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28 OCT 1965

[REDACTED] - (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG III MAF ltr 103/RPL/jfc of 3
October 1965; Ser No: 0025765

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology (U)

Encl: (1) III MAF Command Chronology July 1965

1. Forwarded.



REGAN FULLER
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPC, San Francisco,
California 96601

103/RPL/jfc
3 October 1965
Ser No: 0025765

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2 dtd 14 Jul 1965 Command Chronology
(b) CG FMFPac msg 251922Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III MAF Command Chronology July 1965

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of enclosure (1).


L. W. WALT

#1 of 3

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PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

DANANG AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Lewis W. WAIT

Major General, United States Marine Corps

Commanding

Command Chronology for period 1 July - 31 July 1965

Chief of Staff	Col Regan FULLER, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, Logistics and Area Coordination matters	Col Olin W. JONES, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	LtCol Donald T. DOXEY, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Maj Robert E. GRUENLER, USMC to 10 July LtCol Dale N. DAVIS, USMC to 27 July Col Leo J. DULACKI, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col Hardy HAY, USMC to 10 July LtCol Rex G. DENNY Jr. USMC to 14 July Col Edwin H. SIMMONS, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Col Norman R. NICKERSON, USMC to 27 July LtCol Joseph S. HEITZLER, USMC

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Communication-Electronics Officer

Col Frederick C. DODSON, USMC

Subordinate Units

Commander

3d Marine Division (-) (Rein)

MajGen Lewis W. WALT, USMC

1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Adv)

BGen Keith B. MCCUTCHEON, USMC

Force Logistics Support Group

Col Mauro J. PADALINO, USMC

Det, 1st Force Reconnaissance Co, FMF

Capt David WHITTINGHAM, USMC

Communication Support Co, FMF

Maj Donald L. MURPHY, USMC

Average Monthly Strength:

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	
1541	19,955	161	2,127	23,784

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PART TWO
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

I. INTRODUCTION

During the month of July, the III Marine Amphibious Force CP was located at (AT 994757) 350 meters west of the DANANG, Republic of Vietnam, Airfield adjacent to the 3d Marine Division (Fwd) CP and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Adv) CP.

All forces of III MAF were located in the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) in the three major enclaves of PHU BAI, DANANG, and CHU LAI with the exception of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) which was located at QUI NHON in II CTZ. The mission of III MAF consisted of Phase I, Securing the Base Area, and Phase II, Deep Patrolling and Offensive Operations, as outlined by COMUSMACV LOI of 5 May 1965, enclosure (1). The DANANG TAOR was expanded southward to permit greater maneuverability and to preclude attacks on the airfield proper; one of which occurred on 1 July 1965 and is covered in Section II. Patrols were concentrated on likely areas of approach to the TAOR's in an effort to prevent the VC from massing for attacks against the Marine Units. The USMC TAOR at QUI NHON was established with the landing of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on 1 July. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines relieved the 3d Battalion on 8 July. The COMUSMACV LOI for QUI NHON operations is included as enclosure (2). The overlay indicating the limits of the QUI NHON TAOR is attached to enclosure (2).

Enemy activity consisted of two relatively important raids on Marine positions plus harassing small arms fire, booby traps and minor probes. Intelligence reports indicated a general reorganization for the fall-winter campaign. In addition, indications were received that the VC were concentrating to attack the DANANG TAOR. Confirmed VC casualties during the month of July were 105 KIA, 5 WIA, and 40 captured.

A major increase in activity in the areas of logistics, personnel, civic action and combat information occurred as operations of the Marines shifted toward a more offensive posture.

II. OPERATIONS

a. Unilateral Operations. III MAF operations consisted primarily of strengthening defensive positions in depth, deep patrols and search and clear operations. During July, a major expansion of the DANANG TAOR was requested. The expansion placed the southern boundary approximately 6000 meters south of the airfield. MONKEY MOUNTAIN, the twin peaked peninsula approximately 5 miles northeast of the DANANG Air Base on which a USAF radar site (PANAMA) is located, also became a III MAF responsibility. The approval by CG I Corps for the expanded TAOR was received on 17 July. The main purpose in obtaining this expansion was to permit search and clear operations south of the airfield. This heavily populated area had been the cause of much concern since the VC operated there quite freely. This expansion would permit patrols to

push slowly and methodically the Forward Edge of Battle Area (FEBA) out past the point where enemy mortars could be used effectively against the airfield. In addition, the Reconnaissance Areas of Responsibility (RAOR) approved to the north and northwest permitted deep patrolling to be conducted in close coordination with CG I Corps over likely areas of approach and the strategic HAI VAN Pass area. An overlay of the expanded TAOR and agreement are attached as enclosure (3).

On 31 July, a Reconnaissance Area of Responsibility, a band of about 4000 meters, was approved for the CHU LAI enclave thereby permitting the Marines greater latitude in seeking out the enemy. The CG I Corps letter approving the Reconnaissance Area and an overlay of the area are attached as enclosure (4).

The major unilateral Marine operation occurred on 3 July. The RVN Navy Junk Base on KY HOA Island within the CHU LAI TAOR was overrun by the VC early in the morning. An attack was launched by the Marines to recapture the base. Details of the attack are reported in reference (b).

b. Coordinated Operations. The Marines of III MAF entered a new stage in the conflict in RVN when they launched a series of coordinated operations with RVN forces in the area around the CHU LAI TAOR. The first was a relatively small operation conducted in an area where known enemy resistance was expected to be comparatively light. This was considered necessary in attempting to analyze and work out any problems which might arise when forces of two nations operate in adjacent areas.

The next operation marked the first coordinated Regimental operation in South Vietnam for the Marines. Operation LIEN KET FOUR began on 28 July 65 with forces of the 4th Marines joining with the 51st ARVN Regiment and 3d Marine Battalion RVN. Under operational control of the Fourth Marines, the coordinated force conducted a two day search and clear operation southwest of CHU LAI supported by Marine fixed wing aircraft helicopters and artillery.

c. Enemy Activity. The Viet Cong attempted four significant raids during July. These were in addition to constant minor probing, harassing small arms fire, mines and booby traps. Their most successful raid occurred on 1 July 1965 when they launched a combined attack on DANANG Airbase. Under the cover of mortar and small arms fire, demolition teams breached the tactical wire and severely damaged six USAF aircraft. Friendly casualties were one USAF KIA and three USMC WIA. Known enemy loss was one VC captured. Significant details are contained in reference (b) and Section III B of this report.

Other significant activity consisted of the attack on the Navy Junk Base on 9 July, an attack on the ARVN BA GIA outpost southwest of CHU LAI on 6 July and a significant daylight action against Company D, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines on 17 July. The VC attacked the unit with both mortar and small arms fire. This sharp encounter resulted in eleven VC KIA and two USMC WIA.

d. Air Support. Marine Air was strengthened considerably during July when the second F4B squadron, VMFA 542, arrived at DANANG, and the taxiways and runways of the SATS at CHU LAI were completed. Operations consisted of close air support, visual and radar controlled interdiction, troop and cargo lift, helicopter escort, and landing zone preparation. Considerable progress was made in marrying the transport helicopter, armed helicopter, and fixed wing fighter/attack or attack aircraft into a smoothly coordinated and highly effective team. A typical performance of this team which has become an everyday event follows: A4's or F-4's prepare the helicopter landing zone with cannon, rockets, and bombs. The transport helicopters approach. The armed UH1E's (Hueys) take over for the suppression of light small arms fire. Meanwhile the A4's or F4's orbit overhead prepared to take any heavy resistance under immediate attack. As the transport helos land, the armed Hueys suppress fire on the perimeter of the LZ, remaining clear of the transport helicopters and fixed wing attack aircraft called in by the FAC or TAC(A). They also provide close in protection as the helicopter wave lifts off and departs the zone. This teamwork has reduced hits on the helos in the landing zone significantly.

III. INTELLIGENCE

a. General. Intelligence information indicates that VC forces are becoming stronger, better equipped, more active, and are generally preparing for the fall-winter campaign. Reports of the VC capturing two 105mm howitzers and employing 75mm howitzers in the CHU LAI TAOR caused considerable concern. The large sums of money found on VC troops were considered indicative of a drive to buy and store supplies.

b. Attack on DANANG Air Base. The one VC captured in the attack against Da Nang Air Base on 1 July was the intelligence man of a thirteen man demolition sabotage team from the 3d Battalion, 18th Regiment, 325th PAVN Division. His version of the attack follows: The team joined a special operation company which had a 57mm recoilless rifle and a mortar company which had four 81mm mortars. The combined group trained and rehearsed for thirty days before departing the NAM YEN area (AT 0387) on a three day circuitous route to DANANG. At 302000H the group crossed the SON (River) CAU DO in junks at DO XU and arrived at the southeastern perimeter of the Air Base as planned. Two rifle platoons were stationed to ambush any reaction forces; one on the dirt road from VOA VONG District Capital, and one on the road from I Corps Headquarters to DO XU ferry. The 81mm mortar company split into two sections; the southernmost section.

approximately four hundred meters from the Air Base fence was to fire on the helicopters while the northern section, about six hundred meters from the fence, was to fire on the airstrip in support of the penetrating demolition team. The penetrating force cut its way through the wire, and planted demolition charges near the parked airplanes as the mortars and 57mm RR opened fire at about 010115H. The attacking force then withdrew to rendezvous in HA THAN at (BT 020655). Details of the attack are reported in reference (b).

IV. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

a. Staff. During the month, III Marine Amphibious Force staff responsibilities increased as additional forces were brought into the country and as operations swung from the defensive to a limited offensive role. Operations such as LIEN KET FOUR required additional coordination among the 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Republic of Vietnam Forces. Logistic support for the larger force necessitated additional billets for resolving the problems of equipment, consumables, and the additional load of planning for future operations. Task Organization of III Marine Amphibious Force is included as enclosure (5) to this report.

b. Transplacement and Rotation. The commitment of the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in support of operations in Vietnam necessitated a change from unit transplacement to an individual replacement concept. This change will be effective about 1 September. Responsibility for reassignment of personnel to provide for a uniform rotation of personnel within the Force will be assigned to the Division and Wing.

c. Casualties. Monthly casualties are shown in Table I.

	<u>USMC</u>				<u>NON-BATTLE</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>BATTLE</u>		<u>DOW</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DEATH</u>	<u>INJ/ILL</u>	
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>					
Division	16	177	4	0	17	37	251
Wing	1	4	0	2	0	2	9
Total	17	181	4	2	17	39	260

<u>VC</u>		
<u>KIA *</u>	<u>WIA *</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>
105	5	40
* Confirmed		

TABLE I

USMC and VC Casualties in III MAF TACR's July 1965

V. LOGISTICS

The Provisional Naval Component Command Support Activity (PNCCSUPACT) was activated on 10 July 1965 to discharge the Naval Component Commander's responsibilities for the ashore operations of ports and beaches until the Naval Support Activity DANANG could achieve the capability to fully accomplish its mission. The Provisional Headquarters of PNCCSUPACT was staffed with personnel from III MAF/NCC. Enclosure (6) designates the tasks of the PNCCSUPACT. The Naval Support Activity, DANANG was authorized on 17 July and will replace PNCCSUPACT when it becomes fully operational. Estimated date for achieving full capabilities is 15 October. Enclosure (7) is the CINCPAC confirmation of the establishment of the Naval Support Activity, DANANG.

The poor condition of the roads and railroads necessitated resupply almost exclusively by sea and air in III MAF areas. Slippages in both sea and air scheduled deliveries of Class I supplies reduced stock levels to below the required amount. Therefore, required stock levels of MCI's were reduced from 30 days to 15 days to provide a more realistic basic unit. High surf at CHU LAI caused further delay in resupply over the beach. CG III MAF requested that CO Headquarters Support Activity SAIGON provide direct air shipment to each enclave in an effort to alleviate these critical resupply problems. The supply of bulk POL remained adequate through use of the storage tanks at the ESSO and SHELL tank farms in the vicinity of DANANG Air Base.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS

a. General. The communication requirements of the III Marine Amphibious Force continued to grow to meet the demands of the increasing number of units entering the Republic of Vietnam. As a result of the increase in strength of III Marine Amphibious Force, existing communication facilities were operating at full capacity. Message traffic volume continued to increase but handling times did not increase proportionately. Communications Electronics equipment previously ordered to increase III Marine Amphibious Force communications capabilities has been partially received.

b. Improvements

Sources of electrical power have become more dependable due to III Marine Amphibious Force receiving generators that had been previously ordered. The reliability of III Marine Amphibious Force's DCS external circuits has improved due to better quality circuits and a more stable source of generator power. The radio set AN/PRC-25 has been requested from COMUSMACV. This radio will give III Marine Amphibious Force units an increase in transmission range and a broader frequency spectrum. An initial issue of fifty sets is due III Marine Amphibious Force in September.

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VII. CIVIC ACTION

a. General. The objectives of the III MAF Civic Action Program are:

(1) To gain support for the RVN government, and (2) to gain the confidence and cooperation of the persons residing in USMC Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR's). A continuing program of meetings between local VN Officials and local Marine authorities was pursued. These meetings included dinners, formal conferences among larger groups of people, and two-man informal conferences. Contacts were with officials such as district village and hamlet leaders, officers of the VN Armed Forces and religious leaders. Many projects were pursued during July. These included distributing used clothing, providing entertainment, supporting orphanages, giving blood to RVN hospitals, and attempting to solve the problem of unpaid RVN claims.

b. Major Projects

(1) Medical Assistance - Teams of corpsmen, Marines and interpreters visited various hamlets throughout the TAOR's. They treated approximately 28,750 villagers. Local health workers were trained by formal instruction and by on-the-job training with medical assistance teams. Two children were sent to Saigon for plastic surgery for correction of cleft palates.

(2) Soap Program - About 75% of the disease treated by medical teams was skin infection resulting from poor sanitation. A soap donation campaign has been launched in the United States with the Support of CG FMFPac. This soap is being distributed to villagers in the sanitation program.

