUE TO LAUNCH OUR EFFORTS
 WOULD BE A VISIT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS BY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF.
 I AM PREPARED TO DO THIS AT A DATE CONVENIENT TO YOU. I
 BELIEVE OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO POLISH AND HONE OUR TRADITIONAL
 SKILLS AND RELATIONSHIPS WILL RESULT IN A QUANTUM IMPROVEMENT
 IN THE READINESS OF OUR RESPECTIVE FORCES. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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CG FMFPAC

P 062021Z NOV 71

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FM CG III MAF
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON. DELIVER
DURING DUTY HOURS.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR III MAF (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 050418Z NOV 71 (S) PERSONAL

1. (S) IN REF A, PROVIDED FOR MY INFORMATION, YOU INDICATED TO VADM JOHNSON THAT STEPS HAD BEEN INITIATED WITH III MAF TO COMMENCE THE PREPARATION OF DATA THAT WOULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO YOUR BEING ABLE TO KEEP PHIBPAC ADVISED AS TO SPECIFIC SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS. I HAVE HAD NO FORMAL TASKING IN THIS REGARD, AND THE STAFF HAS GONE AS FAR AS IT CAN ON THE INFORMATION INITIALLY FURNISHED.
2. (S) I UNDERSTAND THAT TASKING, WHEN RECEIVED, WILL BE ON A SHORT DEADLINE BASES, I.E. 15 DEC OR 31 DEC 71, AND WILL REQUIRE INPUT FROM ALL ECHELONS. CONCURRENT WITH THIS TASK WILL BE OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS PREPARATION OF A MAE/MAU/MAB FOR AIRLIFT COMMITMENT TO NEMVAC OPS, PARTICIPATION IN A COMEX AND PHIBCPX, INITIATION OF GOLDEN DRAGON PLANNING WITH THE KOREANS, AND PROVISION OF A NUCLEUS FOR BLUE RIDGE. IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT NIP SITUATION, I HAVE POSTPONED THE 9TH MAB CPX TO ENABLE THAT STAFF TO DEVOTE FULL TIME PREPARING THE AIR MOVEMENT PLANS TO SUPPORT THE NIP CONTINGENCY. I WILL BE NOTIFYING YOU IN A GENERAL SERVICE MESSAGE OF MY PLAN TO PROVIDE PERSONNEL FOR THE BLUE RIDGE TRANSIT AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT MAY HAVE TO BE ALTERED AT THE LAST MINUTE, ALSO DUE TO NIP.
3. (S) I WOULD, THEREFORE, APPRECIATE FORMAL TASKING AND ASSESSMENT OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PLANNING EFFORT MENTIONED TO VADM JOHNSON SO THAT I MAY MAKE FURTHER ALIGNMENT OF MY PLANNING ASSETS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

CG III MAF

R 160529Z NOV 71

ACTN: S/SEC

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FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUADAJA/CG III MAF
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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN JONES.
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR III MAF

A. CG III MAF 160529Z/NOV71 (S)(PERSONAL)

1. (S) IN REF A YOU ASKED FOR FORMAL TASKING REGARDING
THE PREPARATION OF DATA NEEDED TO KEEP COMPHIBPAC ADVISED AS
TO SPECIFIC SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS.

2. (S) I FULLY APPRECIATE THE MANY TASKS THAT YOU AND YOUR STAFF
ARE INVOLVED IN. ACCORDINGLY, THE TASKING TO PROVIDE THE
INFORMATION DISCUSSED WITH COMPHIBPAC WILL BE BROKEN INTO
TWO INCREMENTS IN ORDER TO SPREAD THE WORK LOAD:

A. THE FIRST INCREMENT WILL INVOLVE UPDATING THE
TIME PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST (TPFDL) FOR USE IN
REVISING CINCPAC'S OPLAN 5027. IT WAS THIS INCREMENT THAT
WAS DISCUSSED WITH REFERENCE TO A 31 DEC DEADLINE. IT IS NOT
CG FMFPAC

P 200207Z NOV 71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1401 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
ANTICIPATED THAT ASSEMBLING THIS DATA WILL INVOLVE EXCESSIVE
STAFF PREPARATION.

B. THE SECOND INCREMENT, AND THE ONE REQUIRING THE MOST
STAFF WORK, WILL INVOLVE THE PREPARATION OF LOGISTICS AND
EMBARKATION DATA TO SUPPORT THE TPFDL. IT IS ANTICIPATED
THAT YOUR STAFF WILL BE GIVEN 90 DAYS TO COMPLETE THIS PHASE
OF DEVELOPING THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING DATA.

3. (S) THIS BODY OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING DATA WILL SERVE TWO
PURPOSES. FIRST, IT WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR REVISING
VARIOUS CINCPAC CONTINGENCY PLANS, COMMENCING WITH 5027, AND
SECOND, IT WILL SERVE TO INFORM COMPHIBPAC, CINCPACFLT, AND
CINCPAC OF OUR SPECIFIC SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS. ACCORDINGLY,
IT WILL BE OF GREAT VALUE IN ENSURING THAT PACOM PLANS
ACCURATELY REFLECT MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS.

4. (S) MY STAFF IS PRESENTLY PREPARING THE NECESSARY TASKING
DIRECTIVE. DUE CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO ESTABLISHMENT
OF REASONABLE DEADLINES.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

CG FMFPAC

P 200207Z NOV 71

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TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO ROADKUA/CG FIRST MAW

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BT

SECRET //N000000//

PERSONAL FOR MGEN ADAMS FROM MGEN BROWN. INFO MGEN OWENS.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY.

1. REF TO YOUR CALL CONCERNING THE MAINTENANCE OF THE A4/TA4
RADAR COMPUTER DOPPLER NAV AND APPROACH POWER CONTROL SYSTEM,
WE CONCUR WITH 2D MAW PROPOSALS WITH THE FOLLOWING RESERVATIONS:
IN THE EVENT THAT THE A4 IS GIVEN A SIOP COMMITMENT THE APG-53A
AND THE ASN-41 IS AN EXCELLENT PIECE OF EQUIP FOR NAVIGATIONAL
PURPOSES. WITHOUT A SIOP COMMITMENT THIS EQUIPMENT IS OF COURSE
NOT NEEDED FOR OTHER THAN TRAINING. THE DOPPLER NAVIGATION APN-
153 IS EXCELLENT FOR OVER WATER NAVIGATION SUCH AS REQUIRED FOR
TRANPACS BUT IN AN ECM ENVIRONMENT IT BECOMES A DETRIMENT. THE
APPROACH POWER CONTROL SYSTEMS WOULD BE NICE TO HAVE DURING NIGHT
CVA OPERATIONS BUT IS NOT CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR DAY CVA OR
FIELD OPERATIONS.

CG THIRD MAW

P 200247Z NOV 71

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SECRET PERSONAL FOR MARDIS

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FM CG FMFPAC

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CG III MAF

TOD:210546Z NOV 71

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SECRET //NO0000// PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN JONES.

MARDIS DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

1. FOLLOWING MSG PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFO. ^{PLEASE} ₁ PROTECT OUR SOURCE. *J*

QUOTE:

R 182236Z NOV 71

FM JCS

TO CINCPAC

BT

SECRET

JCS SEND

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY ADJUSTMENT TO AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP

ALFA/MAU POSTURE (U)

REFS: A. JCSM-261-70, DTD 28 MAY 70, SUBJ: 'SOUTHERN ASIA
PLANNING (U)'. S. YOUR 132125Z JUL 71. C. YOUR 142247Z OCT 71.

1. (S) APPENDIX B TO REF A PROVIDED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF
2 AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUPS (ARGS) IN A READY STATUS IN WESTPAC FOR
COMMITMENT IN THE RVN IF REQUIRED. REF B SPECIFIED REACTION TIMES
FOR ARG ALFA AS 120 HOURS AND 168 HOURS FOR ARG BRAVO. REF C
RECOMMENDED EXTENSION OF ARG ALFA REACTION TIME FROM 120 TO 168
HOURS DURING THE PERIOD 7-14 APR 72 IN ORDER THAT ARG ALFA COULD
PARTICIPATE IN A COMBINED FORCES AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING EXERCISE IN
THE ROK.

2. (S) IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SCHEDULING FLEXIBILITY TO ACHIEVE
MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF WESTPAC ARG ASSETS, THE EXTENSION REQUESTED

T. C. BUDD II, LTCOL, STAFF SEC 39-505

CG FMFPAC

P 202217Z NOV 71

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X

IN PARA 4 OF REF C IS APPROVED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. HOWEVER, WHILE US PARTICIPATION IN THE PROPOSED APR 72 COMBINED FORCE AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE MAY BE INDICATED FOR CONTINUED PLANNING, IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT SUCH PARTICIPATION REMAINS SUBJECT TO OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND AVAILABILITY OF FORCES. GP-4

UNQUOTE:

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

CG FMFPAC

P 202217Z NOV 71

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SECRET (128)

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIV-
ER DURING DUTY HOURS.

