

DECLASSIFIED

3Ops/lwp

0019 66

4 JAN 1966

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on III Marine Amphibious Force 103/RPL/
lpf of 19Nov65 Ser: 0040165

From: Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: III MAF Command Chronology for September 1965 (U)

Ref: (a) CMC ltr A03D22-KPS of 7Aug65

1. Forwarded in accordance with paragraph 3 of reference (a).
2. Unclassified upon removal of basic document.

H. J. Woessner

H. J. WOESSNER
By direction

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ 286 644

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

65 9887

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

103/RPL/lpf
19 NOV 1965
0040165

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG FMFPAC msg 251942Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III MAF Command Chronology September 1965

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).


L.W. WALT

COPY NO 1 OF 3 COPIES

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 - 30 SEPTEMBER 1965

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

PART FOUR

ENCLOSURES

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

DANANG AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

LEWIS W. WALT

Major General United States Marine Corps

Commanding

Command Chronology for period 1 Sept - 30 Sept 1965

Chief of Staff	Col Regan FULLER, USMC to 12 Sept 1965 Col George C. AXTELL, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff	Col Howard E. WERTMAN, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Col Don W. GALBREATH, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Col Leo J. DULACKI, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col Edwin H. SIMMONS, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Col Harold A. HAYES, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	Col Elmer G. GLIDDEN JR, USMC
Supply Officer	Col Howard G. TAFT, USMC
Force Engineer	Col William M. GRAHAM, USMC
Communications - Electronics Officer	Col Frederick G. DODSON, USMC
Adjutant	LtCol Burton L. LUCAS JR, USMC from 30 Sept 1965

SUBORDINATE UNITS

3d Marine Division (-) (Rein)
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Force Logistics Support Group
2d Battalion, 9th Marines

COMMANDER

MajGen Lewis W. WALT, USMC
BGen Keith B. MCCUTCHEON, USMC
Col Mauro J. PADALINO, USMC
LtCol William F. DONAHUE JR, USMC

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SUBORDINATE UNITS

7th Engineer Battalion
1st Force Reconnaissance Co
Communications Support Co
Communication Co, 7th Communication Bn

COMMANDER

Lt Col Ermine L. MEEKER, USMC
Maj Malcolm C. GAFFEN, USMC
Maj Donald L. MURPHY, USMC
Capt Charles T. HAMPTON, USMC

Average Monthly Strength

USMC		USN		
<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
2,366	32,019	268	3,204	37,853

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General. During September 1965, III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was located at coordinates (AT 994757) which is 350 meters west of the DANANG Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam, adjacent to the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing command posts. All forces under the operational control of III MAF were located in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines and HMM-363 were attached to Task Force Alfa in II CTZ during September. III MAF continued the build up of forces as personnel strength increased from 30,912 to 37,853 in September.

B. Operations. III MAF continued to conduct unilateral and coordinated operations in support of the mission as contained in reference (a). One operation was conducted on 7 September in support of RVNAF, as specifically spelled out in Phase III of reference (a), by rapidly moving 3d Battalion, 3d Marines into the area south of the DANANG TAOR (AT 965615) to relieve the pressure the VC were exerting on ARVN forces. Expansion of the DANANG TAOR southward permitted III MAF to begin operation GOLDEN FLEECE; an operation aimed at denying the VC access to the rich rice producing areas along the SONG CAU DO, SONG YEN, SONG BAU and SONG VINH DIEN.

C. Enemy Activity. The Viet Cong reverted from the tactic of amassing large forces to small unit actions during September. This change is attributed largely to the results of Operation STARLITE; the surprise search and destroy operation which proved that large concentrations of VC forces could be discovered and defeated by US/RVN Forces. In reverting to small unit activity, the VC concentrated on ingenious land mines and booby traps in an effort to limit III MAF offensive action.

II. OPERATIONS

A. USMC Operations. The most significant unilateral III MAF operation in September was Operation GOLDEN FLEECE which was conducted in the southern sector of the DANANG TAOR to prevent the VC from taking the newly harvested rice from the farmers. This operation consisted of continuous patrols, search and destroy operations, and ambushes in the area where the rice being harvested. Operation GOLDEN FLEECE began on 9 September and will continue until the rice crop in the DANANG TAOR is harvested. This operation increased III MAF activity and consequently the number of USMC initiated VC contacts rose from 44 in August to 228 in September. The casualty results of III MAF operations are shown in Table I.

USMC		VC	
KIA	37	KIA	216
DOW	3	VCC	37
WIA	274	VCS	595
		Wpns Captured	49

TABLE I

CASUALTY RESULTS III MAF OPERATIONS SEPT 1965

As indicated by Table I, the USMC/VC kill ratio was 5.8:1, a decrease from the 10:1 ratio results of August. This decrease can be attributed to the fact that no concentrated large force VC resistance, of Operation STARLITE magnitude, was encountered in September.

B. Coordinated Operations. Three major operations were conducted in September in coordination with RVNAF; the largest of which was Operation PIRANHA.

1. Operation PIRANHA. This coordinated operation was a search and destroy attack in the QUANG NGAI area east of NS grid line BS 72, south of EW grid line BS 90, north of EW grid line BS 81. The attack was launched at 0630 on 7 September by forces of the 7th Marines (1st and 3d battalions) and ARVN units consisting of 2d Battalion, 4th Regiment and 2d Vietnamese Marine Corps Battalion. None of the approximately 3,300 dwellings in the III MAF portion of the objective were destroyed and there were only 2 civilian casualties (2 WIA). This is a direct result of troop indoctrination and the prudent use of supporting arms. Only scattered concentrations of VC forces were encountered during the four day operation, and most of the VC casualties, shown in Table II, resulted from the discovery and destruction of caves and fighting holes; 66 VC were killed in a single cave. Details of the operation are reported in references (c) and (d).

RVNAF		USMC	
RVNAF KIA	5	USMC KIA	1
WIA	33	WIA	12
VC KIA	66	VC KIA	112
VCC	11	VCC	49
WPNS CAPTURED	11	WPNS CAPTURED	10

TABLE II

CASUALTY RESULTS OF OPERATION PIRANHA 7-10 SEPTEMBER 1965

2. Operation QUYET TANG 10/N. This operation started as a unilateral search and destroy mission conducted by ARVN forces 10 kilometers south of DANANG on 7 September. Heavy resistance was encountered, however, and at 0730 on 10 September General THI, the I Corps commander, requested USMC assistance. In response to this request, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines was airlifted

from CHU LAI to the target area in the vicinity of grid coordinates (AP 965615). Of particular significances in this operation was the rapidity of this fifty mile movement of 1,037 troops. The first wave of troops departed CHU LAI at 101230H and the last element of troops and supplies was in place at 111840H. The operation terminated at 151600H, and resulted in 3 Marines KIA, including the Battalion Commander, and 4 Marines WIA. All Marine casualties were caused by mines. The details of the operation are reported in references (c) and (d).

3. Operation HARD ROCK. This search and clear operation was conducted in the vicinity of grid coordinates (BT 680000) (BT 677995) (BT 640060) (BT 670057) by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and a reinforced squad from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion in conjunction with the ARVN junk fleet. It began at 260641H and is extending into October. Initial action consisted of over-land movement of one company to the vicinity of grid coordinates (BT 663031) and helicopter lift of second company into a landing zone in the vicinity of grid coordinates (BT 676005). Elements of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion were helicopter lifted into a landing zone in the vicinity of grid coordinates (BT 665044). Little resistance was encountered so Company B and the Reconnaissance company were removed from the operation on 27 September. Casualties results by 30 September were: 1 Marine wounded and 17 VCS captured.

4. Other Coordinated Operations. There were four more coordinated platoon - company size operations. Also, the combined USMC/Popular Forces Company at HUE PHU BAI continued its highly successful self-help demonstrations to the Vietnamese people in the HUE PHU BAI area. This unique organization of 60 Marines and 150 Vietnamese is billeted in the village of THUY PHU (YD 913118), where approximately half of their operations consisted of helping the villagers to repair bridges, roads and other civic action projects. The primary indication of the success of this operation is the large amount of reliable information on VC activity which is received by the company.

5. Summary. In addition to the three major operations mentioned above, III MAF conducted 2,880 patrols, ambushes and minor search and destroy operations; USMC initiated contacts with VC force were encountered on 290 of the operations.

C. Air Support.

1. Fixed Wing. 1st MAF fixed Wing jet aircraft flew 2,647 sorties in September. This was an increase of approximately 800 sorties over August operations; almost half of the sorties were flown in support of other commands, including forty-seven electronic countermeasures (ECM) strikes, and twelve ELINT missions for 2d Air Division, and thirty-two 7th Fleet ECM strikes. The ECM and ELINT missions were flown against air control radar and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites in North Vietnam in support of USAF and USN strikes.

2. Helicopter. Helicopter support capabilities were increased in September by MAG-36 becoming operational. UH-34 and UH-1E helicopters were used to transport troops and supplies, in support of III MAF and RVNAF

operations. The UH1E was additionally used for FAC (airborne), psychological warfare, and command aircraft duties. The UH-37 helicopters, brought in by MAG-36, were used for heavy supply movement and to salvage a UH-34 which crash landed during Operation PIRANHA.

3. Transport. The capabilities of the KC-130 aircraft were expanded during September by the addition of a new mission in support of USMC air-ground team operations when a KC-130 functioned as the direct air support center (DASC) for Operation PIRANHA. The aircraft stayed airborne 9 hours controlling aircraft, relaying information and providing a source of emergency air refueling for A4 and F4 aircraft. This afforded excellent communications and control and resulted in a definite improvement in coordinating the air-ground team concept.

4. B-52 Exploitation Plans. Operation Plan 101-66 (reference (f)) was published on 9 September to establish a basis for using B-52 aircraft to attack VC forces in the I Corps area in conjunction with USMC/ARVN follow-up operations.

D. Naval Gunfire. CTG 70.8 continued to support III MAF operations during September by firing 1,175 rounds of ammunition. The decrease from the 5,096 rounds fired in August is attributed to the limited scale of VC resistance.

E. Expansion. In order to provide better protection for the DANANG Air Base from mortar attack, CG III MAF requested, in a letter to CG I Corps, that the DANANG TAOR be expanded to the south, and that a reconnaissance zone be established south of the TAOR. The expansion was approved by Brigadier General THI, CG I Corps, on 21 September. Enclosure (1) contains the correspondence concerning the expansion and an overlay of the newly established southern boundary for the TAOR and RZ.

F. Enemy Activity.

1. General. VC initiated contacts in III MAF TAOR's increased from 250 in August to 489 in September. The intensity of the attacks and the size of attacking forces decreased, however, as indicated by the decrease in Marine casualties from 534 in August to 297 in September.

2. Land Mines. The most effective form of attack utilized by VC forces was the booby trap/land mine which accounted for 17 KIA and 71 WIA; almost a third of the total III MAF battle casualties in September. One of the casualties was a Battalion Commander.