(3) Food Program - Limited amounts of food were distributed by units of this command in five hamlets. More than 1,000 pounds of bread were baked and delivered to an orphanage in DANANG. Rice captured from the VC was redistributed to loyal Vietnamese, particularly in the CHU LAI area.

(4) Engineering Assistance - Due to operational requirements, engineer assistance in July was minimal. Twelve wells were dug in one refugee village at CHU LAI, and a 1,000-square-meter area was cleared for a school in the DANANG TAOR. Fuel and oil were provided for tractors used to clear the area for a new life hamlet in the DANANG TAOR.

(5) Relocation - A program was initiated to relocate the homes of local people who live on the periphery of the DANANG Air Base complex.

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This move was considered necessary to provide unobstructed fields of fire approximately 400 meters wide around the airfield. The move has not been resisted by the people; however, progress has been slow. It has been necessary to prepare new sites where the people may rebuild their homes. In addition, many graves have to be moved. Each move consists of relocating the entire house along with truck loads of dirt for floors. Equipment with which to accomplish this all comes from Marine Corps assets. The project has progressed smoothly from a civil affairs standpoint.

VIII. COMBAT INFORMATION

a. Press Briefings. Daily briefings at the DANANG press center were held by the Combat Information Bureau. All press representatives in the area were invited to attend. Distinguished journalists visiting III MAF during the month were: Daniel Z. HENKIN, Editor, Journal of the Armed Forces; Jack RAYMOND, noted DOD reporter, New York Times; Chesly MARELY, Chicago Tribune; Sander VANOCHE, Radio-TV commentator for NBC. In addition to briefings, 48 escorted trips were conducted to Marine tactical areas.

IX. STATUS OF ROADS AND RAILROADS

a. General. The main arteries of transportation among the three USMC enclaves consist of a single highway and adjacent railroad. The condition of both makes them unreliable for resupply and troop movement. South of DANANG, most railroad bridges are still out as a result of the November 1964 floods. Highway bridges and railroad tracks are frequently damaged by VC forces.

b. Repairs. The road from DANANG to KEE PHU BAI was kept open by the Vietnamese most of the month by road and bridge repair, by-passes, and pontoon bridge construction. A ferry of 50-ton capacity began operating on the SONG CAU DO. Principal components of the ferry are part of an 14 1/2 floating bridge from 3d Engineer Battalion assets. The ferry is required to supplement the SONG CAU DO bridge which has marginal load capability.

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PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 1 July - VC Forces conducted a mortar/infantry attack on DANANG Air Base.
- LtGen Victor H. KRULAK, CG FMFPac arrived for a three day tour.
- 3d Battalion, 7th Marines ^(Lt Col Bodley) landed at QUI NHON. ^{HMM-163}
^{Lt Col Ewers}
- 2 July - Captain Charles K. HOLLOWAY, MC, USN, Preventive Medical Unit, Pearl Harbor, arrived to begin a study of potential malaria problems. This study is continuing.
- Received letter from Headquarters, 2d Signal Group authorizing a full duplex common user teletype circuit from SSO, MACV, Communications Center, SAIGON, to III MAF Communications Center DANANG.
- LtGen Victor H. KRULAK held a press conference in which he discussed requirements for ARVN/USMC team work.
- 3 July - CHU LAI SATS taxiway and runway were completed.
- 4 July - LtGen John L. THROCKMORTON, USA DEP COMUSMACV, visited III MAF Headquarters.
- OP ORDER 304-65 (Enclosure (8)), directing entry to Vietnam of 8,003 additional Marines for 23 units was published.
- Received COMSEVENTHFLT 030434Z on security of mission planning for Southeast Asia. Message stated necessity for security, and that all planning messages will be marked LIMDIS.
- Received MACV J-6 letter giving radio frequency authorization to III Marine Amphibious Force for three radar frequencies.
- Received Camp Butler, Okinawa 300950Z June 1965 on requirements for commercial vehicles. Message requested feasibility of Force Logistics Support Group installing radios in commercial vehicles for use in Republic of Vietnam.
- 5 July - AN/TPS-21 radar, used for acquisition and adjustment of artillery fire on target (AT 384747), proved very successful. According to villagers near target area, 50 VC were killed by the barrage.
- VC units 20 miles south of CHU LAI captured two 105mm howitzers from ARVN forces.
- 6 July - VC attacked the ARVN BA GIA outpost south of CHU LAI. VC troops also reported using AN/PRC-10 radio for imitation and deception.
- RLT-9 Headquarters and 2d Battalion, 9th Marines landed at DANANG.

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- 7 July
- LtGen Theodore J. CONWAY, USA, DEP C/S for Force Development, Department of the Army, visited III MAF.
 - ~~2d Battalion, 7th Marines relieved 3d Battalion, 7th Marines at QUI NHON.~~
 - Received Memorandum from Naval Component Commander 10/JES/wee dtd 7 July 1965 listing Naval units for Communication guard.
 - Logistic support for BLT 2/7 at QUI NHON is to be provided by III MAF for the first thirty days, then U.S. Army Supply Corps, Vietnam. III MAF will continue to provide Marine Corps peculiar items.
- 8 July
- LtGen Paul S. EMRICK, USAF, C/S CINCPAC, RA3m George W. PRESSEY, USN, and BGen Joseph A. MCCHRISTIAN, USA, visited III MAF.
 - CG III MAF message 061142Z informed CINCPACFLT of the departure of the Navy Communication Security Team of 1st Radio Battalion FMF.
 - 2d Battalion, 7th Marines relieved 3d Battalion, 7th Marines at QUI NHON.
- 9 July
- Mr Sander VANOCUR, News commentator, and Mrs WHALEN, WALL STREET JOURNAL reporter, visited III MAF.
 - Handcarved dummy weapons were found by a patrol west of LE MY in the DANANG TAOR.
 - 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (1/4) recaptured the VN Navy Junk Base in CHU LAI TAOR after it was overrun by VC. The fleet was relocated near the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines MLR. Details are reported in reference (b).
- 10 July
- MajGen Richard G. STILLMELL, USA, C/S COMUSMACV, visited III MAF.
 - VMFA-542 arrived at DANANG Air Base and commenced operations.
 - The Provisional Naval Component Command Support Activity was activated.
- 11 July
- A district chief reported VC 105mm guns at coordinates (BS 445691) approximately 12 miles southwest of CHU LAI TAOR. These are believed to be the guns captured from ARVN on 5 July.
 - CG III MAF sent request to COMUSMACV requesting 75 HF frequencies in addition to those previously authorized.
- 12 July
- Received COMSEVENTHFLT message 120156Z requesting that CG III MAF assume communications guard for VAdm Paul P. BLACKBURN during 14-15 July visit.

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14 July

Vadm Paul P. BLACKBURN, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, visited III MAF. Three Marines killed and eight wounded when one round of 4.2 inch mortar fire landed short. Details are reported in reference (b).

- CG III MAF informed COMUSMACV that a portion of the site selected for construction of an integrated ammunition storage facility had been preempted for tactical reasons and that a new location was being sought.
- MAG-11 assumed OPCON of VMFA 542 and VMFA 513.
- 15 July - III MAF ltr 110B/RGH/lg dated 15 July to Provisional Naval Component Command Support Activity granted temporary frequency authorization.
- CG III MAF message 150722Z dispatched to Commanding General, FMFPac, concerning Radio Set AN/PRC-25. This message outlined the urgency of obtaining these radios for use Republic of Vietnam immediately.
- 17 July - The largest daylight attack on a USMC force in South Vietnam was launched by VC forces in the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR. Details are reported in reference (b).
- Concern for Class I support for III MAF was expressed to Commanding Officer, Headquarters Support Activity. SAIGON.
- CG III MAF informed CG FMFPac of desired stock levels for III MAF. This was further amplified by CG III MAF message 211504Z July to CG FMFPac, which spelled out MCI requirements for III MAF and the rationale on which the requirements were based.
- 18 July - The following VIP's visited III MAF.

Hon Robert S. MCNAMARA	Secretary of Defense
Hon Maxwell D. TAYLOR	Ambassador to VN
Hon U. ALEXIS JOHNSON	Dep Ambassador to VN
Hon Henry Cabot LODGE	Ambassador (Designate) VN
Gen Earle G. WHEELER, USA	Chairman, JCS
Hon Leonard UNGER	State Dept
Hon John C. MCNAUGHTON	Asst SecDef for InterNatSec
Hon Arthur SYLVESTER	Asst SecDef Public Affairs
Gen William C. WESTMORELAND, USA	COMUSMACV
LtGen Andrew J. GOODPASTER, USA	Asst to Chairman, JCS
LtGen John L. THROCKMORTON, USA	Dep COMUSMACV
Mr Barry ZORTHIAN	USIS Saigon
Mr Chester COOPER	White House Action Off on VN
Mr William COLBY	State Dept
- 19 July - CG III MAF message 190304Z to CG FMFPac concerning 45 KW 400 cycle generators stated that a critical requirement still exists for four generators PU-296 for the 1st LAAM Battalion and that this Headquarters does not wish to divert generators slated to support air conditioning for III Marine Amphibious Force Communication Center.
- Provisional Base Defense Battalion was formed.

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20 July

Real estate acquisition was being held up by the lack of funds to reimburse real property claimants. This hampered progress on a number of construction projects. General WALT brought this to the attention of General WESTMORELAND by CG III MAF message 200740Z.

- Adm ~~Lysma~~ S. G. SHARP, USN, CINCPAC, visited III MAF.
 - MajGen Sidney S. WADE, USMC, CG I MAC (Fwd) arrived for 3 days tour of III MAF.
- 21 July
- Written confirmation was received for expansion of the DANANG TAOR.
 - Written confirmation was received for establishment of a reconnaissance zone at the CHU LAI TAOR.
 - CINCPACFLT advised that the Chief of Naval Operations had approved the establishment of a Naval Support Activity at DANANG.
- 22 July
- The following VIP's visited III MAF.
- | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| BGen William R. DEPTY, USMC | J-3 MACV |
| Hon Mr Edward J. SHERIDAN | Dep Asst Sec of Def |
| MGen Robert H. CURTAIN, USAF | JCS Working Committee |
| RAdm Alexander HUBBARD, USN | JCS Working Committee |
| Mr Lewis E. TURNER | Spec Asst Sec AF Log & Instal |
- 24 July
- The following VIP's visited III MAF.
- | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Hon James A. REED | Asst Sec of the Treasurer |
| Adm Edwin J. ROLAND, USCG | Commandant, USCG |
| MGen Frank A. OSMANSKI, USA | Chairman, JCS Working Comm |
- A critical shortage of packaged POL products developed. Commercial sources could not fill requirements. Emergency requisitions were submitted to COMUSMACV. Small amounts were received from MACV, Subic Bay, and Okinawa.
- 25 July
- Debriefing on patrols indicated a requirement to provide both infantry and reconnaissance units with jungle hammocks. One thousand were ordered to be used on a 90 day test and evaluation basis to determine suitability and T/E requirements.
- 26 July
- BGen Richard S. ABBEY, USAF, DEP C/S, MACV, visited III MAF.
- 27 July
- The following VIP's visited III MAF
- | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| MGen Milton B. ADAMS, USA | J-5, MACV |
| MGen John N. EUBANKS, USA | J-5 (Designee) MACV |
| VAdm Paul M. BLACKBURN, USN | COMSEVENTHFLT |
| LtGen Joseph H. MOORE, USAF | CG, 2d Air Div |
| BGen George B. SIMIER, USAF | C/S Plans, 2d Air Div |
| LtGen Edgar W. WILSON, USA | Dep CG & C/S USARPAC |

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28 July

Gen William C. WESTMORELAND, USA, COMUSMACV visited
III MAF.

- LIEN KET FOUR Operation was launched.

- 29 July - CG III MAF requested policy guidance from CG FMFPac on the integrated ammunition system proposed by COMUSMACV. CG FMFPac replied to the effect that the current Marine Corps Class V system would be followed, and the assurance of significant improvement over current system is a requisite for CMC concurrence with the proposed system.
- 30 July - QUI NHON TAOR was increased in size to encompass the area shown in enclosure (2).
- 31 July - CG III MAF requested CG FMFPac guidance relative to drawing Class V from ARVN dumps. COMUSMACV indicated it may be necessary to provide reimbursement in kind to ARVN. III MAF will not draw from ARVN dumps except in an emergency.

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REFERENCES

- a. Maps, Vietnam AMS L 701 Series Scale 1:50,000 sheets 6658 I, II, III, IV, 6659 II, III, IV, 6756 I, IV, 6757 II, III, 6559 I, II, III, IV, 6560 II, III, IV
- b. Command Chronology of 3d Marine Division for July 1965 *
- c. Command Chronology of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing for July and August 1965 **

ENCLOSURES

1. ✓ United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Letter of Instruction, covering operations of the III Marine Expeditionary Forces in the Republic of Vietnam, dated 5 May 1965 (S).
2. ✓ United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Letter of Instruction, governing operation of elements of the III Marine Amphibious Force in the QUI NHON area dated 6 July 1965 (S).
3. ✓ Letter from Commanding General, I Corps Tactical Zone, authorizing enlargement of the DANANG TAOR (with overlay) dated 20 July 1965 (S).
4. ✓ Letter from Commanding General, I Corps Tactical Zone, authorizing establishment of a Reconnaissance Zone in the CHU LAI Tactical Area of Responsibility (with overlay) dated 18 July 1965 (S).
5. ✓ III Marine Amphibious Force Task Organization effective 15 July 1965 (S).
6. ✓ CG, III MAF message 080556Z Jul65, subj: Activation of the Naval Component Command Support Activity (C).
7. ✓ CINCPACFLT message 310717Z Jul65; Establishment of Naval Support Activity DANANG (U).
8. ✓ Operation Order 304-65 dated 4 July 1965 (S).
9. ✓ III MAF Msge, 242326 Jul 65, III MAF Plans Summary to Accompany SITREP #84.(S)

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REWORKING

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96213

AUTH *PACA & Basic*

5 MAY 1965

MACJ31

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction Governing Operations of the III Marine Expeditionary Force in the Republic of Vietnam

NR 7702

TO: Commanding General
III Marine Expeditionary Force

9TH MEB
S&C # 90345

- Reference:
- (A) Map Series L701 Scale 1:50,000 sheets 6559 II, III, IV, 6756 I, IV; 6757 II, III; 6559 I, II, III, IV; 6560 II, III, IV.
 - (B) COMUSMACV ltr ser 00169 of 10 Mar 65 (S)
 - (C) COMUSMACV LOI of 7 Apr 65 (S)
 - (D) COMUSMACV msg 100430Z Apr 65 (S) Extracts of LOI of 7 Apr 65
 - (E) COMUSMACV msg 270135Z Apr 65 (S) Modification of LOI of 7 Apr 65
 - (F) COMUSMACV msg 270813Z Apr 65 (S) Rules of Engagement and Operating Procedures for Marine Jet Aircraft in South Vietnam

CANCELLATION: This directive supersedes references B, C, D, E and F and is effective upon receipt.

