

- A-1. COMNAVFORV 130331Z JAN 70 (C) *gp-4*  
 PERSONAL FOR LTGEN NICKERSON INFO RADM ADAMSON AND RADM DILLON  
 FROM ZUMWALT  
 ACTOV AND ICTZ TURNOVER BRIEFING (U)
- A-2. COMNAVSUPACT DANANG 131140Z JAN 70 (U)  
 PERSONAL FOR LGEN NICKERSON FROM ADAMSON  
 BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL VISIT
- A-3. COMUSMACV CITE 561 DTG 121430Z JAN 70 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4 Declassified 25 Jan 69 (sic)*  
 FROM MGEN TOWNSEND TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
 JANUARY COMMANDERS' WIEU (U)
- A-4. COMUSMACV CITE 597 DTG 141111Z JAN 70 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
 FROM MGEN TOWNSEND TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
 VISIT OF H. A. KISSINGER'S NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
- A-5. CG 1ST MARDIV 140755Z JAN 70 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
 FOR LTGEN NICKERSON  
 BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL VISIT
- A-6. C/S XXIV CORPS 150831Z JAN 70 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
 FROM BGEN SHEDD TO BGEN DULACKI  
 QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE DODBLUE RIBBON PANEL  
 IN XXIV CORPS AO
- A-7. CG XXIV CORPS 151041Z JAN 70 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4 - not released*  
 FROM LTGEN ZAIS TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
 REQUEST FOR INCREASED FIRE SUPPORT (S)
- A-8. COMUSMACV 650 DTG 151122Z JAN 70 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
 FROM GEN ABRAMS TO GEN BROWN, LGEN MILDREN, LTGEN NICKERSON  
 EXPEDITIOUS REPORTING
- A-9. CG FMFPAC 152025Z JAN 70 (S) MCEO *gp-4*  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON, MGEN JONES, MGEN THRASH, MGEN OWENS,  
 MGEN WHEELER, BGEN JOHNSON, BGEN DWYER, BGEN PADALINO, BGEN BARROW,  
 COL CASS FROM LTGEN BUSE  
 EXCHANGE OF INFO RELATING TO SUBVERSIVE/MILITANT/SUBVERSIVES (U)
- A-10. COMUSMACV CITE 657 DTG 152358Z JAN 70 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
 FROM BGEN POTTS TO LGEN NICKERSON  
 GUERRILLA STRENGTH (U)
- A-11. COMUSMACV CITE 752 DTG 171104Z JAN 70 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
 FROM GEN ABRAMS TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
 SECURITY FOR USAAG AND CORDS COMPOUNDS IN ICTZ (U)
- A-12. CG AMERICAL DIVISION 181025Z JAN 70 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
 FROM MGEN RAMSEY TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
 EXTRACT FROM QUANG NGAI DAILY INTSUM DTG 140825Z JAN 70 - VC COMPARISON  
 OF ARVN WITH US FORCES

- A-13. ✓ COMUSMACV CITE 806 DTG 190207Z JAN 70 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM GEN ABRAMS TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
SPECIAL VCI APPREHENSION AWARDS PROGRAM FOR TET (U)
- A-14. ✓ COMNAVFORV 190526Z JAN 70 (C) *gp-4*  
FOR LTGEN NICKERSON INFO LTGEN ZAIS FROM ZUMWALT  
COASTAL GROUPS II AN 16 (U)
- A-15. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 190759Z JAN 70 (S) *gp-1*  
FROM LTGEN ZAIS, TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
REQUEST FOR VARIOUS CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
- A-16. ✓ COMSEVENTHFLT 190940Z JAN 70 (C) *gp-4*  
FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM BRINGLE  
VISIT OF VIETNAMESE BOY SCOUTS TO A SEVENTH FLEET SHIP ON 22 FEB 1970
- ~~A-17. ✓ CG FMFPAC 200045Z JAN 70 (S)  
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE  
CASE OF CYSGT B. R. DEEZ~~
- A-18. ✓ COMUSMACV CITE 861 DTG 200920Z JAN 70 (U) EYES ONLY  
FROM BGEN SMITH TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
BRIEFING - RACIAL TENSIONS IN THE ARMY
- A-19. ✓ COMUSMACV CITE 894 DTG 210404Z JAN 70 (S) *gp-4*  
FROM MGEN BAUTZ TO GEN BROWN, LTGEN MILDREN, VADM ZUMWALT,  
LTGEN NICKERSON  
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM (U)
- A-20. ✓ COMUSMACV CITE 904 DTG 210639Z JAN 70 (C) EYES ONLY *gp - not shown*  
FROM BGEN SMITH TO BGEN DULACKI  
INFO ON HELO PILOTS
- A-21. ✓ CG FMFPAC 210225Z JAN 70 (S) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON, MGEN JONES, MGEN THRASH,  
MGEN OWEN, MGEN WHEELER, BGEN HOFFMAN, BGEN JOHNSON, BGEN  
DWYER, BGEN PADALINO, BGEN BARROW, COL CASS, AND COL JONE,  
INFO LTGEN VAN RYZIN FROM LTGEN BUSE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
SECURITY OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT
- A-22. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 221120Z JAN 70 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM LTGEN ZAIS, TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
ENEMY CALIBER 50 ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE
- A-23. ✓ CG FMFPAC 212021Z JAN 70 (U)  
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE  
PACFLT COMREL FUND
- A-24. ✓ DCG USARV LONG BINH 230332Z JAN 70 (C) EYES ONLY *gp - not shown*  
FROM MILDREN TO ZAIS INFO NICKERSON  
GENERAL OFFICER CHANGES
- A-25. ✓ DCG USARV LONG BINH 230330Z JAN 70 (C) EYES ONLY *gp - not shown*  
FROM MILDREN TO RAMSEY INFO NICKERSON  
APPROVAL OF GENERAL OFFICER CHANGES

DECLASSIFIED

B-1. COMUSMACV CITE 1167 DTG 260240Z JAN 70 (U) EYES ONLY  
FROM BGEN SMITH TO BGEN DULACKI  
QUOTED DSM CITATIONS

B-2. CG XXIV CORPS 270949Z JAN 70 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
TET, 1970  
FROM LTGEN ZAIS TO LTGEN NICKERSON

B-3. CMC 291850Z JAN 70 (S) MCEO *gp-4*  
FROM CMC TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF  
INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS FOR I MEB UNITS

~~4. DUMED 202115Z JAN 70 (U)  
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM DUMED  
LEOL ORVAL J. CORRIEVAL, USMC, 056260 DIAGNOSIS~~

~~5. CMC 311123Z JAN 70 (U)  
FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM MAJGEN ANDERSON  
REQUEST FOR MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY CHANGE  
CASE OF CYCOT DOBERT C. SHORES~~

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

# SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

2 JAN 70 - 4 FEB 70

*III MAF Specimens SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
2 Jan - 4 Feb 70*

*Book # 1*

RETURN TO  
STAFF SECRETARY  
TOP SECRET

1267

TOP SECRET

1. ✓ COMUSMACV 021050Z JAN 70 CITE 066 (TS) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM MGEN TOWNSEND TO LGEN NICKERSON, INFO LTGEN MILDREN  
LTGEN ZAIS  
FORCE PLANNING
2. ✓ CMC 052341Z JAN 70 (TS) *gp-1*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO LTGEN NICKERSON  
KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (U)
3. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 091100Z JAN 70 (TS) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM LTGEN ZAIS TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FORCES (COMUSMACV PLAN NO 186-69 (RESIDUAL FORCE (C)))
4. ✓ CG FMFPAC 101942Z JAN 70 *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WALT INFO LTGEN NICKERSON, MGEN ROBERTSON, MGEN  
OWENS AND BGEN DWYER FROM LTGEN BUSE  
KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (H)
5. ✓ CG FMFPAC 122005Z JAN 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIV E FOR GEN WALT INFO LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE  
KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (U) LOCATION OF UNITS \* SCAMP, CMR PLT & ETC.
- ~~6. ✓ CG FMFPAC 140221Z JAN 70 (TS) MCEO  
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WALT INFO LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE  
FORCE PLANNING (U) 2 Jan 70 - G-1 War Copy~~
- ~~7. ✓ CG III MAF 140016Z JAN 70 (TS) EYES ONLY  
FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FORCE~~
8. ✓ COMUSMACV 161116Z JAN 70 (TS) CITE 701 EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM MGEN TOWNSEN TO GEN BROWN LTGEN MILDREN, VADM ZUMWALT, LTGEN  
NICKERSON, LTGEN CORCORAN, LTGEN EWELL, MGEN MCCOWN, INFO LTGEN ZAIS  
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM (U)
9. ✓ CG FMFPAC 162302Z JAN 70 (TS) MCEO *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE  
USMC COMMAND CONTROL STRUCTURE IN ICTZ APPROVAL FOR PROPCAL OF
9. ✓ CG FMFPAC 200128Z JAN 70 TS MCEO *gp-4*  
FOR NICKERSON FROM BUSE  
OUR COMMENT ON REVISIONS TO REFLECT 8.9 TO A 9 TO 9.5K MAB
10. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 220929Z JAN 70 (TS) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM LTGEN ZAIS, TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM (U)
11. ✓ CG COMUSMACV CITE 1133 DTG 251000Z JAN 70 EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM MGEN TOWNSEND TO LGEN NICKERSON INFO LTGEN ZAIS  
HEADQUARTERS FOR TRANSITIONAL FORCES, I CTZ (U)
12. ✓ CG COMUSMACV CITE 1165 DTG 260225Z JAN 70 EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM MGEN TOWNSEND TO LGEN NICKERSON INFO LTGEN ZAIS  
HQ FOR U.S. COMMAND ELEMENTS IN I CTZ (U)

13. ✓ CMC 261220Z JAN 70 (TS) MCEO *gp-4*  
FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN  
VAN RYZIN  
FORCE PLANNING (U) - MAB 10.8K vs. 9.5K
14. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 270134Z JAN 70 (TS) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM LTGEN ZAIS TO LTGEN NICKERSON  
HQS FOR US COMMAND ELEMENTS IN ICTZ - ACTION UNDERWAY  
FUNCTIONS OF III MAF PERFORMED BY OTHER THAN 1STMARDIV
15. ✓ CG FMFPAC 272322Z JAN 70 (TS) MCEO *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE  
HQS, US COMMAND ELEMENTS IN I CORPS (U) - WHEELER'S  
271944Z JAN 70 TO MCCAIN
16. ✓ COMUSMACV CITE 1285 DTG 280305Z <sup>300506Z JAN 70</sup> JAN 70 (TS) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM GEN ABRAMS TO GEN WHEELER ADM MCCAIN  
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VEITNAM
17. ✓ CG FMFPAC 302121Z JAN 70 (TS) MCEO *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN DULACKI FROM BGEN WILSON  
IDENTIFICATION OF 185 GRADES AND SKILLS ASSOCIATED  
W/REDUCTIONS OF MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS.
18. ✓ CG FMFPAC 310234Z JAN 70 (TS) MCEO *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN NICKERSON FROM  
LTGEN BUSE  
FORCE PLANNING (U) ALTERNATIVE TROOP LIST TO 10.8K
19. ✓ COMUSMACV CITE 1478 DTG 311026Z JAN70 (TS) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM GEN ABRAMS TO LTGEN NICKERSON INFO LTGEN ZAIS  
FORCE PLANNING (U) - STATUS OF CAPS
20. ✓ COMUSMACV CITE 1479 DTG 311100Z JAN 70 (TS) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM GEN ABRAMS TO LTGEN NICKERSON INFO LTGEN ZAIS  
HQ FOR U.S. COMMAND ELEMENTS IN I CTZ (U) - TRANSFER  
OF I CORPS ARE RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTERIM FUNCTION  
OF CG III MAF
21. ✓ COMUSMACV CITE 1503 DTG 010718Z FEB 70 (TS) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM TOWNSEND TO LTGEN NICKERSON LTGEN CORCORAN  
ROK FORCES IN VIETNAM (U) - ROLES FORESEEN FOR KOREAN  
FORCES
22. ✓ COMUSMACV CITE 1517 DTG 011052Z FEB 70 (TS) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
FROM GEN ABRAMS TO GEN BROWN, LTG MILDREN, VADMZUMWALT,  
LTG NICKERSON, LTG CORCORAN, LTG EWELL INFO LTG ZAIS,  
MG MCCOWN  
FORCE PLANNING (U) - FUTURE REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING
23. ✓ CMC 022218Z FEB 70 (TS) MCEO *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO LTGEN NICKERSON FROM  
LTGEN VAN RYZIN - FORCE PLANNING (U) - 8.9K RESIDUAL MAB
24. ✓ CG FMFPAC 032147Z FEB 70 (TS) MCEO *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE  
FORCE PLANNING (U) - REMOVAL OF EXPENSIVE EQUIPMENT
25. ✓ CG FMAPC 040322Z FEB 70 (TS) MCEO *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE  
FORCE PLANNING (U) - POST PHASE IV MARINE FORCE

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM MGEN TOWNSEND C/S MACV SAIGON		DATE 02 JAN 70
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 021050Z JAN 70		COPY NO. 4 OF 4 COPIES REC'D
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL
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	CG			14 Jan 70	
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	DEP CORDS				
	DSA ICTZ				
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	TCC				
	SGT MAJ				

SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING

TOPSECRET MAC 066 EYES ONLY

REMARKS:

DISPOSITION:

Retain for \_\_\_ months.

Destroy after routing.

Section	Signature

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TOP SECRET

021050Z Jan 70

FM HQ TOWNSEND C/S MACV SAIGON  
 TO LGEN MCKERSON CG III MAF DANANG  
 INFO LTG MILDREN DCG USARV LONG BINH  
 LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS PHU BAI  
 ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~

**T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE MAC 066 EYES ONLY**  
 SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING (U)

REF: III MAF 310724Z DEC 69 WHICH REQUESTED INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF CAPS IN PLANNING FUTURE TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS.

1. THE JCS APPROVED (FOR PLANNING PURPOSES THE PHASE IV FORCE PACKAGE MARINE HEAVY OPTION) OUTLINED AT THE COMMANDERS WIEU ON 27 DECEMBER 1969. THIS OPTION WOULD RETAIN ONE (1) RLT AT A STRENGTH OF APPROXIMATELY 7,500 UNTIL THE SUPPORT/TRANSITIONAL LEVEL IS REACHED. SUPPORT FOR THIS ONE REMAINING RLT WOULD BE ENTIRELY BY THE ARMY LOGISTIC SYSTEM.

2. TO COMPENSATE FOR THE EVENTUAL LOSS OF THE CAPS, AN INCREASE OF 30 ADDITIONAL MOBILE ADVISORY TEAMS (MATS) IS CONTEMPLATED FOR I CTZ. WHEN THESE ADDITIONAL MATS ARE DEPLOYED ABOUT JUNE-JULY 1970, THE NUMBER OF MATS IN I CTZ WILL TOTAL 80.

3. THE CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF MATS DIFFERS FROM THAT OF THE CAPS, IN THAT MATS DO NOT JOIN THE TERRITORIAL FORCE UNIT PERMANENTLY AS IS THE CASE WITH CAPS. THEREFORE, THE CONTINUED UTILIZATION OF CAPS BY THE REMAINING RLT APPEARS APPROPRIATE WHERE REQUIRED AND WITHIN THE SUPPORT CAPABILITY OF THE RLT.

4. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE KEYED TO THE QUESTIONS POSED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF REFERENCE MESSAGE.

A. A DECISION TO REDEPLOY ALL OR PART OF THE CAPS WITH USMC FORCES REDEPLOYING DURING PHASE IV WILL BE BASED ON YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS (PARAGRAPH 5, BELOW) THE CAPS NOT APPROVED FOR RETENTION SHOULD BE SCHEDULED TO REDEPLOY AS PART OF THE USMC FORCES DURING PHASE IV.

B. ANY CAPS APPROVED FOR RETENTION AFTER PHASE IV WILL BE ADDITIVE TO THE APPROXIMATELY 7,500 SPACES REQUIRED FOR THE REMAINING RLT.

C. IT IS INTENDED THAT MATS WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THOSE TRAINING AND ADVISORY FUNCTIONS REQUIRED BY TERRITORIAL FORCES IN I CTZ WHEN CAPS ARE REDEPLOYED. OTHER FUNCTIONS NOW PERFORMED BY CAPS WILL HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED AS US FORCES REDEPLOY.

5. REQUEST YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR CAPS; THE CAPABILITY OF THE REMAINING RLT TO SUPPORT CAPS AFTER PHASE IV; AND THE NUMBER OF CAPS RECOMMENDED TO BE RETAINED AFTER PHASE IV.

GP-4

SEE NOTE; DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CMC		06 JAN 70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
			052347Z JAN 70			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG			13 Jan	N	SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
	DCG			1/13	B	
	C/S					REMARKS:
	DC/S			1/13	P	
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					Section
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	G-1	I		1-7-70	(N)	REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.
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	G-5					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.
	G-6					
	ADJ					Section
	AWARDS					
	CAP					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.
	CHAP					
	CIB					Section
	COMP					
	DENT					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.
	ENGR					
	FOODS					Section
	FSEO					
	HQ CMT					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.
	INSP					
	MTO					Section
	NJA					
	OPANAL					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.
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	PMO					Section
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.
	PSYOPS					
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	REPRO					
	SJA					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					Section
	FORMED O					
	SIC					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					Section

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CCN: 048 & 049/IN

FILE: EGG

CMC

052341Z JAN 70

2 3

1-7-70 T. H. Miller

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(2)

**TOP SECRET**

PT000271  
 PTTZYUW RUEOFIA07 0052341-TTT RHMAFA.  
 ZNY TTTT ZEF-1  
 P 052341Z JAN 70  
 FM CMC  
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE  
 INFO LTGEN NICKERSON SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 THIS IS A KEYSTONE BLUEJAY MESSAGE

KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (U)

- 714 20/6
- A. ADMIN CINCPAC 190233Z DEC 69
  - B. COMUSMACV 300318Z DEC 69
  - C. CINCPAC 010854Z JAN 70
  - D. JCS 201620Z (NOTAL)
  - E. CINCPAC 270028Z DEC 69
  - F. REPORT OF CINCPAC REDEPLOYMENT CONFERENCE 25-26 SEP 69
  - G. CG FMFPAC 032011Z JAN 70
  - H. CMC 261943Z AUG 69
  - I. MARINE CORPS T-DAY PLAN
  - J. MCO 5400.35

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA 0704 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

- K. CMC 311521Z DEC 69
- L. CG FMFPAC 272101Z DEC 69
- 1. (S) REF A OUTLINED THE PLANNING SEQUENCE LEADING TO A CINCPAC MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE CMC GUIDANCE RELEVANT TO PERSONNEL POLICIES, DESTINATIONS, DEACTIVATIONS, AND EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION FOR DISCUSSIONS AT THE CONFERENCE.
- 2. (TS) FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES PLANNING ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED.
  - A. JCS DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO REDEPLOY 12.9K MARINES BY 15 APR 1970.
  - B. MACV TROOPLIST WAS PROMULGATED BY REFERENCE B.
  - C. RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITS TO REMAIN IN PACOM ARE CONTAINED IN REFERENCE C.
  - D. REFERENCE D PROVIDED CINCPAC/PACOM WITH BROAD GUIDANCE RELATIVE TO SERVICE COMPONENTS PERSONNEL POLICIES, AND EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION, AND STATED THAT INFORMATION ON PERSONNEL CRITERIA FOR REDEPLOYMENT DURING PHASE 3 AS WELL AS ON DEACTIVATIONS/DESTINATIONS WOULD BE FORWARDED AFTER RECEIPT OF THE APPROVED PHASE 3 TROOP LIST.
  - 3. STEPS E AND F OF REF A HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY ACCOMPLISHED.

PAGE THREE RUEOFIA 0704 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 EXCEPT THAT THE CINCPAC MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE IS NOW SCHEDULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE E, FOR 12-16 JAN 1970 AT CINCPAC.

- 3. (TS) ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE WHICH REFLECTS INITIAL CONSIDERATION OF REF G IS PROVIDED:

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

A. PERSONNEL POLICY AS CONTAINED IN ENCLOSURE TO REFERENCE F REMAIN UNCHANGED EXCEPT THAT PERSONNEL ROTATION CRITERIA FOR PHASE 3 WILL BE ESTABLISHED SUBSEQUENT TO FINAL EVALUATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REFERENCE G.

**B. DEACTIVATION SCHEDULES/DESTINATIONS OF UNITS.**

UNLESS THERE ARE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS DESIRE TO FOLLOW SAME GENERAL PLAN FOR REDEPLOYMENT/DEACTIVATION OF UNITS AS FOLLOWED IN PHASE 2. CG FMFPAC IS DESIGNATED THE DEACTIVATION COMMANDER WITH AUTHORITY TO DEACTIVATE UNCOMMITTED VIETNAM AUGMENTATION UNITS AS INDICATED BELOW.

