

**SECRET**

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CG III MAF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco

O P 060425Z  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO DDKUAQ/CG III MAF  
INFO WWD/CMC  
BT

S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN WALT INFO GEN. GREENE FROM LTGEN KRULAK  
COMBAT OPERATIONS CONTROL STRUCTURE FOR USMACV (U)

A. YOUR 030616Z (PASEP)

1. AGREE WITH REF A THAT STUDY GROUP SUBJECT IS OF FAR REACHING IMPORTANCE.
2. OF PRIMARY INTEREST IS PROTECTION OF MARINE COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTHORITY OVER MARINE FORCES IN VIETNAM. FOR THE MOST PART OUR REACTIONS ARE PRETTY OSVIOUS. HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS GIVE YOU MY VIEWS.

PAGE 2 YVNA 620 S E C R E T

3. WITH REGARD TO SUBPARAS OF PARA 1 OF REF A, THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES SHOULD GOVERN OUR CONFERENCES:

A. COMBAT OPERATIONS

(1) RETENTION OF COMMAND OVER NU. S. OPERATIONS IN I CTZ.  
III MAF SHOULD BE A MAJOR COMMAND DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE ONLY TO THE OVERALL COMMANDER, COMUSMACV, OR WHATEVER TITLE HE MAY BE ASSIGNED.

(2) ADEQUATE MARINE REPRESENTATION IN RANK AND NUMBERS ON THE OVERALL COMMAND LEVEL.

B. IF DIRECTORATE OF COMBINED OPERATIONS OR EQUIVALENT AGENCY SHOULD BE FORMED AT THE OVERALL AND MAJOR SUBORDINATE (III MAFX IVTZL COMMAND LEVEL, III MAF SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED IN RANK AND NUMBERS.

C. WITH REGARD TO ALLOCATION, COORDINATION AND METHOD OF CONTROL OF SUPPORTING FORCES:

(1) III MAF SHOULD RETAIN THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND AUTHORITY.

(2) APR SUPPORT

(A) PROTECT THE PRESENT POLICY WHEREBY MARINE AVIATION SUPPORTS III MAF REQUIREMENTS FIRST AND IS UTILIZED TO MEET 2D

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PAGE 3 YNA 620 S E C R E T

AIR DIV REQUIREMENTS, ONLY IF IN EXCESS OF III MAF REQUIREMENTS.

(9) SEEK TO OBTAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROVISION OF CGOSE AIR SUPPORT OF ALL U.S./THIRD COUNTRY/URVN FORCES IN I CTZ.

(C) GAIN AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL PROVIDE FOR USE OF MARINE UNITS FOR AIR DEFENSE OF THE DANANG AIR DEFENSE SUB SECTOR, REALIZING THAT THE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIR DEFENSE OF SEA RESTS IN MAINLAND SOUTH EAST ASIA AIR DEFENSE REGION. SPECIFICALLY, III MAF LAAMS AND MACS ARE INTEGRATED INTO THE OVERALL SYSTEM; MARINE F4B'S SHOULD ASSUME ALL OF THE ALERT/CAP TASKS IN DANANG SUB SECTOR.

(DO AVOID THE LOSS OF CONTROL OF MARINE AIRCRAFT BY MACV FORMATION OF AN AIR FORCE CONTROLLED JOC, SUCH AS THAT OPERATED IN KOREA.

(3) III MAF SHOULD COMMAND ALL U.S. ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT, ENGINEER AND CHEMICAL SUPPORT IN I CTZ.

(4)(5)(6) THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIRLIFT, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT SHOULD CONTINUE. IN PARTICULAR, THE STATUS QUO SHOULD BE MAINTAINED REGARDING LOCATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL OF VMGR AIRCRAFT.

4. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR A WORKING MEMBER OF THE STUDY

PAGE : YNA 620 S E C R E T

GROUP, I AM SENDING LTCOL OWENS (246868) BY THE FIRST AVAILABLE TRANSPORT TO SJIGON. HE WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO THELL FISHER FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND ASSIGNMENT, AND REMAIN AS LONG AS YOU NEED HIM.

GP-4

BT

TOP WW-2  
6/17/9H AES

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66425Z/OCTOBER 1965

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR BRIG GEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

1. MY AVIATION SAFETY AND NATOPS OFFICERS HAVE JUST COMPLETED A SWING THROUGH ALL OF FMFPAC. I HAD A PRESENTATION OF THEIR GENERAL FINDINGS TODAY.
2. WITH CERTAIN NOTEWORTHY AND REASSURING EXCEPTIONS, THEIR REPORT ON 1ST MAW ARRAYED MANY SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES WHICH CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO GO UNCORRECTED. YOU WILL HAVE A COPY OF THEIR WRITTEN REPORT AS SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED.

PAGE 2 YNA 807 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. MEANWHILE, I WOULD LIKE A PRESENTATION DURING MY VISIT TO THE WING ON YOUR SAFETY AND NATOPS PROGRAMS, EXHIBITING WHERE YOU ARE MAKING IMPROVEMENTS AND ILLUSTRATING HOW YOU ARE ENSURING THAT EVERY ASPECT OF THE PROGRAMS HAS COORDINATED COMMAND ATTENTION, AND THE CONTINUITY OF EMPHASIS ON BOTH PROGRAMS, FROM YOUR LEVEL DOWN THROUGH THE SQUADRONS. FEEL FREE TO MAKE ANY ITINERARY ALTERATIONS YOU WISH IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THIS BRIEFING.