1. Situation:

a. General. US Armed Forces and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) exercise naval control over the South China Sea, have air superiority in South Vietnam (SVN), and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) between 17° and 20° N latitude. US forces and RVNAF are conducting air attacks against selected targets in DRV. RVNAF is engaged in counterinsurgency operations against Viet Cong (VC) and Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units in SVN.

b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B: MACV J2 Intelligence Estimate No. 1 of 1 May 1965.

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c. Friendly Force.

(1) US Seventh Fleet conducts naval and air operations in support of overall campaign against DRV and VC in SVN.

(2) 2d Air Division provides air defense of SVN, maintains air superiority, conducts operations against DRV/VC and supports ground action in SVN as necessary.

(3) I Corps RVNAF continues operations against VC and, if necessary, PAVN forces in Corps Tactical Zone.

(4) VNAF conducts CAS missions for I Corps, RVNAF and conducts operations against DRV/VC as necessary.

(5) Vietnamese Navy (VNN) supports Vietnamese Army (ARVN) operations and maintains counter-infiltration screen along SVN coast from DMZ, south.

2. Mission: In general render combat support to RVNAF. In coordination with CG, I Corps, participate in or provide for the defense of Hue-Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai airfields and auxiliary facilities. Maintain the capability to conduct, (on order) deep patrolling and offensive operations and reserve/reaction operations in coordination with CG, I Corps. Be prepared to execute U.S. contingency plans as directed by COMUSMACV.

3. Operations.

a. Concept.

(1) Phase I: Security of Base Area.

(a) Normally all ARVN units will be withdrawn from that area which is designated and assigned as a US security area or Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Coordination with police, Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF) in the area will be effected through an officer designated by CG, I Corps.

(b) The base area will consist of three zones, whose traces will be agreed between CG, III MEF and CG, I Corps.

1. A close in perimeter around the airfields or other similar installations to prevent sabotage or direct attack.


2. An intermediate extended zone (EZO) preferably out to mortar range.

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2. An outer zone (extended TAO) preferably extending out to light artillery range and covering most likely areas of assembly and avenue of attack. Aggressive patrolling must take place in this zone.

(2) Phase II: Deep Patrolling and Offensive Operations:

(a) Following establishment of the base security areas in Hue-Phu Bai, Da Nang and Chu Lai, and in close coordination with CG, I Corps and local RVMAF commanders, the III MEF will initiate reconnaissance and offensive operations against VC bases and forces. These will be conducted unilaterally in easily identifiable TAO's from which, for the duration of each operation, all RVMAF have been excluded. These operations should contribute to the security of the base areas, and serve to prevent massing of enemy forces for surprise attack on the base area.


(b) Designation and delineation of these TAO's will be on a case-by-case basis as determined by the CG, I Corps in coordination with the CG, III MEF. Selections will be based on available intelligence, its experience and success are gained in these operations in the various base areas, selection of these TAO's may be delegated to the III MEF element commanders at Hue-Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai in coordination with such subordinate elements of I Corps as designated by the CG thereof.

(c) Movement to and from the TAO's will be coordinated with I Corps and its subordinate elements. US advisory teams will assist by acting as combat liaison officers. RVMAF liaison personnel must accompany the III MEF units in order to provide identification of friendly forces and as a means of contact with and identification of civilians.

(d) As experience is gained, the scope of these offensive operations may be increased. Eventually, it should be possible to effect coordination between III MEF operations in one TAO with RVMAF in adjacent but separate and clearly defined TAO's.

(e) The final step in Phase II is the conduct of pre-planned combined III MEF/RVMAF search and destroy operations. These may be initiated by CG, I Corps, by CG, III MEF, or by MACV/RVMAF High Command, with the concurrence of all commanders involved. Of utmost importance to the successful conduct of combined search and destroy operations is the nature of the tactical plans. They must be as simple as possible, with clearly defined and easily recognizable control features. Intricate fire and maneuver plans must be avoided. The details of joint operational planning and conduct of operations will follow the procedures outlined for reserve/reaction operations discussed below.

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(3) Phase III: Reserve and Reaction Forces in Coordination with RVNAF (Phase I and II Continue).

(a) III MEF units will provide combat support to RVNAF on the basis of operational coordination. Operations will generally be in support of RVNAF forces in contact with an enemy force, upon the request of, and as approved by the CG, I Corps.

(b) Upon receipt of the request for combat support, the III MEF element commander and principal staff officers will move to the RVNAF CP (usually a Div CP), meet with their opposite numbers and jointly develop an operations plan. Agreement on the details of the operations, such as objectives, times, fire support coordination, communications and signals, will be developed as the planning progresses.

(c) Because of the coordination problems and the absence of a positive command chain controlling all units, it is essential that the plan be simple and avoid close and intricate maneuver involving III MEF and RVNAF forces, and that there be no close tactical interdependence between the two which would require precise execution to insure operational success. Therefore, it is important that clearly defined zones and objectives be assigned which are readily identifiable on the ground and on the map. Boundaries, phase lines and other control measures must be unmistakable and understood by both commanders and their staffs.

(d) Once agreement is reached, each commander executes his portion of the plan. The commanders and staffs remain co-located throughout the operation insofar as possible; as a minimum they retain senior and responsible representatives at the combined CP. Communications will be established between the III MEF units and adjacent RVNAF units through the advisors with those units who, acting as combat liaison officers, will report positions, actions and intelligence directly to the III MEF element commander or his staff.

(e) Supporting ground weapons and air support will be closely controlled in order to avoid fire on friendly positions. A Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) is desirable and, if established, will be a cooperative undertaking. In the absence of an FSCC the control of fires becomes a problem of establishing and updating no-fire lines. The exchange of fire support and common use of air support must be anticipated.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Vietnamese liaison personnel will be provided at battalion level and with artillery units as necessary to identify and prevent firing on friendly civilians or forces. Every effort will be

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made to provide VNN liaison personnel with companies operating separately.

(2) III MEF Close Air Support will be employed under the procedures of Annex A.

(3) CG, III MEF, will report the readiness of III MEF Combat Forces at the separate base areas of Hue-Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai, to enter Phase II and III. The III MEF element at Da Nang will not enter Phase III, nor other III MEF combat forces Phase II without the specific approval of COMUSMACV.

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(4) III MEF units actually engaged in operations against the VC/DRV will have first priority call on the Close Air Support resources of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and other US air units as required.

(5) III MEF and his subordinate commanders are not responsible for the rural reconstruction of their areas, though civic action, psychological warfare activities, and intelligence activities that contribute to rural reconstruction are encouraged. All such measures should be coordinated with Vietnamese civil or military authorities, through US counterparts where appropriate.

(6) In the event of a civil disturbance within a TAOR, the III MEF unit commander will immediately notify the nearest civil or military authorities and attempt to arrange for local forces to quell the disturbance. If such assistance is not available, or until it arrives, the III MEF unit will take appropriate passive or active measures to defend itself and the facilities it is charged with defending.

4. Logistics: To be issued separately.

5. Command Relations:

a. III MEF will pass to operational command of COMUSMACV upon establishment ashore.

b. As a matter of policy, US Forces will not be placed under the command of allied commanders nor is the GVN prepared to accept the operational control of US commanders. However, this restriction is not intended to preclude the temporary tactical direction of US Forces by RVNAF commanders under particular circumstances so warranting or the temporary tactical direction of RVNAF by US commanders under similar circumstances when mutually agreed by the appropriate commanders. Matters of this nature which cannot be resolved by subordinate US commanders will be referred to COMUSMACV.

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c. The basic concept underlying command relations between the CG, III MEF and CG, I Corps, is one of combat support in the mutual self-interest of both commands. Close and mutual coordination and cooperation is essential to the success of this concept.

d. National command integrity will be maintained at all levels.

e. The Senior Advisor, I Corps, and all other MACV advisory teams, at all levels, will continue their mission of advice, assistance and operational support of RVNAF under direction of COMUSMACV. MACV advisory teams will assume liaison responsibility to the CG, III MEF and his subordinate forces, as required and directed by COMUSMACV.

6. This document may be downgraded to SECRET upon release of the information by the American Embassy Saigon and the GVN that additional Marine elements are landing at Chu Lai on or about 7 May 1965

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W.C. Westmoreland

W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

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Copies furnished:

- CINCPAC
- CINCPACFLT
- CG, FMFPAC
- 2d Air Division
- SA, I Corps
- American Embassy Saigon
- CINC RVNAF

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"ANNEX A (Operat 3 Procedures for Marine Aircraft in South Vietnam)

1. The current procedures for operational coordination and control for Forward Air Control were designed for the support of ARVN units by U.S. and VNAF aircraft. The employment of U.S. forces in a combat role requires modification of those rules and procedures.

2. With specific reference to the III MEF, AOC, and the I ASOC, the following rules will apply:

a. Marine jet aircraft will operate under the tactical air control system through AOC representing in this case the Commander, 2d Air Div.

b. Marine combat forces will have first call on Marine aircraft at all times. The III MEF may request fighter aircraft for pre-planned strikes and for strip or other alert as deemed necessary by the CG, III MEF and such requests will be honored by AOC and ASOC.

c. Each day CG, III MEF will indicate to AOC, Marine fighter aircraft available for the forthcoming 24 hour period. These aircraft, less those on alert for the support of Marine combat forces on operations, may be fragged by AOC for in-country missions.

d. Marine aircraft may conduct strikes in close support of Marine combat forces on the ground under the control of a Tactical Air Control Party on the ground or a Marine or U.S. Air Force controller in the air. In the absence of a TACP or Airborne FAC, U.S. Army Airborne observer may mark target. No Vietnamese observer is necessary with an airborne FAC on a close support mission although the presence of such an observer is desirable.

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Annex A to Encl (1)

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3. In accordance with the recently published ARVN directive on air support system operated by the VNAF and in accordance with optimum operating procedures, the Marine ground elements may call directly on I ASOC for air support whether it be by Marine, U.S. Air Force or VNAF fighter aircraft. I ASOC will inform I Corps TOC and determine whether there are friendly forces in the area. However, I Corps TOC does not have veto power over the launch of U.S. aircraft in close support of U.S. troops engaged in combat on the ground. Tactical air control parties on the ground will utilize Vietnamese liaison parties with battalions and separate companies to avoid calling air strikes on friendly troops or civilians.

4. Interdiction targets not involved in the close and immediate support of U.S. ground forces will only be struck after approval by the TOC and unless in free strike area, will be controlled by a FOC or ALO aircraft, with Vietnamese observer aboard.

5. Priorities and procedures applicable to employment of utility helicopters are as follows:

a. The III MEF will control directly that helicopter squadron which is in direct support of the III MEF. The supporting CTOC will be kept appraised of the activities of this squadron by the USIF operations officer in the CTOC.

b. In the event the III MEF requires helicopter support in addition to that available from the one direct support squadron, requests will be forwarded to U.S. element of the CTOC and will be processed in accordance with existing procedures.

c. If helicopters from the helicopter squadron providing direct support to the III MEF are required on other missions,

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will not be committed until release is secured from the III MEF.

d. One USMC helicopter squadron will be in general support of I Corps. These helicopters will be available for support of the III MEF as outlined in b above.

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J2 Section, Hq MACV
Saigon, South Vietnam
1 May 1965

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 1

Reference: Map QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI Provinces, Scale 1:250,000.

1. (3) MISSION: Secure the proposed CHU LAI airfield.
2. (C) AREA OF OPERATIONS:

a. Weather:

(1) General:

(a) The spring transition began in mid-March and signaled the start of the southwest monsoon, which lasts from late April or early May to September. The weather will be clear, dry, and hot.

(b) The winds during the transitional month of May are variable. During June, July and August a low-pressure system is stabilized over south Indo-China and there is a regular in-blowing wind from the southwest or south. Along the coast sea breezes usually begin at approximately 1000 hours, reaching a maximum force in the early afternoon and dying away at sunset, when it is replaced by a land breeze which persists until dawn. In the coastal plains, local breezes may become the predominating wind and have sufficient force to reverse the general monsoon current.

(2) Effects on Enemy Activity:

(a) The enemy has proven continuously, through past activities, that the weather is not a detriment to his operations.

(b) VC techniques within the QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI area suggest a pattern is being established with high and low peaks in activity coincident with the wet and dry seasons respectively. The rainy season is used to expand the VC areas of influence and the dry season is used to consolidate the newly acquired areas.

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(3) Effects on Friendly Activity:

During the forthcoming southwest monsoon, wheeled and tracked vehicles will be able to move across the sand dunes and shallow lagoons of the coastal plain. The rice fields of the piedmont area are always flooded, either by irrigation or naturally, making dry season off-road traffic-ability poor. The flying weather will be excellent over all of the QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI area. Drop zones may be easily selected in the coastal plain and piedmont regions.

b. Terrain:

(1) General:

(a) The terrain in the area is of three types: The Coastal Plain, the Piedmont Region, and the Mountains.

(b) The Coastal Plain extends between one and four kilometers inland from the coast. This plain is composed of sandy soils and is characterized by a shallow water table, brackish lagoons, and sand dunes. Fertility of the area is poor.

