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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG III MAF ltr 103/RPL/Ipt Serial No. 0050665 of 21Dec65

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From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: III MAF Command Chronology for October 1965

Ref: (c) CMC ltr A03D22-kps of 7Aug65

1. Forwarded in compliance with paragraph 3 of reference (c).


H. J. WOESSNER
By direction


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65 A784

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

103/RPL/lpf
21 DEC 1965

№ 005 0665

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CG FMFPac msg 251940Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology for October 1965

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

J. C. AxteLL
J.C. AXTELL
CHIEF OF STAFF

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III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

OCTOBER 1965

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PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

PART FOUR

ENCLOSURES

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PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III Marine Amphibious Force

Danang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam

LEWIS W. WALT

Major General United States Marine Corps

Commanding

Command Chronology for period 1 October - 31 October 1965

Chief of Staff	Col George C. AXTELL, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff	Col Howard E. WERTMAN, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Col Don W. GALBREATH, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Col Leo J. DULACKI, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col Edwin H. SIMMONS, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Col Harold A. HAYES, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	Maj Charles J. KEEVER, USMC from 29 October
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6	Col Elmer G. GLIDDEN JR, USMC
Supply Officer	Col Howard G. TAFT, USMC
Force Engineer	LtCol Lester G. HARMON, USMC
Communications - Electronics Officer	Col Frederick C. DODSON
Adjutant	LtCol Burton L. LUCAS JR, USMC
Base Development Officer	LtCol Charles F. LANGLEY, USMC

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SUBORDINATE UNITS

COMMANDER

3d Marine Division

MajGen Lewis W. WALT, USMC

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

BGen Keith B. MCCUTCHEON, USMC

Force Logistics Support Group

Col Mauro J. PADALINO, USMC

2d Battalion, 9th Marines

LtCol William F. DONAHUE JR, USMC

7th Engineer Battalion

LtCol Ermine L. MEEKER, USMC

1st Force Reconnaissance Co

Maj Malcolm G. GAFFEN, USMC

9th Motor Transport Battalion

Maj Joseph F. JONES, USMC

Communication Support Co BWP

Maj Donald L. MURPHY, USMC

Communication Co, 7th Communication Bn

Capt Charles T. HAMPTON, USMC

Average Monthly Strength

USMC		USM		TOTAL
OFFICER	ENLISTED	OFFICER	ENLISTED	
2,490	34,568	365	4,588	42,011

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PART TWO

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General. During October 1965, III Marine Amphibious Force headquarters was located at coordinates (AP994757) which is 350 meters west of the DANANG Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam, adjacent to the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing command posts. All forces under the operational control of III MAF were located in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines and HMM-363 were attached to Field Force Vietnam (formerly Task Force Alfa) in II CTZ during October. III MAF continued to grow as personnel strength increased from 37,853 to 42,011. The Chu Lai TAOR was expanded as shown in enclosure (1).

B. Operations. III Marine Amphibious Force continued to conduct unilateral and coordinated operations in support of the mission as defined by reference (a). The specific areas of responsibility for each battalion are shown on the overlays of enclosures (2), (3) and (4). In addition to continuing with Operation GOLDEN FLEECE, six other major operations and over 3,500 minor actions were conducted to destroy VC forces, deny them food supply, pacify the civilian population, and defend the bases within the TAOR's.

C. Enemy Activity. The Viet Cong resorted to minor probes, sniper fire and land mine harassment until the last few days of the month when three very aggressive, concentrated assaults were launched on III MAF bases and positions. These attacks indicated that the VC forces have the desire and capabilities to execute such attacks regardless of losses, therefore, additional emphasis may have to be placed on base defense.

II. OPERATIONS

A. USMC OPERATIONS. In addition to continuing with Operation GOLDEN FLEECE, two other major unilateral operations were conducted during October.

1. GOLDEN FLEECE. The protection of the rice harvest south and southwest of DANANG from VC confiscation continued from the month of September. The operation was expanded to include protection of rice harvest in the CHU LAI TAOR also. The success of this operation is indicated by intelligence reports (see section III) that the VC have not received the rice they had planned on as food for the winter campaign and are resorting to money "taxation" instead of the customary rice levy.

2. TRIPLE PLAY. Two companies of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines launched this search and destroy operation on 18 October in the vicinity of coordi-

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notes (BT 3714) (BT 3715) (BT 3815) (BT 3914) (BT 3915) approximately 12 miles north of CHU LAI. The operation lasted two days and resulted in 16 VC KIA, 6 VCC and 18 VCS with only two Marines wounded.

3. TRAIL BLAZER. Operation TRAIL BLAZER, which consisted of an extensive deep patrol and series of ambushes was launched by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion on 18 October from a patrol base in the vicinity of coordinates (AT 871626). The purpose of this operation was to determine the extent of VC concentrations in the main valleys leading from the mountains into the DANANG TAOR, and to determine the probability of VC attack from this area. The six day operation resulted in 2 VC KIA, 5 VC complexes of training camps, mine moulding shops and bivouac areas destroyed, and the accumulation of intelligence information concerning the location of trails and other likely areas of troop concentration. This information has been evaluated and has been used to assist in developing an aerial target list.

4. MINOR OPERATIONS. In addition to the major operations listed above, 3,520 ambushes, patrols, and minor search and destroy operations were conducted resulting in 287 VC contacts. The casualties resulting from III MAF operations in October are shown in Table I. Although the total VC casualties have decreased steadily since operation SPARKITE, operations have been successful in preventing VC confiscation of rice, keeping VC forces on the move, and expanding III MAF territorial control.

TABLE I

CASUALTY RESULTS OF III MAF OPERATIONS

OCTOBER 1965

USMC				VC				WPNS
KIA	WIA	DOW	EQUIPMENT	KIA	WIA	VCC	VCS	CAPTURED
44	380	7	21 Aircraft destroyed 41 Aircraft damaged	214	59	14	67	80

B. COORDINATED OPERATIONS

1. RED SNAPPER. Operation RED SNAPPER was a coordinated search and destroyed operation conducted north and south of Highway One from (ZD 095005) to (AU 860000). The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, entered the objective area by conducting a shore-to-shore landing in the TUA MOI Bay area in conjunction with a motorized march from DANANG along Highway One via HAI VAN Pass. The 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion and 706th RF Company moved by LVT from NAM-O bridge at coordinates (AT 9383) to the line of departure at coordinates (AT 815840). The operation ended on 25 October in vicinity of coordinates (AU 860000). Contact with VC forces was very light as indicated by the casualty results: 7 VC KIA, 6 VC captured, and 6 weapons captured, with no friendly casualties. The III MAF operation

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plan is included as enclosure (5). Details of the operation are provided by reference (c).

2. DRUM HEAD. Operation DRUM HEAD was a coordinated 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, and ARVN Platoon operation conducted on 26 and 27 October from coordinates (BS 489898) and (BS 495907) with one company forming blocking position further east at (BS 514899). The attacking force completed the operation in the vicinity of MY LOC (three) (BS 495890). Elements of the battalion moved to new objectives south of TRA BONG River (BS 5074) and swept the area. During the day approximately 250 Vietnamese civilians requested to be evacuated from the area to escape VC terrorism. Casualties resulting from this operation were: 1 VC KIA, 26 VCS, 1 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA.

3. LIEN KET 10. Operation LIEN KET 10 was a coordinated operation conducted by 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 6th ARVN Regiment, on 29 and 30 October from helicopter landing zones in vicinity of BT 367053. The operation was conducted to search and clear the area bounded by coordinates (BT 3306), (BT 3608), (BT 3803) and (BT 3701). Resistance was light as indicated by the casualty results: 1 VCC, 3 VCS and no friendly losses.

C. AIR SUPPORT

1. Fixed Wing. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing fixed wing aircraft continued to support USMC, RVNAF, 2d Air Division and Task Force 77 as indicated by TABLE II.

TABLE II

1ST MAW FIXED WING OPERATIONS

OCTOBER 1965

SORTIES	III MAF	2D AIR DIV	TF 77
GAS	21	4	
HELO ESCORT	281		
IZ PREP	91		
TPQ-10	594		
PHOTO	88		
ID	208	565	
AIR DEFENSE			
SCRAMBLE			
SPECIAL	8	180	
ECM		137	4
TOTAL	1,391	886	4

2. HELICOPTER. Helicopters of the 1st MAW flew a total of 21,788 sorties in transporting 35,354 passengers and 1,960 tons of cargo.

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D. NAVAL GUNFIRE. CTG 70.8 continued to support III MAF operations during October by providing naval gunfire on six separate occasions. Total rounds fired was 562, a decrease of 613 rounds which is attributed to the limited scale of VC resistance during planned III MAF assaults, and the proximity of civilian forces and rapidity of VC withdrawal during their assaults on III MAF.

E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS. III MAF units augmented conventional equipment and tactics during October to adapt to the nature of guerrilla-type warfare.

1. Smoke Machine. This device, which forces smoke into tunnels, driving inhabitants out and revealing secret entrances and ventilating holes, was employed successfully during October. On 1 October the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines used it on one tunnel and four fighting holes. It was effective in determining the extensiveness of these hideouts, thereby simplifying destruction.

2. Sniper Teams. III MAF ambush capabilities were improved by the addition of scout-snipers equipped with eight power scope-mounted Winchester M70 rifles. VC troops were killed at ranges up to 700 yards.

F. VC ACTIVITY

1. Land Mines. III MAF suffered 50 WIA from land mines during October, a decrease of almost 50% from September which is attributed to adapting tactics that minimize these casualties.

2. Attacks. VC activity during October generally consisted of minor probes, sniper and land mine harassment while avoiding confrontation with assault forces. However, a night assault on positions of two platoons of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, west of Danang, and night demolition team attacks on MARBLE MOUNTAIN Air Facility and CHU LAI Air Base were experienced. At 280009H and 280010H VC forces attacked the MARBLE MOUNTAIN Air Facility, the nearby US Naval Hospital (under construction) the MCS 9 camp, and the CHU LAI Airfield, inflicting considerable damage to aircraft equipment and buildings. On the night of 30 October VC forces attacked Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines at the Company CP on Hill 22 (AT 956668) 8,000 meters southwest of DANANG Air Base. The attackers were repelled at all positions after a short encounter. The casualties from these attacks are shown in Table III. Details of the attack are provided in enclosure (6).

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TABLE III
CASUALTY RESULTS OF THREE VC ATTACKS

OCTOBER 1965

ATTACK	USMC			VC		
	KIA	WIA	EQUIP DAMAGED	KIA	VCC	WPNS CAPT
Hill 22 Marble Mountain	12	23		47	1	26 Small arms
	4	108	19 Helicopters Destroyed 35 Helicopters Damaged	17	4	11 Weapons 3 Bangalore Torpedoes 189 Handgrenades
Chu Lai	0	1	2 Aircraft Destroyed 3 Seriously Damaged 3 Lightly Damaged	15	2	7 Weapons 13 Satchel Charges 12 Grenades

III. INTELLIGENCE

A. General. Intelligence reports during October indicated that the Viet Cong intended to concentrate on minor probes and assaults, psychological warfare, and replenishing supplies.

B. Forces. The order of battle of VC units in I CTZ is shown below:

Confirmed units:	1 Regiment
	17 Battalions
	36 Companies
Probable	1 Regiment
	10 Battalions
	14 Companies
Possible	8 Battalions
	2 Companies

This indicates a possible increase in strength of approximately 1,000 troops, and indicates an increase in VC activity.

C. Logistics. The condition of ammunition and weapons captured from VC forces indicates that their supply lines remain open and active. It appears from intelligence sources that they are depending on the local area for food; however, and that efforts to obtain it have not been very successful. Money taxation is being substituted for the former technique of rice assessment, because of the protective measures employed under Operation GOLDEN FLEECE. This has met occasional resistance, and should have a disillusioning effect on the victims eventually.

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D. Propaganda. The VC employed psychological warfare, in the form of leaflets, posters and demonstrations. The general themes were: Vietnamese policies must be decided by Vietnamese people; U. S. soldiers die in Vietnam for Wall Street capitalists; Cease artillery fire and air strikes; End GVN close control and confiscation of rice; Release young men in PF; RF and ARVN service and stop the draft.

