

6. CG III MAF 010153Z Oct ⁶⁵ 4.84 For BGen CROWEY from MG WALT
 Sp 4 Subj: IARCS (U)
7. CG III MAF 010734Z Oct 65 Personal for LtGen KRULAK from
 Sp 4 MGen WALT
 Subj: Code names for Company size operations
8. CG III MAF 020065Z Oct 65 Personal for LtGen KRULAK from
 Sp 4 MGen WALT
 Subj: Command and Control study
9. CG III MAF 030200Z Oct 65 Personal to Gen WESTMORELAND
 Sp 4 from GEN WALT
 Subj: Attack on Marble Mt.
10. CG III MAF 030616Z Oct 65 Personal for LtGen KRULAK from
 Sp 4 MGen WALT
 Subj: Combat operations control structure for US MACV
- ~~11. CG III MAF 030618Z Oct 65 Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND
 Sp 4 from MGen WALT
 Subj: Future plans 2/2 (U)~~
- 5 removed placed in TS files*

12. CG III MAF 031456Z Oct 65 *gp - not shown* Personal for Gen KRULAK
Subj: Possible Marine captive
of VC near Marble Mt.
13. CG III MAF 040340Z Oct 65 *gp - 4* Personal for LtGen KRULAK from
MGen WALT
Subj: Analysis of recent Marble
Mt. attack
14. CG III MAF 041421Z Oct 65 *gp - 4* Not for COMUSMACV pass to MGen
ROSSON
Subj: Concern by Gen WESTMORELAND
over garbage; refuse
disposal dump
- ~~15. CG III MAF 061108Z Oct *Removed to TS folder JJA* Personal for
Gen WESTMORELAND 061150Z Oct
Subj: Release of 2/7 to III
MIF~~
- ~~16. CG III MAF 062910Z Oct *Addressed to LtGen KRULAK of
personal from MGen WALT to
COMUSMACV 062619Z Oct
Subj: Public plans, 2/7 (II)*~~
- ~~17. CG III MAF 120104Z Oct *Personal for RADM WILLIAMS
Subj: Visit*~~
18. CG III MAF 130940Z Oct 65 *gp - 4* Personal from MGen WALT to LtGen
KRULAK
Subj: Special item of interest
during Senator BREWSTER's
visit
19. CG III MAF 140714Z Oct 65 *gp - 4* Personal for LtGen KRULAK from
MGen WALT
Subj: Can We rehabilitation
- ~~20. CG III MAF 141108Z Oct *Removed placed in TS folder JJA* Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND
from MGen WALT
Subj: Brief of a few items of
interest~~
- ~~21. CG III MAF 150144Z Oct *Personal for MGen WADE from
MGen WALT
Subj: Change of schedule*~~
22. CG III MAF 182305Z Oct 65 *gp - 4* Personal for LtGen KRULAK from
MGen WALT
Subj: Command Control study

23.	CG III MAF	190024Z Oct <i>gp - not shown</i>	Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND from MGen WALT Subj: Visit by COMUSMACV
24.	CG III MAF	200120Z Oct 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: Missions and Tasks NSA Danang
25.	CG III MAF	210926Z Oct	Personal for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: Historical Officer MACV
26.	CG III MAF	220826Z Oct <i>removed placed in TS folder</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: Gen WESTMORELAND's visit
27.	CG III MAF	240346Z Oct <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal from MGen WALT to Rep. Craig Hosmer Subj: Visit
28.	CG III MAF	241420Z Oct 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Exclusive for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
29.	CG III MAF	250146Z Oct 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Exclusive for Gen WESTMORELAND from MGen WALT Subj: Recent meeting of the Province Chiefs in Saigon
30.	CG III MAF	271021Z Oct 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: Successful defense of outpost of Ba Long.
31.	CG III MAF	280926Z Oct <i>removed placed in TS folder</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: Nha Trang Commanders Conference
32.	CG III MAF	300330Z Oct 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: Report of Steering Committee Recommendation on the Ops structure of Macv
33. ✓	CG III MAF	300536Z Oct <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND from MGen WALT Subj: News release

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DR FPO: San Francisco, California 96601

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CCN: 2175

PRIORITY 300536Z

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: COMUSMACV

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// C O N F I D E N T I A L //