(c) The Piedmont Region is flat, interspersed with low hill masses. The soil is fertile and composed of light to heavy clay. Almost all of the rice grown in this zone is harvested from the Piedmont Plateau.

(d) The mountains comprise the largest portion of the area and are characterized by rugged peaks, steep slopes, and dense jungles. The mountainous region is generally in the western portion of the area; however, they converge towards the sea, causing compartmentation along the QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI boundary.

(e) Significant are the waterways and valleys leading into the mountainous regions. Although the majority of the population congregates along the coast, substantial population belts parallel these corridors.

(f) Vegetation varies with the area. Along the coastal plain the beaches are often devoid of plants, but there are grasses of various kinds, along with cactus and evergreen groves. Bamboo is found along water-

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courses and lagoons. In the Piedmont Region many crops are grown and there are isolated clumps of trees, such as bamboo, banana, coconut and oil palms. The mountains possess virgin timbers of tropical hard woods. Trees of 50cm diameter and larger are common. The timber is overgrown with vines forming a canopy over a thick, lush undergrowth of smaller trees, vines, bamboo, and other vegetation.

(2) Effects on Friendly Activity:

Access to the mountains is hindered by the vegetation. The routes of exploration follow the stream beds to their sources. Traffic in the mountains is restricted to the existing roads, and the vegetation all but precludes the possibility of air dropping quantities of supplies.

(3) Effects on Enemy Activities:

(a) The terrain is a decisive factor in the development of guerrilla warfare in this area, since 4/5th of the area is heavily forested jungle regions. The VC capabilities are considerably increased in the form of unopposed and unobserved infiltration over concealed routes from the undefined Laotian/Vietnamese border.

(b) The strategic mountainous chain on the QUANG TIN - QUANG NGAI boundary, which extends to within two kilometers of the sea at the proposed CHU LAI air-base site, provides the VC with a haven during the day and an easy access to the populated areas at night. The fact that the mountain range serves as the provincial boundary is also exploited by the enemy in the hope that friendly operational responsibilities are not clearly delineated.

3. (C) ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Disposition: See Annex A, Enemy Order of Battle and Disposition Overlay.

b. Composition: Enemy forces posing a potential threat to the coastal areas of QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces are the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Military Region 5, with a total of six subordinate rifle and two heavy weapons battalions. Total strength of these regiments is 4,650 men. These battalions are armed with 81mm and 60mm mortars, 57mm RR and

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light automatic weapons, including LMGs. The weapons battalions may have in addition both 75mm RR and pack howitzers. Also of primary concern is the headquarters of Military Region 5 and the direct support units, a rifle battalion in direct defense and possibly and engineer battalion with an aggregate strength of approximately 1,880 men. MR-5 is located in the DO XA area of QUANG NGAI Province, approximately 50 kilometers due west of QUANG NGAI City. An advance CP of MR-5 may have deployed to the area approximately 30 kilometers west of CHU LAI. Along the QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI boundary there appear to be three newly arrived battalions, positioned from 10 to 25 kilometers west of CHU LAI. There may also be an AAA unit of undetermined size approximately 20 kilometers west of CHU LAI. Secondary threat forces are the Local Forces deployed along the coast in the foothills consisting of three rifle battalions, eight companies and five district platoons, numbering approximately 1,950 men. In addition to these Main and Local Forces there are approximately 11,000 militia consisting of cadre, armed guerrillas, and self-defense forces.


c. Strengths: Confirmed enemy forces committed in QUANG NGAI and QUANG TIN Provinces, which pose a threat to the CHU LAI area are one MR Headquarters, two Regimental Headquarters, 13 battalions, 27 companies and five platoons, totaling approximately 8,000 men. These include Main and Local Forces. The unconfirmed three battalions in the area may have a strength of 1,200 men. An additional 11,000 militia in the area could be used as replacements or reinforcements. These forces have 35 to 45 81mm mortars, 40 to 50 60mm mortars, 35 to 45 57mm RR, six to ten 75mm RR, six 75mm Pack Howitzers, possibly some 105 Howitzers and ample automatic weapons up to the 12.7mm HMG. The suspected AA unit may have 37mm AAA guns. Most units, Main and Local Forces, are estimated to be armed, at least partially, with the new family of 7.62 weapons. See Annex B for tabulation of enemy composition and strength.

d. Reinforcements: Elements of the 325th PAVN Division could be employed in a reinforcing role. There have been persistent but unconfirmed reports of regimental elements of the 325th PAVN Division located in I and northern II Corps. The 2nd Battalion, 101st Regiment, 325th PAVN Division is confirmed in KONTUM Province.

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e. Recent and Present Significant Activities:

(1) VC initiated incidents in QUANG NGAI Province increased during March and April from the level recorded in February. VC initiated incidents in QUANG TIN Province remain at substantially the same level recorded each month of the first calendar quarter; however, there was a drop in VC initiated activity during April, 1965.

(2) There have been numerous reports of large VC unit movements. Many of these movements have not been confirmed, as the alleged activity occurred in areas of very limited access. Reports include presence of elements of the VC third Regiment, normally based in PHU YEN Province, and another unidentified regimental size unit allegedly armed with 106mm recoilless rifles. The recent deployment of large VC forces in the area west of CHU IAI may be in anticipation of the ARVN annual operation into the DO XA area. Approximately April - May, each year since 1961, the ARVN has made an incursion into the DO XA area.

(3) Despite the reported presence and movements of many battalion size units, there has been only one significant contact with VC Main Force elements during the last thirty days. On 21 April 1965, an estimated two battalions of the VC 1st Regiment routed a four battalion ARVN force. The VC continue to avoid contact with the regular ARVN forces unless it is ARVN initiated.

(4) VC emphasis appears to be directed at selective assassination and kidnapping of GVN hamlet and village officials in areas where GVN influence is a barrier to VC exploitation. RVN paramilitary forces appear to be the target of VC harassing fires and small scale attacks and ambushes.

f. Peculiarities and Weaknesses: The VC of the Central Highlands continue to follow the general organization and tactical doctrine of guerrilla forces. The most serious weakness is considered that of logistical support for sustained combat operations, particularly war material, which to date, has been captured or covertly delivered from the DRV. The logistical needs in the form of food, clothing, shelter and transportation would probably be furnished by the population under VC control. A second weakness is the time involved in VC planning their attack in great detail, to include sand table exercises and a full scale rehearsal of a proposed attack, and the inflexibility of the plans once the attack begins.

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4. (S) ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS:

a. Attack the proposed CHU LAI Airfield employing a force of up to three regiments reinforced by the local and guerrilla forces.

b. Ambush friendly reconnaissance patrols and mobile reaction forces along the likely avenues of approach with a force of up to one reinforced regiment at a time and place of their choosing.

c. Defend their base and assembly areas with a force of up to one regiment reinforced.

d. Defend the DO XA area and Headquarters M-5 with a force of up to two regiments reinforced.

e. Increase the tempo of VC activity in QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces to isolate the proposed airbase, Province Capitals, and district towns.

f. Withdraw to the mountainous base areas.

5. (C) CONCLUSIONS: That:

a. The VC will continue to spread their influence in the QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI area, construct and improve their defenses, and create a more hostile environment in the proposed area of friendly deployment.

b. The enemy may conduct assaults by fire or probing attacks during the initial stages of establishing the beachhead.

c. Friendly reconnaissance patrols along likely avenues of enemy approach into the CHU LAI area will be subject to VC ambushes. The ambush is a favorite tactic of the VC as it can be planned for and initiated at VC pleasure. The likelihood of VC ambushes of friendly forces is higher during the initial stages of friendly deployment before friendly forces gain intimate knowledge of the terrain.

d. The possibility of a large scale ground attack demonstrating VC determination to discredit forces of allied nations, should not be discounted. Although considered unlikely, the VC may consider the heavy losses they would

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suffer to be worth the initial tactical display of strength and subsequent psychological victory among the populace throughout the RVN.

e. Should the enemy decide to exercise his capability to attack the airbase, he would not expect to hold the objective for more than a few hours. The enemy is limited in his capacity for control of objectives by logistic and fire support problems and vulnerability to air strikes.

f. The likelihood of a large VC attack during the initial stages of landing is considered remote. The VC effort in planning an attack in detail suggests this would not be done.

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ANNEX B TO INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 1

COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH OF MAJOR UNITS


<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Quang Ngai	HQ MR-5	Do Xa Bounded by: (BS06, BS26, BS29 and BS09)	See Sub Units	700(Est'd)
	V-30/V Gd Co (MF)	Do Xa	Lt Auto Wpns	75
	V-31/V Sig Co (MF)		Radio	90
	V-32/V Ren Co (MF)		Lt Auto Wpns	70
	V-33/V SM Co (MF)		Lt Auto Wpns	60
	V-34/V Sapper Co (MF)		Pioneer/Demo	75
	V-40/V AA Co (MF)		20mm AA MG 12.7mm AA MG	150
	506/V Engr Co/Bn (MF)		Auto Wpns	150±
	20/V Rifle Bn (MF)		2x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 4x57mm RR Auto Wpns	510
Quang Tin	1st/V Regt (MF) (6 Supt Cos)	SC Quang Tin	See Sub Units	2,185
	60th/1st Bn (MF)	BT03	3x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 6x57mm RR Auto Wpns	(400)
	80th/1st Bn (MF)	BT12	6x81mm Mort 3x57mm RR 7x60mm Mort Auto Wpns	(575)
	90/1st Bn (MF)	BT40	2x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR Auto Wpns	(450)

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
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<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
	400th Wpns/1st Bn (SF)	BT21	2(?)x75mm How 2(?)x75mm RR 6x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 5x57mm RR UnkxAA MG	210
	70th/Quang Tin (LF)	BT23	1x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 5xMG 1x57mm RR Auto Wpns	325±
Quang Ngai	2d/V Regt (MF) (6 Supt Cos)	SC Quang Ngai	See Sub Units	2,460
	93rd/2d Bn (MF)	BS63	Unk	(576)
	95th/2d Bn (MF)	BS83	4x81mm Mort 8x60mm Mort 4x57mm RR 4xHMG Auto Wpns	
	97th/2d Bn (MF)	BS82	Unk	(544)
	300th Wpns/2d Bn (MF)	BS43	Unkx75mm How Unkx75mm RR 4x81mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2x12.7mm HMG	(350)
	Thi Xa 52d/Quang Ngai (LF)	BS57	3x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2xHMG	270
	Thi Xa 38th/Quang Ngai (LF)	BS65	3x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort	380
	8 Local Cos 5 Local Plts	BS83 to BT60	lt Auto Wpns	920
Quang Tin-	U/I Bn	West of Chu Lai	Unk	400±
Quang Ngai	U/I Bn	West of Chu Lai	Unk	400±
	U/I Bn	West of Chu Lai	Unk	400±
	U/I AAA Unit	West of Chu Lai	37mm AAA (Uncont)	Unk

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

MACJ31

6 July 1965

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction Governing Operations of Elements of the
III Marine Amphibious Force in the Qui Nhon Area

7954

TO: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force

Ref: (a) Map Series L701 Scale 1:50,000 sheets 6852 I II III IV, 6851 I IV
(b) COMUSMACV 101440Z May 65 (Procedures for NCF in country)
(c) COMUSMACV 270813Z April 65 (Rules of Engagement and Operating
Procedures for Marine Jet Aircraft in SVN)
(d) COMUSMACV 160050Z April 65 (Utilization of USN Aircraft in RVN)
(e) COMUSMACV 151250Z (Rules of Engagement for Ground Combat Forces)
(f) COMUSMACV 040245Z July 65

1. MISSION: In coordination with CG II Corps, deploy forces to key terrain in the area of Qui Nhon in order to render combat support to RVNAF and to provide security for the airfield, port, logistic facilities and US supporting installations against attack.

2. OPERATIONS:

a. Concept.

(1) Phase I: Security of Base Area.

(a) Normally all ARVN units will be withdrawn from that area which is designated and assigned as a US security area or Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Coordination with police, Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF) in the area will be effected through an officer designated by CG, II Corps.

(b) The base area will consist of three zones, whose traces will be agreed between CG, III MAF and CG, II Corps.

1. A close in perimeter around the airfields or other similar installations to prevent sabotage or direct attack.

2. An intermediate extended zone (TAOR) preferably out to mortar range.

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Enclosure (2)
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REF 7954

3. An outer zone (extended TAOR) preferably extending out to light artillery range and covering most likely areas of assembly and avenues of attack. Aggressive patrolling must take place in this zone.

(2) Phase II: Deep Patrolling and Offensive Operations that contribute to the security of the base area and serve to prevent massing of enemy forces for surprise attack on the base area.

(a) Following establishment of the base security area in Qui Nhon, and in close coordination with CG, II Corps and local RVNAF commanders, the III MAF will initiate reconnaissance and offensive operations against VC bases and forces. These will be conducted unilaterally in easily identifiable TAOR's from which, for the duration of each operation, all RVNAF have been excluded. These operations should contribute to the security of the base area, and serve to prevent massing of enemy forces for surprise attack on the base area.

(b) Designation and delineation of these TAOR's will be on a case-by-case basis as determined by the CG, II Corps in coordination with the CG, III MAF. Selections will be based on available intelligence. As experience and success are gained in these operations in the various base areas, selection of these TAOR's may be delegated to the III MAF element commander at Qui Nhon in coordination with such subordinate elements of II Corps as designated by the CG thereof.

(c) Movement to and from the TAOR's will be coordinated with II Corps and its subordinate elements. US advisory teams will assist by acting as combat liaison officers. RVNAF liaison personnel must accompany the III MAF units in order to provide identification of friendly forces and as a means of contact with and identification of civilians.

(d) As experience is gained, the scope of these offensive operations may be increased. Eventually, it should be possible to effect coordination between III MAF operations in one TAOR with RVNAF in adjacent but separate and clearly defined TAOR's.

