

DECLASSIFIED

30ps:hlb
000943-65
29 Nov 1965

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, III MAF ltr 103/RPL/jfc dated
29 October 1965

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology


1. Forwarded, contents noted.
2. This endorsement may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of the basic correspondence.


V. H. KRULAK

5200

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED



65 8904

III

UNCLASSIFIED

MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

65 3404




COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

5200

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year Intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.



UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o PPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

103/RPL/jfc
29 OCT 1965

00033465


From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG FMFPac msg 251942Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III MAF Command Chronology Aug 1965

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).


L.W. WALT

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

5203

COPY NO 1 OF 3 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

I. I. MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY


1-31 AUGUST 1965

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

PART FOUR

ENCLOSURES

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

DANANG AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

LEWIS W. WALT

Major General United States Marine Corps

Commanding

Command Chronology for period 1 Aug - 31 Aug 1965

Chief of Staff	Col Regan FULLER, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff	Col Olin W. JONES USMC to 19 Aug 1965 Col Howard E. WERTMAN, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	LtCol Donald T. DOXEY, USMC to 8 Aug 1965 Col Don W. GALBREATH, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Col Leo J. DULACKI, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col Edwin H. SIMMONS, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	LtCol Joseph S. HEITZLER, USMC to 26 Aug 1965 Col Harold A. HAYES, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	Col Elmer G. GLIDDEN JR, USMC From 23 Aug 1965
Supply Officer	Col Howard G. TAFT, USMC
Naval Component Command Provisional Support Activity	Col Robert W. BOYD, USMC
Force Engineer	Col William M. GRAHAM, USMC
Communication - Electronics Officer	Col Frederick C. DODSON, USMC

EXEMPTED FROM 5 YEAR DECLASSIFICATION;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



SUBORDINATE UNITS

3d Marine Division (-) (Rein)
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Force Logistics Support Group
 First Force Reconnaissance Co (-)

 Communications Support Co., FME

COMMANDER


MajGen Lewis W. WALE, USMC -
 BGen Keith E. MCCURCHEON, USMC
 Col Mauro J. PADALINO, USMC
 Capt David WHITEINGHAM, USMC
 to 10 Aug 1965
 Maj Malcolm G. GAFFEN, USMC
 Maj Donald L. MURPHY, USMC

Average Monthly Strength

USMC		USN		Total
<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	
1915	26182	201	2614	30912

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
 DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED



PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General. During August 1965 III Marine Amphibious Force headquarters was located at coordinates (AT 994757) which is 350 meters west of the DANANG Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam, adjacent to the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing command posts. All forces were located within the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) except the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) and a Detachment from Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (HMM 161). These units were located at QUI NHON in II CTZ and were under the operational control of Task Force Alfa. Major changes occurred as III MAF strength increased with the landings of both the 7th Marines at CHU LAI and the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines at DANANG on 15 August. III MAF personnel strength increased from 23,784 to 30,812 in August.

B. Mission. III MAF continued to operate within the guide lines of the mission assigned under phase II by the COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (Ref (a)), until authorization to initiate phase III operations was received from COMUSMACV on 6 August (enclosure (2)).

1. Phase II. The assigned mission of phase II operations is:

a. Unilateral reconnaissance and offensive operations against VC bases and forces within III MAF TAOR's to prevent massing of enemy forces for surprise attacks on base areas.

b. Coordination between III MAF operations in one TAOR with RVNAF operations in adjacent but separate and clearly defined TAOR's.

c. Preplanned coordinated III MAF/RVNAF search and destroy operations on the same objective area.

2. Phase III. The assigned mission in phase III operations consists of continuing phase II operation and the following additional assignments:

a. Combat support for RVNAF on the basis of operational coordination, generally in support of RVNAF forces in contact with an enemy force when requested by CG, I Corps.

b. Development of simple operations plans jointly with RVNAF commanders and staff when III MAF is requested to provide combat support.

3. Future Operations. Capabilities for extended offensive operations have been markedly improved and III MAF is prepared to assume a more aggressive mission under phase III operations than the "Reaction Force" role presently assigned. Proposed changes to the Letter of Instruction were submitted which essentially change the III MAF role to that of a mobile "reserve/striking force."

DOWNGRADED BY 1708Z 11/03/05
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

C. Expansion. The increased size and activity of III MAF necessitated several changes; such as the establishment of a coordinating headquarters at CMU IAF under 3Gen Frederick D. WANCH. Communications and logistics systems also underwent changes in an effort to provide the required support for the expanding force. In conjunction with the increased tempo of combat operations, civic action, combat information, and psychological warfare programs were emphasized.

D. Enemy Activity. Viet Cong activity also increased during the month as indicated by an attack on the Esso Tank farm north of DANANG; several attempts to penetrate the DANANG defense perimeters; the largest small arms assault on III MAF units to date in the vicinity of coordinates (JT 028602) in the DANANG TACOM on 15 August; and increasing reports of troop movements in the DANANG and CMU IAF TACOM's.

II. OPERATIONS

A. USMC Operations

1. Operation STARLITE. The most significant offensive action during this month was Operation STARLITE, launched on 18 August. Three battalions, attached to the 7th Marines, conducted an amphibious-hoiborne search and destroy operation in the VAN THONG village complex south of CMU IAF, supported by air, artillery, and naval gunfire. The purpose of the attack was to eliminate a VC force which reportedly had built up for an attack on CMU IAF. The enemy forces were of regimental strength, and strong resistance was encountered, requiring additional support of one BLT (3/7) from the Special Landing Force (SLF). The USMC units advanced through the objective area in two days and then were joined in mopping up operations by Vietnamese forces consisting of the ARVN 2d Battalion, 51st Regiment; the 3d RVN Marine Battalion; the ARVN 1st Co, 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment; the 4th Troop 3d Squadron Aerial Personnel Carrier; and, the ARVN 11th Ranger Battalion. Operation STARLITE was concluded at 242400H.

2. STARLITE Casualties. Casualties for the operation are shown in Table (1).

USMC		VC	
KIA	45	KIA	*614
DOW	6	VCC	0
WIA	203	VCS	25
		Captured Wpns	109

* Confirmed

Table I

OPERATION STARLITE CASUALTY REPORT

In view of the large number of caves and tunnels which were sealed or destroyed by Marine forces in their sweep operations, it is likely that the actual VC casualties were higher than indicated by the above body count.

2
UNCLASSIFIED

On 9 September the HOA VANG District Police Chief reported information received from an agent source that the VC had suffered 1430 KIA in Operation STARLITE, including a Major General KITCH.

3. Other Operations. Other operational activity consisted of strengthening defensive positions, patrolling, routine searching and clearing operations and stationing armed guards aboard MSTIS and MSTIS charter ships docked at DANANG and CHU LAI.

B. Coordinated Operations. The largest coordinated USMC/ARVN operation conducted in August was Operation BLAST OUT. This operation consisted of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and elements of the 4th ARVN Regiment executing a search and destroy maneuver on VC forces approximately 10 miles southwest of DANANG on 2 August. Details of the operation are reported in reference (b). Other coordinated operations conducted were routine USMC/RF-PF patrols, and small-scale search and destroy actions.

C. Air Support. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing continued to support 3d Marine Division and I Corps ground operations by providing close air support, interdiction, and troop/supply movements. The increase in III MAF and RVNAF activity forced the three UH34 Helicopter Squadrons to exceed planned aircraft utilization to the extent that the aircraft will reach maximum time between overhaul four to six months early at the present rate of operation. An additional Helicopter Group (MAG-36) arrived on 31 August, which should relieve MAG-16 from continuous over commitment. In addition to routine support, several "first" operations were conducted in August:

1. Night Helicopter Assault. The first USMC night helicopter assault in South Vietnam was conducted on 12 August when HMM 361 supported by WMO-2 lifted the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines on a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of coordinates (AT 8485). The success of this operation proved the feasibility of night helicopter assault, and thereby increased the flexibility of III MAF units in attacking VC forces.

2. Cluster Bomb Unit. The air support capabilities of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were further expanded by the addition of the cluster bomb unit (CBU) to the aviation ordnance arsenal. The first tactical delivery of this classified weapon by USMC aircraft was conducted on 11 August.

D. Naval Gunfire. The use of naval gunfire in support of III MAF/ARVN operations increased from 934 rounds fired in July to 5,096 rounds in August as a result of increased USMC activity and the addition of the destroyers USS BRITCHETT, USS ORLECK, and USS HENDERSON as naval gunfire support ships. The system for obtaining NGF support, both preplanned and quick reaction, was well established and provided excellent coordination and control in such activities as Operation STARLITE, and in the defense of the Esso tank farm. The Task Organization and a chronology of significant events of naval gunfire in support of III MAF/ARVN operations is submitted as enclosure (1) of this report.

UNCLASSIFIED

B. Enemy Activity. In addition to minor harassment attacks, VC forces attempted several perimeter defense penetrations at DAMNG Air Base on 17 August. An estimated battalion size attack was launched on the Esso tank farm north of DAMNG at coordinates (AT 837063) on 5 August. The tank farm attack resulted in two tanks destroyed and three damaged. Initial reports indicated that mortars and recoilless rifles were used. However, later investigation, by an explosive ordnance demolition team, revealed evidence that the tanks were destroyed by demolition charges, which were also used to open the tank farm gate. A simultaneous attack was launched on the N.2-O bridge located between the tank farm and DAMNG at coordinates (AT 387843). USMC artillery and naval gunfire was directed into the area from which the attacks were launched.

VC forces also launched the heaviest small arms, semi-automatic and automatic weapons attack encountered by III MAF forces to date, on 15 August. It was directed at a platoon position of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines in the vicinity of coordinates (BT 028692) in the DAMNG TRAIL. The fire fight started when the VC probed the USMC position at 151910H and it lasted for fifty minutes. Two Marines were wounded and the VC forces were observed dragging eleven bodies away. Details of Marine response to the attack are reported in reference (b).

III. COMMAND AND CONTROL

A. General. With the influx of additional forces and the increased tempo of operations, changes in command and control were inevitable. The most significant changes were the assumption by CG III MAF of operational control of the I Corps Advisory Group and the establishment of a coordinating headquarters at CHU LAI.

B. Control. As directed by COMUSMACV message 060225Z Aug 1965 (enclosure (2)), CG III MAF became Senior Advisor I Corps and assumed operational control of the I Corps Advisory Group on 7 August. The detailed responsibilities inherent with this additional task are outlined in appendix I to enclosure (2). A general plan and sequence of events in the assumption of control was submitted to COMUSMACV by CG III MAF and is included as appendix II to enclosure (2). This relationship with I Corps has already proven useful in improving coordination between III MAF and I Corps. Recommend changes to the Letter of Instruction LOI (reference (a)) under which III MAF is presently operating have been submitted to COMUSMACV. The LOI is outdated not only by the assumption of the additional responsibilities of the advisory Group, but by the nature of present operations, in that III MAF has successfully conducted the final steps of phase II operations, and is prepared to assume a more aggressive position than the "reaction force" role assigned by reference (a) as indicated by the results of Operation STARLITE.

C. Coordination. The coordinating headquarters, which was established at CHU LAI on 14 August, is under the Assistant 3d Marine Division Commander, BGen Frederick D. KIRCH. The purpose of this headquarters is to provide CG 3d Marine Division with an on-scene representative to act as adjudicator

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

of any conflicts which arise between parallel forces in the CHU LAI TAOR. The build up of the CHU LAI TAOR with the addition of the 7th Marines necessitated this change. The message defining the functions is included as enclosure (3) to this report. In addition to these major changes, operational control of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines located at QUI NHON, was assumed by U.S. Army Task Force Alfa and 3d Battalion, 9th Marines replaced 1st Battalion, 9th Marines as the DANANG Air Base Defense Battalion under OPCON of III MAF.

IV. INTELLIGENCE

A. General. Intelligence reports indicated a possible build-up of VC forces and preparation for a fall-winter campaign. Groups of as many as 100 VC were reported by various sources, in both the DANANG and CHU LAI areas, armed with an assortment of small arms which included sub-machine guns, rifles, carbines, and hand grenades. There were also indications of a redistribution of units in the CHU LAI and DANANG areas. The increased activity was suspected to be in preparation for assaults on the Air Bases at DANANG and CHU LAI in connection with the celebration of National Liberation Front Day on 19 August. In view of the above, two positive steps were taken.

1. Special Security measures were taken at DANANG Air Base on 17 August consisting of cancelling liberty, sealing the gates to all except essential indigenous personnel, and dispersing aircraft. The details of the special security precautions are included as enclosure (4) of this report.

2. Operation SPARLITE was launched on 18 August to destroy the forces concentrated south of CHU LAI.

B. STARLITE. During the period of early July to mid-August, numerous reports were received concerning movements of units in the mountainous area west and southwest of CHU LAI. The incidence of reports increased in late July and early August. Sources of information were: QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Sector agents, QUANG NGAI National Police, SMIAT, TAM KY and BINH SON District Hqs, Vietnamese Military Security Service, ARVN I Corps and ARVN 2d Division. Many of the reports were inconsistent but by 15 August sufficient intelligence information was obtained to conclude that elements of the 1st VC regiment had moved into the CHU LAI area. During the night of 14 August, the G-2, Advisory Group I Corps, reported to III MAF that a VC had defected to the 2d ARVN Division. The defector claimed to be from the 40th Bn and stated that the 1st Regimental CP, the 40th Bn, the 60th Bn, elements of the 90th Bn, and probably elements of the 400th weapons Bn were located in the VAN TUONG area. Total strength was estimated at approximately 2,000. This information was consistent with III MAF OOB (order of battle) holdings on the 1st VC regiment. On the basis of this intelligence, the decision was made on the evening of 15 August to launch Operation STARLITE at dawn on 18 August.

C. Enemy Defensive Tunnels. The VC forces have been very effective

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

at avoiding III MAF forces in search and destroy operations such as STAR-LITE by the use of tunnels and fighting holes. As a result, obtaining intelligence information concerning the structures of these holes is essential. Their complexity makes it difficult to seal them off or clear them of VC forces; some of them being 20 feet deep and 100 feet long with trap doors and hidden exits. A typical complex VC tunnel is included as enclosure (5) with pictures of several caves included as enclosure (6).

V. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

A. Morale: Troop morale received considerable attention during this period. The large number of troops and the anticipated duration of tour required that extensive enclave and in-country recreation facilities be developed. The R&R program was also expanded by obtaining an increased share of COMUSMACV quotas for out of country flights and implementing Marine Corps flights to Hong Kong, and Bangkok, Thailand. Table II shows the number of III MAF Marines who participated in the R&R program.

	<u>Bangkok</u>	<u>Hong Kong</u>	<u>Total</u>
III MAF Program	1050	1050	2100
MACV Program	0	94	94
Total	1050	1144	2194

Table II

MARINES PARTICIPATING IN THE REST AND RECREATION PROGRAM--Aug 1965

B. Casualties. III MAF casualties for August are shown in Table III.

	<u>USMC</u>						<u>Total</u>
	<u>Battle</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DEATH</u>	<u>Non-Battle</u>	
<u>KIA</u>	<u>INJ/ILL</u>						
Division	62	450	12	0	49	26	599
Wing	2	8	0	0	10	6	26
Total	64	458	12	0	59	32	625

VC

<u>KIA</u>	<u>VCC</u>
681	84

Table III

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE CASUALTIES - AUGUST 1965

VI. LOGISTICS

A. General. The overall logistics posture of the III MAF continued to improve. The Force Logistic Support Group was strengthened significantly

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

with the arrival of RLT SEVEN logistic support personnel at CMU LAI. This unit was absorbed by FLSU #1. A critical shortage of qualified ammunition personnel still existed; however, CG FMFPAC initiated action to bring the Third Forces Service Regiment Ammunition Company to full strength.

3. Cargo. A total of 58,474 M/T of military cargo was cleared through the port of DANANG during August which was a significant increase over the 34,621 M/T figure for July. However, a backlog of shipping waiting to be offloaded continued to be a problem. This was related to the limited facilities available to accommodate ships carrying U. S. cargo, RVN cargo and commercial cargo to support the local economy. CINCPACFLT has directed (encl (16)) that military port operations are in no way to conflict with those of the RVN and, as a result, all RVN cargo operations receive first priority use of available ramps and piers. Additional offloading ramps are being constructed, and the requirement for a centralized RVN Port Authority to provide for more efficient scheduling and discharge of ships has been addressed to COMUSMACV.

C. Food. A shortage of "C" rations developed with stocks of MCI's falling to 9 days supply on 28 August. This shortage was the direct result of slippage of resupply shipping schedule; inability of U. S. Army Ryukyus Island (USARYIS), Okinawa to fill a requisition for 765,000 MCI's, and non-receipt of 5 days of MCI's scheduled to arrive from Clark AFB, PI. "A" rations fell to 0 days supply on hand throughout the month. COMUSMACV was informed of this situation and corrective action was initiated.

D. POL. Packaged POL products also remained in short supply. This situation prevailed throughout RVN with in-country commercial assets being exhausted. As a result, on 3 August, COMUSMACV directed that packaged POL products would be supplied through service channels. CG FMFPAC furnished CONSERVPAC with a list of items required to support III MAF for 30 days, and CONSERVPAC ordered 90 days of supply for direct shipment to DANANG. Commencing on 15 November, USARYIS, Okinawa is scheduled to provide resupply of packaged POL for the III MAF. On 5 August, the VC attacked the Esso POL terminal at Lien Chieu, destroyed two JP-4 storage tanks and inflicted extensive damage to three other tanks. This eliminated the majority of the commercial storage capability for JP-4 in the I Corps area. The USNS COSSATOT was positioned at DANANG as floating storage and two T-1 tankers were requested to shuttle fuel from the COSSATOT to expeditionary fuel farms at both DANANG and CMU LAI. This system has provided the POL required for operations but has not provided the necessary reserve ashore. An advance Base Functional Component Fuel system is being installed at DANANG and one is planned for CMU LAI. This will significantly improve the POL storage situation ashore.