3. Tactics. There were no VC initiated concentrated attacks during September and only one significant ambush; however resistance to USMC initiated attacks was more stubborn and contact time prior to VC withdrawal was longer.

III. INTELLIGENCE.

A. General. Intelligence reports indicated an overall change in VC activity from the massing of large forces near III MAF Air Bases which occurred in August. The remainder of the VC units involved in Operation STARLITE were reported to be reconsolidating, retraining, and re-equipping in the general area of AN KY in the vicinity of coordinates (BS 7682). Based on these reports Operation PIRANHA was launched. The details of the operation are reported in the Operations section of this report and in references (c) and (d).

B. VC Reorganization. There appeared to be a reorganization of the structure of VC forces which involved integrating North Vietnamese troops into the existing units in the III MAF TAOR's. The PAVN troops which were integrated into local units were reported to be sent in to boost morale which had been deflated by STARLITE.

C. Local Support. Information received from captives and ralliers (defectors) indicated that the VC efforts to collect rice through taxation and bond issue did not totally replenish their dwindling supply, and that rural support was gradually diminishing. This trend could have a definite effect on VC morale and capabilities in future operations.

IV. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION.

A. Strength. The average personnel strength of III MAF increased from 30,912 to 37,853 in September as MAG-36 and MACS-7 completed their movement into country, and individual rotation became effective.

B. Personnel Rotation. In August CMC directed a change from unit to individual rotation. In response to this, individual replacements began arriving in September, and a system of redistributing personnel was initiated by the 1st MAW to provide a transition to the new system which will result in an even flow of personnel into and out of Wing units. The initial redistribution was conducted between MAG-36 and MAG-16; thereby providing MAG-36 with combat experienced personnel and preventing a complete exodus of experience in MAG-16 due to personnel rotation. The 3d Marine Division is planning a similar program.

C. Organization. An Adjutant Section was activated in III MAF on 30 September 1965 to provide a method of control for the increasing load of administrative requirements. A Table of Organization was also submitted for a separate Naval Component Command Staff in case that organization should be separated from III MAF. The proposed T/O is included as enclosure (2) to this report.

D. Rest and Recreation Programs. The III MAF R&R program to Hong Kong and Bangkok was cancelled on 3 September by COMUSMACV, and the MACV R&R flights to Hong Kong were also cancelled from 3 September through 15 September. A III MAF sponsored R&R program to Okinawa was started on 18 September which provided a daily flight from FUTEMA to DANANG or CHU LAI to FUTEMA. The R&R period consists of four nights in Okinawa, with billeting and messing provided by MCAF Futema and Camp Butler. Table III indicates

III MAF participation in R&R programs in September 1965.

	<u>MACV Program</u>	<u>III MAF Program</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bangkok	300	34	334
Hong Kong	178	115	293
Okinawa	<u>0</u>	<u>1120</u>	<u>1120</u>
Total	478	1269	1747

TABLE III I

III MAF PARTICIPATION IN R&R PROGRAMS SEPT 1965

E. Currency Conversion. Conversion from U.S. dollars to military payment certificate (MPC) was established on 1 September. Force Order 7000.1 (enclosure (5)) established regulations for exchange and possession of various currencies.

F. ARVN Interpreter Program. Force Order 5312.8 (enclosure (6)) was published on 21 September 1965 establishing the policy and guidelines for the ARVN interpreters assigned to the command. As of 30 September there were 54 ARVN interpreters assigned.

V. LOGISTICS.

A. General. The tempo of logistic operations continued at an ever increasing pace with emphasis on attaining the desired stockage objectives of classes of supply, and improving the overall logistic posture of the Force. Particular attention was directed to the establishment of a Joint Transportation Office, a Theatre Movement Plan, computation of requirements to support Phase II operation in RVN and the development of a Logistic Organization for WESTPAC. A modification of the tasks and mission of the Naval Support Activity was recommended to CINCPACFLT by CG III MAF msg 292328Z Sept 1965. Specifically, it was recommended that a sub-depot be established at CHU LAI to provide the required support for port operations and to relieve the tactical resources which are currently committed for Logistics-Over-the-Shore (LOTS) operations.

B. Port Operations.

1. During September 1965, 64,218 measured tons of cargo were discharged through the Port of DANANG and 21,878 measured tons were discharged at CHU LAI. Discharge of cargo at DANANG has been impeded by lack of sufficient lighterage and a backlog of ships to be offloaded continues. The lack of lighterage, and in particular the lack of IST's, has caused a backlog of cargo waiting to be shipped from DANANG to both CHU LAI and PHU BAI.

2. Cargo discharge operations were further interrupted at CHU LAI by foul weather on 18 September. Two sections of causeway were breached and IST-399 ran aground in the CUS HO inlet attempting to reach the IST sand ramp.

C. Supply.

1. All classes of supply were adequate with only a few exceptions. A shortage of BA-279 batteries required 3d FSR to air-ship 10,000 in response to CG III MAF request of 16 September.

2. On 22 September, CG FMFPAC instituted the Red Ball Program. This program provides for designating items that require exceptional supply action which will receive immediate transportation priority. Accelerated follow up action is taken on these items, on a continuing basis, until supply action is completed.

3. An Army mobile test facility for POL products requested by III MAF arrived at QUI NHON and was transhipped to DANANG on 30 September. This mobile laboratory will be located at DANANG Air Base and manned by a U. S. Army team of one officer and seven enlisted men. It will provide quality control services for all units in the I Corps area, and will result in considerable time saving for testing POL products. Heretofore, all samples of POL were delivered to SAIGON for testing. This resulted in a 24 to 48 hour delay before POL could be certified for use.

4. USARYIS, Okinawa was designated the primary source of supply for packaged POL products, but deliveries are not expected until approximately 15 November. In the interim, COMSERVPAC has arranged for shipments direct from CONUS.

5. On 11 September, CG FMFPAC granted authority for the FLSG to extend the lead time for Class II items from 15 days to 45 days. This will more accurately reflect the actual lead time required for these items.

D. Construction.

1. Construction during the month of September was hampered by heavy rains which damaged the roads in both the DANANG and CHU LAI enclaves. A major effort was required to keep essential roads open and traffic to a minimum. The priority of crushed rock for road surfacing has compounded the problem, and rock crusher breakdowns impeded the production of gravel.

2. Repairs to the southern 4,000 feet of the CHU LAI expeditionary airfield were started on 2 September. These repairs were required to restore the laterite base beneath the runway matting. The matting is being lifted in 1000 foot segments and the laterite base is being replaced by a 14 percent mixture of sand and cement before re-laying the matting. This mixture is expected to hold up under continuous loads better during wet weather than laterite.

3. On 12 September, construction of the southern helicopter parking apron for MAG-36 was completed at CHU LAI.

4. Two 10,000 barrel capacity fuel tanks were completed on 20 September at DANANG Air Base. These fuel tanks are part of a planned tank farm of twelve 10,000 barrel tanks to support the Air Base.

5. On 25 September, installation of a 150 foot, 60 ton capacity floating bridge to span the SONG TUY LOAN (River) at coordinates (AT 946699) was accomplished to provide an important link in the limited lines of communication in the DANANG TAOR.

6. Construction of the 400 bed hospital at Marble Mountain continued at a rapid rate with required materials on hand. A total of 23 buildings, were under construction by the end of the month. The first increment is expected to be completed by 15 October 1965.

E. Lines of Communication.

1. On 2 September, CG III MAF/NCC requested permission of the CG, I Corps, ARVN, to use the existing railroad bed from the DANANG Air Base south to the SONG THU BAU River, as a communication route for wheeled vehicles. Specifically, it was requested that III MAF be allowed to remove the rail tracks and ties, stacking them alongside the road bed ready for reinstallation. CG, III MAF/NCC further offered to schedule pioneer type maintenance of the road bed and to make repairs of those sections already damaged by enemy action.

F. Base Development.

1. Ammunition Storage. On 23 September, representatives from the COMUSMACV ammunition Office visited this Headquarters in connection with ammunition storage facilities. These representatives made it clear that the NCC was not required to construct or operate a joint ammunition storage facility.

2. III MAF Headquarters. Rear echelon elements of the 2d ARVN Division remain in facilities which are scheduled to be occupied by Headquarters elements of III MAF. These 2d Division rear echelon elements have not completed their movement because of a lack of necessary RVN sea transportation. On 24 September the CG III MAF/NCC requested COMUSMACV to arrange for one 542 class LST to accomplish the move.

G. Motor Transport.

1. Thirty-three M-76 Otter Marginal Terrain Vehicles arrived at POE, CONUS on 25 September 1965 for further shipment to DANANG. Additionally, two hundred and sixty-seven M-274A1 (Mechanical Mules) are awaiting shipment from Barstow to the 3d Marine Division.

2. CG FMFPAC msg 181719Z Sept 1965 relates intent to request replacement of all M-422 vehicles in III MAF that are in marginal serviceable condition with new M-422's.

3. CG FMFPAC msg 252140Z Sept 1965 requires III MAF to report on eight end items of motor transport, i.e., M-35, M-49, M-50, M-69 M-51, M-52, M-54 and M-62, which are scheduled to be replaced by the multi-fuel family of vehicles. Introduction of the multi-fuel vehicles into III MAF is scheduled for 1 April 1966.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS.

A. General. During the month of September, communication facilities for the III MAF continued to expand due to the increasing number of units arriving in the Republic of Vietnam and the increases in tempo of combat operations.

B. Message Traffic. The communication center experienced its first major decline in total message traffic since May 1965. This can be attributed to a successful message reduction program which has been implemented by III MAF. The total volume of message traffic in August was 52,050. In September the total was 49,432; a reduction of 2,618. DCS circuitry continued to improve in reliability. A prolonged period of outage occurred on the 21st and 22d of September due to the main cable interconnecting Air Force Terminal and DANANG Control being out of service. The USS OKANOGAN and U. S. Army Communication Center I Corps received and transmitted traffic for III Marine Amphibious Force during this period of outage.

C. Improvements.

1. Multiplexer. One (1) multiplexer An/TCC-20 was installed at the III MAF Communication Center and one (1) multiplexer AN/TCC-20 was installed at DANANG Control on 26 September. The purpose of this installation was to provide multiplex channels over the cable pairs laid under the DANANG Air Field. Isolation relays had to be fabricated to provide equipment interface.

2. Radio Sets. COMUSMACV provided III MAF a temporary allocation of fifty (50) radio sets, AN/PRC-25, for controlled employment in III MAF area of operations. Allocation was made to provide improved command and control communications during special operations such as STARLITE and PIRANHA. A good portion of the communication equipment required to complete present and near future requirements arrived on Okinawa during the month of September. It is presently awaiting transportation to Republic of Vietnam. Much of the equipment is fixed plant communication center items which will be utilized by III MAF, 3d MarDiv and 1st MAW. A technical team will be requested to assist in the installation of the equipment and indoctrination of operating of personnel.