III MAF RESPONSIBILITIES (U)

A. CG III MAF 040618Z/NOV71 (SECRET) (MARDIS)

1. YOUR VIEWS EXPRESSED IN REF A ARE WELL STATED, AND
I AM PLEASED TO HEAR THAT MOST OF THE PROBLEMS HAVE
BEEN RESOLVED.

2. AS YOU INDICATE, THERE ARE TASKINGS OF III
MAF WHICH AT FIRST BLUSH MIGHT APPEAR BEYOND THE
PARAMETERS OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL BUT WHICH ARE APPRO-
PRIATE BY VIRTUE OF III MAF'S POSITION AS THE SENIOR
FMF COMMAND IN WESTPAC. THESE INCLUDE:

A. RESPONSIBILITY FOR HANDLING POW'S RETURNED IN
RVN (EGRESS-RECAP).

B. COORDINATION OF EVALUATION PROGRAMS FOR RDT&E

CG FMFPAC

R 212225Z/NOV 71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

129
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1476 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT ASSIGNED TO THE FIELD FOR TESTING.

- C. HOSTING OF MAF-WIDE CONFERENCES.
- D. COORDINATION OF SPECIAL AIRLIFT REQUESTS.
- E. COORDINATION OF AMPHIBIOUS AND MSC SHIPPING.
- F. COORDINATION OF THE WESTPAC LFORM PROGRAM.

3. WHILE III MAF (BOTH IN RVN AND OKI) HAS DONE A
SUPERB JOB IN REDISTRIBUTION OF T/E EQUIPMENT AND
SUPPLIES, I FEEL THIS AN ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN OF
WHICH WE CAN RELIEVE YOU SUBSEQUENT TO 1 FEB 1972.
4. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, YOUR MESSAGE HAS GENERATED
ADDITIONAL THINKING ON THE MATTER HERE IN HAWAII, AND
I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING SOME ADDITIONAL TASKS FOR III
MAF WHICH ARE AS FOLLOW:

A. III MAF SHOULD SUB-ALLOCATE AIR MOVEMENT
TRAINING HOURS TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AS REQUIRED
TO ACCOMPLISH III MAF AIR-GROUND TRAINING OBJECTIVES.
THIS WOULD NOT ALTER THE POINT OF CONTACT BETWEEN MAC
AFFILIATION TEAMS AND THE SUPPORTED COMMAND (I.E., DIV,
WING, OR FSR).

B. III MAF SHOULD COORDINATE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS,
PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1476 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
TO INCLUDE MO/NOA, WHICH BEAR ON TWO OR MORE COMMANDS
TO INCLUDE: MONITORING MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS, RECOMMEND-
ING PRIORITY OF ISSUE BETWEEN MAJOR COMMANDS; AND PRO-
VIDING ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING CRITICAL HARD-TO-PROCURE
MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT.

C. CG III MAF SHOULD COORDINATE THE EFFORTS OF
FORCE LEVEL CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES UNDER HIS OPERATIONAL
CONTROL OR AVAILABLE TO HIM FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
TO INSURE BALANCED SUPPORT IS PROVIDED TO AIR AND
GROUND ELEMENTS. THIS WOULD INCLUDE FORCE ENGINEERS
AND NCR UNITS.

RELATIVE TO THE COORDINATION OF CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES,
I BELIEVE THAT CO D (REINFORCED TO INCLUDE PLAT, 3D
BRIDGE CO), 7TH ENGINEER BN SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO
YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL. I WOULD PROPOSE, THEREFORE,
THAT THIS TAKE PLACE EFFECTIVELY 1 JAN 1972 WITH COMMAND
LESS OPERATIONAL CONTROL ACCURING TO CO, 3D FSR AND
THAT CO D PHYSICALLY RELOCATE TO THE TENGEN/CAMP FOSTER
AREAS.

5. I WILL DISCUSSS THESE TOPICS AND ANY OTHERS YOU

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA1476 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
FEEL PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT DURING MY FORTHCOMING
VISIT.

6. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

CG FMFPAC

R 212225Z/NOV 71

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R 221915Z NOV 71

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW

INFO RUAOAJA/CG III MAF

BT

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TOD: 22NOV71 2007Z

CCN: 1496

DRAFTED: G-3

CONCURRED: G-3, C/S

RELEASED: CG

UNCLAS//N00000// PERSONAL FOR MGEN OWENS INFO
LTGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING
DUTY HOURS.

FMFPAC TRAINING READINESS EVALUATION (TRE)

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE, MANY MANAGEMENT ACTIONS HAVE
BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY

WITHIN FMFPAC TO IMPROVE/MAINTAIN UNIT READINESS.

OUR PRESENT READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM HAS PROVIDED

ME A GOOD INSIGHT INTO WHAT ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO

ACHIEVE A C-1/C-2 STATUS. ONE FACET OF THE PROBLEM

NOT COVERED IN OUR REPORTING SYSTEM IS THE QUALITY

OF THE TRAINING BEING ACCOMPLISHED AND CONSEQUENTLY

THE ABILITY OF OUR UNITS TO PERFORM THEIR ASSIGNED

MISSION. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, OUR INSPECTION

PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED DURING THE LAST YEAR TO

CG FMFPAC

R 221915Z NOV 71

ACTN: S/SEC

1-3

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PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1496 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR,
 PROVIDE FOR A CONCEPT FOR CONDUCTION TRAINING
 READINESS EVALUATIONS (TRE'S) OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS
 AND AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS. TO DATE THIS HEADQUARTERS
 HAS CONDUCTED TWO TRE'S, ONE OF A THIRD MARDIV
 BATTALION AND THE OTHER OF A THIRD MAW AIRCRAFT
 SQUADRON. THE RESULTS OF THESE EVALUATIONS HAVE
 REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT THIS CONCEPT IS A
 VALUABLE TOOL FOR ME TO MONITOR UNIT READINESS. THE
 TRE IS TO BE CONDUCTED ON A NO-NOTICE BASIS AND WILL
 EVALUATE ONLY THOSE UNITS REPORTING A COMPOSITE
 READINESS OF C-2X OR BETTER.

2. DURING THE PERIOD 29NOV-3DEC71, A TRE TEAM FROM
 MY HEADQUARTERS WILL CONDUCT AN EVALUATION OF A FIRST
 MAW SQUADRON. COL HAL VINCENT, WHO HEADS MY G-4
 AVIATION WEAPONS SYSTEM BRANCH, WILL BE OFFICER-IN-
 CHARGE OF THIS TRE. LTCOL CLIFF WARFIELD, WHO HEADS
 MY G-3 AVIATION OPERATIONS/TRAINING SECTION, WILL
 BE COL VINCENT'S PRIMARY ASSISTANT. OTHER TRE TEAM
 MEMBERS INCLUDE ONE OFFICER EACH FROM MY SAFETY/
 STANDARDIZATION, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND AIRCRAFT

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1496 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
 ORDNANCE SECTIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE TEAM WILL BE
 COMPRISED OF FOUR OFFICERS FROM MAWTUPAC. UPON
 ARRIVAL AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON 29NOV71, COL VINCENT
 WILL PROVIDE YOU OR YOUR DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE
 A COPY OF MY LOI TO HIM CONCERNING THE PROCEDURES
 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THIS TRE. ALSO AT THIS TIME, HE
 WILL SUBMIT THE "FRAG" AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR
 THE CONDUCT OF THE TRE. DEPENDING ON WHICH SQUADRON
 IS SELECTED FOR THE TRE, THE CONDUCT OF THE TRE AND
 TRE TEAM SUPPORT MAY REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT "FRAGGING"
 OF YOUR ASSETS. IT IS REALIZED THAT THIS CONCEPT
 MIGHT WELL RESULT IN A DISRUPTION OF PREVIOUSLY
 SCHEDULED TRAINING; HOWEVER, I CONSIDER THIS NECES-
 SARY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE NO-NOTICE STATUS OF THE
 TRE AND CONSEQUENTLY OBTAIN A BETTER EVALUATION OF
 THE SELECTED UNIT'S READINESS.

3. THE TRE TEAM WILL EVALUATE AN AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
 WHILE IT IS PREPARING FOR AND CONDUCTING FLIGHT
 OPERATIONS. SIMULATED COMBAT CONDITIONS WILL BE
 INTRODUCED WHEN FEASIBLE. READINESS TO ACCOMPLISH

CG FMFPAC

R 221915Z NOV 71

2-3

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA1496 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR THE ASSIGNED MISSION WILL NATURALLY BE OF A MAJOR CONCERN. FLIGHT OPERATIONS REQUIRED FOR THE TRE WILL VARY FROM TWO TO THREE DAYS DEPENDING ON THE TYPE UNIT BEING EVALUATED. STAFF FUNCTIONS (I.E., OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AIRCREW TRAINING, SAFETY, STANDARDIZATION, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE) WILL BE EVALUATED DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE UNIT BEING EVALUATED AND TERMINATION OF THE TRE. REQUIRED TRAINING AREAS/TARGETS NOT UNDER YOUR CONTROL HAVE BEEN RESERVED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. IT IS REQUESTED THAT SUPPORT ASSETS AVAILABLE WITHIN FIRST MAW (E.G., AERIAL REFUELING, FAC(A) AIRCRAFT, EVALUATION AIRCRAFT, BOGEY AIRCRAFT, COMMAND AND CONTROL AIRCRAFT, TRE TEAM TRANSPORTATION) BE PROVIDED AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE TRE. SUPPORTING UNITS (E.G., H&MS, MASS, MACS) REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASKS OF THE SQUADRON BEING GIVEN THE TRE WILL ALSO BE EVALUATED. UPON COMPLETION OF THE EVALUATION, A DEBRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE TRE TEAM.