E. Growth. The Naval Support Activity, DANANG, in the process of achieving the capability to perform its assigned mission, assumed the Class I supply function for I Corps area. A logistics assistance team from FMFPAC, under the direction of Colonel Harry C. OLSEN, USMC, visited III MAF with the mission of examining the supply procedures currently in use by

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Marine units for support of operations in RVN. On 24 August, the team completed its study and submitted a comprehensive report with appropriate recommendations to CG FMFAC. The 7th Engineer Battalion arrived at DANANG giving the III MAF an organic force engineer capability. This unit was immediately assigned to construction and repair of supply routes and the construction of a class 6C ferry to augment the existing ferry on the Tourane River.

VII. COMMUNICATIONS

A. General. III MAF communication facilities continued to grow to meet the increasing number of units in Vietnam. The III MAF Communication Center handled a larger volume of traffic over the preceding month, but has succeeded in reducing the message handling times. This can be attributed to new communication-electronics equipment that has been received and more reliable DCS circuitry.

B. Problems. COMUSMACV has agreed to provide III MAF a temporary allocation of 50 radio sets, AN/MRC-25 for controlled employment in III MAF area of operations. Due to limited number of sets and batteries, this equipment will not be issued to using units on a permanent basis. Allocation will be made to provide improved command and control communication during special operations. The installation of Digital Data System (AUTO/DM) for PLBG has been relatively slow due to equipment problems and marginal circuit reliability (AN/MRC-80) caused by high distortion. These problems should be alleviated when the AN/TRC-90B is installed in September.

C. Message Traffic Reduction. To implement CI/CIA/CFM's Message Reduction Program, III MAF has issued a Force Order on Message Reduction Practices. The order implements message Reduction Program by discontinuing the processing of purely administrative traffic by electrical means unless the message directly affects the readiness of U. S. Navy and U. S. Marine Corps forces in the Pacific.

VIII. CIVIL AFFAIRS

A. Objective. The basic objectives of III MAF Civic Action program remained the same; although it became apparent in August that a third objective should be established: The coordination of the rural reconstruction programs of U. S. agencies operating in the I Corps area. This included the programs not only of the USMC, but also of the United States Overseas Mission, Vietnam, (USOM - a branch of the Agency of International Development), the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO - the U. S. Information Service Agency), the MACV Advisors, and the various private charitable and religious organizations in country. To this end, III MAF sent its Civil Affairs Officer to a 5-day Orientation Course in Saigon which was sponsored jointly by the USMC, MACV, USOM and JUSPAO. A three day seminar was also conducted in DANANG area 31 August - 2 September sponsored by III MAF, I Corps Advisory Group, USOM and JUSPAO. The syllabus for this seminar is attached as enclosure (7). The seminar convened on 31 August.

B. Programs:

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

B. Programs:

1. **Medical Assistance:** The Navy-Marine medical teams provided a total of 35,000 treatments.
2. **Soap Program:** A great deal of interest has been shown in the U. S. in response to USMC efforts to start a soap drive, in the form of letters and small contributions of soap. The first large contribution of soap should be arriving in Vietnam early in September.
3. **Clothing Program:** Arrangements were made with Catholic Relief Services whereby large amounts of used clothing were to be made available to USMC by that organization. Limited amounts of clothing were distributed in three hamlets.
4. **Orphanages:** The work with orphanages continued throughout the TAOR. Plans were made to have all orphanages in USMC TAOR's listed, together with major problems. Units will then be assigned the responsibility of working with a specific orphanage so the USMC effort will be spread throughout Marine Corps area of responsibility.
5. **Claims:** The 3d Marine Division Staff Legal Officer was assigned the responsibility of clearing the confusion concerning processing and paying claims. An indication of the troubles in this area was the civilian protest which impeded survey and construction at CHU LAI Air Base. This demonstration was the result of non-payment of claims on homes and property. COMUSMACV was requested to have a payment team and GVN representative assigned to solve these problems.
6. **Food Program:** Liaison was made with Catholic Relief Services whereby that organization will make available to the III MAF large quantities of farm surplus commodities for use in its civic action programs. These would include bulgar wheat, corn meal, soy bean oil, beans, and some powdered milk. The first large shipment of these commodities is expected in September. In the meantime, 15 tons of food were shipped to DANANG for distribution to a refugee village and 15 tons were shipped to the CHU LAI area for distribution to villagers in the area where Operation STARLITE was conducted. Other limited amounts of food were distributed in four other hamlets during the month.
7. **CARE:** The American Legion volunteered to support a program whereby that organization will donate money to CARE, and CARE will make its packages available to III MAF for distribution throughout its TAORs. An appropriate order was promulgated to component units providing the guidelines for the operation of this program and the first CARE packages are expected in September. These packages will consist of tools, sewing materials, resettlers kits, masonry kits, and other items of a self-help nature.
8. **Operation Handclasp:** Material donated under the President's Operation Handclasp have commenced to pile up on the West Coast awaiting transportation to Vietnam. The first large volume of these materials is expected in September.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IX. COMBAT INFORMATION

A. Press Conference. MajGen WALT held a press conference on the first night of Operation STARLITE. This was well attended and well received by members of the news media in the local area. LtGen FRULBY held a short press conference prior to his departure from DANANG on 22 August.

B. Recommendations. CMC directed III MAF to make recommendations for instituting the combat writer/photo team and the number of personnel required to cover Marine units in Vietnam. CIB recommended the addition of a motion picture photographer to each team. Total number of teams requested for coverage of Division and Wing units was nine regular RLT/MAG teams and two special unit teams. Two Marine motion picture teams with total of six men from the U. S. are scheduled to arrive the first part of September for a period not to exceed 90 days. They are on special assignment from Headquarters Marine Corps. Two staff NCO's (MOS 4312) are due the first week in September. Current strength of CIB is 15 enlisted and 5 officers.

C. Visitors. Distinguished journalists visiting III MAF during August included: Peter KALISCHER and his CBS crew. They spent three days in the field making a motion picture called "Day in Vietnam". John PERKINS, noted correspondent, covered Operation STARLITE for two days. Miss Beverly DEEPE, New York Herald Tribune, was here for a period of three weeks. Also John RICH, National Broadcasting Company, gathering material for the Huntley Brinkley Show, Keyes BEECH, Chicago Daily News, and Bob MILLER, United Press International.

X. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

A. Objectives. III MAF organized a psychological warfare campaign in August which has two primary objectives: (1) To demoralize VC troops and sympathizers; so they will abandon the insurrection. (2) To convince the non-combatants that Marines are their friends.

B. Methods. The methods of accomplishing these objectives in August were:

1. Mounting posters (Enclosure (8)) throughout the three USMC enclaves, which announced the Marine victory at VAN TUONG (Operation STARLITE). They were distributed by USMC units on patrol and by U. S. Army Special Forces attached to Vietnamese units.

2. Dropping leaflets and broadcasting messages to residents of encircled areas which indicated the actions they were to take to avoid injury while the VC troops were being eliminated. This method was used in a search and clear operation in the GAM NE hamlet on 18 August. Enclosure (9) is one of the leaflets used in this operation.

3. Distributing the handbill shown in enclosure (10) to one battalion for use in a search and destroy operation southeast of DANANG in grid square (BF 0166) on 30 August. The handbill explained the purpose of the operation in Vietnamese, and had Vietnamese/English questions and answers,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

which were used to obtain intelligence information concerning VC activity in the area. One VC was captured as a result of the information obtained using the leaflets.

XI. I CORPS ACTIVITIES

A. General. For the second consecutive month there has been a considerable increase in GVN counterinsurgency operations. The most significant operation was a 1st Division (ARVN) controlled exercise in the Ba Long Valley (Quang Tri Province). A B-52 strike and 276 sorties of tactical air preceded the entrance of troops into the valley. This marked the first time in 14 months that ARVN units had conducted an operation in that VC strong-point. By the end of the month the detailed planning and close coordination necessary to effect the establishment of the Quang Nam Special Sector had been accomplished. On 1 September, Quang Nam became a special sector under the direct control of I Corps. Of particular significance were the B-52 bombing missions flown during the month. This marked the first occasion that such strikes were conducted in the Corps area. Seven months of planning culminated in the first large scale chemical crop destruction program which was flown in the area of the two northern Corps provinces.

B. Current Operations. I Corps (ARVN) conducted 70 battalion or larger size operations during August. This is the largest monthly total recorded in the past six months and is an increase of 30 over July. Contact was made with the VC on 49 of these operations. During the reporting period, I Corps (ARVN) units reported 702 VC killed and 171 weapons captured, an increase over the previous month of 71 KIA but a decrease of 54 weapons captured. Friendly losses were 136 KIA (38 more than in July) and 106 weapons lost (a decrease of 38 from last month.). Four specific operations punished the VC severely and reduced enemy combat power.

C. Coordinated Operations

1. On 2-3 August a USMC/RVN battalion size operation (Blast Out) took place ten kilometers south of DANANG. In this operation, as in other similar operations, the co-location of command posts and the FSCC was employed.

2. In a search and destroy operation conducted by three 2d Division battalions on 3-4 August 8 kilometers south of Quang Ngai City, 37 VC were killed versus friendly losses of 4 killed and 7 wounded.

3. A sweep of the same area was made again by three battalions on 12 and 13 August which resulted in 59 VC KIA and 29 VCC; 3 ARVN were killed and 9 wounded in this action.

4. The last of these noteworthy operations, Lam Son 190, still continues. This operation took place in the Ba Long Valley, 38 kilometers south of the 17th parallel. On 14 August, two regimental combat teams from the 1st Division attacked from the opposite ends of the east-west valley, supported by a B-52 strike, tactical air, and artillery. The valley was suspected to be a major staging, supply, and training area for the VC and

UNCLASSIFIED

11

UNCLASSIFIED

subsequent discoveries confirmed this. By the end of the month cumulative results were 71 VC killed, 42 weapons captured, 11 tons of salt, corn, rice and dried fish destroyed, and numerous other supplies and structures captured or destroyed. The two regimental combat teams linked up on 19 August. One battalion remains in the valley to continue clearing it and to re-establish an outpost there. U. S. aircraft flew 1277 sorties and VNAF flew 283 in the Corps Tactical Zone. Of the six B-52 missions flown, one was in Quang Tri (Ba Long Valley) and the other five were conducted against the suspected location of the 5th Military Region Headquarters along the Quang Tin-Quang Ngai provincial border 25 kilometers southwest of Tam Ky. Naval gunfire expended 3070 rounds (1099 more than in July) in support of ARVN ground operations.

D. CROP DESTRUCTIONS. During the period 15-26 August, 20 crop destruction sorties were flown by C123 aircraft over five target areas in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Approximately 20,000 gallons of defoliant were sprayed over 4,224 hectares of corn, manioc, rice, and sweet potatoes. Although it is too early to fully evaluate the effectiveness of crop destruction, initial results appear excellent.

E. Training. In the area of training, an air-ground operations systems course was conducted by the Corps G3 Air Advisor and ARVN TOC Director on 27 August with approximately 25 1st Division (ARVN) and US personnel in attendance. The purpose of this course was to orient operations personnel in order to improve procedures and reduce the time required for effecting immediate and preplanned air support. Also, training of GVN aerial observers continued throughout the Corps area. Since 1 July a total of 43 observers have received courses in theory and practical work on observation techniques. The I Corps Monthly Evaluation Report is attached as enclosure (15).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 August - Gen Hunter HARRIS, USAF, CINCPACAF, visited III MAF.
- 2 August - Operation Elast Out, was launched in the DANANG TACR in vicinity of coordinates (AT 9363).
- 3Gen Paul SMITH, USA, Deputy C/S Task Force Alfa, visited III MAF.
- 4 August - CINCPACFLT message 050057Z (Enclosure (16)) directed that military port operations are in no way to conflict with those of the GVN.
- 5 August - Admiral Roy L. JOHNSON, USN, CINCPACFLT visited III MAF.
- The VC attacked the ESSO POL storage terminal at LIEN CHIEU, destroying two of the JP-4 storage tanks and inflicting extensive damage to three tanks.
 - Operational Control of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines passed to U. S. Army Task Force Alfa by CG III MAF message 040144Z (Enclosure (17)).
- 6 August - RAdm Sanong NISALAK, RTMC, Commandant of Royal Thailand Marine Corps, visited III MAF.
- 7 August - CG III MAF designated as SA I Corps and assumed operational control of I Corps Advisory Group by COMUSMACV message 060225Z (Enclosure (2)).
- 9 August - 2d Battalion, 3d Marines reported a camouflaged artillery piece in the vicinity of coordinates (AT 851869). It is believed to be one which was captured from ARVN forces in July. Subsequent attack and search of area did not locate the weapon.
- Received ADMINO CINCPACFLT 020032Z Aug stating that Aug 15 was established as the target date for redesignation of PACFLT NCF Radio Nets from High Frequency to single side band emission.
- 10 August - RAdm Harry HULL, USN, Director, Shore Activities Development and Control Division (OPNAV) visited III MAF.
- Operation Order 301-65 published. Security for MSTs and other ships in I Corps area ports (Enclosure (11)).
- 11 August - Mr Michael MOK writer for Life Magazine visited III MAF.
- Operations Plan 100-66, BA LONG VALLEY Operation, (Enclosure (12)) was published.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- Operations Order 302-66, Marine Deployment Plan, (Enclosure (13)) was published.
- FRAG ORDER 1-65 Support of Da Nang Harbor Defense (Enclosure (14)) was published.
- Aircraft from the 1st MAW performed the first Marine tactical Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU) drop.
- 12 August - First Marine night helicopter assault in Vietnam was conducted starting at 2400H. Details of this successful operation are reported in references (b) and (c).
 - VC forces of up to 100 troops were reported in the southern portion of the DANANG TAOR. Some of the groups sighted were wearing brown uniforms.
 - A six week course in Vietnamese language was started at DANANG Air Base for USMC personnel. The course is taught by an RVN captain.
- 13 August - Reports from several agencies indicated a relocation of VC units west and south of DANANG and CHU LAI, especially in the area south of CHU LAI.
- 14 August - BGen Michael REICHEZ, USA, Chief of Army Transportation Corps, visited III MAF.
 - Coordinating Headquarters established at CHU LAI under the Assistant 3d Marine Division Commander BGen Frederick D. KARCH, USMC.
- 15 August - Headquarters of 7th Regimental Landing Team and the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines came ashore at CHU LAI.
 - Elements of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines came ashore at DANANG.
 - The heaviest volume of semi-automatic and automatic weapons fire encountered to date by USMC forces was directed at a platoon position of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.
- 16 August - The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines relieved the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines as the Base Defense Battalion at DANANG Air Base.
 - Local resistance at CHU LAI impeded survey and ground preparation for MAG-36.
 - A complete warehousing program was started this date by the Naval Supply Activity. The ultimate objective is to eliminate the multiple locations and to warehouse by federal groups.
- 17 August - 2d Battalion, 4th Marines and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines were assigned to the 7th Marines for Operation Starlite.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

- Several minor perimeter defense penetrations were attempted at DANANG Air Base. They were all repelled with minor Marine Corps casualties.
 - Approximately 100 Vietnamese protested the use of a bulldozer in construction of a junk fleet headquarters within the CHU LAI TAOR in the vicinity of coordinates (BT 518116). Vietnamese junk fleet personnel fired shots to disperse the crowd. No injuries were reported and no Marine personnel were involved.
 - A Joint Defense Communications Center was established at DANANG Air Base.
 - LtGen John L. THROCKMORTON, USA, Deputy COMUSMACV visited III MAF.
- 18 August - COMSEVENTHFLT message 181400Z Aug 65 (Enclosure (18)) indicated an increase in VC activity in connection with "National Liberation Front Day" on 19 August.
- Operation Starlite was launched.
 - LtGen Victor H. KRULAK visited III MAF for four days.
- 20 August - LtGen John L. THROCKMORTON, USA, Deputy COMUSMACV visited CHU LAI.
- RADM Edwin B. HOOVER, USN, Commander, Service Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet visited III MAF.
- 21 August - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- Dr Calvin THIELMAN, presidential envoy and Presbyterian theologian.
 - BGen Hal D. MCCOMBS, USA, Head, OSD Vietnam Task Force.
 - BGen Phillip B. DAVIDSON, USA, J-2 US Army Pacific.
- In the process of achieving capabilities to perform assigned mission, the Naval Support Activity assumed Class I function for I Corps area.
 - Operational control of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was passed to III MAF. The Battalion became the DANANG Air Base Defense Battalion.
- 22 August - DANANG Air Base Provisional Base Defense Battalion was disbanded.
- MajGen Lewis J. FIELDS, USMC, CG, 1stMarDiv, visited III MAF.
- 23 August - The following VIP's visited III MAF.
- LtGen John L. THROCKMORTON, USA, Dep COMUSMACV.
 - BGen A. J. SCHINZ, USAF Head, AF Advisory Group, MACV.
- 24 August - The following VIP's visited III MAF.
- RADM Robert B. BROWN, USN, Chief BUMED.
 - RADM Walter WELHAM, USN, CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT Medical Officer.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- Intelligence reports indicated that there are large groups of VC within an area 6-15 miles south southeast and southwest of CHU LAI. This possibly indicates a regrouping of elements which exfiltrated from the Operation Starlite objective area. Details are reported in reference (b).