D. Plans.

1. Airborne Command Post. An Airborne Command Post for use in Special operations is presently being planned. A C-117 aircraft will be

configured to provide access to at least four major nets. The major obstacle is that the C-117 aircraft has limited capability to provide power to four standard aircraft SSB radios and that radios can not be operated simultaneously under these conditions. It has been recommended that radio sets AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRC-47 be used for purpose of conducting in-flight tests to ascertain their suitability for airborne command/control communications.

2. Project Talk Quick. Project Talk Quick has been planned to include Commanding General, III MAF as a subscriber. Presently this Headquarters is awaiting physical inspection and placement of equipment by the contractor during the month of October.

3. Tropospheric Scatter System. In order to provide additional radio channels from CHU LAI to DANANG the AN/TRC-90 Tropospheric Scatter System is being installed by the U.S. Army. The system should be fully operational by 10 October 1965. III MAF is presently preparing a channelization request for this troposcatter system to equitably meet III MAF, 1st MAW, 3d MarDiv, Force Logistics Support Group (FLSG) and Naval Support Activity (NavSupAct) requirements. This tropo system will provide 24 channels of communication which are presently needed to relieve tactical radio relay equipment.

VII. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

A. Objectives. The basic objectives of the III MAF civic action program remained the same. Particular emphasis was placed on the coordination of assistance efforts by all agencies of the U. S. Mission.

B. Joint Coordinating Council. The coordinating committee mentioned in the command chronology for August was formalized and named the "I Corps Tactical Zone Joint Coordinating Council."

1. Purpose. The stated purpose of the Council was:

a. To facilitate the coordination of rural construction in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. To determine requirements for cooperation and support between U. S. agencies operating in the I Corps Tactical Zone and to recommend methods of procedure to meet such requirements.

c. To serve as a forum for the exchange of information between all agencies.

2. Membership. Membership of the Council was established as follows:

- a. U. S. Operations Mission: Deputy Regional Director.
- b. Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office: Senior Field Representative.
- c. I Corps Advisory Group: G-5 Advisor.
- d. USMC: Deputy Chief of Staff, III MAF, Civil Affairs Officer,

III MAF.

3. Committees. The working committees of the Council were formally established in the following fields:

- a. Logistics. (Transportation)
- b. Finance. (Claims)
- c. Public Health
- d. Security. (Public Safety)
- e. Psychological Warfare
- f. Agriculture
- g. Education
- h. Public Works. (Civil Engineering)

4. Tasks. The working committees were assigned the job of canvassing their respective fields and reporting back to the Council:

- a. The present situation in its area of competence with special attention to problem areas.
- b. The capabilities and limitations of each U. S. agency in its field.
- c. The priorities of the problems existing in its field.
- d. The plan of attack on the problems being prepared.

C. Medical Assistance. Medical assistance teams continued to function throughout the USMC TAOR's. A U. S. Navy Medical Service Corps Warrant

Officer was assigned to the III MAF Civil Affairs Section to supervise the medical assistance program.

D. Other Programs. The other programs listed in the Command Chronology for August, 1965, continued to develop. Details of these programs are reported in 3d Marine Division command chronology for September 1965.

VIII. COMBAT INFORMATION

A. News Releases. A total of 265 releases were made during the month; 89 of these were with photographs. These included VIPs, People to People program, combat operations and civil affairs. In addition, a daily situation report of the nightly press briefing was dispatched to FMFPAC.

B. Photography. During September, 21,390 feet of motion picture film was exposed and forwarded by courier or air freight to CMC. Approximately 60% was VIPs, award ceremonies etc. Special projects were covered such as the Lt EK story (1stLt Paul EK CO of the USMC/PF Company), an AHD strike mission, and religious activities. Future projects will include war dogs and mine disposal training.

C. CIB conducted 89 escorted trips to the three Marine airfield complexes at DANANG, CHU LAI and HUE/PHU BAI for civilian correspondents during the month of September.

D. During the month of September, the Escort Bureau arranged for and escorted a special CBS crew directed by Jack LAURENCE, for a 15-minute special with armed Hueys from VMO-2 on the dawn-and-dusk patrol. Maggie HIGGINS, was escorted to 2d Bn, 9th Marines, and Headquarters 9th Marines, Headquarters, 7th Marines and 1st Bn, 7th Marines. While at CHU LAI, she visited Marines from Alpha company, the farthest outpost from CHU LAI. During her visit to the 9th Marines she was escorted to the CAM NE complex. The commanding officers of the regiments and battalions concerned thoroughly briefed her on their operations. The two-day visit in the DANANG complex was highlighted by a dinner with General WALT. Jack FERN from NBC did a 30 minute special on Marines during Operation PIRANHA, as did ABC/TV and three wire services, all escorted by CIB representatives.

IX. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Continued emphasis was placed on psychological warfare in September as indicated by the leaflet dissemination and cultural platoon programs.

A. Leaflet Dissemination. More than 155,000 copies of 7 seven leaflets were distributed in September. The basic themes of the leaflets were:

1. Explanation to non-combatants of our mission, and how they would benefit from USMC attacks on VC forces.

UNCLASSIFIED

2. Warning to VC forces to surrender and prescribed method of surrendering.

3. Explanation of the curfew laws.

B. Cultural Platoon. The USA 1st Psy Ops Detachment organized a cultural show which was presented five evenings a week in hamlets in the secured area around the DANANG Air Base. The performance consisted of music, movies with psychological warfare overtones, and strictly entertainment movies. Although some of the entertainment movies were in English, the Vietnamese audience appeared to enjoy them.

X. I CORPS ACTIVITY.

A. General. There was a decrease in the number of battalion-size or larger operations in September, but a 28% increase in VC KIA. The tempo of VC initiated activities increased considerably after having decreased the previous two months. The main aims of the VC continue to be harassment and isolation of villages and out-posts, along with interdiction of routes of communication. Slight overall progress was noted in rural construction efforts. The QUANG NAM Special Sector was formed on 1 September and additional ARVN forces were allocated to it for operations. This added operational strength, coupled with increased rural construction efforts, has resulted in significant pacification gains during the reporting period. Details of I Corps activities are reported in enclosure (7).

B. Current Operations. There were 52 battalion or larger unit operations conducted in I Corps during September; a decrease of 18 from August. Contact was made with the VC in 31 of these operations. I Corps (ARVN) and USMC units conducted seven coordinated platoon-size or larger operations. Seven airmobile operations, supported by USMC UH-34 helicopters, were conducted in the I Corps area. During September, 975 VC were killed and 350 captured; an increase of 273 KIA and 158 WIA over the August casualties. ARVN captured 210 weapons (39 more than in August) while losing 147 (41 more than in August). There was an increase from last month in the number of ARVN KIA's from 136 to 215. Operation LAM SON 190 in the BA LONG Valley, 38 kilometers south of the 17th parallel, terminated after 30 days duration, on 13 September. A reinforced infantry battalion now occupies an outpost there for the first time since July 1964. Four days after the establishment of QUANG NAM Special Sector, a sector controlled operation (HOA TUYEN 101) was conducted from a point 10 kilometers south of DANANG and west of Highway #1. This four battalion operation had the mission of clearing Highway #14 and securing a large rice harvest. Results of the operation, which terminated on 19 September, were 97 VC KIA, 15 VCC, and 18 weapons captured. An additional 59 VC were credited to aircraft strikes. Friendly losses were: 33 KIA, 117 WIA, and 1 MIA. A coordinated USMC/ARVN search and destroy operation (Operation PIRANAH/LLEN KET 8) was launched on 7 September 12 kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI. Two 2d Division ARVN battalions conducted airmobile assaults

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

near CAP BATANGAN. Results are reported in Table II of this report.

C. Air Support. U. S. aircraft flew 838 sorties and VNAF flew 283 in the I Corps Tactical Zone. There were five B-52 strategic bombing missions conducted during the month against suspected VC locations in QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI provinces. Two of these strikes were followed up by ground operations with negative results. During the month the crop destruction program for QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces was completed. The effect of the defoliant on 6218 hectares of sprayed crops was uniformly excellent. In addition 19 other defoliation sorties were flown.

D. Naval Gunfire. Naval gunfire ships expended 4,822 round of ammunition in support of ARVN ground operations. This was an increase of 1,752 rounds over the August total.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 September - Advance increment of MACS-7 and rotational battery for 1st LAAM Bn arrived in RVN. MACS-7 is to replace MACS-9.
- 2 September - VC psychological warfare leaflets were found in the DANANG and CHU LAI TAOR's. Leaflets message exhorted a rise to heorics in resisting U. S. imperialism during hallowed month of September.
- Railroad at coordinates (AU 8001) was mined.
 - Mr. William JORDAN, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, visited III MAF.
 - MACV cancelled III MAF R&R flights to HONG KONG.
- 3 September - 1st Bn, 9th Marines assumed the responsibility of guarding the radar station on Monkey Mountain (BT 0585).
- VAdm Paul P. BLACKBURN, COMSEVENTHFLT visited III MAF.
- 4 September - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- | | |
|----------------------|------------------------------|
| Hon Richard M. NIXON | U. S. Embassy Guest |
| Hon Mr. James MARSH | U. S. Embassy Official, RVN |
| Hon Mr. Pat HILLINGS | Former Congressman |
| BGen Fritz FREUND | Deputy Chief, JUSPAO, Saigon |
- 5 September - Bridges at (BT 205377) and (BT 207375) damaged.
- 7 September - Operation PIRAMHA launched.
- 8 September - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- | | |
|----------------------|--|
| Dr. Frank STANTON | President of CBS |
| Mr. Frank STARGEL | Former General Manager of Associated Press |
| Mr. Palmer HOYT | Editor of Denver Post |
| RAdm Norvell G. WARD | Head, Naval Advisory Group, Saigon |
- 9 September - BGen Fritz FREUND Deputy Chief, JUSPAO, Saigon visited III MAF
- Operation GOLDEN FLEECE began.
- 10 September - I Corps Commander requested III MAF assistance in Operation QUYET TANG 10/N.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- 11 September - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Gen John WATERS | CINCUSARPAC |
| BGen Edward H. DESAUNSSURE JR. | ADC 25th Inf. Div. |
| BGen John NORTON | Escort Officer from MACV |
| Adm David L. McDONALD | CNO |
| VAdm Bernard A. CLAREY | Deputy CINCPACFLT |
| VAdm Ephraim P. HOLMES | Dir, Navy Program Planning |
| VAdm Paul H. RAMSEY | DCNO (Air) |
- 12 September - Highway #1 bridge at coordinates (BT 401145) destroyed by demolitions.
- Construction at CHU LAI southern helicopter parking apron for MAG-36 was completed.
- 13 September - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- | | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Amb Henry C. LODGE | U. S. Ambassador to RVN |
| Mr. Paul H. CHADBOURN | Mission Coordinator for ambassador visit. |
| Mr. Marcus GORDON | USOM representative, DANANG |
| Gen William C. WESTMORELAND | COMUSMACV |
| SubBGen Nuyen V. CHUAN | CG 1st ARVN Div |
| SubBGen Hoany X. LAM | CG 2d ARVN Div |
| BGen Nguyen C. THI | CG I Corps |
- MACS-7 relieved MACS-9 at CHU LAI and PHU BAI.
- 14 September - Mr. George L. JORGENSEN, Special Assistant to U. S. Ambassador to RVN, visited III MAF.
- 15 September - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|
| MGen Stanley R. LARSEN | CG Task Force Alpha |
| MGen William O. KINMARD | CG 1st Cavalry Div |
- 16 September - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- | | |
|---------------------|------------------|
| VAdm Bernard ROEDER | COMPHIBPAC |
| RAdm Robert B. ERLY | COMPHIBGRU THREE |
- 18 September - Railroad bridge at (ZD 138010) 79% destroyed.
- Foul weather interrupted the discharge of cargo at CHU LAI. Two sections of causeway were broached and LST 399 ran aground in the CUS HO inlet attempting to reach the LST sand ramp.
- 19 September - The 1st Provisional Dog Platoon became operational as the unit assumed the responsibility for security of the vacated

DECLASSIFIED

2d ARVN Division compound.