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND FROM MAJ GENERAL WALT

NEWS RELEASE

MACV/CI

1. ~~MACV/CI~~ AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 28 OCT RELEASED SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER OF HELOS AND AIRCRAFT DAMAGED OR DESTROYED DURING THE VC SUICIDE ASSAULT TEAMS ATTACK DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 28 OCT ON MARBLE MT AF AND CHU LAY AF; I.E. 18 HELOS DESTROYED AND 22 HELOS DAMAGED PLUS TWO A4'S DESTROYED AND 5 DAMAGED. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT THE RELEASE OF SPECIFIC MATERIAL DAMAGES ON CRITICAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT SUCH AS HELICOPTERS AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INCIDENTS PROVIDE VITAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE ENEMY. IN ^{THE} BEST INTERESTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IT IS SUGGESTED THAT SPECIFIC INFO CITED ABOVE NOT BE DISCLOSED TO THE PRESS FOR PUBLICATION TO THE WORLD AT LARGE.

GR4

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301412H / AW

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P 300536Z/OCT

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CON: 1232.

MONTH: OCT.....

PREF: P.....

DTG: 300330Z.....

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3RD MARS:.....

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(3) ALL ADVISORY FUNCTIONS NOT NOW PERFORMED BY THE EXISTING CORPS ADVISORY EFFORT (RAILROAD ADVISOR, ETC) SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEPUTY COMMANDER.

(4) USARPAC SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO CONDUCT A MAN-POWER STUDY OF BOTH USARV AND THE 1ST LOG COMMAND TO DETERMINE IF A REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR BOTH AND TO EXAMINE THE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY BOTH FOR POSSIBLE DUPLICATION.

C. THE FINAL REPORT, INCLUDING THE RECOMMENDATIONS LISTED ABOVE, IS NOW IN FINAL DRAFT FORM FOR PRESENTATION TO COMUSMACV FOR APPROVAL. PRIOR TO PRESENTATION TO COMUSMACV IT WILL BE SENT TO THE PRINCIPAL COMMANDS FOR FINAL CONCURRENCE AND/OR COMMENTS.

2. DISCUSSION

A. III MAF WAS REPRESENTED ON THE WORKING GROUP AND STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL STUDY TO EXAMINE THE COMBAT OPERATION STRUCTURE OF MACV BY COLONEL T. FISHER, COLONEL E. HARPER, COLONEL E. GLIDDEN AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. OWENS (FMFFAC).

B. III MAF REPRESENTATIVES UTILIZED THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA DURING THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE WORKING GROUPS.

(1) THE EXISTING MACV COMBAT OPERATION STRUCTURE WAS THE BEST FOR US OPERATIONS IN RVN. RECOMMEND "STATUS QUO."

(2) THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE MARINE CORPS REPRESENTATION ON ANY JOINT STAFF - AND AT THE COMMAND/POLICY LEVEL.

(3) MARINE CORPS DOCTRINES AND CAPABILITIES SHOULD REMAIN INTACT. PROTECT THE MARINE CORPS DIVISION/WING TEAM CONCEPT.

(4) PROTECT THE EXISTING POLICY WHICH PROVIDES 2ND AIR DIVISION ONLY THAT MARINE AIR SUPPORT THAT IS NOT REQUIRED BY

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MARINE GROUND FORCES.

(5) AVOID THE FORMATION OF A KOREA TYPE OPERATION AND FORMATION OF A JOC.

(6) COMMAND RELATIONS SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH JCS PUBLICATIONS 2 (VNAF). RETAIN NCC ORGANIZATION.

C. UTILIZING THE ABOVE CRITERIA, AND MAKING CERTAIN THAT THE MARINE CORPS INTEREST WERE PROTECTED BY PROMPT AND CONTINUOUS ATTENDANCE AND PARTICIPATION IN ALL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, THE III MAF REPRESENTATIVES WERE ABLE TO DIRECT THE WORKING GROUP'S ATTENTION TOWARD SOLUTIONS WHICH WERE FAVORABLE TO THE III MAF. THE STEERING COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 1B ABOVE SUPPORT THE SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY THE WORKING GROUP.