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA1496 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
4. IN ADDITION TO THE SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE TRE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING FOR THE TEAM:

- A. ON-BASE TRANSPORTATION.
 - B. AIR TRANSPORTATION AS REQUIRED WITHIN WESTPAC.
 - C. WORKING SPACE PLUS ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE.
5. BILLETING FOR THE TRE TEAM HAS BEEN ARRANGED BY THIS HQ.
6. I KNOW YOU WILL ENDORSE THE CONCEPT OF THE TRE AS A MEANS OF DETERMINING WHAT REALLY IS A BREAD-AND-BUTTER ISSUE - CAN A UNIT PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION. IN THIS REGARD, I AM PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH THE EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF ALL AVAILABLE TRAINING ASSETS. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR INFORMING YOUR STAFF AND COMMANDERS, WHO WILL BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE EVALUATION, OF THE TRE CONCEPT AND PURPOSE.
- WARM REGARDS.

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CG FMFPAC

R 221915Z NOV 71

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RET PERSONAL FOR MARDIS

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TO LUADASA CG III MAF

TOD: 231244Z NOV 71

RUW3WUA CG I MAF

BT

MARDIS OK by Phone Con w/ Lt Col Budd @ 2125W 22 NOV

SECRET //NOOOOO// PERSONAL FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON AND MGEN DWYER
FROM MGEN ADAMS. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE. QUOTE.

DTG 200037Z NOV 71

FROM: CINCPAC

TO: JCS

INFO:

CINCLANT
CINCEUR
CINCPACFLT

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

T. C. BUDD II, LTCOL, S/SEC 39-505

ADMIN FMFPAC

P 230332Z NOV 71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-4

SECRET (131)

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PROPOSED ADJUSTMENT OF LPH RESOURCES ASSIGNMENT (U)

A. JCS 5893/121405Z NOV 71 PASEP

1. (S) Ref A discussed possibility of transferring one LPH from PACOM to LANTCOM about June 1972 in order to maintain a balance of LPH resources between CINCPAC and CINCLANT. Cmnd C
is understood that if the LPH is transferred to LANTCOM it would deploy shortly after transfer to meet the requirement for a continuous vertical lift capability within the Mediterranean. In order to address this transfer in the semiannual revision to the force assignment paper, CINCPAC comments were requested.

2. (S) Until the first new construction LHA in PACOM is deployable, now estimated as FY76, the most significant impact of the loss of an LPH on PACOM amphibious operations and plans is as follows:

a. The present capability to lift the assault echelon of two-thirds of one MAF, as opposed to a two MAF assault echelon lift objective, in support of major contingency plans will be further degraded. More significantly, the reduced level of three LPH's will not accommodate the number of helos necessary to meet the landing force requirements for helo assault by one-third of one MAF.

3. (S) In addition to the above major degradation in the readiness of PACOM forces, the following impacts will also

ADMIN FMFPAC

P 230332Z NOV 71

2-4

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be present:

a. The capability to provide training services in support of Marine forces withdrawn from RVN and reconstituted as PACOM reserve will be reduced.

b. Determination of Primary Recovery Ship (PRS) for manned space flight recovery operations in PACOM will necessitate consideration of other type ships with attendant disruption to schedules. USS TICONDEROGA (CVS 14) has been designated PRS for Apollo 16.

c. Amphibious squadron integrity for deployments will be lost, since three remaining LPH's must rotate deployments with four PHIBRON's.

4. (S) The continuing requirements imposed on PACOM forces coupled with planned increases in CINCPAC's area of responsibility weigh heavily against actions which will further degrade the capability of CINCPAC to meet commitments and contingencies. Erosion of PACOM forces cumulatively and seriously is affecting the force potential which is minimally necessary to our forecast requirements. In view of the above, it is considered that the indicated near-term reduction of an LPH in PACOM force levels is highly undesirable.

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P 230332Z NOV 71

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5. (S) Accordingly, it is recommended that the transfer of the LPH from PACOM to LANTCOM be deferred until the planned PACOM LHA is available for deployment. As CincPac

~~GP-4~~ expands to include a good percentage of the Indian Ocean as of 1 January and there is continued reduction of U.S. Forces overseas and the unsettled situation in the Far East and Indian Ocean continue with possibility of worsening, the above recommendation is even more important.
GP-4

UNQUOTE.

WARM REGARDS.

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P 230332Z NOV 71

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P 241836Z NOV 71
FM COMPHIBPAC
TO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
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TOR: 241932Z NOV 71

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PERSONAL FOR ADM CLAREY INFO LTGEN JONES FROM JOHNSON
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

A. COMPHIBPAC SPDLTR SER 31-0038 DTD 27 SEP 71

1. HAVING RECENTLY RECEIVED COMSEVENTHFLT AND COMFIRSTFLT REACTION/COMMENTS TO MY REFERENCE A ON THE SUBJECT OF AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS, I FEEL IT NECESSARY THAT I CLARIFY WHAT I BELIEVE MAY HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED.

2. CONTRARY TO BILL MACK'S AND RAY PEET'S IMPRESSIONS, I AM NOT PROPOSING THAT AN ADDITIONAL LEVEL OF REVIEW FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONAL PLANNING BE INTERPOSED BETWEEN THE FLEET AND NUMBERED FLEET COMMANDERS; RATHER, I HOPE TO STIMULATE EARLY COORDINATION OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE PLANNING DATA AND REVIEW OF DRAFT PLANS AT A WORKING LEVEL PRIOR TO FORWARDING THESE PLANS TO CINCPACFLT FOR FINAL APPROVAL. WITH THE CONCURRENT PLANNING THAT ROUTINELY OCCURS INVOLVING I MAF/COMPHIBGRU--

COMPHIBPAC

P 241836Z NOV 71

COG: S/SEC
1-2

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PAGE TWO RUWJMSA1772 C O N F I D E N T I A L
EASTPAC/FIRST FLEET IN EASTPAC AND III MAF/COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/
SEVENTHFLT IN WESTPAC, I SIMPLY FEEL IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE TWO
TYCOMS WHO BASICALLY HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FLEET COMMANDER FOR
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE MATTERS, AND WHO ULTIMATELY PROVIDE THE FORCES
REQUIRED TO EXECUTE THE PLANS, SHOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REVIEW
OF THE PLAN PRIOR TO FINAL REVIEW/APPROVAL BY YOUR STAFF. THIS IS,
AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE JOPS WHICH IS SOON TO BE
IMPLEMENTED.

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR COORDINATED PLANNING WILL BECOME MORE PRESSING
WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME. THIS BECOMES PARTICULARLY APPARENT AS I SEE
MORE EVIDENCE OF PLANNING BASED ON FREQUENTLY UNREALISTIC REQUIREMENTS
VICE LIMITED CAPABILITIES. IT IS MANDATORY THAT THIS DANGEROUS TREND
BE REVERSED AND, HOPEFULLY, THE PROPOSED COORDINATED REVIEW OF THESE
PLANS BY BILL JONES AND MYSELF WILL DO IT.

4. I AM SURE THAT THE UPCOMING JOPS BRIEFING HOSTED BY FIRST AND SEVENTH
FLEETS WILL DO MUCH TO CLARIFY VARIOUS PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES OF PACFLT
SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS AND IRON OUT ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS. THIS WILL GET
US ALL STARTED OFF ON THE SAME FOOT UNDER THE JOPS.

5. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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#1772

COMPHIBPAC

P 241836Z NOV 71

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R 090021Z DEC 71

FM CG 1ST MAW

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L //N05041//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN OWENS/DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS

TRE 3-71

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CCN: 0152

TOR: 9 DEC 71 0228Z

1. (C) THE POST EXERCISE BRIEFING OF TRE 3-71 HAS CAUSED ME CONCERN FOR THE READINESS OF VMFA-232. DURING THE AIR TO GROUND PHASE MUCH OF THE DIFFICULTY RESULTED FROM FAULTY ORDNANCE LOADING PROCEDURES. I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT THESE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND CORRECTED. THE AIR TO AIR PHASE WAS HANDICAPPED BY A VARIETY OF AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FAILURES, WHICH HAVE ALSO REPORTEDLY BEEN CORRECTED. I FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT A REEVALUATION IS APPROPRIATE IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT THE SKILL OF MY AIRCREWS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL AS WELL AS THE DEPENDABILITY OF SYSTEMS AIRCRAFT AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT PROVIDE THE DESIRED LEVEL OF OPERATIONAL READINESS. THEREFORE I HAVE DIRECTED VMFA-232 TO CONDUCT A MISSILE SHOOT DURING 9/10 DEC AND AN AIR TO GROUND REEVALUATION BY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF FOLLOWING OPERATION FORTRESS LIGHT II. ALTHOUGH THE RECENT EVALUATION WAS NOT COM-

PAGE TWO RUADKUA6804 C O N F I D E N T I A L

PLIMENTARY, I SEE THE TRE AS A WELCOME APPROACH TO SELECTIVELY ASSESSING UNIT EFFECTIVENESS AND PROVIDING ASSISTANCE IN THE CONTINUING EFFORT TO RAISE FMAW COMBAT READINESS.