- 20 September - Two 10,000 barrel capacity fuel tanks were completed at DAMANG Air Base.
- Mr. Charles MANN, Director of USOM, RVN visited III MAF.
 - A 200 person demonstration was staged in front of the DANANG City hall. See enclosure (7).
- 21 September - Mr. Joseph S. ALSOP, syndicated reporter/writer visited III MAF.
- 22 September - 2d Bn, 9th Marines relieved 3d Bn, 9th Marines as Air Base Defense Battalion, DAMANG.
- Approval for expansion of DAMANG TAOR and establishment of extended RAOR was received.
 - CG FMEPAC instituted the "Red Ball" program which provides immediate transportation priority to designated exceptional supply action items.
- 25 September - B-52 raid followed by 2 ARVN company sweep was conducted in vicinity of coordinate (BS 5286). Details are reported in enclosure (7).
- A 150 foot 60 ton capacity floating bridge was installed across the SONG TUY LOAN (River). (AT 946799).
 - RAdm William M. HEAMAN, Deputy Director Pacific Bureau of Yards and Docks and CinC Naval Construction Battalions, visited III MAF.
- 26 September - MGen William J. VAN RIZIN, G-4 HQMC visited III MAF.
- 27 September - BGen Walter E. LOTZ, J-6 Designee MACV, visited III MAF.
- 28 September - BGen Albert W. SCHINZ, Chief, Air Force Advisory Group MACV, visited III MAF.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

PART FOUR

ENCLOSURES

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

References

- (a) Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Letter of Instruction to III Marine Expeditionary Force of 5 May 1965 (S).
- (b) Commander United States, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, message 060223Z Aug65 concerning CG III MAF assumption of command of I Corps Advisory Group (TS).
- (c) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology September 1965 (S).
- (d) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology September 1965 (S).
- (e) Maps, Vietnam L701 Series, Scale 1:50,000 sheets 6658 I II III IV; 6659 II III IV; 6756 I IV; 6757 II III; 6559 I II III IV; 6560 II III IV.
- (f) Operation Plan 101-66; B-52 Exploitation (TS).

Enclosures

- 1. Expansion of DANANG TAOR 21 Sept 1965.
- 2. Proposed Table of Organization for Naval Component Command.
- 3. III MAF Task Organization Chart dated 30 September.
- 4. Force Order 7000.1 Acquisition, Possession, and Conversion of United States Currency, Military Payment Certificates and/or local Currency.
- 5. Force Order 5312.8 Vietnamese Military Interpreter Program.
- 6. Monthly Evaluation Report of I Corps Activity.
- 7. Force Logistics Support Group Command Chronology September 1965.
- 8. 7th Engineer Battalion Command Chronology September 1965.
- 9. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company Command Chronology September 1965.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

103/RCD/dhs
Ser: 0019665
13 Sep 1965

SECRET
MAT

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, I Corps and Tactical Zone I

Subj: Expansion of Currently Assigned TAOR at DANANG

Encl: (1) Overlay of Proposed DANANG TAOR Expansion

1. The most recent extension of the operating area assigned to the III Marine Amphibious Force at DANANG was approved by your headquarters on 20 July 1965. Recent operations in the southern portion of this TAOR, as well as successful I Corps operations south of the TAOR boundary, indicate that further southern expansion of the DANANG TAOR is desirable. This proposed expansion will have a natural boundary along the SONG LA THO and SONG THANH QUIT. Further, this extension will allow the III MAF to assist your headquarters in driving the Viet Cong from the rich rice bowl south of DANANG.

2. In view of the foregoing and to permit III MAF to prepare plans for future operations, it is requested that the expanded area shown on enclosure (1) be approved. Present plans envisage the continued coordinated and gradual movement of Marine forces southward into this area with full control to be accomplished prior to 1 November 1965.

L. W. WALT

SECRET
MAT

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

MAT

APO 4109, 21 September 1965

Hq I Corps & Tac Zone I
Staff - G3

From: Brig General NGUYEN
CHANH THI, CG I Corps
& Tac Zone I

No. 10054/TM3/I/M

To: Commanding General, III MAF

Subject: Widening of operational area in Danang

Reference: Letter No. 0019665 dated 13 Sep 65 from III MAF

1. For the common purpose of driving VC off from the southern area from Danang airfield, our Headquarters approves the widening of the operational area of your Headquarters (See overlay inclosed), as indicated in the referenced letter.

2. However, since the above area is densely populated, your military operations in the above area must be closely coordinated with Quang-Nam Special Sector to avoid deplorable incidents to the local people. In addition, our Headquarters has noted that Highway #1, from Mieu-Bong (vic BT 017685) to Thanh-Quy (vic BT 042622) is often harassed by VC: they stop buses, military vehicles, and conduct sniper fire. So it is requested that you focus your operations into the above area, to insure effective security to this portion of the Highway.

3. We hope that the above recommendations are in compliance with your concept, and will be carried out by both sides in a spirit of friendly co-operation to obtain good results.

Signed: NGUYEN CHANH THI

Info copy:

- J3 JGS
- Quang-Nam Special Sector
- Northern Sub-sector, Quang-Nam Special Sector
- MACV I Corps; TOC I Corps

MAT

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

ONLY TRAS

COMMUNICATION CENTER
CG III MAF
c/o PPO, San Francisco

DRAFTER: PLM
SECT: G-2 PARACHUTE 1

OCN: 1496

PRIORITY 210520Z

FM: CG III MAF
TO: CG III MAF

SECRET

*File-1
MAF-15
DIV-1
WIP-2*

ORGANIZATION OF III MAF (S)

A. YOUR 282302Z AUG 65

B. MY LTR SER 005865 DT 28JUL65 (S)

C. LAM REF A FOR SUB AS PROPOSED NCC STAFF, READ IN ALL COLUMNS AS FOL:


LINE NO., BILLET DESCRIPTION, RANK, MOS, LINE NUMBERS IN PROPOSED III MAF/NCC

STAFF CONTAINED REF B WHICH COULD BE MADE AVAIL FOR SEPARATE NCC STAFF.

FOOTNOTES.

1	COMMAND SECTION				
2	NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER		9903	NONE	
3	AIDE	CAPT	9910	NONE	
4	AIDE	LT	9910	NONE	
5	CHIEF STEWARD	SSGT	3619	NONE	
6	STEWARD ATTENDANT	SGT	3613	NONE	
7	STENOGRAPHER	SGT	8241	NONE	
8	DRIVER	SGT	3531	NONE	
9	CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION				
10	CHIEF OF STAFF	COL/CAPT/USN	9906/1100	25	
11	DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF	COL/CAPT/USN	9906/1100	NONE	
12	ADMIN MAN	YN1	0000	28	
13	DRIVER/ORDERLY	LCPL	3531	NONE	

SU
D



SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER

CG III MAF

c/o FPO, San Francisco

0141 NONE

14	ADMIN MAN	LCPL		
15	N-1 SECTION			
16	ACOPS N-1	LTCOL	0103	43
17	ASST MAJ/ADMIN O	MAJ	0130	48
18	ADMIN CHIEF	MSGT	0141	50
19	ADMIN MAN	LCPL	0141	50
20	N-3 SECTION			
21	ACOPS N-3	MAJ/USN	1100	NONE
22	ASST N-3	LTCOL	0103	NONE
23	ASST N-3/COM. RELATIONS	COMDR/USN	1100	NONE
24	LOGISTICS OPERATIONS CHIEF	MSGT	0441	NONE
25	LOGISTICS MAN	SSGT	0441	NONE
26	LOGISTICS MAN/DRIVER	CPL	0441	NONE
27	LOGISTICS MAN/DRIVER	CPL	0441	NONE
28	ASST N-3/MOVEMENT OFFICER	COMDR/USN	1100	453
29	ASST MOVEMENT OFFICER/AIR	MAJ	9912	456
30	ASST MOVEMENT OFFICER/SURFACE	LCOMDR/USN	1100	NONE
31	EMBARKATION CHIEF	SSGT	0431	NONE
32	EMBARKATION MAJ/TYPIST	SGT	0431	NONE
33	EMBARKATION MAJ/TYPIST	MSGT	0431	460
34	ASST N-3/PLANS/POLICY	LTCOL	9910	NONE
35	ASST N-3/PLANS/POLICY	COMDR/USN	1100	NONE
36	ADMIN OFF	CAJ	0130	NONE
37	ADMIN CHIEF	GYSGT	0141	NONE
38	ADMIN MAN	YN	0000	NONE
39	ADMIN MAN	LCPL	0141	NONE
40	ADMIN MAN/DRIVER	LCPL	0141	NONE

21

D

E

I

SECRET

SECRET

OCT 1988

COMMUNICATION CENTER
CG III MAF
c/o PFO, San Francisco

41	N-4 SECTION			
42	ACOPS N-4	COL	9906	171
43	ASST N-4/PLANS/POLICY	COMDR/USN	1100	186
44	ASST N-4/EQUIP/MAINTENANCE	LCOMDR/USN	1100	NONE
45	ASST N-4/BASE MAINTENANCE	LT/USN	1100	192
46	LOGISTICS CHIEF	GYSGT	0441	175
47	LOGISTICS MAN	SSGT	0441	182
48	ADMIN MAN	YN3	0000	NONE
49	ADMIN MAN	CPL	0141	NONE
50	ADMIN MAN	LCPL	0141	NONE
51	N-6 SECTION			
52	ACOPS N-6/BASE DEVELOPMENT	CAPT/USN	1100	236
53	ASST N-6/AIR BASES	LTCOL	9912	NONE
54	ASST N-6/PORT FACILITIES	COMDR/USN	1100	239
55	ASST N-6/BASE FACILITIES	LTCOL	9911	331
56	ASST N-6/REAL ESTATE	LCOMDR/USN	1100	NONE
57	ADMIN OFFICER	CAPT	0130	NONE
58	ADMIN CHIEF	MSGT	0141	240
59	ADMIN MAN	YN2	0000	NONE
60	ADMIN MAN	CPL	0141	241
61	ADMIN MAN	LCPL	0141	242
62	ADMIN MAN/DRIVER	YN	0000	NONE

5 FOOTNOTES: A - COMMAND SECTION SHOULD BE FILLED WITH PERSONNEL OF SAME SERVICE AS OFF FILLING LINE 24

B - IF LINE 10 FILLED BY USN OFF, LINE 11 SHOULD BE FILLED BY USMC OFF.