E. Weather. There were several periods of monsoon rains during early October which restricted air support and ground force movement. Rainfall in October is shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV

Rainfall in the III MAF TAORs

1-31 October 1965

<u>TAOR</u>	<u>Rainfall</u> (inches)
DANANG	18.46
CHU LAI	18.02
PHU BAI	21.85

IV. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

A. Organization. Force/NCC/SA I CORPS Bulletin 5000, dated 29 October (Enclosure (7)) redesignated the Civil Affairs Officer as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 (Civil Affairs/Civic Action) and redesignated the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 (Plans) as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6 (Plans). On 5 October the Base Development Office was designated a Special Staff Section under the direct cognizance of the Chief of Staff vice the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

B. Replacement and Rotation. The MATS Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) for transportation of FMFPAC WestPac replacement and rotation personnel began service to DANANG Air Base on 6 October. During October, 1,330 replacements were brought in and 1,050 troops were rotated by SAAM aircraft. Individual rotation by air instead of surface transportation will increase the in place overseas time by approximately one month.

C. Strength. The average personnel strength of III MAF increased from 37,853 to 42,011 in October as individuals units were built up.

D. Transient Facilities. In order to provide billeting messing and transportation for III MAF rotation personnel, a transient facility was established at DANANG Air Base. The Force Order establishing the transient facility is included as enclosure (8).

E. Rest and Recuperation. Table V indicates III MAF participation in R and R programs in October 1965.

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TABLE V

III MAF PARTICIPATION IN R&R PROGRAMS

BANGKOK	672
HONG KONG	130
OKINAWA	<u>2400</u>
TOTAL	3202

V. LOGISTICS

A. General. Logistics activities were adversely affected by the monsoon rains in October; however, activation and development of the Naval Support Activity enhanced the overall potential of the supply system.

B. Spare Parts. Shortages of spare parts affected readiness to the extent that the operation readiness of several units decreased to the marginally combat ready category during October. The RED BALL System, initiated in September, was used to expedite shipment of the most critical items.

C. Petroleum Oil Lubricants

1. Fuel Contamination. The 1st MAF F4B aircraft stationed at DANANG Air Base experienced power plant difficulties in October which were traced to salt water contamination in the fuel. The daily fuel sampling afforded by the new US Army QM Mobile Petroleum Laboratory and a more rigid inspection of POL shipping and ship-to-shore transfer lines reduced the possibility of this reoccurring.

2. Fuel Sampling. The 527th QM Mobile Petroleum Laboratory became operational at DANANG during the first week in October. Fuel samples can now be taken from storage tanks and analyzed immediately, whereas before samples had to be sent to Saigon.

3. Fuel Lines. During the period 16 to 28 October the AABFS bottom lay fuel line systems at DANANG and CHU LAI were out of commission. The AABFS at CHU LAI developed a leak and the mooring serving this system was unserviceable. Heavy sea conditions prevented scuba and deep sea divers from performing repair. Since this was the only source of fuel to CHU LAI, a temporary buoyant system was installed using 5,000 feet of flexible hose line from the AABFS system supported by empty 55 gallon drums. This system provided fuel to CHU LAI for the remainder of the month.

D. Construction1. Transportation

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a. Roads. Heavy monsoon rains during October caused serious damage to roads. Traffic was limited, at times, to a maximum of 3/4 ton, and keeping the roads open was a major engineering effort.

b. Runways. Repairs to the south 4000 feet of the Chu Lai Expeditionary runway were continued throughout the month by MCB-10. By 31 October repairs were accomplished to approximately 2600 feet, bringing the total usable runway length of 6600 feet. Heavy rains during the middle of the month slowed progress somewhat, and a shortage of cement temporarily halted progress during the latter part of the month. More cement was received at Chu Lai on 29 October and work was resumed. A failure in the subgrade of the parallel taxiway at the Chu Lai expeditionary airfield caused the removal of approximately 1100 feet of aluminum matting to restore the subgrade. By the end of the month approximately 350 feet had been repaired. At the same time work continued on the northern helicopter parking apron at Chu Lai and approximately one-half the total matting was laid by 31 October.

E. Port Operations

1. During October, 62,229 measured tons of cargo were discharged through the port of Danang and 17,678 measured tons were discharged at Chu Lai. This is less than the tonnage handled during September, but the decrease was caused by the unfavorable monsoon weather. At Chu Lai heavy seas damaged the causeway and on 13 October the seaward section was reported to be sinking. The causeway was still inoperative on 31 October and it is not considered practical to attempt to restore it until after the monsoon season ends. Even with this handicap 19 LST's were offloaded at Chu Lai.

2. During October CTF 76 assigned two (2) 542 class LST's to Nav-SupAct DANANG to be used as intercoastal lighterage (CTF Seven Six 301006 September refers). The Henry County arrived on 4 October and the Jerome County on 21 October. The assignment of these two ships to the Naval Support Activity, Danang is expected to provide a very significant capability to trans-ship cargo between enclaves.

F. Railroad Operations

1. On 16 October COMUSMACV authorized the use of the Vietnamese Railroad in I Corps area. The first six rail cars were spotted in the Danang Yard on 30 October and loaded with 97 tons of 30th MCR cantonment material to be shipped to Hue/Phu Bai. The train departed 010745H November. RVN Regional Forces consisting of 4 companies of 75 troops each are responsible for security along the line. Escorts and air cover are provided for all critical cargo shipments. Air cover is provided by RVNAF and normally consists of one L-19 conducting aerial reconnaissance ahead of the train.

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G. Fiscal. During the period \$8,525,800 (Vietnamese Piasters) of AIK (Assistance in Kind) Funds were allocated to subordinate units. The primary use of these particular funds is for the hire of indigenous labor. Requirements for additional AIK Funds for construction, supplies and services have been submitted to this Headquarters by subordinate units. These requirements are being reviewed for further submission to COMUSMACV.

H. Naval Support Activity. The Naval Support Activity, Danang, was officially activated on 15 October and is now operating Class I Depot, providing intercoastal resupply shipping and providing port and harbor security at Danang. Target dates for assumption of tasks now being performed by CG III MAF are as follows:

1. Danang

Cargo handling shore-side	15 Nov 1965
Trucking	15 Feb 1966
POL requirements consolidation	28 Oct 1965
Operation of Bulk POL Facilities	15 Dec 1965

2. Chu Lai. A full capability is dependent on receipt of all equipment, craft and personnel.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS


A. General. During the month of October the III Marine Amphibious Force Communication Center experienced a moderate increase in total transmissions as outlined below:

	October	September	Increase
Incoming	33,639	32,587	1,052
Outgoing	<u>22,684</u>	<u>16,845</u>	<u>5,839</u>
Total	56,323	49,432	6,891

B. Problems. On 14 October the four external circuits serving III MAF experienced complete outage due to main cable interconnecting Air Force terminal and Danang Control being out of service. One circuit (Z263) to NAVCOMSTAPHIL and two circuits, K-648 and OASO were down at 141025H because of cable failure. Wetwash circuit Z025 to the Philippines was not affected by the cable outage but was down due to circuitry problems between Danang Control and Saigon Control. Circuit restoration was accomplished for the III MAF high priority circuits in accordance with DCA Saigon instructions. Circuit 1930 was

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22 October - Operation RED SNAPPER launched.

23 October - Mr. James T. KENDALL, Chief Council, Congressional Investigation Sub-Committee visited III MAF.

24 October - Operation TRAIL BLAZER concluded.

25 October - The following VIP's visited III MAF:

Sen Edward M. KENNEDY	Democrat - Mass
Sen Joseph D. TYDINGS	Democrat - Md
Sen John C. CULVER	Democrat - Iowa
Sen John V. TUNNEY	Democrat - Calif
MGen Sydney S. WADE, USMC	CG, FMFPAC/I MACV FWD
Mr. Charles A. MANN	Dir, USOM, Vietnam
Mr. Edward B. MARKS	Asst Dir, Operation
Mr. Samuel WILSON	USOM, Vietnam
Mr. William GARRITY	USOM Press Officer
Prof. Henry KISSINGER	Special Consultant to Amb LODGE

- Operation RED SNAPPER secured.

26 October - Operation DRUM HEAD launched.

- Representative Craig HOSMER, Republican, California visited III MAF.

27 October - Operation DRUM HEAD concluded.

28 October - VC attacked Marble Mountain Air Facility, US Naval Hospital and CHU LAI Airfield.

29 October - LIEN KET 10 launched.

- RAdm Norvel G. WARD USN, Chief NavAdvGrp/CTF 115 visited III MAF.

30 October - VC attacked Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines on Hill 22 southwest of DANANG.

- LIEN KET 10 terminated.

31 October - Gen William C. WESTMORELAND USA COMUSMACV visited III MAF.

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restored to full service at 141700H. The USS OKANOGAN received and transmitted traffic for this Headquarters during this period. At approximately 141700H the main cable was restored to service. However, all external circuits were not completely restored due to minor technical problems until 142350H.

C. Service. An AFPS rebroadcast station has been constructed at Chu Lai. During the month of October a transmitter and a 100 foot antenna were installed. The AFPS service representative in charge of the installation estimates the rebroadcast station will be operational by 6 November. Installation of the multi-channel Tropospheric Scatter Equipment AN/TRC-90 is complete at Danang and Chu Lai. This will provide III Marine Amphibious Force a 23 voice and 12 teletype multi-channel capability between the two major installations. At present, the problem of inter-connecting cable pairs across the Danang runway and into Metropolitan Danang is delaying activation of some circuits.

VII. CIVIC ACTION

A. Objectives. The basic objectives of the III MAF civic action program remained the same during October. Particular emphasis continued to be placed by the III MAF staff during the month on the coordination of assistance efforts by all agencies of the U. S. Mission and the integration of that assistance effort into the rural construction program of the Government of Viet-Nam.

B. Internal Reorganization. During the month, the Civil Affairs Section was changed from a special staff section to a general staff section and was designated the G-5 Section. Plans were also finalized to transfer the Psychological Warfare Section from the G-3 Section to the G-5 Section. This transfer will be effected during early November. Personnel of the G-5 Section include:

1. G-5: Responsible to the Commanding General for supervision and execution of the command's civic action and psy-war programs.
2. Civic Action Officer: Responsibility to the G-5 for supervision and execution of the command's civic action program.
3. Psychological Warfare Officer: Responsible to the G-5 for the Command's psy-war program.
4. Medical Advisor: Responsible to the Civic Action Officer for the medical assistance portion of the command's civic action program.
5. Supply Chief: Responsible to the Civic Action Officer for the handling of all civic action supplies and commodities except medical supplies.
6. Medical Storeroom Supervisor: Responsible to the Civic Action Officer for the handling of medical supplies.

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7. Administrative Clerk: Handles all filing and typing for the G-5 Section.

C. Joint Coordinating Council. This Council met each week during October and was very effective in facilitating the coordination of activities of all U. S. Mission agencies. Perhaps the most significant development during the month was the appointment by the Commanding General of I Corps of his Rural Construction Staff Officer to the Council. This officer serves as direct liaison between the Government of Viet-Nam and the U. S. Mission agencies in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

D. Joint Coordinating Council Committees: All of the committees functioned during the month making studies of their respective fields. The Public Works Committee was redesignated the Civil Engineering Committee. The Public Health Committee has undertaken to integrate Government of Viet-Nam rural health workers into 25 of the medical aid stations being operated by III MAF medical assistance teams. It is hoped that during November some of the stations will actually be taken over by the Government of Viet-Nam. The Finance (Claims) Committee was active in resolving the claims problems in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Other committees were still working on their initial surveys and reports.

E. Medical Assistance. Thirty-one III MAF units rendered approximately 40,000 medical assistance treatments to approximately 37,000 Vietnamese villagers during October. Treatments were as follows:

Skin diseases: 27%
 Respiratory infections: 15%
 Headaches: 11%
 Stomach ailments: 11%
 Injuries: 8%
 Diarrhea: 7%
 Dental: 3%
 Miscellaneous: 18%

The foregoing treatments were rendered in hamlets located throughout the three III MAF enclaves as follows:

Phu Bai enclave: 3,818
 Da Nang enclave: 25,074
 Chu Lai enclave: 11,494

In addition to the foregoing treatments, the III MAF Preventive Medicine Unit was active throughout the month in assisting the Government of Vietnam in handling outbreaks of communicable diseases throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone. During one three-day period this unit inoculated 8,500 Vietnamese in Quang Ngai Province for plague and cholera.