(1). TEMPORARY UNITS WILL BE DEACTIVATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER RETURN TO CONUS CONSISTENT WITH AN ORDERLY AND CAREFULLY CONTROLLED TURN IN OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FOR RETURN TO THE STORES SYSTEM. A TARGET DATE OF 30 MAY 1970 IS ESTABLISHED FOR DEACTIVATION OF ALL RETURNING TEMPORARY

PAGE FOUR RUEOEIA 0704 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
UNITS-ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

(2) UNIT DESTINATIONS AND FUTURE STATUS ARE TENTATIVELY ESTABLISHED AS FOLLOWS:

UNIT	STRENGTH	DESTINATION/STATUS
(A) RLT 26		
26THMAR	3788	CAMPEN/DEACT
1ST BN 13TH MAR	669	CAMPEN/DEACT
K BTRY 4TH BN 13TH MAR	110	CAMPEN/DEACT
DET HQ BTRY 4TH BN 13TH MAR	21	CAMPEN/DEACT
CO A 5TH AT BN	69	CAMPEN/DEACT
DET H&S CO 5TH AT BN	6	CAMPEN/DEACT
CO A 5TH ENGR BN	129	CAMPEN/DEACT
DET H&S CO 5TH ENGR BN	4	CAMPEN/DEACT
CO A 5TH RECON BN	72	CAMPEN/DEACT
DET H&S CO 5TH RECON BN	16	CAMPEN/DEACT
CO A 5TH MED BN (C&C CO)	25	CAMPEN/DEACT
CO A 5TH MT BN	95	CAMPEN/DEACT
DET H&S CO 5TH MT BN	3	CAMPEN/DEACT
CO A 5TH SP BN	60	CAMPEN/DEACT

PAGE FIVE RUEOEIA 0704 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE		
DET H&S CO 5TH SP BN	37	CAMPEN/DEACT
DET MP CO HQBN 5TH MARDIV	20	CAMPEN/DEACT
DET SVC CO HQBN 5TH MARDIV	16	CAMPEN/DEACT
CO A 5TH TK BN	24	CAMPEN/DEACT
DET H&S CO 5TH TK BN	73	CAMPEN/DEACT
CO A 5TH AMTRAC BN	146	CAMPEN/DEACT
DET H&S CO 5TH AMTRAC BN	26	CAMPEN/DEACT
DET 9TH COMM BN	6	29 PALMS
DET FLC	651	CAMPEN
7TH MT BN	407	CAMPEN
DET HQBN 3D MARDIV (SCAMP)	50	OKI (1)
1ST AT BN (C)	19	CAMPEN

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

LSU 5TH SERV BN	62	CAMPEN/DEACT
LSU 5TH SERV BN	62	CAMPEN/DEACT
LSU 5TH SERV BN	62	CAMPEN/DEACT
OOONE	448	CAMPEN 2/
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7176</b>	
(B) FORCE UNITS		
1ST SHORE PARTY BN (-)	379	CAMPEN

PAGE SIX RUEOFIA 0704 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

DET 5TH COMM BN	215	CAMPEN/DEACT
1ST TANK BN (-)	438	CAMPEN 3/
3D AMTRAC BN	707	CAMPEN/HAWAII (4)
DET FLC	600	CAMPEN
PLT 1ST BRIDGE CO	48	CAMPEN 5/
PLT 3D BRIDGE CO	60	CAMPEN DEACT 5/
CMR RLJ	43	CAMPEN 6/
1ST HOSP CO	35	OKI 7/
DET 1ST RAD BN	52	HAWAII
3D IT	6	HAWAII
DET TRANS FAC	50	CAMPEN/DEACT
MATERIAL ASST IM	5	CAMPEN/DEACT
CO MP BN	200	CAMPEN/DEACT
OOONE	314	CAMPEN 2/
DET 9TH ENGR BN	200	HAWAII
1ST PLT 5TH SIN HOW BTRY	54	29 PALMS/DEACT
5TH 175 GUN BTRY	158	29 PALMS
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3564</b>	
<b>(C) AVIATION ELEMENT</b>		
H&MS-12 (LESS IMA FOR VMA)	335	IMAKUNI
BT		
#0704		

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE  
 INFO LT GEN NICKERSON FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 THIS IS A KEYSTONE BLUEJAY MESSAGE

MABS-12 (-)	397	IWAKUNI
VMFA-542	324	EL TORO
DET H&MS-11 (IMA FOR VMFA)	58	EL TORO
DET MWHG-1	25	IWAKUNI
WACH-62	68	IWAKUNI
? - DET H&S-18	50	OKINAWA
VMA-211	216	IWAKUNI
VMA-311 (INCL IMA)	250	EL TORO
HMH-351	237	SANTA ANA
DET MAG-16 (INCL IMA FOR HMH)	200	SANTA ANA
TOTAL AIR	2160	

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA 0704 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 TOTAL 12900

(D) ABOVE DESTINATIONS ARE TENTATIVE AND SUBJ TO CHANGE UPON RECOMMENDATION OF CG EMEPAC. CHANGES SHOULD BE PREDICATED ON THE CASE II A TROOPLIST AS MODIFIED AND CONSTRAINED BY CURRENT OKINAWA/JAPAN MANPOWER CEILINGS; THIRD MARDIV BASED WESTPAC/HAWAII AND FIRST MARDIV BASED EASTPAC (2-1-3 WESTPAC-MIDPAC-EASTPAC RLT POSTURE); AND MAX BASE LOADING CAPABILITIES FOR MIDPAC AND EASTPAC FACILITIES

(E) NOTES

1/ IO BE CADRED. PO-72 STRUCTURE IS 1/39. THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR THIS UNIT IN CASE II A TROOPLIST, AND RETENTION OF THE UNIT WILL REQUIRE IDENTIFICATION OF TRADEOFF SPACES. REQUEST COMMENT.

2/ QOCNE WILL BE REDUCED UPON DEPARTURE OF ASSOCIATED PERS FROM WESTPAC.

3/ 1 CO REMAINS IN RVN. ASSUME THAT CO D 3D TK BN WILL BE REDESIGNATED CO D 25E TK BN UPON ARR

1ST TK BN (-) IN CAMPEN

4/ CO (-) IO HAWAII

PAGE THREE RUEOFIA 0704 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 5/ ASSUME THAT THE BRIDGE PL ON OKI WILL BE REDISIG AS A PL OF 1ST BRIDGE CO, AND 3D BRIDGE CO (-) WILL BE DEACTIVATED.

6/ NO PROVISION FOR THIS UNIT IN CASE II A TROOPLIST. RETENTION WILL REQUIRE IDENTIFICATION OF TRADEOFF SPACES.

**PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES**

TOP SECRET

7/ TRADEOFF'S MUST BE IDENTIFIED TO REMAIN WITHIN AUTH  
OKINAWA MANPOWER CEILINGS.

C. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE TROOP LIST GRADE/MOS SUMMARY ASAP.  
ADDITIONALLY, PROVIDE SAME FOR ALL TRADE-OFF'S ASAP.

D. EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS. FOR PLANNING  
PURPOSES, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS  
PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THIS HQ IN REFS H, I, J AND K.  
GENERALLY REMAIN VALID FOR PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENTS EXCEPT THAT  
MAXIMUM EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO SEND FLC ECESSES RETURNING  
CONUS DIRECT TO BARSTOW TO PRECLUDE OVERLOAD AT CAMPEN.  
FURTHER REQ CONSIDER MAXIMUM USE OF ALL LOGISTIC UNITS AT  
WEST COAST BASES TO EXPITE ORDERLY RETURN SUPPLIES AND  
EQUIPMENT TO STORES SYSTEM. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS AS  
REQUIRED WILL BE ISSUED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

PAGE FOUR RUEOFIA 0704 T O P S E C R E T

(S) CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO APPROPRIATE  
CEREMONIES INVOLVING RLT-26 PRIOR TO DEACTIVATION. REQUEST  
COMMENT.

5. (C) ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE, IF REQUIRED, WILL BE PROVIDED  
BY HOMC REPS ATTENDING YOUR PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE 8-10 JAN.  
ATTENDEES FROM THIS HQ WILL BE

NAME	RANK	SERNO	CLEARANCE
J. F. BUGBEE	MAJ	073392	IS (DEB)
W. H. LONG	MAJ	071836	IS (DEA)

ARRIVING HONOLULU INTERNATIONAL UA FLIGHT 111 AT 1615 7JAN70.  
BILLETING ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRED.

6. (U) WARM REGARDS

GP-1  
BT  
#0704

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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~~OTG~~  
Ø911ØØ 2 4

TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT

Ø9123Ø Walter Tulle

3

O 081100Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1  
FM LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS  
TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF  
ZEB

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TOP SECRET LINDIS PHB 069 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FORCES (COMUSMACV OPERATION PLAN  
NO 186-69 (RESIDUAL SUPPORT FORCE (C)))

1. (TS) IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUBJECT REFERENCE, I RECENTLY SUBMITTED  
A PROPOSED TD AUGMENTATION TO THE 101ST ABN DIV (AM) AS COMMAND  
AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS FOR ICTZ ALONG WITH PROPOSED SIGNAL AND  
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS ANNEXES FOR YOUR OPLAN 186-69. THE PROPOSED  
AUGMENTATION PROVIDES A RATHER EXTENSIVE ADDITIONAL CAPABILITY TO  
ALL GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS CONCERNED. THE PROPOSED  
AUGMENTATION AND THE SIGNAL AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS ANNEXES  
AS WELL AS OTHER COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WERE MADE WITHIN THE  
PARAMETERS OUTLINED IN COMUSMACV OPLAN 186-69 AND HIS LETTER OF  
PROMULGATION.

2. (TS) UPON FURTHER THOUGHT, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE ABILITY OF  
THE DIVISION COMMANDER, EVEN THOUGH HIS STAFF IS AUGMENTED TO  
EFFECTIVELY COMMAND AND CONTROL SOME 55,000 TROOPS SPREAD OVER  
SUCH A WIDE AREA AND STILL AT THE SAME TIME, PERFORM HIS DUTIES  
IN THE CORDS AND ADVISORY AREAS PLUS FULFILL HIS REQUIREMENTS  
TO DO EXTENSIVE DUTIES AS AREA COORDINATOR AND IN THE COORD-  
INATION OF LOGISTIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. I ENVISION THE  
APPROXIMATE TROOP STRENGTHS (INCLUDING LOGISTIC SUPPORT) AT THE  
FOUR MAJOR LOCATIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHU LAI	11,000	WITH ADC BG
DA NANG	25,000	
PHU BAI	11,000	WITH ADC BG
QUANG TRI - DONG HA	8,000	WITH BDE BG

AS YOU CAN NOTE ABOVE, THE DIVISION COMMANDER WILL PROBABLY  
LOCATE HIS ADC'S AT CHU LAI AND PHU BAI AND THEREFORE, THESE  
ADC'S WILL NOT BE PRESENT TO HELP THE DIVISION COMMANDER WITH  
OVERALL DIVISIONAL PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE IN THE OPERATIONAL  
AND LOGISTICAL FIELDS.

3. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I BELIEVE THAT INSTEAD OF  
AUGMENTING THE DIVISION, IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO BUILD A  
LIGHT FIELD FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY THE SAME SIZE AS THE AUG-  
MENTATION AND WITH A LTG TO HANDLE OVERALL COMMAND, CONTROL,  
AND COORDINATION AND THUS PERMIT THE DIVISION COMMANDER TO  
DEVOTE THE REQUIRED TIME TO THE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL  
OF THE DIVISION. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PUTTING MY VIEWS IN  
THE MACV PLANNING HOPPER WITH COMMENTS YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE.

WARM REGARDS

GR-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
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	C/S	I		11/11	G	REMARKS:
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PP RUEOFIA RHMAFA  
 DE RUHFMA 1091 010194Z  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 101942Z JAN 70  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUEOFIA/CMC  
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG MCB CAMPEN  
 ZEN/CG THIRD MAF  
 ZEN/CG FIFTH MEB  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WALT INFO  
 LTGEN NICKERSON, MGEN ROBERTSON, MGEN OWENS AND  
 BGEN DWYER FROM LTGEN BUSE //N00000//  
 KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (U)

A. CMC 072152Z/JANTO (TS) (SPECAT) (NOTAL)

1. (U) REF A APPLIES.

2. (TS) FOLLOWING CONCEPT FOR RLT-26 RETURN  
 CEREMONIES IS PROPOSED FOR YOUR APPROVAL;

A. MID-MARCH (PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF RLT-26  
 SHIPBORNE CONTINGENT) TWO PLANE LOADS OF REPRESENTA-  
 TIVE RLT-26 PERSONNEL  
 BE FLOWN FROM DANANG TO EL TORO. CG THIRD

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 1091 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 MAF WILL ARRANGE ARRIVAL PLANESIDE CEREMONY SIMILAR  
 TO ONE HELD FOR RLT-3. CEREMONY REPRESENTS SYMBOLIC  
 RETURN OF RLT; I.E., THE RETURN OF COLORS BY CO WITH  
 APPROPRIATE MEDIA COVERAGE. TROOPS PROCESSED  
 IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CEREMONY.

B. EACH SHIPBORNE CONTINGENT DURING ENTIRE MOVEMENT  
 WILL BE MET AT DOCKSIDE BY CG FIFTH MEB AND PERSONALLY WELCOMED.  
 HOME. MEB BAND PRESENT TO GREET EACH SHIP. NEWS  
 MEDIA COVERAGE AS APPROPRIATE FOR ALL SHIP ARRIVALS.

C. AFTER ALL SHIPBORNE UNITS HAVE RETURNED ON A  
 DATE IN LATE MARCH OR EARLY APRIL FIFTH MEB WILL HOLD APPROPRIATE  
 PARADE/REVIEW CEREMONIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH  
 RETIREMENT OF 26TH MARINES COLORS.

3. (S) DATE FOR PLANESIDE CEREMONY IS CONTINGENT  
 UPON KEYSTONE BLUEJAY MOVEMENT PLAN CURRENTLY BEING  
 DEVELOPED FOR SUBMISSION TO CINCPAC.

4. (S) RECOMMEND PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF RLT-26  
 CEREMONIES BY COORDINATED BY JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
 OFFICER, CAMP PENDLETON. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1091

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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 ZNY TTTT  
 P 122005Z JAN 70  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUOFIA/CMC  
 INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF

10694

BT  
 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WALT INFO LIGEN  
 NICKERSON FROM LIGEN BUSE THIS IS A KEYSTONE  
 BLUEJAY MESSAGE

KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (U) //NO0000//

A. CMC 052541Z/JAN70 (TS)

1. (TS) REF A HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND IS CONCURRED IN  
 WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. GROUND UNITS.

(1) DET HQEN 3D IV (SCAMP) - IF FMFPAC  
 IS AUTHORIZED TO MAINTAIN ONLY ONE SCAMP, IT IS CON-  
 sidered to be in the best interest of the FMFPAC AND  
 THE MARINE CORPS TO MAINTAIN THIS PLATOON AT CAMP  
 PENDLETON VICE OKINAWA FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(A) GREATER PERSONNEL STABILITY AND LESS  
 STRINGENT PERSONNEL CEILING ASSOCIATED WITH CONUS

PAGE 2 RUHFMA1238 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 BASING.

(B) FACILITATES DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE  
 AND EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES WITH COMPHISPAC, THE DES-  
 IGNATED CINCPACFLT COMMAND RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS  
 DEVELOPMENT.

(C) PERMITS USE OF BETTER EXERCISE  
 AREAS WITH FEWER SECURITY RESTRICTIONS AND NO  
 POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS.

(D) TECHNICAL TRAINING AND SENSOR  
 EQUIPMENT ARE MORE READILY AVAILABLE IN CONUS.

(E) BY NATURE OF ITS SIZE AND THE TYPE  
 OF ORGANIC EQUIPMENT, THE SCAMP CAN BE DEPLOYED  
 RAPIDLY BY AIR WITHIN PACOM FOR CONTINGENCY OR EX-  
 ERcISE PURPOSES.

(2) CMR PLT - IT IS CONSIDERED DESIRABLE TO  
 MAINTAIN THIS UNIT IN THE ACTIVE FORCE STRUCTURE,  
 ALBEIT CADRED AT ZERO STRENGTH. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE  
 RECOMMEND THAT CMR PLT BE LOCATED AT 29 PALMS VICE  
 CAMPEN FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(A) PLT IS FORCE UNIT AND SHOULD BE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA1238 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
RETURNED TO ITS PARENT UNIT, I.E., 1ST FAG.

(B) 29 PALMS BAYING FACILITATES EQUIP-  
MENT MAINTENANCE AND POSSIBLE FUTURE EXPANSION.

(3) 1ST HOSP CO - DUE TO OKINAWA CEILING  
CONSTRAINTS, MARINE STRENGTH OF THIS UNIT ON OKI IS PLANNED  
TO BE 24 VICE 35. THEREFORE, RECOMMEND THAT SPACES  
BE PROGRAMMED FOR OKINAWA AND REMAINING 11 BE PROGRAM-  
MED FOR CONUS. THIS HQ WILL IDENTIFY COMPENSATORY  
TRADE OFF OF CURRENT AUTH ON OKINAWA TO ENSURE AD-  
HERENCE TO THE 19.2K CEILING.

(4) DET 9TH ENGR BN - IN KEEPING WITH POST  
RVN FORCE STRUCTURE AND KANEONE BASING CONSTRAINTS,  
THE PLANNED STRENGTH OF THIS UNIT IS 130 USMC. THERE-  
FORE, RECOMMEND THAT 130 SPACES BE PROGRAMMED FOR  
HAWAII AND THAT THE REMAINDER OF 70 BE PROGRAMMED  
FOR CONUS.

B. AVIATION UNITS. REF A STRENGTH FIGURES WILL  
BE UTILIZED AS REDEPLOYING STRENGTHS FOR AVIATION  
UNITS/DETS EXCEPT FOR DET MAG-16. CONCUR WITH OTHER  
ASPECTS OF AVIATION TROOP LIST EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS:

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA1238 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

(1) DET MAG-16 - AN IMA AUGMENT (FOR HMN-361)  
FROM MAG-16 OF 36 PERSONNEL WILL BE REDEPLOYED. THE  
REMAINING PORTION OF THIS DET, (I.E., 164 SPACES) WILL  
BE FILLED AS DETERMINED BY CG III MAF.

(2) DET H&S-18 - CURRENT CEILING FOR MARINE  
SPACES ON OKINAWA PRECLUDES THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL  
MAW UNITS. ACCORDINGLY, THE RECOMMENDED  
DESTINATION OF THIS UNIT IS IWAKUMI VICE OKINAWA.

(3) VMA-311 - CG III MAF HAS NOMENATED  
VMA-223 FOR REDEPLOYMENT. THEREFORE, RECOMMEND THAT  
VMA-223 VICE VMA-311 REDEPLOY TO EL TORO.

2. (U) TROOP LIST GRADE AND MOS SUMMARY REQUESTD  
IN PAR 3.C. REF A IS BEING PREPARED AND WILL BE SUB-  
MITTED SE. 1

3. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1238

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**TOP SECRET** **HEADQUARTERS** **TOP SECRET**  
**III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

III MAP FORM 5216 (REV 6-67)

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Section	Signature

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LTG MILDREN DCG USARV LONG BINH  
VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORVSAIGON  
LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF DA NANG  
LTG CORCORAN CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG  
LTG EWELL CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH  
MG MCCOWN CG DMAC CAN THO  
INFO LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS PHU BAI  
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*16/20* | *16/204*  
*en*

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET - CLOSE HOLD - III MAC 701 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM (U)

1. (S) CJCS HAS REQUESTED COMUSMACV TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM, TO INCLUDE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES, THEIR WEAKNESSES AND STRENGTHS, AND WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE ADEQUATELY SHOULDERING THE COMBAT RESPONSIBILITIES THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN.

2. (S) IT IS REQUESTED THAT ADDRESSEES BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE FOLLOWING POINTS AT THE WIEU 24 JANUARY:

- A. HOW IS VIETNAMIZATION GOING IN YOUR AREA WITH RESPECT TO ARVN, RF/PF, PSDF, PACIFICATION, ETC.?
- B. WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL PROBLEMS IN VIETNAMIZATION?
- C. WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN YOUR AREA AND WHAT IS TO BE DONE ABOUT THEM?
- D. WHAT IS THE CALIBER OF THE ADVISORY EFFORTS?
- E. WHAT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE VIETNAMESE, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, TOWARDS VIETNAMIZATION?