GP-4

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//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

O 092210Z

FM CMG

TO CG III MAF

INFO CG FMFPAG

**EXCLUSIVE**

O 090135Z

FM COMSUMACV

TO CMG

CONFIDENTIAL MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR MAJGEN WALT INFO  
LTGEN KRULAK

1. ON TWENTY NINE SEPT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ADDRESSED A MESSAGE TO EMBASSY SAIGON, FROM POATS, SIGNED BALL, SUBJECT: MARINE CORPS BRIEFING, THE CABLE STATE THAT THE COMMANDANT US MARINE CORPS AND STAFF HAD BRIEFED AA/FE ON MARINE DIVISION CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IN I CORPS AND ENSUING DISCUSSION DEALT WITH OPPORTUNITIES FOR CLOSER COORDINATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BY MARINES AND USOM, INCLUDING DOING WORK WITH GVN PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT OFFICIALS, HEALTH SERVICE, REFUGEE ADMINISTRATORS, PUBLIC WORKS, EDUCATION AND POPULAR FORCES. THE CABLE GOES ON TO EXPLAIN THAT MARINE REGIMENTAL AND LOWER UNIT COMMANDERS NEED CLOSER CONTACT WITH USOM AND THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ASSIGNING USOM LIAISON OFFICERS TO MARINE REGIMENTAL COMMAND POSTS. FURTHERMORE, THE CABLE DISCUSSES MARINE DISTRIBUTION OF WELFARE COMMODITIES PROVIDED BY US CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSISTANCE BY MARINE RIVER PATROLS IN EXTENDING POLICE AND POPULAR FORCES RESOURCES CONTROL.

2. THE USOM REPLY OF SEVEN OCT DISCUSSED THE MATTERS IN THE WASHINGTON MESSAGE AND CONCLUDED WITH THIS PARAGRAPH: QUOTE AS YOU KNOW, THE MARINES ARE UNDER THE HEADQUARTERS OF III MAF WHICH IS A SUBORDINATE COMMAND OF MACV COMUSMACV HAS TASKED GENERAL WALT, CG III MAF, WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTEGRATING OR COORDINATING THE EFFORTS OF ALL US MILITARY SERVICES INTO

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

A COMMON EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE I CORPS IN SAIGON, WE HAVE CLOSE COORDINATION WITH MACV AND ANY PROBLEMS BETWEEN OUR REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE AT CORPS AND REGIONAL LEVEL ARE NORMALLY REFERRED TO SAIGON WHERE WESTMORELAND AND I OR OUR RESPECTIVE STAFFS ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THEM. WE ARE CURRENTLY WORKING CLOSELY WITH MACV AND WESTMORELAND'S SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS - WE FEEL THAT WITH PROPER SUPPORT US TROOPS CAN HAVE A HEALTHY IMPACT ON THE PEOPLE IN THE INTEREST OF THE GVN THROUGH A WELL DEVELOPED MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM. WE HAVE ENCOURAGING EXAMPLES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THE I CORPS GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS CONTACTING GENERAL WALT TO URGE HIM TO TAKE UP HIS PROBLEMS WITH MACV SO AS TO AVOID INVOLVING WASHINGTON AGENCIES IN MATTERS LOCAL COORDINATION. UNQUOTE

3. I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR INCLUSION OF THE FINAL PARAGRAPH BECAUSE I FEAR THAT IF WE ARE NOT CAREFUL THERE WILL BE A TENDENCY FOR AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON HAVING VESTED INTERESTS IN OUR MISSION ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM TO ATTEMPT TO EFFECT COORDINATION AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AS OPPOSED TO DELEGATING THIS FUNCTION TO THOSE RESPONSIBLE ON THE SCENE; I WILL SPEAK TO GENERAL WALT ABOUT THIS MATTER AND URGE HIM TO REFER ANY PROBLEMS HE HAS WITH USOM OR US AGENCY, OR ANY SUGGESTIONS HE HAS TO IMPROVE COORDINATION BETWEEN THESE AGENCIES AND THE US MILITARY FORCES IN THE I CORPS AREA TO HIS HEADQUARTERS RATHER THAN REFERRING THEM THROUGH MARINE CHANNELS .  
BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOR	WN2
101500H	AW

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O 090135Z/OCT

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*Eyes Only*

*TOR 10/17/72*

*CF*

*W*

P 101527Z 7 ~~1972~~ OCT 65  
FM GEN GREENE, CMC, WASH DC  
TO YMZOKIC/MGEN WALT, DANANG  
INFO YMZOKIC/LTGEN KRULAK, DANANG

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY  
FOR YOUR INFO, FOLLOWING MSG SENT GEN WESTMORELAND.