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F. Project Handclasp: More than 210,000 pounds of miscellaneous commodities were received during October through Project Handclasp. These commodities were inventories and distributed to III MAF units.

G. CARE Program: During October CARE assigned a field representative to operate out of Da Nang for the purpose of assisting III MAF in its civic action program.

H. Other Programs: The other programs listed in the Command Chronology for August, 1965 continued to develop. Details of these programs are reported in the 3d Marine Division Command Chronology for October.

VIII. COMBAT INFORMATION

A. Correspondents. Correspondents visiting the III MAF TAOR covering special assignments on Marine activities and meetings with General WALT included; Otto FURCHBERINGER, Managing Editor of Time Magazine, preparing a special 12-page section on Marines in Vietnam; Eiichi NAKAO and Kozuyuki YOKOYAMA of Japanese International news; Morley SATER of CBS News covering Marine reaction to demonstrations in U. S. against intervention in Vietnam; Dickey CHAPPELLE, of the National Observer, covering patrols and operations by Marines in Vietnam; 31 newsmen covering Senator Kennedy and party during two-day visit; Col Robert D. HEINL, USMC (Ret.), free lance writer, gathering material for a book; VAdm Ruthven LIBBY, special correspondent from Copley News Service; R. W. APPLE of New York Times covering Viet Cong suicide attack at two airfields here; Phil GALLIGAN, Joe SIDLO and Pete DUNCAN of CBS News, Philadelphia, Pa., doing special one-hour color show on Marines in Vietnam.

B. News Releases. A total of 213 releases were made during the month; 68 of which were with photographs. These included VIPs, People-to-People, combat operations and civil affairs. Special projects covered included the attack on the Marble Mountain Air Facility. Two senior Marine officers and the OIC CIB made a trip to Saigon the day after the attack and appeared before the press at 1700. They clarified and expanded on information previously released. Local media representatives were given a briefing on the attack the following morning at 7 a.m. The Briefing was conducted by Major General WAIT. A CIB courier was dispatched to FMEFAC the day following the attack with film. The film arrived in HQMC the same day.

C. Photography. During October 13,460 feet of Motion picture film was exposed and forwarded by courier or air freight to CMC. Approximately 65% was features and VIP's etc. Special projects covered were Sentry Dogs and Med Evac.

IX. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

A. Leaflets. Approximately 60,000 copies of eight leaflet messages were disseminated in III MAF TAOR's in October. They were distributed by

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1st MAW helicopters and by individual hand-to-hand delivery. A shortage of paper was the primary deterrent in the psychological warfare program. Attempts to schedule the 5th Air Commando Squadron C47 and U-10 were unsuccessful due to prior commitments and maintenance problems.

B. Loudspeaker Broadcast. UH1E helicopters with loudspeakers and Vietnamese interpreters were used to explain US/RVN objectives and tell non-combatants what to do during attacks on VC forces.

C. Audio-Visual Teams. The US Army 1st Psychological Operation Field Support Detachment (Prov) attached to I Corps presented a cultural show five nights a week to hamlets in the DANANG TAOR. The show consisted of movies explaining the GVN/USMC objectives and entertainment movies.

X. I CORPS ACTIVITY

A. General. The overall offensive capability of the Corps was improved when three additional units reached "combat ready" category and the first of the recently authorized fourth battalion for each regiment completed its training and joined the 1st Regiment.

B. Current Operations. I Corps (ARVN) battalion size or larger operations increased from 52 in September to 58 in October. Eight of these operations were coordinated ARVN/USMC operations either by coordinated USMC/ARVN ground forces or ARVN ground forces supported by USMC helicopters. The number of VC KIA decreased from 975 in September to 792 in October and there was also a decline in the number of VC Captured from 359 to 271. Details of I Corps activity are included in enclosure (9). Details of the reorganization of I Corps up to the present are included in enclosure (10).

C. Vict Cong Activity. The increase in VC activity noted in September continued in October with 773 VC initiated incidents, an increase of 92 over September. The most significant incident was a multi-battalion attack on the RA LONG VALLEY outpost 38 kilometers south of the 17th parallel on 20 October. The attack was repelled by the ARVN forces at the outpost and the casualty results were 167 VC KIA and 10 ARVN KIA. Details of this attack are reported in enclosure (9).

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PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1 October - 3d Battalion, 9th Marines Battalion Commander wounded by mine near railroad bridge at (AT 991642).
- Smoke machine used by 3d Battalion, 9th Marines to locate extremities of tunnel and fighting holes.
- 2 October - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- Mr. Phillip HABIS, Political Affairs Officer, US Embassy Saigon
 - Mr. Otto FUERERINGER, Editor, Time Magazine
- 3 October - AN TPS located on hill 41 tracked movement of 4 VC to vicinity of (AT 929651) where they were fired on by USMC forces.
- 4 October - Operation HARD ROCK concluded.
- 5 October - MGen Richard S. ABBEY, USAF Deputy C/S, MACV visited III MAF.
- 6 October - Seaward causeway section at CHU LAI punctured and leaking.
- 7 October - MGen William W. LATSLEY, Chief, US Army Mobility Command visited III MAF.
- 8 October - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- Senator Howard W. CANNON (Democrat - Nevada)
 - Senator Steven P. YOUNG (Democrat - Ohio)
- 9 October - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- LtGen Victor H. KRULAK, CG, FMFPAC
 - Senator Daniel B. BREWSTER (Democrat - Maryland)
- 10 October - CHU LAI causeway repaired and operational.
- 11 October - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- Representative Mendel L. RIVERS (Democrat - South Carolina)
 - Representative Porter HARDY, Jr. (Democrat - Virginia)
 - Representative S. O. LOVE (Democrat - Louisiana)
 - General Mark W. CLARK, US Army (Retired)
 - General William C. WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV

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- 13 October - CHU LAI causeway seaward section out and sinking.
- 14 October - Approval received from CG, I Corps for extension of CHU LAI TAOR.
 - Sniper Team formed in Hue/Phu Bai TAOR.
- 15 October - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- | | | |
|---------------------------|------|------------------------|
| Gen John P. MCCONNELL | USAF | AF C/S |
| Gen Gabriel P. DISOWAY | USAF | Tactical Air Cntr |
| LtGen Joseph H. MOORE | USAF | CC 2d Air Div |
| MGen John D. LAVELLE | USAF | Dir, AEC Space Program |
| MGen Eugene B. LEBAILLY | USAF | Dir, ISO USAF |
| MGen Timothy F. O'KEEFE | USAF | Asst, Logistics & Plan |
| MGen Gilbert L. MYERS | USAF | Dep CG, 2d Air Div |
| BGen Albert W. SCHINZ | USAR | Ch, AF Advisory Grp |
| BGen Ronald H. VANSTOCKUM | USMC | CG, IFTUPAC |
- 16 October - COMUSMACV authorized use of the Vietnamese railroad in I Corps area.
 - BGen Khang LENGUYEN, Commandant, VN Marine Corps visited III MAF.
- 17 October - Adm U.S. Grant SHARP, CINCPAC, visited III MAF.
- 18 October - Operation TRIPLE PLAY launched.
- 19 October - Operation TRIPLE PLAY secured.
- 20 October - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----|----------------------|
| RAdm Herschel J. GOLDBERG | USN | Chief, BUSANDA |
| RAdm Edward F. METZGER | USN | CO, NSC, Oakland |
| RAdm Bernard H. BIERI | USN | Fleet Supply Officer |
| Gen William C. WESTMORELAND | USA | COMUSMACV |
- The 3d Battalion, 1st ARVN Regiment was helicopter lifted into BA LONG valley area to conduct search and destroy operation following successful repulse of VC attack on BA LONG valley outpost.
- 21 October - The following VIP's visited III MAF:
- | | | |
|----------------------|-----|---|
| BGen John D. LITTLE | | Director, National Security and Foreign Affairs |
| LtGen LEK | | Thailand Supreme Armed Forces |
| MGen John N. EUBANKS | USA | J-5 MACV |

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References

- (a) Commander, United States Assistance Command, Vietnam, Letter of Instruction to III Marine Expeditionary Force of May 1965 (S)
- (b) Commander, United States Assistance Command, Vietnam, message 060223Z August 1965 concerning CG III MAF assumption of command of I Corps Advisory Group (TS)
- (c) 3d Marine Division Command Chronology October 1965
- (d) 1st Marine Air Wing Command Chronology October 1965
- (e) Maps, Vietnam L701 Series, Scale 1:50,000 Sheets 6658, I II III IV; 6659 II III IV; 6756 I IV 6757 II III; 6559 I II III IV 6560 II III IV

Enclosures

- (1) Commanding General, III MAF letter serial number 0030465 with enclosures (S)
- (2) Overlay of DANANG TACR
- (3) Overlay of CHU LAI TACR
- (4) Overlay of HUE/PHU BAI TACR
- (5) III MAF Operation Plan 105-66 RED SNAPPER
- (6) Special Report of VC attack on Marble Mountain Air Facility and CHU LAI Air field
- (7) Force/NCC/SA I Corps Bulletin 5000 dated 29 October 1965
- (8) Force Order 11019.1
- (9) I Corps Monthly Evaluation Report
- (10) Fact Sheet on QUANG NAM Special Sector
- (11) 7th Engineers Battalion Command Chronology October 1965
- (12) Force Logistics Support Command Chronology October 1965
- (13) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company Command Chronology October 1965

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III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco,
California 96601

103/DG/jfc
15 Oct 1965

NO 003 0465

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From: Commanding General
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, APO U. S.
Forces 96243
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, c/o FPO, San
Francisco, California 96601
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific/I Marine Amphibious
Corps (Fwd), c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601
Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF

Subj: Expansion of III Marine Amphibious Force Chu Lai Tactical Area of
Responsibility

Encl: (1) Overlay showing expansion of III MAF Chu Lai TAOR, effective
6 October 1965

1. By agreement between the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious
Force, and the Commanding General, I Corps and Tactical Zone I, Republic
of Vietnam Armed Forces, the III Marine Amphibious Force Chu Lai Tactical
Area of Responsibility is expanded as shown in enclosure (1) effective
6 October 1965.

E. H. SIMMONS
By direction

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 Ser: 0030265
 180900 Oct65

Operation Plan 105-66 Short Title (RED SNAPPER)

Ref: (a) Map VIETNAM AMS 1:50,000, Sheets 6560 II, 6559 I, and 6659 IV
 (b) USMACV Communication-Electronic Operating Instructions (CEOI)
 (c) USMACV Communication-Electronic Instructions (CEI)
 (d) Force Order PO2000.1 (III MAF ComElecPlan Vietnam)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

III Marine Amphibious Force	MGen WALT
3d Marine Division	MGen WALT
1st Marine Aircraft Wing	BGen MCCUTCHEON
I Corps Advisory Group	Col ST CLAIR
Force Logistic Support Group	Col PADALINO
Navy Support Activity DANANG	Capt HUFF

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A, Intelligence.
- b. Friendly Forces. 1st Division, I Corps, plans to conduct regimental size search and clear operations in general area south of Highway #1 and National Railway from (ZD 095005) to (AU 860000).
- c. Attachments and Detachments
 - (1) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company under operational control of 3d Marine Division.
- d. Assumptions
 - (1) That CG I Corps will request the support of III MAF in a coordinated operation.
 - (2) That the duration of the operation will be 48 to 72 hours.

Group-4
 Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
 Declassified after 12 years.

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- (3) That sufficient landing craft can be made available to permit a shore-to-shore landing in the TUA MOI BAY area.
- (4) That Regional Force elements will be available to support III MAF operations as requested by CG III MAF and as approved by CO I Corps.