- The 7th Engineer Battalion arrived at DANANG and was assigned duties as the Force Engineers.

25 August - The following VIP's visited III MAF.

Amb SHIN SANG CHUL	Korean amb to RVN
MCen H. LEE, ROKA	J-2 JCS
BGen S. LEE, ROKA	Sec, JCS
BGen J. KIM, ROKA	Logistics
BGen J. LEE, ROKA	G-1
BGen S. KIM, ROK MG	G-3

26 August - In response to CG III MAF message 181704Z Jun 65 (Enclosure (19)), eleven sentry dogs and handlers arrived as the initial force of the 1st Provisional Dog Platoon. The platoon will eventually consist of two squads; a sentry dog squad and a patrol dog squad.

- BGen John M. WRIGHT, USA DEP Comdr, 1st Cavalry, visited III MAF.

- Only 9 days supply of meals, combat individual (MCI) on hand for III MAF.

28 August - The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines arrived at DANANG.

- Fifty VC bodies were discovered near the Operation Starlite area.

30 August - Defense Condition Red was set by Monkey Mountain Command Radar Center when approximately fifty radar targets were observed in the Hanoi area. Alert lasted approximately 5 minutes.

31 August - MajGen Sydney S. WADE, USMC, CG FMFPac/I MAC (Fwd) visited III MAF Headquarters.

MAG-36 arrived at Chu Lai.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

References

- (a) Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - Letter of Instruction to III Marine Expeditionary Force of 5 May 1965
- (b) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology August 1965
- (c) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology July and August 1965
- (d) Maps, Vietnam L701 Series, scale 1:50,000 sheets 6658 I II III IV; 6659 II III IV; 6756 I IV; 6757 II III; 6559 I II III IV; 6560 II III IV

Enclosures

1. Naval Gunfire Activities in Support of III MAF
2. COMUSMACV message 060223Z Aug65; Letter of Instruction concerning CG III MAF assumption of command I Corps Advisory Group (with appendices) (S)
3. CG III MAF message 120528Z Aug65; Coordination of certain activities within the CHU LAI Area (C)
4. CG III MAF message 160326Z Aug65; Special Security Precautions (C)
5. Diagram of Typical Viet Cong Tunnel (Defensive) (S)
6. Photographs of Viet Cong Caves and Tunnels discovered in III MAF Tactical Areas of Responsibility in the I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam (U) (21 pics)
7. Schedule of Civic Action Seminar conducted at DAMPC, Republic of Vietnam 31 August 1965 (U)
8. Poster used by III MAF in Psychological Warfare Operation, August 1965 (U)
9. Leaflet used by III MAF in Psychological Warfare Operation, August 1965
10. Handbill used by III MAF in Psychological Warfare Operation, August 1965
11. III Marine Amphibious Operation Order 301-66 (S)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

12. Operation Plan 100-6 Balong Valley (TS)
13. Operation Order 302-66 Marine Deployments (S)
14. Mac Order 1-65 Support of DANANG Harbor Defense (S)
15. I Corps Advisory Group Monthly Evaluation Report for August 1965 (U)
16. CINCPAC message 050057Z Aug 65; Operation of U.S. Military Forts and Beaches from ONU LAI to DMZ (U).
17. JC III IAF message 040144Z Aug 65; Organization of Forces
18. COMSVMFLT message 181400Z Aug 65; Alert Posture
19. JC III IAF message 181304Z Jun 65; Scout Dogs

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PART FOUR

ENCLOSURES FOR III MAF COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

AUGUST 1965

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

IVGF FILE

NOFORN

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

G-3 Section
 16 Sep 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

Subj: Naval Gunfire Activities

1. Task Organization

- a. CEG 70.8 - Naval Gunfire Support Group: RADM R. F. DUBOIS
 CEG 70.8.9 Naval Gunfire Support Unit: RADM R. F. DUBOIS or as
 assigned

2. Chronology of major events concerning NCF prior to arrival of the III
 MAF in DA NANG:

28 March 1965: DA NANG Special Sector gave 9th MEB the location of 21 targets in the area generally WEST of the 9th MEB TAOR bounded by coordinates 80-87/90-87 and 80-70/90-70. At the request of the USS CANBERRA Gunnery Officer, the impact area was made extremely large in order to provide maximum safety. All of the targets within the impact area were designated as VIET CONG assembly areas, training areas, and areas of known use, the destruction or harassment of which were highly desirable to DA NANG Special Sector Advisors and also in consonance with the 9th MEB mission.

31 March 1965: Representatives of CEG 71.8 and the USS CANBERRA conferred at 9th MEB F300. ARVN Advisor, Major LEY, was also present. CEG 71.8 representatives and all concerned reviewed NCF requirements for 9th MEB and coordinated plans and communication details necessary for control and coordination. Following this conference 9th MEB dispatched a message to COMUSMACV (dtg 010515Z Apr) stating the intention to exercise the main

DECLASSIFIED

NOFORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

armament of the USS CANBERRA on 2 Apr 1965 unless otherwise directed. Meanwhile the USS CANBERRA conducted non-firing drills awaiting permission to fire from COMSEVENTHFLT. COMSEVENTHFLT message dtg 020518Z Apr directed CTO 71.8 not to fire and to submit details of proposed training and NGF requirements earliest.

2 April 1965: COMUSMACV by phonecon to 9th MEB ordered "no fire" of naval guns. Following the 2 April 1965 phone conversation with COMUSMACV, 9th MEB ESCO requested CTO 71.8, over the Naval Gunfire Support Net, the dates NGF ships would be on station for possible shore bombardment during the month of April in order to meet lead time for NOTAMS and COMUSMACV clearance. USS CANBERRA replied that she would be radar guard for MOUNTAIN MOUNTAIN, her original mission, until 15 April and unavailable for NGF Support (it should be noted that CANBERRA was not relieved of radar guard until just prior to CHU LAI landing on 7 May). As a result of 9th MEB 1 April message, the Operations Officer, 23rd Air Base Group, DA NANG, protested vigorously that the "air block" required to avoid imperilment to aircraft would in effect close down the airstrip for the periods of firing. 9th MEB ESCO then altered the impact area to move the "air block" NORTH and WEST away from the airstrip.

4 April 1965: 9th MEB released message (dtg 040233Z Apr) to COMUSMACV spelling out in detail the dates and times of proposed firings, outlining the impact area and mentioning the target therein and requesting approval. CTO 71.8 was info addres in order to assist them in answering COMSEVENTHFLT request for details of the proposed NGF training and firing.

5 April 1965: COMUSMACV by telephone indicated that approval to fire Naval Gunfire Support, after some study, would be forthcoming. I Corps informed 9th MEB that final authority to fire in this area rested with I Corps.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOFORN

~~TOP SECRET~~
NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

10 April 1965: NGF conference at 9th MEB ESOC was held with representatives of 23rd Air Base Group, I Corps and ASOC. The conference was a success in as much as it cleared up many misconceptions concerning Naval Gunfire. During this conference, 23rd Air Base Group stated that air traffic has priority, however, should NGF be necessary in the DA NANG area 23rd Air Base Group expressed a willingness to divert air traffic on an "as much as possible" basis.

2 May 1965: A COMUSMACV/CINCPACFLT NGF conference was held in SAIGON during the period 3 thru 5 May to "work out" and publish procedures for the conduct of Naval Gunfire Support in RVN. Major GREENWOOD, then Assistant G-3, 9th MEB and Lt MANNING, USN NCF0 9th MEB attended.

3. Chronology of major events concerning NGF after the arrival of III MAF in DANANG.

10 May 1965: COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC of the results of the 3-5 May conference on NGF Support and submitted the developed procedures for concurrence. COMUSMACV exclusive message (dtg 101440Z May) to CINCPAC refers.

14 May 1965: CINCPAC message dtg 140140Z approved the procedures for NGF Support developed at the 3-5 May SAIGON Conference. Further directed that CINCPAC and JCS be info addres on all post action reports.

17 May 1965: COMUSMACV message dtg 170655Z May announced employment of NGF authorized in accordance with procedures outlined at the 3-5 May SAIGON Conference (COMUSMACV dtg 101440Z May), however, in this message he further directed that no naval gun will fire until a RVNAF directive concerning NGF is published and RVNAF and U.S. personnel are familiar with procedures.

18 May 1965: COMUSMACV message dtg 131122Z May lifts restrictions on NGF, however, states RVNAF High Command will inform Corps of control and

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
NOFORN

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

observation requirements. Further states Corps Senior Advisor will ensure all U. S. and RVNAF personnel concerned are familiar with procedures prior to initiating preplanned requests or requesting non-scheduled NGF Support.

21 May 1965: III MAF had not received nor did Major MEYERS (then III MAF Liaison Officer to I Corps) have knowledge of any directive from RVNAF concerning NGF Support.

3 June 1965: COMSEVENTHFLT msg (DTG 010754) to COMUSMACV advised that indications are that the DANANG Air Base Commander had prohibited NGF support within ten mile radius of DANANG Airfield. Further requested conference between CTG 70.8 and local USMC/USAF officers to "work out" any misunderstandings.

4 June 1965: CG III MAF letter 103/RCD/lpf of 4 June 1965 directed Third Marine Division to submit a Naval Gunfire Support plan that would provide NGF support in the defense of all three enclaves.

8 June 1965: Conference held at I Corps Advisory Group Headquarters with representatives of CTG 70.8; local USAF officers, I Corps Deputy Senior Advisor and III MAF present. Results of this conference were marginal inasmuch as USAF continued to show reluctance in agreeing to NGF support in DANANG area. Ten mile circle centered at DANANG Air Base was agreed upon in order to reach some workable solution.

11 July 1965: CG 7thFAC in his message (DTG 090624Z) advised III MAF to make every effort to increase of NGF support.

20 July 1965: CG III MAF message (DTG 181200Z) directed all subordinate units to take full advantage of NGF support ships. This message also recognized the limited availability of NGF ships in I Corps area during months of May and June.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

4

~~TOP SECRET~~
NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

Following is a breakdown of NGF missions for month of July based on best available records as of this date (16 Sep 1965).

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SHIP</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE OF FIRE</u>
6 July	GALVESTON	4th Marines	Fired LZ prep
18 July	STODDARD	2/9	Supported with Illum DANANG
19 July	OKLAHOMA CITY	4th Marines	Supported with Illum
19 July	STODDARD	2/3	Supported with Illum DANANG
20 July	STODDARD	2/3	Supported with Illum DANANG
20 July	CRAIG	2/9	Supported with Illum
21 July	CRAIG	2/9	Supported with Illum
21 July	STODDARD	2/3	H&I and up
22 July	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/3	Massed fires in support of 2/3
23 July	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/3	Massed fires in support of 2/3
24 July	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/3	Massed fires in support of 2/3
26 July	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/9	Supported with Illum
27 July	STODDARD	2/3	Supported with H&I
28 July	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/3	Supported with Illum
29 July	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/3	Supported with Illum
29 July	CRAIG	2/9	Supported with Illum
30 July	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/9	Supported with Illum
30 July	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/9	H&I
31 July	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/3	H&I

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
NOFORN

~~TOP SECRET~~
NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF JULY NGF SUPPORT

<u>ILLUM</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>IE</u>	<u>HC</u>
570 Rounds	8 Rounds	263 Rounds	93 Rounds

4 August 1965: COMUSMACV in message (DTG 301622Z, PASEP by FMFFac 031931Z) passed a "well done" to all personnel concerned with the mass firing conducted in I Corps on 23 - 24 July.

Following is a breakdown of NGF missions for month of Aug based on best available records as of this date (16 Sep 1965).

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SHIP</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE OF FIRE</u>
1 Aug	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/3	H&I
2 Aug	CRAIG & STODDARD	2/3	H&I
2 Aug	GALVESTON	1/3	H&I
3 Aug	GALVESTON	1/3	H&I
4 Aug	STODDARD	2/3	H&I (2 VC Co's)
5 Aug	STODDARD	ARVN ESSO TANKS	H&I
7 Aug	STODDARD	2/3	H&I
8 Aug	PRITCHETT	2/3	H&I
9 Aug	PRITCHETT	2/3	H&I (Emergency)
9 Aug	CRAIG	2/3	H&I
10 Aug	CRAIG & PRITCHETT	2/3	H&I
10 Aug	CRAIG & PRITCHETT	2/3	H&I
12 Aug	GALVESTON	2/9 & 2/3	LZ Prep H&I H&I
13 Aug	PRITCHETT	2/3	H&I

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
NOFORN

~~NOFORN~~

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SHIP</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE OF FIDE</u>
14 Aug	ORLECK	2/3	H&I
15 Aug	ORLECK	2/3	H&I
16 Aug	ORLECK	2/3	H&I
16 Aug	ORLECK	2/3	H&I
19 Aug	HENDERSON	2/3	H&I
18, 19 & 20 Aug	GALVESTON, ORLECK & PRITCHETT	7th Marines (STARLITE)	IE, IILUM, HC, WP
21 Aug	ORLECK & PRITCHETT	7th Marines	IE
21 Aug	HENDERSON	2/3	H&I
21 Aug	GALVESTON	4th Marines	Destruction
22 Aug	HENDERSON	2/3	H&I
23 Aug	HENDERSON	2/3	H&I
23 Aug	ORLECK	4th Marines	H&I
24 Aug	HENDERSON	2/3	H&I
25 Aug	HENDERSON	2/3	H&I
26 Aug	HENDERSON	2/3	H&I
28 Aug	PRITCHETT	2/3	H&I
29 Aug	PRITCHETT	ARVN	H&I
30 Aug	PRITCHETT	2/3	H&I

~~NOFORN~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NOFORN

SUMMARY OF STATUTE NCF SUPPORT

USS CALVAGNANO		USS ORLECK	
ROUNDS	CALIBER	ROUNDS	CALIBER
330	5" HC	157	5"38HE
21	5"58	54	5"36MP
11	5"38 ILLUM	51	5"38 ILLUM
445	5"58 IM		

SUMMARY OF AUGUST NCF SUPPORT

<u>ILLUM</u>	<u>IM</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>HC</u>
570 Rounds	361 Rounds	4052 Rounds	93 Rounds

Complete summary of NCF for September will be available from Third Division 2300 on 5 October 1965.

4. Conduct of NCF in RVN.

a. Types of Missions

(1) Preplanned Missions: Normally for a scheduled operation where the requirement for NCF Support ship is known at least 48 hours in advance.

(2) Non-scheduled Missions: Normally for a specific operation requiring a quick reaction response (emergencies).

b. Naval Gunfire Support Ship Availability. Each morning at 0700H CTG 70.8, Naval Gunfire Support Group, sends the names and locations of ships available for naval gunfire support missions to the surveillance Operations Center (SOC). III MAF is info addressee on these messages.

c. Consent. All NCF missions will be observed by either a U. S. Naval Gunfire spotter or an Air Liaison Officer (ALO), Forward Air Controller (FAC), or an airborne artillery spotter.

UNCLASSIFIED

NOFORN

NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

d. Specifications

(1) The conduct, control and coordination of NGF Support for III MAF Forces will be through the 3d Division FSCC for each separate mission, preplanned or non-scheduled.

(2) Steps to be taken in order to conduct preplanned missions in support of the III MAF enclaves (requested 48 hours in advance of scheduled firing) is as follows:

CHU LAI ENCLAVE

First Step. CHU LAI FSCC advises I Corps TOC through Third Division FSCC of the mission request.

Second Step. The assigned NGF Support Ship reports to CHU LAI FSCC on DELTA 30 (4301 single sideband) for briefing.

Third Step. NGFO in FSCC briefs assigned NGF Support ship on fire support area, NGF spot net frequencies, call sign of ground spotter or AO, and area of impact.

Fourth Step. NGFO passes same info to RHM-4 or RHM-7 NGFO on DELTA 30 and passes control of assigned ship to the battalion AO or FO to conduct the observed fire mission.

DA NANG ENCLAVE

First Step. Third Division FSCC clears NGF support mission if outside of TAOR with I Corps TOC (FALCON 6266)

Second Step. The assigned NGF Support Ship reports to DA NANG FSCC on DELTA 30 (4301 single sideband) for briefing.

Third Step. Third Division NGFO in FSCC briefs assigned NGF Support Ship on fire support area, NGF spot net frequencies, call sign of ground spotter or AO, and area of impact.

UNCLASSIFIED

NOFORN

NOFORN

Fourth Step. NGFO passes same information in step three above to Regimental Headquarters (3d or 9th) requesting Naval gunfire one DELTA 30, passes control of assigned NGF ship to the battalion AO or FO to conduct the observed fire mission.

Fifth step. Following must be notified:

- a. 6252 Fighter wing of intent to fire and NGF ship location and area in which fire will be delivered (FALCON 6111).
- b. DA NANG tower of Fire Mission. (FALCON 6199) Indicate that MONROE 14 (NGFO FACC) will check in on tower frequency (275.8 mcs)
- c. Panama control (FALCON to Panama Control Hot Line) Panama com talk to Monroe on UHF Guard Channel.
- d. DA NANG tower (radio) - Panama Control (telephone) - DASC (telephone) on "Open line" and "End of target".
- e. Communications: 3d MarDiv FACC must have positive communications on:

- (1) DA NANG Tower Channel (275.8 mcs)
- (2) SEC Spot Net(s)
- (3) Guard Channel (UHF)

PHU BAI ENCLAVE

Same procedures as for DA NANG.

e. Steps to be taken in order to conduct non-scheduled missions (emergencies) in support of III MAF enclaves is applicable to CMU LAI, DA NANG and PHU urgent requests for NGF Support will be made over the most direct channels available.