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CG 1ST MAW

R090021Z DEC 71

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32.

R 100820Z DEC 71
FM COMNAVFORJAPAN
TO RUAOAJA/CG MCB FWD
INFO RUAOAJA/CG THIRD MAF
RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

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BT

UNCLAS E F T O FOUO SPECAT EXCLUSIVE//N000000//
FOR BGEN BARROW INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON AND LTGEN JONES FROM BURKE
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

CONVERSION NORTH FUJI MNVR AREA

A. MEMO NO. 587 OF 12 JULY 1968 (NOTAL)

B. FAP-US-17-42 OF 5 SEP 1969 (NOTAL)

C. SOFA

I. UNDER AUTH OF REF A EAST FUJI MNVR AREA CONVERTED FROM USFJ
EXCLUSIVE USE FACILITY UNDER ART II.1A OF REF C TO USFJ JOINT
USE FACILITY UNDER ART II.4B OF REF C.

COMNAVFORJAPAN

R 100820Z DEC 71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-2

134

2. REF B TABLED BY USFJ AS A FOLLOW ON TO DECISIONS REACHED AT 9TH SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETINGS DECEMBER 1968. EFFECT ON REF B IS CONCURRED IN BY JOINT COMMITTEE IS TO CONVERT REMAINING MANEUVER AREA FAC 3123 TO JOINT USE UNDER ART II.4B

PAGE TWO RUADLBA2777 UNCLAS E F T O FOUO SPECAT EXCLUSIVE REF C AND REDESIGNATE AS AN ADDITION TO FUJI MANEUVER AREA FAC 3183. EXCEPTED WOULD BE EXCLUSIVE USE CANTONMENT AREA OF APPROX 700 ACRES. PROPOSED CONVERSION WOULD ALSO OBLIGATE USFJ TO RELEASE FIVE EXCESS LAND PARCELS SUBJECT TO INSTALLATION OF NEW BOUNDARY MARKERS AND SECURITY FENCING AT NO COST TO U.S. GOVERNMENT. REF B WAS COORDINATED IN ADVANCE WITH CO MARRANGE CO, CAMP FUJI. 3. GOJ HAS INFORMALLY BROACHED SUBJECT IN JOINT COMMITTEE. FOLLOW ON EXPECTED TO RESULT IN FORMAL DISCUSSION POSSIBLY IN FUJI MNVR AD-HOC COMMITTEE OF FSC. 4. CONSIDER DESIREABLE YOU DESIGNATE REPRESENTATIVE TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS ON SHORT NOTICE AND TO PROVIDE LIAISON WITH MY JOINT COMMITTEE REP, CAPT J.J. CREAMER, PHONE 234-5287. 5. ORIGINATOR WILL KEEP ALCON ADVISED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. BT

2777

COMNAVFORJAPAN

R 100820Z DEC 71

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0454 SECURITY MANUAL.

O 110606Z DEC 71
FM CTF SEVEN NINE
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC ZFF-1
BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION
QUOTE

O 110316Z DEC 71
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUMFRBA/CTF SEVEN FOUR
RUHGOLA/CTG SEVEN FOUR PT THREE
RUMFUFA/CTF SEVEN SIX
RUAOAJA/CTF SEVEN NINE
RUHGOSA/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO
BT

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T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM CLAREY INFO RADM COOPER,
RADM FERRIS, CAPT ROGERSON, RADM GADDIS AND LGEN ROBERTSON FROM MACK
//N00000//

PAKISTAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (S)

CTF SEVEN NINE

O 110606Z DEC 71

ACTN: S/SEC
1-2

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PAGE TWO RUAOAJA2383 T O P S E C R E T SPECATE EXCLUSIVE

1. (TS) CURRENT TASKING FOR PAKISTAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS HAS ENTERPRISE AND TRIPOLI WITH ESCORTS ENROUTE VICINITY SINGAPORE. TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE, "GO", "NO GO" DECISIONS THE FOLLOWING FACTS ARE PROVIDED;

- A. FOR TRIPOLI TO CONDUCT FORTRESS LIGHT II AT MINDORO, SHE MUST REVERSE COURSE WITH ARG ALFA NLT 111200Z DEC 71.
- B. FOR ENTERPRISE TO RETURN TO YANKEE STATION AND RELIEVE CONSTELLATION SO SHE CAN HONOR DEPENDENTS CHARTER FLIGHT BY MAKING PORT VISIT SINGAPORE ON 18 DEC AS SCHEDULED, ENTERPRISE MUST BE TURNED TOWARD YANKEE STATION NLT 130500Z DEC 71.

2. (TS) IN THE EVENT CURRENT TASKING IS CONTINUED, TF 74 COULD COMMENCE

TRANSIT OF THE STRAIT OF MALLACA 130800Z DEC 71 AND ETA VICINITY OF CHITTAGONG WOULD BE 171100Z DEC 71.

3. (S) BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT IF CURRENT TASKING CONTINUES ARG ALFA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN 120 HOUR REACTION TIME, COMSEVENTHFLT WILL

ASSIGN ARG/BLT BRAVO TO A 120 HOUR REACTION POSTURE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ARG ALFA/31ST MAU CAN RETURN TO ITS ASSIGNED READINESS POSTURE.

GP-4

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UNQUOTE

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CTF SEVEN NINE

O 110600Z DEC 71

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P 162001Z DEC 71
FM CG FMFPAC/COMMACORBASEPAC
TO RUAOAJA/CG III MAF
RUAOAJA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW
RUAOAJA/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER
RUADKUA/MCAS IWAKUNI

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SECRET NOFORN//N00000// SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON,
MGEM METZGER, MGEM OWENS, BGEN BARROW AND COL VAN CAMPEN
FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AT MCAS, IWAKUNI

1. CI AND NIS OPERATIONS BEING CONDUCTED AT MCAS, IWAKUNI ARE
CONSIDERED HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL UNDERTAKINGS AND SHOULD SERVE AS
MODELS FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENT.

2. OVER THE PAST MONTHS THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY (JSP) AND
OTHER LEFT WING ELEMENTS GATHERED ALLEGED EVIDENCE THAT NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WERE BEING STORED/MAINTAINED AT MCAS, IWAKUNI. IN AN
EFFORT TO UNDERMINE PRIME MINISTER SATO'S GOVERNMENT, THE JSP
PRESENTED BITS OF INFORMATION (PHONE BOOKS, DATA ON AMMO, MAPS)
SUPPOSEDLY RELATED TO THE ALLEGED STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
ASSOCIATED ACTIVITY AT IWAKUNI. USING THIS ADVERSE INFORMATION
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DIET DISCUSSION OF THE OKINAWA REVERSION
TREATY, THE JSP HOPED IT COULD CAUSE PM SATO TO STEP DOWN. THIS
EVENTUALITY WAS AVERTED BY SATO'S FINESSE. HOWEVER, THE SITU-
ATION WAS ALSO EASED BY THE PROMPT, RESPONSIBLE ACTIONS OF THE
MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS/UNITS INVOLVED IN CURRENT OPERATIONS AT
IWAKUNI. WITHOUT DISCLOSING ANY PARTICULARS, IT IS CORRECT TO
SAY THAT THE 7TH CIT AND NIS, IWAKUNI MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRI-
BUTION TOWARD DEFUSING THE SITUATION. THIS IS A PRIME EXAMPLE
OF MARINE/NIS COOPERATION IN DOING A MOST PROFESSIONAL JOB. WE
CAN ANTICIPATE CONTINUED HARASSMENT ON EVERY CONCEIVABLE
ISSUE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND
DEPORTMENT. COMMANDERS OF OKINAWA AND JAPAN BASED UNITS MUST
BE MADE AWARE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT PROMPTLY IN THESE
SITUATIONS AS WELL AS THE NECESSITY OF PROVIDING INFORMATION
TO HIGHER AUTHORITY IN A TIMELY MANNER.

3. FOR COL VAN CAMPEN: YOUR COMD IS TO BE CONGRATULATED FOR
PROVIDING TIMELY AND ACCURATE RESPONSES IN A MOST TRYING CIRCUM-
STANCE. THE OUTSTANDING WORK OF THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
REPS AT IWAKUNI IS APPRECIATED. PLEASE PASS MY APPRECIATION TO
THEM. WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

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CG FMFPAC/COMMACORBASEPAC

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R 162004Z DEC 71
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUAOAJA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUADKUA/CG FIRST MAW
RUWJNWB/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUWJGFB/CG THIRD MAW
RUHHFAA/CG FIRST MARBDE
INFO RUAOAJA/CG III MAF
RUWJNWA/CG I MAF

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BT
UNCLAS//N00000//
PERSONAL FOR MGEN METZGER, MGEN OWENS, MGEN DWYER,
MGEN BROWN, BGEN ARMSTRONG, INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON
AND MGEN DWYER, FROM LTGEN JONES. DELIVER DURING
DUTY HOURS.