2. MISSION. III MAF will conduct a coordinated search and clear operation, including a shore-to-shore landing in the general area north of Highway #1 and the National Railway, (ZD 095005) to (AU 860000) commencing on or about 22 October 1965.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. 3d Marine Division will activate a battalion landing team and execute a shore-to-shore amphibious/helicopter landing in the TUA MOI BAY area. As an alternative or supplementary method of entry into the objective area, planning will include provision for a motor march from Da Nang along Highway #1 through HAI VAN Pass. Scheme of maneuver will be dependent upon mode of entry; however, particular attention will be given the NUI VINH PHONG (ZD 1209) (ZD 1308) (ZD 1408) (ZD 1508) and NUI GION (AU 8208) (AU 8307) (AU 8306) promontories.
- b. 3d Marine Division
 - (1) On order, activate a battalion landing team and, in accordance with the concept of operations, conduct a coordinated search and clear operation north of highway #1 and the National Railway, (ZD 095005) to (AU 860000).
 - (2) Execute, as required, preliminary reconnaissance operations in support of this plan.
- c. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 - (1) Be prepared to provide helicopter lifts in accordance with 3d Marine Division plans.
 - (2) Be prepared to furnish necessary fixed-wing helicopter escort and close air support as required.
 - (3) Be prepared to provide visual aerial reconnaissance of the objective area.
- d. I Corps Advisory Group
 - (1) Provide positive combat liaison through advisory personnel supporting participating elements of the 1st Division, I Corps.
 - (2) Keep III MAF fully informed of disposition of ARVN, Special Forces, RF, and PF units in the objective area.

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e. Navy Support Activity

- (1) Be prepared to provide landing craft and crews, on an as-available basis, to lift elements of the BLT and to conduct the shore-to-shore movement from DANANG to TUA MOI.

f. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) This plan is effective for unilateral planning upon receipt and for coordinated planning subsequent to initial combined planning conference.
- (2) Highway #1 delineates the boundary between ARVN and III MAF zones of action. Responsibility for the highway remains with 1st Division, I Corps.
- (3) Direct liaison is authorized between supporting and supported US units upon receipt and with Vietnamese units subsequent to initial planning conference.
- (4) Combined planning conference will be held on or about 18 October. Time and place to be announced.
- (5) Execution will be on order.
- (6) Tentative D-Day is 22 October 1965.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Administration. No change.
- b. Logistic Support Concept. Force Logistics Support Group (FLSG) will be prepared to provide logistical support.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

- a. Communications. In accordance with references (b) through (d).
- b. Command Posts. No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT



G. C. AXTELL
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

A - INTELLIGENCE (To be issued)

Z - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z

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EXTRA	15

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

G. C. AXTELL
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z to Operation Order 105-66

OFFICIAL:


E. H. SIMMONS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 C/O FPO San Francisco,
 California 96601

103/180W/ab

SECRET

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Viet Cong Attack of Marble Mountain Air Facility and Chu Lai Airfield
 of 28 October 1965, report of

Ref: (a) CG III MAF 272130Z Oct65
 (b) CG III MAF 280422Z Oct65
 (c) CG III MAF 281604Z Oct65

Encl: (1) VC Attack on Marble Mountain Air Facility
 (2) VC Attack on Chu Lai Airfield
 (3) I Corps G-2 evaluation of VC interrogation

1. References (a), (b) and (c) provided preliminary information regarding the Viet Cong attacks on Marble Mountain Air Facility and Chu Lai Airfield on 28 October 1965. Subsequently, more detailed information was collected, and the information contained herein presents an analysis and a reconstruction of the attacks and other related items.

2. A few minutes after midnight on 28 October 1965, the Viet Cong began a systematic destruction of aircraft and other equipment in two different enclaves of the III Marine Amphibious Force. Upon receiving notice, almost simultaneously, of the attacks on Chu Lai and Marble Mountain, III MAF placed all units in the Da Nang Enclave on 100% alert. The Da Nang Air Base Defense Battalion augmented the perimeter defense. The enclave of Hue Thu sai was alerted. Enclosures (1) and (2) provide a description of the intelligence leading up to the attacks, the VC attacks, the damage, and the defenses as they existed at the time of the attacks.

3. A detailed analysis of other Viet Cong activities within the Da Nang Zone during the night 27/28 October 1965, indicates that other VC attacks may have been planned to coincide with the attack on Marble Mountain Air Facility. First, at 1950Z 27 October, 1st Battalion 1st Marines received a fairly reliable agent report which indicated that a VC force estimated at battalion size was moving out of the mountains towards their positions. As a result, 600 rounds of 82 artillery fire were fired into the area of the last reported location. A subsequent report from a different source indicated that a VC battalion had been moving in the area of impact, and were forced to disperse by this fire. Second, at 2005H 27 October a squad from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines ambushed what is believed to have been the

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Encl. #2

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advance party of a VC company. The time, direction of movement and distance from the Da Nang air base were such that this company could have been in position to attack this installation or Marble Mountain Air Facility at the time the actual attack took place (see enclosure (1), Paragraph 3).

4. Reference (a) reported that interrogation of four wounded prisoners revealed essentially identical stories regarding the Marble Mountain attack, i.e., that the VC had moved by small boat from the Hai Van Pass area to the beach north of Marble Mountain; that a second force was to land south of Marble Mountain; and that each force numbered about 200. Enclosure (3) contains an analysis of prisoner interrogations made by the U-2, 1 Corps AVMH. This analysis is considerably more detailed, even to the details of VC's birthplace and of their training. However, a report received from the Hoa Vang District Chief (Enclosure 1, para 2b) in certain respects appears to be more plausible. An assembly area located north of FOC-9 coincides with the route described in this report. The total numbers appear to be somewhat high; however, the evidence is insufficient information available to determine the number of VC that operated to the south of Marble Mountain complex. None of the reports can be given complete credibility in that inconsistencies appear throughout. As an example, enclosure (3) indicates a boat trip of 45 KM through an area well patrolled by VNH and USM units in three hours time, while the original interrogation indicated that the trip began at 1400H. The retirement route of the report provided by the Hoa Vang District Chief corresponds with a report from the Central Registry Detachment, which this HQ rated as 1/5, that VC wounded were located south of Marble Mountain. This same report stated that 20 VC were killed, 25 VC were missing and 34 VC were wounded. This number of VC reported missing coincides quite closely to the AM-16 confirmed count of 17 VC killed and 4 VC captured. Consideration must be given to the fact that the prisoners referred to in enclosure (1) and enclosure (3) are the same VCC.

5. Although the time of the two attacks could have been a coincidence, it is much more likely that they were coordinated. The size of the unit involved at Chu Lai was considerably smaller than the unit at Marble Mountain. Therefore, the attack at Chu Lai could have been for diversionary purposes rather than a concerted effort to destroy aircraft. This is supported, somewhat, by the fact that the skill displayed by the sapper group at Chu Lai indicated considerably less adroitness at handling explosives than the group at Marble Mountain. See Enclosure (2).

6. The VC at both Marble Mountain and Chu Lai were highly skilled at infiltration. They were able to penetrate both the physical barriers and military defenses unannounced. Although there are conflicts in statements and reported routes of attack, analysis of the facts supports the thesis that the first indication of VC presence coincided very closely with explosions around or in the aircraft. The signal in the Marble Mountain attack may have been given by firing mortars. In any case, it has been impossible to differentiate between the time of the mortar attack, the time the aircraft began to burn and the time of the attack on the U. S. Naval Hospital. The main point appears to be that none of the explosives were in position and ready to begin their systematic destruction upon signal or at an appointed time (enclosure 3 tends to confirm the fact that the destruction began on signal).

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7. Conclusions. Considering all factors available, in conjunction with analysis of occurrences, the following conclusions appear valid:

a. The probable route used by VC to the Marble Mountain Air Facility was from the southwest, across the Tourane River west of the Air Facility, to an assembly area at (N7 055749).

b. The route of penetration into the Chu Lai enclave has not been determined.

c. The quick response of the Marines on duty, both at Marble Mountain and Chu Lai, prevented the VC from inflicting considerably more damage. As examples; at Marble Mountain, the northern sapper group was stopped completely and one of the western sapper groups was reduced to two persons who failed to reach the helicopter parking areas; at Chu Lai, the group which had proceeded down the west side of the runway was turned back from the aircraft parking area by the actions of members of the crash crew.

d. The size of the force attacking the Marble Mountain Complex is estimated at 60-90.

e. The size of the force attacking Chu Lai is estimated at 15-20.

f. There is no evidence to corroborate the Boi Vang District Chief's statement that the VC were from NVN. To the contrary, evidence indicates that VC were from Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces.

g. The size of the force, scheme of maneuver, completeness of plans, analysis of weapons, and examination of the VC killed, indicate that a hard core, main force VC unit, well trained and resolute in purpose, attacked the Marble Mountain complex.

h. The size of the force, scheme of maneuver, actions of the force, analysis of weapons, analysis of plane weapons and examination of the VC killed indicate that the Chu Lai attack group was not as highly trained as the unit which attacked Marble Mountain.

i. Time of the attacks, in conjunction with method of attack, substantiate the thesis of a planned coordinated attack in two enclaves, with the strong possibility that a third was planned on Da Nang airbase.

j. The VC have the capability of infiltrating small groups into any of the enclaves.

8. Action by Command

a. The skill exhibited by the infiltrators indicated that permanent barriers of type utilizing double apron cyclone fences, augmented by carefully placed mine fields, sensitive electronic or seismic intrusion devices, counter mortar radar and powerful lighting is required around all military

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installation where critical equipment and materials is kept. Materials are enroute for the Da Nang Air Base. Plans are being expedited for other areas including fuel and ammunition storage.

b. Pending construction of permanent barriers the following action has been taken:

- (1) Expediting Class IV materials, especially wire and concertina.
- (2) Strengthened perimeter defense of Marble Mountain area with additional infantry units.
- (3) Continuing the high level of patrols and ambushes throughout the enclave.

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VC ATTACK ON MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY**1. Prior Intelligence Indications**

a. Commencing in the latter part of July, there was a series of reports that the Viet Cong were developing plans for operations in the Quang Nam Sector. According to reports of various degrees of credibility, the VC plans included the following:

- (1) VC would increase cadres in Da nang and other key areas for the purpose of sabotage, inciting demonstrations and conducting acts of terrorism;
- (2) Units in the coastal areas would be reinforced with troops from Quang Ngai and Quang Tin;
- (3) Attacks in southern Quang Nam would be made to draw attention from the Da nang airbase;
- (4) Surprise attacks would be launched against the Marines; and
- (5) Suicide troops would be used to attack the Da nang airbase.

b. There also were several reports that two high ranking VC officers were in the Quang Nam area. These were General Van Tien Dung, Chief, General Staff, PAVN, who led the forces which defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, and Senior Colonel Nguyen BA PHAT, a veteran of operations against the French in Quang Nam Province, former CO of Military Region V and CO of a Military Region in North Vietnam.

c. Other reports indicated that special mission units were being organized for purposes of sabotage, terrorism and suicide attacks against the airbase, and there have been reports of the VC infiltrating decoctions into the Da nang area and of political teams being employed to incite demonstrations.

Of particular significance were the following reports:

(1) A Combined Studies Division secret agent report of 22 September, rated 3/3 by the Quang Nam Citizens Grievance Committee, concerning VC actions against the Da nang area, was received by III MAF on 1 October 1965. The report stated the VC had moved troops to form a sizable force to attack Da nang and its airbase during the rainy season. Reported plans included the employment of human wave tactics, and the use of 100 suicide agents armed with bombs to assault the airfield. Simultaneously, the VC would organize meetings to incite the people to march on Da nang. The report also stated that the VC were willing to lose large numbers of men to create repercussions throughout the world. According to the reporting agent, the VC commenced bringing explosives to Da nang prior to 22 September.

(2) On 13 October, I Corps Advisory Group provided III MAF with copies of three PAVN I Corps messages; the information contained in these

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Enclosure (1)

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messages was generally consistent with that reported above.

d. During the 60 days prior to the attack on Marble Mountain Air Facility, III MAF contact with the VC was limited to squad and platoon size units, except for an engagement of an element of 3d BN, 9th Marines, on 3 October, which probably involved at least a VC company. In recent weeks there has been an increase in the frequency of VC contacts, particularly in the south and southwest portion of the Demang TAOR; however, there was no confirmation of large VC units (bn) moving in the vicinity of the Demang TAOR.