PAGE THREE OF FOUR PAGES

COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES

SECRET

SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
CG III MAF
c/o FPO, San Francisco

C - IF LINE 11 FILLED BY USN OFF, LINE 10 SHOULD BE FILLED BY
USMC OFF.

D - IF LINE 21 FILLED BY USN OFF, LINE 22 SHOULD BE FILLED BY
USMC

E - IF LINE 22 FILLED BY USN OFF, LINE 21 SHOULD BE FILLED BY
USMC OFF.

TOTALS: FOURTEEN USMC OFF, TWENTY-FOUR USMC ENL, TWELVE USN OFF, FIVE USN ENL.

GRAND TOTAL FIFTY-FIVE.

3. THE PROPOSED SEPARATE MGC STAFF LIST IN PARAGRAPH 1 UTILIZES TWENTY SPECIFIC
LINE NUMBERS FROM REF B. ^(11 OFF AND 9 ENLISTED) THE REMAINDER OF THE LINE NUMBERS IN EACH AFFECTED
SECTION OF REF B REMAIN INTACT AS NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS TO CARRY OUT THE FUNCTIONS
OF THE PARTICULAR SECTION WITHIN THE III MAF RESPONSIBILITIES.

4. NO ADDITIONAL REPRESENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR III MAF AS A RESULT OF THE
UTILIZATION OF TWENTY LINE NUMBERS FROM REF B IN THE PROPOSED SEPARATE MGC STAFF.
HOWEVER CERTAIN RANK AND MOS CHANGES TO REF B ARE REQUIRED AND ARE LISTED AS
FOLLOWS:

LINE 556 - CHANGE RANK FROM COMDR 1400 TO MAJ 9912.

171 - CHANGE MOS FROM 9912 TO 9906

186 - CHANGE RANK FROM LTCOL 9910 TO COMDR 1100.

192 - CHANGE RANK FROM CAPT 6402 TO LT/USN 1100.

236 - CHANGE RANK FROM COL 9910 TO CAPT/USN 1100.

239 - CHANGE RANK FROM LCOMDR 1400 TO COMDR 1100.

331 - CHANGE RANK FROM LCOMDR 1400 TO LTCOL 9911.

240 - CHANGE RANK FROM CMSGT 1371 TO MSGT 0141.

242 - CHANGE RANK FROM PVT 3531 TO LCPL 0141.

9 RELEASED BY: *[Signature]*

COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

CONFIDENTIAL

Task Organization: 30 September 1965

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
I. Naval Component Command					
A. <u>Prov NCC Supt Act Da Nang</u>	25	346	1	13	385
1. <u>Headquarters</u>	6	37			43
a. Det, Sub Unit #2, H&SCo, HqBn	5	21			26
b. Det, Comm Supt Co		8			8
c. Det, CommCo, 7th CommBn		2			2
d. Det, H&MS-1, M&MG, FMAW	1	6			7
2. 3d Shore Party Bn (-)	19	309	1	13	342
a. H&SCo (-)	11	169	1	13	194
b. Company A	4	69			73
c. Company C	4	71			75
B. <u>30th Naval Const Regt</u>					
1. Hq, 30th NCR Da Nang	3	1	5	22	31
2. MCB-5 Da Nang			16	560	576
3. MCB-8 Da Nang			16	337	353
4. MCB-9 Da Nang			18	581	599
5. MCB-10 Chau Lai			20	543	563
C. <u>PCO, USNH Da Nang</u>			2	15	17
D. <u>PCO, Nav Support Activity Da Nang</u>			63	678	741
II. III Marine Amphibious Force					
A. <u>Hq III MAF (Da Nang)</u>	79	607	3	7	696
1. Staff	55	101	3	3	162
2. Comm Supt Co (-)	10	215		1	226

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USI</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
3. Comm Co, 7th Comm Bn	10	272		3	285
4. Prov Dog Plt	1	11			12
5. 7th CI Team, (Chu Lai)	3	8			11
B. <u>Base Defense Bn (Da Nang)</u>					
1. 2dBn, 9th Marines	42	954	3	53	1052
C. <u>Sub Unit #1, 1st ForReconCo, (Da Nang)</u>	6	67		1	74
D. <u>Force Engr Grp. (Da Nang)</u>	32	761	1	8	802
1. 7th Engr Bn (-)(Rein) Less Co G	32	761	1	8	802
a. 1st Bridge Co	(4)	(109)			(113)
E. <u>9th MFB, (-)(Da Nang)</u>					
F. <u>Dat "J", 1st Radio Bn</u>	2	52			54
1. Hq, Da Nang	1	16			17
2. Team 1, Da Nang		12			12
3. Team 2, Chu Lai	1	20			21
4. Team 3, Phu Bai		4			4
G. <u>Sub Unit #1, 1st ARGUSO</u>	5	49	6		55
1. Saigon	1	15	1		17
2. Bien Hoa		4	1		5
3. Vung Tau	1	3			4
4. Da Nang		5	1		6
5. Quang Ngai	1	2			3
6. Qui Nhon	1	3			4
7. Pleiku		7	1		8
8. Nha Trang		2	1		3
9. Can Tho	1	8	1		10
H. <u>3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMP</u>					
1. <u>Hq Bn (-)(Da Nang)</u>					
a. Hq Co					
b. Comm Co (-)					
c. Service Co					

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
d. MFCo (-)					
e. 3d CIT (-)					
f. Det 1st ITT					
2. <u>3d Marines (-) (Rein) (Da Nang- Phu Bai)</u>					
a. HqCo (Rein) (Da Nang)					
(1) Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv					
b. 1stBn 1st Mar (Da Nang)					
c. 2dCn. 3d Mar (Da Nang)					
d. 3dCn. 4thMar (Rein) (Phu Bai)					
(1) 3dBn 4thMar					
(2) Det HqBn, 3dMarDiv					
(3) 3dPlt (Rein) CoB, 3d ATBn (5 M50AL Cantos)					
(4) 3dPlt (Rein) CoB, 3d Engr Bn					
(5) 3dPlt (Rein) CoB, 3d TkBn (5M48A 3 Tanks)					
(6) 3dPlt (Rein) CoC, 3d ReconBn					
e. 4thBn 12thMar (-) (Rein) (Phu Bai)					
(1) HqBtry (-) (Rein) (Chr Tn)					
(2) Btry M, 4thBn (SP) (6 155How)					
(3) Btry-I, 3dBn (6 155How)					
(4) 107MM Mortar Btry, 2dBn (6 Mortars)					
3. <u>ADC Command Group (Chu Lai)</u>					
4. <u>4th Marines (-) (Rein) (Chu Lai)</u>					
a. HqCo					

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
(1) Det HqBn, 3dMarDiv					
(2) Det 3d CIT					
b. 1stBn, 4th Marines					
c. 2dBn, 4th Marines					
d. 3dBn, 3d Marines					
e. Co B (-) (Rein), 3dATBn, (15 M30A1 Ontos)					
(1) Co Hq (-)					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 2d Plt					
(4) 3d Plt, Co A					
f. Co B (-) (Rein), 3dEngrBn					
(1) Co Hq (1)					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 2d Plt					
(4) 3d Plt Co A					
g. Co A (Rein), 1st AmtracBn, FMP (44 LVTP-5, 3 LVTC, 1 LVTB)					
(1) Det HASC Co (2 LVTE 1)					
h. Co C (Rein), 3dTankBn, FMP (17 M48A3 Tanks)					
(1) Det HASC Co (3 Flame Tanks)					
5. <u>3dBn, 12th Marines Artillery</u> <u>Battalion Group (Chu Lai)</u>					
a. 3dBn (-), 12th Marines					
(1) Hq Btry					
(2) Btry G (6 105 How)					
(3) Btry I (6 106 How)					
(4) 107mm Mortar Btry (6 Mortars)					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
b. 3dBn(-) (Rein), 12th Mar					
(1) Hq Btry (Rein)					
(a) Det, GFR Hq Btry, 12th Mar					
(2) Btry G (6 105 How)					
(3) Btry H (6 105 How)					
(4) 107mm Mortar Btry (6 Mortars)					
(5) Btry C, 1stBn, 12th Mar (6 155 How)					
c. Btry M, 4thBn, 11thMar (6 155 How)					
d. Btry K, 4thBn, 12thMar (SP) (6 155 How)					
e. 3d 155 Gun Btry (SP) FIF (6 155 How)					
f. 1st Pln, 1st 8" How Btry (SP) (2 8" How)					
6. <u>Recon Group Alpha</u>					
a. Co B, 3d Recon Bn					
b. Co C (-) (Rein), 1st Recon Bn					
(1) Co Hq (-)					
(a) Det, HqsCo					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 3d Plt					
7. <u>7th Mar (-) (Rein) (CHU LAI)</u>					
a. HqCo (-) (Rein)					
(1) Det HqBn, 1st MarDiv					
b. 1stBn, 7thMar					
c. 3dBn, 7thMar					

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USM</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
d. Co C (-)(Rein), 1st ABn (10 M50A1 Ontos)					
(1) Co Hq (-)					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 3d Plt					
e. Co C (-)(Rein), 1st Engr Bn					
(1) Co Hq (-)					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 3d Plt					
f. Co A (-), 3d AmTrac Bn, FMF (34 M71PS, 2 M71C, 1 M71H)					
(1) Co Hq (-)					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 3d Plt					
g. Co B (-)(Rein), 1st Tank Bn FMF (12 M48A3 Tanks)					
(1) Co Hq (-)					
(a) Det H&SCo (3 Flame Tanks)					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 3d Plt					
8. <u>9th Marines (-)(Da Nang)</u>					
a. Hq Co					
b. 1st Bn, 9th Mar					
c. 3d Bn, 9th Mar					
9. <u>12th Mar (-)(Rein)(Da Nang)</u>					
a. Hq Btry (-)(Rein) (2 CMRS)					
(1) Det Hq Bn, 3d Mar Div					
b. Btry L, 4th Sn, (SP) (6 M55 How)					