3. (U) AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT IS BEING PREPARED BY THE MACV STAFF FOR PRESENTATION AT THE 24 JANUARY WIEU. REPRESENTATIVES OF ADDRESSEES' COMMANDS ARE TO BE INVITED TO ATTEND A PRE-BRIEF, REQUEST ADDRESSEES' REPRESENTATIVES BE INFORMED AS TO ADDRESSEES' VIEWS ON THE QUESTIONS IN PARA 2 ABOVE.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

400

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7

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
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 O 162302Z JAN 70  
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 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF  
 BT

**T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM  
 LTGEN BUSE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //NO0000//

A. CG III MAF 150954Z JAN70

1. YOUR PROPOSAL CONTAINED REFERENCE A IS APPROVED EXCEPT WORDS QUOTE HAVE COMMAND LESS OPCON OF ASSIGNED MARINE FORCES UNQUOTE IN PAR 6.
2. I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH CMC AND BELIEVE THAT DELETION IS BEST AS AN OPENING PLAY.
3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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1942

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

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**TOP SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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**EXCLUSIVE FOR**

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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 O 200128Z JAN 70  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WICKERSON FROM  
 LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //NO0000//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 31212Z/DEC69 (TS/SPECAT: MCEO)

B. CG III MAF 060954Z/JAN70 (TS/LD/SPECAT)

C. CG FMFPAC 14032Z JAN70 (TS/SPECAT: MCEO)

1. (U) REFS A, B AND C APPLY.

2. (TS) DURING CHAPPY'S VISIT ON 16 JAN, HE SUGGESTED  
 THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN FOR AN RVN MAB NOT TO  
 EXCEED 9K AS AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO THE 10.8K MAB  
 PROPOSED IN REF C.

3. (TS) STAFF LIAISON WITH G-3 (PLANS) HMC INDICATES  
 REF C WILL BE APPROVED FOR PLANNING WITH THE REQUEST  
 THAT A 9 TO 9.5K MAB BE ADDRESSED. THE 9.5K CEILING  
 IS TO INCLUDE 600 SPACES FOR SUPPORT/TRANSITIONAL FORCE  
 (FORMERLY IDENTIFIED AS NO-MAF MARINES IN RVN, REF A).

PAGE 2 RUHFMA2218 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS  
 EYES ONLY

LEAVING AN 8.9K MAB CEILING.

4. (TS) REQUEST YOUR RECOMMENDED REVISIONS TO  
 REF C TO REFLECT 8.9K MAB BY 21 JAN. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2218

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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					ITC TALS XXIV CORPS 22 JAN 75	SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 221007 JAN 75				
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 TO LTG WICKERSON, CG, III MAF  
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T O P S E C R E T CLOSE HOLD PHB 166 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 SKJ: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM (U)

A. MSG, /S, MACV, 151116Z JAN 70 (TS) (BOM)

1. IN PREPARATION FOR THE 24 JANUARY WIEU, I SOLICITED COMMENTS FROM MG WRIGHT AND BG BURKE AS TO THEIR VIEWS REGARDING THOSE POINTS NOTED IN PARA 2 OF REF A. A SYNOPSIS OF THEIR OBSERVATIONS AND MY ASSESSMENT IS OFFERED IN PREPARATION OF THE OVERALL CORPS EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM.

2. IT HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED THAT THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF OUR EFFORT IN VIETNAM IS TO WORK OURSELVES OUT OF A JOB; IN ESSENCE, VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR. ANY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN XXIV CORPS MUST, OF NECESSITY, BE TWOFOLD:

A. SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN ARVN AND TERRITORIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES ARE MANIFESTED IN THEIR INCREASED ASSUMPTION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE RESPONSIBILITIES. THEIR ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULACE HAS BEEN THE KEY FACTOR IN CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE 1969 PACIFICATION EFFORTS MET WITH EXCEPTIONAL DEGREES OF SUCCESS. THE PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, POPULAR ELECTIONS, INCREASED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND MANY OTHER SIMPLE, BUT SIGNIFICANT, INDICES ATTEST TO THE REALIZATION OF THESE AIMS.

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

3. PROGRESS OF VIETNAMIZATION:

A. THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION IS FULLY CAPABLE OF PLANNING, COORDINATING AND CONDUCTING INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS WITH MINIMAL SUPPORT FROM US UNITS. GIVEN SUFFICIENT AIRCRAFT AND FIRE SUPPORT, ARVN'S CAPABILITY IS COMPARABLE TO US FORCES AND SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF THE ENEMY.

B. SIMILARLY, TERRITORIAL FORCES, THE RF'AN PF'S AND PSDF'S HAVE DEMONSTRATED AN INCREASED CAPABILITY TO ASSUME THE VITAL MISSION OF PROTECTING THE POPULACE. IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT, AS THE DENSITY OF US FORCES DECREASES, THE CONTINUING SUCCESS OF VIETNAMIZATION HINGES ON THESE TERRITORIAL FORCES' ABILITY TO PROTECT THE POPULATION, IN TURN FREEING ARVN TO MANEUVER AND ENGAGE THE ENEMY BEYOND THE PERIPHERY OF THE POPULATION TRACE.

C. THE SUCCESSES OF THE 1969 PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN ARE APPARENT. THE RECRUITING LEVEL OF THE PSDF IS A VALID INDEX OF THE PEOPLE'S CONFIDENCE IN THEIR GOVERNMENT AND OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND IT. LIKEWISE, THE INCREASED CONFIDENCE SHOWN BY LEADERS AT THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVEL IS EXPRESSED IN THEIR OBVIOUS CONCERN FOR THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE AND DESIRE TO ENCOURAGE A RETURN TO NORMALCY.

4. CRITICAL PROBLEMS. THOUGH THERE ARE NO OBVIOUSLY CRITICAL PROBLEMS, CERTAIN SITUATIONS DO EXIST WHICH INFLUENCE VIETNAMIZATION.

A. RELATIONS BETWEEN ARVN AND THE TERRITORIAL FORCES ARE NOT ALWAYS OPTIMUM. THERE IS A DEFINITE NEED FOR GREAT COOPERATION, COORDINATION AND UNITY OF EFFORT AND SPIRIT.

B. IN MEASURING PROGRESS OF VIETNAMIZATION, THE PROGRESS OF ARVN UNITS IS TOO OFTEN UNDERSTATED BY COMPARING THEIR ABILITY WITH THAT OF US UNITS, WHEN, IN FACT, THEIR CAPABILITY COMPARED TO THAT OF THE VC/NVA IS A MORE VALID YARDSTICK.

5. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.

A. STRENGTHS.

- (1) THE IMPROVED TACTICAL CAPABILITY OF THE 1ST ARVN DIV AND THE TERRITORIAL FORCES, WHICH I HAVE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED.
- (2) THE CAPABILITY OF VIETNAMESE FIELD OPERATORS TO GATHER AND EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE AND THEIR DEMONSTRATED PROFICIENCY IN USE OF RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED SURVEILLANCE DEVICES.
- (3) COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN ARVN PSYOPS PERSONNEL AND THE VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE (VIS) IN THE CONDUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.
- (4) ARVN AND TERRITORIAL FORCES' SELF-CONFIDENCE AND AGGRESSIVENESS.

GP 74

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 FM LTG ZAIS, CG, XXIV CORPS  
 TO LTG NICKERSON, CG, III MAF  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T CLOSE HOLD PHB 166 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION  
 OF TWO

B. WEAKNESSES.

(1) ARVN'S LACK OF ORGANIC MEDIUM AND HEAVY ARTILLERY  
 ASSETS AND VNAF'S LACK OF SUFFICIENT HELICOPTERS FOR TROOP  
 MOVEMENT AND LOGISTIC RESUPPLY.

(2) LACK OF LOGISTICAL MATERIAL DENSITY AND RELUCTANCE  
 TO FULLY EXERCISE VIETNAMESE SUPPLY CHANNELS.

(3) WEAKNESS IN LEADERSHIP AND DEGREE OF EXPERIENCE ON THE  
 PART OF JUNIOR LEADERS IN THE RF AND PF.

(4) LACK OF SUFFICIENT DEEP RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY. A  
 CAPABILITY MUST BE DEVELOPED INDEPENDENT OF HELICOPTER SUPPORT,  
 WHICH IN THE FUTURE MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE.

(5) LACK OF COORDINATED EFFORT OR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION  
 BY VARIOUS GVN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCIES. THERE IS A  
 GREATER NEED TO PROMOTE A FREE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN  
 AGENCIES.

(6) INSUFFICIENT LOGISTICS TRAINED OFFICERS TO STAFF  
 SECTOR MAINTENANCE AND DIRECT SUPPORT LOGISTICS CENTERS.

C. WHILE NOT IDENTIFIABLE AS WEAKNESSES, PER SE, THERE STILL  
 EXISTS A DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY IN SEVERAL AREAS ESSENTIAL TO  
 SUCCESSFUL VIETNAMIZATION:

(1) ARVN CAPABILITIES. AFTER TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES  
 IT CANNOT BE PREDICTED WITH ANY DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE OR CERTAINTY  
 THAT THE 1ST ARVN DIV -- GIVEN THE SHEER SIZE AND TOPOGRAPHIC  
 LIMITATIONS OF NICTZ, COUPLED WITH THE WEAKNESSES ALREADY  
 ENUMERATED -- CAN SUCCESSFULLY COPE WITH A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE  
 IN NVA UNITS AND CONCENTRATED ENEMY THRUSTS LAUNCHED SIMULTANEOUSLY  
 ON MULTIPLE FRONTS.

(2) MONTAGNARDS. THE BRU CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT MINORITY  
 GROUP POSSESSING LITTLE RECOGNIZABLE IDENTIFICATION WITH GVN.

ANY DEGRADATION OF GVN ABILITY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THESE  
 POTENTIALLY DISSIDENT ELEMENTS WILL CERTAINLY PROVIDE FERTILE  
 OPPORTUNITIES FOR NVA/VC PROSELYTIZING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL  
 EXPLOITATION.

(3) REFUGEES. DESPITE GREAT PROGRESS IN RESETTLEMENT, A CERTAIN DEGREE OF UNEASINESS PREVAILS IN AREAS, SUCH AS: CUA VIET, CAN LO AND GIO LINH. THIS UNEASINESS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED IN PART TO THE PROXIMITY OF THESE AREAS TO THE DMZ AND THE RESULTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES.

6. CALIBER OF ADVISORY EFFORT.

A. ADVISORS AT SECTOR IN BOTH PROVINCES ARE COMPETENT, WELL MOTIVATED AND RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY FOR CONTINUED UPGRADING OF THE TERRITORIAL FORCES. SIMILARLY, ARVN ADVISORS ARE EXCELLENT AND COMPARABLE TO THE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO US UNITS.

B. AT THE SUB-SECTOR LEVEL, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADVISORY EFFORT IS REDUCED DUE TO A SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS IN AUTHORIZED GRADES. MANY MAJOR'S SLOTS ARE FILLED BY CAPTAINS WITH RESULTING LACK OF EXPERIENCE. TOO OFTEN, THESE JUNIOR OFFICERS FUNCTION MORE IN A LIAISON CAPACITY RATHER THAN AS ACTUAL ADVISORS. THIS SITUATION CAN ONLY BE IMPROVED BY THE ASSIGNMENT OF MAJORS WHO POSSESS THE REQUISITE EXPERIENCE AND PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE.

IN ADDITION, THESE OFFICERS SHOULD BE COMBAT VETERANS IN ORDER TO COMMAND MORE CONFIDENCE AND RESPECT FROM THEIR COUNTERPARTS.

7. ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE. GENERALLY, A FEELING OF CONFIDENCE SEEMS TO PREVAIL AMONG THE POPULATION AND RVNAF.

THERE IS A HIGH DEGREE OF REALISM IN RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR EVENTUAL ASSUMPTION OF TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR.

MILITARY FORCES APPEAR TO LOOK FORWARD WITH ENTHUSIASM, CONFIDENCE AND PRIDE TO THE TIME WHEN THE TOTAL DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE WILL BE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MILITARY AS WELL AS THE CIVILIAN LEADERS SEEM TO RECOGNIZE AND ACCEPT THE GRADUAL PHASE OUT OF US FORCES. SELF-CONFIDENCE IS APPARENT AS

PROVINCE CHIEFS OUTLINE PLANS TO REDUCE CURFEW RESTRICTIONS WHERE POSSIBLE, INCREASE THE AREAS OPEN FOR FISHING AND FORESTRY AND, IN GENERAL, REDUCE UNCERTAINTY WHILE STRIVING TO CREATE A MORE STABLE ENVIRONMENT.

SIC III MAF NOTE: REQUEST IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO 2100 HOURS. IF NOT DELIVERED THEN, REQUEST FIRST AM DELIVERY 23 JAN 70

GP-4  
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# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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			IN	OUT								
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	DCG	<b>I</b>		<b>1/21</b>	<b>[Signature]</b>							
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**TOP SECRET**

R 251300Z ZFF-6 ZFF-3

FM MG TOWNSEND C/S MACV

TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF DA NANG

INFO LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS PHU EAI

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T MAC 1133 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: HEADQUARTERS FOR TRANSITIONAL FORCES, I CTZ (U)

REFERENCES: A. CG III MAF MSG 140816Z JAN 70 (TS)

B. COMUSMACV OPLAN 186-69 (TS)

C. CONVERSATIONS OF 25 JAN 70 BETWEEN GEN'S ZAIS AND BAUTZ.

1. (TS) REFERENCES ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. FORWARDS CG XXIV CORPS VIEWS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LIGHT FIELD FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN I CTZ.

B. IS RESIDUAL SUPPORT FORCE PLAN THAT ESTABLISHES AN AUGMENTED DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AS COMMAND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS IN I CTZ.

2. (TS) RECOMMENDATIONS AND VIEWS SIMILAR TO THOSE EXPRESSED BY GENERAL ZAIS IN REFERENCE A WERE PRESENTED WHEN THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE FOR REFERENCE B WAS UP FOR DECISION. REASONS FOR DECISION WERE PROVIDED DURING REFERENCE C. REFERENCE B WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

175

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11

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

## TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM <b>MR TOWNSEND MACV</b>	DATE <b>26 JAN 70</b>
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>P 260225Z JAN 70</b>		COPY NO. <b>4</b> OF <b>5</b> COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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	CG					<b>TOP SECRET/MAC 1165/EO          HQ FOR U.S. COMMAND ELEMENTS IN          ICTZ.</b>
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## TOP SECRET

INFO LIG 2415 CG XXIV CORPS FOR GEN  
ZAIS

1 0 P S E C R E T M A C 1165 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: HQ FOR U.S. COMMAND ELEMENTS IN I CTZ (U)

REFERENCE: III MAF 170330Z JAN 78 (TS) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REFERENCE PROPOSED TWO ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR THE TRANSITION OF U.S. COMMAND ELEMENTS IN I CTZ, BOTH OF WHICH INVOLVED A DEGREE OF MERGER OR AMALGAMATION OF HQ III MAF AND HQ XXIV CORPS, WITH THE LATTER BEING REMAINED HQ XFFV.  
2. (TS) BOTH ALTERNATIVES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED; HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT CONTINUITY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL CAN BE OBTAINED AND INTERFERENCE MINIMIZED BY TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITIES WITHOUT INTER-MERGERS, AMALGAMATION, OR NAME CHANGE FOR XXIV CORPS.

3. (TS) ACCORDINGLY, COMUSMACV HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING:

- A. XXIV CORPS IS TO ASSUME AREA RESPONSIBILITIES FROM III MAF ON 2 MARCH 1978, AT WHICH TIME III MAF WILL COME UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF XXIV CORPS, I.E., THE REVERSE OF CURRENT RELATIONSHIP.
  - B. HQ III MAF (SCALED DOWN) IS TO REMAIN TO HANDLE SERVICE MATTERS AND THEN PHASE OUT AS THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION/MAV (MINUS) IS REDEPLOYED.
  - C. THERE IS TO BE APPROPRIATE USMC REPRESENTATION WITH HQ XXIV CORPS UNTIL THE SUPPORT LEVEL IS REACHED.
  - D. IT IS VISUALIZED THAT THE FUNCTION OF CG, III MAF CAN BE PERFORMED IN THE INTERIM AS AN ADDITIONAL DUTY OF CG, 1ST MARINE DIV.
4. (U) REQUEST THAT PLANNING AND COORDINATION WITH GEN ZAIS BASED UPON THE FOREGOING BE INITIATED WITHOUT DELAY, SHIFT IN COMMAND TAKE PLACE ON 2 MARCH 1978, AND THAT COMUSMACV BE KEPT INFORMED OF PROGRESS IN THE INTERIM.

GP 4.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
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# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

## TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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TOP SECRET

PTTZYUW RUEOFIA7611 0161220-TTTT--RUHHFMA RHMMAFA.

ZNY TTTT

RUHHFMA-T- RHMMAFA

P 261220Z JAN 70

FM CMC

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

23718

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN VAN RYZIN  
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 140321Z JAN 70 (TS) (SPECAT) (MCEO)

B. CG FMFPAC 171821Z JAN 70 (TS) (SPECAT) (MCEO) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) WE HAVE REVIEWED YOUR PROPOSAL IN REF A FOR A  
10.8K RESIDUAL MAB AND YOUR PROPOSAL IN REGARD TO THE  
REDEPLOYMENT OF CAPS OUTLINED IN REF A AND B2. (TS) THE CONCEPT FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE CAPS AS  
CONTAINED IN REF B IS CONCURRED IN. YOUR CONCEPT FOR THE  
ORGANIZATION OF THE RESIDUAL MAB IS ALSO CONCURRED IN AS  
ONE ALTERNATIVE3. (TS) AS YOU KNOW THE JCS ARE CONSIDERING APPROVAL OF A  
MAB OF LESS THAN 10.8K. THEREFORE, AS CMC DISCUSSED WITH  
YOU THE MARINE CORPS WOULD BE IN A MORE TENABLE POSITION  
TO GO FORWARD WITH A RESIDUAL MAB OF 9 TO 9.5K. ( WITH  
THIS IN MIND REQUEST YOU DEVELOP AN ALTERNATIVE TROOPPAGE TWO RUEOFIA7611 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS  
EYES ONLYLIST OF 9 TO 9.5K. THE 9.5K FIGURE INCLUDES 600 SUPPORT  
TRANSITION FORCES. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE A 1200 LOGISTICS  
ROLLUP FORCE OR 600 CAPS

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

7611

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM <b>LTG ZAIS XXIV CORPS</b>		DATE <b>27 JAN 70</b>				
				SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>0 270134Z JAN 70</b>		COPY NO. <b>3</b> OF <b>5</b> COPIES REC'D					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT <b>REF: MAC 1165, DTG 260225Z</b>					
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14



# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

## TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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			272322Z JAN 70			
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FOR  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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## TOP SECRET

15

TOP SECRET

OO RHMMAFA  
 DE RUHMFMA 3223 0272322  
 ZNY TTTTT  
 O 272322Z JAN 70  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF  
 BT

25236

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM  
 LTGEN BUSE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //NOOOOO//

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF WHEELER'S 271944Z JAN70  
 TO MCCAIN INFO ABRAMS. PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE.

QUOTE:

SUBJ: HEADQUARTERS, US COMMAND ELEMENTS IN I CORPS (U)  
 REF: MAC 1163/260203Z JAN 70 (EO).

1. (TS) THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS HAS DIS-  
 CUSSED THE REFERENCED MESSAGE WITH ME. HE HAS NO  
 PROBLEMS WITH THE CHANGES YOU PROPOSE EXCEPT THE ASSIGN-  
 MENT OF III MAF FUNCTIONS AS AN ADDITIONAL DUTY OF CG,  
 1ST MAR DIV.

2. (TS) CMC WOULD PREFER TO MAINTAIN A SEPARATE III  
 MAF HEADQUARTERS IN BEING, ALTHOUGH SCALED DOWN, AS LONG  
 AS THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND 3D MARINE AIR WING ARE  
 PRESENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE CMC INTENDS TO MAKE APPRO-

PAGE TWO RUHMFMA3223 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 MCEO

PRIATE NOMINATION FOR BILLET OF CG III MAF. WARM  
 REGARDS.

UNQUOTE:

2. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

3223.