YOUR 00135CTPEI. SUBJECT IS STATE DEPARTMENT  
MESSAGE. I AM NEITHER THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE IN  
QUESTION NOR ITS AUTHOR. IF I WANT TO MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS  
TO YOU I WILL DO SO DIRECTLY AS I HAVE IN THE PAST. I AM  
COMPLETELY AWARE OF YOUR TREMENDOUS RESPONSIBILITIES AS  
COMMANDER IN THE FIELD AND AM EXERTING EVERY EFFORT HERE AT  
HOME TO SUPPORT YOU, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND ALL OTHER  
AGENCIES OF OUR GOVERNMENT AND OF OUR PEOPLE IN THE COMMON  
EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A VICTORY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. MAJOR  
GENERAL WALT AND THE MARINES UNDER YOUR COMMAND FEEL AS I DO  
AND ARE DAILY DEMONSTRATING THEIR FAITH IN YOU AND IN OUR  
CAUSE.

WITH WARM REGARDS AND BEST WISHES.

WALLY

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS)

*1 OF 1*

NNNN

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*EYES ONLY*

*#24*

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R 110722Z  
FM CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FVD)  
TO RUMFUAQ/CG THIRD MAF  
BT

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

- PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN WALT FROM MAJGEN WADE
1. HAVE SCHEDULED 2 DAY VISIT YOUR COMMAND ARRIVING 1200, 18 OCT AND DEPARTING 0800, 20 OCT. MY PARTY WILL INCLUDE 1 MAJ, 2 CAPT, 1 SSGT AND 1 CPL. WILL HAVE LUNCH ABOARD AIRCRAFT ON 18 OCT.
  2. DESIRE VISIT HEADQUARTERS DANANG, PHU BAI AND CHU LAI FOR INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWING TOPICS:
    - A. CURRENT ACTIVITIES.
    - B. PROBLEM AREAS IN WHICH MY HQ MAY ASSIST.
    - C. POWER UNITS AND GENERATORS FOR DIVISION CP.

- PAGE TWO RUABQL 067A C O N F I D E N T I A L
- D. TECHNICAL ASST AND CONTACT INSTRUCTION TEAMS.
  - E. CLOTHING PROBLEMS.
  - F. TRANSIENT FACILITY DANANG.

3. WARM REGARDS.

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TOR WM2  
120410H AW

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R 110722Z/OCT

2 OF 2

*Delighted to  
looking forward to  
your visit*

# 22

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EFC185VV ULB150

PP RUMFUAQ  
DE RUMFUL 1908 2840540  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 110338Z  
FM COMSEVENTHFLT  
TO RUMFUAQ/CG III MAF/NCC  
BT

11000

*NSA Deleted*

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PERSONAL FOR MGEN WALT FROM RADM WILLIAMS *Level with C of the base*  
HAVING RECENTLY ASSUMED TEMPORARY COMMAND OF SEVENTH FLEET DURING  
ADM BLACKBURNS ILLNESS I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY WVNR  
WITH YOU INFORMALLY ON A NOT TO INTERFERE BASIS WITH OTHER COMMITMENTS  
YOU MAY HAVE.

2. I INTEND TO BE PRESENT FOR THE ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND CEREMONY AT  
NAVSUPACT DA NANG ON 15 OCT AND PROPOSE VISITING YOU ON THAT DAY FOR  
A BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME IF CONVENIENT.

3. I WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY COL LO PRETE, THE FLEET MARINE OFFICER.

CP-4

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COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION AS REQ WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST.

TOR: WW-2 1  
11/1546H ATH

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110338Z/OCT

*C/S 2'd like to invite  
Adm & pty to lunch*  
*(Signature)*

#23

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R 140445Z  
 FM CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)  
 TO RUMFUAQ/CG THIRD MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN WALT FROM MAJGEN WADE

1. HAVE DELAYED MY VISIT YOUR COMMAND ONE WEEK. NOW PLAN ON ARRIVING 1200, 25 OCT AND DEPARTING 0300, 27 OCT.
2. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

TOR	WW1
150600H	AW

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*Personal to Ken Wade* 140445Z/OCT

*Thank you for your considerate  
 action in changing your schedule.  
 We will look forward to  
 seeing you on the 25 Oct  
 warm regards.*

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O 170131Z  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMFUA/C G III MAF  
 INFO RUMSVD/DEP SA I CORPS  
 E

SECRET 36761 FROM MACJCO. PERSONAL  
 FOR GENERAL WALT FROM WESTMORELAND.

SUBJ: VISIT BY COMUSMACV

REF: YOUR MESSAGE DTG 141100Z

- 20-21
1. (S) PLAN TO VISIT DA NANG ON WEDNESDAY, 27 OCTOBER  
 RON DA NANG, AND RETURN APPROXIMATELY 1300 THE NEXT DAY  
 WILL STOP BRIEFLY AT QUANG NGAI ENROUTE TO VISIT ARVN 2D  
 DIVISION. PROPOSE MEETING YOU AT CHU LAI AT APPROXIMATELY  
 1255 HOURS. SUGGEST A BITE OF LUNCH WITH TROOPS
  2. (S) THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR PLANNING

PAGE 2 RUMSNA 3657U SECRET  
 PURPOSES:

- A. WOULD APPRECIATE COVERING AS MUCH OF THE I CORPS  
 AREA AS POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE MAJOR MARINE INSTALLATIONS AND  
 UNITS, ARVN 1ST DIVISION, SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS AT ASHAU AND  
 KHE SANH, AND THE DONG DA TRAINING CENTER. I AM ANXIOUS  
 TO SEE AND TALK TO AS MANY TROOPS AS POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE  
 PRESENTING DECORATIONS AS APPROPRIATE WITH MINIMUM CEREMONY.
- B. SUGGEST WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON BE DEVOTED TO VISITING  
 III MAF UNITS AND MEETING WITH GENERAL THY, WITH WEDNESDAY  
 EVENING DEVOTED BUSINESS SUPPER AND INAPPROPRIATE BRIEFINGS. IF  
 CONVENIENT AND TIME PERMITS, WOULD LIKE TO MEET AND TALK TO  
 VARIOUS GROUPS OF OFFICERS AND MEN. NO SOCIAL ACTIVITIES DESIRED.
- C. SUGGEST BIPARTING DA NANG EARLY THURSDAY A.M.  
 FOR VISITS TO SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS, TRAINING CENTER, AND 1ST  
 DIVISION, TERMINATING AT PHU BAI. WILL ARRANGE T-39 PICKUP AT  
 PHU BAI FOR FLIGHT BACK TO SAIGON, ETD 1300
3. WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY AIDE AND PROBABLY A REPORTER  
 WHO HAS REQUESTED A TRIP WITH ME FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES.  
 REQUEST DETAILED ITINERARY. BEST REGARDS

G-4

E

TCR SAJ  
 17/1623H AES

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O 170131Z/OCT

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17/10/32

[REDACTED]

(M)

R 1718507 ZPF-1  
FM SSC MAGV  
TO CG III MAF

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 518A  
PERSONAL FOR MAJ GEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND

1. LAST WEEK A MEETING OF PROVINCE CHIEFS WAS HELD IN SAIGON TO DISCUSS RURAL CONSTRUCTION AND RELATED SUBJECTS. SUP BRIG GEN THANG, RECENTLY APPOINTED MINISTER FOR RURAL CONSTRUCTION, CHAIRED SEVERAL OF THE SEMINARS. HE REPORTED TO MY J-3 THAT PROVINCE CHIEFS WERE VERY CONCERNED OVER US FORCES TAKING OVER WHAT THE VIETNAMESE CONSIDERED TO BE CIVIL FUNCTIONS; SPECIFICALLY, CHECKING IDENTIFICATION CARDS AT CHECK POINTS, CONDUCTING HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES IN HAMLETS AND ARRESTING SUSPECTED VC. THE PROVINCE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM STATED THAT SUCH ACTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN BY US MARINES IN HIS PROVINCE.

2. THANG WAS INFORMED HE WOULD CERTAIN THAT CHECK POINT ACTIVITIES HAD BEEN TAKEN IN CONCERT WITH THE NATIONAL POLICE; THAT THE US MARINES WERE MERELY ASSISTING THE GVN IN EXERCISE OF THE POLICE FUNCTION; AND THAT ACTUAL CHECKING OF ID CARDS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY AUTHORIZED VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL. MOREOVER, HE WAS INFORMED THAT WHILE US MARINES MIGHT, IN THE COURSE OF AN OPERATION, CHECK INDIVIDUALS TO FERRET OUT VC SUSPECTS, NORMALLY THE ACTUAL ARREST WAS CARRIED OUT BY AUTHORIZED VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL, IF PRESENT, AND IN ANY CASE THE SUSPECTS WERE TURNED OVER TO GVN AUTHORITIES AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE TIME.

3. THANG REITERATED THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEFS WERE VERY CONCERNED THAT THE OUTWARD ASPECTS OF LEGALITY BE MAINTAINED AND THE US FORCES ACT IN SUPPORT OF, AND NOT IN LIEU OF, GVN AUTHORITIES. HE WAS ASSURED THIS IS OUR POLICY.

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS *jam*

1 OF 1

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P 191500Z

FM MAR LN OFFICE  
 TO RUMAUQ/CG III MAF

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY-PERSONAL FROM COL GLIDDEN

1. STEERING GROUP ON SUBJECT MET 191430R. TWO BASIC COURSES OF ACTION PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED, IE, A, RETAIN CURRENT STRUCTURE AND B, EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDER TO EXERCISE CONTROL OF USA FORCES, WERE PRESENTED. ONE ADDITIONAL COURSE OF ACTION COMPATIBLE TO BOTH THE ABOVE IN THE ADVISORY EFFORT WAS ALSO PRESENTED. THE LATTER ESSENTIALLY PROVIDES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MAG WITH A DEPUTY C/S FOR THE ADVISORY EFFORT.
2. OTHER AREAS/ORGANIZATIONS DISCUSSED.

PAGE TWO RUMFKE 372 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

A. COMMAND AND CONTROL BY TASK FORCES ASSIGNED IN EACH CORPS AREA. AF OBJECTED STRONGLY TO THIS PROPOSAL BECAUSE IT SPLITS AF WINGS/SQDNS FOR OPCON.

B. COMMAND AND CONTROL BY A LAND FORCE COMMANDER. USMC OBJECTED TO THIS BECAUSE IT FRAGMENTS III MAF.

C. I ATTEMPTED TO INTERJECT MACV TOC AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THIS STUDY GROUPS CONSIDERATION, RATHER THAN BE TREATED BY A SEPARATE GROUP, AS NOW THE CASE. GEN COLLINS REPLIED THAT ORGANIZATION MUST BE SETTLED FIRST AND THEN III MAF WOULD BE CONSULTED RELATIVE TO TOC.