2. VC ATTACK AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY

a. General. At approximately 0039, 26 October 1965, a VC Force estimated at 70, and possibly including some personnel from North Vietnam, launched a well planned and well coordinated attack on the Marble Mountain Air Facility. Based on other VC activities at this time (see paragraph 3), this attack appeared to be part of a large scale offensive operation directed against friendly forces during the night of 27/28 October. The attack on Marble Mountain Air facility included:

- (1) The infiltration by three, possibly four, VC demolition teams, composed of 10 men each, into the Marine Aircraft Group 16 helicopter ramp, and the systematic destruction of helicopters.
- (2) The firing of mortars, automatic weapons and small arms fire into the area occupied by Mobile Construction Battalion Five by an estimated 10 VC from the high ground 600 meters to the north-northwest.
- (3) The infiltration by one, possibly two, VC demolition teams, composed of 10 men each, into the area under construction as U. S. Naval Hospital, and the systematic destruction of buildings and other facilities.
- (4) The firing of automatic weapons and small arms into the area occupied by Mobile Construction Battalion Eight.
- (5) The firing of small arms harassing fire into positions occupied by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.
- (6) The mining of the MSR just north and south of the MAC-16 area. From reports received, it appears that all of these instances occurred within minutes of each other. For area locations see TAB A.

b. VC Infiltration. Initial interrogation reports indicated that the VC forces had embarked aboard an estimated 90 boats of various size and departed from the area in the vicinity of HAI VAN PASS, AT 0691, at intervals commencing at 1400. Although all four Viet Cong captives indicated that they landed at a point on the beach approximately one kilometer north of the MAC-16 area at 2300, it is doubtful that such a force could have moved a distance of 15 kilometers in this time without being detect-

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Enclosure (1)

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old the Naval Advisory Group reported no suspicious activity in this area during this period. A more probable method of infiltration, and one which more realistically supports the VC attack, is outlined in a report received by the Hong Kong Military Staff from an agent in whom H/K. This report indicates that at 0930 ET on 20/09, approximately 300 men, plus 800 porters, were sighted coming from the direction of French Falls, VC 031603, moving towards Long Bong, VC 096705. At Long Bong they split into two groups. The first group embarked in sampans and went up the river to My Tai, VC 094745, just northwest of NVA-9. The second group crossed the bridge just southeast of Marble Mountain, VC 077708, and were equipped with one M1 machine gun, which fired at the flare ship. (See TAB 3)

9. General Conduct of VC Operations. (See TAB A). Based on reports received and on-the-spot investigations, the following is considered a reasonably valid reconstruction of the general conduct of VC operations. After arrival at My Tai, a VC Force of approximately 90 assembled on the eastern slope of the high ground 600 meters to the north-northeast of NVA-9. At this point the force split into the units which were linked with the following elements:

(1) Unit number 1, estimated at approximately 10 men, remained in position with the mission of taking NVA-9 under mortar and automatic weapons fire. This unit was armed with at least two 60mm mortars and several automatic weapons. For details see paragraph 2.c.

(2) Unit number 2, estimated at four 10-man teams, moved 1500 meters south in defilade behind out to the east of the NVA-9 area, to a tree line which runs west to east to the hill. After moving to the hill, the unit took advantage of the cover afforded by the crest of the road to move to a position just opposite the NVA-16 helicopter ramp and ship area. The unit then split into four groups, and three of these groups attacked the NVA-16 area. Meanwhile another 10-man team from this unit moved east from the assembly area, crossed the hill and approached NVA-16 from the north; this team probably aimed the road north of NVA-16. For details of this attack see paragraph 2.c.

(3) Unit number 3, estimated at approximately one or two 10-man teams, moved with unit number 2 to the hill. At the peak, this unit moved into the E. S. Naval Hospital area and, with covering small arms fire, systematically destroyed buildings and facilities in the northern portion of the Naval Hospital, and, after blowing a hole in defensive wire to the west, withdrew in that direction. It is felt that this unit may also have aimed the hill south of the NVA-16 area. For details of this attack see paragraph 2.c.

(4) Unit number 4, estimated at 10 men, moved into position to the north and northwest of NVA-9 and commenced to deliver a heavy volume of fire into that area at 0930. This fire continued intermittedly until about 0900. For details see paragraph 2.b.

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KaoIawaro (1)

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(5) Unit number 5, estimated at 10 men moved into positions to the north and west of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and commenced to deliver small arms harassing fire at 0005. This fire continued intermittently against different positions until 0045. For details see paragraph f.i.

d. VC Withdrawal. Based on reports received and on-the-spot investigations, it appears that the VC withdrew after the attack through the villages to the west of MGB-9 area and the U. S. Naval Hospital area. This supposition is based upon the discovery of a considerable number of imprints in the sand which led from the mortar positions to the village to the west. These imprints appear to have been made by dragging bodies of KIA or MIA. This route of withdrawal is corroborated by the same report given by the Hoa Yang District Chief concerning infiltration. In this report it was further indicated that, after the attack, the VC withdrew to the vicinity of Kham Dong at 0230, with 90 KIA/MIA. When they were reassembled there, they came under artillery fire which resulted in an additional 50 KIA/MIA. The report further stated that the VC continued to withdraw to Nam Quan, BT 039600, and Thanh Tinh.

e. MAG-16. (See TABS A and C)

(1) At approximately 0009 28 October, the MAG-16 area was attacked by an estimated four VC demolition teams, each with 10 men. Coordinated enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire was received from two areas; approximately 750 yards NW, BT 058747, and 750 yards SW, BT 055743, from the SW corner of the MAG-16 ramp. Though the facility did not come under an actual mortar attack, three 60mm rounds impacted behind the tent line, and one fell on the west portion of the pierced steel planking mat. These are evaluated as overshots from MGB-9 attack. The concurrent actions of the four teams for the duration of the attack can best be described by treating each separately, using arbitrary numerical designators. For graphic depiction see TAB C.

(2) The machine gun bunker guarding the main access road was put out of action by the grenades of Teams 1 and 2, who were then penetrating the MAG-16 perimeter.

(a) Team 1 proceeded north and west through the VMD-2 tent spaces throwing grenades. One VC was killed by squadron personnel in this area. The attack continued north to the MAG-16 Supply and Maintenance area, (Butler Buildings), where the VC commenced a systematic destruction of the UH1E helicopters on the adjacent pad by placing or throwing grenade-potage satchel charges in or under the aircraft. A Chief hospital Coryman standing his med-evac watch in the ready helicopter was killed. Working their way east across the parking ramp the VC were opposed by members of the crash crew. One crash crew member was killed in this action. Centires and a covering machine gun took the VC under fire in this area. One VC ran through a crash crew tent ripping out communications wire and then went back onto the ramp. After moving through the

SECRET
Enclosure (1)

SUBJECT

UH-1B's on the line, the team split and went south through the rows of parked UH-34's of HMM-263 and HMM-361, placing grenades and charges as they went. On the southern end of the ramp, their attempt to get to helicopters parked on the runway was foiled by defenders between the ramp and runway. The greatest destruction was in the initial action against the VCO-2 UH-1B helicopters; intensity and damage diminished as the team worked south through the UH-34's.

(b) Team 2 entered through the HMM-263 and HMM-361 maintenance areas. Personnel from these squadrons who were standing watch took the team under small arms fire, killing 6 and wounding 2. A few VC broke contact and moved either south, or on through to the ramp to augment the first team with their demolitions, before eventually withdrawing to the southwest corner of the pad area. Later inspection of the withdrawal route to the south revealed blood stains and tracks of dragging feet, indicating an unknown number of escaping VC wounded.

(c) Simultaneously with the above two attack elements, a third team of approximately 11 VC attempted to penetrate the HMM-16 maintenance area from the north. This penetration was completely stopped by the squadron avionics and maintenance section personnel whose intense fire resulted in 7 VC killed and 4 wounded. Two of the WIA later died.

(d) A fourth VC unit, presumably another team, was observed and taken under fire along a sand dune to the south of the helicopter pad. A few casualties were observed in this group, but were removed by the VC during withdrawal.

(5) Immediately following the estimated 20 minute attack, increased perimeter defense and damage control action were initiated. Helicopters were then launched on medical evacuation missions. Intermittent small arms fire continued about the facility for approximately one more hour. A flare plane arrived on station at 0125.

(4) A HMM-16 Nighty Nite (0422) and a H-40 water truck struck mines on the USR approximately 825 yards to the north of the main entrance road between 0200 and 0230. Casualties in these incidents totaled one U. S. killed and 5 injured.

(a) Three bloody trails or impressions of bodies being dragged were found leading south from the air facility.

(b) Tracks heading into the facility probably made by the VC teams were also found. There were three or four in number; with each track there was an individual track made by crepe sole shoes.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

(c) One of the watches (made in USSR) recovered from the body of a dead VC was exactly one hour behind local time at the time of capture.

(d) At least one VC in one of the teams spoke English. When pinned down by friendly fire he was heard to say "don't shoot, don't shoot, we are friends."

(e) The Dai Uy Hoa (Capt Hoa) District Chief, upon examination of the VC dead and their equipment on the morning of 20 October, made the following comments: (Evaluation: M-3)

1. VC had all worn yellow shoes at one time or the other, because of yellow stains on their feet. They had not worn the rubber sandals of local forces in the region, because there was no evidence of straps marks on their feet. His conclusion, therefore, was that they were NVN or NVN regular troops, and probably from the same unit.

2. Head hair of the VC was all about the same stage of growth and cut in the same manner; another indication that they were possibly from the same unit.

3. Calluses on hands associated with manual labor were absent; therefore, improbable they were guerrillas or local force.

4. They appeared well-fed.

5. Gold-filled dentures of VC indicated that dental work may have been done in North Vietnam.

6. Weapons carried by the VC are common to NVN elements.

7. Capt Hoa stated he believed corpses were North Vietnamese.

2. Mobile Construction Battalion Nine (See PAR 1).

(1) At 2055 27 October, 00B-9 security posts reported sporadic small arms fire to the west, in the rice paddies across the Fournane River. The firing was not considered significant as it is a usual occurrence in this area.

(2) At 0005 28 October, 00B-9 security posts reported small arms fire being directed at the 00B-16 area. Almost simultaneously, 00B-9 received 60mm mortar fire from undetermined location. A later crater analysis indicated that the principal target was officer's country. The mortar firing ceased at 0015, after 49 rounds were received. At that time the 00B-9 area came under intense automatic weapons fire from the north and east. This fire prevented personnel from moving rapidly to their positions, but all posts were partially saved at 0040.

SECRET
Enclosure (1)

SPROCKET

(3) automatic weapons fire was then received from four positions in the village to the west. In all instances VC automatic weapons fire ceased when heavy volumes of F-60 AD fire were returned. Examination of VC automatic weapons firing positions the following day indicated that five VC may have been hit by F-60-9 fire.

(4) At 0135 F-60-16 fired heavy volumes of automatic weapons fire over the F-60-9 area into the village directly to the west.

(5) At 0150 F-60-8 reported movement in the village to the west of the hospital site. Indications were that the VC were making their withdrawal through the village directly west of F-60-9 and the village directly west of the hospital.

(6) At 0240 two of three vehicles moving north on the main road detonated two mines just south of F-60-9. One vehicle was destroyed and the other damaged.

(7) At 0241 two F-60 helicopters arrived at F-60-9 for medical evacuation. A total of 39 persons were lifted by 9 helicopters.

(8) At 0314, a jeep moving south on the main road detonated a mine at a point about 900 meters north of F-60-9.

(9) At 0617 a patrol was dispatched to search the area for VC. The patrol located the mortar and automatic weapons firing positions to the north-northwest.

g. U. S. Naval Hospital. (See TAB A, B and C)

(1) At approximately 0010 28 October, a group estimated at 20 VC entered the construction site for the new U. S. Naval Hospital. At that time there were six members of F-60-9 conducting a moving patrol in the northern half of the hospital site, and one doctor and 25 naval corpsmen in billets to the south. Upon observing the movement and heavy firing from the VC, the patrol members withdrew to the south to join forces with the doctor and corpsmen. The VC pursued the group and kept all personnel pinned down with a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire. Meanwhile, other VC systematically exploded charges in critical buildings and equipment. A later examination of damage indicated that the VC apparently had knowledge of the area, and had extensive skill in the use of demolitions.

h. Mobile Construction Battalion Eight. (See TAB A)

(1) At about 0010 28 October, F-60-8 observed what appeared to be mortar explosions in the F-60-9 and F-60-16 areas. At the same time a

SPROCKET

Enclosure (1)

SUMMARY

heavy volume of automatic weapons and small arms fire was received in the FCB-8 area from the north and northeast. This fire continued intermittently until 0300.

(2) At 0015 or 0020 three VC were seen running south from the MAC 16 area in an area about 15 meters across the road from FCB-8. One man appeared to be hit from behind and fall. It was later reported that all three had been hit, but no bodies were found in the morning.

(3) At 0300 a boat was observed drifting toward the eastern shore of the Vinh Bien River, but was finally lost from sight.