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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TO AFSA (MG GREN BROWN)  
INFO USAF (MG WILSON)  
C R III MAF (LTG NICKERSON)

COMNAVFORV (ADM ZIMMALT)  
SSG I FFV (LTG CORCORAN)  
SSG II FFV (LTG EWELL)  
SSG CAN THO (MG MCCOWN)  
VFC CAS SAIGON (AMB BUNKER)  
SSG XXIV CORPS (LTG ZAIS)  
020030Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
ADM MCCAIN CIRCIPAC HAWAII  
ZM




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TOP SECRET NOFORN SENSITIVE SECTION ONE OF FOURTEEN EYES ONLY  
ADDRESSEES MAC 1295 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

REF: A. JCS 88483/122245Z JAN 70 EYE ONLY (TS)  
B. MAC 1284/280219Z JAN 70 EYES ONLY (SCW)

1. (U) REFERENCES ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:
  - A. REF A REQUESTS MACV ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM.
  - B. REF B IS MACV CODEWORD INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.
2. (U) THIS MESSAGE AND REF B ARE IN RESPONSE TO REF A.
3. (S) THIS ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IS IN TWO PARTS AS FOLLOWS:
  - A. PART I - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
    - (1) ENEMY SITUATION (PARA 4A).
    - (2) ALLIED SITUATION (PARA 4B).
    - (3) CONCLUSIONS (PARA 5).
  - B. PART II - DETAILED APPRAISALS
    - (1) ENEMY SITUATION (PARA 6).
    - (2) ALLIED SITUATION
      - (A) PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT (PARA 7A).
      - (B) OVERALL APPRAISAL OF SVN FORCES (PARA 7B).
      - (C) SITUATION BY CTZ (PARA 7C).
      - (D) PARAMILITARY FORCES (PARA 8).
      - (4) PERSONNEL (PARA 9).
      - (5) TRAINING (PARA 10).
      - (6) LOGISTICS (PARA 11).
      - (7) COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS (PARA 12).
      - (8) ADVISORY EFFORT (PARA 13).
      - (9) REVIEWS OF VIETNAM (PARA 14).



## A. ENEMY SITUATION.

(1) A CONTINUAL DECLINE IN THE INTENSITY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY HAD OCCURRED DURING 1969. THE ENEMY SHIFTED FROM SUSTAINED OFFENSIVES, TO COUNTRY-WIDE "HIGH POINTS" AND FINALLY TO CORPS-WIDE SURGES OF ACTIVITY DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF THE YEAR. DECLINING STRENGTH, INCREASED RALLIES, RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS AND ALLIED OPERATIONS HAVE ALL CONTRIBUTED TO THE ENEMY'S DIFFICULTIES. HOWEVER, THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT THE ENEMY IS PLANNING TO STEP UP THE LEVEL OF HIS ACTIVITY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

(2) THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INDICATOR OF THE ENEMY'S INTENTIONS IS THE SHARP INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF HIS LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES. LOGISTICS ACTIVITY IN THE LAOS PANHANDLE IS GREATER THAN THAT OBSERVED AT THIS TIME LAST YEAR AND VEHICLE DETECTIONS HAS RISEN SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS. THE SENSOR DETECTIONS THUS FAR IN JANUARY INDICATE THAT THIS TREND IS CONTINUING. THE ENEMY IS MAKING A SIGNIFICANT EFFORT TO RESTORE, IMPROVE AND PROTECT HIS LOC'S IN LAOS AS EVIDENCED BY THE PLACEMENT OF 100MM AAA GUNS IN LAOS AND SAM MISSILE EMPLACEMENTS NEAR THE BAN KAPAI AND MU GIA PASSES. THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICS CAPABILITY IN THE COSVN AREA HAS BEEN IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY BY THE RESUMPTION OF LARGE SCALE CAMBODIAN MUNITION SHIPMENTS TO THE VIET CONG, NORTH VIETNAM

ALSO CONTINUES TO REQUEST AND RECEIVE SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTS OF WAR MATERIAL, INCLUDING VEHICLES, POL AND EXPLOSIVES.

(3) THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN THE COSVN AREA HAS BEEN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF FIVE REGIMENTS TO THE DELTA, SIGNIFYING THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE WAR IN THE DELTA FROM ONE CHARACTERIZED BY SMALL UNIT ACTIONS TO ONE WHICH COULD INVOLVE LARGER UNITS. THE ENEMY RETAINS A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY FOR CONTINUED OFFENSIVE ACTION AND APPEARS TO BE PREPARING FOR

INCREASED MILITARY ACTIVITY DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN, IN HOPES OF INFLECTING ALLIED CASUALTIES, DISRUPTING

RVNAF MODERNIZATION AND IMPEDING PACIFICATION. THE ENEMY'S ULTIMATE GOAL REMAINS THE COMPLETE DOMINATION OF THE RVN.

B. ALLIED SITUATION. THE 1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT GOALS WERE LARGELY MET, AND THE 1970 PLAN AIMS AT

CONSOLIDATING AND EXPANDING THOSE GOALS. THERE IS EVERY EXPECTATION THAT THE CURRENT MOMENTUM OF THE PROGRAM WILL BE SUSTAINED. RVNAF REGULAR AND TERRITORIAL FORCES CONTINUE TO

GAIN IN OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND STRUCTURAL BALANCE, ALTHOUGH

MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE BEFORE THOSE FORCES CAN ALL BE CONSIDERED FULLY EFFECTIVE. SEVERAL MAJOR ARVN COMBAT UNITS HAVE YET TO

BE TESTED IN BATTLE AND SOME CONTINUE TO SHOW A LACK OF CONFIDENCE AND AGGRESSIVENESS. LACK OF STRONG LEADERSHIP, ESPECIALLY AT THE LOWER LEVELS, CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR SHORTFALL. VNN, VNAF, AND VNGC SHOW CONTINUING GROWTH IN OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, AND AS THE ACTOV AND PHASE II RVNAF I&M PROGRAMS CONTINUE, BOTH VNN AND VNAF ARE EXPECTED TO GAIN SUBSTANTIALLY IN SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

SOME STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES IN THE AREAS OF COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OF BOTH REGULAR AND TERRITORIAL FORCES WILL REQUIRE ADDRESSAL BEFORE RVNAF CAN REACH ITS MAXIMUM ATTAINABLE EFFECTIVENESS. THE MAJOR PROBLEMS FALL INTO THE FOUR FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL, TRAINING, LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. ADVISORY EFFORT AND COMBINED

MACV/JCS PLANNING CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON THESE PROBLEM AREAS, SOME OF WHICH SHOULD SHOW SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN 1970. PARAMILITARY FORCES CONTINUE TO REPRESENT AN INVALUABLE EXTENSION OF THE GVN PRESENCE AND AUTHORITY INTO CONTESTED POPULATION AREAS, AND 1970 SHOULD SEE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT AND LARGER INVOLVEMENT OF THESE FORCES IN THE ONGOING PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN. THE OVERALL ADVISORY EFFORT IS CONSIDERED TO BE SATISFACTORY, BUT OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE IS HAMPERED BY THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADVISORS OF LOWER GRADE (AND HENCE, LESS MATURITY AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT) THAN IS REQUISITE TO THE EFFECTIVE GUIDANCE OF VIETNAMESE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP. THE ATTITUDE OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD VIETNAMIZATION IS LARGELY ONE OF CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM REFLECTING INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN GVN AND RVNAF ABILITIES. IN SUM, THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN JANUARY 1970 IS A NATION WHOSE POTENTIAL IS EQUAL TO THE TASK AT HAND, ONE OF GROWING STRENGTH AND CONFIDENCE, AND ONE WHOSE FUTURE WILL DEPEND LARGELY UPON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION OF THE PEOPLE TOWARD FULL CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO MEET THE CHALLENGE AT HAND.

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5. (TS/NF) CONCLUSIONS.

A. WHILE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES ARE STEADILY GAINING IN COMBAT PROFICIENCY AND STRUCTURAL BALANCE, ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION IS REQUIRED BEFORE THEY CAN SUCCESSFULLY COUNTER LARGE-SCALE ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL US AND FREE WORLD SUPPORT.

B. THE AMOUNT AND COMPOSITION OF CONTINUED US SUPPORT WILL DEPEND LARGELY UPON (1) FUTURE ENEMY INITIATIVES AND THE SUCCESS OF RVNAF RESPONSE; (2) TIMELY ATTAINMENT OF I&M GOALS; (3) CONTINUED PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT TO CONSOLIDATE THE POPULATION GAINS MADE LAST YEAR; AND (4) CONTINUED POLITICAL STABILITY IN SAIGON.

C. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE ADDITIONAL US TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS DURING THE REMAINDER OF CY 70; HOWEVER, THE MAGNITUDE AND TIMING WILL DEPEND ON HOW WELL RVNAF REACTS TO ENEMY INITIATIVES AND HOW WELL THE GVN CONSOLIDATES ITS HOLD ON CONTESTED AREAS

SUCH AS SOUTHERN I CORPS, BINH DINH IN II CORPS, LONG AN AND HAU NGHIA IN III CORPS AND KIEN HOA AND DINH TUONG IN IV CORPS.  
 PART II - DETAILED APPRAISALS

6. (SNF) THE ENEMY SITUATION.

A. THE ENEMY STILL HAS APPROXIMATELY 226,000 TROOPS POSING A DIRECT THREAT TO SOUTH VIETNAM. HE RETAINS THE CAPABILITY OF INITIATING OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY ON RELATIVELY SHORT NOTICE. HOWEVER, HE DOES NOT HAVE A CURRENT CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN SUCH AS ATTACK FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME.

B. THE TEMPO OF ENEMY ACTIVITY HAS AGAIN DECLINED FOLLOWING BRIEF IPSURGES THROUGHOUT JANUARY WHICH WERE CHARACTERIZED BY ATTACKS BY FIRE AND LIGHT GROUND ATTACKS. A CONTINUAL DECLINE IN THE INTENSITY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY OCCURED THROUGHOUT 1969. THE ENEMY SHIFTED FROM SUSTAINED OFFENSIVES TO COUNTRY-WIDE "HIGH POINTS" AND FINALLY TO CORPS-WIDE SURGES OF ACTIVITY DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF THE YEAR.

C. THE ENEMY THREAT IS GREATEST IN III CORPS AND IN NORTHERN I CORPS AND IS DEVELOPING IN THE DELTA. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT

HAS BEEN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF FIVE ENEMY REGIMENTS FROM III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE TO THE PERIPHERAL AREAS OF THE DELTA. THIS DEPLOYMENT,

THE 32 PERCENT INCREASE IN TOTAL NVA STRENGTH AND THE ENEMY'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HIS COMMAND AND CONTROL THROUGH THE FORMATION OF ONE OR MORE DIVISION-LEVEL HEADQUARTERS PORTEND THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE WAR IN THE DELTA. WHAT HAD BEEN PRIMARILY A VC EFFORT CHARACTERIZED BY SMALL UNIT ACTIONS AND GUERRILLA WARFARE MAY NOW BE DEVELOPING INTO A SITUATION THAT COULD INVOLVE LARGER UNITS.

D. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF TRENDS WHICH COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON THE ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

(1) THE ENEMY SUSTAINED HIGH COMBAT LOSSES DURING 1969 WITH APPROXIMATELY 172,000 KILLED IN ACTION, ALTHOUGH LOWER THAN HIS LOSSES

IN 1968, THEY ARE CONSIDERABLY GREATER THAN HIS COMBAT LOSSES FOR ANY OTHER PREVIOUS YEAR.

(2) A TOTAL OF 47,023 PERSONNEL RALLIED TO THE GVN DURING 1969. OF THIS TOTAL, 28,405 WERE ENEMY MILITARY, 12,648 POLITICAL AND 5,970 FELL INTO A MISCELLANEOUS GROUPING.

(3) WHILE THE INFILTRATION OF ENEMY PERSONNEL INTO SVN IS GENERALLY FOLLOWING THE NORMAL CYCLIC UPWARD PATTERN FOR THIS TIME OF THE YEAR, THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THUS FAR OF ANY SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF PERSONNEL INTO THE PIPELINE. THE TOTAL RATE IN 1969 OF APPROXIMATELY 100,000 WAS LOWER THAN 1968 BUT HIGHER THAN 1966 AND 1967. A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF PERSONNEL INFILTRATED FROM NVN HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE COSVN AREA.

(4) IN CONTRAST TO THE DECLINE IN ENEMY STRENGTH SINCE 1 JANUARY 1969, THE NUMBER OF ENEMY MANEUVER AND COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS INCREASED BY 66 BATTALIONS, REFLECTING THE ENEMY'S DETERMINATION TO IMPROVE HIS FORCE STRUCTURE IN A MANNER WHICH ENHANCES HIS CAPABILITY FOR CONDUCTING SMALL UNIT ATTACKS. THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF HIS SAPPER/RECON BATTALIONS, A TREND WHICH SUGGESTS AN EMPHASIS ON THIS TYPE OF OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY. DESPITE THIS INCREASE IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ENEMY BATTALIONS, THE MANNING LEVELS OF MANY UNITS ARE LOW.

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T O P S E C R E T NOFORN SENSITIVE EYES ONLY ADDRESSEES  
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(5) THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INDICATOR AT THIS TIME OF THE ENEMY'S INTENTIONS IS THE SHARP INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF HIS LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES. THE ENEMY HAS INITIATED A MAJOR RESUPPLY PROGRAM IN THE LAOS PANHANDLE AND ACTIVITY IN THIS AREA IS GREATER THAN THAT OBSERVED AT THIS TIME LAST YEAR.

(A) A DETERMINED EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO RESTORE, IMPROVE AND PROTECT ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN LAOS. NEW ROAD CONSTRUCTION IN SOUTHERN NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS AND THE SHARP INCREASE IN VEHICLE DETECTIONS SINCE NOVEMBER 1969 INDICATES THE EXTENT OF THIS RESUPPLY EFFORT. THE SENSOR DETECTIONS THUS FAR IN JANUARY INDICATE THAT THIS TREND IS CONTINUING. FURTHER, THE INTRODUCTION OF 100MM AAA GUNS ALONG THE LOCS IN LAOS, AS WELL AS THE CONFIRMED PRESENCE OF SAM MISSILE SITES NEAR THE BAN KARAI AND MU GIA PASSES INDICATES THE ENEMY'S INTENT TO NOT ONLY IMPROVE HIS LOGISTICAL SYSTEM BUT PROTECT IT AS WELL.

(B) THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO IMPORT A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF WAR MATERIAL. VEHICLE IMPORTS INCREASED BY 1600 OVER 1968 AND NVN CONTINUES TO REQUEST AND RECEIVE SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF POL. RECENT REPORTS INDICATE THAT THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE IN 1970.

(C) THE ENEMY'S WAR EFFORT IN THE COSVN AREA OF THE REPUBLIC HAS BEEN AIDED BY THE RESUMPTION OF LARGE SCALE CAMBODIAN MUNITIONS SHIPMENTS TO THE VIET CONG. SINCE MID-NOVEMBER AS MUCH AS 3,000 TONS OF MUNITIONS MAY HAVE BEEN TRANSPORTED TO SANCTUARIES ALONG THE BORDER AREA. SHIPMENTS OF RICE TOTALING APPROXIMATELY 2,000 TONS WERE REPORTEDLY DELIVERED DURING DECEMBER 1969. THESE SHIPMENTS ARE BY FAR THE LARGEST REPORTED SINCE SIHANOUK EASED HIS EMBARGO ON COMMUNIST SUPPLY TRAFFIC LAST SEPTEMBER.

(6) A DECIDED SHIFT IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY EFFORT OCCURRED DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF 1969. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE GREATEST NUMBER OF ENEMY ATTACKS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES AND TO A LESSER EXTENT ARVN FORCES THAN COMPARED TO THE FIRST HALF OF 1969 WHEN THESE FORCES BORE THE BRUNT OF THE ENEMY EFFORT.

E. ALL INDICATIONS CONTINUE TO UNDERSCORE THE ENEMY'S INTENTION TO INCREASE MILITARY ACTIVITY DURING THE REMAINDER OF HIS CURRENT WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN. ALTHOUGH A LIMITED UPSURGE IN OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY COULD TAKE PLACE AT ANY TIME, PRESENT INDICATORS SUGGEST THAT ENEMY ACTIVITY WILL NOT BE COORDINATED COUNTRY WIDE BUT WILL OCCUR IN THE MILITARY REGIONS AS ENEMY UNITS REACH THEIR REQUIRED STATE OF READINESS. THE ENEMY MAY BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE HIS RELIANCE ON ATTACKS BY FIRE AND SMALL UNIT ATTACKS DESIGNED TO INFLICT MAXIMUM ALLIED CASUALTIES, DISRUPT RVNAF MODERNIZATION AND IMPEDE THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THIS WILL BE COMBINED WITH ATTEMPTS TO WEAKEN THE GVN AND ESTABLISH A BROAD BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THE PRG.

## 7. (TS/NF) ALLIED SITUATION.

## A. PACIFICATION.

(1) THE 1970 PACIFICATION PROGRAM AIMS AT CONSOLIDATING 1969 GAINS, AND WITH THE CONTINUED HIGH PRIORITY GIVEN THE PROGRAM BY PRESIDENT THIEU, THERE IS EVERY EXPECTATION THAT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF PACIFICATION WILL BE MAINTAINED. INCREASED TRADE AND TRAFFIC BETWEEN COUNTRY AND TOWN, AND REOCCUPATION OF MANY ABANDONED AREAS BY FORMER REFUGEES ALL MARK THE DECLINE OF THE VIET CONG AUTHORITY AND WIDER PRESENCE OF THE GVN. FOR THE FUTURE, THE GVN LOOKS TO CONSOLIDATING AND STRENGTHENING PACIFICATION AND MOVING OUT ON DEVELOPMENT, A DIFFERENT THRUST THAN 1969'S EXPANSION. THE GVN GOAL OF PROVIDING EFFECTIVE SECURITY FOR 100 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION AND COMPLETE SECURITY FOR 90 PERCENT IS AMBITIOUS, AND ITS ACHIEVEMENT IN 1970 WILL BE DIFFICULT. ON THE DEVELOPMENT SIDE, 1969 WITNESSED A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTED GOVERNMENTS WITH REAL POWER OVER LOCAL AFFAIRS IN THE VILLAGES AND HAMLETS. THE GOAL IS TO EXTEND THIS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND TO INCREASE THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE PROVINCES AS WELL.

( ) CHIEU HOI. ALTHOUGH THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM HAS EXPERIENCED A HIGH DEGREE OF SUCCESS, THE NUMBER OF RALLIERS HAS DECREASED SHARPLY DURING THE LAST MONTH, IN PART PROBABLY AS A RESULT OF LESS EXPANSION OF SECURITY INTO THE LAST AREAS OF ENEMY STRENGTH AND THE NEW AWARENESS

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 OF THE ENEMY OF THE IMPORTANCE OF ARRESTING THE PROGRESS OF  
 THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM.

(3) INFORMATION. THE INFORMATION PROGRAM, URGENTLY  
 NEEDED TO SUPPORT POLITICAL MOBILIZATION, CONTINUES TO BE  
 OVERLY MECHANICAL AND HAS NOT BEEN INFECTED WITH THE DYNAM-  
 ISM WHICH CAUGHT MUCH OF THE REST OF THE PACIFICATION  
 PROGRAM. IT HAS NOT REALLY REACHED THE PEOPLE WHO COUNT -  
 THE UNCOMMITTED PEASANTS AND WORKERS TO WHOM THE VC HAS  
 SOME DEGREE OF POTENTIAL APPEAL. RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR  
 A MASSIVE INDOCTRINATION EFFORT, THE GVN ESTABLISHED A  
 POLITICAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND

IN EACH PROVINCE LATE IN 1969. THESE COMMITTEES WILL SEEK

TO PREPARE ALL GVN PERSONNEL FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE  
 PROGRAM AND TO ENGAGE THE PSDF, AND PRIVATE GROUPS IN THE  
 CAMPAIGN. THE GVN HOPES TO USE "FACE-TO-FACE" TECHNIQUES  
 TO REACH THE ENTIRE POPULATION ON A PERSONAL BASIS. WE  
 WILL HAVE TO SEE HOW THIS WORKS OUT.

(4) PHOENIX. THE PHOENIX PROGRAM, WHICH NEUTRA-  
 LIZED 10,534 A AND B VCI IN 1969, IS STILL NOT EFFECTIVE  
 AGAINST AN APPARATUS WITH YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN COVERT  
 OPERATIONS. LACK OF ACCEPTANCE AND INITIATIVE ON THE PART

OF SOME VIETNAMESE IN THE PROGRAM CONTINUES TO BE A PROB-

LEM AS WELL AS IMPROVEMENT IN THE LEGAL AND PENAL MACHINERY,  
 A VITAL ELEMENT OF THIS PROGRAM. THE PHOENIX INFORMATION  
 PROGRAM INITIATED ON 1 OCTOBER 1969 IS DESIGNED TO INFORM

THE PEOPLE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIVITIES AND EFFORTS TO

PROTECT THEM FROM THE THREAT OF THE VCI WHO MANAGE AND,  
 IN EFFECT, COMMAND THE VC TERRORISTS. THEIR ASSISTANCE IS  
 SOLICITED IN OBTAINING INFORMATION ON MEMBERS OF THE VCI.