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
c. 1st 8 th How Btry (SP) (-) (4 8 th How)					
d. 1st Bn (-), 12th Mar					
(1) Hq Btry					
(2) Btry A (6 105 How)					
(3) Btry A (6 105 How)					
e. 2d Bn (-), 12th Mar (18 105 How)					
(1) Hq Btry					
(2) Btry I					
(3) Btry E					
(4) Btry F					
10. <u>3d ATB (-) (Da Nang)</u>					
a. H&SCo					
b. Co A (-) (25 M30A1 Cores)					
c. Co C (25 M30A1 Cores)					
11. <u>3d Engr Bn (-) (Hain) (Da Nang)</u>					
a. H&SCo					
b. Support Co					
c. Co A (-)					
d. Co B					
e. Co C, Tech Engr Co					
12. <u>3d Med Bn (-) (Da Nang)</u>					
a. H&SCo					
b. Co C					
c. Co D					
13. <u>2d Recon Bn (Da Nang)</u>					
a. H&SCo					
b. Co A					
c. Co C (-)					
(1) Co Hq (-)					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 2d Plt					

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
14. <u>3d MTBn (-) (Da Nang)</u>					
a. H&SCo					
b. Co A (30 M-35 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T trucks)					
c. 2d Plt Co B (15 M-35 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T trucks)					
15. <u>1st AmTrac Bn (-) FMF (Da Nang)</u>					
a. H&SCo (12 LVTP-5, 3 LVTC-1, 1 LVTR-1)					
b. Co B (44 LVTP-5, 3 LVTC-1, 1 LVTR-1)					
16. <u>3d Tank Bn, (-), FMF, (Da Nang)</u>					
a. H&SCo (-) (6 Flame Tanks, 3 CVD Tanks)					
b. Co A (17 M48A3 Tanks)					
c. Co B (-) (12 M48A3 Tanks)					
I. <u>1st Marine Aircraft Wing</u>	1015	7201	34	121	8371
1. <u>M4HG-1</u>	258	2024	9	44	2335
a. <u>H&HS-1 (Da Nang)</u>	141	651	7	23	822
(1) Air Delivery Plt	1	3			4
b. 1st LAAM Bn (Da Nang)	27	500	1	10	538
c. 2d LAAM Bn (Chu Lai)	32	491	1	11	535
d. <u>MASS-7 (Chu Lai)</u>	22	215			237
(1) Det "A" (Phu Bai)	3	15			18
e. <u>MASS-2</u>	12	97			109
(1) Det, <u>MASS/ASRT (Da Nang)</u>	8	11			19
(2) Det, <u>MASS/ASRT (Chu Lai)</u>	5	14			19
(3) Det, 2 ASRT (PLEIKU)	7	27			34
2. <u>MAG-11 (Da Nang)</u>	153	1467	4	15	1639

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
a. H&MS-11 (1 C-117D)	33	375			408
b. MABS-11	14	440	1	14	469
c. VMFA-513 (15 F4B)	43	239	1		283
d. VMFA-542 (15 F4B)	44	269	1		314
e. VMGJ-1(-) (6 EF-10B, 2 RF-3A)	19	144	1	1	165
3. <u>MAG-12 (Chu Lai)</u>	151	1340	6	20	1517
a. H&MS-12 (1 C-117D)	151	1340	6	20	1517
(1) MATCU-67	8	54			62
b. MARS-12	17	460	4	20	501
c. VMA-214 (18 A4C)	27	166	1		194
d. VMA-225 (19 A4C)	32	148			180
e. VMA-311 (21 A4E)	32	171	1		204
4. <u>MAG-16 (Marble Mountain)</u>	259	1403	8	22	1692
a. H&MS-16 (2 C-117D)	35	206			331
(1) Det CH-37 (6 CH-37)	13	62			75
(2) MATCU-68	8	56			64
b. MABS-16	13	295	5	13	326
c. HMM-131 (Phu Bai) (24 UH- 34D)	51	183	1	3	238
d. IPMM-261 (23 UH-34D)	56	179	1	3	239
e. HMM-361 (24 UH-34D)	55	183	1	3	242
f. MVO-2 (21 UH-1E)	28	149			177
5. <u>MAG-36 (Chu Lai)</u>	194	1067	7	20	1228
a. H&MS-36	44	301			345
b. MABS-36	16	293	4	12	325
c. HMM-362 (24 UH-34D)	51	159	1	2	213
d. HMM-364 (24 UH-34D)	53	165	1	3	222
e. VMC-6 (18 UH-1E)	30	149	1	3	183
J. <u>Force Logistic Support Group (Total)</u>	109	3049	30	196	3384
1. <u>Force Logistic Support Group (Da Nang)</u>	56	1454	5	35	1550

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
a. H&SCo(-) (Rein) 3d Svc Bn	24	273	4	18	319
b. Supply Co (-) (Rein) 3d Svc Bn	21	664	1	17	703
c. Maint Co (-) (Rein) 3d Svc Bn	9	400			409
d. Truck Co (-) (Rein) 3d Svc Bn	2	117			119
2. <u>Force Logistic Support Unit #1 (Ops Det)</u>	44	1332	17	108	1501
a. FISU Headquarters	28	803	8	839	
(1) H&SCo (Provisional)	13	183	8	204	
(2) Supply Co (Provisional)	9	285		294	
(3) Maint Co (Provisional)	6	335		341	
b. Shore Party Group (Provisional)	5	247	1	16	269
(1) Co "B", 3d SPBn	4	112		5	121
(2) Co "C", 1st SPBn	1	135	1	11	148
c. ME Group (Provisional)	11	253		5	269
(1) Co "A", 7th MEBn (-)	3	77		1	81
(2) 2d Plt, Co "C" 9th MEBn	1	25			26
(3) Co "B", 1st MEBn (-)	4	78		2	84
(4) Co "D", 3d MEBn	3	73		2	78
3. <u>Force Logistic Support Unit #2 (Ops Det)</u>	7	212	8	53	280
a. FISU Headquarters	2	13			15
b. H&SCo (Provisional)		30		2	32
c. Supply Plt	1	39			40
d. Maint Plt	2	76			78
e. Co "B", 3d MEBn (-)	2	44			46
f. Co "A", 3d MEBn		10	8	51	69

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
4. <u>Force Logistic Support Unit</u> <u>#3 (Qui Non)</u>	2	51			53
a. FLSU Headquarters	1	3			4
b. Supply Plt	1	24			25
c. Maint Plt		21			21
d. MT Sect	3				3

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o PFO, San Francisco
 California 96601

ForceO 7000.1

1/ea

8 Sep 1965

FORCE ORDER 7000.1

From: Commanding General
 To: Distribution List

Subj: Acquisition, Possession and Conversion of United States Currency,
 Military Payment Certificates and/or Local Currency

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV Directive Number 37-6 of 23 August 1965 (NOTAL)

Encls: (1) Currency Exchange and Control Procedures
 (2) Daily Record of Individual Currency Exchange Activity
 (3) Summary of Daily Exchange Activity
 (4) Daily Report of Cash Count
 (5) Receipt for Purchase of Piasters

1. Purpose. To publish the regulatory policy governing the acquisition and possession of Military Payment Certificates (MPC's) and acquisition and conversion of local currency (piasters) by all United States personnel and other personnel authorized use of US Government facilities in Vietnam as outlined in reference (a).

2. Definitions. For the purpose of this order, the following definitions apply:

a. United States Currency. Legal tender of the United States of America.

b. Military Payment Certificate (MPC). An instrument denominated in US dollars or fractions thereof, used as the official medium of exchange for each transactions in all establishments of the Armed Forces of the United States in Vietnam. MPC's are printed in denominations of 5, 10, 20, and 50 cents and \$1, \$5, and \$10. Authorized transactions of fractional amounts less than 5 cents will be made in US coin of 1 cent denomination.

c. Dollar Instruments. Any instrument other than MPC's and US currency, constituting an obligation to pay US dollars except personal checks drawn on a US bank when used as provided herein.

ENCLOSURE (4)

Force 7000.1
8 Sep 1965

3. General

a. Possession of any foreign currency, including US currency, MPC's, dollar instruments, or personal checks drawn in US dollars, by local Vietnamese Nationals, or other residents of the Republic of Vietnam, is strictly forbidden by Vietnamese law, regardless of the type or form of such currency.

b. Upon arrival in Vietnam, all US sponsored personnel must declare the amount of foreign currencies in their possession, including US currency. All US currency and dollars instruments will be converted to MPC's at the point of entry into Vietnam. No US currency or dollar instruments will be in the hands of US military or US Government sponsored civilian personnel after their arrival with the exception of one cent coins.

c. The use of MPC's is restricted to transactions in the Navy Exchanges, US Postal Facilities, Military Messes and Clubs, USO Clubs and for piaster conversion transactions in officially authorized conversion facilities.

4. Policies

a. All personnel under the Control of the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force/Naval Component Commander/Senior Advisor I Corps, including contractor personnel and technical representatives and all other persons authorized the use of US facilities, will comply with the Republic of Vietnam regulations which prohibit:

(1) Purchase of piasters from other than officially authorized conversion offices.

(2) The importation and/or exportation of more than 500 piasters into or from Vietnam without the prior express approval of the National Office of Exchange.

b. Acquisition of MPC's by means other than that authorized herein is prohibited.

5. Procedures

a. Acquisition of MPC's

(1) All personnel with permanent duty station in Vietnam or who are on temporary additional duty in Vietnam who are authorized use of US Government facilities will be paid their pay and allowances in MPC's.

Force 7000.1
8 Sep 1965

(2) Personnel receiving currency or dollar instruments through the mail will present these currencies/instruments to the Disbursing Officer who will either convert these monies to MPC's or Treasury check to be mailed to an address outside Vietnam by the recipient..

b. Acquisition of US Currency

(1) Monies received through mail (See para 5a(2)).

(2) Personnel departing on emergency leave, PCS, R&R, or temporary additional duty outside RVN must have MPC's converted to US dollars or dollar instruments prior to departure. Upon presentation of travel orders or in the absence of travel orders, a certificate of travel intentions signed by the Commanding Officer, conversion will be accomplished by the Disbursing Officer servicing the port of exit.

(3) Personnel and activities authorized US Postal privileges may purchase US Postal Money Orders in amounts not to exceed the amount of MPC's drawn in any calendar month, providing such money orders are dispatched immediately to an address outside Vietnam.

c. Purchase of Piasters

(1) Piasters procured through authorized channels at the Official Rate of exchange (72.7655) will be used for all official transactions including transactions by non-appropriated fund activities.

(2) Piasters procured at the Special Currency Fund Rate (118) will be used solely for personal transactions by authorized individuals. Under no circumstances will such funds be used to pay salaries, procure supplies or defray other expenses by appropriated or non-appropriated fund activities. The Special Currency Fund Rate (one to 118) was arranged for the following reasons:

(a) To assist in avoiding additional inflation brought about by the pressure of additional dollars in country as a function of the increased number of American Troops.

(b) To give the serviceman a break by allowing him to convert dollars on a favorable exchange basis.

(c) To discourage blackmarket operations that have been thriving in the country to the disinterest of the Government of Vietnam and the US. Therefore, it is of extreme importance that all members of this command understand this situation and without exception, exchange their dollars as required to piasters at authorized places on the basis of 118 piasters to the dollar.