(4) No mortar rounds were received in the FCB-8 area, and the VC did not attempt to breach the defensive perimeter. There were no casualties in FCB-8, and it is believed that no VC casualties were inflicted.

(5) At 0700 FCB-8 sent out a squad sized patrol to investigate the area just outside the defensive perimeter for mines. No mines were found. At the southeast corner of the hospital fence, however, many bare-foot tracks were found, and it appeared that one or more persons had crawled under the fence at that point.

1. 1st Battalion, 9th Marines

(1) At 0005 Platoon Leader, Battery D, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, located at WF 063660, received 18 rounds of semi-automatic rifle fire from approximately four VC. The fire was from an estimated distance of 250 meters from the south and east. Fire was returned, and the VC broke contact at 0020.

(2) At 0015 a squad from Company G, located at an old French bunker at WF 081697, received 10 rounds from one carbine and one automatic weapon from an estimated distance of 75 meters to the southwest. Fire was returned and the VC broke contact at 0035.

(3) At 0030 Company A, located at WF 092666, received 10 rounds of carbine fire from several directions from four VC. Fire ended at 0045.

(4) At 0115 the 3d Platoon, Company H, proceeded to WF 088696 to establish an ambush to block the VC withdrawal. At 0730 the platoon patrolled to WF 084703 and apprehended four VC. They then proceeded to Tan An, WF 094607, then south to WF 097660, where they fired on three boats, sinking one.

(5) At 0445 the 3d Platoon, Company A, moved to join a patrol at WF 097661, and both moved to occupy blocking positions at WF 094605.

SECRET

(6) At 0030 the 61st Mortar Platoon intensified normal H and I and illumination fires in areas of suspected VC activity.

3. Other Viet Cong Activities. During the night 27/28 October, the Viet Cong conducted other local activities which may have been part of the operations against Da Nang or diversionary. The following is a summary of these activities:

a. At 1930 27 October, a fairly reliable report received from an agent by 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, indicated that a VC battalion was moving out of the mountains and was located in grid squares AF 0468 and 0467. As a result, a total of 600 rounds of H were fired into a 2000 meter unpopulated area. A subsequent report from another agent, received 24 hours later, revealed that this heavy artillery fire caused the VC battalion to break into small groups and scatter to villages nearby. All indications are that this battalion was part of an overall offensive operation and was moving towards Marine positions within the Da Nang TADA.

b. At 2005 27 October, a squad from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, ambushed what is believed to have been the advance party of a VC company moving west to east at BT 030648. After the initial Marine fire, a search was conducted, and search teams received semi-automatic fire from an estimated 40 VC at BT 037643. The ambush returned fire and then withdrew under covering fire from 61st Mortars and artillery. The VC suffered 15 KIA. Fire discipline of the VC was excellent, and they did not run when the ambush was sprung. At 0645 Company 1 (-) returned to the ambush site to conduct a thorough search. They found two bodies dressed in black, with one carbine magazine nearby, at BT 030642. Large amounts of Chinese brass were found in the area. The company also found a Vietnamese child who lives in the area, and who had an injury bandaged in a professional manner. It may be that it was done by the VC. At 0700 two VCS were apprehended at BT 030642 and taken to 3d ITF. It is believed this VC company was part of a coordinated attack on Da Nang, and the successful ambush by Marines caused it to withdraw prior to reaching its objective. This belief is supported by the fact that the company was moving in the direction of the Da Nang airbase, and time and distance being considered, the time of the attack on Marble Mountain Air Facility.

c. At 0230 28 October, a VC force estimated at three companies attacked an NVA outpost at BT 078576, 14 miles southwest of Da Nang. Two of the three VC platoon positions were overrun. It is believed that this was in all probability a diversionary action.

4. Subsequent Intelligence. The following information was received by III MAF after 28 October 1965:

SECRET

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

a. On 30 October the Hoa Vang Sub-Section Advisor received a report from an agent, rated B/3 by the District Headquarters, indicating that on 29 October 1 RF VC regiment (3RVN), moved to Thanh Truong in the Dien Bien District. The regiment had suffered many casualties. Their mission was to attack the Hoa Vang District, Hoa Cam Training Center and Ia Leng Airbase. The regiment picked up 50 workers in the village of Thanh Truong. It was reported that part of this unit had attacked Marble Mountain Air Facility on 28 October, and suffered 70 KIA and 113 MIA. The unit picked up 50 coffins in Thanh Truong.

b. On 30 October the 1st Astrac Battalion discovered what was suspected to be two VC mortar positions at RF 059729. Positions were approximately four feet in diameter, had a sunken hole for a mortar tube and two triangular diagram imprints on the surface. One diagram pointed directly towards Marble Mountain Air Facility. These positions were approximately 2600 meters from the air facility, which is within 6km mortar range.

c. At 1000 28 October, Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines conducted a sweep of Py Thi Village, RF 056736, thought to be the infiltration and withdrawal point for forces involved in the attack on Marble Mountain Air Facility. There they found a 50 round link from a 7.62mm intermediate LMG, a Chicom copy of the Soviet RPD light machine gun. The RPD is a new weapon for the VC, and it has been issued only to RF units. This is the first time this weapon has been encountered by units of III MAF.

TAB A: Sketch Map of Marble Mountain Air Facility
 TAB B: Probable VC approach Route
 TAB C: Attack on BQ-16
 TAB D: Sketch Map of U. S. Naval Hospital Damage
 TAB E: Damage to U. S. Naval Hospital
 TAB F: BQ-16 Defensive Posture
 TAB G: BQ-9 Defensive Posture
 TAB H: Viet Cong Losses
 TAB I: U. S. Losses
 TAB J: Photos

SECRET

a. On 30 October the Hoa Yang Sub-section Advisor received a report from an agent, rated B/3 by the District Headquarters, indicating that on 29 October 1 AF VC regiment (1AVN), moved to Thanh Truong in the Dien Bien District. The regiment had suffered many casualties. Their mission was to attack the Hoa Yang District, Hoa Can Training Center and Ia Heng Airbase. The regiment picked up 50 workers in the village of Thanh Truong. It was reported that part of this unit had attacked Marble Mountain Air Facility on 28 October, and suffered 70 KIA and 115 WIA. The unit picked up 50 coffins in Thanh Truong.


b. On 30 October the 1st Airstream Battalion discovered what was suspected to be two VC mortar positions at SF 039789. Positions were approximately four feet in diameter, had a sunken hole for a mortar tube and two triangular diagram imprints on the surface. One diagram pointed directly towards Marble Mountain Air Facility. These positions were approximately 2600 meters from the air facility, which is within 8km mortar range.

c. At 1000 20 October, Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines conducted a sweep of My Tho Village, SF 056736, thought to be the infiltration and withdrawal point for forces involved in the attack on Marble Mountain Air Facility. There they found a 50 round link from a 7.62mm intermediate and, a CHISON copy of the Soviet RPD light machine gun. The RPD is a new weapon for the VC, and it has been issued only to AF units. This is the first time this weapon has been encountered by units of III MAF.

TAB A: Sketch Map of Marble Mountain Air Facility
 TAB B: Probable VC approach route
 TAB C: Attack on 100-16
 TAB D: Section Map of U. S. Naval Hospital Damage
 TAB E: Damage to U. S. Naval Hospital
 TAB F: 100-16 Defensive posture
 TAB G: 100-9 Defensive posture
 TAB H: Viet Cong losses
 TAB I: U. S. losses
 TAB J: Photos

PROBABLE VC APPROACH ROUTE TO MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY


~~SECRET~~



GROUP NO. 1
IN SAMPANS
TO MY THI

KHUE DONG

GROUP NO. 2 OVER
BRIDGE TO POINT
SOUTH OF MARBLE
MOUNTAIN




SCALE: 1:50,000
TAB B TO ENCLOSURE (2)

THANH QUIT
DEPARTURE DURING
27 OCTOBER 1965

~~SECRET~~


DECLASSIFIED



NORTH PORTION OF DANANG EAST HOSPITAL

▼ BLAST LOCATION
% PERCENT DESTROYED

TAB D TO ENCLOSURE (2)
DECLASSIFIED



- DEMOLITION UNIT NO 2
- DEMOLITION UNIT NO 3
- BARBED WIRE
- CONCERTINA
- TO BE REPLACED

Scale: 1:5,000

MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY

TAB ENCLOSURE (7)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DAMAGE TO U.S. NAVAL HOSPITAL

1. 3 Receiving Wards	100% Destroyed*
2. Surgery NR 1	100% Destroyed*
3. X-Ray Building	100% Destroyed*
4. Laboratory	100% Destroyed*
5. Sterilizer	100% Destroyed*
6. Surgery NR 2	5% Damage
7. Pharmacy	5% Damage
8. Storage	Less than 5% Damage
9. Generator Station	
All electrical switching	100% Destroyed
2 100 kW Generators	100% Destroyed
1 100 kW Generator	Damaged but repairable
2 100 kW Generators	Operable

* Refers to Building only. Does not refer to foundation and concrete floor.

SECRET
TAB E TO ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

MAC-16 DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

MAC-16 perimeter defense consisted of 15 machine gun positions located from the NE corner of the camp around to the NW corner of the airfield. Machine gun positions were augmented by foot patrols between positions. 75 personnel were involved with perimeter security. An additional 25 personnel were assigned to internal security plus 30 personnel involved with damage control. Each squadron has a provisional company designated as a reserve force. All units within MAC-16 are connected with a wire alert system. MAC-16 maintains communications with units in the complex by both radio and wire.

As Marine Pt Installation Coordinator for Defense, 30 MAC-16 issued a Defense Coordination Plan on 10 Oct 65. This plan was formulated to prevent mutual interferences, facilitate the exchange of information, and providing mutual support by coordinating and reinforcing fields of fire and by establishing special lines of communication. This plan involved MAC-16, MAC-16, U. S. Naval Hospital and Marine Air Group 16.

SECRET

MAC-16 DEFENSE CAPABILITIES (1)

7-1

SECRET

M23-9 DEPT/DA/COM FORT/DA

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 9 Defense plan envisages three separate states of readiness. A 40 man permanent guard force is detailed from within the battalion. This force is responsible for manning the 10 main bunkers located on the perimeter under normal readiness condition three. When information is received that enemy activity is anticipated perimeter defenses are augmented by two duty sections. These duty sections are broken into five teams which man the perimeter between the main bunker positions during periods of reduced visibility and number of each five team have a position on the perimeter to insure slight contact all the way around.

Under condition one (actual attack) all personnel man their positions on the perimeter along three designated for moving internal patrols, emergency control and command post duties.

An underground command post has been constructed and contains both wire and radio communications. A sound power system links all main bunkers with the duty officer and duty chief.

A double apron fence is constructed completely around the camp. Single strand wire and cooperation form the outer barrier. Between the outer and inner barriers, the area has been leveled and cleared. For-holes and slit trenches are constructed adjacent to all tents and buildings throughout the area.

CLASSIFIED

PART 6 OF 60 DECLASSIFIED (1)

SECRET

VIET COMBAT LOGS

PHU THUAN MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY

1. Quantities:

AK-47	17
AK(VN)	4
VCs	1
UNIDENTIFIED KIA/DA	8

2. Weapons, ordnance and equipment:

- a. 7 Kalashnikov (AK) assault rifles, 7.62mm
 - 1 Tokarev pistol M1933
 - 2 W.C. pistol cal .45
 - 5 Bangalore torpedoes
 - 1 M-40 rocket launcher with three rounds
- b. approximately 50 pounds of personal equipment and papers.

* Our report of 4 Nov 65 indicated 20 VC killed, 25 VC missing, 34 VC wounded in attack.

SECRET
TAB E VC RELOGS (1)

(U)

REPORT

U. S. AIR FORCEBARBARA MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY

1. Casualties:

KIA: 4 (3 F4U-16, 1 P-51D-9)

MIA: 108 (24 F4U-16, 84 P-51D-9)

2. U. S. Aircraft and equipment losses:

a. <u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Major Damage</u>	<u>Minor Damage</u>
UH 1 H	13	2	2
UH 34	6	9	17
OH 37	0	0	5
b. <u>Vehicles:</u>			
F50 Water Truck	1	0	0
M42 Truck (Mighty Mite)	1	0	1
M85 Grack Truck	0	1	2
M35 Gun Truck	0	1	0
c. <u>Miscellaneous:</u>			
15,000 square feet of matting destroyed.			