(e) The final step in Phase II is the conduct of pre-planned combined III MAF/RVNAF search and destroy operations. These may be initiated by CG, II Corps, by CG, III MAF, or by MACV/RVNAF High Command, with the concurrence of all commanders involved. Of utmost importance to the successful conduct of combined search and destroy operations is the nature of the tactical plans. They must be as simple as possible, with clearly defined and easily recognizable control features. Intricate fire and maneuver plans must be avoided. The details of joint operational planning and conduct of operations will follow the procedures outlined for reserve/reaction operations discussed below.

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(3) Phase III: Reserve and Reaction Forces in Coordination with RVNAF (Phase I and II Continue).

(a) III MAF units will provide combat support to RVNAF on the basis of operational coordination. Operations will generally be in support of RVNAF forces in contact with an enemy force, upon the request of, and as approved by the CG, II Corps.

(b) Upon receipt of the request for combat support, the III MAF element commander and principal staff officers will move to the RVNAF CP, meet with their opposite numbers and jointly develop an operations plan. Agreement on the details of the operations, such as objectives, times, fire support coordination, communications and signals, will be developed as the planning progresses.

(c) Because of the coordination problems and the absence of a positive command chain controlling all units, it is essential that the plan be simple and avoid close and intricate maneuver involving III MAF and RVNAF forces, and that there be no close tactical interdependence between the two which would require precise execution of insure operational success. Therefore, it is important that clearly defined zones and objectives be assigned which are readily identifiable on the ground and on the map. Boundaries, phase lines and other control measures must be unmistakable and understood by both commanders and their staffs.

(d) Once agreement is reached, each commander executes his portion of the plan. The commanders and staffs remain co-located throughout the operation insofar as possible; as a minimum they retain senior and responsible representatives at the combined CP. Communications will be established between the III MAF units and adjacent RVNAF units through the advisors with those units who, acting as combat liaison officers, will report positions, action and intelligence directly to the III MAF element commander or his staff.

(e) Supporting ground weapons and air support will be closely controlled in order to avoid fire on friendly positions. A Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) is desirable and, if established, will be a cooperative undertaking. In the absence of an FSOC the control of fires becomes a problem of establishing and updating no-fire lines. The exchange of fire support and common use of air support must be anticipated.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Vietnamese liaison personnel will be provided at battalion level and with artillery units as necessary to identify and prevent firing on friendly civilians or forces. Every effort will be made to provide VNM liaison personnel with companies operating separately.

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(2) III MAF Close Air Support will be employed under the procedures of references (c) and (d).

(3) CG, III MAF, will report the readiness of the III MAF Combat element at Qui Nhon, to enter Phase II and III.

(4) III MAF units actually engaged in operations against the VC/DRV will have first priority call on the Close Air Support resources of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and other US air units as required.

(5) III MAF and his subordinate commanders are not responsible for the rural reconstruction of their areas, though civic action, psychological warfare activities, and intelligence activities that contribute to rural reconstruction are encouraged. All such measures should be coordinated with Vietnamese civil or military authorities, through US counterparts where appropriate.

(6) In the event of a civil disturbance within a TAOR, the III MAF unit commander will immediately notify the nearest civil or military authorities and attempt to arrange for local forces to quell the disturbance. If such assistance is not available, or until it arrives, the III MAF unit will take appropriate passive or active measures to defend itself and the facilities it is charged with defending.

(7) In accordance with the provisions of reference (e):

(a) CG, III MAF is directed to inform MACV 24 hours in advance of their proposed search and destroy operations associated with the general defense of Qui Nhon.

(b) CG, III MAF is directed to obtain approval of COMUSMACV for any offensive search and destroy operations in areas which are not associated with the general defense of Qui Nhon.

(c) Combined planning for the commitment of the III MAF element at Qui Nhon in the reserve reaction role should go forward with Vietnamese II Corps Commander. III MAF combat elements may be committed on the approval of COMUSMACV only if requested by CG, ARVN II Corps and when ARVN reserves have been committed or are not available.

(d) In order to reach a common understanding on those areas which are regarded as a threat to Qui Nhon, CG III MAF submit to MACV overlays indicating the Qui Nhon primary TAOR and the larger tactical zone which includes VC bases and concentration areas which are regarded as a potential threat to the base areas. In this tactical zone, operations would be conducted in full advance coordination with CG, II Corps.

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(e) NGF will be fired in support of the III MAF element at Qui Nhon in accordance with reference (b).

3. COMMAND RELATIONS:

a. The TF 79 element landing at Qui Nhon will pass to operational control of COMUSMACV upon establishment ashore. It will in turn be passed to the operational control of CG, III MAF.

b. As a matter of policy, US Forces will not be placed under the command of allied commanders nor is the CWN prepared to accept the operational control of US commanders. However, this restriction is not intended to preclude the temporary tactical direction of US Forces by RVNAF commanders under particular circumstances so warranting or the temporary tactical direction of RVNAF by US commanders under similar circumstances when mutually agreed by the appropriate commanders. Matters of this nature which cannot be resolved by subordinate US commanders will be referred to COMUSMACV.

c. The basic concept underlying command relations between the CG, III MAF and CG, II Corps, is one of combat support in the mutual self-interest of both commands. Close and mutual coordination and cooperation is essential to the success of this concept.

d. National command integrity will be maintained at all levels.

e. The Senior Advisor, II Corps, and all other MACV advisory teams, at all levels, will continue their mission of advice, assistance and operational support of RVNAF under direction of COMUSMACV. MACV advisory teams will assume liaison responsibility to the CG, III MAF and his subordinate forces, as required and directed by COMUSMACV.

4. RELIEF OF THE SLF BY THE III MAF ELEMENT AT QUI NHON:

a. The SLF commander and CG III MAF are allowed the widest latitude in effecting a relief in place, as coordinated with CG II Corps and CTF 76.

b. CTF 76 NGF and GAS resources have been made available to cover this relief of the SLF by elements of TF 79, subsequently III MAF.

c. When completely relieved and as agreed by CTF 76 and COMUSMACV, the helo squadron embarked in the USS TWO JIMA will remain in the vicinity of Qui Nhon to provide helicopter support.

d. In this regards, CG, III MAF should inform COMUSMACV earliest of the feasibility of landing a separate and distinct helicopter squadron or elements thereof, exclusive of the SLF, to provide helicopter support of the III MAF element at Qui Nhon.

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W. C. Westorland


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General, United States Army
Commanding

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2d Air Division
SA, II Corps
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CG, USASCV
CTF 76
CTG 76.5
CTG 78.5

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AFO 4109, 20 July 1965

Hq I Corps
G3From: Brig Gen NGUYEN CHANH THI
CG I Corps & Tac Zone I

No. 7584/TM3/1/M

To: Commanding General,
III Marine Amphibious Force

Subject: Tactical Area of Responsibility of III MAF

Reference: - Letter No. 008165 dated 5 July 65 from III MAF
- Letter No. 7366 dated 13 July 65 from Tac Zone I

1. On 7 July 65, Hq I Corps received Letter dated 5 July 65 No. 008165 from III MAF recommending to expand the Tactical Area of Responsibility. Upon receipt of the above letter, we instructed our Staff to study the problem based on the following factors:

- (1) The anti-Communist spirit of the local population;
- (2) Administrative administration and territorial security;
- (3) Coordination of ARVN Forces in the area;
- (4) Enemy situation;
- (5) The lack of experience on the part of 9th USMC Regt in distinguishing the civilian people from VC.

And this Headquarters has noted that:

The expanding of the Tactical Area of Responsibility of III MAF in Danang must be done very slowly and gradually, to be able to control adequately and prevent effectively VC infiltrations. So the recommended expanding of the TAOR of III MAF in Danang, especially in the area South of Cam-Le river, must be carried out phase by phase and in one area after another. As a result, each time USMC elements occupy an area, this area is completely controlled by the armed forces and the administration.

2. In principle, we agree entirely with the recommendation for expanding the TAOR of III MAF in Danang. However, based on the above concept, we respectfully recommend that:

The expanding of the TAOR be divided into several phases, requiring a very detailed and continuous coordination between the ARVN units present in the area and the USMC units that are going to come there.

In the attached overlay, the expanded TAOR of III MAF is divided into 3 areas:

- a. Area A (See overlay):

Enclosure (3)

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Effective 15 July 65, this area has been placed under the responsibility of III MAF. Details are determined by letter No. 7366 dated 13 July 65 from Tac Zone I, with one change: 2 RF Companies will be maintained in the area to continue guarding the axes of communication and controlling the people, as well as to accompany the USMC units in their operations and patrols in the area.

b. Area B (See overlay):

Effective date: 17 July 65. Since this area is densely populated, the enemy can easily mix up among them to operate and set up organizations, and the local Authorities cannot control it effectively. We recommend that the reception of this area be divided into 2 phases:

(1) Phase 1 (joint operations and patrols):

While awaiting a complete occupation of Area A, and sufficient strength to occupy gradually Area B, for all military operations in this area, III MAF will coordinate directly with Danang Special Sector through the Advisory channel and through the VN Liaison Officers near USMC units.

After having coordinated with Danang Special Sector in general, III MAF will instruct its subordinate units to discuss details with the ARVN units in the area, to avoid deplorable misunderstandings.

(2) Phase 2 (occupation)

Depending on the capability to expand the TAOR, III MAF will occupy and control the small areas one by one, as outlined in the plan approved by I Corps and III MAF.

c. Area C (See overlay)

This area is secure, the people are under our control. It has been placed under the responsibility of III MAF since 17 July 65. Same responsibility and operations of USMC as applied for Area A.

3. All the existing RF and PF units located within the expanded TAOR of III MAF will be maintained, to conduct joint operations with USMC elements. When Hq III MAF deems that it is no longer necessary, the RF units will be withdrawn from there.

4. Since there are ARVN units stationed and operating in the new TAOR of III MAF, the following coordinating procedures must be applied:

(1) Arty and Air Force Support:

This does not concern Areas A and C, because they are relatively secure.

With regard to Area B, all requests for Air

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ENCLOSURE ③

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and Arty support from USMC must be notified to Danang Special Sector for consultation before implementation.

(2) Pacification:

Pacification will be the responsibility of ARVN units and of the Local Administrative Authorities; however, USMC may assist them, as it did in Le-My area.

(3) Defense of Danang Harbor:

To have unity of command, Hq I Corps has decided to establish a CP in charge of defending Danang Harbor effective 1 August 65, handled by Danang Naval Base in conjunction with US Navy. The TAOR of III MAF and of the Danang Harbor Defense CP are closely related to each other. There must be a coordination between the two Hqs for mutual support.

(4) River control:

The control on Danang River and Cam-Le River is the responsibility of Danang Naval Base and Danang Special Sector. USMC may reinforce and coordinate their operations.

5. It is hoped that the above recommendations will be compatible with the concept of III MAF, and that they will be carried out by both parties in a spirit of friendly cooperation, in order to obtain good results.

Info copy:

/s/ NGUYEN CHANH THI

- Danang Special Sector
- Danang Naval Base
- MAGV; G2; TOC I Corps

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ENCLOSURE (8)

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Hand-Message

From: G3 Tac Zone I
To: G3 12th Tac Area
III MAF
Info: Quang-Tin, Quang-Ngai Sectors
MACV, TOC I Corps
No. 7559/TM3/I/M.

Reference Letter No. 09165 dated 14 July 65 from III MAF.

1. Hq Tac Zone I approves the recommendation by III MAF to use the area Southwest of the USMC Tactical Area of Responsibility at Chu-Lai (see attached overlay) as a reconnaissance operation area from 15 July 65 to 31 Dec 65.

2. Hq 12th Tac Area will coordinate with 4th USMC Regt at Chu-Lai in the reconnaissance operations to reconnoiter the terrain. The existing posts will be maintained. During the above period, all bombings and shellings in the above area must be agreed upon by 4th USMC Regt at Chu-Lai.

3. To facilitate the contacts and liaison, it is respectfully requested that III MAF instruct 4th USMC Regt at Chu-Lai to appoint one Liaison Officer near the ARVN Hq responsible for all coordinated operations during the above period.

APO 4109, 18 July 1965

Brig Gen NGUYEN CHANH THI
CG I Corps & Tac Zone I

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ENCLOSURE (14)

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
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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
APO San Francisco 96601

2:JWD:agv
3800

14 JUL 1965

09165



From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, I Corps, ARVN

Subj: Request for Reconnaissance Zone

Encl: (1) Overlay of proposed RAOR

1. It is requested that the area shown in enclosure (1) be designated a reconnaissance zone for the period 15 July 1965 through 31 December 1965.
2. If approved, III MAF reconnaissance elements under operational control of the 4th Marines at Chu Lai will conduct reconnaissance and area familiarization operations within the area. Coordination will be effected between the 4th Marines and the 2nd Division, ARVN. It is specifically requested that no air strikes nor artillery fire be delivered within the reconnaissance zone without clearance from the 4th Marines.


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C-3, III MAF

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ENCLOSURE (4)



Enc (4)

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DATE: [REDACTED]
BY: [REDACTED]

EXAMINED
SECT [REDACTED]
FRAMES [REDACTED]
CWO

PHONE CO. [REDACTED]
TO: [REDACTED]
FROM: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

F1 1/2 1
MAF 13
DIV 1
WING 30/ITV
FLS 14
FEG 2
COMBATCO 1
DET 1 1/2 1
PUNCSA 4

1/10 8 0 8 2/1

THE MAP WASH. [REDACTED] 150800Z JULY 1965.