3. RESULTS- GENERAL CONSENSUS WAS THAT CURRENT ORGANIZATION IS MOST DESIRABLE AND WITH DETAILED POLICING UP IN THE AREA OF USARV FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION, AND REDUCING COMUSMACVS SPAN OF CONTROL BY DEVELOPING A JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE GP AND AMALGAMATION OF MAG AND TF 115, IT COULD BE PRESENTED AS THE PREFERRED COUSE OF ACTION. GEN COLLINS STATED HE AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH. THE WORKING GROUPS SHOULD PROCEED ALONG THESE LINES. AT THIS POINT AN INHOUSE DISCUSSION DEVELOPED BETWEEN J-STAFF ARMY REPS AND USARV REPS AS A RESULT OF USARPAC POINTING OUT THAT THE USARV STAFF WAS ORDERED HERE FOR A PURPOSE THEY ARE NOT NOW PERFORMING.

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PAGE THREE RUMFKE 372 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 ESSENTIAL POINTS DISCUSSED EVOLVED AROUND DUPLICATION BETWEEN  
 J-STAFF AND ARMY G-STAFF. WORKING GROUPS WAS INSTRUCTED TO STUDY  
 THIS AREA FURTHER TO DETERMINE WHICH FUNCTIONS THE J-STAFF COULD  
 RELINQUISH.

4. I WILL ATTEMPT TO GET PROJECT BACK ON TRACK TOMORROW POINTING  
 OUT THAT PROBLEM IS ESSENTIALLY ONE OF ARMY ORGANIZATION. UNTIL  
 AIR IS CLEARED PROPOSE THAT MYSELF AND LTCOL OWENS REMAIN TO MONITOR  
 THIS AND THE MACVTOC PROJECT.

5. NEW AND RELATED SUBJECT.

A. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING COMMAND AND CONTROL STEERING  
 COMMITTEE MEETING MACV J-3 PRESENTED TO J STAFF WORKING GROUPS,  
 A WORKING PAPER ON PROPOSED MACVTOC, A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED  
 20 OCT BY III MAF COURIER.

6. I ATTENDED ABOVE MEETING AND MADE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS.

7. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF MACVTOC PROCEEDING ON "CRASH BASIS"  
 DUE TO COMUSMACV DOCTRINE TO BE OPERATIONAL BY 1 NOV 65.

8. PLAN TO PROCEED IN 3 PHASES, (A) IMMEDIATE, 1 NOV, (B)  
 INTERMEDIATE AND (C) FINAL. IMMEDIATE PHASE TO BE ESTABLISHED BY  
 CO-LOCATING G-2/G-3 CAPABILITIES WITH TACC AT TAN SON NHUT.  
 INTERMEDIATE PHASE, 1 DEC TO BE LARGER SCALE OPERATION AT A PHYSICAL

PAGE FOUR RUMFKE 372 C O N F I D E N T I A L

LOCATION NOT YET DETERMINED, AND TO BE STAFFED ENTIRELY BY  
 PERSONNEL NOW AVAILABLE ON MACV STAFF. PROBABLY NEITHER  
 IMMEDIATE OR INTERMEDIATE PHASES WOULD BE OPERATIONAL 24 HOURS.  
 FINAL PHASE TO BE FULLY STAFFED JTCC WITH ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL  
 REQUIRED OBTAINED FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES.

9. ALTHOUGH MACV WORKING PAPERS TO/E INDICATES SENIOR MAN TOC  
 TO BE GRADE O6, MENTION MADE DURING DISCUSSION OF MARINE B/G AS  
 HEAD MAN.

10. ONE PROBLEM THAT MUST BE SOLVED PRIOR TO ANYTHING MORE THAN  
 SKELETON OPERATION. PHYSICAL LOCATION NOT DETERMINED BUT INDICATED  
 AS BEING EITHER JGS/HIGH COMMAND OR TAN SON NHUT. JGS/HC FAVORED  
 FOR FOLLOWING LONG RANGE MACV GOAL COMBINED MACV/ARVN OPERATION  
 TO CONDUCT WAR.

11. WORKING GROUPS DIRECTED TO GO AHEAD WITH WHAT THEY HAD DONE,  
 AND PREPARE BRIEFING FOR COMUSMACV (BELIEVED TO BE 20 OCT) FOR  
 PURPOSE OF OBTAINING DECISION AS TO PHYSICAL LOCATION AND  
 DESIGNATION OF "PROJECT MANAGER" TO PROCEED WITH PLANNING AND  
 IMPLEMENTATION.

12. APPEARS MACVTOC WILL BE OPERATIONAL IN SKELETON FORM PRIOR TO  
 MODIFICATION OF EXISTING COMMAND STRUCTURE OR ADOPTION OF NEW

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PAGE FIVE RUMFKE 372 CONFIDENTIAL  
MACV ORGANIZATION AS RESULT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY AND IS  
THEREFORE OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO US.

13. NEW SUBJECT. FMFPAC REP LTCOL OWENS, REQUEST FOREGOING BE  
PASSED TO CG FMFPAC.

GP-4

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WW-1

28/0023H AES

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O 202147Z

FM CG FMFPAC  
TO CG III MAF

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTIONS OF TEXT RECEIVED GARBLED, WILL SVC UPON REQ.