- (1) Step One. The most direct and expeditious method is to

DECLASSIFIED

NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOFORN

contact a NCF Support ship direct. This will not be possible at all times due to location and continued movement of naval gunfire support ships.

III MAF Command Center and 3d Division FSCC will maintain an availability and location table on all ships assigned on a daily basis by GEL 71.8.

(2) Step Two. Direct contact with I Corps FOC with mission request.

(3) Step Three. The Coastal Surveillance Center (DA NANG) maintains a current status of NCF Support ships and can be used as a relay station to either a specific gunfire ship or to the Surveillance Operation Center (SAIGON).

(4) In each of the above steps I Corps FOC, 6252 Fighter Wing and Panama Control must be advised in order to assure an "air block" is established and all supporting units will be coordinated.

6. Naval Gunfire Capabilities

a. Range of the Naval Gun (Maximum Effective).

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>FULL CHARGE</u>	<u>REDUCED CHARGE</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ORD.</u>
5"/38	15,000 Yds	6,000 Yds	8,070 Ft.
5"/54	22,500 "	10,000 "	16,500 "
6"/47	21,000 "	16,000 "	21,300 "
8"/55	26,000 "	21,000 "	13,280 "

b. Rate of Fire Per Gun Per Minute

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>RAPID</u>	<u>SUSTAINED</u>
5"/38	15	8
5"/54	40	40
6"/47	*15	10 (Rapid fire turret)
8"/55	*10	10 (Rapid fire turret)

* Slow fire turret.

c. Naval Gunfire Nets

D-31 NCF Support (1)
D-86 NCF Support (8)

MISSION
3A370, 1A1
"

IPPL
4314
12350

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOFORN

NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

	<u>EMISSION</u>	<u>FREQ</u>
D-16 NGF Control	3A3JO.1A1	3224
D-39 NGF Control Overload	"	5120
D-30 SFOP Spot #1	"	4301
D-67 SFOP Spot #2	"	8230
D-68 SFOP Spot #3	"	8630
D-300 NGF Air Spot #1	UHF	262.2
D-337 NGF Air Spot #2	UHF	318.6

d. Recommendations for Effective Naval Gunfire Support.

- (1) CHU LAI - 5"/54 destroyer
- (2) PHU BAI - 5"/54 or larger
- (3) DA NANG - 5"/38 for close support.
5"/54 or larger for deep support.
- (4) The 6"/55 Naval Gun can cover all current TAORS at CHU LAI, DA NANG and PHU BAI.

e. NGF Fire Support Request. When requesting a fire support mission

all requesting agencies of III MAF will use the following format:

- ALFA TYPE OF OPERATION
- BRAVO NUMBER OF SHIPS REQUIRED
- CHARLIE COORDINATES FOR SHIP TO REPORT TO
- DELTA TIME TO BE ON STATION
- ECHO EXPECTED DURATION ON STATION
- FOXTROT TYPE OF TARGET
- GOLF SPOTTING FREQ BY CIRCUIT NUMBER TO BE USED
- COUPLER CODE (KAC 139) WILL BE USED.

NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

O 060225Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMFUA/008 III MAF
RUMSAG/SA I CORPS
BT

#5679

TOP SECRET 27586 FROM MAC J-3
SUBJECT: LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

1. YOUR PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION AND THE COMMENTS OF THE SENIOR ADVISOR, I CORPS, HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND STUDIED.
2. YOUR SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE 030511Z AUG SUGGESTING AN UPDATING OF YOUR LOI HAS BEEN NOTED. YOU ARE NOW AUTHORIZED TO INITIATE PHASE III OPERATIONS. SUBMIT YOUR RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE LOI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. THE SENIOR ADVISOR, I CORPS IS, AS YOU INDICATED, ALSO

PAGE 2 RUMSAG 28250 TOP SECRET

THE COMMANDER OF I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP. IT IS IN THIS ROLE AS THE COMMANDER OF THE ADVISORS IN I CORPS THAT HE AND HIS ORGANIZATION ARE TO BE PASSED TO YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL ON 7 AUGUST. IN THIS CAPACITY, YOU AND YOUR STAFF MAY DEAL WITH HIM AND HIS COMMAND IN THE SAME MANNER AS YOU DEAL WITH ANY OTHER SUBORDINATE ELEMENT UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

|||

4. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN AN APPROPRIATE STATUS WITH THE I CORPS COMMANDER, IT IS DESIRED THAT COLONEL ST CLAIR BE DESIGNATED AS THE DEPUTY SENIOR ADVISOR, I CORPS. THIS DESIGNATION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT COLONEL ST CLAIR IS YOUR DEPUTY FOR MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE III MAF OR THAT HE HAS STATUS OTHER THAN AS A COMMANDER UNDER YOUR OPCON. AS IN THE CASE OF ANY OTHER COMMANDER YOU MAY CALL UPON HIM FOR RECOMMENDATIONS, REPORTS OR ASSISTANCE AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY. FURTHER INTEGRATION OF THE ADVISORY EFFORT INTO THE III MAF STRUCTURE REQUIRES ADDITIONAL STUDY.

5. PENDING THE FINALIZATION OF YOUR LOI, YOU WILL ASSUME OPCON OF THE I CORPS ADVISORY TEAM AT 070001H AUGUST, AND YOU ARE DESIGNATED AS THE SENIOR ADVISOR, I CORPS.

GP-4
BT

TOR:06/1154H/AUG65/EJM

CCN:234

DIST:FILE.....COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES
MAF.....COPY 2-4 OF 4 COPIES

060225Z AUG 65

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Encl #2

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE SENIOR ADVISOR
I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP
Advisory Team #1
APO US Forces 96337

JUL 27 1965

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: I Corps Advisory Group Responsibilities (U)

TO: COMUSMACV
ATTN: MACV J3
APO US Forces 96243

1. (U) References:

- a. Message, MACJ3 25702 (S), DTG 230844Z Jul 65.
- b. Message, MACV 25686 (S), DTG 230729Z Jul 65.

2. (U) In compliance with the request contained in reference a, inclosed is a detailed list of the responsibilities of the Senior Advisor of this Corps.

3. (C) It should be noted that General Thi is already aware of the action proposed in reference b. In fact, I received my first knowledge of this proposed action from General Thi in a discussion which he held on 22 July with Mr Sam Thomsen, US Consul in Hue and myself. General Thi stated he had received the information from General Thieu. On 24 July, General Thi questioned me about the outcome of the proposed action and was informed the matter was under study.

1 Incl
as

/s/ HOWARD B. ST CLAIR
HOWARD B. ST CLAIR
Colonel, Infantry
Senior Advisor

Cy Furn:
CG, III MAF

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (4)

Appendix I

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RESPONSIBILITIES OF I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP

A. The following are the responsibilities of the I Corps Advisory Group:

1. (U) GENERAL RESPONSIBILITY: To advise, assist and support the RVN military and para-military units and staffs in all combat, combat support and combat service support operations and training; to assist the RVN in developing and maintaining an effective conventional and counter-insurgency military capability; to exercise operational control of all assigned US units; and to perform liaison among US, RVN and International Military Assistance (Third Country) Force Commanders.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION: (See Annex A to Incl 1)

a. Corps organic forces include two infantry divisions, the Danang Military Garrison, one 155 howitzer artillery battalion, one armored cavalry squadron, one combat engineer group, three ranger battalions, other combat support and combat service support units and general reserve forces as allocated.

b. Within five sectors and one special sector, para-military forces employed by I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) include 93 company size, 621 platoon size and 351 squad size regional and popular force units.

c. Corps Commander exercises operational control over the special forces within ICTZ. This effort encompasses both border surveillance and pacification. In the latter role, these forces also have sub-sector responsibilities in three camps (to be increased to six in the near future). In addition, the Corps furnishes combat support and combat service support to 24 civilian irregular defense group companies located in the seven Special Forces camps.

B. SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES:

1. (U) Commands I Corps Advisory Group and field teams within ICTZ. (See Annex A to Incl 1)

2. (C) Exercises operational control over all allocated US Army aviation resources.

3. (U) Promotes the proper utilization and maintenance of MAP equipment and supplies.

4. (U) Discharges duties of Area Coordinator I Corps Tactical Zone.

5. (U) ADMINISTRATION:

(a) Advises I Corps on all matters pertaining to the maintenance of unit strength, personnel management, development and maintenance of unit morale, maintenance of discipline, troop welfare,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

headquarters management and other miscellaneous administrative matters.

(b) Advises and assists I Corps on all military police activities.

(c) Supervises assignment of US personnel within I Corps Advisory Group and field detachments.

(d) Supervises and provides membership to Danang USO Council.

(e) Supervises the rest and recuperation program for all I Corps advisory personnel.

(f) Supervises Special Service activities to include representation on a composite recreational fund council.

(g) Provides Chaplain activities.

(h) Installation Coordinator for the City of Danang.

(i) Maintains a liaison section at Headquarters, MACV.

(j) Operates a protocol section with Headquarters, I Corps Advisory Group.

(k) Monitors the troop information program I Corps.

(l) Sponsors Community Relations Councils in IOTZ.

6. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

(a) Advises and assists I Corps in all aspects of intelligence except counterintelligence and clandestine collection; supports I Corps through utilization of allocated US intelligence assets; produces operational intelligence for targeting efforts; collection, dissemination and reporting as required.

(b) Advises I Corps on planning, collection, production and dissemination of intelligence.

(c) Advises I Corps on the followings:

(1) Viet Cong Captives Program (MACV Intelligence Guide)

(2) Document exploitation (MACV Intelligence Guide)

(3) Defector Platoon Program

(4) Sector Intelligence and Operation Center and province Intelligence Coordination Committee (MACV Intelligence Guide)

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

Letter Hqs MACV Subj: MACV Position on Premier's Order Number 2195-TTP/TP (U), dated 3 Feb 65 and letter, Hqs MACV Subj: MACV Position on Province Intelligence Coordination Committee (PICC), dated 19 June 1965).

(5) Source Control Program (MACV Intelligence Guide)

(d) Supports I Corps on:

(1) Visual Aerial Reconnaissance Program (MACV Directive 381-1). Coordinates efforts of US Army, USAF, USMC, and VNAF observation aircraft into one integrated program.

(2) Intelligence Contingency Fund Program (Letter, Hqs MACV, Subj: SOP for Funding and Accounting for Intelligence Contingency Funds dated 15 August 1964).

(3) Operation of a Corps Targeting Center to include liaison with Target Research and Analysis Center, MACV.

(4) Aerial Photography Program. (MACV Intelligence Guide)

(e) Supports US Intelligence Effort

(1) Collects and reports intelligence and information for US purpose as directed.

(2) Conducts parallel reporting through US channels of all ARVN collected and produced intelligence. (MACV Intelligence Guide)

(3) Safeguards US classified information. (MACV Directive Security Guide)

(4) Releases US classified information. (MACV Directive 380-4 and Letter, MACV, Disclosure of US Classified Information to Foreign Nationals dated 14 July 1965)

(5) Briefs personnel requiring access to cryptographic material. (MACV Memo 380-6)

(6) Participates in recovery of US detainees. (Letter, MACJOO, dated 16 January 1965, Subject: Detainee Program)

(7) Furnishes technical intelligence release of war trophies. (MACV Directive 643-2)

(8) Chairs the Joint Intelligence Committee which coordinates activities of all US intelligence agencies with CTZ I. (Established by local informal agreement)

(9) Forwards biographic data on RVNAF Officers. (MACV Directive 381-9)

UNCLASSIFIED

7 (C) OPERATIONS:

a. Advises, assists and supports the Commanding General I Corps, in conceiving, developing, coordinating and implementing operational plans for joint and combined operations within the ICTZ employing forces organic to the Corps as well as US and other RVNAF forces.

b. Advises, assists and supports I Corps in all matters pertaining to training.

c. Provides US personnel and participates in an integrated Corps Tactical Operations Center.

d. Coordinates and controls the utilization of US air and naval gunfire assets in support of RVNAF operations.

e. Maintains status of operational readiness of all combat units in the Corps area and in organizational, training, and logistical problems which significantly affect operational readiness.

f. Advises and assists the Corps artillery commander in employment of all artillery in I Corps, to include positioning, fire support procedures, fire planning, forward observe utilization and artillery training.

g. Advises I Corps on all engineer plans and activities which supports or are related to the Corps mission. Maintains technical liaison with Engineer Branch, MACV. Coordinates with I Corps Area Logistical Command (I CALG) supply and maintenance problems of Engineer units in the Corps area. Maintains liaison and coordinates with governmental engineer agencies such as Naval Bureau of Yards and Docks, Dept of Public Works, USOM Dept of Public Works Section, and province chief of engineer problems within their jurisdiction which are related to the Corps mission.

h. Advises I Corps on all phases of signal communications. Assists in the coordination of all US military communications media within the Corps Tactical Zone. Maintains asset data and provides quarterly input to COMUSMACV on the disposition and utilization of all principal items of communications equipment within the Corps. Distributes and maintains accountability for codes and cipher systems used by US advisory personnel with the Corps.

i. Advises and assists the armored squadron commander on organizational, training, logistical deployment and tactical operations of the Armored cavalry squadron in ICTZ.

j. Advises and assists the Corps chemical officer on matters pertaining to CER operations. This includes planning and coordination for the use of chemical munitions, weapons and defoliation.

k. Coordinates and assists in the development of new ARVN TO&E's and changes to existing TO&E's as required (MACV Directive 10-6, 28 May 65).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Establishes an Army Aviation Element co-located within Corps TOC and each Division TOC, to ensure coordination of US/VNAF air activities in support of all Corps operations (MACV Directive 95-4, 13 Jul 65).

m. Controls all Army aviation aircraft assets assigned to I Corps. Allocated assets are presently assigned the following tasks:

(1) CV-2. Two mission ready CV-2's allocated, with the primary mission of resupplying Special Forces camps and combat patrols. This mission is accomplished by paradrop, lolex, or landing at Special Forces strips.

(2) U1-A. Four U1-A's allocated with an average of two to three mission ready aircraft each day. Their primary mission is the movement of advisors and supplies with I Corps. This is accomplished by scheduled and unscheduled courier flights.

(3) U6-A. One U6-A assigned with the primary mission of Psywar.

(4) O1-F. Effective 1 August 65 I Corps will have twenty-four Army O1-F's assigned with the primary mission of supporting the I Corps Surveillance Plan. Additional missions include radio relay, artillery adjustment and convoy escort.

(5) UH-1B. Ten (unarmed) aircraft assigned with the primary mission of providing corps and division advisors with visual reconnaissance and advisor staff transportation. Their mission also includes command and control aircraft for air mobile operations, medical evacuation, and VIP transportation.

(6) UH-1G(A). Eighteen (armed) aircraft available in I Corps with the primary mission of supporting air-mobile operations. Additional missions include the escort of Marine and Army helicopters on resupply and medical-evacuation flights.

(7) CH-37. One CH-37 assigned with the primary mission of supporting Rius Springs operations.

n. Conducts briefings and quarterly reviews as require (MACV Dir 1-3, 17 Jun 65).

o. Prepares and maintains a non-combatant emergency evacuation plan (MACV Op Plan 60-64, 16 Mar 64).

p. Prepares and maintains a plan for the security of MACV personnel, installations and property (MACV Op Plan 61-64, 15 Sep 64).

8. (U) LOGISTICS*

Advises the Corps on all matters pertaining to the logistics field and coordinates the logistics activities of the MACV advisory groups

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

in the Corps area. This includes:

*NOTE: I CALC advisory effort was transferred from responsibility of SA, I Corps to J-4, MACV, on 1 July 65.

- (1) Preparation of logistical estimates, administrative plans and orders.
- (2) Establishment of medical evacuation and hospitalization plans.
- (3) Proposed locations of field depots, supply points and maintenance units.
- (4) Coordination of the location of installations and training areas.
- (5) Collection and evacuation of salvage, excess and captured material.
- (6) Determination of status of equipment.
- (7) Consumption and control of POL.
- (8) Determination of transportation requirements.
- (9) Highway regulation and traffic control.
- (10) Preparation of movement plans, march tables and traffic circulation plans.
- (11) Coordinates supply, maintenance, and evacuation for MACV Detachments in coordination with I CALC.

9. (U) RURAL RECONSTRUCTION AND PSYWAR.

a. Advises and supports I Corps on rural reconstruction, psywar, civil affairs and civic action activities.

b. Assists and advises I Corps on all aspects of the Corps Rural Reconstruction Plan to include:

- (1) Developing and making periodic revisions of the Corps plan.
- (2) Establishing priorities of resources for each DTA and Sector.
- (3) Reviewing and approving provincial plans.
- (4) Utilizing the available resources in manpower and material in accordance with specific phases of rural reconstruction.

UNCLASSIFIED

(5) Supervising the implementation of plans at division and province level.

(6) Supervising the development and revision of provincial rural reconstruction budgets and expenditures of all rural reconstruction funds.

c. Assists and advises I Corps in all psychological warfare, civic action and civil affairs activities to include:

(1) Developing Corps psyops plans and policies.

(2) Operation of the Corps PsyOps Center in the Planning, production and dissemination of propaganda.

(3) Assisting in the coordination of US support of Psywar/CA operations.

(4) Supervising the Corps Military Civic Action Program.

(5) Employment of psywar teams.

(6) Employment of civil affairs teams.