TRAINING READINESS EVALUATION (TRE)

1. THIS HQ INSTITUTED THE TRAINING READINESS EVALUATION
(TRE) IN JUNE 1971. THE FIRST UNIT TO BE EVALUATED WAS
A THIRD MARDIV INFANTRY BN. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY
EVALUATIONS OF A THIRD AND FIRST MAW F-4 SQDN IN JULY
CG FMFPAC

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ACTN: S/SEC
1-3

137

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1122 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR
AND DECEMBER 71 RESPECTIVELY.

2. AS YOU KNOW, THE CONCEPT OF THE TRE REQUIRES THAT A SQUADRON OR BATTALION DEMONSTRATE ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM THE ASSIGNED MISSION ON A NO-NOTICE BASIS. WITH REGARD TO A BATTALION, THE EXERCISE INCLUDES BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE COMBAT, DAY AND NIGHT, AND EVALUATES THE CAPABILITY OF UNITS FROM SQUAD TO BATTALION LEVEL. THE TRE OF AN ACFT SQUADRON IS CONSIDERABLY MORE COMPLICATED THAN THAT OF THE INFANTRY BATTALION; HOWEVER, WE ARE LOOKING FOR THE SAME THING - THE ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION. AIRCREW PROFICIENCY IS, OF COURSE, EVALUATED. ADDITIONALLY, SAFETY AND NATOPS PROCEDURES, MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES, ORDNANCE HANDLING/LOADING PROCEDURES, IN-FLIGHT REFUELING, AND SUPPORTING UNIT (E.G., MACS, VMCJ) CAPABILITY ARE SOME OF THE AREAS EVALUATED.

3. IN MY VIEW, THE INSTITUTION OF THE TRE HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MOST MEANINGFUL INNOVATIONS OF RECENT YEARS. THROUGH THIS EVALUATION, WE CAN ACCURATELY ASSESS THE ACTUAL READINESS OF OUR UNITS AS OPPOSED TO WHAT MAY, IN REALITY, BE WISHFUL THINKING ON

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1122 UNCLAS PERRSONAL FOR
THE PART OF THE UNIT COMMANDER. IN THE THREE EVALIATIONS CONDUCTED THUS FAR, EVEN THOUGH EACH UNIT CONCERNED WAS RATED AS C-2, WE OBSERVED A NUMBER OF SHORTFALLS. I AM BY NO MEANS SUGGESTING THAT UNIT COMMANDERS ARE EENGAGING IN FALSE REPORTING. THE SHORTFALLS NOTED HAVE BEEN LARGELY IN AREAS WHICH ENCOMPASS THE INTANGIBLE, SUCH AS LACK OF JUDGEMENT, INEXPERIENCE, POOR LEADERSHIP, AND FAILURE TO FOLLOW ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES. THESE DO NOT APPEAR IN THE FORSTAT. NEVERTHELESS, THESE ARE FACTORS WHICH WILL INFLUENCE PROBABLE SUCCESS OR FAILURE AS SURELY AS WILL A SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT. IN SHORT, I BELIEVE THE TRE IS THE MEANS BY WHICH WE CAN DETERMINE WHETHER A COM-MANDER IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYING THE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RESOURCES PROVIDED TO HIM.

4. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THE TRAINING READINESS EVALUATION CAN BE USED AS A VERY EFFECTIVE TOOL BY EACH OF YOU. AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED TO BOB OWENS, TIME AND FUNDING CONSTRAINTS WILL NOT PERMIT THIS HQ TO CONDUCT MORE THAN A SAMPLING EVALUATION OF OUR SQUADRONS AND

CG FMFPAC

R 162004Z DEC 71

2-3

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PAAGE FOUR RUHHFMA1122 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR BATTALIONS. I WOULD, THEREFORE, STRONGLY ENCOURAGE EACH OF YOU TO INSTITUTE THIS CONCEPT WITHIN YOUR COMMANDS ON A CONTINUING BASIS. MY STAFF STANDS READY TO OFFER ANY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED IN THIS REGARD. 5. I WOULD REQUEST THAT YOU KEEP ME INFORMED OF YOUR EVALUATIONS AND THE RESULTS THEREOF. I AM AWARE, OF COURSE, THAT GROUND UNITS DO PRESENTLY CONDUCT PERIODIC TACTICAL TESTS. WHILE THESE SHOULD CONTINUE, THEY DO NOT, IN MY OPINION, PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE TRE. THE TACTEST IS, IN EFFECT, A FINAL EXAMINATION OF A PHASE OF TRAINING. THE UNIT HAS PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF AND CAN ADEQUATELY PLAN AND TRAIN FOR THIS EVOLUTION. THE TRE, WHILE SIMILAR IN SOME RESPECTS TO THE BATTALION TACTEST, PROVIDES A REAL-WORLD INDICATOR OF RESPONSE CAPABILITY. I KNOW OF NO OTHER WAY WE CAN MEASURE THIS ALL-IMPORTANT FACTOR. 6. TWO FURTHER WORDS ON THE TRE. FIRST, WE HAVE FOUND THAT IN ORDER TO PROPERLY CONDUCT THIS EVALUATION, WE MUST DRAW ON THE BEST QUALIFIED OFFICERS AVAILABLE. I MEAN QUALIFIED IN TERMS OF EXPERIENCE, TECHNICAL KNOW-

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA1122 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR HOW, JUDGEMENT, AND PROFESSIONALISM. THIS MEANS WE HANDPICK TEAM MEMBERS RATHER THAN ASSIGN WHOEVER MIGHT BE AVAILABLE. THIS, I BELIEVE, IS ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS AND CREDIBILITY OF THE EVALUATION. LASTLY, I HAVE BEEN MOST HEARTENED BY THE COMMENTS OF YOUR COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN IN THE ROLE OF THE EVALUATED. THESE COMMENTS HAVE BEEN UNANIMOUS IN ENTHUSIASTICALLY ENDORSING THIS CONCEPT AS AN HONEST MEANS OF TELLING IT LIKE IT IS. I AGREE. WARM REGARDS.
BT

1122

CG FMFPAC

R 162004ZDEC 71

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TO CG III MAF
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← DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE →

SECRET. MARDIS //N03010//

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WESTPAC FORWARD BASING (U)

1. (S) CINCPAC, IN CONJUNCTION WITH PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT ^{CMOS} ~~COMDS~~ AND CINCSAC, HAS BEEN TASKED BY JCS TO PREPARE INTEGRATED MILITARY DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR GUAM AND TINIAN. THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS ENVISION MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR CURRENT/NEAR TERM (FIVE-YEAR CONSTRUCTION) AND LONG TERM REQUIREMENTS BASED ON ROLL BACK FROM OKINAWA, JAPAN, TAIWAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES.

2. (S) THE MARINE CORPS POSITION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE PLANS IS:

A. PREFERRED POSITION - BASE 2/3 MAF ON TINIAN AND USE BABELTHUAP AS A TRNG AREA.

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGE

SECRET

SECRETSUBSEQUENT PAGES TO
OUTGOING 'UNCLASSIFIED SMOOTH MESSAGE' -----

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET. MARDIS

B. FALLBACK POSITION - BASE THE FORCE, LESS ONE MAB, ON TINIAN; BASE THE MAB ON GUAM, AND USE BABELTHUAP AS A TRNG AREA.

3. (S) AS A FOLLOW-ON TO THE ABOVE, CMC FORWARDED A SERIES OF ASSUMPTIONS AND QUESTIONS TO THIS HQ. THESE ASSUMPTIONS AND QUESTIONS, ALONG WITH SEVERAL DEVELOPED BY THIS HQ, ARE LISTED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER FROM THE PRESENT STATUS QUO, THROUGH PARTIAL DENIAL, TO COMPLETE DENIAL OF FACILITIES ON OKINAWA AND/OR JAPAN. THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED SO AS TO MAXIMIZE COMBAT EFFICIENCY, FLEXIBILITY IN TRNG, AND BASING OF FORCES IN WESTPAC.

A. ALTERNATIVE A: RETENTION OF CURRENT BASES ON OKINAWA AND JAPAN, WITH TRNG CONDUCTED ON TINIAN/BABELTHUAP.

(1) WHAT TRAINING FACILITIES (AIR/GROUND) WOULD BE REQUIRED ON TINIAN/BABELTHUAP AND HOW WOULD THEY BE SUPPORTED?

(2) WHAT IS THE AVAILABILITY OF REQUIRED SHIPPING FOR THE CONDUCT OF TRNG ON TINIAN/BABELTHUAP AND CAN

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SECRETSUBSEQUENT PAGES TO
OUTGOING UNCLASSIFIED SMOOTH MESSAGE

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET. MARDIS

THIS TRNG BE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED?