ALTHOUGH INITIAL RESULTS ARE ENCOURAGING, THERE IS STILL  
 MUCH LEFT TO BE DONE. TERRORISM CONTINUED AT A HIGH  
 LEVEL DURING 1969, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF ACTS AND INCIDENTS  
 DURING THE PERIOD JULY THROUGH DECEMBER DECREASED BY MORE  
 THAN 8,000 FROM THE JANUARY TO JUNE TOTAL OF MORE THAN  
 23,000 - A 37.3 PER CENT REDUCTION.

(5) REFUGEES. REFUGEE OPERATIONS IN 1969 REDUCED  
 THE ACTIVE CASE-LOAD OF REFUGEES FROM 1.4 MILLION IN  
 FEBRUARY TO AROUND 250,000 AT END OF DECEMBER. THE  
 EMPHASIS IN 1970 WILL BE ON RETURNING PEOPLE TO THEIR  
 VILLAGES AND ON ACCOMPLISHING IT IN SUCH A MANNER THAT  
 RETURNERS WILL BE SELF-SUPPORTING, SELF-GOVERNING AND  
 PROGRESSIVE.

16-48

(6) RURAL ECONOMY. DESPITE THE SEVERE ECONOMIC THREATS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT RESURGENCE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE,

PRIMARILY DUE TO IMPROVED SECURITY, TO A GOOD RICE CROP, AND TO THE PROVINCIAL ROADS AND BRIDGES PROGRAM. IN 1969 THERE WERE 161 KILOMETERS OF NEW ROADS BUILT AND 348 REPAIRED, 2400 METERS OF NEW BRIDGING CONSTRUCTED AND 1300 METERS REPAIRED. THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM HAS TREMENDOUS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POTENTIAL, BUT IS, AS YET, ESSENTIALLY UNREALIZED, DESPITE DISTRIBUTION OF MORE LAND IN 1969 THAN IN THE PREVIOUS SEVEN YEARS.

B. OVERALL APPRAISAL OF SVN FORCES.

(1) GENERAL. THE RVNAF IN GENERAL CONTINUES TO SHOW IMPROVEMENT IN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, INCREASED CON-

FIDENCE IN ITS OWN ABILITY, AND IMPROVED FLEXIBILITY IN COMBAT OPERATIONS, BUT SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES STILL HAMPER ITS OVERALL PERFORMANCE. THE PROPORTION OF TIME DEVOTED TO COMBAT OPERATIONS HAS DOUBLED SINCE EARLY 1968 TO A HIGH OF 50 PER CENT AT END 1969. THE ARVN/VNMC MANEUVER BATTALION KILL RATIO IN THE 4TH QUARTER OF CALENDAR YEAR 1969 SHOWED AN INCREASE FROM THE THIRD QUARTER AND REACHED A YEARLY HIGH OF 4.5 TO 1. THE ENEMY ELIMINATED PER MONTH, INCLUDING KILLED, CAPTURED AND SURRENDERED REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT DURING EARLY 1969, DECLINING SLIGHTLY DURING THE LAST HALF OF THE YEAR. THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF ARVN AND VNMC MANEUVER BATTALIONS HAS CONTINUED TO IMPROVE SINCE 1968. A COMPARISON OF COMBAT POWER AVAILABLE AND THE MONTHLY AVERAGE OF OPERATIONAL RESULTS ACHIEVED BETWEEN

THE BEGINNING AND END OF 1969 CLEARLY REFLECTS VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR EFFORT AND THE IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF. ARVN COMBAT POWER INCREASED FROM 24 TO 26 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL, BUT ITS SHARE OF RESULTS INCREASED FROM 18 TO 31 PERCENT. SIMILARLY, THE COMBAT POWER OF THE TERRITORIAL FORCES INCREASED FROM 39 TO 41 PERCENT, WHILE THEIR SHARE OF THE

RESULTS DOUBLED FROM 5 TO 10 PERCENT. US RESULTS DROPPED FROM 70 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL TO 44 PERCENT, ALTHOUGH US COMBAT POWER DECREASED ONLY FROM 31 TO 26 PERCENT.

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TOP SECRET NOFORN SENSITIVE SECTION FIVE OF FOURTEEN EYES  
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THE EXPANSION OF THE RVNAF DURING THE PAST 18 MONTHS HAS PROVIDED  
FOR A CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN COMBAT CAPABILITY AND SOME  
ROUNDING-OUT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT,

WHICH HAS RESULTED IN A MARKED INCREASE IN UNILATERAL  
OPERATIONS AND THE ASSUMPTION BY RVNAF OF A GREATER SHARE  
OF THE WAR BURDEN. HOWEVER, RAPID EXPANSION HAS FURTHER  
DILUTED THE ALREADY-SHORT LEADERSHIP AND TECHNICAL SKILLS  
AND HAS MILITATED AGAINST THE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT  
REQUIRED FOR MAXIMUM COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. CONTINUED  
EMPHASIS IS NEEDED ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT THROUGH  
IMPROVED LEADERSHIP AND ADDITIONAL TRAINING OF THE PRESENT  
FORCE. MANY UNITS CONTINUE TO BE UNDERSTRENGTH. UNITS  
MUST BE BROUGHT TO AUTHORIZED STRENGTH TO PERMIT BETTER  
USE OF ASSIGNED EQUIPMENT, DESERTIONS MUST BE REDUCED  
AND BASE FACILITIES MUST BE IMPROVED.

(2) ARVN. THE CAPABILITIES OF ARVN HAVE BEEN  
INCREASED PRIMARILY IN THE COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT AREAS,  
AND ADDITIONAL INCREASES ARE PLANNED IN COMBAT SERVICE  
SUPPORT ELEMENTS TO IMPROVE ARVN SELF-SUFFICIENCY. HOWEVER,  
STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES WILL STILL EXIST EVEN WHEN THE  
PRESENTLY APPROVED EXPANSION PROGRAM IS COMPLETE. ARVN  
WILL BE DEFICIENT IN ARTILLERY ASSETS, BOTH IN LONG-RANGE  
WEAPONS FOR DEFENSE OF THE DMZ AND IN MEDIUM AND LIGHT

WEAPONS IN SUPPORT OF BOTH ITSELF AND THE TERRITORIAL  
FORCES. TO MAKE UP SHORTFALLS IN VNAF TACTICAL AIRLIFT  
AND HELICOPTER CAPABILITY, ARVN MAY REQUIRE ADDITIONAL  
GROUND MOBILITY. A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF ARVN OPERATIONS

IS PRESENTED AT PARAGRAPH 7C BELOW.

(3) VNN. SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE ACTOV PROGRAM  
IN OCTOBER 1968 THE VIETNAMESE NAVY HAS EXPANDED  
FROM 17,500 PERSONNEL TO A TOTAL OF 32,781 AT THE END  
OF DECEMBER 1969. APPROXIMATELY 1/3 OF THE U.S. SMALL  
COMBATANT CRAFT HAS BEEN TURNED OVER TO THE VNN TO INCLUDE  
1/2 OF THE ARMORED RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT. ALL TURNSOVERS  
WERE ON SCHEDULE, AND VNN MANNING WAS WELL ABOVE THE  
ORIGINAL PLAN. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE VNN DURING COMBINED  
RIVER INTERDICTION OPERATIONS HAS BEEN EXCELLENT, AND  
UNILATERAL OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORY, WITH AN  
OVERALL UPWARD TREND TOWARD EXCELLENCE. THE VNN PRESENTLY  
PERFORMS APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF INNER BARRIER COASTAL  
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS, ASSUMING NO SIGNIFICANT SETBACKS  
IN TURNSOVER SCHEDULES, 100 PERCENT OF INNER BARRIER OP-

OPERATIONS SHOULD BE VIETNAMESE BY END FY 71. APPROXIMATELY 51 PERCENT OF THE NAVAL INTERDICTION OF ENEMY INFILTRATION AND COMMUNICATIONS/LIAISON ROUTES IS CURRENTLY BEING PERFORMED BY THE VNN, AND IT IS POSSIBLE TO INCREASE THIS TO 100 PERCENT BY JANUARY 1971. THE VNN, WITH ADVISORY ASSISTANCE, WILL BE CAPABLE OF ASSUMING ALL WATERBORN COMBAT MISSIONS EXCEPT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE BY JANUARY 1971. VNN EXPANSION IS CONSIDERED TO BE PROGRESSING VERY WELL.

THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN THE AREAS OF LOGISTICS, LEADERSHIP, COMMUNICATIONS AND PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION VERY SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE OTHER SERVICES, BUT NONE IS CONSIDERED TO BE INSURMOUNTABLE.

(4) VNAF. THE PAST OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF VNAF HAS BEEN EXCELLENT IN ALL EXCEPT FORWARD AIR CONTROL AND LIAISON IN II CTZ. WITHIN IV CTZ, VIETNAMIZATION OF THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IS PROGRESSING AHEAD OF SCHEDULE. VNAF WILL ASSUME TOTAL CONTROL OF THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IN IV CORPS BY JUNE 1970, AND WILL OPERATE THE COUNTRY-WIDE SYSTEM BY THE END OF 1971. THE

PRESENT CAPABILITY OF THE VNAF SQUADRONS IS GENERALLY COMPARABLE TO USAF ORGANIZATIONS FOR DAYLIGHT VFR OPERATIONS. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE NIGHT OR IFR TRAINING FOR VNAF AIRCREWS. THE CAPABILITIES OF HELICOPTER UNITS WILL BE EXPANDED SIGNIFICANTLY WHEN GUNSHIPS ARE MADE AVAILABLE IN 1970 TO SUPPORT AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS. THE IMMEDIATE POTENTIAL OF VNAF OPERATIONS IS LIMITED BY THE AVAILABILITY AND READINESS OF AIRFRAMES. ESTIMATES OF UP TO A 30 PERCENT INCREASE IN SORTIES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH AN INCREASE IN MAINTENANCE MANNING, SUPPLY SUPPORT AND EXPERIENCE. AS EXPERIENCED CADRES ARE REMOVED FOR PRESENT

OPERATIONAL SQUADRONS TO FORM NEW SQUADRONS, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES WILL BE DEGRADED. THIS DEGRADATION WILL REMAIN UNTIL THE NEWLY TRAINED PERSONNEL HAVE GAINED THE NECESSARY EXPERIENCE. SIGNIFICANTLY, VNAF UNITS THAT CONVERTED TO NEW AIRCRAFT IN THE PAST YEAR BECAME OPERATIONALLY READY PRIOR TO PROGRAMMED DATES.

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TOP SECRET NOFORN SENSITIVE SECTION SIX OF FOURTEEN  
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 PROVIDED THERE IS NO SLIPPAGE  
 IN TRAINING OR RECEIPT OF ASSETS, THE VNAF IS CAPABLE

OF EXPANDING THE PRESENT FORCE TO THE PROGRAMMED 40  
 SQUADRONS AND BECOMING AN EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION. CURRENT  
 STRENGTHS IN THE VNAF ARE THAT THEY HAVE THE  
 ABILITY TO LEARN, ARE LOYAL TO THE VNAF AND GVN, HAVE  
 A MOTIVATION FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND POSSESS A HARD  
 CORE OF EXPERIENCED PROFESSIONALS. THE PRIMARY WEAKNESSES  
 EVIDENT IN THE VNAF ARE THOSE OF LACK OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT,  
 LACK OF SKILLED PERSONNEL IN TECHNICAL AREAS AND

CONCENTRATION OF DECISION-MAKING AT VNAF HEADQUARTERS.  
 (5) VNMC. THE VNMC IS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE AND  
 OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE; HOWEVER, AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE

HEADQUARTERS AND MORE ENGINEER SUPPORT WOULD INCREASE  
 ITS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY.

(6) TERRITORIAL FORCES. THE RF AND PF HAVE  
 DEMONSTRATED A STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR ABILITY TO

PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SECURITY FOR THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH  
 VIETNAM. DURING 1969 THERE WAS A STEADY INCREASE IN  
 THE RF/PF FORCE STRUCTURE, WHICH HAS DEVELOPED A MUCH  
 GREATER DENSITY AND AREA COVERAGE CAPABILITY. MODERNIZATION  
 OF EQUIPMENT AND MOTIVATION OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY  
 HAVE MATERIALLY ASSISTED IN MATURING THE TERRITORIAL

FORCES. IT IS PROJECTED THAT BY 1 JULY 1970 THE RF/PF

STRUCTURE WILL CONSIST OF 1,603 RF RIFLE COMPANIES AND  
 6,531 PF PLATOONS, INCLUDING COMBAT SUPPORT, COMBAT  
 SERVICE SUPPORT AND HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL, THE TOTAL  
 AUTHORIZED SPACES AT END FY 70 WILL BE 275,670 RF AND  
 239,390 PF. GREATER EFFORT MUST BE PLACED ON REALLOCATION

AND REDISTRIBUTION OF FORCES TO KEEP PACE WITH  
 CHANGES IN TERRITORIAL SECURITY AND THE REDEPLOYMENT OF  
 REGULAR FORCES. KILL RATIOS FOR RF IN 1969 HAVE FLUCTUATED  
 BETWEEN 4.1 TO 1 AND 5.1 TO 1, WHILE THOSE OF PF  
 HAVE FLUCTUATED BETWEEN 3.5 TO 1 AND 3.9 TO 1. THE  
 NUMBER OF DAY AND NIGHT OPERATIONS INCREASED IN 1969 BY  
 24 PERCENT FOR RF AND 26 PERCENT FOR PF. CURRENT WEAKNESSES  
 IN TERRITORIAL OPERATIONS CAN BEST BE OVERCOME BY MORE

AGGRESSIVENESS ON THE PART OF UNIT LEADERS, TOGETHER WITH INCREASED AND MORE EFFECTIVE TRAINING.

(7) PARAMILITARY FORCES. OVERALL, THE PARAMILITARY FORCES ARE MAKING A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE EXPANSION OF GVN PRESENCE AND TO POPULATION

SECURITY. WHEN PERFORMING THE SPECIFIC ROLES FOR

WHICH ORGANIZED, EACH FORCE WAS SUCCESSFUL IN 1969. MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCE AND THE NATIONAL POLICE, SHOW CONTINUED STRUCTURAL IMPROVEMENTS. SOME FORCES STILL HAVE QUALITATIVE WEAKNESSES IN THE AREAS OF LEADERSHIP, TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT, BUT THESE ARE TARGETED FOR SPECIFIC ATTENTION IN 1970. AN APPRAISAL OF INDIVIDUAL PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IS AT PARAGRAPH 8, BELOW.

C. SITUATION BY CORPS TACTICAL ZONES.

(1) I CTZ. PACIFICATION PROGRESS CONTINUES AT A SLOW PACE THROUGHOUT I CTZ. THE COASTAL PLAINS AREA IS LARGELY PACIFIED, AND ARVN FORCES ARE CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS IN THE PIEDMONT AND MOUNTAINOUS AREAS TO THE WEST. THE THREE PROVINCES OF SOUTHERN I CTZ CONTINUE TO BE A SECURITY PROBLEM. IN EARLY JANUARY 1970 THERE WAS AN INCREASE OF COMBAT ACTIVITY IN QUANG NAM AND QUANG TIN PROVINCES BUT IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO TELL IF IT IS TARGETED AGAINST THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. DURING CY 69, THE AGGREGATE OPERATIONAL RESULTS ACHIEVED BY I CTZ ORGANIZATIONS WERE CONSISTENTLY BETTER THAN THOSE ATTAINED BY THE ARVN FORCES IN THE OTHER CORPS AREAS. THE 1ST DIV, WHICH HAS THE REPUTATION OF BEING ONE OF ARVN'S BEST, PERFORMED WELL DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD. IT SPENT MORE TIME ON COMBAT OPERATIONS THAN ANY OTHER ARVN ORGANIZATION; THE NUMBER OF ENEMY KIA ACHIEVED WAS ABOVE THE ARVN AVERAGE, AND ITS KILL RATIO DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS WAS A VERY IMPRESSIVE 9.8 TO 1. EVEN MORE ENCOURAGING THAN THE CONTINUED GOOD PERFORMANCE OF THE 1ST DIV, WAS THE MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN THE 2D DIV. THIS DIVISION WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A PROBLEM UNIT IN EARLY 1968; YET, IN 1969 IT WAS ONE OF ARVN'S BEST PERFORMERS. THE NUMBER OF ENEMY KILLS ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE 2D DIVISION WAS HIGHEST AMONG ALL ARVN ORGANIZATIONS WHILE ITS KILL RATIO WAS WELL ABOVE THE ARVN AVERAGE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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16-7 #13

0280305Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON  
 TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
 ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC HAWAII

ZEM

TOP SECRET NOFORN SENSITIVE EYES ONLY ADDRESSEES  
 SECTION SEVEN OF FOURTEEN MAC 1285 EYES ONLY  
 IN ADDITION, AFTER RECEIVING THE LOWEST ADVISOR ASSES-  
 SEMENT OF OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN-COUNTRY FOR 3D  
 QUARTER CY 68, THE 2D DIVISION'S RATING HAS INCREASED IN  
 EACH SUCCEEDING QUARTER TO BECOME ARVN'S SECOND BEST A  
 YEAR LATER. THE NEW ARMORED BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS HAS  
 ALREADY ENGAGED IN TWO SUCCESSFUL COMBAT OPERATIONS. IN  
 THE SECOND OPERATION, IN DECEMBER, THE HEADQUARTERS CON-  
 TROLLED SIX MANEUVER BATTALIONS INCLUDING ARMORED, INFAN-  
 TRY AND RANGER ELEMENTS IN A SERIES OF RELATIVELY HEAVY  
 CONTACTS. AS FOR PROBLEMS, THERE WAS A DOWN-TREND IN

THE RESULTS ATTAINED BY THE 51ST REGIMENT. THIS TREND  
 IS PROBABLY DUE MORE TO UNDER-EMPLOYMENT THAN TO ANY  
 DETERIORATION IN UNIT CAPABILITY. THE PERCENT OF TIME

DEVOTED TO COMBAT OPERATIONS DECLINED SHARPLY DURING THE  
 LATTER PART OF THE YEAR, DROPPING TO LESS THAN 25 PERCENT  
 IN 4TH QUARTER. ALSO OF CONCERN ARE THE HIGH DESERTION  
 RATES IN BOTH THE 51ST REGIMENT AND THE 2D DIVISION.  
 INDICATORS OF RF/PF UNITEFFECTIVENESS SHOW CONTINUED

IMPROVEMENT IN I CORPS. THE REDUCTION IN WEAPONS LOST,  
 HIGH KILL RATIOS AND LOW DESERTION RATES REFLECT THE  
 AGGRESSIVENESS, MORALE AND UNITY OF THE RF/PF COMMAND IN

I CORPS.