10. (U) REGIONAL FORCE AND POPULAR FORCE ADVISORY EFFORT

a. Advises and assists I Corps on administration, organization, training and logistical support of regional and popular forces.

b. In the administrative field, this includes assignment of RVN officers and noncommissioned officer, recruitment, promotions, pay and allowances, awards and decorations, and elimination of ineffectives.

c. In the organization and training field, this includes operations of seven training centers conducting eleven different courses of instructions, scheduling of and allocating quotas to courses conducted at training centers within I Corps and National training centers, allocation and activation of new units and TO&E revisions.

d. In the logistics field, this includes finances as they pertain to rations, maintenance, rehabilitation and new construction funds; equipment for replacement items and activation of new units; relief supplies for dependents and widows of Regional Force/Popular Force soldiers; and transportation of units and equipment.


11. (C) LIAISON/COORDINATION

Maintains Liaison and/or coordination with the following agencies:

a. United States Operation Mission (USOM)

b. Controlled American Source (CAS)

UNCLASSIFIED



- c. Special Military Intelligence Activity (SMIAT)
- d. 704th CIG Detachment
- e. Air Force Advisory Team 5
- f. 1st Naval Zone Advisory Team
- g. Headquarters 5th Special Forces Group
- h. I Corps Area Logistics Command Advisory (I CALC)
- i. Direct Air Support Center (USAF)
- j. Target Research and Analysis Center
- k. Royal Australian Army Detachment
- l. United States Information Service
- m. United States Counsel (Hus)
- n. III Marine Amphibious Force

C. (U) REPORTS:

In the discharge of the various responsibilities, this Advisory Group is required to submit reports to MACV. Frequency of submission and magnitude of each report varies. The following is a representative list:

- a. Monthly Status of Training Regional and Popular Forces.
- b. Medevac Team Report.
- c. MRU Check of Medical MOS.
- d. ARVN Order of Battle.
- e. Daily Situation Summary Report.
- f. Spot Report of Significant Activities.
- g. Monthly Evaluation Report (MONEVAL).
- h. SA's Monthly Evaluation of Combat (Support) Effectiveness.
- i. Wagon Wheel Report.
- j. After Action Report on all Significant Combat Actions.
- k. Daily Air Activities Report (DAAR)
- l. Quarterly Hand Spray Report.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- m. Monthly Scout Dog Platoon Report.
- n. Location and Mission of all ARVN Artillery
- o. ARVN Artillery VT Fuze expenditure.
- p. Daily Intelligence Summary.
- q. MACV/USOM/JUSPAO/Province Team Report.
- r. Monthly Report of Pacification Progress, Population and Area
- s. Monthly Evaluation of Province Situation and GVN Statistics.
- t. Training Strength Report.

Control.

UNCLASSIFIED

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART FOR I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

AUTHORIZED

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ADVISORY TEAM #1 (Hqs I Corps Adv Gp)	102	135	237
ADVISORY TEAM #2 (2d Inf Div Adv Gp)	124	186	310*
ADVISORY TEAM #3 (1st Inf Div Adv Gp)	89	138	227*
TOTAL:	315	459	774
SECURITY PERSONNEL	1	128	129
I CORPS SUPT ELEMENTS			
a. 220th Avn Co	42	114	156
b. Prov Avn Co	51	186	237
c. 178th Sig Co	11	261	272
TOTAL:	104	561	665
Special Forces	21	82	103
AFAT 5	17	24	41
Naval Adv Team	27	37	64

*Totals include advisory personnel assigned to Sectors, Sub-sectors, and Regional/Popular Forces

UNCLASSIFIED

Annex A to Incl 1

10

ENCLOSURE (b) [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

VIET CONG DEFEATED
BY GOVERNMENT FORCES IN
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Almost one regiment of Viet Cong forces were destroyed
By Vietnamese forces and US Marines at CHU-LAI, QUANG-NGAI.
Viet Cong has left 600 bodies on the battle field, more than
1000 wounded, 58 prisoners, all their weapons were captured or destroyed.

Many places, which Viet Cong
always said "Nobody can Come" are
now controlled by VN Forces and
US Marines.

These caves where hundreds
of Viet Cong were buried by our Army,
were also discovered.

Most of their weapons were
destroyed, however, some are still
laying on the battle field.

And.....scattered all over
the battle field.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (8)

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TO THE VILLAGERS OF CAM NE

In order to return security and peace to the people in the village, the ARVN forces and the USMC have coordinated in an operation to clear and to destroy the VC subversive agents who have, by day and night, been terrorizing, oppressing, and exploiting the innocent people.

With the mission of annihilation of those aggressors against peace, the ARVN forces, disregarding danger, have tightened the besieged circle, and, one by one, have killed the doomed VC bandits, so as to rescue the people from the hell of the Southern Liberation Front.

We will not harm the people of the village, and we request that the people cooperate with our forces so as to destroy every one of the aggressive communists.

The villagers shall be protected, and will be well treated with courtesy. Medical care and food will be provided during the period that the operation for the liberation of the villagers from the VC is underway.

The ARVN troops will ensure the safety of the villagers, and there will not be any reprisal killings by the VC.

/s/ Headquarters,
I Corps
I TacZone

UNCLASSIFIED

19
DECL.

REF ID: 10042
PRIORITY: 101408Z

DRAFTER: 63 PHONE: PARCIENT 3
TRANS TO: CWO

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG 3D MARDIV
CG PROV JCC SUPT ACT

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO: COMUSMACV
CPTG 76.4
CTF 115
SA I CORPS
CG NAV SUP T ACT DA NANG
ABC CEMETARY GROUP 3D MARDIV

CG FIFPAC
CINCPACFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
CTF 76
CG FIFPAC/I MAC (FWD)
MSTS SAIGON
MSTS REP DA NANG

//S E C R E T //

- 1. III MAF OPERATION ORDER 301-66
- 2. COMUSMACV 220307 JUL NOTAL
- 3. COMUSMACV 291539Z JUL NOTAL
- 4. III MAF TRAG ORDER 1-65 DTF 111536Z JUL NOTAL
- 5. SITUATION

File 1
MAF 14
DIV 10
PNCCSA 8-7 76.4
CG NAV SUP T ACT DNG
MSTS REP DNG
SA I CORPS 2

A. GENERAL

- (1) REFERENCE A SETS FORTH REQUIREMENTS FOR FURNISHING NECESSARY GUARDS FOR MSTS AND MSTS CHARTER AND OTHER US SHIPS CARRYING MILITARY CARGO.
- (2) REFERENCE B DIRECTS III MAF TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY AS NECESSARY FOR MSTS AND OTHER U.S. SHIPPING CALLING AT I CORPS PORTS UTILIZING, AS NECESSARY, III MAF TROOPS FOR SHIPBOARD SECURITY FUNCTIONS.

B. ENEMY FORCES

- (1) SEE CURRENT INTSUS.
- (2) VC POSSESS CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY SWIMMERS WITH FLOATING MILES,

COPY X OF 35 COPIES

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure *1/1*

MORTARS, AND ARMED JUNKS AGAINST SHIPPING IN I CORPS HARBORS.

9. FRIENDLY FORCES

UNCLASSIFIED

(1) CONTAMINER TASK GROUP 76.4 IS TASKED WITH ENSURING HARBOR SECURITY BY MEANS OF HARBOR PATROLS. ONE DD IS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO DA NANG HARBOR DEFENSE DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS. CTG 76.4 WILL PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FOR GUARDS FROM WHITE ELEPHANT LAKE TO DA NANG HARBOR AND WILL PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FOR GUARDS FROM SHORE PARTY CP AT CHU LAI. CTG 76.4 WILL PROVIDE BOX MEALS FOR GUARDS IN DA NANG HARBOR.

(2) CTG 115 CONDUCTS SURVEILLANCE, GUNFIRE SUPPORT, VISIT AND SEARCH, AND OTHER OPERATIONS ALONG THE COAST OF RVN IN ASSISTING RVN IN DETECTION AND PREVENTION OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION BY SEA.

(3) ARVN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE ASSISTS THE U.S. NAVY IN CONTROLLING MOVEMENT OF MERCHANT SHIPS AND PREVENTING ACTS OF SABOTAGE AGAINST MERCHANT SHIPS IN DA NANG HARBOR.

2. MISSION

A. III MAF WILL PROVIDE GUARDS FOR MSTS SHIPS, MSTS CHARTER SHIPS, AND OTHER U.S. COMMERCIAL SHIPPING IN I CORPS PORTS.

3. EXECUTION

A. CO PROV NCC SUPT ACT IS TASKED WITH PROVIDING SECURITY OUTLINED HEREIN. DETAILED SOP INCLUDING GUARD ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO SHIP'S MASTERS WILL BE PREPARED AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY AND SUBMITTED TO THIS HQS FOR APPROVAL. APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS AND GUARD ORDERS WILL BE DELIVERED TO EACH SHIP'S MASTER.

B. 30 MARINE DIVISION WILL FURNISH GUARDS TO CO PROV NCC SUPT ACT WHEN REQUIRED, FOR MSTS, MSTS CHARTER, AND OTHER U.S. SHIPPING IN I CORPS HARBORS (CHU LAI).

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- (1) TO INFLUENCE SUPPORT ACTIVITY, INFORM 3D MARINE DIVISION BY 1800 EACH DAY OF NUMBER OF SHIPS EXPECTED AT DA NANG AND CHU LAI FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY.

(2) PERSONNEL. FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED.

- (A) OFFICER OF THE DAY - 1 EACH DA NANG AND CHU LAI.
 (B) SERGEANT OF THE GUARD - 1 EACH DA NANG AND CHU LAI
 (C) CORPORAL OF THE GUARD - 1 PER RELIEF
 (D) GUARDS 2 PER SHIP PER RELIEF OR 6 PER SHIP PER DAY.

(3) UNIFORM AND ARMAMENT

- (A) UNIFORM: COMBAT.
 (B) ARMAMENT AND ACCOUTREMENTS: SGTS AND CORPORALS OF GUARD .45 CAL PISTOL WITH 21 ROUNDS. GUARDS: 14-14 WITH 100 ROUNDS AND 2 HAND GRENADES. FIVE CELL FLASHLIGHTS AND WHISTLES ALL ABOVE.

- (4) DUTIES: PRIMARY DUTY OF GUARDS ABOARD SHIPPING IS TO PREVENT SWITERS FROM PLACING MINES AGAINST SHIP'S SIDE. SECONDARY MISSION IS TO ASSIST IN DEFENDING THE SHIP IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK BY A BOARDING PARTY OR ARMED JUNK RAID.

- (5) POSTING INSTRUCTIONS: CORPORALS OF THE GUARD WILL OBTAIN PERMISSION FROM MATE ON DECK TO POST GUARDS. IF PERMISSION IS GRANTED, THE CORPORAL OF THE GUARD WILL INFORM THE SHIP'S OFFICER OF THE DUTIES OF THE GUARDS. IF PERMISSION TO POST GUARDS IS NOT GRANTED GUARDS WILL BE RETURNED TO LANDING AND THE OFFICER OF THE DAY INFORMED. THE OOD WILL REPORT THE INCIDENT TO CO PROVISIONAL NCG SUPPORT ACTIVITY, WHO WILL IN TURN REPORT TO HQ, III MAF (COMMAND CENTER). CORPORALS OF THE GUARD WILL INFORM THE MASTER OF THE SHIP THAT GUARDS MUST BE PERMITTED TO HAVE INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

PASSED AS [REDACTED] PEDITIOUSLY.

(6) SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS:

8

UNCLASSIFIED

(A) THE MASTER OF THE SHIP IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS SAFETY. GUARDS ARE PLACED ABOARD TO ASSIST THIS EFFORT. IF THE MASTER ISSUES ORDERS WHICH COUNTER THE INSTRUCTIONS THE GUARD HAS RECEIVED, THE GUARD WILL INFORM THE MASTER OF SUCH AND WILL INFORM THE CORPORAL OF THE GUARD BY FASTEST MEANS POSSIBLE.

(B) GUARDS WILL BE POSTED ON THE DECKS OF SHIPS WHERE THEY HAVE THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE BOATS OR SWIMMERS APPROACHING. FOR BEACHED LST'S, ONE GUARD WILL NORMALLY BE POSTED ABOARD ON THE AFTER DECK OF THE SHIP. THE OTHER GUARD WILL BE POSTED ON THE BEACH BY THE BOW RAMP DOORS.

(C) GUARDS WILL PERFORM THEIR DUTIES IN SUCH A MANNER THAT SHIP'S ACTIVITIES WILL NOT BE AFFECTED.

(D) CO PROV HCC SUPT ACT WILL ADVISE SHIP'S MASTERS TO RIG FLOOD-LIGHTS AND PROVIDE SEARCHLIGHTS.

(E) MARINE GUARDS WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SHIPBOARD DISCIPLINE OR MASTER-AT-ARMS FUNCTIONS. THESE REMAIN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SHIP'S MASTER.

(7) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:

(A) GUARDS MUST BE THOROUGHLY INSTRUCTED REGARDING THE USE OF WEAPONS. EACH GUARD WILL BE INSTRUCTED THAT HE WILL USE WEAPONS ONLY WHEN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

(B) GUARDS WILL FIRE A WARNING SHOT IF SWIMMERS APPROACH A SHIP. IF THE SWIMMER PERSISTS IN HIS ATTEMPT TO CLOSE WITH THE SHIP THE GUARD WILL FIRE OR USE OTHER WEAPONS AS APPROPRIATE. A

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

STRING OF BUBBLES APPROACHING A SHIP MAY MARK THE TRAIL OF AN UNDERWATER SWIMMER. GUARDS WILL FIRE A WARNING SHOT IN FRONT OF THE BUBBLES, THEN WAIT APPROXIMATELY 30 SECONDS. IF THE BUBBLES PERSIST HE IS CLEARED TO FIRE OR USE OTHER WEAPONS.

UNCLASSIFIED

(C) IN OTHER CASES GUARDS WILL FIRE OR USE OTHER WEAPONS ONLY IF THE SHIP HE IS GUARDING IS FIRED UPON.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. 3D MARINE DIVISION WILL ISSUE NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS INSTRUCTIONS. (SEE 2.B(1) FRIENDLY FORCES CTG 76.4)

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. CO PROV NCC SUPT ACT WILL PROVIDE GUARD CP.

B. CO PROV NCC SUPT ACT PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SHIPS AND PROV NCC SUPT ACT HQS ON HARBOR COMCON 2716.

C. CG 3D MARDIV ESTABLISH STANDBY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SHIPS AND PROV NCC SUPT ACT HQS. ADVISE THIS HEADQUARTERS FREQUENCIES EMPLOYED.

GP-6

RELEASED BY *Deaull*
(M)

Top / 4 Mar / 11/21/40 / JPC
Top / WOI II / 11/0800 / JPC

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

- (2) DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY FORCES WILL BE PREPARED AND ISSUED SEPARATELY.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

- (1) ARVN. ON 14 AUGUST 1965 FOUR BATTALIONS OF THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION AND ONE BATTALION OF THE I CORPS RESERVE COMMENCE AN ESTIMATED 32 DAY OPERATION IN THE BA LONG VALLEY. ARVN CONCEPT OF OPERATION IS TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS FOR THREE DAYS TO REOPEN THE BA LONG VALLEY AND THEN TO ESTABLISH OUTPOSTS TO INSURE THAT GOVERNMENT FORCES RETAIN CONTROL OF AREA.

- (2) ARMY AVIATION. I CORPS AVIATION COMPANY PROVIDES LIMITED HELICOPTER PROTECTION.

- (3) USAF. MACV AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER PROVIDES USAF AND RVNAF RECONNAISSANCE, INTERDICTION, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, ANTI-AIR WARFARE SUPPORT AND AIRLIFT UPON REQUEST AND AS DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV.

- C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. REGIONAL FORCES WILL BE REQUESTED FOR ATTACHMENT TO III MAF FORCES, IF COMMITTED.

D. ASSUMPTIONS

- (1) THAT CG I CORPS MAY REQUEST III MAF MOBILE RESERVE/STRIKING FORCE ASSISTANCE.
- (2) THAT COMUSMACV WILL APPROVE ABOVE REQUEST AND DIRECT MAXIMUM AVAILABLE ASSISTANCE.
- (3) THAT 2D AIR DIV WILL PROVIDE USAF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT TO LIFT ONE INFANTRY BATTALION REINFORCED, INCLUDING ONE 107MM HOWTAR BATTERY, TO DONG HA AIRFIELD, 7 MILES NW OF QUANG TRI.

UNCLASSIFIED

2. MISSION. UPON REQUEST AND AS APPROVED BY COMUSMACV III MAF WILL CONDUCT MOBILE RESERVE/STRIKING FORCE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF ARVN FORCES IN BA LONG VALLEY.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

3. EXECUTIONA. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

- (1) III MAF CANNOT UNDERTAKE MOBILE RESERVE/STRIKING FORCE OPERATIONS UNTIL ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED BY CG I CORPS. UPON RECEIVING APPROVAL FROM COMUSMACV, III MAF WILL DEPLOY UP TO ONE REINFORCED BATTALION TO DONG HA AIRFIELD IN USAF FIXED AIRLIFT. FORCES WILL BE HELILIFTED FROM THAT AIRFIELD TO ZONE OF ACTION. DISPOSITION OF FORCES WILL BE DETERMINED AS SITUATION DEVELOPS.
- (2) SUBORDINATE COMMANDS CONDUCT ADVANCE UNILATERAL PLANNING TO REDUCE RESPONSE TIME TO A MINIMUM.
- (3) UPON RECEIVING REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, III MAF WILL:
 - (A) ISSUE WARNING ORDER.
 - (B) REQUEST APPROVAL OF COMUSMACV.
 - (C) REQUEST AIRLIFT BE ALERTED.
 - (D) AUGMENT LIAISON WITH I CORPS AS NECESSARY.