REPORT
 TAB I TO PROLOGUE (1)

SECRET

VC ATTACK ON CHU LAI AIRFIELD

1. Prior Intelligence Indications. During the past month there were numerous low level reports of units up to battalion size moving toward Chu Lai. Although there were no specific or reliable reports concerning an attack of the type conducted, this has always been a recognized VC capability. No reports received provided information on the approximate time of a movement against Chu Lai.

2. VC attack at Chu Lai Airfield.

a. General. At approximately 0001 28 October, a VC force estimated at 15-20, penetrated the Chu Lai airfield and launched a well-coordinated and well-planned attack. In view of the timing involved, it is believed that this attack was coordinated with the attack on Marble Mountain Air Facility. At the time of the attack, the field was in the process of recovering aircraft.

b. VC Infiltration. Although not confirmed, it is believed that the VC unit infiltrated the defense perimeter from the northwest.

c. Contact of the attack. (See TAB A)

(1) After arrival on the northwest end of runway 32/14, the unit apparently split into two groups. One group attacked the VMF-224 flight line, setting match charges as they proceeded south along the revetted aircraft. Prior to the first explosion, a member of the M4-12 guard, located near the north end of the parked aircraft line, challenged a VC, who reacted by throwing a grenade at the sentry. The grenade did not explode and the Marine then tried to fire his riot gun, but had a misfire. The VC then threw a match charge which did not explode. Grenades and automatic weapons fire were then heard along the flight line. One VC was wounded in this area and was seen to withdraw and escape across the runway to the northwest. Continuing south along the flight line, the VC blew up an ad aircraft in the VMF-214 sector. A sentry in the next re-vestment row, shot, and killed the VC crouched under the tail of the struck plane. Another guard saw two more VC run east between the tents towards the runway, joining with the wounded VC who had retreated earlier. All three VC were later KIA.

d. The second group apparently went south along the west side of the runway end, as the first explosion took place on the flight line, they threw a grenade against the back of the M4-12 tent. As the M4-12 crew took cover, they observed the VC cross the runway eastward toward the crash crew area. When the crash crew heard the small arms fire and charges exploding, they set up a hasty defense around their tent and vehicles. An estimated three or four VC were then seen at a distance of only 10 to 12 feet away coming east across the runway. Upon opening

SECRET
Enclosure (2)

SECRET

fire, the VC threw a grenade or explosive charge over the Marines. It hit the crash truck, exploded and wounded one of the crew and injured another. The VC then broke and headed south, pursued by fire; one VC was killed, another one was seen to fall. He was helped by a third VC and they continued to withdraw across the runway to the southwest, passing a parked AV-11C and then over a hill. Two dead VC were later found beyond this point, and a wounded VC, who later died, was captured beside the runway.

3. Actions Involving the 4th Marines

a. At 0013 the Operations Watch Officer heard explosions and sporadic small arms fire. Upon investigation it was learned from 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, that a fire fight was in progress on the airfield.

b. At 0115 Battery "C" of the Battalion Artillery Group reported receiving small arms and rocket fire. At this time a flare plan was requested from 3d Marine Division, and the Regiment went on 100% alert.

c. At 0116 a call to MAC-12 indicated that two M4B's were burning.

d. At 0120 Company I reported receiving small arms fire.

e. At 0240 illumination was provided by Blue and 4.2-inch mortars.

f. At 0105 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, reported additional small arms fire was being received.

g. At 0105 MAC-12 reported they had received 1 KIA and had accounted for 2 VC KIA and 1 VC MIA.

h. At 0110 Company C reported that they had accounted for 1 VC KIA at 0055, and had captured one M-40 rocket launcher.

i. At 0130 a flare ship reported on station and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, accounted for 2 VC KIA and 1 VC MIA.

j. At 0150 Company K took five VC under fire at the north end of the airfield.

k. At 0245 Battery C accounted for 1 VC KIA.

l. At 0450 Company A patrol accounted for 1 VC KIA.

m. At 0625 3d Battalion, 3d Marines started a sweep operation to National Route 1, with no contact.

TAB A: Sketch of Attack
 TAB B: Viet Cong Losses
 TAB C: U. S. Losses
 TAB D: Defense Posture
 TAB E: Photos

SECRET
 Enclosure (2)

SECRET

VIENTIANE COMBAT

CHU MI AIRFIELD

1. Ammunition

AK-47 15 (7 7.62-12, 6 3d Kurziv)

12 (7.62) 12

2. Weapons, Ordnance and Equipment

1 U. S. Cal. 45 pistol

4 Thompson sub-machine guns

1 French M1.

6 200 round charges (2 blocks - 200 grams)

5 200 round charges (5 blocks - 200 grams)

6 concussion grenades

6 Fragmentation grenades

1 8-40 rocket launcher with one round

SECRET

U. S. AIRCRAFT

CRU 101 100000

1. Inventory

101 0

101 1

2. U. S. AIRCRAFT WHICH WERE DAMAGED

a. <u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Major Damage</u>	<u>Minor Damage</u>
101	2	3	3

b. Miscellaneous

1 Boat truck damaged.

1 Airplane van damaged.

DECLASSIFIED
TABLE OF CONTENTS (2)

SECRET

CHU LAI BASE

DEFENSE POSTURE

The defense of the Chu Lai airfield entails two distinct perimeters. One, the outer perimeter, is occupied by a mix of one infantry battalion headquarters and two rifle companies. The second perimeter is manned by provisional companies organized from within Marine Air Group 12, 2d and 3d and 4th. Twelve provisional companies occupy positions depicted on map 9. This perimeter is manned in varying degrees depending on the hour of the day and the condition of readiness required. Condition four, met during daylight hours, involved one provisional rifle platoon from each provisional company on an alert status to take position on the inner perimeter on 15 minute notice. The conditions graduate to condition one, where provisional companies man all positions on the inner perimeter.

In addition to the perimeter defenses, 146 men are assigned to the flight line area on internal guard duties. In the aircraft parking area, three men are posted for every six aircraft. During condition four, one man is awake, the other two asleep.

SECRET

CAN BE DECLASSIFIED (2)

2-1

K I N

AIG 4179, 30 October 1965

I CMBG
STAFF - 02

* 624/01/042/TV/V

R E P O R T

TO: GS, 1001.

SUBJECT: Initial report of 4 VC captured during the enemy raid at the Marble Mountain airfield in the night of 27 Oct 65.

I. In a raid over the 334th helicopter airfield in the Marble Mountain area of DaNang in the night of 26 Oct 65, 4 seriously wounded VC were captured and are being attended in General Day Nam hospital. They are:

1. Lam Dai: native of Ky Tra village, Lam Ky district, Quang Tin province; the newly enlisted man was an ammunition carrier at 278th VC Co.
2. Tran Thanh: native of Pho Nam hamlet, Hoa Lien Village, Quang Nam province, last Ldr of 2nd Sqd, 278th Co.
3. Nguyen Thanh: native of Thanh Trung village, Dien Ban district, Quang Nam province, private, 3rd Plt/278th Co.
4. Phan Thanh: native of Thanh Trung village, Dien Ban district, Quang Nam, private, Porter Plt/278th Co.

All the VCCs were from 278th "Sapper" Co of Quang Nam & DaNang.

II. Here is the result of their initial interrogation.

1. Attack on the Marble Mountain Airfield

a. Attacking force & Movement to the objective area.

- 278th Sapper (Special Op) Co of Quang Nam & DaNang, with a strength of 140 men most of them native of Quang Nam, was recently activated and had been trained since three 5 months.

- It consisted of 3 Sapper Plts and 1 Nvy Spns Plt (60mm Mortars and M16) and a reinforcement of 20 recruits still in breaking training period and employed as ammunition carriers.

- The unit was equipped with
 - 2 mortars, 60mm
 - 2 MG, cal. 30
 the remainder in AAs and individual weapons.

- The Co was stationed in Thanh Son area (vic AT 940 630) in Dien Ban district.

-1-

S/001/001 (3)

K I N

d

On 24 Oct 65, the Co moved to Nam Yen (area West of Lien Chieu). It was from there that the unit skirted the sea line to attack the Marble Mountain airfield.

At 2719:00, the VC unit left Nam Yen for Thong Tu, crossed Highway #1 and the railroad between Nam O and Lien Chieu.

At 2720:30, the Co reached, the beach where 2 motorized boats and a number of row junks were kept ready to carry the unit.

At 2723:30, the craft reached a point at 300m North of the Marble Mountain and gained selected positions.

b. Development of the attack

The Co was broken into 3 teams for the attack.

- Team 1.
1st Plt/278th Co (45 men) broke into the Western side of the USMC Bn to hold down the unit.
- Team 2.
2nd and 3rd Plts/278th (60 mm) broke into the helicopter parking area and destroy aircraft with bangalore and grenades.
- Team 3.
Mortar Plt set the 2 tubes of 60mm cal with 50 rounds of ammunition on the My Thi hill (vic BT.053.740) covered with pine trees to engage the USMC Bn.

This Plt also sent 2 Sqds to lay mines at the 2 ends of the asphalted road section included into the objective area, a point close to the Marble Mountain, and the other one close to the Trinh Minh The Street bridge, to check the advance of SVN reinforcements that could be sent.

- Fire opening time:

Readiness at position at 2724:00 the attack order was given by means of the second round of mortar.

- Withdrawal direction.

The entire Co withdrew to Nam Yen by the same way it came to the objective area.

-2-

ENCLOSURE (3)

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COMMENT BY 02/1072.

1. According to VCOs statements, 278th Sapper Co was activated 5 months ago and that was the first time it was committed in operation. Most of the unit personnel consisted of local people. It is true that all VCOs were seriously wounded and that were were still hindered in forcing the truth out of them.

It is suspected that the VC attacking Co might be the Sapper Co Nguyen Van Troi that already raided our Banang airfield and the Lien Chieu POL depot. The VC captured in the raid over Banang airfield stated he belonged to Co Nguyen Van Troi alias 275th Co that was based at Nam Yen too. The same information was released by VCOs after the attack on Lien Chieu POL depot. This time, 278th Co also departed from Nam Yen base and went through Nam O Lien Chieu in a usual manner.

2. The fact that 1 VC Co moved from Nam Yen through Nam O and Lien Chau to take motorized boats and rowing junks kept ready at the beach at only 20:30 revealed that:

- There are many VC organizations among the people in the area they went through (which made the past VC attack over Lien Chieu POL depot feasible).

- The local security check (by RF, PF, Junk Flotilla, Police, village and hamlet administrations) was too loose or that VC Fifth Columnists have been available in their organizations.

- The VC planned withdrawal on the same route of approach once more confirmed the strong belief by the enemy on its organizations among local people. The fact that a number of junks and motorized boats were kept ready to carry them is one more proof of VC strong organizations among local people.

3. Our control on the sea is still loose as 1 VC Co was carried on boats and junks on a long round voyage from Nam O to the Marble Mountain without being disclosed.

4. The quick execution of the raid and the success in damaging a great number of aircraft showed the accurate information that the VC can obtain on the disposition of the USMC unit in the Marble Mountain up to the last minute before the attack.

It is possible that VC organizations are available in the Marble Mountain area and they are clutching to USMC units for information. If they are existent, that must be among the individuals who have had access to USMC camps for trade purpose or are domiciliated close to the US military reservations.

-3-

ENCLOSURE (3)

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The guard organized by the USMC unit in the area was not without gaps.

6. The VC raid over the Marble Mountain base was specified possible in the "Estimate on VC capabilities in the Danang area and its surroundings" from G2/ICZ. The Memo was submitted to the CG and to MACV/ICZ as well as to III MAF some months ago. The enemy point of departure, the movement to close with the objective and the method of operation used by the VC exactly fit the provisions of G-2/ICZ.

7. The above facts lead my Section to the following conclusion:

a. If there is no closer control of the people living in the villages of Hoa Vang district that surround Danang, the security of this city is still uncertain. The enemy has taken advantage of our loose control at the border line of Danang to send their men in the city to take shelter, activate organizations for easy shuffling between Danang and its surroundings.

As a result, the present security situation in the villages surrounding Danang is problematic and the Hoa Vang district Police cannot lay an efficient control.