THE FOLLOWING [REDACTED]

THE MARINE AIRBORNE FORCE

	JING		ISA		TOTAL
	INF	ENL	INF	ENL	
	1604	2087	142	2400	26935
	1445	2528	167	2122	28392
1. INF REG	54	28	1	0	337
2. STAFF	37	1	1	0	85
3. COMB BATT BN CO, (111), MAF	14	210	0	0	224
4. DET BATT (CONV) CO, MAF	3	2	0	0	28
5. MARINE DIVISION (111) (111)	907	1608	65	562	17596
	547	1668	19	372	22666
6. HQ BN (-)	81	1000	14	24	1159
7. TRG CO (-)	62	60	9	9	706
8. COMM CO (-)	8	22	0	0	229
9. SERVICE CO (-)	3	11	0	0	117
10. ENR BN (-)	4	7	0	0	11
11. ENR YTD (-)	0	5	0	0	5
12. ENR 1ST INF	0	6	0	0	6

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ENCLOSURE (6)

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	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
MP CO (-)	4	64	0	0	68
DET 3D JMWV CO, PMP	0	0	5	15	20
<u>2D MARINES (-) (REIN) (DANANG-PHU BAI)</u>	234	4301	12	176	4723
<u>4TH HQ CO</u>	23	147	0	2	172
<u>1ST BN, 3D MAR (DANANG)</u>	43	962	3	54	1062
<u>2D BN, 3D MAR (DANANG)</u>	42	990	3	46	1081
<u>3D BN, 4TH MAR (REIN) (PHU BAI)</u>	126	2202	6	74	2408
<u>3D BN, 4TH MAR</u>	67	1275	4	55	1401
DET HQ BN 3D MARDIV	0	3	0	0	3
2D PLT (REIN) CO B, 1ST AMTRAC BN (10 LVTP-5)	5	204	0	4	213
3D PLT (REIN) CO C, 3D TR BN (5 M3A3 TRS)	6	87	0	0	93
3D PLT (REIN) CO B, 3D AT BN (5 M3A1 CRTOS)	4	95	0	2	101
3D PLT (REIN) CO B, 3D INCR BN	6	122	0	1	129
CO C, 3D RECON BN	4	81	0	3	88
4TH BN, 1ST MAR (-) (REIN)	34	335	2	9	380
HQ BTRY (-) (REIN) (4 TR TM)	23	130	2	9	164
BTRY I, 3DBN (6 107MM HOW)	4	82	0	0	86
BTRY M, 4TH BN (6 107MM HOW)	5	72	0	0	77
107MM MORTAR BTRY, 2D BN (6 HOWEARS)	2	51	0	0	53
<u>4TH MARINES (-) (REIN) (PHU BAI)</u>	213 213	4182 4182	11	175	4581 4581
HQ CO	21	234	0	1	256
DET HQ BN 3D MARDIV	0	3	0	0	3
DET 3D GIE	4	7	0	0	11
<u>1ST BN, 4TH MAR</u>	14	880	3	49	946

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	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
2D BN, 4TH MAR	43	937	3	52	1035
3D BN, 3D MAR	36	960	3	49	1048
CO A, 1ST AMTRAC BN (24 LVTP-5, 3 LVTC, 1 LVTB)	5	204	0	4	213
CO B (-) (REIN), 3D ATBN (15 M50A1 ONTOS)	4	95	0	2	101
CO HQ (-)	1	35	0	2	38
1ST PLAT	1	20	0	0	21
2D PLAT	1	20	0	0	21
3D PLAT CO A	1	20	0	0	21
CO G (REIN), 3D BK BN	6	87	0	0	93
CO C (17 M48A3 TKS)	6	73	0	0	79
BATT HQ CO (3 M48A3 TKS)	0	14	0	0	14
CO B (-) (REIN), 1D ENR BN	6	122	0	1	129
CO HQ (-)	3	12	0	1	16
1ST PLAT	1	38	0	0	39
2D PLAT	1	32	0	0	33
3D PLAT, CO A	1	30	0	0	31
BATT SUPPORT CO	0	10	0	0	10
CO H, 3D BRCON BN	4	81	0	3	88
1D BN (-) (REIN), 12TH MAR	44	175	2	14	635
HQ BTR (GT)	23	110	2	9	164
BATT C (6 105MM HOW)	5	72	0	0	77
BATT B (6 105MM HOW)	4	82	0	0	86
BATT MORTAR BATT (6 HOWS)	4	69	0	0	73
BATT G, 1ST BN (6 105MM HOW)	2	82	0	2	86

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	155MM		105MM		TOTAL
	CO	HOW	CO	HOW	
UNCLASSIFIED BTRY K, 4TH BN (6 155MM HOW)	4	89	0	2	95
1ST PLAT, 1ST 8-INCH HOW BTRY (SP) (2-8-INCH HOW)	2	51	0	1	54
<u>9TH MARINES (-) (REIN) (DA NANG)</u>	103	2189	8	84	2384
HQ CO	20	146	2	1	169
1ST BN 9TH MAR (DESIGNATED DIVISION RESERVE)	42	988	3	45	1078
2D BN 9TH MAR	41	1055	3	38	1137
<u>PROVISIONAL AIRFIELD DEFENSE BN</u> (TO BE ESTABLISHED)					
<u>12TH MARINES (-) (REIN) (DA NANG)</u>	81	1012	9	22	1124
HQ BTRY (-) (REIN) (2 CO'S)	20	295	3	7	325
HQ BTRY (-)	14	154	3	4	175
BTRY L, 4TH BN (6 155MM HOW)	4	91	0	2	97
1ST 8" HOW BTRY (SP) (-) (4 8-INCH HOW)	2	50	0	1	53
<u>1ST BN (-) (REIN), 12TH MAR</u>	40	519	5	11	575
HQ BTRY	12	151	5	4	172
BTRY A (6 105MM HOW)	8	97	0	2	107
BTRY B (6 105MM HOW)	8	97	0	2	107
BTRY D, 2D BN (6 105MM HOW)	9	101	0	1	111
105MM MORTAR BTRY (6 HOWTAR)	3	73	0	2	78
<u>2D BN (-), 12TH MARINES</u>	21	298	1	4	224
HQ BTRY	12	108	1	4	125
BTRY E (6 105MM HOW)	9	90	0	0	99
<u>1ST AIRBORNE BN (-) (DA NANG)</u>	12	210	0	5	227
HQ CO (22 LVTC-5, 3 LVTC-1, 8 LVTC-1, 1 LVTC-2)	6	46	0	1	53
CO B (-) (24 LVTC-5, 3 LVTC-1, 1 LVTC-1)	6				

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	ORF	ENL	OFF	ENL	TOTAL
3D AVIATION TRUCK BN (-) (DANANG)	12	119	0	4	135
HQS CO	10	84	0	2	96
CO A (-) (10 M50A1 ONTOS)	1	19	0	2	22
CO G (-) (10 M50A1 ONTOS)	1	16	0	0	17
10 ENGINE BN (-) (REIN) (DANANG)	23	540	0	7	570
HQS CO (-)	9	84	0	7	100
SUPPORT CO (-)	4	212	0	0	216
CO A (-)	5	135	0	0	140
CO G	2	44	0	0	46
CO G, 7TH ENGINE BN	3	65	0	0	68
3d MOTOR TRANSPORT BN (-) (REIN) (DANANG)	10	167	0	5	182
HQS CO (-)	6	62	0	5	73
CO A (30 M-35 2 1/2 TON TRKS)	3	80	0	0	83
2d PLAT CO B (15 M-35 2 1/2 TON TRKS)	1	25	0	0	26
2TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BN (-) (REIN) (DANANG)	6	131	0	3	140
HQS CO	2	32	0	3	37
CO A (-) (REIN)	4	99	0	0	103
CO G	1	11	0	0	12
1ST PLAT, CO A (15 M-51.5 TON TRKS)	1	31	0	0	32
2ND PLAT, CO B (15 M-51.5 TON TRKS)	1	29	0	0	30
3RD PLAT, CO D (15 M-51.5 TON TRKS)	1	28	0	0	29
10 RECONNAISSANCE BN (-) (DANANG)	28	226	1	10	255
HQS CO	3	84	1	4	97
CO G	5	67	0	3	75
CO B	5	75	0	3	83

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~~SECRET~~ (DANANG)

	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
B&S CO (6 FLAME TANKS)	30	380	1	6	417
CO A (12 M48A3 TANKS)	21	212	1	3	237
CO B (12 M48A3 TANKS)	6	107	0	2	115
CO C (12 M48A3 TANKS)	3	61	0	1	65
REG 2/7 (CHI NHON) <i>Loss Opcon</i>	71	1390	3	41	1508
20 BN, 7TH MAR	41	1073	2	35	1151
DEF BN CO, 7TH MAR	0	3	0	0	3
23 PATT, CO A, 3D APPRO BN (10 M79'S)	1	41	0	1	43
23 PATT, CO C, 1ST AIB (5 M50A2 ONTOS)	1	19	0	1	21
23 PATT, CO B, 1ST TKN BN (5 M8A3 TKS)	1	27	0	1	29
23 PATT, CO C, 1ST RECON BN	1	21	0	1	23
23 PATT (6), CO C, 3D INGR BN	1	45	0	0	46
BATT BN, 2D BN, 1ST MAR (6 M105 mm HOW)	7	116	0	1	124
BRN BN, 2D BN, 1ST MAR	2	12	1	0	14
DIV UNIT 261 (10 US M10)	20	33	0	1	54
D T BATTAL CO, ME * (DANANG)	2	29	0	0	31
SUB CO (17) (DANANG)	2	99	0	0	110
D T J & H (BATTAL) (DANANG)	3	47	0	0	50
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING (ADV) (DANANG)	35	4377	18	52	5032
	35	460	18	53	606
REG 1 (DANANG)	90	678	1	7	776
REG 1 (DANANG)	21	43	0	0	67
ADJUTANT GENERAL	2	25	0	0	27
MSG-2 (MARS & H ASST)	37	139	0	0	172
MSG-9 (DANANG) (GU LAI)	3	17	0	0	20
1ST MARINE BN (3 BATT'S, 18 COYS, 103 MSLS)	20	454	1	7	490

*5 Aug 0001
to FFA*

* ADMINISTERED BY HQ BN

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	ENL	ENL	OP	EP	TOTAL
<u>MAG-11 (DANANG)</u>	145	1217	4	16	1382
H&S-11	26	281	0	0	307
M&S-11	13	217	1	13	244
✓ MPA-513 (15 FEB)	46	362	1	2	413
✓ MPA-512 (13 FEB)	41	268	1	0	310
✓ VNG-1-1 (-) (7 FEB-14 FEB)	19	87	1	1	108
<u>MAG-12 (QUANG LAI)</u>	142	1160	7	17	1334
H&S-12 (1 G-11' D)	29	271	0	0	300
M&S-12	25	430	4	17	476
✓ VNA-214 (17 A-40)	25	139	1	0	165
✓ VNA-215 (19 A-40)	31	156	1	0	188
✓ VNA-301 (19 A-40)	32	172	1	0	205
→ <u>MACS-9</u> M&S-11 (DA NANG)	25 48	1264 1297	6	12 13	1540 1597
M&S-11 (-) (1 G-11' D)	80	452	0	0	532
M&S-11 (-)	11	228	3	6	248
✓ M&S-11 (-) (11 FEB-14 FEB) (-) (NO BAD)	30 54	111 444	1	2 3	144 158
✓ M&S-11 (24 JAN-31)	56	161	1	2	210
✓ M&S-11 (25 JAN-31)	51	167	1	2	224
✓ M&S-11 (1 G-11' D 5 FEB-13)	27	135	0	0	162
<u>FORGE (DA NANG)</u>	51	1237	10	128	1426
H&S-11 (-) (1 FEB-10 FEB 58)	14	158	2	9	183
M&S-11 (-)	0	33	0	0	32
M&S-11 (-) 30 FEB 58					
M&S-11 (-)					

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ENCL (5)

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	WFO		USN		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
SVC PLAT (-) (AFIN) <i>Soft Sect</i> <i>Medical Sect</i>	2	22	0	0	24
COIN PLAT (-) (FBI)	1	53	0	0	54
DAMN PROCESSING PLAT	1	15	0	0	16
DET SUPPORT CO, HAS EN, 3D IGR <i>Co Hq</i>	0	21	0	0	21
DET GRAVES REG PLAT					
DET FORD, BOW, LAIRD PLAT					
DET DEER HEN SECT					
SUPPLY CO (-) (AFIN), 3D SVC IN	1	189	1	6	197
CO HQ (-) (AFIN)	2	13	0	0	15
SUP PLAT (-) (AFIN)	1	80	1	6	91
ADM PLAT (-) (AFIN)	1	16	0	0	17
PLAT IN					
DET 3, 2D ALPH SECT					
DET AND CO, 3D IGR					
CO (-) (AFIN), 3D SVC IN					
PLAT (-) (AFIN), 3D IGR	2	16	0	0	38
PLAT IN					
PLAT 2, 3 IGR SECT					
DET 3D SVC IN					
DET <i>Plt</i> , 3D IGR	0	17	0	0	17
DET (AFIN) (AFIN) 3D IGR	1	138	0	0	140
3D IGR					
3D IGR (-) (AFIN), 3D SVC IN					
SVC PLAT (-) (AFIN), 3D SVC IN	1	30	0	0	31
DET SQUAD (-) (AFIN), 3D SVC IN	1	31	0	0	32

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	USMC		USM		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
MAINT CO., (-) (REIN), 3D SVC BN	5	265	0	0	270
CO HQ (-)	1	11	0	0	12
MT MAINT PLAT (-) (REIN)	1	87	0	0	88
MT MAINT PLAT (-)					
DET MT MAINT CO, 3D FSR					
ORD MAINT PLAT (-) (REIN)	1	61	0	0	62
ORD MAINT PLAT (-)					
DET ORD MAINT					
ELECT MAINT PLAT (-) (REIN)	1	36	0	0	37
ELECT MAINT PLAT (-)					
DET ELECT MAINT CO, 3D FSR					
ENGR MAINT PLAT (-) (REIN)	1	57	0	0	58
ENGR MAINT PLAT (-)					
DET ENGR MAINT CO, 3D FSR					
GEN SUPPLY MAINT PLAT, GS MAINT CO, 3D FSR	0	13	0	0	13
TRUCK CO (-) (REIN), 3D SVC BN	2	98	0	0	100
CO HQ (-) (2 M-35 2 1/2 TON TRKS)	2	29	0	0	31
TRK PLAT (-) (10 M-35 2 1/2 TON, 1 M-52 TRKS)	0	26	0	0	26
TRK SECT, DS TRK PLAT (10 M-35 2 1/2 TON)	0	31	0	0	31