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**EXCLUSIVE**

A. COMUSMACV 180741Z

1. REF A IS MACV'S MOST RECENT REGITAL TO THE YYS OF WHAT HE BELIEVES WAS IMPROTANT IN LAST WEEK'S ACTIVITY. WHILE I CERTAINLY HAVE NO BASIS FOR DISAGREEING WITH HIM AS TO THE SIGNIFCANCE OF EVENTS IN I, III AND IV CORPS, I JUST HAVE TO SAY, HAVING BEEN THERE TO SEE IT, THAT HIS REPORT DOES NOT DO JUSTICE TO YOUR WORK DURING THE PERIOD. IN FACT I BELIEVE THAT FEW ANYWHERE ARE FULLY AWARE THE GREAT INTENSITY OF YOUR PATROL, AMBUSH AND SNIPER ACTIVITY, AND OF ITS EFFECT ON THE VC, AS WELL AS THE WORK OF THE WING UNDER ADVERSE MONSOON CONDITI UNS NOT NOW PREVAILING IN III, IV, AND EIGHT ZERO PER CENT OF I CORPS AREA.

2. I FEEL THAT WE MAY AS WELL TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MACV'S FAILURE TO REPORT ON OUR AFFAIR, AND PUT IT BEFORE HIM IN TERMS THAT CANNOT BE MISTAKEN. -- TERMS SUCH AS SAYING, IN SO MANY WORDS, THAT YOUR PATROL INTENSITY HAS RISEN TO 3500 PER MONTH - THREE TIMES THAT OF AUGUST; THAT YOUR AMBUSH ACTIVITY HAS GROWN CORRESPONDINGLY; THAT YOUR ACCOMPANYING MEDICAL CIVIC ACTION NOW REACHES ALMOST 1000 PEOPLE A DAY - THREE TIMES THAT OF AUGUST; THAT YOUR AIR ELEMENTS ARE INVOLVED WITH TRANSPORTING YOUR OWN FORCES AND THE VIETNAMESE AS WELL AS PROVIDING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT; AND THAT THE ALL WEATHER RADAR BOMBING ACCOMPLISHMENTS ARE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IN KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON THE VC.

3. IN ORDER TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY MARINE ACTIVITIES AND THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN SUCH A WAY THAT MACV CANNOT OVERLOOK THE IMPRESSIVE RESULTS, I SUGGEST THAT A RECAP OF THE WEEKS OPERATIONS BE SUBMITTED REGULAR AS A PART OF YOUR DAILY SITREP AT THE END OF EACH WEEK. BY INCLUDING STATISTICS AS WELL AS A SUMMARY FORMAT MACV COULD NOT MISTAKE THEIR SIGNIFCANCE. JUST AS A SAMPLE OF WHAT I ENVISAGE MIGHT BE PROVIDED I OFFER THE FOLLOWING: "DURING THE PERIOD OF 10-16 OCTOBER, THE VIET CONG APPEARED TO BE ON THE DEFENSIVE IN I CORPS, BECAUSE OF AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING BY FRIENDLY FORCES AND VC PREOCCUPATION WITH THE RICE HARVEST IN AREAS NOT UNDER CVN CONTROL, VIET CONG MILITARY EFFORTS WERE DEVOTED TO HARASSMENT, TERRORISM, AND SABOTAGE WITH ONLY ONE SMALL SCALE ARMED ATTACK REPORTED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE CORPS AREA. VC ACTIVITY REMAINED LIGHT IN THE VICINITY OF ALL MARINE TAOR'S. REPORTS CONTINUE TO BE RECEIVED WHICH INDICATE THAT THE VC ARE BEING DRIVEN FROM THE COASTAL REGIONS NEAR THE III MAF TAOR'S TO THE HIGH GROUND WEST OF THE ENCLAVES. ADDITIONALLY, ORGANIZED UNITS ARE SPLITTING INTO SMALL GROUPS TO CONDUCT TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE AND TO PRESENT LESS LUCRATIVE TARGETS FOR INCREASED TEMPO MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS. THE FIRST VC REGIMENT IS REPORTED AS REMAINING IN AN AREA TO THE WEST OF CHU LAI WHERE IT IS REGROUPING AND RETRAINING IN ORDER TO COUNTER ITS LOSSES RESULTING FROM OPERATION STAR LIGHT. PLANS TO ATTACK THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY HAVE BEEN ABANDONED IN THE FACE OF AGGRESSIVE MARINE CORPS PATROLLING IN THE AREA TO THE SOUTH OF MARBLE MOUNTAIN. ONSET OF THE MONSOON RAINS IN I CORPS AREA WHILE INHIBITING AIR OPERATIONS TO A DEGREE