D. NO FURTHER MEETINGS OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE WERE BELIEVED NECESSARY. THE WORKING GROUPS WERE DISESTABLISHED EXCEPT FOR THOSE MEMBERS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE A FIND REPORT FOR COMUSMACV. PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO COMUSMACV THE REPORT WILL BE CIRCULATED AMONG THE MAJOR COMMANDS AND MACV "J" STAFF SECTIONS REPRESENTED ON THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR FINAL COMMENT AND/OR CONCURRENCE.

E. CONCURRENT WITH THE SPECIAL STUDY ON THE COMBAT OPERATION STRUCTURE OF MACV AN ADDITIONAL SPECIAL STAFF STUDY BY MACV (UTILIZING ONLY MEMBERS OF THE MACV STAFF) FORMULATING A MACV TOC WAS UNDERWAY. IN VIEW OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS RELATIVE TO THE STUDY ON THE COMBAT OPERATION STRUCTURE OF MACV, THE CONTINUING MACV TOC STUDY BECOMES OF INCREASING INTEREST TO THE

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III MAF/MARINE CORPS, AS THE POTENTIAL CONTROL OF A MACV TOC
(OR J TOC; OR JOC) OVER MARINE AIR AND GROUND OPERATIONS IS GREAT.

F. THE PROGRESS OF THE INTERNAL MACV STAFF STUDY TO ESTABLISH
A MACV TOC IS BEING MONITORED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE BY COLONEL E.
HARPER, MARINE LIAISON TO THE 2ND AIR DIVISION. LATEST INFORMATION
INDICATES THAT COMUSMACV ADVISED THE MACV STAFF THAT THEIR INITIAL
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MACV TOC WERE TOO AMBITIOUS, AND THAT FURTHER
EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD PRODUCING A TOC CAPABLE OF RE-
SOLVING PRIORITIES BETWEEN U.S. ARMY TACTICAL COMMANDS. FURTHER,
THAT THE TOC SHOULD BE LOCATED IN THE EXISTING MACV PHYSICAL
FACILITIES.

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CON... 1070

MONTH, OCTOBER

PRE... P

DTG... 271021Z

ORIGINATOR... CG III MAF

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MAF...

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PRIORITY 271021 Z OCT65

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG FMFPAC

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT

1. OUR SITREP FOR 19-20 OCT CONTAINED INFORMATION ON THE SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF THE BA LONG OUTPOST BY 2D BN FIRST REGT FIRST DIV (ARVN). THE FINAL TALLY WAS: FRIENDLY 10 KIA, 39 WIA, 6 MIA, 6 WPNS. ENEMY 160 KIA, 2 VCC, 53 WPNS, LARGE AMOUNTS OF DEMOLITIONS AND AMMUNITION. AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE THIS IS THE FIRST KNOWN SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF AN OUTPOST AGAINST A DETERMINED ENEMY ATTACK. WE HOPE THIS WILL SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE TO THE REST OF THE ARVN AND THE VC THAT IT CAN BE DONE.

I HAVE SENT GENERAL THI THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE: QUOTE THE DEFENSE OF THE BA LONG OUTPOST ON THE NIGHT OF 19-20 OCT 1965 BY THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE 1ST DIV (ARVN) WAS AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF LEADERSHIP, COURAGE AND TENACITY. IT SERVES AS THE CLIMAX TO YOUR SUCCESSFUL CLEARING OPERATION, IAM SON 190, AND PROVES TO THE PEOPLE OF BA LONG, THE ENEMY, AND THE WORLD THAT YOU ARE IN BA LONG VALLEY TO STAY.

PLEASE PASS MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS ON A JOB WELL DONE TO CAPT NGUYEN HUU CUONG, BN CMDR AND TO THE MEN OF THE 2D BN 1ST REGT WHO SO GALLANTLY DEFENDED THE OUTPOST. I AM PROUD TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THEM AND THE WORK THEY ARE DOING. UNQUOTE.