(2) II CTZ. THE GENERAL ENVIRONMENT IN II CTZ  
 IS MUCH THE SAME AS THAT OF I CTZ AND THERE HAS BEEN AN  
 SLOW BUT STEADY OVERALL INCREASE IN SECURITY. THIS IS  
 PARTIALLY DUE TO A SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN ENEMY-  
 INITIATED ACTIVITY IN MOST OF THE PROVINCES; BINH DINH,

HOWEVER, REMAINS A PROBLEM. FURTHER PROGRESS, AS MEASURED  
 BY THE HES, WILL BE SLOW, AS THE MAJORITY OF THE POPU-  
 LATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED SECURITY AND FUTURE OPERATIONS  
 WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE SMALL  
 POPULATION POCKETS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE VAST EXPANSES  
 OF THE CTZ AREA. THERE HAS BEEN A SLIGHT REGRESSION IN  
 THE SECURITY SITUATION IN PHU YEN AND NINH THUAN PROVINCES  
 DUE TO AN UPSURGE IN ENEMY-INITIATED ACTIVITY. REPORTS  
 INDICATE INCREASED ENEMY MOVEMENT BOTH INTO AND WITHIN  
 BINH DINH AND PHU BON. THE PRESENT RELATIVELY FAVORABLE

MILITARY SITUATION CONTINUES TO PROVIDE STABILITY FOR  
 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT. THE MAJORITY OF II CTZ  
 ARVN UNITS WERE COMMITTED TO PACIFICATION MISSIONS DURING  
 THE LATTER PART OF 1969, WITH SOME SHORT TERM COMBAT OP-

16-#14

ENGAGEMENTS CONDUCTED ON THE EDGES OF POPULATED A  
 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WERE MADE WITH NVA UNITS AROUND BU  
 PRANG/DUC LAP BY THE 23D DIVISION AND ATTACHED ELEMENTS  
 OF THE 22D DIVISION DURING THE PERIOD OCTOBER-DECEMBER  
 1969. DURING A SERIES OF SHARP GROUND ATTACKS THE ARVN  
 FORCES OBTAINED GOOD RESULTS, WITH THE ENEMY FORCES  
 WITHDRAWING BY THE END OF THE QUARTER WITHOUT ACHIEVING  
 ANY SIGNIFICANT OBJECTIVES. BY THIS EXPERIENCE, THE  
 23D DIVISION CAME INTO ITS OWN. NEVERTHELESS, DURING  
 THESE ENGAGEMENTS THE AGGRESSIVENESS AND OVERALL OP-  
 ERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF SOME UNITS WAS REPORTED BY  
 ADVISORS AS UNSATISFACTORY. THE 22D DIVISIONS CAPA-  
 BILITIES IN COMBAT ARE LARGELY UNKNOWN. IT HAS BEEN

EMPLOYED PRIMARILY IN PACIFICATION MISSIONS ALONG THE  
 COAST, AND HAS NOT BEEN COMBAT TESTED. FURTHER, IT  
 DOES NOT ENJOY A HIGH ADVISOR ASSESSMENT. THE 42D  
 REGIMENT, WHICH HAD A HIGH OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS  
 ASSESSMENT DURING EARLY 1969, DROPPED TO A VERY LOW

ASSESSMENT IN THE SPRING FOLLOWING THE DAK TO/BEN RET  
 OPERATIONS. THIS REGIMENT ACHIEVED POOR RESULTS DUR-  
 ING THE LAST OF 1969. RF AND PF ORGANIZATION IN TERMS  
 OF ASSIGNED STRENGTHS AND LOWERED DESERTION RATES WAS  
 DEMONSTRATED CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT DURING 1969,  
 BUT THEIR PERFORMANCE CONTINUES TO BE IT POOREST IN

THE COUNTRY. STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF RF/PF IN II  
 CORPS HAS SHOWN LITTLE IMPROVEMENT IN OPERATIONAL  
 PERFORMANCE DUE PRIMARILY TO THE LIMITED CONTACTS WITH  
 ENEMY FORCES AND UNIT INACTIVITY.

GP-4

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TOP SECRET

NRN

16-#15

0 280305Z Z YH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC HAWAII  
ZEM

TOP SECRET NOFORN SENSITIVE SECTION EIGHT OF FOURTEEN  
EYES ONLY ADDRESSEES MAC 1285 EYES ONLY

(3) III CTZ. THE SITUATION IN III CTZ IS ONE IN WHICH TERRITORIAL FORCES ARE ASSUMING THE DOMINANT ROLE IN MAJOR POPULATION AREAS SUCH AS CND, WHILE ARVN UNITS MOVE OUT TOWARD THE BORDER AREAS TO COUNTER ENEMY MAIN STRENGTH. WITH MORE THAN 98 PERCENT OF ITS POPULATION LIVING IN AREAS OF A, B, OR C NEAR SECURITY, III CTZ CONTINUES TO SHOW IMPROVEMENT IN PACIFICATION. HOWEVER, HAU NGHIA CONTINUES TO BE A PROBLEM AREA AND LONG AN HAS A LONG WAY TO GO. THE RECENT INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY IN III CTZ APPEARS TO BE MAINLY DIRECTED TOWARD THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THERE ARE SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT IN III CTZ ARVN UNITS. WHILE TOTAL NUMBER OF ENEMY KIA ACHIEVED BY THE MAJOR III CTZ ORGANIZATIONS (5TH, 18TH AND 25TH DIVISIONS) VARIED WITH THE LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY, THE KILL RATIO IMPROVED IN EACH SUCCEEDING QUARTER OF CY 69, RISING FROM 3.8 TO 1 DURING 1ST QUARTER TO 7.7 TO 1 IN 4TH QUARTER. THE 5TH DIVISION STILL REMAINS ONE OF THE LOWEST IN COUNTRY IN OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND OVERALL RESULTS, EVEN THOUGH A HIGH KILL RATIO WAS ACHIEVED IN THE 4TH QUARTER. TWO BATTALION COMMANDERS WERE RECENTLY REPLACED AND LEADERSHIP IS IMPROVING, ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL WEAKNESS AT LOW LEVELS. THE 18TH DIVISION HAS SHOWN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, PARTICULARLY IN THE 3D QUARTER OF THE YEAR WHEN BOTH ITS ASSESSMENT AND RESULTS WERE ABOVE AVERAGE, BUT IN THE 4TH QUARTER BOTH DECLINED. THIS DIVISION HAS A RELATIVELY NEW DIVISION COMMANDER AND DURING THE LAST QUARTER FOUR BATTALION COMMANDERS WERE REPLACED. THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT OF THE 25TH DIVISION IMPROVED THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. WHILE OPERATIONAL RESULTS WERE LOW EARLY IN THE YEAR, DURING THE PAST TWO QUARTERS THEY IMPROVED AND WERE ABOVE THE COUNTRY AVERAGE. AS FOR DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT, THE NUMBER OF BATTALIONS INVOLVED IN PACIFICATION SUPPORT DECREASED SHARPLY TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR WITH A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN THE PERCENT OF TIME SPENT ON COMBAT OPERATIONS. WHILE THERE ARE SOME INDICATORS OF IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS, NONE OF THESE DIVISIONS HAS YET FACED THE TEST OF MAJOR COMBAT ON ITS OWN. THE AIRBORNE DIVISION, WHICH HISTORICALLY HAS BEEN REQUIRED TO HAVE A LARGE PORTION OF ITS FORCE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO SAIGON, BEGAN OPERATING ALONG THE III CTZ CAMBODIAN BORDER IN DECEMBER 1969 WITH SIX OF ITS NINE BATTALIONS. INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE DIVISION HAS ENJOYED GOOD SUCCESS IN AIRBORNE TACTICS UNDER THE INTELIGENCE OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION. VNN PERFORMANCE IN III CTZ HAS

BEEN EXCELLENT. PORTIONS OF "GIANT SLINGSHOT", A COMBINED INTERDICTION OPERATION, HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO VNN. ANOTHER COMBINED OPERATION, "READY DECK", ON THE UPPER SAIGON RIVER, HAS RESULTED IN 500 VC KIA DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS. ALL FACETS OF RF/PF ORGANIZATION IN III CTZ SHOWED IMPROVEMENT IN 1969. THE PERFORMANCE OF TERRITORIAL FORCES AND THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THEMSELVES HAS RISEN. LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO BE SPOTTY, BUT MANY UNITS ARE EXPERIENCED AND COMBAT-READY.

(4) IV CORPS. THE PRESENCE OF NVA UNITS AND INCREASED NVA INFILTRATION INTO VC UNITS IN THE DELTA, ALTHOUGH AN OBVIOUS THREAT TO THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, REFLECTS IN A VERY POSITIVE WAY THE SUCCESS OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND IN PARTICULAR THAT OF THE TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES, WHICH MAKE UP 80 PERCENT OF ALL FORCES IN THE DELTA. AS IN III CTZ, THE MAIN THRUST OF ENEMY ACTIVITY APPEARS TO BE DIRECTED TOWARD THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, AS EVIDENCED BY THE TARGETING FOR ATTACK OF THE PSDF THROUGHOUT THE AREA. THE RECENT DROP IN THE NUMBER OF RALLIERS MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE ENEMY'S CONCENTRATION ON DISRUPTING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND POSSIBLE PREPARATION FOR INCREASED ACTIVITIES. THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS FROM DINH TUONG DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE PRECIPITATED A LOSS OF PACIFICATION MOMENTUM. SIMILARLY, THERE HAS AS YET BEEN NO REGRESSION IN KIEN HOA AND SECURITY THERE HAS CONTINUED ITS SLOW INCREASE. THE TIME SPENT ON COMBAT OPERATIONS BY IV CTZ UNITS INCREASED DURING THE YEAR, REACHING THE COUNTRY AVERAGE BY THE 4TH QUARTER. HELICOPTER SORTIES FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF IV CTZ UNITS HAVE BEEN HIGHER THAN ANY OTHER CTZ.

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NNNN

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TOP SECRET

16-#17

0200305Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON  
 TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
 ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC HAWAII

ZEM

TOP SECRET NOFORN SENSITIVE SECTION NINE OF FOURTEEN EYES ONLY  
 ADDRESSEES MAC 1285 EYES ONLY

THE MAJORITY OF THE HELICOPTER SORTIES ARE PROVIDED FROM U.S.  
 ASSETS, ALTHOUGH VNAF PROVIDES A HIGHER PROPORTION OF SUPPORT IN  
 IV CTZ THAN ANY OTHER CTZ. THE 7TH DIVISION HAS GENERALLY

SPENT LESS TIME ON COMBAT OPERATIONS THAN OTHER DIVISIONS.

ITS RESULTS DURING 1969 WERE BELOW AVERAGE AND ITS KILL  
 RATIO IN THE 4TH QUARTER WAS LOWEST IN THE CTZ. SINCE

THE DEPARTURE OF THE US 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION IN JULY 1969,  
 THE 7TH ARVN DIVISION HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE IMPROVED

OPERATIONAL RESULTS IN AN AREA WHERE ENEMY DENSITY IS HIGH  
 AND AVAILABILITY OF COMBAT SUPPORT HAS BEEN APPRECIABLE.

THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN NEW DIVISION COMMANDER IN EARLY 1970  
 MAY IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DIVISION, THE 21ST  
 DIVISION CONTINUES TO BE ONE OF ARVN'S BETTER PERFORMERS.  
 DURING CY 69 ITS ACTIVITIES WERE CHARACTERIZED BY LARGE-  
 SCALE SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS, AND THE RESULTS ATTAIN-

ED WERE WELL ABOVE THE ARVN AVERAGE. THE MOST ENCOURAG-  
 ING DEVELOPMENT WAS THE IMPROVEMENT IN AGGRESSIVENESS,  
 FLEXIBILITY, PROFESSIONAL SKILL, AND OPERATIONAL RESULTS  
 SHOWN BY THE 9TH DIVISION WHEN IT MOVED FROM ITS OWN  
 TACTICAL AREA IN CHUONG THIEN AND KIEN GIANG PROVINCES IN

EARLY NOVEMBER, AND AGAIN WHEN IT DEPLOYED, AFTER A BRIEF  
 STAND-DOWN INTO DINH THONG PROVINCE FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS  
 IN BASE AREA 470. ALTHOUGH THE RATIO OF FRIENDLY TO ENEMY  
 FORCES IN IV CTZ IS APPROXIMATELY 3 TO 1, RVNAF UNITS IN  
 THE 44TH SPECIAL TACTICAL ZONE ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN  
 HALTING THE INFILTRATION OF ENEMY UNITS AND SUPPLIES FROM  
 CAMBODIA. ALL DIVISIONS IN IV CTZ CONSISTENTLY EXCEEDED

THE NATIONAL AVERAGE IN DESERTIONS AND IN THE 4TH QUARTER  
 INCREASED TO THE HIGHEST FOR THE YEAR. AT PRESENT, VNN  
 AND USN BOATS ARE CONDUCTING INTERDICTION OPERATIONS  
 ALONG THE WATERWAYS ADJACENT TO THE CAMBODIAN BORDER.  
 IV CTZ CONTINGENCY PLANS HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO REINFORCE  
 THE 44TH STZ AND REPOSITION ORGANIC ASSETS WITHIN THE  
 CTZ TO INCLUDE EMPLOYMENT OF THE 9TH DIVISION AS A REACTION  
 FORCE IN THE 44TH STZ IF THE SITUATION WARRANTS. THE RF/PF  
 EFFECTIVENESS IN IV CTZ HAS SUFFERED FROM DESERTION RATES  
 THAT CONTINUE TO BE ABOVE THE NATIONAL RF AND PF AVERAGES;  
 HOWEVER, THE NUMBER OF CONTACTS PER OPERATION HAS INCREASED  
 STEADILY FOR BOTH RF AND PF IN IV CORPS.

16-#18

### 3. (T SNF) PARAMILITARY FORCES.

A. PSDF, ALTHOUGH THE FIGURES MAY BE SOFT, GVN REPORTS THAT THE PSDF FAR EXCEEDED ITS GOAL OF 2,000,000 MEMBERS ORGANIZED, AND ALSO EXCEEDED THE TRAINING GOAL OF 1.6 MILLION, BUT WITH SERIOUS QUALITY DEFICIENCIES. THE WEAPONS-ISSUED GOAL OF 400,000 WAS 99.8 PERCENT ACHIEVED. THE PSDF, AS A PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION AND MOVEMENT NOT DIRECTLY IDENTIFIED WITH RVNAF, IS BEGINNING TO DEPRIVE THE ENEMY OF HIS SUPPORT BASE. THIS POSES THE DILEMMA TO THE NVA AND VC OF HOW TO COMBAT THE PSDF WITHOUT ATTACKING THE POPULATION DIRECTLY AND THUS FURTHER ALIENATING THEM. THE 1970 PSDF IMPROVEMENT PLAN

REQUIRES EACH A, B AND C HAMLET TO ORGANIZE ONE FULLY-ARMED 35-MAN PLATOON (CALLED A "KEY INTERTEAM") FROM AMONG ITS COMBAT MEMBERS. NATIONWIDE, IT IS PLANNED TO ORGANIZE 15,000 OF THESE INTERTEAMS, WITH MORE THAN 500,000 COMBAT MEMBERS PARTICIPATING. PRESIDENT THIEN CONSIDERS THE PSDF TO BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROGRAMS

FOR 1970 AND HAS PLACED HIS PERSONAL PRESTIGE BEHIND IT.

B. NATIONAL POLICE. THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE HAS GROWN FROM 17,000 IN 1962 TO ITS PRESENT STRENGTH OF MORE THAN 86,000 AND HAS

GRADUALLY DEPLOYED FROM A PREDOMINANTLY URBAN BASE INTO THE COUNTRY-SIDE. THE PLANNED MANPOWER GOAL FOR END CALENDAR YEAR 1970 IS 122,000. FACILITIES, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT ARE GENERALLY ADEQUATE, BUT THE QUALITY OF THE PERSONNEL IS INADEQUATE. THIS IS DUE IN PART TO THE RESTRICTED RECRUITMENT BASE CAUSED BY A NATIONAL MOBILIZATION DECREE WHICH ALLOWS THE MILITARY FORCES TO ABSORB THE BETTER-QUALIFIED PERSONNEL. ADDITIONALLY, ONLY 40 PERCENT HAVE CAREER STATUS, WHILE THE REMAINDER WORK ON A DAILY HIRE BASIS. EXCEPTIONALLY RAPID EXPANSION HAS ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE WEAKNESSES OF THE FORCE, WHICH ARE LACK OF EXPERIENCE, POOR MANAGEMENT AT ALL LEVELS AND INADEQUATE TRAINING. CURRENT ADVISORY EFFORT IS DIRECTED TOWARD IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF BOTH THE EXISTING POLICE FORCE AND NEW RECRUITS.

C. PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS (PRU). THE PRU HAVE CONSTITUTED THE SINGLE MOST EFFECTIVE ANTI-VC FORCE IN THE COUNTRY.

VIETNAMIZATION BEGINNING IN MARCH 1969 RESULTED IN A DECLINE IN EFFECTIVENESS, BUT DECEMBER 69 AND JANUARY 70 TO DATE HAVE SEEN A REVERSAL OF THIS TREND. THE PRU ARE CAPABLE, IF SUPPORTED BY THE GVN AND US, OF AVERAGING 700 TO 800 VCI REDUCTIONS PER MONTH. COMPLETE VIETNAMIZATION AND INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL POLICE STRUCTURE IS TARGETED FOR JULY 1971.

D. REVOLUTIONARY CADRE (RDC). THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE RETURNED IN 1969 TO ITS ROLE OF POLITICAL CATALYST, WHILE ITS PARAMILITARY ROLE DECREASED TO SELF-PROTECTION AND TRAINING OF PSDF. THE ENEMY HAS INCREASED HIS TARGETING OF THE RDC, AND AS A RESULT, CASUALTIES ARE UP 28 PERCENT OVER 1968. HOWEVER, THE TOTAL ATTRITION RATE WAS DOWN FROM 25.5 PERCENT IN 1968 TO 15.8 PERCENT IN 1969. THE RD PROGRAM SUFFERS FROM POOR LEADERSHIP BY GROUP LEADERS AND CONTROL GROUP CHIEFS.

E. CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP (CIDG). THE CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP MANS BORDER CAMPS AND PROVIDES MOBILE STRIKE FORCES TO SUPPORT THESE CAMPS AGAINST ENEMY INCURSIONS, ITS MISSION IS TO CONDUCT BORDER SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS, COLLECT INTELLIGENCE, INTERDICT ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTES AND LOC AND TO PROVIDE POPULATION SECURITY IN REMOTE AREAS WHERE GVN CONTROL IS LIMITED OR NON-EXISTENT.

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FM SSO MACV (MG TOWNSEND C/S MACV)


TO 42500 7AF (GEN BROWN)

SSO USARV (LTG MILDREN)  
CG III MAF (LTG NICKERSON)  
COMNAVFORV (VADM ZUMWALT)

SSO I FFV (LTG CORCORAN)  
SSO II FFV (LTG EWELL)  
SSO CAN THO (MG MCCOWN)  
INFO CAS SAIGON (AMB BUNKER)  
SSO XXIV CORPS (LTG ZAIS)

025030Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC HAWAII  
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~



16-#20

## TOP SECRET NOFORN SENSITIVE SECTION TEN OF FOURTEEN

## EYES ONLY ADDRESSEES MAC 1285 EYES ONLY

BORDER CAMPS DO NOT PREVENT INFILTRATION; HOWEVER, THEIR PHYSICAL LOCATION DOES, IN MOST CASES, SERVE TO DENY FREE ACCESS TO THE ENEMY OF THE ROUTES ALONG WHICH THEY ARE SITUATED. THE CIDG MISSION IS NOW BEING FULLY VIETNAMIZED, AND THE NUMBER OF

BASES IS CURRENTLY BEING REDUCED FROM 51 TO 38 BY 30 JUNE 1970-PRINCIPALLY INTERIOR CAMPS BEING CONVERTED TO RF. THE DISPOSITION OF PERSONNEL SPACES AS THE CIDG PHASES DOWN

AND REASSIGNMENT OF THE BORDER CONTROL MISSION ARE SUBJECTS OF CURRENT MACV/JCS STUDY. US INVOLVEMENT WITH CIDG IS TARGETED TO CEASE BY END CY 70.

9. (TS/NF) PERSONNEL. PROBLEMS EVOLVING FROM QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE PERSONNEL SHORTFALLS CONTINUE TO IMPAIR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF. DESPITE OVERALL STRENGTH INCREASES, VERY LITTLE IMPROVEMENT HAS BEEN NOTED IN THE UNDER-STRENGTH CONDITION OF ARVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS. DESERTIONS CONTINUE TO BE A MAJOR PERSONNEL PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF DESERTERS, AS WELL AS THE DESERTION RATE, IS LOWER IN 1969 THAN IT WAS IN 1968. THERE WERE 139,670

RVNAF DESERTIONS DURING 1968, WITH AN AVERAGE DESERTION RATE PER THOUSAND PERSONNEL ASSIGNED OF 15.4, AS COMPARED TO 1969, WHICH HAD, AS OF 30 NOVEMBER, 112,937 DESERTIONS, WITH A RATE PER THOUSAND OF 11.6. THIS DRAIN OF MANPOWER INCREASES THE EFFORT REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT FORCE LEVEL. ALTHOUGH ARVN EFFECTIVENESS SHOULD CONTINUE TO SHOW

STEADY IMPROVEMENT, THE CHRONIC SHORTAGE OF COMPETENT LEADERS WILL CONSTRAIN THE RATE OF PROGRESS. THIS DEFICIENCY REVEALS ITSELF IN MANY WAYS, THE MOST SERIOUS OF WHICH IS THE LACK OF AGGRESSIVENESS DISPLAYED BY SOME ORGANIZATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING 3D QUARTER CALENDAR YEAR 1969, THE ADVISORS TO 32 OF THE 133 ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS REPORTED THAT THOSE UNITS WERE NOT AGGRESSIVE WHEN IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY. IN VNN, MIDDLE-MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY, AND SHORTAGES ALSO EXIST IN SMALL BOAT PATROL OFFICERS. TO OFFSET THIS, OFFICER COURSES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR PBR, PCF, AND RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT ON-THE-JOB TRAINING. OFFICER AVAILABILITY, USING ALL RESOURCES, WILL REACH 50 PERCENT OF REQUIRED STRENGTH

IN JUNE 70, 75 PERCENT IN OCTOBER AND 90 PERCENT IN DECEMBER. IN VNAF, RECRUITING EFFORTS TO MEET THE PHASE II MANNING REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL, AND VNAF HAS BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE. THE DESERTION RATE IS ONLY 0.2 PER THOUSAND PER MONTH, AS OPPOSED TO 13.1 IN

APVN. VNAF SHOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING RECRUITMENT.