B. 3D MARINE DIVISION

- (1) BE PREPARED TO COMMIT ONE REINFORCED INFANTRY BATTALION, INCLUDING ONE 107MM HOWTAR BATTERY, AS A MOBILE RESERVE/STRIKING FORCE, TO SUPPORT ARVN FORCES OPERATING IN BA LONG VALLEY.
- (2) MAINTAIN NECESSARY FORCES ON A TWELVE HOUR ALERT STATUS DURING THE PERIOD 14-17 AUGUST 1965.
- (3) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT, ON ORDER, COMBINED PLANNING WITH ARVN STAFFS (TO BE DESIGNATED).

C. FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

- (1) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, CONSISTENT WITH OTHER ASSIGNED URGENT MISSIONS, TO ARVN FORCES OPERATING IN THE BA LONG VALLEY AREA. ANNEX A TO REFERENCE B APPLIES.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- (2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE HELICOPTER LIFT, FOR UP TO ONE REINFORCED BATTALION CONSISTENT WITH OTHER ASSIGNED URGENT OPERATIONAL MISSIONS, TO SUPPORT III MAF MOBILE RESERVE/STRIKING FORCE IN OPERATIONS IN THE BA LONG VALLEY AREA. ANNEX A TO REFERENCE B APPLIES.

D. FORCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP

- (1) BE PREPARED TO FURNISH LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT ONE REINFORCED INFANTRY BATTALION, INCLUDING ONE 107MM HOWTAR BATTERY, COMMITTED TO BA LONG VALLEY.

E. U. S. ARMY ADVISORY GROUP, I CORPS

- (1) ENSURE III MAF IS FULLY INFORMED ON THE PROGRESS OF ARVN OPERATIONS.

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) THIS DIRECTIVE IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT FOR UNILATERAL PLANNING PURPOSES.
- (2) DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING UNITS (U.S. ONLY) AUTHORIZED AND DIRECTED. FOR PLANNING.
- (3) SUBMIT COPIES OF PLANS TO THIS HQ PRIOR TO 1600 13 AUGUST 1965.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS. TO BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. REFERENCES B AND C APPLY.

B. COMMAND POSTS.

III MAF	DANANG
3DMARDIV	DANANG
FMAW	DANANG
FISG	DANANG
I CORPS	DANANG
1ST DIV (ARVN)	HUE

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. COMMUNICATIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH LOI AND COMSOP.

GP-4

RELEASED BY *Degan Fuller* (W)

TOD: 11/2325H/AUG65/EJM

CCN: 505

DIST: FILE.....COPY 1 OF 9 COPIES
MAF.....COPY 2-4 OF 9 COPIES
DIV.....COPY 5 OF 9 COPIES
MAW.....COPY 6-8 OF 9 COPIES
FLSG.....COPY 9 OF 9 COPIES

COPY 3 OF 9 COPIES

111210Z AUG 65

HAS BEEN SENT

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CCN: 1068

DRAFTER DEW
SECT G-3 PHONE 37
TRANS TOD
CWO

IMMEDIATE 10008Z

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG 3D MARDIV (FWD)
CG FIRST MAW (ADV)
CG FIRST MARDIV
CG THIRD MAW
CG FIRST MAW (REAR)
ADMNO THIRD MARDIV
RLT-7
FLSG
MAG-36
7TH ENGR BN
4TH MAR

MAF-14
DIU-10
WING - UZA-TTY
FLSG-7
4TH MAR-2/TTY

INFO: CINCPAC
COMUSMACV
CG FMFPAC
CINCPACFLT
CG FMFPAC/1 MAC (FWD)
COMSEVENTHFLT
CTF 79

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

//SECRET//

OPERATION ORDER 302-66 MARINE DEPLOYMENTS (U)
4TH MAR KEEP FOR INFO PASS TO BGEN KARCH

- A. CINCPAC 291845Z JUL (NOTAL)
- B. COMUSMACV 010130Z AUG (NOTAL)
- C. CG FMFPAC 032341Z AUG (NOTAL)
- D. CINCPACFLT 300218Z JUL (NOTAL)
- E. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 030422Z AUG (NOTAL)
- F. ADMNO THIRD MARDIV 291255Z JUL (NOTAL)
- G. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 040118Z AUG (NOTAL)

~~SECRET~~

1. SITUATION

A. GENERAL. REF A THROUGH E CONTAINS NOTIFICATION OF AUTH AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF USMC UNITS FROM EASTPAC TO RVN/WESTPAC AND CERTAIN WESTPAC UNITS TO RVN. INCLUDED IN THE EASTPAC MOVEMENT IS ONE BLT FOR RELIEF OF BLT 1/3 (DANANG) AND ONE BLT TO RE-CONSTITUTE THE SLF SUBSEQUENT TO THE LANDING IN RVN OF BLT 3/1.

COPY 1 OF 34 COPIES

Endo 100

- B. ENEMY FORCES. SEE CURRENT ISUMS.
- C. FRIENDLY FORCES. CINCPACFLT PROVIDES SURFACE LIFT AND COORDINATES MOVEMENT OF REINFORCING UNITS TO RVN.
- D. ATTACHMENTS. ALL ATTACHMENTS EFFECTIVE UPON LANDING OF THE UNIT IN RVN.

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ETA (REF G)</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
RLT-7 HQ	15 AUG	CHU LAI
BLT 1/7	15 AUG	CHU LAI
DET 4/7 (WHEN RELIEVED FR SLF)	UNK	CHU LAI
BLT 3/9	15 AUG	DANANG
LOG SPT GRP (REF F)	15 AUG	CHU LAI
CO A (REIN) 7TH ENGR BN	9 AUG	DANANG
7TH ENGR BN (-)(REIN)	24-30 AUG	DANANG
DET HQ 1ST FOR RECON CO	UNK	DANANG
DET VMCO-1	UNK	DANANG
MAG 36	1 SEP	CHU LAI
2D LAAM BN	15 SEP	CHU LAI
VMA 211	UNK	CHU LAI
VMF(AW) 312	UNK	DANANG

2. MISSION. III MAF IS REINFORCED BY ADDITIONAL UNITS IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT MISSIONS ASSIGNED.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION III MAF CONTINUES NORMAL OPERATION PREPARED TO ATTACH REINFORCING UNITS. IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT NEWLY ARRIVING UNITS BY:

UNCLASSIFIED

- (1) DESIGNATING ASSEMBLY AREAS AND ROUTES AS REQUIRED.
- (2) PROVIDING VEHICLES, PERSONNEL AND GUIDES AS REQUIRED TO ASSIST MOVEMENT OF ARRIVING UNITS TO ASSIGNED AREAS.

B. 3D MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN)(FWD)

ATTACHED: RLT-7 (-BLT 2/7)
 BLT 3/9
 CO A (REIN) 7TH ENGR BN

C. FMAW (ADV)

ATTACHED: DET VMCG-1
 MAG 36
 2D LAAM BN
 VMA 211
 VMF (AW) 212

D. DET, 1ST FOR RECON CO (-)

ATTACHED: DET HQ, 1ST FOR RECON CO.

E. FLSG.

ATTACHED: LOG SUPT GRP (REF F)

- (1) BE PREPARED TO FURNISH MOTOR TRANSPORT SUPPORT TO OTHER MAF UNITS TO ASSIST IN THE MOVEMENT OF ARRIVING UNITS.

F. FORCE ENGINEER GROUP (FEG)

7TH ENGR BN (REIN)

- (1) FEG ESTABLISHED UPON LANDING OF HQ CO 7TH ENGR BN.
- (2) CO A (REIN) REVERTS TO PARENT UNIT CONTROL UPON LANDING OF 7TH ENGR BN (-) (REIN).
- (3) 7TH ENGR BN (REIN) UNDER OPCON OF III MAF ADCOM 3D MAF.
- (4) CARRY OUT ENGINEER FUNCTIONS AS ASSIGNED.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS

- (1) CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT NEWLY ARRIVING UNITS BY:
 - (A) DESIGNATING ASSEMBLY AREAS AND ROUTES AS REQUIRED.
 - (B) PROVIDING VEHICLES, PERSONNEL AND GUIDES, AS REQUIRED, TO ASSIST MOVEMENT OF NEWLY ARRIVING UNITS TO ASSIGNED AREAS.
- (3) SUBMIT SITREPS EVERY 6 HOURS DURING ARRIVAL OF UNITS BEING ATTACHED (LESS DET VMCG 1).

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. TO BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

A. CPIS AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) III MAF -- DANANG
- (2) THIRD MARDIV (FWD) -- DANANG
 - (A) ADC COMMAND GRP -- CHU LAI
- (3) FIRST MAW -- DANANG
- (4) FLSG -- DANANG
 - (A) FLSU #1 -- CHU LAI
- (5) REG (WHEN ESTABLISHED) -- DANANG

UNCLASSIFIED

6. DIVISION/WING/FORCE UNITS SUBMIT FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS TO III MAF THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS.

GP-4
TOP/WWIT
11/15/61
C/S

RELEASED BY *[Signature]*

TOP/WWIT
11/15/61
Jea

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP/WWIT
11/23/61
RP

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

CORR: 194
PRIORITY: 111536Z

MAF-13
CICU-11
DENG-318/74
MIAD-2
I CORPS--2
R250-6/74
SEGE--4

DRAFTER: JRG
SECT: G-3 FROM: PARCIMENT 3
TRANS TO: GWD

1013-18-1/74
COMM: SP-2
DET: 1

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: III MAF

INFO: CG I CORPS
SA, I CORPS
ADVISOR DSS
CTG 76 A
CTF 76

U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY DETACHMENT
U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP ZOO
COMUSMACV
COMSEVENTHFLT
6222 ATTACK FLEET CTG

//S E C R E T//

FRAG ORDER 1-65 SUPPORT OF DA LANG HARBOR DEFENSE.

A. COMUSMACV LOG DTG 5 MAR 1965 MAGJ 31 (HOLL 1)

B. SITUATION

A. GENERAL. CG III MAF IS RESPONSIBLE IN REF (A) FOR DEFENSE OF DA LANG AIRFIELD AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES. AS A RESULT OF RECENT BUILDUP OF U. S. FORCES AND INFUX OF MEN AND MATERIAL, THE PORT AREA OF DA LANG AND PERIMETER AREAS CONTAIN MANY IMPORTANT AND VULNERABLE TARGETS BOTH ASHORE AND IN THE WATER. IN VIEW OF THE DIVERSE COMMANDS INVOLVED, THERE IS A REQUIREMENT, IN ORDER TO DISCHARGE III MAF MISSION, FOR CAREFUL COORDINATION AND STRICT FIRE CONTROL PROCEDURES TO AVOID ENDANGERING FRIENDLY FORCES, AS WELL AS A COLLECTIVE COORDINATED EFFORT BY ALL COMMANDS CONCERNED.

B. ENEMY. SEE CURRENT ITSUMS. VC HAVE CAPABILITY OF ATTACKING HARBOR INSTALLATIONS BY SEA OR TERRESTRIAL ATTACK. FOR EXAMPLE, RECENT REPORTS SUGGEST POSSIBLE PLAN TO USE LARGE JUNKS DISGUISED AS FISHING BOATS TO ATTACK NAVAL ZONE HEADQUARTERS AND JUNK FORCE BASE WITH MORTARS. USE OF LAND OR SEABORNE RAIDING PARTIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH JUNK BOMBING ATTACK IS POSSIBLE. SWIMMERS WITH MINES ARE AN EVER PRESENT THREAT.

C. FRIENDLY.

rec'd
Sect
TOP SECRET
ENCLOSURE

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

Enclosure

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

(1) RVR FORCES. CG I CORPS MAINTAINS REGIONAL FORCE ELEMENTS CAPABLE OF REACTING PROMPTLY TO GROUND ATTACK AROUND PERIMETER OF DANANG HARBOR. LIMITED NUMBER PATROL BOATS ARE ^{N: 50} AVAILABLE TO INVESTIGATE ^{S. 4112.2. 2000} REVENUE HARBOR.

(2) U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP OPERATES NAVAL ONE HQ, MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH U. S. SHIPPING IN HARBOR, MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH U. S. MERCHANT SHIPS OPERATING IN HARBOR AREA, AND PROVIDES MINIMUM SECURITY TO U. S. FACILITIES ASHORE.

(3) U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY DETACHMENT PROVIDES MINIMUM SECURITY TO U. S. FACILITIES ASHORE AND OCCASIONALLY HAS HIGH SPEED SMALL CRAFT AVAILABLE FOR INTERCEPT OF UNIDENTIFIED OR HOSTILE VESSELS.

(4) CTG 76.4 OPERATES HARBOR ENTRANCE CONTROL POINT (HECP); MAINTAINS COMMUNICATION WITH, AND ASSISTS IN COORDINATION OF, PRINCIPAL HARBOR ACTIVITIES; THROUGH MCM-11 MAINTAINS RADAR SURVEILLANCE OF HARBOR AND DETAILED INFORMATION AND PLOT OF SHIPPING; ^{VEGETATION} ^{RESEARCH} ^{BOATS} ^{OF} INTERCEPT UNIDENTIFIED/HOSTILE CRAFT; ^{PROVIDES} ^{INFORMATION} ^{FOR} ^{ESSENTIAL} FOR COORDINATION OF FIRES; ^{AND} PROVIDES MINIMUM SECURITY FOR U. S. SHORE BASE FACILITIES.

2. MISSION. III MAF CONDUCTS DEFENSE OF SHORE FACILITIES AT DA NANG AND COORDINATES Afloat IN SHORE DEFENSES AT DA NANG.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. III MAF CONTINUES NORMAL OPERATIONS AT DA NANG, CHU LAM, PHU BAI, AND QUI NHON; ESTABLISHES ALTERNATE MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH NAVAL COMMANDS RESPONSIBLE FOR HARBOR DEFENSE OF WATER AREAS; POSITIONERS TASK TO PROVIDE LIMITED DIRECT FIRE ANTI-JUNK CAPABILITY OVER HARBOR AREA, AND AND PROVIDES GROUND FORCES AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FORCES AS NECESSARY.

B. 3D MARDIV (FWD)

(1) ESTABLISH/MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS IN PAR 5.

(2) DEPLOY TANK SECTION IMMEDIATELY TO OBSERVATION POINT (OP) USE OP TO ENHANCE LOCAL SECURITY AND PROVIDE DIRECT FIRE CAPABILITY AGAINST MARINE TARGETS IDENTIFIED BY CTG 76.4

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING REINFORCEMENT/REACTION
HAU VAN PASS,
FORCES FOR DEPLOYMENT TO MONKEY MOUNTAIN AREA, OR OTHER POINTS AROUND
HARBOR AS DIRECTED:

(A) ONE RIFLE CO BY LVT OR TRUCK ON 30 MIN REACTION.

(B) ONE RIFLE CO BY HELICOPTER ON ONE HOUR REACTION.

(4) UTILIZE FSCG CAPABILITIES TO ASSIST CTF 76.4 IN COORDINATION
AND CONTROL OF HARBOR DEFENSIVE EFFORTS.

C. 1ST MAW

(1) BE PREPARED TO LAUNCH ALERT VMA/VMFA FOR HARBOR DEFENSE ON
ORDER.

(2) BE PREPARED ON ONE-HOUR NOTICE TO LIFT RIFLE COMPANY BY
HELICOPTER TO BEACH, RAILROAD, OR ROADBED LZS IN VICINITY HAU VAN PASS
OR TO MONKEY MOUNTAIN PENINSULA AREA AS DIRECTED.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) ALL UNITS CONTINUE NORMAL MISSIONS.

(2) DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED WITH U.S. COMMANDS INVOLVED IN
HARBOR DEFENSE.

(3) FOR NIGHT HELICOPTER OPERATIONS, EMBARK TROOPS AT HELICOPTER
FLIGHT LINE; DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS, PICK UP WILL BE MADE IN NEAREST
REGULAR LANDING ZONE.

(4) REPORT ALL ENEMY CONTACTS BY FLASH REPORT.

4. ADMINISTRATION. NO CHANGE.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

A. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
COMUSMACV CEOI, CG III MAF 060820Z MAY, CG III MAF 041304Z JUNE,
3D MARDIV COI, AND AS DIRECTED HEREIN.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

3D MARDIV G-3

FALCON 6232

SHOVE 3

3D MARDIV FSGC

SHOVE BAILEY

DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR

PUMA 126

MIUWS II (HECP) (CTG 76.4 RED)

ROADRUNNER 34

NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP

ROADRUNNER 35

NAVAL ADVISORY DET

ROADRUNNER 36, 37

GP-4

RELEASED BY *Frankella*

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Copy
File
21

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco 96601

103/EHS/jab

JUL 28 1965

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding General
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Subj: Operational Control MACV Advisory Effort

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV 230729Z
(b) COMUSMACV 230844Z
(c) SA I Corps ltr of 27Jul65, "I Corps Advisory Group Responsibilities"

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) and after examination of reference (c), the following general plan and sequence of events is recommended:

a. Assignment of the operational control of I Corps Advisory Group to III MAF. Action: COMUSMACV

b. Designation of SA, I Corps Advisory Group, as Deputy Chief of Staff (Advisory Affairs), III MAF. Action: CG, III MAF

c. Coordinated study of responsibilities to determine:

(1) Which responsibilities, if any, should be assumed by III MAF.

(2) Which responsibilities, if any, could be eliminated.