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2. 3D RECON BN'S OPERATION TRAIL BLAZER PROVED TO BE A REAL SUCCESS. LTCOL VAN CLEVE AND HIS MEN DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB OF GOING INTO THE VC'S TERRITORY AND FINDING SUPPLY ROUTES, CHECK POINTS, LIVING AND WORKING AREAS. THEY UNCOVERED A VC BASE CAMP (AT 830630) WHICH INCLUDED A CARPENTER SHOP, EIGHT CAVES, STORAGE AREA, CARPENTER TOOLS AND MOLDS FOR MANUFACTURING MINES. ANOTHER CAMP WAS DISCOVERED CAPABLE OF SLEEPING TWENTY MEN. SEVERAL OTHER CAMPS IN THE VICINITY INCLUDED SLEEPING, COOKING AND LUMBER STORAGE AREA. FOUND VC PACKS CONTAINING LARGE QUANTITY OF NARCOTICS AND ANTI*BIOTICS. UNCOVERED CACHE WITH FIVE CASES OF CHISOM GRENADES, LARGE AMOUNT OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES, DOCUMENTS AND ONE HUNDRED POUNDS OF RICE. ANOTHER AREA (AT 820630) CONTAINED PERSONAL EFFECTS, EMPTY PIGEON COOPS, FOUR CASES CHICOM GRENADES MARKED 9-1-65 AND 6-1-65 TWO CASES OF RIFLE AT GRENADES AND UNIFORMS FOR 100 MEN. DOCUMENTS INDICATE EXTENSIVE TRAINING IN MAP READING AND OTHER MILITARY SUBJECTS HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE AREA. ONE DEAD VC CARRIED PAPERS THAT REVEALED HE WAS FROM HAI PHONG, NORTH VIETNAM AND CARD CARRYING MEMBER OF COMMUNIST PARTY. A COMPLETE RECAP OF THE OPERATION HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ADDENDUM TO OUR SITREP 177. THE INFORMATION THEY COLLECTED WILL BE INVALUABLE TO US IN FUTURE OPERATIONS. SENATOR KENNEDY WHO WAS HERE ON THE NIGHT OF THE 24TH AND THE MORNING OF THE 25TH WISHED TO INTERVIEW SOME PERSONNEL WHO HAD BEEN ON A ~~PARADE~~ ^{PATROL}. LTCOL VAN CLEVE AND SEVERAL OF HIS MEN WERE MADE AVAILABLE.

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3. OPERATION RED SNAPPER TERMINATED AT 252100H. THE RESULTS WERE NOT SPECTACULAR AS TO NUMBERS BUT CLEARING THE AREA ALONG WITH THE ARVN OPERATION^{SOUTH} OF THE HIGHWAY SHOULD REMOVE A HAVEN FOR POTENTIAL SABOTEURS AND SOME OF THE PRESSURE AND THREAT THAT HAS BEEN SLOWLY BUILDING IN THE HAI VAN PASS AREA AGAINST THE ESSO STORAGE PLANT AND NAMO BRIDGE.

4. CONTINUING OUR PLANS FOR BLUE MARLIN. THEIL FISHER HAS BEEN NAMED LANDING FORCE COMMANDER. HE, A DIV 2, 3, AND 4 REP HAVE GONE TO PUSAN TO PLAN WITH COMPHIBRON FIVE PRIOR TO FIVE'S EMBARKING WITH THE ROK'S TO QUI NHON. THE OPERATION IS PROGRESSING NICELY. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED. REGARDS. MGEN WALT

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ORIGINATOR-CG III MAF.....

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MAF-copy 1 of 1.....

DIV.....

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FLSG.....

PNCCSA..... **SPECAT**.....

12TH MAR.....

9TH MAR..... **EXCLUSIVE**.....

3RD MAR.....

7TH MAR.....

3RD ENGR.....

7TH ENGR.....

3RD RECON BN.....

FORCE RE CON.....

7TH COMM BN.....

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CRPTO.....

4TH MARS.....

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~~EXCLUSIVE~~

CGN: 956

PRIORITY 250/46Z

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TRANS TO	
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FROM: CG III MAF
TO: COMUSMACV ((COMMAND CHANNEL))

(SPECAT)