BUT RAPID EXPANSION WILL CUT DEEPLY INTO THE LIMITED NUMBER OF TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL AVAILABLE IN THE UNITS NOW, AND THE QUALITY OF THE FORCE WILL BE REDUCED DURING THE EXPANSION PROGRAM. CHANGES ARE NEEDED IN THE PERSONNEL SYSTEM TO FACILITATE VNAF'S ACHIEVEMENT OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

10. (S/NF) TRAINING. IN 1969 THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN MILITARY TRAINING. 127,000 NEWLY-INDUCTED MEN RECEIVED RECRUIT TRAINING AND MORE THAN 89,000 COMPLETED COURSES OF INSTRUCTION IN MILITARY SCHOOLS. 945 NEW PF

PLATOONS AND 288 RF COMPANIES RECEIVED BASIC TRAINING

AND WERE ADDED TO THE FORCE. THE TRAINING OUTPUT FOR 1970 WILL BE AT AN EVEN HIGHER LEVEL. ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING WAS GIVEN TO 10,100 VIETNAMESE IN 1969 AND 10,800 MORE

ARE SCHEDULED FOR TRAINING IN 1970. A FORMAL ON-THE-JOB TRAINING PROGRAM WAS ESTABLISHED, WHICH WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASING AMOUNT OF TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR VIETNAMESE AT US UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS. THE FIRST CLASSES GRADUATED FROM THE NATIONAL DE FENSE COLLEGE AND FROM THE 4 YEAR COURSE AT THE VIETNAMESE NATIONAL MILITARY ACADEMY. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE PUT INTO EFFECT TWO PROGRAMS

IN THE TRAINING FIELD WHICH WILL RESULT IN IMPROVEMENTS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. FIRST, COMBAT-

EXPERIENCED NCOs WILL BE USED AS A SOURCE OF OFFICER CANDIDATES. IN 1970, 30 PERCENT OF THE OFFICERS WILL COME FROM THIS SOURCE. SECOND, A MUCH-NEEDED EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO REDUCE "HOME-STEADING" AT SCHOOLS AND TRAINING CENTERS. THERE IS NOW A PROGRAM TO REPLACE OFFICERS WHO HAVE SERVED 4 YEARS AS INSTRUCTORS WITH COMBAT-EXPERIENCED OFFICERS. HOWEVER, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FORMIDABLE AND CONTINUING PROBLEMS. SPECIALIST TRAINING

IN SOME AREAS IS NOT KEEPING UP WITH DEMAND.

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THIS IS BOTH A PROBLEM OF A LACK OF QUALIFIED INPUT, LACK OF  
 QUALIFIED INSTRUCTORS, AND, BECAUSE OF UNPROGRAMMED STUDENT

LOADS, ONE OF INSUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT ON WHICH TO TRAIN. TRAIN-  
 ING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS ARE GENERALLY OPERATED ON AN AUSTERE  
 BASIS, AND ARE OFTEN OVERLOADED TO TWICE THEIR REASONABLE

CAPACITY. IN THE SHORT RUN, AND BECAUSE OF THE VIETNAMIZATION  
 PROGRAM, OVERLOADING IS PROBABLY INEVITABLE, BUT EQUALLY INEVIT-  
 ABLE IS DEGRADATION OF TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS. IN VNN, PRESENT  
 IN-COUNTRY TRAINING FACILITIES PROVIDE FOR AN AVERAGE MONTHLY  
 INPUT OF 2,000 STUDENTS, OF WHOM 1,000 ARE RECRUITS. THE  
 ADDITION OF LARGER SHIPS AND NEW EQUIPMENT TO THE VNN INVENTORY  
 CREATES A NEED FOR SPECIALIZED TRAINING NOT AVAILABLE IN  
 COUNTRY. FURTHER, THE VNN CANNOT TRAIN SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL  
 IN TECHNICAL SPECIALTIES SUCH AS ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY AND  
 RADIO. TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE EXPANDED VNN, PLANNED OFF-  
 SHORE TECHNICAL TRAINING WAS MORE THAN DOUBLED IN THE LAST  
 HALF OF FY 69 AND THE IN-COUNTRY FACILITIES WERE EXPANDED.  
 IN VNAF, THE AJP TRAINING CENTER WILL CONDUCT TRAINING IN 40  
 SEPARATE COURSES IN ITS EIGHT SCHOOLS, AND WILL ATTAIN A NEW  
 TRAINING SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN 17 MAINTENANCE SPECIALTIES START-  
 ING IN 1ST QUARTER CALENDAR YEAR 1970. BY JULY 1970, VNAF  
 WILL ADD 243 CONUS-TRAINED INSTRUCTORS TO THE EXISTING ATC  
 INSTRUCTOR CADRE. ARVN TRAINING PROGRAMS AND 7AF INTEGRATED  
 TRAINING WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN VNAF SELF-  
 SUFFICIENCY. THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT INSTRUCTORS AT PRESENT  
 TO MEET THE CY 1970 LOAD WITH PROPER PREPAREDNESS, BUT THIS

DIFFICULTY WILL BE OVERCOME AS TRAINING PROGRESSES. OVERALL,  
 THE RVNAF QUANTITATIVE TRAINING OUTPUT IS BOTH IMPRESSIVE AND,  
 WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS, ADEQUATE FOR THE FORCE STRUCTURE.  
 QUALITATIVELY, THE RESULTS ARE MIXED. ON THE ONE HAND, THE  
 PRODUCT OF THE TRAINING CENTERS FED INTO COMBAT UNITS IS  
 CONSIDERED ADEQUATE, AS IS THE OUTPUT FROM THE BRANCH-

ORIENTED SCHOOLS. ON THE OTHER HAND, OUTPUT FROM THE MORE  
 TECHNICAL SCHOOLS IS MUCH LESS THAN SATISFACTORY. AS A  
 CONSEQUENCE, IT WILL TAKE A LONGER TIME TO BRING SOME TYPES

OF COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS UP TO AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY.  
 INNOVATIONS PRIMARILY POINTED TOWARD STRENGTHENING LOCAL LEADER-  
 SHIP ARE:

A. THE TRIPLE TRIANGLE TACTICS PROGRAM, WHICH DESPITE THE NAME, IS ACTUALLY MOTIVATIONAL TYPE TRAINING FOR PF PLATOON LEADERS. 5,000 PLATOON LEADERS ARE PROGRAMMED FOR THIS TRAINING IN 1970.

B. THE NEW HORIZONS CAMPAIGN WILL BE CONDUCTED BY NATIONAL GENERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT (GPWD) TEAMS WHICH WILL TRAVEL TO ARVN, RF, AND PF UNITS AND PRESENT TRAINING WITH A VIEW TOWARD IMPROVING ADMINISTRATION, LOGISTICS, LEADERSHIP TECHNIQUES AND POLITICAL WARFARE TECHNIQUES. PRIORITY FOR THIS TRAINING WILL GO TO UNITS THAT ARE POOR PERFORMERS AND HAVE HIGH DESERTION RATES.

C. AS A PART OF A MAJOR NEW PSDF IMPROVEMENT PLAN APPROXIMATELY 35,000 PSDF INTERTEAM (PLATOON) AND TEAM (SQUAD) LEADERS WILL RECEIVE 6 WEEKS OF TRAINING AT PF TRAINING CENTERS DURING 1970. MOBILIZATION TRAINING TEAMS WILL TRAVEL TO HOME SITES TO GIVE 4 WEEKS

OF TRAINING TO OTHER COMBAT PSDF MEMBERS. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THIS PSDF IMPROVEMENT PLAN IF SUCCESSFUL, WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF TERRITORIAL SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC.

D. OVER 16,000 VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS RECEIVED MOTIVATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRAINING AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER AT VUNG TAU DURING 1969. IN 1970 9,000 NEWLY ELECTED VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS ARE PROGRAMMED FOR TRAINING AT VUNG TAU AND ANOTHER 40,000 AT PROVINCE TRAINING CENTERS. REFRESHER TRAINING IS SCHEDULED FOR OFFICIALS WHO RECEIVED INITIAL TRAINING IN 1969. PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE TO TRAIN 14,000 PSDF CADRE, 2,500 TECHNICAL CADRE, AND 12,000 CHIEU HOI/ INFORMATION CADRE IN 1970. THIS TRAINING IS CENTRAL TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF THE NATION. THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS HAS BEEN ONE OF THE FEW UNQUALIFIED SUCCESSSES OF 1969, CERTAINLY FROM AN INSPIRATIONAL AND MOTIVATIONAL POINT OF VIEW. PRESIDENT THIEU HAS ADDRESSED EACH OF THE GRADUATING CLASSES. IN ADDITION, BOTH HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE SPECIAL TRAINING PROGRAM ON THE 1970 PLAN FOR PROVINCE CHIEFS AND DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEFS FOR ADMINISTRATION TAKING PLACE AT VUNG TAU IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY.

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11. (C) LOGISTICS: THE RVNAF LOGISTICS SYSTEM IS WELL ESTABLISHED AND ORGANIZED AND IS WORKING MODERATELY WELL. BASE DEPOTS (LOCATED IN THE SAIGON AREA) EXERCISE OVERALL NATIONAL MATERIAL MANAGEMENT, OVERHAUL AND REBUILD OF EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS STOCK, STORAGE AND ISSUE OF MATERIAL. EACH AREA LOGISTICS COMMAND (ALC) HAS FIELD DEPOTS WHICH ARE SUPPORTED FROM THE BASE DEPOTS AND IN TURN SUPPORT THE VARIOUS ORDNANCE, ENGINEER AND SIGNAL DIRECT SUPPORT UNITS, AMMO SUPPLY POINTS, SECTOR MANAGEMENT AND DIRECT SUPPORT CENTERS (RF-PF SUPPORT) AND DIVISION LOGISTICS BATTALIONS. CHANGES IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR HAVE INCREASED VNAF LOGISTICS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. THE DECISION TO VIETNAMIZE THE WAR MAGNIFIED THE URGENCY OF REALIZING RVNAF SELF SUFFICIENCY AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. MANY FACTORS HAVE AFFECTED THE RVNAF LOGISTICS SYSTEM AND CONTRIBUTE TO ITS PRESENT STATUS. RAPID INCREASES IN THE RVNAF COMBAT FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIRED COMMENSURATE INCREASES IN THE LOGISTICS SUPPORT BASE. ALTHOUGH ADDITIONAL LOGISTICS PERSONNEL WERE AUTHORIZED IN THE FSI THE CAPABILITY TO FULFILL THE AUTHORIZATIONS WITH TRAINED AND QUALIFIED PERSONNEL IS LIMITED AND IS BEING REALIZED SLOWLY. THE INTRODUCTION OF MODERN WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT IN SIGNIFICANT DENSITIES INTO THE RVNAF INVENTORY ENLARGED THE SCOPE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE RVNAF SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. BASIC TO THE SUPPORT OF THESE SYSTEMS ARE TECHNICALLY TRAINED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND MODERN DEPOT FACILITIES AS WELL AS ADVISORS WITH SUFFICIENT EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE TO PROPERLY GUIDE THEM. DEPOT REPAIR CAPABILITIES, PERSONNEL SKILL, AND PHYSICAL PLANTS ARE CURRENTLY INADEQUATE TO FULFILL FUTURE REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, CURRENT PROGRAMS ARE UNDERWAY TO CORRECT THESE DEFICIENCIES. THE ASSUMPTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS OF OPERATIONS BY RVNAF AND THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS HAS, MORE THAN ANY SINGLE ACTION DRAMATIZED THE NEED FOR A COMPLETELY SELF-SUFFICIENT RVNAF LOGISTICS SYSTEM. WITH INCREASED MOVEMENT OF RVNAF UNITS INTO AREAS AWAY FROM THEIR BASES, THE LOGISTICS SYSTEM AND PROCEDURES ARE BEING TESTED ON A BROAD SCALE. OPERATIONS SUCH AS THE BEN HET/DAK TO AND BU PRANG/DUC LAP OPERATIONS WERE VERY ENCOURAGING, WHEREIN LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF RVNAF FORCES WAS EXCELLENT. MOST EQUIPMENT IN THE HANDS OF RVNAF TROOPS IS NEW AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS THEREFORE ARE MINIMAL. AS THIS EQUIPMENT AGES THRU USAGE, MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS WILL INCREASE. IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING, THE FOLLOWING GENERAL AREAS IN THE RVNAF LOGISTICS SYSTEM MERIT ATTENTION. COMMAND EMPHASIS AND INTEREST IN LOGISTICS AT THE LOWER LEVELS NEED TO BE IMPROVED. ONE REASON FOR THIS DEFICIENCY IS THE LACK OF QUALIFIED OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THESE UNITS. TECHNICAL PROFICIENCY OF LOGISTICS PERSONNEL NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED IN MOST AREAS, ESPECIALLY IN THE HIGHLY

TECHNICAL FIELDS AND LOWER LOGISTICS ECHELONS. IN SOME CASES, PERSONNEL ARE NOT PREPARED BY BACKGROUND TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN COMPLEX EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS. THIS CONDITION CAN AND IS BEING IMPROVED, AND AVAILABLE SKILLED PERSONNEL ARE BEING IDENTIFIED AND ASSIGNED. MAJOR PROBLEMS IN VNN CENTER AROUND THE FACTS THAT THE LOGISTICS SHIPS ARE INEFFICIENTLY UTILIZED AT PRESENT, AND THE VNN IS SLOW IN ASSIGNING PERSONNEL TO THE LOGISTICS SUPPORT COMMAND. VNN WILL RELY HEAVILY ON USN LOGISTICS SUPPORT THROUGH FY 72, WITH MNOR SUPPORT CONTINUING INTO FY 73. IN VNAF, THE SUPPLY ACCOUNTING SYSTEM IS A SLOW, LABORIOUS AND ERROR-PRONE MANUAL SYSTEM; HOWEVER, A COMPUTER IS SCHEDULED TO BE INSTALLED IN MARCH AND OPERATIONAL BY JULY 70, WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE SIMPLEST AND QUICKEST APPROACH TO IMPROVING THE VNAF SUPPLY SYSTEM. PRESENT CAPABILITIES ARE GOOD IN THE AIRCRAFT REPAIR AREA, AND WITH CONTINUED TRAINING, VNAF IS CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROPER LOGISTICAL MANAGEMENT.

12. (SNF) COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. RVNAF SIGNAL UNITS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SATISFY APPROXIMATELY 65 PERCENT OF THEIR COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS. THIS LIMITED CAPABILITY IS DUE TO A SHORTAGE OF COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES UNDER CURRENT IOE, A LACK OF SUITABLY-TRAINED AND QUALIFIED OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, LITTLE (IF ANY) MANAGEMENT OF THE TACTICAL SYSTEM RESOURCES, A HIGH DEPENDENCE UPON US ADVISORY COMMUNICATIONS AND ALMOST TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON US FIXED LONG-HAUL SYSTEMS TO SATISFY HIGH USER REQUIREMENTS. THE ARVN COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED AS "UNRELIABLE, UNRESPONSIVE AND INADEQUATE". THE VNAF C-E CAPABILITY IS PRESENTLY CONFINED TO USAF/VNAF BED-DOWN AREAS AND AIR BASES BUT IS CONSIDERABLY AHEAD OF ARVN. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL FOR OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF C-E FACILITIES IS PROGRESSING ACCORDING TO PROGRAM. HOWEVER, AS IS THE CASE WITH ARVN, THE COMPETITION IS SEVERE FOR THE TECHNICALLY-TRAINABLE MANPOWER BASE AND THIS MAY AFFECT FUTURE PROGRESS. VNAF SHOULD ATTAIN AN ADEQUATE C-E POSTURE BY THE END OF 1973. THE PRESENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WITHIN THE VNN IS MARGINALLY ADEQUATE TO COMMAND AND CONTROL THE FORCE, BUT INADEQUATELY EQUIPPED. UNDER CURRENT PLANS, SHORTAGES IN C-E ASSETS, PERSONNEL SKILL DEFICIENCIES AND INADEQUATE PROCEDURES ARE BEING RESOLVED BY INCREASING TURNOVER OF ASSETS TO VNN, AND BY PROVIDING ADDITIONAL TRAINING IN C-E DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES. THERE ARE SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES RVNAF-WIDE IN THE C-E AREAS OF LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, ENGINEERING, OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, MAINTENANCE, AND LOGISTICS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT IT WILL TAKE FROM 5 TO 7 YEARS AS A MINIMUM TO ACHIEVE A VIABLE C-E POSTURE WHICH WILL MEET RVNAF REQUIREMENTS.

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16-#26

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FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON DC

ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC HAWAII

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TOP SECRET NOFORN SENSITIVE SECTION THIRTEEN OF FOURTEEN  
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13. (TS/NF) APPRAISAL OF ADVISORY EFFORT.

A. GENERAL. ON THE WHOLE THE ADVISORY EFFORT IS ADEQUATE.  
THERE ARE, OF COURSE, AREAS OF WEAKNESS AS WELL AS OF STRENGTH.

GENERALLY, THE ADVISOR TO RMNAF HAS BEEN A COMBAT AND SERVICE  
SUPPORT COORDINATOR, OBSERVER, AND EVALUATOR IN ADDITION TO BEING

AND ADVISOR TO HIS COUNTERPART. THE PACIFICATION ADVISOR HAS ALSO

BEEN A SUPPORT COORDINATOR, OBSERVER AND EVALUATOR AND HAS GIVEN

AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF DETAILED OPERATIONAL ADVICE TO HIS COUNTER-  
PART. AS VIETNAMIZATION PROCEEDS, THE ROLE OF THE RUNAF ADVISOR  
WILL SHIFT AND WILL CONCENTRATE ON SUCH THINGS AS IMPROVEMENT

OF MILITARY AND CIVIL TRAINING, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT.  
THE PACIFICATION ADVISOR WILL BECOME LESS SUPPORT ORIENTED, HIS  
ADVICE WILL NOT BE AS PERVASIVE NOR AS OPERATIONAL IN NATURE,  
AND PACIFICATION WILL BECOME LESS AND LESS A JOINTLY PLANNED AND  
EXECUTED PROGRAM.

B. IN ARVN, GENERALLY IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS, INCLUDING ADDED  
AGGRESSIVENESS, REFLECTS THE ADVISORY EFFORT, MUCH CREDIT ALSO  
CURRENTLY BELONGS TO US UNIT COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS WHO WORK  
WITH THEIR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPART COMMANDERS ON BOTH TACTICAL AND  
PACIFICATION OPERATIONS. THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH  
THE ADVISORY EFFORT TO ARVN IS OFFICER GRADE IMBALANCE; THAT IS,  
JUNIOR OFFICERS FILLING ASSIGNMENTS WHICH DEMAND BROADER PROFESSIONAL  
BACKGROUND. THIS PROBLEM IS ILLUSTRATED BY THESE PERCENTAGES OF  
FILL OF TACTICAL UNIT ADVISORS AS OF 2 JANUARY 1970: LTC 87.6 PER  
CENT, MAJOR 57.1 PERCENT, CAPTAIN 78.1 PERCENT AND LT 217.1 PERCENT.  
FOR LOGISTICAL ADVISORS, PERCENTAGES OF FILL WITH PROPER GRADES  
ARE LTC 64 PERCENT, MAJOR 57 PERCENT, CAPTAIN 83 PERCENT. HOWEVER,  
OVER 22 PERCENT OF THE LOGISTICAL ADVISOR POSITIONS ARE VACANT AS  
OF 26 JANUARY 1970. EQUALLY CRITICAL, THEREFORE, ARE THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR PROPER GRADES AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF ADVISORS TO  
THE ARVN LOGISTICAL SYSTEM. GRADE IMBALANCES HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT  
UPON THE TOTAL ADVISORY EFFORT AND ONLY PARTIAL RELIEF OF THIS  
WEAKNESS CAN BE EFFECTED BY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT WITHIN MACV.

C. USN AND USAF. USN AND USAF ADVISORY EFFORTS ARE SATIS-  
FACTORY, AS REFLECTED IN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS OF VIETNAMIZATION  
PROGRAMS. THE QUALITY OF NAVY AND AIR FORCE ADVISORS IS GENERALLY  
HIGH AND GRADE IMBALANCES ARE NOT A PROBLEM. HOWEVER, FOR THE

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NAVY, UPON COMPLETION OF TURNOVER, THE SOURCE OF ADVISORS FROM US BOATS WILL DIMINISH CONSIDERABLY, REQUIRING A MORE EXTENSIVE ADVISOR TRAINING PROGRAM FOR THOSE ADVISORS WITHOUT VIETNAM EXPERIENCE.