2 M-49 TRKS, 1 M-50 TRK

1 M-172 TRK + 1 M-62 TRK

TRUCKS, ~~2 M-49 TRKS~~
1 M-62 WRECKERS

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	ARMED		UNARMED		TOTAL
	OFF	ENCL	CEI	ENI	
DET Truck Co, H+S Bn, 3^dFSR (4-11-52 TRKS, 2 MILIT TRKS)	0	8	0	0	8
TRK SECT, INVT ENCL PLT, TRK CO, 3^dFSR (4 M52 TRKS)	0	4	0	0	4
FUEL TRANS SECT, TRANSPORT PLT TRK CO, 3^dFSR (2 M49 TANKERS)	0	4	0	0	4
3^d SHORE PARTY BN (-)	12	269	0	13	294
H&S CO (-)	6	121	0	12	139
CO A	3	66	0	0	69
CO C	3	82	0	1	86
3^d MED BN (-)	3	98	27	100	188
H&S CO	3	97	7	32	95
CO G (-) (REIN)	0	1	10	48	59
3^d SIGNAL CO (-)	0	0	10	20	30
<u>ARCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT UNIT #1 (HU LAT)</u>	22	605	15	65	707
PROVISIONAL H&S CO	5	39	0	0	44
DET H&S CO, 3 ^d SVC BN					
DET 3 ^d FSR					
PROVISIONAL SUPPLY CO	6	150	0	0	156
DET SUP CO, 3 ^d SVC BN					
DET H&S CO, 3 ^d SVC BN					
DET RATION CO., 3 ^d FSR					
DET BULK PLT, CO 3 ^d FSR					
DET AMMO CO, 3 ^d FSR					
PROVISIONAL MAINTENANCE CO	2	162	0	0	164
DET MAINT CO, 3 ^d SVC BN					
DET MAINT BN, 3 ^d FSR					

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	H&S		UEN		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
CO B (REIN), 3D SHORE PARTY BN	4	101	0	0	105
DET H&S CO, 3D SHORE PARTY BN					
CO B (REIN), 3D MED BN	0	19	15	65	99
PREV MED SECT, H&S CO, 3D MED BN					
DET 3D DENTAL CO					
CO C (-)(REIN), 3D MTBN	5	134	0	0	139
1ST PLT, CO G, (15 M36 2 1/2 TON TRKS)					
2D PLT, CO G, (15 M36 2 1/2 TON TRKS)					
1ST PLT CO B, (15 M36 2 1/2 TON TRKS)					
1ST PLT CO C, 9TH MT BN (15 M-51, 5 TON TRKS)					
DET TRK CO, 3DSVCBN (20 M35, 1 M36, 1 M38, 1 M39, w/n 172 Trk & 1 M32 TRK)					
DET TRK CO, 3D FSR					
PROVISIONAL MAINT PER					
<u>FORCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT UNIT #2 (PHU BAI)</u>	8	162	7	28	205
PROVISIONAL H&S CO	4	19	0	0	23
DET H&S CO, 3D SVC BN					
DET TRK CO, 3D SVC BN					
DET 3D FSR					
PROVISIONAL SUPPLY CO	1	34	0	0	35
DET SUP CO, 3D SVC BN					
DET H&SCO, 3D SVC BN					
DET RATION CO, 3D FSR					
DET BULK FUEL CO, 3D FSR					
DET AMMO CO, 3D FSR					

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	USMC		(G)		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
PROVISIONAL MAINTENANCE CO	2	65	0	0	67
DET MAINT CO, 3D SVC BN					
DET MAINT BN, 3D FSR					
CO A (-) (REIN), 3D MED BN	0	8	7	28	43
DET 3D DENTAL CO					
CO B (-) (REIN), 3D MT BN	1	36	0	0	37
DET TRK CO, 3D SVC BN (3 M35'S)					
<u>FORCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT UNIT #3 (QUI NEON)</u>	2	70	0	0	72
PROVISIONAL H&S CO	1	3	0	0	4
DET H&S CO, 1ST SVC BN					
DET 1ST FSR					
DET 3D SVC BN					
PROVISIONAL SUPPLY CO	0	8	0	0	8
DET SUP CO, 1ST SVC BN					
DET H&S CO, 1ST SVC BN					
DET RATION CO, 1ST SVC BN					
DET BULK FUEL CO, 1ST FSR					
DET AMMO CO, 1ST FSR					
DET 3D FSR					
PROVISIONAL MAINTENANCE CO	0	17	0	0	17
DET MAINT CO, 1ST SVC BN					
DET MAINT BN, FSR					

ENCLOS

	USMC		UN		TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
20PLT, CO C, 1ST MT BN (15 M3 2 1/2 TON TRKS)	1	34	0	0	35
DET CG C, 1ST MED BN	0	8	0	0	8
DET CO C, 1ST DENTAL CO					
<u>*PROVISIONAL NCG SUPPORT ACTIVITY</u>	9*	18*	0*	0*	27*
<u>30TH NAVAL CONSTRUCTION REGIMENT</u>	2	1	57	¹⁵⁶⁵ 2562	1625
HQ STAFF	2	1	4	19	3
NCP-3	0	0	18	508	526
NCP-9	0	0	17	520	537
NCP-10 <i>CHULAI</i>	0	0	18	518	536
DET ACB-1 <i>CHULAI</i>					

* ADMINISTERED BY HQCO, HQBN

CP-6

RELEASED BY *Ch Jones*

ENCLOSURE

Form required Ph I

3 VMFA

4 VMA

Ph II

2 VMFA

2 VMF

On I

Haz Phu Ba 1 Bw

Danny 4 "

Chu Lu 5 "

Quang Ngai 1 "

Qui Nam 4

1 Hm ^{Bl} Eng 2 Syd

3 " 2 1 5

1 " 2 1 3

DE RUHLHL 6260 20717
 ZNY EEEEE
 R 310717Z
 FM CINCPACFLT
 TO ZEN/COMSERVPAC
 INFO RUECW/CNO
 RUECEM/GMC
 RUMFCR/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUMFUAQ/NCC (CG III MAF)
 RUWSUAV/COMPHIBPAC
 RUMSHS/MEDSUPPACT SAIGON
 RUHPG/CG FMFPAC
 RUMFCR/CTF SEVEN SIX
 ZEN/COMCBPAC
 RUECEH/BUDOCKS
 RUECH/BUPERS
 RUECD/BUSANDA
 RUECM/CHNAVMAT
 RUECYG/DIRFIDSUPPACT
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 RUWDAF/EPDOPAC
 RUWDKN/COMINPAC
 ZEN/DIRPACDOCKS

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVSUPPACT DANANG

A. SECNAVNOTE 5450 SER 1901 OF 17 JUL 1965

B. CINCPACFLT 210249Z

1. REF A FORMALLY ESTABLISHED NAVSUPPACT DANANG AND PROVIDED FOLLOWING GUIDANCE:

A. NAVSUPPACT DANANG IS A SHORE (FIELD) ACTIVITY, COMMAND OF WHICH IS DELEGATED TO CINCPACFLT, TO BE EXERCISED THROUGH COMSERVPAC.

B. AREA COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITIES ARE ASSIGNED NCOMNAVPHIL.

Enclosure (7) (7)

PAGE 2 RUHLHL 6260 UNCLAS E F T O

C. THE MISSION IS TO CONDUCT MILITARY LOGISTIC OPERATIONS AT PORTS AND BEACHES FOR THE SUPPORT OF U.S. FORCES AND ATTACHED THIRD COUNTRY FORCES IN ASSIGNED AREAS.

2. REF B, PROMULGATED PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF REF A, ADVISED OF THE APPROVAL OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVSUPACT DANANG, AND PROVIDED THE MISSION (IN CONSONANCE WITH REF A) AND TASKS FOR THE SHORE (FIELD) ACTIVITY.

3. RECOGNIZING THAT PERSONNEL, MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCTION ACTIONS WILL GOVERN THE POINT IN TIME AT WHICH NAVSUPACT WILL ACHIEVE A COMPLETE CAPABILITY TO MEET THE ASSIGNED MISSION AND TASKING, IT REMAINS DESIRABLE TO ESTABLISH A TARGET DATE FOR ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES. THE DATE OF 15 OCT 1965 IS ESTABLISHED AS THE DATE FOR NAVSUPACT DANANG TO ACHIEVE THE CAPABILITY TO MEET ITS ASSIGNED MISSION.

BT

Enclosure ⁽¹⁷⁾
~~(12)~~

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COMM: # 518

DRAFTER J. E. GREENWOOD

SECT G-3 PHONE 3

TRAVS TOD

CNO

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE 041645Z

FROM: CG III HQ

TO:

CG III HQ, CG III HQ, CG III HQ

BLT 2/7

INFO: CG III HQ

SA I CORPS

SA II CORPS

CG III HQ / I MGR (FWD)

9-1-D

OPERATION ORDER 304-65

A. COMUSMACV 040245Z JULY (NOTED)

F. COMUSMACV 040245Z JULY (NOTED)

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1. SITUATION

A. GENERAL

(1) RE: A REFERS. HIGHER HEADQUARTERS HAS AUTHORIZED THE ENTRY

INTO RVN OF 8000 ADDITIONAL MARINES FROM THE FOLLOWING UNITS:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| HQ BN (-) 3D MAR DIV | 3D INF BN (-) |
| 3D MAJ (REAR ECHELON) | 3D MK BN (-) |
| 4TH MAR (REAR ECHELON) (OTR LAY)* | 9TH INF BN (-) |
| 9TH MAR HQ | 1ST ABRAC BN (-) |
| BLT 2/9 | 3D SF BN (-) |
| BLT 2/7 (QOI NHON)* | DET 3D PSR |
| 12TH MAR HQ | HEMS LI |
| 21 W 12TH MAR | MARS LI |
| 8 LHM PLAT | VFPL-542 |
| 3D MP BN (-) | MACS-9 |
| 3D ENGR BN (-) | A BTRY 1ST LAAM BN |
| 3D AT BN (-) | DET 3D PSR (-) |

*(NOTE: (1) UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED, ABOVE UNITS LAND DA NANG)

(2) BLT 2/7 HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO LAND AT QOI NHON AND PROVIDE

SECURITY FOR CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS IN THE QOI NHON SUPPORT AREA UNTIL

RELIEVED FOR FURTHER DEPLOYMENT AS DIRECTED BY CG III HQ.

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(3) REMAINDER OF INCOMING UNITS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO LAND AT CHU LAI OR DA NANG, REPORT OPCON CG III MAF, AND EXECUTE MISSIONS AS DIRECTED.

(4) LANDINGS AT CHU LAI AND DA NANG ARE FULLY COVERED AND SHOULD POSE NO MAJOR COORDINATION PROBLEM AS OBJECTIVE AREAS ARE OCCUPIED BY NORMAL PARENT UNITS OF INCOMING FORCES. LANDING AT QUI NHON IS ALSO COVERED, BUT WILL REQUIRE MORE DETAILED COORDINATION IN VIEW OF THE RELIEF TO BE EFFECTED AND THE RVNAF AND U. S. FORCES IN THE AREA.

B. ENEMY FORCES.

- (1) SEE CURRENT III MAF ISUMS.
- (2) QUI NHON STUDY TO BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.

C. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) COMSEVENTHFLT CONDUCTS LANDINGS AT QUI NHON, CHU LAI, AND DA NANG AND PROVIDES AIR AND NCF SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. WILL RECONSTITUTE SELF UPON RELIEF OF BLT 3/7 AT QUI NHON.

(2) RVNAF ASSIST IN PROVIDING SECURITY AT LANDING SITES AS REQUESTED.

2. MISSION. III MAF CONTINUES CURRENT OPERATIONS IN DA NANG, PHU BAI, AND CHU LAI AREAS; ENSURES PROPER LIAISON IS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN ALL PARTIES INVOLVED IN QUI NHON LANDING; PROVIDES COMBAT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT AS REQUESTED FOR INCOMING UNITS; COORDINATES AS NECESSARY WITH I CORPS FOR LANDING AT CHU LAI AND DA NANG.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. III MAF SUPPORTS LANDING OF ADDITIONAL.

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FORCES AT QUI NHON, DA NANG, AND CHU LAI. SUPPORT WILL CONSIST PRIMARILY OF PROVIDING TACTICAL SECURITY, COORDINATING OPERATIONS WITH RVNAF AND U. S. FORCES INVOLVED, ASSISTING IN MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT ON BEACHES, AND PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION TO MOVE UNITS TO ASSIGNED AREAS.

B. 3D MAR DIV (FWD)

- (1) CONTINUE DEFENSE OF DA NANG, CHU LAI, PHU BAI POSITIONS AND CONDUCT NORMAL COMBAT OPERATIONS.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF GROUND UNITS LANDING AT DA NANG AND CHU LAI.
- (3) SUPPORT UNITS LANDING AT DA NANG AND CHU LAI BY:
 - (A) DESIGNATING LANDING AREAS, ASSEMBLY AREAS, AND ROUTES AS APPROPRIATE.
 - (B) DEPLOYING FORCES AS REQUIRED TO SECURE LANDING AREAS FROM INTERFERENCE BY ENEMY GROUND UNITS.
 - (C) PROVIDING VEHICLES, PERSONNEL, AND GUIDES IN COORDINATION WITH FLSG, AS REQUIRED TO ASSIST MOVEMENT OF INCOMING UNITS TO ASSIGNED AREAS.

C. 1ST MAW (ADV)

- (1) *CONTINUE OPNS IN SUPPORT OF III MAF.*
- (2) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF AVIATION UNITS LANDING AT DA NANG AND CHU LAI.
- (3) BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE INCOMING AVIATION UNITS AND PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THEM ASHORE.

PAGE 3 OF 10 PAGES

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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~~SECRET~~D. FLSQ

(1) COORDINATE BEACH FUNCTIONS FOR DA NANG AND CHU LAI LANDINGS; ESTABLISH NECESSARY COMMUNICATIONS, BEACH MARKERS, EGRESS ROUTES, AND STAGING AREAS; FURNISH SHORE PARTY EQUIPMENT; ^{ARRANGE} TRANSPORTATION AS REQUIRED FOR LOGGERS' TENTS.