ForceO 7000.1
8 Sep 1965

(3) Clubs and Messes designated as conversion facilities will maintain separate records on piasters procured at the Official Rate and piasters procured at the Special Currency Fund Rate. Such records must substantiate the purchase and sale or use of these funds.

(4) Purchase of piasters at the Official Rate or Special Currency Fund Rate will be effected through officially authorized conversion facilities as listed below:

- (a) American Embassy, Saigon.
- (b) Military Finance and Disbursing Officers or their bonded agents.
- (c) Those Officer and Enlisted Clubs and Messes designated as a conversion facility.

d. Conversion of Piasters to US Currency

(1) Conversion of piasters to US currency, not to exceed \$40.00, may be accomplished for authorized personnel departing Vietnam on permanent change of station or emergency leave, provided that personnel can demonstrate, through presentation of a receipt, that piasters were acquired from authorized sources. The conversion will be made by the Disbursing Officer servicing the port of exit.

(2) In addition, personnel may exchange piasters acquired in the following manners:

(a) Sale of Motor Vehicles. Sales of motor vehicles must be documented by listing the name and address of purchaser, description of vehicle sold, original date and place of purchase, cost price and selling price. The authorization, signed by the American Embassy Administrative Officer, must be presented to the Disbursing Officer.

(b) Sale of Personal Effects. Sales of personal effects, excluding motor vehicles, must be documented and must include description of the item sold and the selling price. The sale authorization signed by the Unit Property Control Officer must be presented to the Disbursing Officer at the time the conversion is requested.

5. Action

a. The following Commanders are authorized, at their discretion, to establish conversion facilities at Officer and/or Enlisted Clubs and Messes in their respective area of responsibility, provided rigid controls are established to ensure compliance with this order and strict accounting of conversion transactions:

ForceO 7000.1
8 Sep 1965

- (1) Commanding General, Third Marine Division.
- (2) Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing.
- (3) Commander, 30th Naval Construction Regiment.
- (4) Commanding Officer, Naval Support Activity, Danang (When Activated).
- (5) Commander, Advisory Group, I Corps.

b. Instructions, procedures and forms to be utilized by conversion facilities are contained in enclosures (1) through (5).

c. The Commanders listed in subparagraph 6a above are responsible for providing necessary conversion facilities at the point of arrival/departure for their respective personnel, except that conversion of MPC's and piasters to US dollars for Advisory Group, I Corps will be handled by the Disbursing facilities, 3d Marine Division.

d. All Subordinate Commanders will take the following actions:

- (1) Publish such instructions as are deemed necessary to implement and ensure compliance with the contents of this order.
- (2) Include acquisition, possession and conversion of currency as a subject in the orientation and information program for all personnel.
- (3) Take swift and severe disciplinary action on any violators.


REGAN FULLER
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus
Field Dir, ARC

Force 7000.1
8 Sep 1965CURRENCY EXCHANGE AND CONTROL PROCEDURES1. Acquisition of piasters by authorized conversion facilities:

a. Conversion officers who require piasters will acquire such monies through the authorized finance channels.

b. Each purchase of piasters will be supported by a certificate showing the following information:

- (1) Date of purchase.
- (2) Location of the conversion point.
- (3) Title of the conversion facility.
- (4) The US dollar amount of the purchase.
- (5) The amount of piasters received.
- (6) The rate of exchange.
- (7) Name and signature of the officer making the purchase.
- (8) Name and signature of the disbursing officer selling the piasters.
- (9) Transaction number of purchaser.

This certificate becomes part of the official records of the conversion point and will be available for inspection by competent authority.

c. Conversion points will not maintain piasters on hand in excess 30 days anticipated requirements.

2. Sale of piasters for Military Payment Certificates:

a. Conversion points established in accordance with paragraph 6a of this order are authorized to sell piasters for military payment certificates or personal checks drawn on a US bank in dollars and made payable to the conversion facility. Appropriate identification is required to insure that unauthorized personnel are not permitted to convert MPC's for piasters.

b. Daily records of exchange transaction will be maintained through the use of the following forms:

- (1) Daily Record of Individual Currency Exchange Activity. (Enclosure (2)).
- (2) Summary of Daily Exchange Activity. (Enclosure (3)).
- (3) Daily Record of Cash Count. (Enclosure (4)).

These forms will be retained by the conversion officers as a ready reference to past transactions. The records will be available at all times for inspection by authorized persons. These forms will be furnished by the III Marine Amphibious Force G-1 Section upon request.

ForceO 7000.1
8 Sep 1965

c. Maintenance of Records

(1) The conversion cashier will assign a transaction number to each sheet of the Daily Record of Individual Currency Exchange Activity used that day.

(2) The Conversion cashier will indicate the amount of dollars received and piasters disbursed for each individual transaction. The individual for whom the conversion is made will complete the line filling in his organization, name, rank, service number and signature.

(3) The conversion cashier will furnish each individual who exchanges MPC's for piasters with a receipt. (See Enclosure 5). These receipts will be reproduced locally.

(4) At the end of each day's business, the exchange cashier will complete the Summary of Daily Exchange Activity by posting each transaction to this form. Care will be exercised to assure that the beginning balances for each day are the same as the ending balances on the preceding day and that each entry is supported by a transaction voucher (either the certificate of purchase or the Daily Record of Individual Activity).

(5) The monies on hand at the end of each day's business will be counted and recorded on the Daily Record of Cash Count. The results of this count will be compared to the balances recorded on the Summary of Daily Exchange Activity.

ENCLOSURE (1)

2

Daily Record of Cash Count

Conversion Point:		Date:	
Cash Count			
Type Currency	Denomination	Quantity	Total
MPC's	10.00		
	5.00		
	1.00		
	.50		
	.25		
	.10		
	.05		
	Personal Checks		
TOTAL			
Recorded Balance			
over or (short)			
PIASTERS	500		
	200		
	100		
	50		
	20		
	10		
	5		
	1		
TOTAL			
Recorded Balance			
over or (short)			

Enclosure (4)

(Name & Location of
Conversion Point)

(Date)

Receipt for Purchase of Plasters

On this date _____
(Name, Rank Service Number)

purchased _____ \$VN in exchange for \$ _____ MPC.

(Name & Signature of
Conversion Officer
or Authorized
Representative)

Enclosure (5)

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPC, San Francisco,
California, 96601

ForceO 5312.8
1/DLR/dr
21 Sep 1965

FORCE ORDER 5312.8

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Vietnamese Military Interpreter Program; Policy and Instruction
concerning

1. Purpose. To set forth the policy and procedures governing the necessary employment and administration of Vietnamese Military Interpreters generally assigned for combat operations.

2. Background. Prior to the recent rapid increase of forces, a token number of interpreters from the ARVN were assigned to the III Marine Amphibious Force for such operational duties as were required, including ITT functioning, CI Teams and regimental/battalion headquarters of the operating forces. It has now become evident that an increase of interpreters must be acquired to effectively distribute their service down to rifle platoon level during certain operations. This substantial increase will result in a considerable administrative burden which will require standardized and clearly described procedures.

3. Policy.

a. It will be the policy of this Command to make maximum use of ARVN interpreters for operational requirements, consistent with MACV capability to provide.

b. In view of the limited availability of the interpreter personnel, the proper utilization of this speciality is a requirement of utmost importance. Commands/units will ensure that interpreters are utilized for interpreter duties, as intended by this program, and that they are not assigned any other duties that detract from the purpose for which they are provided.

4. Administrative Instruction. The following instructions are essential to the administration of a sound interpreter program.

a. Requisitions. All requests for ARVN interpreters will be submitted via the chain of command to this Headquarters (Attn: G-1). Requests will contain the number of personnel required, approximate duration of assignment and justification for the requirement.

ENCLOSURE (5)

DECLASSIFIED

ForceO
21 Sep 1965

b. Check in. Interpreter personnel reporting to the III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters for assignment will be provided transportation to I Corps by the Division or Wing to which operationally assigned. They will report to the office of I Corps Headquarters, Adjutant General for administrative processing. It is recommended that if available, the unit ARVN Liaison Officer act as escort during this check in phase. Upon arrival I Corps Headquarters such personnel will be checked for and provided with the required clothing, equipment, weapon, and I. D. Card. The interpreters will be assigned to the rolls of Headquarters Company, I Corps.

c. Assignment/Reassignments. Upon completion of the administrative processing at I Corps Headquarters, interpreters will be provided transportation to further report to the Command or Unit to which they are operationally attached.

d. Records/Reports. Commands are responsible for maintaining a current roster of the interpreters to include the assignment down to regimental level. A monthly report of interpreters on board will be forwarded to I Corps Headquarters, Adjutant General, with a copy to this Headquarters. Joins and losses will be submitted upon occurrence.

e. Discipline. All cases concerning breach of discipline, improper performance of duty, or other unfavorable matters will be reported by the unit commander via the chain of command to Division/Wing level for forwarding direct to I Corps Headquarters, Adjutant General, with a copy to this Headquarters. These reports will be submitted in detail to set forth the problem area to include recommendation that the individual either be released of his duties or retained. Personnel that are in an AOL or AWOL status will be reported directly to Adjutant/Generals Office, I Corps Headquarters, with a copy to this Headquarters.

f. Annual Leave. ARVN interpreter personnel are authorized a seven (7) day leave period during each quarter of the year. The seven (7) day leave periods are inclusive of travel time. Personnel requesting leave will submit such application through the assigned unit commanders via Division/Wing levels for forwarding direct to I Corps Headquarters, Adjutant General for approval. Commands will assure assistance in the preparation of requests, and enter an endorsement recommending approval/disapproval consistent with operational requirements.

g. Sick leave. The same procedure as indicated in paragraph 4f above will apply. This request will also contain a recommendation from the unit medical officer. In the event the medical officer's recommendation contains an urgency of relief from duty, such cases should be approved at unit level and sick leave orders be issued to report directly to I Corps Headquarters Adjutant General, for further disposition. A copy of sick leave orders will be forwarded to the Division or Wing concerned and this Headquarters.

ForceO 5312.8
21 Sep 1965

h. Pay. Interpreters are paid once a month. They are paid during the period from the 25th of the month through the 1st day of the following month. All interpreter personnel assigned to the Danang enclave will report to Headquarters Company, I Corps for receipt of pay. Commands/Units will ensure that a means of transportation is provided. Personnel assigned to units located outside of the Danang enclave will be paid at the local military air terminal serving that area. A disbursing representative from Headquarters Commander I Corps will be present at the air terminals on an announced day of the paying period. Commands, consistent with operational requirements, will ensure their assigned interpreter personnel are present for the receipt of pay.

i. Reports of Favorable Matter. Whenever the performance of an interpreter is considered noteworthy or commendable beyond the usual requirements of duty, the Unit Commander should report this favorable information by an appropriate letter to the I Corps, Adjutant General. In cases of gallantry in action, a recommendation for an appropriate award will be submitted.

j. Casualties. The treatment of interpreter casualties will be handled in the same manner as that of Marine personnel. In cases requiring hospitalization they will be evacuated to an RVN hospital. The 3rd Marine Division will effect liaison with I Corps Headquarters, Adjutant General for disposition. All casualties will be reported immediately by message at Division or Wing level direct to I Corps Headquarters, Adjutant General with information copy to this Headquarters.

k. Grade Status/Working Hours. All RVN interpreters are assigned the grade of Staff Sergeant (E-6) and should be accorded the privileges associated with this grade. The working hours will be consistent with operational requirements. In this connection and when operational functions permit, discretion should be exercised relative to observing the customs of their country.

l. Mail. Incoming mail for interpreters should be addressed to I Corps Headquarters, Adjutant General, KBC 4109.