(3) WHAT ADDITIONAL NAVY SUPPORT WOULD BE
REQUIRED FOR THE CONDUCT OF TRNG ON TINIAN/BABELTHUAP?(4) HOW OFTEN WOULD TRNG BE CONDUCTED ON
TINIAN/BABELTHUAP?(5) WOULD BOTH FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING AVN
ELEMENTS TRAIN WITH GROUND ELEMENTS ON TINIAN/
BABELTHUAP?(6) WHAT FACILITIES COULD BE GIVEN UP AND STILL
MAINTAIN 2/3 MAF ON OKINAWA/JAPAN?B. ALTERNATIVE B: RETENTION OF III MAF, LESS ONE MAB,
ON OKINAWA AND JAPAN AND RELOCATION OF ONE MAB TO
TINIAN WITH TRNG ON BABELTHUAP.

(1) WHAT WOULD BE THE COMPOSITION OF THE MAB?

(2) WHERE WOULD THE GROUND AND AVN UNITS BE
LOCATED?(3) WHAT NAVY SUPPORT WOULD BE NEC (FACILITIES
AND SHIPPING)? COULD IT BE ATTAINED (INCLUDING THAT
NEC FOR TRNG ON BABELTHUAP)?

(4) COULD THE NAVY SUPPORT SPLIT-BASING ON

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGE:

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SECRETSUBSEQUENT PAGES TO
OUTGOING UNCLASSIFIED SMOOTH

←DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS AND SPACES PER LINE→

SECRET. MARDIS

OKINAWA AND TINIAN?

(5) HOW OFTEN WOULD BABELTHUAP BE USED UNDER
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES?(6) WHAT FACILITIES WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THE
MAB?C. ALTERNATIVE C: COMPLETE DENIAL OF OKINAWA/JAPAN
WITH 2/3 MAF BASED ON TINIAN.

(1) WOULD THE MAF HAVE TO BE RESTRUCTURED?

(2) WHERE WOULD GROUND AND AVN UNITS BE
LOCATED?(3) COULD SHIP SCHEDULING AND AVAILABILITY SUPPORT
TRNG ON BABELTHUAP?(4) WHAT NAVY SUPPORT WOULD BE NEC (FACILITIES
AND SHIPPING)? COULD IT BE ATTAINED?(5) HOW MUCH TRNG COULD BE CONDUCTED ON
TINIAN?(6) HOW OFTEN WOULD TRNG BE CONDUCTED ON
BABELTHUAP? COULD IT BE CONTINUOUS?(7) ~~WHAT AND HOW~~ COULD FIXED AND ROTARY WING
AIR SUPPORT BABELTHUAP TRNG?D
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(8) IF JOINT SERVICE DEVELOPMENT PRECLUDED TOTAL
BASING ON TINIAN, REQUIRING A MAB TO BE BASED ON GUAM,
WHAT WOULD BE THE COMPOSITION OF MAB?

D. ALTERNATIVE D: COMPLETE DENIAL OF OKINAWA AND
RETENTION OF FACILITIES IN JAPAN.

~~W~~ WOULD IT BE FEASIBLE OR DESIRABLE TO RETAIN MAF
FIXED WING ACFT IN JAPAN IF GROUND AND ROTARY MAF ASSETS
MOVE TO TINIAN?

4. (U) YOUR VIEWS AND RESPONSES TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS,
AS APPROPRIATE, WOULD BE APPRECIATED ~~BY THIS HQ~~ AS BASIS
TO REPLY TO CMC. PLEASE ADD ANY ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
AND QUESTIONS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE OR PERTINENT.

5. (U) REQ CONSOLIDATE RESPONSE AND REPLY BY 30 DEC 71.
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FM CG III MAF
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
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T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE//NO0000//
FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON. DELIVER DURING
DUTY HOURS.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (U)

1. (TS) THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
QUOTE

102015Z DEC 71 (TS)
FM CTF SEVEN NINE
TO COMSEVENTHFLT
INFO CTF SEVEN SIX
BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE//NO0000//
FOR VADM MACK INFO RADM GADDIS FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 170555Z DEC 71 (TS-SPECAT)

CG III MAF

O 210113Z DEC 71

ACTN: S/SEC 1-4

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PAGE TWO RUADAJAD372 T O P S E C R E T

8. COMSEVENTHFLT 180444Z DEC 71 (U)

C. CG III MAF CONPLAN 5060A (S)

1. (TS) REFS A AND B REQUESTED ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF MAINTENANCE OF THE CURRENT TASK FORCE 74 POSTURE FOR BOTH THE SHORT RANGE (2 WEEKS) AND THE LONG RANGE (3 MONTHS) CONTINGENCY. THIS MESSAGE ADDRESSES THE SITUATION IN LIGHT OF THE CRITERIA CONTAINED REF A WHICH IMPACT HEAVILY ON THE ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF THE DEPLOYED MARINE FORCE I. E., SUBSTITUTION OF LPD FOR LPH AND ON-STATION RELIEF OF ALL SHIPS.

2. (TS) IN ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS WERE CONSIDERED VALID:

A. THAT THE PURPOSE OF REPLACING THE LPH WITH AN LPD WOULD BE TO RECONSTITUTE ARG ALPHA/31ST MAU AS A 120 HOUR MR-ONE CONTINGENCY FORCE AND,

B. THAT ARG/BLT BRAVO WOULD THEN BE RELIEVED OF THAT CONTINGENCY MISSION.

C. THAT MARINE FORCES WOULD BE EMBARKED ONLY IN THE LPD.

3. (TS) IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A BALANCED MARINE FORCE WITHIN THE ANTICIPATED TIME REQUIRED AND IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE LIFT CAPABILITY OF THE LPD, A MARINE AMPHIBIOUS ELEMENT (MAE) IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE. ALTHOUGH THE MAE AS ORGANIZED IN REF C WAS ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED AS AN AIR-LANDED FORCE TO SUPPORT FIXED WING EVACUATION OPERATIONS, A SUBSTITUTION OF 4 CH-46 HELICOPTERS FOR THE PLANNED 4 UH-1E'S AND A MODIFICATION OF THE BASIC PERSONNEL, EQUIP AND VEHICLE LISTS WOULD PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL HELILIFT EVACUATION CAPABILITY FOR AN EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT.

4. (TS) THIS REORGANIZED LPD-BASED MAE CAN BE EMBARKED AT OKINAWA ON 24 DEC 71 FOR A SHORT OR LONG RANGE DEPLOYMENT PROVIDED:

A. THE DESIGNATED LPD IS THE DENVER NOW AT WHITE BEACH.

B. STANDDOWN FROM THE 120 HOUR REACTION TIME RQMTS IS GRANTED FROM THE MAE EMBARKATION DATE UNTIL THE RESUMPTION OF THIS MISSION BY ARG ALPHA/31ST MAU.

C. THE CURRENT BLT BRAVO (BLT 3/9) REMAINS ON OKINAWA VICE SAILING FOR SASEBO ABOARD ARG BRAVO 23 DEC 71 AS NOW SCHEDULED. ORGANIZATION OF MAE UTILIZING BLT 3/9 ASSETS CURRENTLY MOST FEASIBLE.

D. ARG ALPHA/31ST MAU RETURNS TO OKINAWA FOR BLT
CG III MAF O 210113Z DEC 71

2-4

(139)

TOP SECRET

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PAGE FOUR RUADAJAC372 T O P S E C R E T
 TURNOVER AS SCHEDULED 19 JAN 72.

5. (TS) THE PROPOSALS OUTLINED ABOVE WERE DEVELOPED WITH THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

A. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MAE ON OKINAWA WOULD ALLOW THE USE OF COMMAND, GROUND AND AVIATION ELEMENTS NOW LOCATED ON ISLAND. THE CONSTITUTION OF THIS FORCE FROM THE ASSETS OF THE 31ST MAU WOULD NECESSITATE AN AT-SEA TRANSFER IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, WOULD SERIOUSLY DEplete THE PRESENT CAPABILITY OF THE 31ST MAU AS A CONTINGENCY FORCE AND WOULD DISRUPT THE PLANNED SEQUENCE OF FOLLOW-ON CONTINGENCY BLT'S.

B. DELAY OF THE 19 JAN 72 BLT TURNOVER FOR THE 31ST MAU WOULD REQUIRE AN EXTENSION OF SOME RTD'S AND WOULD DISRUPT THE TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES OF FOLLOW-ON BLT'S.

6. (TS) THE COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED HEREIN IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE THE LEAST ADVERSE IMPACT ON TF79. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROPOSAL WOULD PROVIDE RELIEF IN THE FORM OF A BETTER CONTINGENCY POSTURE FOR AFLOAT MARINE FORCES, WOULD FREE THE REMAINDER OF ARG BRAVO FOR NECESSARY OPPORTUNE SHIPPING, FUJI LIFTS AND AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING AND WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF THE THIRD QUARTER

PAGE FIVE RUADAJAC372 T O P S E C R E T
 SCHEDULE.

7. (TS) EVEN THOUGH THE MAE WOULD BE CAPABLE OF OPERATING ONLY A SINGLE EVACUATION POINT AT ANY ONE TIME, IT WOULD HAVE THE INCREASED FLEXIBILITY RESULTING FROM THE CAPABILITY OF SUSTAINING A LONG TERM DEPLOYMENT AND THE ABILITY TO EVACUATE U. S. CITIZENS VIA HELICOPTER OR LANDING CRAFT.