Police operations, if they are conducted, cannot reveal VC traces too. It is necessary to apply a method similar to the one that has been enforced in cities.

b. It is recommended to US and VN forces available in Danang to practice coordinated operations along the city beaches and the defensive perimeter to test our defensive method and system and have a clear idea of our defensive capabilities and weaknesses. If we only rely on a paper check we have not laid hands on the gaps and the same deficiencies are probable to continue.

The above is submitted to your consideration and decision.

Comment by the Co's	Decision of the CG

ENCLOSURE (3)

K I N

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO San Francisco,
California 96601

FOR/NGO/SA I CORPS BUL 5000
5/mrs
29 October 1965

FOR/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND/SA I CORPS BULLETIN 5000

From: Commanding General/Naval Component Commander, Senior Advisor I Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: Redesignation of Staff Sections

1. Purpose. To promulgate information concerning the redesignation of the subject sections.
2. Action. Effective this date, the staff sections listed below are redesignated as indicated:

FROM

Civil Affairs/Civic Action

Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-5 (Plans)

TO

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 (Civil
Affairs/Civic Action)

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6 (Plans)

3. Self-Cancellation. 31 December 1965.

L. W. Walt
L. W. WALT

DISTRIBUTION:

- Case 1, A, G, I
- Case 2, (Less C Through G)
- Case 3, (Less A)

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco
California 96601

ForceO 11019.1
1/DTD/ref
29 October 1965

FORCE ORDER 11019.1

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Establishment and operation of Danang Transient Facility

Ref: (a) CG FMFPac 052318Z OCT 65 (NOTAL)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this order is to announce the establishment of the Danang Transient Facility and to assign responsibility for its operation.

2. Background

a. With the advent of scheduled airlift of replacements and rotation personnel, it has become necessary to establish a transient facility in the vicinity of the Danang airfield.

b. A Transient Facility Liaison Section has been furnished to this Command by Camp Butler. Reference (a) tasks this Liaison Section with the planning and scheduling of personnel arriving or departing on Special Assignment Aircraft (SAA) flights in coordination with the 3d Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Processing, manifesting, and providing information to Camp Butler for prepositioning of baggage of rotation personnel are also functions of the Liaison Section.

c. The responsibility for billeting, messing, and transportation of transient personnel rests with this Command.

d. In addition to those personnel being lifted by SAA flights, there are a number of casualties moving through the Danang Air Base who are the responsibility of this Command and who may require transportation, messing, and emergency billeting.

3. Policy. It is the desire of the Commanding General that all transient personnel be processed with every courtesy and the best possible messing and billeting available consistent with the austere resources available to the entire Force.

4. Mission

ForceO 11019.1

29 October 1965

a. Transient Facility. The mission of the Transient Facility is to provide billeting, messing, local transportation, and security for III MAF passengers arriving or departing from the Danang Air Base.

b. Liaison Section (Camp Butler). The Liaison Section will be responsible for the processing, scheduling, manifesting, and planning movement of personnel being airlifted on SAA flights. These functions will be performed in full coordination with commands sending or receiving personnel through these lifts. In addition, the Liaison Section will provide Camp Butler with information to permit prepositioning of baggage and such other information as may be required by the Commanding Officer, Camp Butler. The Liaison Section will perform such other duties in connection with transient personnel, including R&R movements, as may be agreed upon by this Headquarters and the Commanding Officer, Camp Butler.

5. Responsibilities

a. Commander, Force Logistics Support Group. Assigned responsibility for development and operation of the Transient Facility.

(1) Provide shelter, cots, blankets, and other required materials to house 150 men. Be prepared to furnish additional materials to house an additional 150 men on an emergency basis. Sources of materials will be indicated by this Headquarters by separate directive.

(2) Provide consumable supplies as required.

(3) Erect and maintain the Transient Facility billeting and office shelters as required. Hot meals will be served to transient personnel when practical; otherwise MCI's will be served.

(4) Act as reporting senior for the officer assigned as augmentation to assist in operation of the Transient Facility.

b. Commanding General, 3d Marine Division

(1) Provide the following personnel to FLSG for duty in the Transient Facility:

1 Officer-in-Charge. May be any rank, commissioned or warrant

1 Troop Handler, rank of Sgt or above

1 Cook, rank of Cpl or above

1 Messman

Force 0 11019.1
29 October 1965

(2) Coordinate plans for movement of personnel by SAA lifts with the Transient Facility Liaison Section as required by reference (a).

c. Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

(1) Provide the following personnel to FLSG for duty in the Transient Facility:

- 1 Senior Troop Handler. Rank of SSgt or above, any MOS
- 1 Cook, rank of LCpl or above
- 1 Messman

(2) Coordinate plans for movement of personnel by SAA lifts with the Transient Facility Liaison Section as required by reference (a).

d. Force Motor Transport Officer


(1) Provide transportation for movement of personnel between the Transient Facility and the point of embarkation/debarkation as requested by the Transient Facility Liaison Section.

(2) Provide transportation for transients between the Transient Facility billeting area and the facility designated for their messing by the Commander, FLSG.

6. Action

a. Personnel to fill the billets specified in paragraph 5 above will be assigned immediately upon receipt of this order.

b. Suggestions from Commanders for the improvement of the processing of transient personnel to implement the policy outlined in paragraph 3 above are encouraged. Such suggestions should be forwarded to this Headquarters (ATTN: G-1).


G. C. AXCELL
Chief of Staff

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CASE 2, (less C, N, O, P)

INFO COPY:

CASE 2, C (41)

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HEADQUARTERS
WILSON GROUP
Group Team #1
PO Box 96337

7 November 1960

Monthly Evaluation Report (U)

TO: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
APO San Francisco 96601

Monthly Evaluation Report for the month of

Richard A. Wilson
RICHARD A. WILSON
Major, MC
Head, Wilson Group

1 Incl
as

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- CO, 7th Amphib Div - cy 15
- CO, 8th Amphib Div - cy 16

Page 1 of 1 pg. RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
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REF-IG

REF: Monthly Evaluation (October)

REF A

I CORPS

(G) GENERAL: Only a slight increase

in activity was noted while a 32 per cent increase in VC activity occurred during October. The first VC attack in the Tactical Zone in four months was made during the month. Overall offensive capability of the Corps improved in the condition of the following units in the Tactical Zone:

The 1st Battalion, 4th Regiment, finished its reorganization in the 2d Division. Also, the first of the reorganized battalions for each regiment, the 4th Battalion, 1st Regiment, was reformed and became operational. Finally, the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Squadron was increased by the addition of the 2d Squadron. The Fiscal Year 1968 budget was increased as 40 per cent more missions were planned for September. This resulted in a sharp increase in the number of opportunities located and attacked.

(G) CURRENT OPERATIONS: I Corps (ARVN) operations during the month increased from 52 in September to 59 in October. Of these operations 38 were in contact with the VC compared with 21 in the previous month. There were eight battalion-level operations in I Corps (ARVN) and USMC operations during October. The operations were supported by USMC helicopters, were conducted in the Tactical Zone and increased from 975 in September to 792 in October. There was a decline in the number of VC captured during the month. The number of VC captured was 119 (a sharp rise of 119 over

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REMARKS: [Illegible]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [Illegible]

REFERENCES: [Illegible]

APPROVALS: [Illegible]

REVISIONS: [Illegible]

STATUS: [Illegible]

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REMARKS: [Illegible]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [Illegible]

REFERENCES: [Illegible]

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DISPOSITION: [Illegible]

REMARKS: [Illegible]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [Illegible]

REFERENCES: [Illegible]

APPROVALS: [Illegible]

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Maj Lee
Some good historical
material here.
V.R.
P/B

HEADQUARTERS
 III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

G-3 Section
 8 Nov 1965

UNCLASSIFIED

From: I Corps Advisory Group
 To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 Subj: Fact Sheet on Quang Nam Special Sector, submission of
 encls: (1) Organizational Diagram

1. Background

a. On 16 October 1964, I Corps assumed responsibility for Quang Ngai Province from II Corps, which had lost the 25th Division to III Corps. One additional regiment, the 51st, and two ranger battalions, the 11th and 39th, were transferred to 2d Division control to offset the increased area. Simultaneously, VC strength and activity increased in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces, severely impeding use of the north-south communication and supply axis, Highway #1.

b. In March 1965 U. S. Marine elements landed at Da Nang and began to assume the defense of the base.

c. On 1 June 1965, Brig Gen THI directed that the 2d Division move its headquarters from Da Nang to Tam Ky (Quang Tin Province) to be more centrally located and thus ease control problems.

d. On 24 July 1965, a formal request was made by Gen THI for the authority to create Quang Nam Special Sector (QNSS) effective 1 September 1965.

2. Req. On 1 September 1965 QNSS was formed directly under I Corps Headquarters to assume the rural construction responsibilities of both Quang Nam Province and the Da Nang Special Sector (DSS). It also assumed control of all ARVN and RF military operations within Quang Nam Province. This province had previously been a part of the 12th Division Tactical Area.

3. Facts bearing On Request to Set Up QNSS

a. The successful mortar attack on Bien Hoa Airbase influenced the decision to establish the Da Nang Special Sector (DSS). It was formed on 1 November 1964 to provide security for Hanang City and the airbase. The overall success of DSS was to influence the establishment of QNSS.

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Cont #10

b. The 9th MEB landed in Da Nang during March 1965, releasing ARVN and RF/FF units for the conduct of operations in the Da Nang sector. III MAF landed in May 1965 and soon thereafter assumed responsibility for the majority of DSS areas. ARVN and RF/FF units were now made available for operations in other areas of Quang Nam Province.

c. A staff study compiled by the 2d Division during April 1965 recommended the separation of Quang Nam Province from the 12th JTA and the relocation of the 2d Division Headquarters to Quang Nam City.

d. The movement of the 2d Division CP to Tam Ky was not completely accomplished because of the need to retain responsibility for Quang Nam Province and to use Da Nang as a Division rear area. The CP established at Tam Ky functioned as a tactical control element but proved unsatisfactory.

e. Staff and advisory personnel from DSS and Quang Nam Province provided an experienced base for the establishment of the new sector command and staff groups.

f. The enemy strength in Quang Nam Sector increased from 1670 to 4948 between August 1964 and April 1965 with a corresponding increase in activity. There was a resultant loss of control over government hamlets in the heavily populated areas of Dien Hoa, Hieu Dai, and Hai Loc districts.

4. Actions

a. Organization. On 24 July 1965 I Corps Commander requested permission to rename Quang Nam Province to Quang Nam Special Sector and place it under control of I Corps. Authority to implement this plan was granted on 4 September 1965.

b. Personnel. I Corps Commander appointed Colonel Nam Quang Ten, former Assistant Division Commander 1st Division, as Commander of QNSS, and LtCol Tung, former DCS/Opns I Corps, as Province Chief of Quang Nam Province and Deputy Commander, QNSS. The Commander, I Corps Advisory Group named LtCol Gerald G. STACY as the Senior Advisor QNSS.

c. Headquarters. On 21 August 1965 an organizational meeting on QNSS a proposal was made to establish a heavy CP at Hoi An and a light CP at Da Nang was discussed. The Deputy Commander QNSS was in favor of having all command and control sections at Hoi An except the Da Nang Military Garrison. The Deputy Commander felt that it would weaken the pacification effort in the Hoa Vang and Da Nang area by requiring them to report to the light CP in Da Nang. The Commander QNSS was in favor of the heavy CP at Hoi An and the light in Da Nang.

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REF

The U. S. advisors were not in favor of the split CP proposal, as it would split the advisory effort to support the dual staff concept. The decision was given on 23 August 1965 that NASS would be divided into two zones, the Northern Zone consisting of Da Nang City, Hoa Vang and Hien Bus Districts; the Southern Zone consisting of the remainder of Quang Nam Province. The decision has resulted in the establishment of a dual staff, restricted the pooling of experienced personnel in one location, and caused a requirement for additional personnel in excess of the original plans.

5. Results. Although only two months have elapsed since the establishment of NASS, some results are discernable:

a. More troops have been made available for military operations in the sector.

b. Some governmental control was extended to the densely populated areas west of Hien Bus District Headquarters for the first time in over a year.

c. Facilitated governmental control of the recent rice harvest and opened Route 14 for use.

d. Improved the planning and conduct of tactical operations in the Isthmus due to its reduced territory and open of control.

6. Recommendations. None.


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SPECIAL QUANG NAM SECTOR

ORGANIZATION CHART



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
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