(2) BE PREPARED TO ASSISTilate SERVICE BY AND USE ATTACHED TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT AS APPROPRIATE.

(3) BE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO PROVIDE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOR III MAF FORCES AT QUI NHON.

E. BLT 2/7

(1) ANTICIPATE BLT WILL REPORT OPCON THIS HQ WHEN ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

(2) RELIEVE BLT 3/7.

(3) IN COORDINATION WITH II CORPS, DEPLOY FORCES TO KEY TERRAIN ^{AREA} IN THE QUI NHON, IN ORDER TO REINFORCE THE RVNAF DEFENSE OF THE AIRFIELD, PORT, LOGISTIC FACILITIES, AND U. S. SUPPORTING INSTALLATIONS.

(4) SUBMIT SITREPS EVERY 6 HOURS BEGINNING AT H-HOUR, DIRECT TO COMUSMACV INFO THIS HQ. UPON COMPLETION OF LANDING PHASE SUBMIT SITREPS AS OF 2200H TO REACH THIS HQ NOT 0400H DAILY.

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) TENTATIVE H-HOUR QUI NHON - 061500H JULY 1965.

TENTATIVE H-HOUR DA NANG - 070700H JULY 1965.

TENTATIVE D-DAY DA NANG - 8 JULY 1965.

FIRM LANDING TIMES WILL BE ANNOUNCED UPON RECEIPT.

PAGE 4 OF 10 PAGES

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(2) REPRESENTATIVES OF CG III MAF WILL ASSIST IN COORDINATING THE LANDING OF BLT 2/7 AND HTT 361 AND THE RELIEF OF BLT 3/7 AT QUI NHON. COL W. P. PALA, THE SENIOR OFFICER ASSIGNED, WILL ENSURE FULL COORDINATION WITH CG II ARMY CORPS REPRESENTATIVE, THE MACV REPRESENTATIVE (SENIOR ADVISOR 22D ARVN DIV), BLT 3/7, BLT 2/7, APPROPRIATE NAVAL COMMANDERS, AND THE COMMANDER OF THE U. S. FORCES IN THE QUI NHON SUPPORT AREA. IN COORDINATION WITH CG ARMY II CORPS AND U. S. ADVISORS, HE WILL ALSO SELECT A SECURE AREA FOR INSTALLATION OF THE HELICOPTER SQUADRON TO SUPPORT BLT 2/7 AT QUI NHON. THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS WILL BE ASSIGNED AS ASSISTANT REPRESENTATIVES *ASSISTANT OFFICERS?*

LTCOL G. H. NIESEN	12TH MARINES
MAJOR L. K. KECK	FMAW
MAJOR D. C. MILLER	12TH MARINES
MAJOR D. H. MORGAN	FLSG
CAPT W. D. FITTS	12TH MARINES
CAPT R. O. O'BRIEN	COM CO.
LT J. V. PARKER	12TH MARINES
LT G. M. MC GILL	12TH MARINES

(3) SORTIE SITREPS EVERY SIX HOURS DURING LANDING OF AUGMENTATION UNITS AT DA NANG AND CHU LAI.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

A. GENERAL.

(1) LOGISTIC SUPPORT CONCEPT.

(A) IT IS ENVISIONED THAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS IN THE QUI NHON AREA AS WELL AS THE REMAINDER OF INCOMING UNITS TO DA NANG AND CHU LAI MUST BE INTRODUCED FROM DA NANG. IN ~~THE~~ QUI NHON, THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF RESUPPLY WILL BE BY AIR WITH BACKUP BY SEA. THE INADEQUACY AND INSECURITY OF LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

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(A) SUPPLY POINT DISTRIBUTION INITIALLY.

(B) UNIT DISTRIBUTION ON ORDER OF CO, BUT 2/7.

(6) RESUPPLY.

(A) BY AIR OR SEA FROM FLSG

REQUESTS FOR LOGS OF SUPPORT TO BE MADE WHEN ESTABLISHED
FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE UNIT COMMANDER BY SA I NHA, AND FLSG IN CHS LAI AND
BY THE UNIT.

(7) AIR DELIVERY.

(A) REQUESTS FOR AIR DELIVERY INTO OBJECTIVE AREA OF
EMERGENCY AND HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS WILL BE REQUESTED FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS.

(8) CAPTURED MATERIAL.

(A) ITEMS OF CAPTURED MATERIAL HAVING INTELLIGENCE VALUE
WILL BE REPORTED TO SA IY CORPS HEADQUARTERS III MAF FOR EVACUATION
INSTRUCTIONS.

(B) WHEN DIRECTED BY SA IY CORPS, III MAF CAPTURED ITEMS WILL
BE TURNED OVER TO IN-COUNTRY FORCES.

(9) SALVAGE.

(A) ALL SALVAGE MATERIAL WILL BE EVACUATED TO THE FLSG AT
DE NANG OR AS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.

6. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION.

(1) CASUALTIES OCCURRING IN THE AIR-LIFTED FORCES WILL BE EVACUATED
BY RETURNING AIRCRAFT.

(2) ALL CASUALTIES WILL BE PROCESSED THROUGH COLLECTING AND
CLEARING COMPANY WHEN ESTABLISHED.

(3) REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY EVACUATION BY HELICOPTER WILL BE
PROCESSED BY SENIOR MARINE TACTICAL UNIT COMMANDER.

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(4) HOSPITALIZATION. WILL BE INITIALLY ABOARD TWO JIMA OR 8TH ARMY HOSPITAL NHA TRANG UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED FOR QUI NHAN. EXISTING MEDICAL FACILITIES AT CHU LAI AND DA NANG WILL BE UTILIZED.

D. TRANSPORTATION.

(1) HIGHWAY.

(A) COORDINATING CONTROL MEASURES.

1. LANDED UNIT COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES PRESENT.
2. ZONE OF ACTION: BY UNIT COMMANDER COORDINATED WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES.

(B) CIRCULATION.

1. MARKING OF ROUTES AS REQUIRED BY OCCUPYING UNIT.
2. AMBULANCES HAVE PRIORITY OF MOVEMENT.

(2) AIR.

(A) HELICOPTER LANDING SITES TO BE DESIGNATED.

(B) ADMINISTRATIVE REQUESTS FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

(3) PIPELINES.

(A) FUEL AND WATER PIPELINES WILL BE ESTABLISHED AS REQUIRED AND IN COORDINATION WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES.

E. SERVICE.

(1) DETACHMENT OF FLSG.

(A) PROVIDE INITIAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO FORCES LANDED AT QUI NHON AS DIRECTED BY BLT COMMANDER AND AS DIRECTED BY FLSG/FLSU IN DA NANG AND CHU LAI.

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(B) ESTABLISH MULTI-CLASS DUMPS; UNLOAD SUPPLIES FROM AIRCRAFT AND MOVE SUPPLIES TO ESTABLISH DUMPS.

(C) ESTABLISH AND OPERATE WATER POINTS AS REQUIRED.

(D) MAKE PROVISIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POW STOCKADE AS REQUIRED.

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(2) FLSG, III MAF.

(A) PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SERVICE FUNCTIONS TO DEPLOYED UNITS AS REQUESTED.

(3) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(A) EMBARKED CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL WILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE SENIOR COMMANDER IN AREA CONCERNED.

(B) MAXIMUM USE WILL BE MADE OF IN-COUNTRY MATERIAL AND FACILITIES.

F. PERSONNEL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES.

G. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) BOUNDARIES. TO BE ANNOUNCED.

(2) PROTECTION OF INSTALLATIONS - BY THE BATTALION COMMANDER.

(3) REPORTS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING DIRECTIVES.

(4) UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT.

(A) UTILITIES WITH HELMET (CAMOUFLAGE COVER (GREEN SIDE OUT)

(B) EQUIPMENT WILL INCLUDE NORMAL ARMS, FULL CANTEENS AND FIELD TRANSPORT PACK.

(5) SUPPLY INSTRUCTIONS. FORMAL PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.

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5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

A. COMMUNICATIONS. TO BE ISSUED.

B. CP'S AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) 111 MAF-DA NANG
- (2) FMAW - DA NANG
- (3) 3D MARDIV - DA NANG
- (4) CG 111 MAF REPRESENTATIVE QUI NHON AREA - INITIAL CONTACT

THROUGH SA 22D ARVN DIV.

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DRAFTER RJW
SECT CMD CTR PHONE 105
TRANS TOD _____
CWO _____

CCN 435
IMMEDIATE 2423267

MAF-13
DIU-11
WING-38/TTY

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FROM: CG III MAF
TO: COMUSMACV
~~CG FMFPAC~~

INFO: CMC
CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT
CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
CTF SEVEN NINE
CTF SEVEN SIX

CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)
CG THIRD MAB
CMT MCS
ADMINSO THIRD MARDIV
SR ADV I CORPS
CTE 70.2.1.1

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III MAF PLANS SUMMARY TO ACCOMPANY SITREP #84

III. PLANS SUMMARY

A. THIRD MARINE DIVISION INTENTIONS

1. FIRST BATTALION, THIRD MARINES. ONE PLATOON OF COMPANY D WILL PATROL IN GRID SQUARES (AT 8263), (AT 8363), (AT 8463) AND ESTABLISH NIGHT POSITIONS IN THE VICINITY OF (AT 858642). AMBUSHES WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON LIKELY ROUTES OF APPROACH.

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2. THE SECOND BATTALION, THIRD MARINES WILL CONTINUE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN THE NGOC SON (AT 8578)/DONG SON (AT 8675) VALLEY. COMPANY F, HAVING COMPLETED ITS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION FROM GRID SQUARE (AT 8575) NORTH TO GRID SQUARE (AT 8580) WILL PATROL BACK THROUGH THE SAME AREA SEARCHING FOR VC HIDING PLACES, CONTRABAND AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. A PLATOON OF COMPANY H WILL PATROL FROM (AT 840805) TO (AT 849798) and

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THEN SEARCH AVENUES OF APPROACH TO THE SOUTH. ONE PLATOON OF COMPANY F WILL PATROL GRID SQUARES (AT 8377), (AT 8277) AND (AT 8177).

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3. THIRD BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES. WILL CONDUCT A "HAMMER AND ANVIL" OPERATION WITH COMPANIES L AND M AND ELEMENTS OF THE 224TH REGIONAL FORCES COMPANY EMPLOYING A HELILIFT INTO LANDING ZONES AT (YD 899061) AND (YD 915061). ARTILLERY WILL FIRE PREPARATION INTO THE LANDING ZONES AND SMOKE WILL BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE LANDING. THE REGIONAL FORCES WILL SET UP BLOCKING POSITIONS FROM (YD 893092) SOUTHEAST TO (YD 916084). COMPANIES L AND M WILL PATROL THE EAST AND WEST BANKS OF THE SONG NONG RIVER FROM THE LANDING ZONES TO THE REGIONAL FORCES BLOCKING POSITIONS.

4. THIRD RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION. COMPANY D WILL COMMENCE PATROLS IN THE HAI VAN PASS AND CONTINUE BLOCKING POSITIONS IN THE VICINITY OF RED BEACH NUMBER TWO. COMPANY A WILL CONTINUE OPERATIONS AT DONG DEN MOUNTAIN.

5. FIRST BATTALION, TWELFTH MARINES WILL CONDUCT A 107MM FIREX, FIRING FROM POSITIONS AT (AT 933837), WITH IMPACT AREAS NORTH OF THE CA DE SONG *River*. [REDACTED]

6. NINTH MARINES WILL EXTEND PATROL COVERAGE IN THE SOUTHEAST SECTION OF THE TAOR AND WILL COMMENCE THE CLEARING PHASE OF QUANG CHAU HAMLETS (ONE) AND (TWO), (BT 0069) AND (BT 0068).

7. FOURTH MARINES. FIRST BATTALION WILL CONDUCT A COORDINATED OPERATION WITH UNITS OF THE SIXTH ARVN REGIMENT ON THE PENINSULA CENTERED ^{IN} (BT 4416) AND ON THE ISLAND CENTERED ^{IN}

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(BT 4315). SECOND BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES, AND THE THIRD BATTALION, THIRD MARINES WILL CONDUCT DAY AND NIGHT PATROLS.

8. BLT TWO SLASH SEVEN WILL CONDUCT PATROLS THROUGHOUT THE QUI NHON TAOR.

9. THERE ^{are} THIRTY-TWO PATROLS AND SEVEN AMBUSHES PLANNED DURING THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS.

B. FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING INTENTIONS

1. MAG ONE ONE. GROUND ALERT AND GCI/AMEX.
2. MAG ONE TWO. GROUND ALERT, HELICOPTER ESCORT, COMBAT AIR PATROL, SMOKE LAYING, BLUE BLAZER AND TPQ-10 BOMBING.
3. MAG ONE SIX. LOGISTICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, TROOP LIFT, OUTPOST RELIEF, AIR LANDED ASSAULT, RECONNAISSANCE/PHOTO AND SPOT.

C. FIRST LAAM BATTALION SITREP. CONDUCTED AAW EXERCISES CONSISTING OF FOUR USAF F-102 RAIDS AND EIGHT MAG ONE ONE F1B RAIDS. ALL RAIDS WERE SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGED.

D. VMCJ ONE. CONDUCTED SEVEN ECM MISSIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM. FOUR MISSIONS WERE IN SUPPORT OF A SEVENTH FLEET ROLLING THUNDER TWENTY-FOUR A STRIKE THAT WAS CANCELLED IN THE TARGET AREA. THREE SORTIES SUPPORTED A SECOND AIR DIVISION STRIKE ON THE LANG CHI EXPLOSIVES PLANT. PASSIVE ECM WAS CONDUCTED ENROUTE TO AND IN THE TARGET AREA. NO FLAK OR ENEMY AIRCRAFT WERE ENCOUNTERED.

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E. DO NOT SERVICE THIS MESSAGE; FOLLOW-UP AIR MAIL DELIVERY TO ALL ADDRESSES.

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