8. (TS) THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED HEREIN ARE CONSIDERED DESIRABLE FOR BOTH THE SHORT AND LONG RANGE CONTINGENCY.

9. (U) URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY RESOLUTION OF PROPOSALS CONTAINED PARA 4.

GP-1

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UNQUOTE

2. (TS) THE QUOTED MESSAGE OUTLINES MY POSITION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR SUPPORTING THE INDIAN OCEAN CONTINGENCY FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, IF REQUIRED. MY LCI WAS PUBLISHED YESTERDAY DIRECTING THE 9TH MAB TO ACTIVATE THE MAE HQ AND DETERMINE THE T/O AND T/E REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE MISSION BASED ON OUR CONPLAN 5060Z AND TASKED THE DIV, WING AND FSR TO BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE FORCES ON ORDER. THE MAE WHEN CG III MAF

O 210113Z DEC 71

3-4

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE SIX RUAOAJA0372 T O P S E C R E T

FORMED WILL HAVE A HQ, A RIFLE CO (REIN), A 4 CH-46 HELICOPTER
AND A LOG SPT ELEMENT.

3. (TS) THIS MORNING I RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM SEVENTHFLT
WHICH INDICATED THAT THE TRIPOLI WILL REMAIN WITH TF 74
FOR TWO MORE WEEKS BEFORE BEING RELIEVED. WE ARE PLANNING
TO LOAD THE MAE (TG 79.7) ABOARD THE DENVER TO SAIL TO SASEBO
24 DEC 71 WITH ARG BRAVO FOR AN UPKEEP PERIOD UNTIL EARLY JAN.
AT THAT TIME, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INDIA-PAKISTAN SITUATION
AND A REEVALUATION OF THE MAE PACKAGE ABOARD THE SHIP WILL
BE MADE.

4. (U) I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF THE SITUATION AS IT PROGRESSES.

5. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

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CG III MAF

O 210113Z DEC 71

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IMMEDIATE

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TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE //NO0000// SECTION I OF II
INFO LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN ROBERTSON. DELIVER DURING DUTY
HOURS.

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM VADM MACK IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO.
QUOTE:

P 201414Z DEC 71
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUACAJA/CTF SEVEN NINE
RUMFRBA/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUMFOFA/CTF SEVEN SIX
RUYNWCA/CTF SEVEN THREE
RUYRSAA/CTF SEVEN TWO
RUMFRYA/CTF SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
RUADLLA/CTF SEVEN ZERO PT NINE
BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE //NO0000// SECTION ONE OF TWO
FOR ADM CLAREY INFO LTGEN ROBERTSON, RADMS COOPER, GADDIS, COLE,
FOWLER, BERGIN, CAPT HORN, FROM MACK
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (U)

- A. CINCPACFLT 170555Z DEC 71 NOTAL
- B. COMSEVENTHFLT 190524Z DEC 71 NOTAL
- C. COMSEVENTHFLT 180252Z DEC 71 NOTAL

1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED COMSEVENTHFLT ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF

PAGE TWO RUH60AA9099 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
MAINTENANCE OF TF 74 POSTURE FOR A SHORT RANGE OF TWO WEEKS AND A LONG
RANGE OF THREE MONTHS. REF A FURTHER REQUESTED THAT THE ASSESSMENT
FOCUS ON THE LOGISTICAL ASPECTS OF SUCH OPERATIONS AT POINT CHARLIE
AS THE QUOTE WORST CASE UNQUOTE SITUATION.

2. (TS) IN ADDITION TO THE CRITERIA SPECIFIED IN PARAS TWO AND THREE OF
REF A, THE FOLLOWING BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ARE MADE.

A. SINGAPORE CAN BE USED FOR POL AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT WITHIN
EXISTING CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT TF 74 OPERATIONS.

B. RAF BASE AT GAN ISLAND CAN BE USED AS AN AIR DIVERT/LIMITED
LOGISTICAL FIELD.

C. CVA ASSETS ON YS CAN BE MAINTAINED AT 1.0 CVA PER MONTH (UPON
COMPLETION CURRENT NVN CONTINGENCY OPS) VICE 1.6 PER MONTH.

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CGG:S/SEC 1-5

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D. ORDNANCE RESUPPLY OF TF 74 WILL NOT BE REQUIRED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH YS ORDNANCE RESUPPLY WITHOUT AUGMENTATION BY ANOTHER AE.

E. COLOMBO FORT VISIT FOR TF 74 WILL BE APPROVED FOR R&R AND LIMITED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

F. TF 74 WILL BE PERMITTED TO OPERATE RANDOMLY IN AN AREA BOUNDED BY 2N/2 90E/9, 7N/7 90E/9, 4N/4 80E/8, 4N/4 77-30E/7, 1N/1 77-30E/7, AND 1N/1 80E/9. TF 74 WOULD PLAN TO OPERATE RANDOMLY IN THIS AREA, HOWEVER IT WOULD PLAN TO MOVE TOWARD THE EASTERN SECTION OF THIS AREA

PAGE THREE RUHGCAA90999 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE TO SHORTEN SUPPLY LINES TO SINGAPORE, UTAPAO AND TRANSIT TIME FOR RELIEVING UNITS.

SPECIFIC COMMENT CONCERNING THE IMPACT OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE TWO CASES: SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM.

3. (TS) SHORT TERM ASSESMENT, PRESENT DATE TO APPROXIMATELY 1 JAN 72.

A. THREE CVA CAPABILITY. THE CRITERIA OF A 70 PERCENT TEMPO OF OPS CANNOT BE MET WITH THREE CVAS IN WESTPAC. THE REQUIREMENT TO HAVE 1.0 CVA PER MONTH AT BOTH YS AND POINT CHARLIE WILL RESULT IN AN 80 PERCENT TEMPO OF OPERATIONS FOR THE THREE CVAS WITH ON STATION ASSIGNMENTS OF 50-60 DAYS DURATION.

B. DD/DE ESCORTS: INDIAN OCEAN REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE REQUIREMENT FOR MLSF ESCORTS, CAN BE ACCOMMODATED UNTIL 1 JAN 72 WITH EXISTING SEVENTHFLT ASSETS, BUT SEVENTY PERCENT TEMPO OF OPS CANNOT BE ACHIEVED OR MAINTAINED IN THIS TIME FRAME BY RESCHEDULING ACTIONS ALONE. OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED CONSIDERABLY TO ACHIEVE A SEVENTY PERCENT TEMPO. ESCORT OF MLSF UNITS TO AND FROM PT CHARLIE COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED ON AN OPPORTUNE BASIS BY SCHEDULING ROTATION OF EXCORTS COINCIDENTAL WITH MLSF TRANSITS UNTIL 1 JAN 72. THE IMMEDIATE TEMPO OF SEVENTHFLT CRUISER-DESTROYER FORCE OPERATIONS

PAGE FOUR RUHGCAA90999 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE IS EIGHTY-EIGHT (88) PERCENT AT SEA.

C. MLSF: FORESEE NO DIFFICULTIES IN MEETING TF 74 LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS IN THE SHORT TERM GIVEN ITS CURRENT COMPOSITION AND LACK OF SIGNIFICANT AE REQUIREMENTS.

D. AIR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. THIS IS THE IMMEDIATE SHORT RANGE/LOGISTIC PROBLEM. DAILY AIR LOGISTICAL SUPPLY IS DESIRABLE FOR /C NORS: NFE PARTS AS WELL AS OTHER TF NEEDS. PARTS:MAIL WILL BE STAGED AT CUBI/ SUBIC FOR AIRLIFT TO TF 74 VIA UTAPAO WITH DIVERT FIELD AT GAN ISLAND.

E. PATROL FORCE. BY AUGMENTING CUBI WITH THE VP-40 GUAM DET, TF72 CAN SUSTAIN REQUIRED TF 74 OPS UNTIL 1 JAN 72 WITHOUT FURTHER AUGMENTATION. HOWEVER, WITHOUT USE OF GAN, PT CHARLIE MAKES P-3 COVERAGE EXTREMELY INEFFICIENT (2.5 HOURS ON STATION FOR 12.5 FLYING HOURS).

F. SUBMARINE UNIT. THIS ASSET WILL BE ADDRESSED BY SEPARATE MSG SHOULD THE DECISION BE MADE TO PROVIDE SUBMARINE ASW PROTECTION

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FOR TF 74. SCAMP IS PRESENTLY ENROUTE TO A HOLDING POINT EAST OF MALACCA STRAIT.

G. AMPHIBIOUS FORCES. NO CHANGE WILL BE REQUIRED FOR AMPHIBIOUS FORCES CURRENTLY ON STATION FROM TF76/TF 79. HOWEVER, PREPARATIONS FOR USE OF A LPD WITH MAE EMBARKED FOR RELIEF OF TRIPOLI ARE IN PROGRESS.