~~URGENT~~ FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM MAJ GEN WALT

~~EXCLUSIVE~~

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A. SSO MACV 171030Z

1. IN REF A YOU ADVISE ME THAT SUBSEQUENT TO A RECENT MEETING OF THE PROVINCE CHIEFS IN SAIGON, SUB BRIG GEN THANG REPORTED THE CONCERN OF THESE PROVINCE CHIEFS OVER US FORCES TAKING OVER WHAT THE VIETNAMESE CONSIDER TO BE CIVIL FUNCTIONS; I.E. CHECKPOINTS, SEARCHES, AND ARRESTS. FURTHER THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM HAD STATED THAT SUCH ACTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN BY US MARINES IN HIS PROVINCE.
2. YOUR REPLY TO GEN THANG IS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT AND VERY MUCH APPRECIATED. EVERYTHING WITHIN OUR POWER IS EMPLOYED TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF USURPING VIETNAMESE CIVIL FUNCTIONS. WE ARE INSISTENT THAT VIETNAMESE ACCOMPANY, ~~FOR EXAMPLE,~~ ALL PATROLS IN ORDER TO DO THE ACTUAL QUESTIONING, CHECKING, AND SEARCHING. THIS IN ITSELF OFTEN CREATES PROBLEMS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE DANANG AIR BASE DEFENSE BATTALION ONLY HAS EIGHT RF SOLDIERS ATTACHED. THE BATTALION PERFORMS AN AVERAGE OF THIRTY PATROLS A DAY. I CORPS HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PROVIDE AN RF COMPANY OR AN EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF PF TO AUGMENT THE AIRBASE DEFENSE BATTALION. THE VALIDITY OF THE REQUIREMENT IS RECOGNIZED BY I CORPS, BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO MEET THE BASIC REQUIREMENT.
3. THERE WILL BE TIMES WHEN MILITARY EXIGENCIES REQUIRE US MARINES TO PERFORM CERTAIN SEARCH AND ARREST FUNCTIONS. THIS IS RECOGNIZED BY CG I CORPS. ALL THAT

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GEN THE ASKS IS THAT IT BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM AND THAT VCS OR OTHER SUSPECTS BE TURNED OVER TO GVN AUTHORITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. THE QUANG NAM PROVINCE CHIEF, LTCOL TUNG, IS AN AGGRESSIVE, FORCEFUL AND EFFECTIVE OFFICER. HE IS ALSO EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC AND OUTSPOKEN. HE IS PRONE TO GENERALIZE, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT COMES TO COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE AMERICANS, FROM VERY SKETCHY EVIDENCE. IN ADDITION TO MY OWN PERSONAL INQUIRIES, I HAVE HAD ^{THE} ~~THE~~ DEPUTY SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS AND ^{III MAF} ~~III MAF~~ G-3 INVESTIGATE AS BEST THEY CAN THE SPECIFICS UNDERLYING THIS PARTICULAR ^{EXC} ~~COMPLAINT~~. THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN ONLY ONE SPECIFIC INCIDENT OF RECORD. THIS WAS NO MORE THAN A MISUNDERSTANDING. ON 28 SEPT THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF THE HIEU DUC DISTRICT FILED A COMPLAINT WITH THE PROVINCE CHIEF THAT THE MARINES HAD CAUSED HIM TO DETAIN CERTAIN VCS AGAINST HIS BETTER JUDGEMENT. HE STATED THAT HIS JAIL WAS TOO SMALL, HE DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH FOOD TO FEED THEM, AND BESIDES HE DIDN'T THINK THEY WERE VC.

5. ALL OF THE FOREGOING HAS BEEN REVIEWED IN DETAIL WITH COL THANH, CHIEF OF STAFF, I CORPS. IN ADDITION WE HAVE HAD OTHER CONVERSATIONS IN THE PAST OVER THE ~~OUTSPOKEN REMARKS~~ BY THE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE. THANH IS AS EMBARRASSED AS WE ARE THAT THIS COMPLAINT WAS BROUGHT UP AT THE CONFERENCE. HE HAS ASSURED US THAT LTCOL TUNG HAS BEEN TOLD TO MAKE HIS COMPLAINTS, IF ANY, THROUGH THE III MAF LIAISON OFFICER TO III MAF FOR RESOLUTION, OR IF NECESSARY, THROUGH I CORPS, ~~HE~~ HE IS NOT TO TAKE THEM GRATUITOUSLY TO SAIGON PRIOR TO SEEKING RESOLUTION WITHIN I CORPS.