5. Logistics. All clothing, equipment, and weapons are provided by the ARVN. Replacements and resupply of these items will be provided at I Corps Headquarters.

6. Coordinating Instructions.

a. The Commanding General, Third Marine Division, FMF, and the Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, are authorized direct liaison with I Corps Headquarters for the purpose of coordination on interpreter personnel administration.

DECLASSIFIED

ForceO
21 Sep 1965

b. The Commanding General, Third Marine Division, FMF will coordinate with I Corps Headquarters concerning disbursing arrangements at the areas outside of Danang enclave. The utilization of the Marine Air Courier Flight is authorized for the purpose of transporting the ARVN disbursing representative.

G. C. AxteLL
G. C. AXTELL
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION "AA"

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

*G-3
log book*

HEADQUARTERS
I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP
Advisory Team #1
APO US Forces 96337

MACTN-ICOP

7 October 1965

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation Report (U)

THRU: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco 96601

TO: See Distribution.

Attached hereto is Monthly Evaluation Report for the month of
September 1965.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



RICHARD A. WILSON
Captain, AGC
Admin Officer

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

- MACJ323 - cys 1 thru 4
- US Consul Hue - cy 5
- SA, 1st Inf Div - cy 6
- SA, 2nd Inf Div - cy 7
- CG, III MAF - cys 8 & 9
- USOM - cy 10
- CO, 23rd Air Base Gp - cy 11
- CO, Det C-1, 5th SF Gp(Abn) - cy 12
- Admin Office, I Corps - cy 13
- G2 Advisor, I Corps - cy 14
- G3 Advisor, I Corps - cy 15

Pg 1 of 1 pg

Of 9 of 15 cys

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (5)

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (September 1965)(U)

ANNEX A

I CORPS

1. (G) GENERAL: There was a decrease in the number of battalion-size or larger operations in September as compared to August, but a 28 percent increase in VC KIAs was realized. The tempo of VC initiated activities increased considerably after having decreased the previous two months. The main aims of the VC continue to be harassment and isolation of villages and out-posts, along with interdiction of routes of communication. Slight overall progress was noted in rural construction efforts. The Quang Nam Special Sector was formed 1 September and additional ARVN forces were allocated to it for operations. This added operational strength, coupled with increased rural construction efforts, has resulted in significant pacification gains during the reporting period. *Deleted*

2. (C) CURRENT OPERATIONS: There were 52 battalion or larger unit operations conducted in I Corps during September, a decrease of 18 from the previous month. Contact was made with the VC in 31 of these operations. I Corps (ARVN) and USMC units conducted seven coordinated platoon-size or larger operations. Seven airmobile operations, supported by USMC H-34 helicopters, were conducted in the Corps area. During September, 975 VC were killed and 359 captured for an increase of 273 and 158, respectively. ARVN captured 210 weapons (39 more than in August) while losing 147 (41 more than in August) to the VC. There was an increase from last month in the number of ARVN KIAs from 136 to 215. Operation Lam Son 190 in the Ba Long Valley, 38 kilometers south of the 17th parallel, terminated after 30 days duration on 13 September. A reinforced infantry battalion now occupies an outpost there for the first time since July 1964. Four days after the establishment of Quang Nam Special Sector, a sector controlled operation (Hoa Tuyen 101) began 10 kilometers south of

Page 1 of 6 pages. UNCLASSIFIED
Copy 9 of 15 copies.

ENCLOSURE (1)

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (September 1965)(U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

Da Nang and west of Highway 1. This four battalion operation had the mission of clearing Highway 14 and securing a large rice harvest. Results of the operation which terminated on 19 September, were 97 VC KIA, 15 VCC, and 18 weapons captured. An additional 59 VC are credited to have been killed by air. Friendly losses were 33 KIA, 117 WIA, and 1 MIA. Follow up sweeps throughout this area have netted 20 more VC KIA and 5 captured weapons. A coordinated USMC-ARVN search and destroy operation (Operation Piranha-Lien Ket 8) took place on 7 September, 12 kilometers northeast of Quang Ngai. Two 2nd Division ARVN battalions conducted airmobile assaults near Cap Batangen. After three days of action, 66 VC were killed, 11 taken prisoner, and 11 weapons captured. ARVN losses were five KIA and ^{to C. Air Support} 33 wounded. U.S. aircraft flew 838 sorties and VNAF flew 283 in the Corps Tactical Zone. There were five B-52 strategic bombing missions conducted during the month against suspected VC locations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Two of these strikes were followed up by ground operations with negative results. Naval gunfire expended 4822 rounds (1752 more than in August) in support of ARVN ground operations. During the month the crop destruction program for Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces was completed. The effect of the defoliant on 6218 hectares of sprayed crops was uniformly excellent. In addition, 19 other defoliation sorties were flown. The 4th Armored Cavalry Squadron continued its reorganization. The M-41 tank troop completed transition training on their new tanks at the Armor School, and will be employed in the 11th DTA upon arrival in the I CTZ. A third M-113 APC troop completed training and loaded aboard an LST for movement to the I CTZ.

Page 2 of 6 pages.

Copy 9 of 15 copies.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (September 1965)(U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

3. (C) VC ACTIVITIES: During September, 281 VC initiated incidents were reported. This represents a 25 percent increase from August. The most significant rise took place in Quang Tin Province where the incident rate increased 87 percent. One major attack occurred on 20 September when an estimated two to three VC companies ambushed elements of the 3rd Battalion, 51st Regiment, on Highway 14 in Quang Nam Special Sector. The unit suffered 39 KIA and 50 WIA as compared to 11 VC killed in this action. There was no contact during the month with main force VC units of battalion-size or larger. Viet Cong activity was largely limited to low level incidents such as harassment of outposts and sabotage of lines of communications. A noted increase in the number and severity of incidents took place during the last week of the month in the 1st Division area. This was marked by mortar harassments of the Ba Long Valley outpost, Khe Tri, and the 3rd Regimental CP and interdiction of Highway 1 and the railroad north of Da Nang. Rallies and documents reconfirmed the three main force battalions (804th, 806th, and 808th) accepted in Quang Tri Province. Reports also indicate that the 1st VC Regiment has returned north to vicinity of Tien Phouc in Quang Tin Province after operating for four months in Quang Ngai Province. The number of VC inspired demonstrations rose sharply to 12. General themes were release of husbands and sons from government service, compensation for crop damage, stop air strikes, and termination of governmental control of the rice harvest. The demonstration in Da Nang on 20 September resulted in the apprehension, trial, and execution of three agitators. The largest demonstration, approximately 7,000 people, occurred on 26 September in Quang Tri City as a result of a

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3 of 6 pages.

Copy 9 of 15 copies.

ENCLOSURE (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

MACVN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (September 1965)(U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

grenade incident in a Buddhist temple four days before. Indications are that this was not VC inspired.

4. (C) RURAL CONSTRUCTION: Recent ARVN clearing operations in the 11th DTA tend to stabilize portions of this area; however, there are still insufficient military forces and cadre teams to show effective gains in rural construction. Quang Nam Special Sector, through intensified clearing operations, has made definite gains and, with the recruitment of additional cadre teams, should continue to progress. In the 12th DTA the most significant progress noted, were the pacification gains in Tu Nghia District (Quang Ngai Province). Insufficient mobile action cadre and lack of sufficient RF and PF forces continue to be the problem area in the I Corps.

5. (C) PSYOPS/CA: Standard air and ground leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts characterized the psywar effort for the month. Major themes were; "Protect the rice harvest from the VC," "Chieu Hoi," and "Illegality of public demonstrations." More face-to-face propaganda is being disseminated with the use of psywar teams and audio-visual vehicles. Increased command and advisory effort is being employed to energize the payment of indemnification claims from the MILCAP Fund. A team of experts knowledgeable in the administration of the MILCAP Fund from MACV and the ARVN Psywar Directorate met with ARVN and US sector advisory personnel to determine problem areas and arrive at workable solutions. After a study of the situation, detailed guidance was issued to each division and sector advisor in I CTZ. As a result a marked increase in activity to clear up a backlog of indemnification claims has taken place. Civic Action also consisted in administering to the medical needs of civilians and refugees and the distribution of relief supplies to refugees.

Page 4 of 6 pages.

Copy 9 of 5 copies.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (September 1965)(U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

6. (C) LOGISTICS: Logistics problems continue. Bridging and construction material continue to be in short supply. Distribution of supplies is a major problem area particularly in view of the necessity to stockpile supplies prior to the forthcoming rainy season. Delivery of supplies to outposts in the 12th DTA is complicated because of inability to use lateral roads from Highway 1 and the limited allocation of airlift. Completion of the Cau Lo bridge on Highway 1 and use of LSTs to ferry supplies to Chu Lai will help in raising level of stocks in depots during October; however, delivery of supplies to outposts and villages west of Highway 1 continues to be a major problem area.

7. (C) ENGINEER: Keeping Highway 1 open remains the primary engineer task. Elapsed time from destruction of bridge to completion remains satisfactory; however, tactical bridging available in depot is in critical short supply. The approaching rainy season with possible accompanying floods and the present VC rate of destruction could cause this limited supply to be exhausted in approximately two months. Bridge timbers, crushed rock, and FSP also remain in critical short supply.

8. (C) PERSONNEL: I Corps is presently at 118 percent strength but much of this overstrength is accounted for by personnel assigned to the recently formed 4th battalions. These personnel will not be carried as authorized assigned strength until their training cycle is complete. There has been an increase in the average operational strength for Infantry battalions to 524 from 440 in August. The ARVN desertion rate continues on a downward trend, with slightly lower than six per 1000 as compared to the national rate of 13.63. This can be attributed in part to increased command emphasis

Page 5 of 6 pages

UNCLASSIFIED
Copy 9 of 15 copies.

ENCLOSURE (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (September 1965)(U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

and successful tactical operations within the Corps zone. Morale continues to be good.

9. (C) SECURITY: An 87 percent increase in manhours devoted to physical security has taken place. This is a result of additional US guard posts being provided and the requirement for around the clock security for billet areas. Security of U.S. billets has also been increased by using a more efficient system of accountability of Vietnamese passes and by limiting the number of indigenous personnel given access to these areas.

Page 6 of 6 pages

UNCLASSIFIEDCopy 9 of 15 copies.

ENCLOSURE (1)