(3) Which responsibilities should be under the direct cognizance of III MAF through DC/S (Advisory Affairs).

(4) Which responsibilities should remain the unilateral responsibility of the Senior Advisor, I Corps Area.

Action: Staffs, III MAF and
Advisory Group

d. Based upon the above, recommendations to COMUSMACV on assignment of responsibilities. Action: CG III MAF

e. Publication of LOI. Action: COMUSMACV

f. Implementation. Action: CG III MAF

Appendix II
L. W. WALT

UNCLASSIFIED

CCN: L200

SECT 3/S
TRANS TO
CWO

PRIORITY L20528Z AUG 14 1965

MAF 14
DEU-LQ
WING - ~~UNCLAS~~ 45
FLSG - 5/TTY
PACSA-8
4th MAR - 2/TTY

Q

FROM: CG III MAF/NCC
TO: CG 3D MARDIV (FWD)
CG 1ST MAW (ADV)
CO FLSG
CO BOTH NCR
CO PROV NCC SUPPORT ACTIVITY
PCO NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, DANANG
CTF 76
CTG 76.4
ADC GI 3D MARDIV CHU LAI

INFO: COMUSMACV
DOICC, SAIGON
HEDSUPACT, SAIGON
CG FMFPAC
CG FMFPAC ADV/I MAC

HAS BEEN SENT

UNCLASSIFIED

//CONFIDENTIAL/

COORDINATION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE CHU LAI AREA

1. A COORDINATING HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AT CHU LAI UNDER THE ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER, 3D MARINE DIVISION. THIS GROUP HAS, INTER ALIA, BEEN SO ESTABLISHED SO AS TO ANTICIPATE AND ALLEVIATE ACTUAL OR POSSIBLE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BEFORE IRREVERSIBLE ACTIONS, PLANS, OR COMMITMENTS ARE TAKEN THAT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT:

- A. ANOTHER COMMAND OR COMMANDS
- B. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT OR THE LOCAL POPULACE
- C. REAL ESTATE ALLOCATION
- D. OVERALL LONG-RANGE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING

AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF CHU LAI ENCLAVE.

2. IT IS THUS PATENT THAT THE 3D MARINE DIVISION ADC COMMAND GROUP AT CHU LAI MUST BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF PROBLEM AREAS, PROJECTS, FUTURE PLANS

9-A

ISD/WING
12
3/31/CBS
13/1220
4th MAR
10XB

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (3)

HAS BEEN SENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AND DESIRES OF VISITING REPRESENTATIVES WITHIN THE CHU LAI AREA OF ANY
COMMAND OF 110 MAF/NCC, AS WELL AS THOSE OF COMMANDS NOT A PART OF III
MAF/NCC. 3D MARINE DIVISION ADC GROUP WILL IN TURN KEEP CG III MAF/NCC
INFORMED WITH RESPECT TO THE ABOVE. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS AND/OR
GUIDANCE RELATING THERETO WILL BE UNDERTAKEN, AS REQUIRED, BY CG III
MAF/NCC.

3. IT IS THEREFORE DIRECTED THAT ALL VISITORS TO THE CHU LAI AREA REPORT
TO THE 3D MARINE DIVISION ADC COMMAND GROUP IN THE COURSE OF THEIR VISIT
AND APPRISE THAT GROUP OF THE NATURE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTERS PROMPTING
THEIR VISIT, TO ENSURE COHESIVENESS OF EFFORT AND A MINIMUM OF CONFLICT IN
THE FUTURE. ADDITIONALLY, INTERESTED COMMANDS ARE REQUESTED TO KEEP ADC GP
3D MAFDIV AND THIS HQ INFORMED OF THEIR PLANS AND PROGRAMS AT CHU LAI AND
OF ANY CONFLICTS THAT HAVE ARISEN OR ARE FORESEEN.

GP/

RELEASED BY

[Handwritten Signature]

*100 / w w
130535*

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

B. REPORTED INTENSIFICATION OF VC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AROUND DANANG AIRFIELD COMPLEX TO INCLUDE CLOSE OBSERVATION OF MARINE PATROL AND AMBUSH TECHNIQUES.

C. REPORTED FORMING SPECIAL RAIDER SQUADS AND SABOTAGE TEAMS FOR INFILTRATING DANANG AIRFIELD ITSELF, POSSIBLY DISGUISED AS U. S. NEGRO MARINE PATROLS OR INDIVIDUALS, TO DESTROY AIRCRAFT, POL, AND ORDNANCE DUMPS.

D. REPORTED FORMING FEMALE GUERRILLAS W/MISSION TO ASSIST MAIN VC ACTION THROUGH CREATING DIVERSIONS IN DANANG AND VICINITY BY DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROVOKING POPULACE AGAINST U. S. OR HARASSING AND SABOTAGING MILITARY TRAFFIC. FEMALES REPORTEDLY WILL BE DISGUISED AS PEDDLERS, DEALERS, FARM WOMEN, AND CATTLE DRIVERS WITH CAPABILITY FOR OVERT USE OF CONCEALED WPNS AND GRENADES.

E. REPORTED CONTINUED PRESENCE IN DANANG AREA OF NGUYEN VAN TROL COMPANY THAT RAIDED AIRFIELD 1 JUL AND MORTARED TANK BN CP ON 10AUG. VCC INDICATED UNIT PRESENTLY DISPERSED AND TO REASSEMBLE ON 18 AUG VIC BT 0064.

F. REPORTED PRESENCE OF VC GENERAL OFFICER IN QUANG NAM WITH STAFF CAPABILITY TO CONTROL AND COORDINATE REGIMENTAL OR LARGER UNIT ACTIONS.

G. INCREASING VC RESISTANCE IN COMBAT HAMLETS TO USMC EFFORTS TO CLEAR TACR TO SOUTH BUT AVOIDANCE OF CONTACT BY MAIN FORCE UNITS.

H. INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF 19 AUG AS FOCAL DAY FOR ENHANCING VC PRESTIGE WITH SUCCESSFUL BLOW AGAINST MARINES AT DANANG.

3. G-2 COMMENTS, DANANG:

A. ENEMY NOW HAS CAPABILITY TO ATTACK DANANG COMPLEX WITH AT LEAST FOUR MAIN FORCE BNS WITH REGIMENTAL COMD STRUCTURE SUPERIMPOSED. IN CONJUNCTION WITH ATTACK BY ABOVE FORCE AGAINST SELECTED POINT, SPECIAL SABOTAGE SQUADS COULD SEEK TO PENETRATE AIRFIELD DEFENSE TO DESTROY AIRCRAFT AND INSTALLATIONS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE USE OF SUCH TACTICS AS REAR SALLYING, DIVERSIONARY AND DISRUPTIVE TACTICS COULD BE EMPLOYED IN VIC DANANG AND LOC'S. IN LIEU OF THE ABOVE MORTAR ATTACK A REAR SALLYING DIVERSIONARY ATTACK AND SHELLING MAY ALSO BE USED TO COVER PENETRATION OF AIRFIELD BY DEMOLITION SQUADS.

3. NOTWITHSTANDING HEAVY LOSSES ANTICIPATED BY SUCH ACTION, ABOVE LISTEN INDICATIONS SHOW VC MAY BE WILLING TO TRADE LOSSES FOR A SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY THAT COULD RESULT FROM EVEN LIMITED TACTICAL SUCCESS SCORED AGAINST MARINE COMBAT POWER AT DANANG. 1 JULY SUCCESSFUL RAID AND MORTAR ATTACK AGAINST U. S. FACILITIES IN AREA FOLLOWED BY LARGER SCALE EFFORT ON "NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT REVOLUTIONARY DAY" WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO WORLD GROWING STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION OF VC TO RESIST U. S. COMBAT POWER. ACCORDINGLY, PERIOD 17 AUG - 20 AUG CONSIDERED PARTICULARLY CRUCIAL.

C. REPORTS OF NEGROES OPERATING WITH VC CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED. IT IS PRESUMED BOTH AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN TROOPS WHO FOUGHT FOR FRENCH AGAINST VIET MINH HAVE DESERTERS REMAINING IN VIETNAM. ANY ABILITY OF THESE NEGROES AND CAUCASIANS TO PASS THEMSELVES OFF AS USMC PERSONNEL WOULD GIVE VC AN ADDED CAPABILITY TO PENETRATE USMC POSITIONS.

4. G-2 COMMENTS, PHU BAI: NO CHANGE IN SITUATION AND NO REPORTED TRENDS, HOWEVER ENEMY RETAINS CAPABILITY OF ATTACKING PHU BAI AIRFIELD WITH ESTIMATED 3 MF BNS SUPPORTED BY LOCAL GUERRILLAS.

5. G-2 COMMENTS, CHU LAI: NUMEROUS REPORTS RECEIVED TEND TO INDICATE BUILD UP IN EASTERN QUANG TIN AND NORTHERN QUANG NGAI PROVINCES. WHILE REPORTS OF THREATENED ATTACK CONTINUE, NO TIME FRAME, CONFIRMING TRENDS, NOR SPECIFIC INDICATORS HAVE BEEN NOTED. ENEMY RETAINS CAPABILITY OF ATTACKING CHU LAI WITH POSSIBLE TWO REGIMENTS OR EST TOTAL 8 TO 10 BNS SUPPORTED BY LOCAL GUERRILLAS.

UNCLASSIFIED

NOT BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE BASE.

UNCLASSIFIED

E. SECURITY GUARDS ON THE GATES PROVIDING ENTRANCE TO THE AIR BASE WILL BE DOUBLED.

F. ADDITIONAL ARVN SECURITY TROOPS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED FROM I CORPS TO ASSIST U. S. PERSONNEL IN THE INSPECTION AND CLEARING OF RVNAF ESSENTIAL TRAFFIC IN AND OUT OF THE AIRBASE.

G. MAXIMUM DISPERSAL OF AIRCRAFT IS MANDATORY. INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT UNIT COMMANDERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT. THE CG, FIRST MAW AS III MAF TACTICAL AIR CDR IS ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY AS OVERALL COORDINATOR FOR DISPERSAL PLANS. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO USING OUTLYING AIRFIELDS WHERE FEASIBLE.

H. CG THIRD MARDIV WILL PROVIDE ONE ADDITIONAL BATTALION FOR ADDED AIR BASE PERIMETER SECURITY.

I. MAXIMUM USE OF FLARES IS MANDATORY OVER LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH TO THE AIRBASE.

J. ALL PERSONNEL WILL CARRY INDIVIDUAL ARMS AT ALL TIMES.

8. THE FOREGOING INCREASED SECURITY MEASURES SHOULD IN NO WAY INTERFERE WITH COMBAT OPERATIONS. TO THE CONTRARY, USMC INFANTRY UNITS WILL INCREASE AGGRESSIVE COMBAT PATROLLING IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE AIRBASE WITH MAXIMUM EFFORT DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS. ALL U. S. PERSONNEL WILL BE ON THE ALERT FOR SUSPICIOUS AND UNIDENTIFIED PERSONNEL.

9. COMMANDING GENERAL, I CORPS AND COMMANDER 41ST TACTICAL WING, VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE HAVE SEEN AND CONCUR WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS MESSAGE.

10. WHILE PRIMARY EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE DA LANG AREA, COMMANDERS

1965 01 06 1400

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AT THE PH. 01 AND 010101 ARE ALSO DIRECTED TO COMPLY WITH DIRECTIVES
CONTAINED HEREIN AND INCREASE SECURITY MEASURES TO THE FULLEST.

01-4

RELEASED BY

Deane Fuller


UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

CIVIC ACTION SEMINAR SCHEDULE

31 AUGUST 1965

<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</u>
0800-0820	Introductory Remarks	III MAF/USOM/JUSPAO
0820-0850	G-2 Briefing	I Corps
0900-0950	G-3 Briefing (to include V.C., ARVN, & MACV Advisory Structures)	I Corps
1000-1025	Regional Forces & Popular Forces	I Corps
1025-1050	U. S. Special Forces Civic Action Program	U. S. Special Forces
1100-1130	Refugees in I Corps	USOM
1300-1420	Political Situation in I Corps & Functioning within Political System	USOM
1430-1455	Practical Solutions to Civic Action Problem in Phu-Bai & Le My areas	III MAF
1455-1520	MACV-ARVN Communications Capabilities & limitations	I Corps
1530-1555	USOM Provincial Operations and Structures	USOM
1600-1730	JUSPAO Operations and MACV Psy-War Operations	JUSPAO/I CORPS

1 SEPTEMBER 1965

0800-0850	Rural Reconstruction (Concepts and explanation of present plan in I Corps area)	I Corps
0900-0950	Provincial Funding	USOM
1000-1050	MILCAP Funding	I Corps
1100-1130	MEDCAP	I Corps
1300-1325	USOM Operations	USOM
1325-1350	Public Health Programs	USOM
1400-1425	Peoples Action Teams	U.S. Embassy
1425-1450	Education Programs	USOM
1500-1525	Public Works	USOM
1525-1550	Public Safety Programs	USOM
1600-1625	Self-Help Programs	USOM
1625-1650	Agricultural and Fisheries Programs	USOM
1700-1730	JUSPAO Facilities	JUSPAO

DECLASSIFIED

2 SEPTEMBER 1965

<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</u>
0800-0850	Role of Private Charitable Organizations	III MAF/CARE/CRS
0900-0950	Reporting of Civic Action Programs	III MAF
0900-1130	Work Shops (Regional personnel will meet separately to discuss regional problems and possible approaches. USOM and I Corps staff will circulate during period)	All Sponsoring Agencies
1300-1500	Work Shops (Continued)	All Sponsoring Agencies
1510-1600	Closing Remarks by: (1) Col. Sam WILSON Asst. Director for Opns, USOM (2) Mr. Barry ZORTHLAN Director, JUSPAO (3) B.Gen. Melvin HENDERSON ADC, 3rd MARDIV	All Sponsoring Agencies

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP
Advisory Team #1
APO US Forces 96337

8 September 1965

MACTN-ICOP

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation Report (U)

THRU: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco 96660

TO: See Distribution

Attached hereto is Monthly Evaluation Report for the month of August 1965.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



RICHARD A. WILSON
Captain, AGC
Admin Officer

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:


- MACJ323 - cys 1 thru 4
- US Consul Hue - cy 5
- SA, 1st Inf Div - cy 6
- SA, 2nd Inf Div - cy 7
- CG, III MAF - cys 8 & 9
- USOM - cy 10
- CO, 23rd Air Base Gp - cy 11
- CO, Det C-1, 5th SF Gp(Abn) - cy 12
- Admin Office, I Corps - cy 13
- G2 Advisor, I Corps - cy 14
- G3 Advisor, I Corps - cy 15

UNCLASSIFIED

Pg 1 of 1 pg

Cy 8 of 15 cys

ENCLOSURE 15
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES.



DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (August 1965)(U)

ANNEX A

I CORPS

1. (e) GENERAL: For the second consecutive month there has been a considerable increase in GVN counterinsurgency operations (and a comparable decrease in VC initiated incidents). The most significant operation was a 1st Division (ARVN) controlled exercise in the Ba Long Valley (Quang Tri Province). A B-52 strike and 276 sorties of tactical air preceded the entrance of troops into the valley. This marked the first time in 14 months that ARVN units had conducted an operation in that VC stronghold. By the end of the month the detailed planning and close coordination necessary to effect the establishment of the Quang Nam Special Sector had been accomplished. On 1 September, Quang Nam became a special sector under the direct control of I Corps. Of particular significance were the 6 B-52 bombing missions flown during the month. This marked the first occasion that such strikes were conducted in the Corps area. Seven months of planning culminated in the first large scale chemical crop destruction program which was flown in the area of the two northern Corps provinces.