GP-4

TOD MACV
~~250230H~~ HJM
251430H
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9 RELEASED BY CG [Signature]

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C/O:

OC 1200

mcm

ACTION

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CCN: 938

PRIORITY: 241420Z

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG FMFPAC

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

// SECRET // MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

~~EXCLUSIVE~~ EXCLUSIVE FOR LTJEN ABULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT
1. FOLLOWING MSG RELEASED THIS CMD CENTER SUBMITTED FOR INFO,
QUOTE: PRIORITY: 211340Z OCT65 FROM: CG III MAF TO: SACLL, DA

INFO: COMUSMACV J-32 // SECRET // DA PASS TO SACLL LTCOL JONES, ESCORT

OFFICER, PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS SEND

PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS (U)

1. (S) AMONG INFORMATION GIVEN BY BRIEFERS TO STAFF MEMBERS OF SUBJECT SUB-
COMMITTEE ON 19, 20, & 21 OCT 65, THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE CONSIDERED OF IM-
PORTANCE:

a. (S) FROM: HQ, CAM RANH BAY LOGISTICS AREA:

(1) 50% SHORTAGE OF FORK LIFTS IN 10TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION.

(2) REQUIREMENT FOR FIVE ROCK CRUSHERS (150 TON) ON REQUEST SINCE
JULY.

(3) REQUIREMENT FOR SIX 100KW GENERATORS.

(4) 14 OUT OF 16 FORK LIFTS DEADLINED FOR LACK OF PARTS (35TH ENGI-
NEER GROUP).

(5) REQUIREMENT FOR A POWER BARGE ON REQUEST SINCE JULY.

(6) 16 OUT OF 18 FIVE KW GENERATORS ON DEADLINE FOR LACK OF PARTS
(35TH ENGINEER BATTALION)

(7) ONLY ONE "PUSH" RECEIVED SINCE JULY.

(8) THAT SEC DEF WAS FURNISHED A LIST OF MAJOR ENGINEER SHORTAGES
ON 19 JUL ON HIS VISIT TO CAM RANH BAY; NONE OF THE ITEMS LISTED HAVE BEEN
RECEIVED BY CAM RANH BAY (35TH ENGINEER GROUP). NOTE: MENDALL PARTY EVINCED

Handwritten signature or initials in a circle.

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(9) REQUIREMENT HARBOR DRILL BITS SHIPPED FROM GRANITE CITY DEPOT 27 AUG NOT YET RECEIVED.

(10) THAT MR. GILLEAS INTENDS TO TRACE INDIVIDUAL REQUISITIONS BACK TO OKINAWA AND WILL ASK USARYIS TO FURNISH HIM A LIST OF REQUISITIONS THAT SAIGON HAS LEVIED ON THAT HEADQUARTERS.

b. (S) FROM THE STAGING AREA, 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV:

(1) THAT THE BDE LEFT CONUS WITH 30% ZERO BALANCES WITH ALL UNITS

C-4

(2) DIFFICULTY EXPERIENCED IN GETTING REPAIR PARTS FOR THE 274 A-1 MULE:

(3) THAT THIS UNIT NEVER KNOWS WHETHER IT RECEIVES ALL OF ITS "PUSH" WITH THE PROBABILITY THAT SOME IS PILFERED BY OTHER UNITS. ONLY 450 OUT OF 3400 PONCHOS WERE RECEIVED.

(4) THAT THERE ARE SHORTAGES OF SAND BAGS, MAJOR ASSEMBLIES, ENGINES, TRANSMISSIONS, CLUTCHES, RADIATORS, PRESSURE PLATES FOR ALL VEHICLES, AND OXYGEN ACETELYN - NOW BORROWED FROM RM&K CONTRACTORS.

(5) THAT ONLY 53% OF THE ASL IS AT 100% FILL.

(6) THAT THE BDE IS SHORT 4000 COTS. HAVE NOT ANY COTS AT PRESENT.

(7) THAT THE BDE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT ON 7 JULY AND NEVER RECEIVED ANY OF IT.

(8) THAT A SERIOUS SHORTAGE IS THE BACK OF AN X RAY MACHINE IN THE MEDICAL COMPANY.

(9) OPERATIONS EFFECTED BY LACK OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, NEW 57-F TO&E CALLED FOR 30 DAY CAPABILITY WITHOUT AUGMENTATION. BDE HAS NOW BEEN COMMITTED FOR 83 CONTINUOUS DAYS WITHOUT AUGMENTATION. TO PROPERLY SUPPORT BDE IN PRESENT ENVIRONMENT, THE MAINTENANCE BN SHOULD HAVE SAVED SOME OF MAINTENANCE BN OF 173RD BDE.

(10) SHORTAGE OF TIRE TUBES FOR 3/4 AND 2 1/2 TON TRUCKS.