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AND CREATING EXTREMELY ADVERSE CONDITIONS FOR GROUND OPNS HAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DILUTED THE HIGH TEMPO OF PATROLS UP TO COMPANY SIZE, AMBUSHES AND COMBINED ACTION COMPANY ACTIVITIES BY THE III MAF WHICH HAVE INCREASED THREE FOLD SINCE AUGUST. ADDITIONALLY IN OPERATION GOLDEN FLEECE EQUIVALENT OF AN ENTIRE REGIMENT AS WELL AS AIR COVER WAS FULLY ENGAGED IN PROVIDING SECURITY OF THE RICE HARVEST, PREVENTED VC FROM TAKING IT. AND HAS INSTILLED CONFIDENCE IN THE FARMERS SOME OF WHOM ARE DELIVERED TO THEIR FIELDS IN MARINE HOPTRS OR OTHER TRANSPORT. NEWLY ORGANIZED SNIPER TEAMS OF THIRD MARDIV INCREASED TEMPO OF OPS AND ACHIEVED KILLS IN ONE INSTANCE AT 700 YDS. MARINE AIR MEANWHILE MAINTAINED A HIGH SORTIE TEMPO CONSIDERING WEATHER WHICH WORSENERED TOWARD THE END OF THE PERIOD. PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES AND CIVIC ACTION CONTINUED AT AN ACCELERATED PACE. SUMMARY FOR WEEK FOLLOWS;

## READ IN FOUR COLUMNS

NO PATROLS

1,046

OPNS WITH NO CONTACTS

75

NO AMBUSHES

175

VC KIA

24

CO OPNS

12

VC GAP

5

BN OPNS

1

WEAPONS GAP

14

## READ IN THREE COLUMNS

SORTIES

FIXED WING

HELO

PAX

254

3,318

CARGO TONS

349.2

5,872

## READ IN TWO COLUMNS

CIVIC ACTIONS.

MEDICAL TREATMENT

15,293

MEDICAL TRAINING

6

CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

5

REFEGEES FED

6

CLOTHING DISTRIBUTED

CASH DONATIONS

\$200.00

RICE TRANSPORTED."

4. STATISTICALLY THE ABOVE AND OTHER ITEMS COULD APPEAR IN YOUR SUMMARY. THERE IS FLEXIBILITY TO THIS APPROACH IN THAT ITEMS MAY BE ADDED OR DELETED AS REQUIRED. THERE ARE MANY AVENUES TO APPROACH THIS PROBLEM, IN ORDER THAT THE GREAT INTENSITY OF YOUR EFFORTS BE BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE, AND PUT INTO PROPER PERSPECTIVE WITH THE ULTIMATE RESULT OF PROPER RECOGNITION. IN THIS REGARD STATISTICS MUST BE PRECEDED BY A VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT TIME MAGAZINE NARRATIVE STYLE. CONCURRENTLY YOUR LIAISON OFFICER IN SAIGON MUST SOMEHOW INTRUDE HIMSELF INTO THE MACV WEEKLY OPSUM PREPARATION PROCESS IN THE FIGUATIVE STAGES. PERHAPS YOU CAN ARRANGE THIS WITH BILL ROSSON. FINALLY, ARVN OPNS MIGHT BE ALSO SUMMARIZED BUT HERE WE MUST APPLY THE SAME YARDSTICKS AND TECHNIQUES STATISTICALLY, AS WE DO FOR III MAF. THIS MAY REQUIRE A SHAKE UP OF ST CLAIR'S REPORTING SYSTEM TO YOU.

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P 230340Z  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO YYNB/CINCPACFLT  
 INFO DDKUAQ/CG III MAF  
 YYNB/COMSERVPAC  
 BT

**SECRET**

PERSONAL FOR VADM CLAREY, MGEN WALT AND RADM HOOPER  
 MISSIONS AND TASKS OF NAVSUPACT DANANG. (C)

- A. YOUR 162136Z
- B. YOUR 090609Z
- C. III MAF 101534Z
- D. YOUR 210249Z JUL

1. REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO  
 INCREASING III MAF LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES, TO SUPPORT THE MAF ON A  
 "GARRISON BASIS" TO MEET GROWING DEMANDS NOW ENVISAGED.

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2. AS A GENERAL RESPONSE, I BELIEVE IT PERTINENT TO OBSERVE THAT  
 THE FMFPAC LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION, AS IT NOW EXISTS, IS A HEAVILY  
 AUGMENTED ONE - IN EXCESS OF THAT USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH  
 AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS; AND THAT WE HOPE AND FULLY EXPECT TO SEE  
 IT AUGMENTED FURTHER. I AM CONFIDENT WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO THE  
 JOB IN VIETNAM.

3. IN RESPONDING TO REF A, COMMENTS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF REF B  
 ARE CONSIDERED PERTINENT TO AN APPRAISAL OF WHAT CG III MAF MEANS  
 IN REF C. REF B ACTUALLY CHANGED THE RULES, RELATIVE TO THE  
 HANDLING OF CLASS V AND VA SUPPLIES, AS ESTABLISHED BY REF D.  
 EACH SERVICE IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF AMMUNITION  
 FROM THE HIGH WATER MARK ONWARD. THIS CHANGE IN THE RULES, I  
 UNDERSTAND CLEARLY, WAS NOT AIMED AT THE MARINES, AND REALLY DID  
 NO MORE THAN BRING THE ORDERS INTO CONSONANCE WITH CURRENT  
 PRACTISE. NEVERTHELESS, IT DID CHANGE THE RULES, AND THAT IS  
 PROBABLY WHAT MOTIVATED III MAF IN REF C. HE PROBABLY FELT THAT  
 THIS CHANGE COULD BE THE FORE-RUNNER OF MORE. INSOFAR AS MARINES  
 ARE CONCERNED, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT LOGICAL, NOR TO BE  
 EXPECTED, THAT THE NAVY SHOULD MOVE MARINE CORPS CLASS V AND VA  
 BEYOND THE BEACH DUMP OR DOCK SIDE DUMP AREA. THE CHANGE