2. (b) CURRENT OPERATIONS: I Corps (ARVN) conducted 70 battalion or larger size operations during August. This is the largest monthly total recorded in the past six months and is an increase of 30 over July. Contact was made with the VC on 49 of these operations. During the reporting period, I Corps (ARVN) units reported 702 VC killed and 171 weapons captured, an increase over the previous month of 71 KIA but a decrease of 54 weapons captured. Friendly losses were 136 KIA (38 more than in July) and 106 weapons lost (a decrease of 38 from last month). Four specific operations punished the VC severely and reduced enemy combat power. On 2-3 August a combined USMC/ARVN battalion size

UNCLASSIFIED

Pg 1 of 5 pgs

Cy 8 of 15 cys

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (August 1965)(U)

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX A (Cont'd)
(BASTO)

operation, took place ten kilometers south of Da Nang. In this operation, as in other similar combined operations, the co-location of command posts and the FSCC was employed. In a search and destroy operation conducted by three 2d Division battalions on 3-4 August 8 kilometers south of Quang Ngai City, 37 VC were killed versus friendly losses of 4 killed and 7 wounded. A sweep of the same area was made again by three battalions on 12 and 13 August which resulted in 59 VC KIA and 29 VCC; 3 ARVN were killed and 9 wounded in this action. The last of these noteworthy operations, Lam Son 190, still continues. This operation took place in the Ba Long Valley, 38 kilometers south of the 17th parallel. On 14 August, two regimental combat teams from the 1st Division attacked from the opposite ends of the east-west valley, supported by a B-52 strike, tactical air, and artillery. The valley was suspected to be a major staging, supply, and training area for the VC and subsequent discoveries confirmed this. By the end of the month cumulative results were 71 VC killed, 42 weapons captured, 11 tons of salt, corn, rice, and dried fish destroyed, and numerous other supplies and structures captured or destroyed. The two regimental combat teams linked up on 19 August. One battalion remains in the valley to continue clearing it and to re-establish an outpost there. US aircraft flew 1277 sorties and VNAF flew 283 in the Corps Tactical Zone. Of the six B-52 missions flown, one was in Quang Tri (Ba Long Valley) and the other five were conducted against the suspected location of the 5th Military Region Headquarters along the Quang Tin-Quang Ngai provincial border 25 kilometers southwest of Tam Ky. Naval gunfire expended 3070 rounds (1099 more than in July) in support of ARVN ground operations. During the period 15-26 August, 20 crop destruction sorties were

UNCLASSIFIED

Pg 2 of 5 pgs

Cy 8 of 15 cys

MACTN-IC
 SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (August 1965)(U)

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

flown by C-123 aircraft over five target areas in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Approximately 20,000 gallons of defoliant were sprayed over 4,224 hectares of corn, manioc, rice, and sweet potatoes. Although it is too early to fully evaluate the effectiveness of crop destruction, initial results appear excellent. In the area of training, an air-ground operations systems course was conducted by the Corps G3 Air Advisor and ARVN TOC Director on 27 August with approximately 25 1st Division (ARVN) and US personnel in attendance. The purpose of this course was to orient operations personnel in order to improve procedures and reduce the time required for effecting immediate and preplanned air support. Also, training of GVN aerial observers continued throughout the Corps area. Since 1 July a total of 43 observers have received courses in theory and practical work on observation techniques. *Attended by the 7 Corps staff. Evaluation report is attached as enclosure (15).*

3. (C) VC ACTIVITIES: During August, VC activity decreased for the second consecutive month. A total of 224 VC initiated incidents were reported, a reduction of 25 per cent from July. This was the lowest number of VC initiated incidents during any month in 1965. It should be noted, however, that in Quang Nam Province incidents rose 18 per cent. Two significant VC attacks occurred during the month. An attack took place on the BSSO Lien Chieu POL Dump during the early morning hours of 5 August which resulted in the destruction of two POL tanks and damage to three others with the resultant loss of 20,000 barrels of JP-4 aviation fuel. This attack was conducted by the Nguyen Van Troi Company, named in honor of a native of Hoa Vang District who was captured while attempting to mine a Saigon bridge during Mr. McNamara's visit in 1963 and who was recently executed in Saigon. Shortly after midnight on 31 August, an estimated VC battalion overran the

Pg 3 of 5 pgs

Cy 8 of 15 cys

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (August 1965)(U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

UNCLASSIFIED

An Hoa outpost in Binh Son District. The RF Company guarding this outpost suffered heavy losses. Information has been received that as a result of the losses suffered by the 1st Regt (VC) at the hands of the USMC in Operation Starlight, the 108th Regiment has been formed in Quang Tin Province and is composed of the 70th and 94th Battalions, and either the 73d or 75th Local Force Company. This regiment remains unconfirmed but would be a logical replacement for the 1st Regiment. Operation Starlight has reduced the threat of a large scale VC operation in Quang Ngai unless reinforcements are received from other areas. Operation Lam Son 190 in the Ba Long Valley has caused displacement of the 803d, 804th, 806th, and 808th Battalions, ^{and} has reduced the threat in Quang Tri Province.

4. (C) RURAL CONSTRUCTION: Slight progress was made in the 11th DTA as a result of recent ARVN clearing operations and cadre teams resuming work in hamlets following the June rice harvest protection program. Some gains were made in Quang Nam Province where cadres were relocated into areas secured by USMC units. Otherwise, no significant progress was made in the 12th DTA primarily due to lack of adequate military and para-military forces to provide necessary security for cadres working in hamlets. It is expected that the formation of the Quang Nam Special Sector, effective 1 September, will enhance coordination of rural construction activities among military, civilian, and National Police agencies in that area.

5. (C) PSYWAR/CA ACTIVITIES: Routine ground and aerial leaflet drops along with ground and air-borne loudspeaker broadcasts characterized the psywar effort for the month. The newly organized Psywar Mixed Committee, composed of I Corps DC/S for Political and Social Affairs, I Corps Psywar/CA Advisor, I Corps G2, and representatives from the Chieu Hoi Center, JUSPAO, VIS, USOM, National Police, III MAF,

Pg 4 of 5 pgs Cy 8 of 15 cys.

UNCLASSIFIED

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (August 1965)(U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

and the Psywar/CA Center was convened twice during the period and began an outline for a unified ICTZ Psywar/CA Program. The attachment of the 1st Psyops Field Support Detachment (Prov) from Okinawa has given impetus to the advisory and assistance effort for the 3d ARVN Psywar Bn and 1st CA Co. Tactical psywar and civic action support was given to the 9th Marines in an operation at Hoa Thai in Quang Nam Province. This was the first such combined ARVN/USMC-Psywar/CA operation and was very effective.

6. (C) LOGISTICS: Support remained good during the month. The required rafting operations at the Cao Lau Bridge, 10 kilometers west of Hoi An, seriously impaired convoy movements between Da Nang and the provinces to the south. The closing of the Da Nang River Bridge, at Da Nang City, for repairs greatly hampered supply movement to and from Da Nang East Airfield. Lack of adequate sea and surface transportation facilities continues to be the gravest problem in Corps logistics. Critical shortages of ordnance and engineer items existed throughout the reporting period due to non-arrival of supplies by ship. This condition was partially alleviated by air shipment.

7. (C) ENGINEER: The condition of Route 1 continues to be the primary engineer task. The critical shortage of tactical bridging was reduced. One M-2 Panel Bridge (Bailey) was received by the Engineer Depot and tactical bridging was prestocked in Quang Ngai, Tam Ky, and Hue. Bridge timbers and crushed rock remain in short supply.

8. (C) SECURITY: During this reporting period improvements were made on the physical security, perimeter, barriers, and communications between bunkers at MACV compounds. An inspection of the security guard was made by this headquarters in the 11th DTA and no major deficiencies were noted.

UNCLASSIFIED Pg 5 of 5 pgs Cy 8 of 15 cys

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DE RUEHL 0740 05/0057Z

R R 050057Z

FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUMUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMFUAQ/CG III MAF/NCC

ZE N/COMSE R VPA C

RUMPG/CG FMFPA C

INFO RUE CW /CNO

RUE CE M/CMC

RUMPLHQ/CINCPAC

RUMSIA/COMUSMACV

RUMSIS/HEADSUPPACT SAIGON

RUMFUAQ/CG III MAF

RUMFUAZ/CG SEVEN THREE

RUMFUU/CG SEVEN SIX

RUMDP/COMPHIBPAC

RUMUNJ/COMNAVFORJAPAN

RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL

RUMGH/COMNAVMARIANAS

ZE N/DIRPACDOCKS

ZE N/COMCBPAC

RUMSPG/COMWESTSEAFRON

RUE CE H/BUDOCKS

RUE CD/BUSHIPS

RUE CH/BUPE RS

RUE CD/BUSAN DA

RUE CE F/BU ME D

RUE CM/CHINA VMA T

RUE CYN/COMSTS

RUAUDM/COMSTSFE

BT

SECRET

OPERATION OF U.S. MILITARY PORTS, BEACHES, AND DEPOTS FROM CHU LAI TO DMZ (U)

- A. CINCPAC 241945Z APR PASEP
- B. CINCPAC 110427Z MAY PASEP
- C. CINCPACFLT 220514Z MAY NOTAL
- D. CINCPACFLT 260107Z MAY NOTAL
- E. NWP 22A ART 101B
- F. OPNAV INSE 4620.6 ENCL (1)

REF A DIRECTED THAT MILITARY LOGISTIC OPERATIONS AT PORTS AND BEACHES FOR THE SUPPORT OF U.S. FORCES AND ATTACHED THIRD COUNTRY FORCES IN THE DANANG/CHU LAI AREA WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED USING NAVY RESOURCES. REF B AMPLIFIED REF A.

FILE-1 of 15
MAF-2-13
DIV-14 of 15
NCC-15 of 15

Copy # of 15 Copies

MASTER FILE

UNCLASSIFIED

05 00/02/15 57

ENCLOSURE (16)

UNCLASSIFIED

... ADDITIONAL ... RESPONSIBILITIES IN ... OF REFS A AND B AND IS HEREBY CANCELLED AND SUPERSEDED. ... NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY REFERRED TO IN PARA 7 OF REF D WILL NOT BE ESTABLISHED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. REMAINING PROVISIONS OF REF D REMAIN IN EFFECT EXCEPT LIGHTERAGE REQTS WILL BE DETERMINED BY COMSEVENTHFLT.

- REF E INDICATES THAT CERTAIN COMBAT OPERATIONS WHICH INVOLVE WATERBORNE MOVEMENT, WATER TERMINAL, AND LOGISTICS OVER-THE-SHORE OPERATIONS (LOTS) POSSESS CHARACTERISTICS OF, AND EMPLOY AMPHIBIOUS TECHNIQUE BUT ARE NOT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. REF E PROVIDES POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE CONDUCT OF LOTS OPERATIONS.
- FOR COMSEVENTHFLT - IN SUPPORT OF REFS A AND B, CONDUCT LOGISTICS OVER-THE-SHORE OPERATIONS AT DANANG, CHU LAI AND SUCH OTHER LOCATIONS IN RVN FROM CHU LAI TO THE DMZ AS MAY BE REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF U.S. AND ATTACHED THIRD COUNTRY FORCES IN IMPLEMENTING THIS MISSION. ESTABLISH SUCH ORGANIZATION IN THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE SEVENTHFLT AS MAY BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE FOR:
 - A. CONTINUITY OF OPS THRU EMPLOYMENT OF A DIRECTING STAFF AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.
 - B. LOADING AND UNLOADING OF SHIPS AND MOVEMENT OF CARGO BETWEEN SHIP AND SHORE.
 - C. AS NECESSARY INTRA-HARBOR AND INTER-HARBOR LIGHTERAGE.
 - D. OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TERMINATING SHORESIDE UPON

MASTER FILE

REF 3 RUHLHL 0740 SECRET

DISCHARGE OF LIGHTERAGE /SHIPS AND TURN-OVER OF THE CARGO TO THE RECEIVING AGENT DESIGNATED BY THE NCC, AT A LOCATION IN THE POLY/SEAON AREA IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO POINT OF DISCHARGE. FOR OUTBOUND CARGO, RESPONSIBILITY IS THE REVERSE OF THE PROCEEDING.

FOR NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER TO COMUSMACV. IN SUPPORT OF REFS A AND B CONDUCT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS ASHORE TO SUPPORT U.S. AND ATTACHED THIRD COUNTRY FORCES FROM CHU LAI TO THE DMZ. IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MISSION PROVIDE FOR:

- A. ESTABLISHING AND OPERATING A SUPPLY ACTIVITY AT DANANG AND AT SUCH OTHER LOTS WATER TERMINALS AS MAY BE REQUIRED TO RECEIVE, STORE

MAINTAIN, CONTROL AND ISSUE COMMON ITEMS RECEIVED THROUGH THE U.S. SUPPLY PIPELINE FOR ALL U.S. FORCES AND FOR ATTACHED THIRD COUNTRY FORCES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA DEFINED. COMMON SUPPORT SUPPLIES (GENERALLY THOSE NOW PROVIDED THROUGH HSAS) WILL BE ACQUIRED THROUGH THE IN-COUNTRY SUPPLY SYSTEMS DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV. ALL OTHER CATEGORIES OF SUPPLY ARE CONSIDERED SERVICE PECULIAR AND WILL BE ACQUIRED THROUGH SERVICE CHANNELS. SUPPLY ACTIVITY OPERATIONS INCLUDING IN-TRANSIT SERVICE TO RESPECTIVE SERVICE ELEMENTS IN THE AREA FOR ARE PECULIAR.

- B. EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE WITHIN THE ORGANIC CAPABILITY OF THE MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE AS ARRANGED FOR BY INTER-SERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENT.
- C. OPERATE POL TERMINALS FOR THE RECEIPT, STORAGE, AND ISSUE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



... POL AND COMMON ITEMS OF PACKAGED POL, INCLUDING THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF TANKAGE AND PIPELINES, TO COMPLEMENT INCOUNTRY COMMERCIAL POL RESOURCES.

THE NCC WILL CONDUCT NECESSARY LIAISON ON PORT MATTERS WITH LOCAL CIVIL AUTHORITIES, AND COORDINATE ACTIVITIES OF ALL USARV COMMANDS PARTICIPATING IN LOGISTIC OPERATIONS HEREIN PRESCRIBED BY

THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED IN AMPLIFICATION OF THE ABOVE TASKING:

A. NAVY EXCHANGE SERVICES AT DANANG WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE DSUPACT SAIGON.

B. STORAGE OF MATERIAL, EXCEPT COMMON ITEM SUPPLIES AND MATERIAL HELD IN TRANSIT, IS A SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY.

C. THE MOVEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIAL FROM SUPPLY ACTIVITY IS A SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY.

D. DISPOSITION OF MATERIAL THROUGH SURFACE RETROGRADE MOVEMENT IS A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SHIPPING SERVICE UNTIL DELIVERY TO THE SEVENTHFLT RECEIVING AUTHORITY IN THE DESIGNATED PORT AREA.

E. PRESENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATION OF AIR CARGO TERMINALS REMAINS UNCHANGED. CARGO DELIVERY TO AND FROM THE AIR CARGO TERMINALS IS A SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY.

UNCLASSIFIED

MASTER FILE

PAGE 5 RUHLHL 0740 SECRET

F. MILITARY PORT OPERATIONS ARE IN NO MANNER TO CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF GVN.

9. FOR COMSERVPA G- PROVIDE OR ARRANGE FOR MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT, CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT AND SERVICE CRAFT REQUIRED BY COMSEVENTHFLT TO EXECUTE THE MISSION ASSIGNED IN PARA 5.

10. FOR CG FMFPA G- PROVIDE OR ARRANGE FOR ALL SHBRESIDE CAPABILITY REQUIRED BY THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER TO COMUSMACV TO EXECUTE THE MISSION ASSIGNED IN PARA 6.

GP- FOUR
BT

TOP/PI
0713052 AR



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

*Port
Ops*

DRAFTED BY: JSH
SECTION: MAF G-4 PHONE: PARCHMENT 204

ROUTINE 092350Z JUNE

FROM: CG III MAF

*Dist: FILE - 1
MAF - 12
DIV - 10
MAW - 25
FASG - 5*

TO: CG THIRD MARDIV (FMD)
CG FIRST MAW (ADV)
FLSG

THIS READDRESSES CINCPACFLT 050057Z AS INDICATED ABOVE.

THIS MESSAGE IS DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF BASIC MESSAGE

RELEASED BY: *N. R. Nickerson*

MASTER FILE

JUNE

17

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure

N. U.S. PORTS AND BEACHS

05

00

57

DECLASSIFIED

DRAFTER VIEW
SECT G-3 ONE PARCIMENT 3
TRANS TO
CWO

CON: 395

PRIORITY 0401442

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG 3D MARDIV (FWD)
CG FIRST MAW (ADV)

File 1
MAF 14
DIV 10
WING 30/TTK

Wing G-3
Div G-3

INFO: COMUSMACV
CG USATFA NHA TRANG
CG USARV
SA II CORPS
BLT 2/7
MAG 16

Wing G-3/JO

HAS BEEN SENT
AUG 6 1965

//SECRET//

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

- A. COMUSMACV 310298Z JULY (NOTAL)
- B. III MAF 030126Z (NOTAL)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE A EFFECTIVE 050001H AUG 6, CG 3D MARDIV (FWD) REDESIGNATE BLT 2/7 AS 2D BN 7TH MARINES (REIN) AND PASS OPCON OF 2D BN 7TH MARINES (REIN) TO TASK FORCE ^{ALFA} ~~ALPHA~~.
2. ADMIN 2D BN 7TH MARINES (REIN) REMAINS 3D MARDIV. ADMIN DET HMM-161 REMAINS 1STMAW.
3. REF B REQUESTS COMUSMACV TO ADVISE DATE LOGISTIC SUPPORT BY USARV WILL COMMENCE.

GP-4

RELEASED BY *Carsons*

700/0.0042
11/16/78

HAS BEEN SENT

19

04

01
20F 55
DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (17)
44

DRAFTER JEG
SECT G-3 PHONE 3
TRANS TOD
CWO

PRIORITY 181304Z

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: COMUSMACV

INFO: CG THIRD MARDIV (FWD)
CG FMAW (ADV)

JUN 20 1965

file - 1
MAF - 12
DIU - 10

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

SCOUT DOGS

1. SCOUT DOGS FROM DOG PLAT ASSIGNED I CORPS AREA HAVE BEEN USED TO ADVANTAGE BY ELEMENTS OF THIS COMMAND. SUFFICIENT DOGS ARE NOT AVAILABLE, HOWEVER, TO FULFILL THE NEEDS OF III MAF TACTICAL AND REAR AREA SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.
2. FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH COMUSMACV DURING A RECENT VISIT TO THIS COMMAND, AND FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE LOCALLY, UNDERSTAND ADDITIONAL DOGS MAY BE AVAILABLE FROM OTHER CORPS AREAS OR OUT-OF-COUNTRY RESOURCES.
3. REQ YOUR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING ADDITIONAL SCOUT DOG SUPPORT FOR THIS COMMAND. CONSIDER THAT A MINIMUM OF TWO PLATOONS OR APPROXIMATELY 25 DOGS COULD BE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED IN III MAF AREA.

GP-4

RELEASED BY *2/2/65*

TOP SA1
181845Z

TOD
191873Z

FMAW

16A

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 HAS BEEN SENT UNCLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE (19) *04*