4. (TS) LONG TERM ASSESSMENT OF THREE MONTHS DURATION:

PAGE FIVE RUHGOAA9099 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

A. FOUR CVA CAPABILITY. AS NOTED IN PARA 3, THREE CVA'S CANNOT MEET THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF 1.0 CVA'S ON BOTH YS AND POINT CHARLIE WITH A TEMPO OF OPS OF 70 PERCENT. FOUR CVAS CAN MEET THIS REQUIREMENT WITH ABOUT A 60-40 OPERATING TEMPO. WITH REGARD TO A1.0 CVA FACTOR FOR PT CHARLIE AND A 1.6 CVA FACTOR FOR YS, THIS COMBINATION WOULD REQUIRE AN 80 PERCENT TEMPO OF OPS FOR FOUR CVAS IN WESTPAC. THE 1.6 YS CVA FACTOR BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT DUE TO THE CURRENT DRY SEASON IN SEASIA AND CONTINGENCY OPS IN EITHER SEASIA OR NEASIA. THUS, TO MEET PT CHARLIE AND YS REQUIREMENTS, AND SEASIA CONTINGENCY OPS, WITH AN OVERALL 70 PERCENT TEMPO OF OPS, FIVE CVAS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN WESTPAC.

B. CARDIV STAFF CAPABILITY. THE CURRENT INDIAN OCEAN OPS, COUPLED WITH SEASIA OPS, POINT OUT THE DISADVANTAGE OF HAVING ONLY TWO CARDIVS DEPLOYED IN WESTPAC. OBVIOUSLY, THE ONLY RECOURSE IS TO RETAIN BOTH CARDIVS AT SEA WITH ONE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE OTHER ON YANKEE STATION. IN ORDER TO GAIN SOME FLEXIBILITY FOR PRESENT OPS AND FUTURE CONTINGENCIES, AT LEAST THREE CARDIV STAFFS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE SEVENTHFLT.

C. DD/DE ESCRPTS. AS STATED IN THE SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT, THE CURRENT DD/DE POSUTE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT EXCEEDING THE 70

PAGE SIX RUHGOAA9099 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
PERCENT TEMPO OF OPS WITH ATTENDENT DEGRADATION OF READINESS.
ACTION REQUIRED TO MEET TF 74 OPS FOR A DURATION OF THREE MONTHS WOULD INCLUDE:

(1) DEDICATING SHIPS TO SPECIFIC TASKS TO ELIMINATE THE SCHEDULING DIFFICULTY OF ROTATING SHIPS THROUGH VARIOUS ASSIGNMENTS FOR TRAINING AND MORALE PURPOSES.

(2) STANDDOWN PARPRO PICKET SHIPS AND REDUCE NGFS COMMITMENT TO TWO SHIPS.

(3) AUGMENTATION OF THREE DESTROYERS TO SEVENTHFLT, AT LEAST ONE OF WHICH SHOULD BE A DDG.

(4) USE OF SINGAPORE BY INDIAN OCEAN ESCORTS FOR MAINTENANCE.

D. MSLF. GIVEN THE VALIDITY OF THE ASSUMPTION STATED IN PARA 2 WITH REGARD TO NO REARMING OF ORDNANCE (TF 74 CURRENTLY HAS APPROX 10 DAYS WTRIKE ORDNANCE ONBOARD), AND THE USE OF SINGAPORE FOR A STAGING AREA, THERE ARE NO SURFACE LOGISTIC PROBLEMS WHICH CANNOT BE HANDLED BY EXISTING SEVENTHFLT ASSETS.

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E. AIR LOGISTICS. AS NOTED IN THE SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT, AIR LOGISTICS IS THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM. THIS CAN BE PARTIALLY ALLEVIATED IN THE LONG TERM BY THE USE OF UTAPAO AND GAN ISLAND FOR LOGISTIC STAGING. IF SUCH PERMISSION IS OBTAINED, GAN ISLAND COULD BE USED

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE //NO00000// SECTION II OF II. FOR A DIVERT FIELD AS WELL AS LIMITED LOGISTIC STAGING AREA.

F. PATROL FORCE. CURRENT LEVEL OF OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REQUIRE APPROX 1260 FLT HRS PER MONTH. THIS EQUATES TO ONE FULL VPRON DEDICATED TO THIS CONTINGENCY WITH NO TRAINING FLIGHTS CONSIDERED. ACCORDINGLY, FOR THREE MONTHS OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF TF 74, CTF 72 WOULD REQUIRE A ONE VPRON AUGMENTATION ABOVE WHAT IS PLANNED FOR ON 1 JAN 72.

G. AMPHIBIOUS FORCES. PLANNING IS NOW PROCEEDING FOR THE POSSIBILITY

PAGE TWO RUHGOAA9108 T O P S E C R E T FSPECAT EXCLUSIVE OF THREE MONTHS INDIAN OCEAN OPS INVOLVING TF 76/TF 79 ASSETS. PLANNING PROVIDES FOR THE RELIEF OF TRIPOLI BY AN LPD WITH A MAE AND FOUR CH-45'S EMBARKED. FEASIBILITY OF THIS PLAN WILL BE TESTED BY ARG BRAVO. EVEN THOUGH THE MAE WOULD BE CAPABLE OF OPERATING ONLY A SINGLE EVACUATION POINT AT ANY ONE TIME, IT WOULD HAVE THE INCREASED FLEXIBILITY RESULTING FROM THE CAPABILITY OF SUSTAINING A LONG TERM DEPLOYMENT AND THE ABILITY TO EVACUATE U.S. CITIZENS VIA HELICOPTER OR LANDING CRAFT. HOWEVER, THIS PLAN OF ACTION WILL REQUIRE A STAND DOWN FROM THE 120 HOUR REACTION TIME RGMT FROM THE MAE EMBARKATION DATE UNTIL THE RESUMPTION OF THIS MISSION BY ARG ALFA/31ST MAU.

5. (TS) IN SUMMARY, THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT FOR THE SHORT TERM (1 JAN 72) IS FOUR SHORTENED AIR LOGISTICS LINKS BY MEANS OF A MORE FLEXIBLE OPERATING AREA FOR TF74. IF THE RAF BASE AT GAN CAN BE UTILIZED WITH STAGING OUT OF UTAPAO (SUPPORTED BY CUBI/SUBIC), THEN THIS WILL HELP TO PARTIALLY ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON SEVENTHFLT UNITS WOULD BE THE HIGH TEMPO OF OPS REQUIRED FOR THE CVA'S AND CURDIV STAFFS (80/100 PERCENT) BOTH AT PT CHARLIE AND YANKEE STATION, AND THE DISRUPTION OF THE UPKEEP/PORT VISIT SCHEDULE. IN THE LONG TERM, THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT

PAGE THREE RUHGOAA9108 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FORCE CHANGES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED:

A. REQUIREMENT FOR MINIMUM OF 4 CVAS. ASSIGNMENT OF A 1.0 CVA FACTOR TO SEASIA OPS. WAIVER OF 48 HOUR REQUIREMENT OF SECOND CVA AT YANKEE STATION FOR CONTINGENCY OPS.

B. REQUIREMENT FOR THREE CURDIV STAFFS (THIS REQUIREMENT EXISTS WITH OR WITHOUT INDIAN OCEAN OPS).

C. REQUIREMENT FOR THREE ADDITIONAL DESTROYER TYPES.

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D. REQUIREMENT FOR ONE ADDITIONAL VPRON ABOVE PLANNED FORCE LEVELS FOR 1 JAN 72.

E. ACCEPTANCE OF THE LPD/MAE CONCEPT WITH 120 HR REQUIREMENT STAND DOWN.

6. (S) AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR APPLICABLE TO BOTH SHORT AND LONG TERM IS THE PROPOSED PORT VISIT TO COLOMBO. THIS VISIT WOULD BENEFIT TF 74 OPS BOTH FOR MORALE PURPOSES AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR LIMITED MAINTENANCE OPPORTUNITIES AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

7. (TS) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:

A. OPERATING LOCATION FOR TF 74. BE MODIFIED NOW IAW REF B.

B. YS CVA ASSETS BE REDUCED TO ONE ASAP IF CONTINUED TF 74 OPS ARE REQUIRED IN INDIAN OCEAN AND WAIVER BE GRANTED AS STATED IN PARA 5A ABOVE.

PAGE FOUR RUHGOAA9108 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

C. A FOUR CVA POSTURE IN WESTPAC BE ESTABLISHED IF IT APPEARS THE INDIAN OCEAN COMMITMENT WILL EXTEND BEYOND MOD-FEBRUARY. A THIRD CARDIV STAFF SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO WESTPAC ASAP.

D. DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR USE OF GAN IAW REF C BE OBTAINED.

E. LPD BE AUTHORIZED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR LPH IF OPERATION EXTENDS BEYOND 1 JAN 72.

F. ESCORTS BE REDUCED BY TWO NOW (ONE ESCORT VICE THREE FOR LPH/LPD) UNLESS INTELLIGENCE INDICATES HIGH RISK TO LPH/LPD.
UNLESS INTELLIGENCE INDICATES HIGH RISK TO LPH-LPD.

G. EXCORTS FOR AO/AE/AFS NOT REPEAT NOT BE REQUIRED UNLESS INTELLIGENCE INDICATES HIGH RISK TO UNREP SHIPS.

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UNQUOTE

2. WARM REGARDS.

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