D. CORDS. THE CORDS ADVISORY STRUCTURE PARALLELS THE RVN CPDC STRUCTURE FROM NATIONAL LEVEL TO THE DISTRICT, BUT THE RELATIONSHIP IS MORE INTENSE AT THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVEL THAN AT ANY OTHER. THE SUCCESS OF THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION

CAMPAIGN AND THE 1969 P&D PLAN REFLECTS THE VALUE OF THE CORDS ADVISORY EFFORT AT ALL LEVELS. THIS EFFORT REFLECTS IN TURN NOT ONLY THE PAYOFF FROM THE SINGLE MANAGER CONCEPT, BUT ALSO THE ACCRETION OF EXPERIENCE IN PACIFICATION ADVISORY WORK AT THE

PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVELS SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDS; HOWEVER, DESPITE THIS GENERAL SUCCESS, THERE ARE SHORTCOMINGS AND WEAKNESSES. THE OFFICER PICTURE AS OF MID-JANUARY 1970

WITH RESPECT TO CORDS MILITARY FIELD ADVISORS IS MISLEADING WHEN VIEWED IN TERMS OF TOTALS ONLY. FOR EXAMPLE, CORDS IS AUTHORIZED 2176 FIELD ADVISORS AND 2157, OR 99.1 PERCENT ARE ASSIGNED. UNDER CLOSER SCRUTINY THE PICTURE IS NOT SO ROSY. GRADE SUBSTITUTION IS A MAJOR PROBLEM AS ILLUSTRATED BY THESE PERCENTAGES OF FILL: COL 41.8 PERCENT, LTC 125.9 PERCENT, MAJ 44.7 PERCENT, CPT 46.4 PERCENT. SHORTAGES, PARTICULARLY IN THE GRADE OF CAPTAIN AND MAJOR

ARE BEING FILLED BY LIEUTENANTS, IN WHICH GRADE THE PERCENTAGE OF FILL IS 316.3 PERCENT. THIS GRADE SUBSTITUTION IS FURTHER

AGGRAVATED BY SERVICE BRANCH SUBSTITUTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE ONLY 60-70 PERCENT OF THE POSITIONS AUTHORIZED FOR MAJORS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS ARE FILLED BY OFFICERS FROM THE REQUIRED BRANCH. IN ADDITION, PERSONNEL FREQUENTLY LACK THE NECESSARY TRAINING AND PREPARATION NEEDED TO BE IMMEDIATELY EFFECTIVE AS ADVISORS.

THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE CASE OF MATS TEAMS AND PHOENIX OPERATIONS WHERE MANY INEXPERIENCED LIEUTENANTS ARE TEAM LEADERS DUE TO THE SHORTAGE OF CAPTAINS. SOME ADVISORS, TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED AND WELL INTENTIONED, HAVE RECEIVED ONLY A MINIMUM OF TRAINING IN THE RVN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND LAWS THAT PROHIBIT ACTIONS THAT THEY ENCOURAGE THEIR COUNTERPARTS TO UNDERTAKE. THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM AT ALL LEVELS, HOWEVER, IS THE UNDERSTANDABLE

DIFFICULTY MOST MEN HAVE IN FULLY GRASPING THE COMPLEXITIES OF VIETNAM AND OF PACIFICATION SO AS TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE AND USEFUL ADVICE AND SUPPORT TO THEIR COUNTERPARTS WITHIN A 12-MONTH TOUR.

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FM 53 MACV (MG TOWNSEND C/S MACV)

TO XAFS 717 (GEN BROWN)

FM USARPV (LTG WILDBEN)

FM III MAF (LTG NICKERSON)

FM COMNAVTF RV (VADM ZUMWALT)

FM I FFV (LTG CROCCRAW)

FM II FFV (LTG EWELL)

FM CAN THE (MG MCCANN)

FM 6 CAS SAIGON (AMB BRYNER)

FM 23 XIV CORPS (LTG ZAIS)

FM 23306Z ZYH 777-1 777-A

FM GEN ADAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON

FM GEN WHEELER CJOCS WASHINGTON DC

FM ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC HAWAII

FM OP SECDEF WFTM SENSITIVE FINAL SECTION OF FOURTEEN

EYES ONLY ADDRESSES MAC LOGS EYES ONLY

14. (C) VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES TOWARD VIETNAMIZATION.

A. VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES TOWARD VIETNAMIZATION ARE MOST CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FOR RVNAF OFFICERS; THE SAME ATTITUDES ARE BELIEVED TO BE HELD BY THE BULK OF GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS. THE ATTITUDES OF THE SOLDIERS AND THE GENERAL POPULACE IN THIS REGARD ARE LESS CLEARLY DEFINED SINCE


THEIR INTERESTS AND CONCERNS ARE UNEQUIVOCATED AND ORIENTED TOWARD MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS.

B. AMONG RVNAF OFFICERS, US POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS OF 3 NOVEMBER AND THE CAUTION DEMONSTRATED BY THE SIZE AND TIMING OF PHASE 3 DEPLOYMENTS HAVE DONE MUCH TO BELIEVE CONCERN WITH PRECIPITATING WITHDRAWAL AND

ABANDONMENT OF OUR VIETNAMESE ALLY. BASIC TRENDS IN ATTITUDES ARE:

- (1) QUALITY OF OPTIMISM AND CONFIDENCE IN RVNAF ABILITY TO ASSUME A GREATED COMBAT ROLE.
- (2) CONCERN THAT WITHDRAWAL WILL CONTINUE WITHOUT

BEYOND THE INITIAL PHASES OF VIETNAMIZATION AND THE MILITARY SITUATION.



(3) CONTINUING CONCERN THAT COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT

SERVICE SUPPORT WILL BE WITHHELD IN ADDITION TO COMBAT  
FINAL ANALYSIS IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTLOOK OF THE SOUTH

ATTENTION THAT ALL DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF FUTURE OF  
VITAMINIZATION, THEIR POTENTIAL IS CLEARLY EQUAL TO THE  
CHALLENGE, BUT WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT THEY COME TO  
BELIEVE THEY CAN DO THE JOB. THE FORM AND PACE OF EVERY FACET  
OF VITAMINIZATION MUST ACCOMMODATE AND DEAL WITH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL  
IN EVERY OPERATIONAL MEASURE WITH THE MATERIAL.  
C. IN THIS MATTER, MOST OFFICERS CURRENTLY BELIEVE EITHER

THAT (1) THE US WILL STAG ON WITH FEW STOPS ENOUGH TO  
CONTAIN ENEMY ATTACKS BUT NOT POWERFUL ENOUGH TO DISCOURAGE HIM  
COMPLETELY, (2) THE ENEMY IS BELIEVINGLY DEFEATING  
THAT COMBAT, WHILE WAITING FOR THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF US  
TROOPS, AT THE NATIONAL LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS WILL BE LAUNCHED  
WHICH OWN, IN THE END, MAY NOT BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND.

D. T. DATE, VITAMINIZATION HAS OPERATED SURPRISINGLY  
LITTLE CONCERN AMONG VITAMINIST SOLDIERS AND THE GENERAL  
PUBLIC. THE SOLDIER'S ATTITUDE IS PROBABLY A REFLECTION  
OF HIS LEADERSHIP AND THE CONFIDENCE HE HAS IN HIS OWN UNIT.  
THE PEOPLE APPEAR TO HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE IN ARVN ABILITY  
TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE WAKE OF US WITHDRAWALS; HOWEVER,

FEW PROBABLY UNDERSTAND THE SCOPE OF THE TASK TO BE FACED.  
E. ONE SIGNIFICANT TREND THAT IS SURFACING AND THAT IS

OVERSHADOWING CONCERN OVER REDEPLOYMENTS, PARTICULARLY FOR  
THE SOLDIER AND THE COMMON MAN, IS THE GROWING PROBLEM  
OF INFILTRATION AND THE STEADILY RISING COST OF LIVING.  
THIS IS A VERY REAL AND IMMEDIATE CONCERN AND ONE WHICH,  
IF IT CONTINUES UNCHECKED, MAY VERY WELL HAVE A MORE  
ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PVNAT THAN THE  
DRAWDOWN OF US TROOPS.

2-4

RE: DELIVER DURING DOWNS ROUTES  
ATTN: THIS MSG IS IN LIEU OF MNO 1824 FORWARDED BY

TOP SECRET

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THIS MSG REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ACTION AND IS A TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG FMFPAC		31 JAN 78					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 3 OF 3 COPIES REC'D					
			382121Z JAN 78							
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EXCLUSIVE  
FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

#1 Force Planning Folder  
#2 ICTZ Folder  
**17**

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

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TOP SECRET

PP RHMMAFA  
 DE RUHMFMA 3692 0302121  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 302121Z JAN 70  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN  
 DULACKI FROM BGEN WILSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //N00000//

- A. CMC 281502Z JAN 1970 (S) PASEP  
 B. CG, FMFPAC 302106Z JAN 1970 (S)
1. (S) THE REFERENCES REQUEST THE IDENTIFICATION OF 185 GRADES AND SKILLS ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCTIONS OF MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS. THE PROMPT IDENTIFICATION IS NEEDED BY CMC TO ACCURATELY ESTABLISH MANNING GOALS FOR WESTPAC, IN THE POST PHASE III TIME FRAME.
  2. (S) CMC HAS STATED THAT OCCNE SPACES ARE NOT SATISFACTORY FOR REDUCTION BECAUSE THE ACCEPTANCE OF REDUCTION IN THAT AREA WILL LOWER THE END STRENGTH OF THE MARINE CORPS BELOW THE DOD APPROVED LEVEL.
  3. (S) ALTHOUGH THE REQUEST FOR USARV TO ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR I CORPS SECURITY WITH ITS ASSOCIATED 129 SPACES WILL PROBABLY EVENTUALLY BE APPROVED, IT WILL TAKE TIME AND IN THE INTERIM WE WILL CONTINUE TO REQUIRE REPLACEMENT INPUT TO FLC FOR THAT

PAGE TWO RUHMFMA3692 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 PURPOSE. IDENTIFICATION OF REDUCTIONS IN THIS AREA WOULD DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF MANNING LEVELS BY CUTTING INPUT STILL REQUIRED FOR I CORPS SECURITY, AND FOR THIS REASON ARE NOT DESIRABLE.

4. (TS) THE CANCELLATION OF REPLACEMENT INPUT FOR III MAF HAS NOT BEEN ADDRESSED AS YET IN COMMAND TRAFFIC AND IS NOT GENERALLY KNOWN BY THOSE WHO WOULD BE HANDLING THE ACTION ON REFERENCES A AND B. THIS FACT, THOUGH, DOES HAVE PROFOUND EFFECT ON THE ACTION REQUESTED. IN CONSEQUENCE I AM TAKING THIS MEANS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM.
5. (TS) BY CANCELLING THE REPLACEMENT INPUT TO III MAF, LESS THE RADIO BN, RECON COMPANIES AND CAP, ON 23 JAN 70, WE HAVE IN EFFECT REDUCED THE MANNING AUTHORIZATION. IN CONSEQUENCE IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THIS WOULD BE THE LOGICAL PLACE TO EFFECT REDUCTIONS. REQUEST YOUR CONSIDERATION OF IDENTIFYING THE 185 SPACES IN QUESTION IN REFERENCE A FROM HQ, III MAF AND CR H&S COMPANY, III MAF.
6. (TS) IF THIS IS DONE IT SHOULD OBLVIATE THE NEED FOR ANY CHANGE TO EXISTING PHASE III REDEPLOYMENT TROOP LIST AS REGARDS DET MABS-16 (164 SPACES). WARM REGARDS

GP-4  
 3692

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

## TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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# FOR

## MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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# 18

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VV PAC963  
 PP RUEOFIA RHMNAPA  
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 ZNY TTTTT  
 P SIG234Z JAN 70  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUEOFIA/CMC  
 INFO RHMNAPA/CG III MAF

28554  
 28555

BT  
 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO  
 LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE, MARINE COMPS EYES  
 ONLY, SECTION 1 OF 2 //R05000//  
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. CMC 261220Z/JAN70 (TS-SPECAT-MC00)
- B. CG FMFPAC 140321Z/JAN70 (TS-SPECAT-MC00)
- 1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED AN ALTERNATIVE TROOP LIST TO THE  
 10.5K MAB (FORWARDED IN REF B) FOR A MAB OF 9 TO  
 9.5K INCLUDING 600 SUPPORT TRANSITION FORCES. THIS  
 MESSAGE ADDRESSES AN ALTERNATIVE TROOP LIST, REQUESTED  
 BY REF A, AND, ADDITIONALLY, THE COMPOSITION OF THE  
 LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE AS PROPOSED IN PAR 9, REF B.
- 2. (TS) MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE (8.9K):
  - A. ASSUMPTIONS
    - (1) THOSE OUTLINED IN PAR 2 REF B REMAIN VALID

PAGE 2 RUHNFMA3458 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MC00  
 EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) SINGLE FIXED WING SQUADRON WILL  
 OPERATE ONLY FROM DANANG AIRFIELD AS A TENANT.
- (B) SUPPORT OF ROK MARINE BRIGADE BY THE  
 REDUCED MAB WILL BE EXTREMELY LIMITED.
- (2) FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTION MADE:  
 MAB HQ MUST BE COLLOCATED WITH ANOTHER MAB UNIT.
- B. ALTERNATIVE TROOP LIST (THE SUPPORT/TRANSITIONAL  
 FORCE OF 600 SPACES IS ADDITIVE TO THE MAB TOTAL OF 2.9K,  
 THUS PROVIDING A GRAND TOTAL OF 9.5K):

(1) COMMAND ELEMENT:

MAB HQ	161
1ST CI TM, FMP	16
3D IT TM, FMP	11
1ST INTERP TM	6
2D SSCT (REIN)	9
TOTAL	203

(2) GROUND ELEMENT:

1ST MARINE REGIMENT	3797
1ST BN (REIN), 11TH MAR	742

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

(18)

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA3738 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC

BTRY K (REIN), 4TH BN, 11TH MAR	120
1ST 8" HOW BTRY (SP) (-), FMP	118
CO A (REIN), 1ST RECON BN	114
CO A, 1ST MT BN	79
CO A (REIN), 1ST TANK BN, FMP	129
CO A (REIN), 1ST ENGR BN	161
TOTAL	5260

## (3) AVIATION ELEMENT:

KAMS-16 (MAG-16)	354
MASS-16	539
HMM-263	258
DET HMM-463 (6/CH-53)	88
DET VMO-2 (4/OV-10)	53
HML-167 (12/UH-1E, 18/AH-1)	326
VMA(AV)-242 (12/A-6)	365
MASS-3 (-)	68
MATCU	68
TOTAL	2219

## (4) SUPPORT ELEMENT:

DET 1ST SERV BN	301
-----------------	-----

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA3738 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC

DET 1ST FSR	415
1ST PLT, CO A, 7TH ENGR BN, FMP	32
SHORE PARTY CO, SP BN	67
COL & CLEAR CO, 1ST MED BN	25
11TH DENTAL CO (-)	2
CO A, 1ST MP BN, FMP	121
DET RAD BN, FMP	51
COMM SPT CO, 7TH COMM BN, FMP	204
TOTAL	1218

## (5) RECAPITULATION:

COMMAND ELEMENT	203
GROUND ELEMENT	5260
AVIATION ELEMENT	2219
SUPPORT ELEMENT	1218
TOTAL	8900

C. MAJOR REVISIONS FROM TROOP LIST, REF B ARE:  
 (1) COMMAND ELEMENT: THE HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN REDUCED TO 161. IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE ELEMENT ON WHICH THE HEADQUARTERS SATELLITES TO PROVIDE HOUSEKEEPING AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AS WELL.

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHFMAS738 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO AS SECURITY.

(2) GROUND ELEMENT: THE 175MM GUN BATTERY HAS BEEN ELIMINATED AND THE 8" HOW BTRY REDUCED TO TWO PLATOONS. THE ENGINEER UNIT HAS BEEN REDUCED IN STRENGTH BUT THE COMBAT ENGINEER CAPABILITY IS LOCATED IN THE GROUND ELEMENT RATHER THAN THE SUPPORT ELEMENT AS IN REF B. RECON CAPABILITY ALSO HAS BEEN REDUCED.

(3) AVIATION ELEMENT: THE AVIATION ELEMENT WAS REDUCED BY A MAG (VA) INCLUDING THE H&MS, MABS AND A VMA(A4) SQUADRON. THE VMA(AW) (12/A-6) AND DETACHMENT OF VMO (A/OV-10) PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE MAG (VA) WAS INCLUDED IN THE MAG(VH). AN INCREASE IN THE H&MS AND MABS WAS INCLUDED IN MAG-16 (MARBLE MOUNTAIN) TO REFLECT THE INCREASED SUPPORT NECESSARY FOR THE VMA(AW) WHICH WILL OPERATE FROM A SEPARATE AIRFIELD (DANANG). HELICOPTER STRENGTH REMAINS 21 CH-46D, 6 CH-53, 12 UH-1E AND 18 AH-1. REMAINING UNIT STRENGTHS HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED FROM T/O TO ACCOMMODATE MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND CEILING CONSTRAINTS.

(4) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT: THE DETACH-

PAGE 6 RUHFMAS738 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
MENT OF THE RADIO BATTALION IS REDUCED BY 85 AND THE COMM SUPPORT COMPANY 31.

3. (TS) THE COMPOSITION OF THE LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE (PROPOSED NAME: PROVISIONAL SERVICE BN, DANANG) IS SUMMARIZED BELOW:

A. TROOP LIST

UNIT	MARINE CORPS	
	OFF	ENL
BATTALION HEADQUARTERS	18	77
H&S ELEMENT (NOTE 1)	13	328
MOTOR TRANSPORT ELEMENT	6	263
SUPPLY ELEMENT	22	495
SECURITY COMPANY (NOTE 2)	7	296
TOTAL	66	1471

NOTE 1 - INCLUDES MAINTENANCE FUNCTION WITH 1 OFF AND 27 ENLISTED.

NOTE 2 - SECURITY COMPANY (303) SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A SEPARATE ADDITIVE TO THE LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE OF 1234 MARINE SPACES. SHOULD THE BN BE COLLOCATED WITH OTHER FWMF IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO REDUCE THE SECURITY

BT

3738

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

**TOP SECRET**

**T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO FINAL SECT OF 2  
REQUIREMENT.

B. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THREE MONTHS WILL BE  
REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE ROLL-UP AFTER DEPARTURE OF  
THE LAST MAJOR ELEMENT BEING SUPPORTED BY FLC. THE  
TIME ESTIMATE DEPENDS ON SHIPPING AVAILABILITY.  
PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE ROLL-UP FORCE SHOULD HAVE  
FIVE MONTHS OVERSEAS ELIGIBILITY REMAINING.

4. (TS) THE MAB SET FORTH IN PAR 2 ABOVE PRESERVES THE  
CONCEPT OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM AND INCLUDES  
ALL ELEMENTS NORMALLY FOUND IN A MAB; HOWEVER, IT  
POSSESSES NEITHER THE FIREPOWER, THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT,  
NOR THE BALANCE OF THE 10.8K MAB. I RECOMMEND EVERY  
EFFORT BE MADE RETAIN THE 10.8K MAB. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3739

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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TOP SECRET MAC 1473 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: HQ FOR U.S. COMMAND ELEMENTS IN I CTZ (C)

REFS: A. MACV 1165/260225Z JAN 78 (TS)

B. III MAF 270000Z JAN 78 (TS)

1. (TS) REFERENCES ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. REF A CONTAINS IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TRANSFER OF I CORPS AREA RESPONSIBILITIES FROM III MAF TO XXIV CORPS.

B. REF B PROPOSES THAT THE INTERIM FUNCTION OF CG, III MAF BE PERFORMED BY A MARINE DEPUTY COMMANDER, XXIV CORPS, THAT THE VIETNAMESE BE INFORMED EARLY OF THE PLAN, AND THAT AN APPROPRIATE PRESS RELEASE BE MADE NOW.

2. (TS) INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM JGS THAT CMC WILL NOMINATE THREE STAR OFFICER JUNIOR TO GENERAL TALS AS CG, III MAF.

3. (TS) ANNOUNCEMENT ON COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN I CTZ IS TO BE MADE COMMAND-WIDE SHORTLY BY GENERAL SERVICE MESSAGE. MESSAGE WILL AUTHORIZE CG, III MAF, TO INFORM CG, I CTZ OF THE PLAN ON A SPECIFIED DATE. JGS WILL BE INFORMED BY MACV ON SAME DATE.

4. (TS) ANTICIPATE ISSUING A MACV PRESS RELEASE TIMED WITH CMC NOMINATION OF CG (DESIGNATE) III MAF.

P-4.

SSD NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

5B

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