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DIRECTED BY REF B, WHICH CONFIRMS THAT WHICH HAS, IN FACT, BEEN THE PRACTISE AT DANANG AND CHU LAI REGARDING THE MOVEMENT OF MARINE CORPS AMMUNITION, IS ALL RIGHT WITH US. 11

4. WITH REGARD TO THE MATTER OF INCREASING LOGISTIC SUPPORT CAPABILITIES OF THE MAF THE FOLLOWING FACTS APPLY:

A. OUR PRESENT PLANNING, AS WELL AS THE ACTUAL ORGANIZATIONS BEING DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE MARINE CORPS FORCES IN RVN, HAS BEEN BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF ARMY LOG COMMAND SUPPORT IN I CORPS AREA. FURTHER, IT IS BASED ON THE DETERMINATION THAT THE MARINES SHALL NOT ASK FOR NAVY LOGIST SUPPORT BEYOND THAT SUPPORT PROPERLY RENDERED BY THE ADVANCED NAVAL BASE ACTIVITIES ENVISAGED IN REF D.

B. ON THE PREMISE THAT NAVSUPPORT DANANG WILL PROVIDE AN ASSURED SOURCE OF SUPPLY AND SUPPORT FROM THE ADVANCED NAVAL BASE, WE ARE PLANNING, AND PROGRESSING TOWARD, A LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF ALL MARINE CORPS AND ATTACHED NAVY FORCES IN RVN. THIS IS BEING ACCOMPLISHED BY:

(1) INCREASING THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT ASSETS OF III MAF EACH TIME THE COMBAT FORCE IS INCREASED.

(2) ADDING TO FMFPAC, AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE, ADDITIONAL

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COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES WHICH DO NOT NOW EXIST IN THE MARINE CORPS. THE ACTIVATION OF THE 9TH ENGINEER BATTALION, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS BEEN DIRECTED, AND OTHER UNITS WILL BE ACTIVATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I HOPE TO SEE THESE UNITS DEPLOYED TO RVN WHEN COMBAT READY.

(3) AUGMENTING THE PRESENT FORCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT PRESENT AND PLANNED FUTURE FORCES, OPERATING IN THE ENVIRONMENT EXPECTED. THE ULTIMATE ORGANIZATION WILL RESULT IN THE OPTIMUM DISTRIBUTION OF TWO DIVISION SERVICE BATTALIONS, ONE FULL STRENGTH FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, AND THE MAJOR PORTION OF A SECOND FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT, BETWEEN THE ENCLAVES IN RVN AND THE LOGISTIC BASE ON OKINAWA.

C. ALTHOUGH FUTURE OPERATIONS WILL EXPAND OUR AREAS OF CONTROL AND INFLUENCE, AND THEREBY THE DISTANCES OVER WHICH SUPPLIES MUST BE MOVED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT, I BELIEVE THERE WILL BE ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR OUR COMMITTED FORCE PROVIDED BY THE INCREASED LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION DESCRIBED ABOVE.

5. IN SUMMARY, THE DEPARTURE FROM THE AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE TO THE CONDUCT OF A LAND CAMPAIGN IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT, WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP FROM A LOG COMMAND, HAS RESULTED IN MANY CHANGES FOR FMFPAC #19  
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FORCES, IN BOTH OUR TECHNIQUES AND ORGANIZATIONS. THE DRAIN ON ASSETS OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO BRING TWO FSR'S TO FULL STRENGTH, TO ACTIVATE NEW BATTALIONS, TO BRING UNITS FROM MANNING LEVELS TO T/O STRENGTH, AND TO ESTABLISH LOGISTIC AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS, BOTH IN COUNTRY AND AT OFFSHORE LOCATIONS, ARE SUBSTANTIAL. HOWEVER THERE ARE NO IDENTIFIABLE MARINE CORPS LOGISTIC FORCE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE MAF LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION FOR WHICH AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION IS NOT IN VIEW NOW.

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 P 291150Z  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO CG III MAF NCC  
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL 38539 FROM MACJ4.  
 FOR MAJ GEN WALT FROM BRIG GEN CROWLEY.

SUBJ: LARCS (C)

UNDERSTAND ALL BUT THREE ARE DEADLINED. SOMETHING MUST  
 GIVE SO I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING: IMMEDIATELY THE ARMY WILL SEND  
 TEAM TO MAKE 10 OPERATIONAL; WITHDRAW REMAINING 12 TO CAM  
 RANH FOR REQUIRED REPAIR AND FUTURE USE THAT AREA. WILL STRIVE  
 TO KEEP MAXIMUM OF REMAINING 10 OPERATIONAL, REPLACING AS  
 PRACTICAL. WITH AIR FORCE BASES COMING IN AT CAM RANH AND  
 PHAN RANG WE PLAN TO MOVE AIR FORCE LCM-6'S, TRAILERS AND  
 CREWS TO CAM RANH IN LIEU OF 10 LARCS. HIPE YOU AGREE. GPA

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