2. (C) STAFF MEMBERS EXPRESSED CONCERN AT CONDITION OF ARMY UNITS COVERED BY THIS REPORT WHEN COMPARED WITH 1ST DIV AND 173RD BDE. REPORT ON 1st CAV #28

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DIV FOLLOWS. **SECRET**

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TO: CVA 62
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// C O N F I D E N T I A L //

PERSONAL FROM KEN WALT TO REP CRAIG HOSMER

1. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR FORTH COMING VISIT. THE BELOW ITINERARY IS
FORWARDED FOR YOUR APPROVAL. CONSIDERATION, HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY
SIAGON YOUR ARE SCAI DEPART 261000H.

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<u>26Oct1965</u>			
0830-0835	ARRIVE DEPLANE AF OPS FROM USS INDEPENDENCE BY CIA AIRCRAFT	PROTOCOL	
0835-0845	ENPLANE HELO ENROUTE III MAF HELO PAD	CG III MAF/NCC	BY HELO
0845-0850	ENROUTE III MAF BRIEFING ROOM		
0850-0950	BRIEFING OF III MAF GENERAL/SPECIAL SITUATION	AC/S, G-2, G-3, G-4, CAOFP III MAF	DC/S COORDINATE
0950-1000	ENPLANE HELO ENROUTE "C" MED	CG III MAF/NCC	
1000-1015	VISIT PATIENTS "C" MED	CG III MAF/NCC	AWARD PURPLE HEARTS
1015-1025	ENROUTE VILLAGE LE MY	CG III MAF/NCC	BY HELO
1025-1050	VISIT LE MY	CG 3D MAR DIV	CIVIC ACTION PROJECT- III MAF CAOFP ACCOMPANY.
1050-1100	ENROUTE AF OPS	CG III MAF/NCC	BY HELO. MEET CONSTITUENTS AIR FORCE OPS.
1100-	DEPART DANANG FOR AN KHE		

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES.

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2. WARM REGARDS. L. W. WALT ~~WALS~~.

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TO: CG FMFPAC

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SSN: 1
TOF: 200119Z

INFO: CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)

S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT

MISSION AND TASKS NAVSUPPACT DANANG

A. CINGPACFLT 162136Z

B. III MAF 170136Z SEP

1. REF A REQUESTS YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO INCREASING ORGANIC MAF LOGISTICS CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE MAF OVER THE EXTENDED LOCS THAT WILL DEVELOP AS OPERATIONS RANGE FARTHER AFIELD. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

2. BY REF B THIS COMMAND RECOMMENDED THAT NAVSUPPACT PROVIDE FOR MOVEMENT OF INCOMING AND OUTGOING AMMO BETWEEN SHIP AND OWNING SERVICE AMMO DUMPS. THIS RECOMMENDATION WAS BASED ON THE CURRENT PHYSICAL SITUATION HERE AT DANANG AND CHU LAI. IT WAS BASED ON ELIMINATING A NEED FOR INTRANSIT OR TERMINAL STORAGE AREAS SUCH AS THE PROGRAMMED PROCEDURE FOR CLASS I, II & IV COMMON, III AND IIIA. IT WAS NOT INTENDED THAT NAVSUPPACT DELIVER TO SERVICE AMMO DUMPS INLAND OR OUTSIDE DANANG LOCAL AREA (TO SUPPORT OVER-THE-ROAD DISTRIBUTION) THE PROCEDURE PROPOSED IN REF B WAS DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE DOUBLE HANDLING AT THE BEACH/DOCK AREA AND THE NEED FOR NAVSUPPACT TO ACQUIRE, DEVELOP, AND MAN A CLASS V-VA INTRANSIT STORAGE FACILITY.

24

NO

3. AS III MAF EXPANDS THE TAORS, TACTICAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES WILL BE DISPLACED TO SUPPORT TO THE COMBAT TROOPS. THIS EXPANSION/DISPLACEMENT, HOWEVER, IS ENVISIONED TO BE PRIMARILY ALONG THE LITTORAL OF RVN RATHER THAN DEEP PENETRATIONS INLAND. NAVSUPPORT WILL PROVIDE A SUPPLY DEPOT AT DANANG, A SUB DEPOT AT CHU LAI AND OTHER SEA PORTS OR BEACHHEADS LOTS AS NECESSARY. MAF LOGISTIC UNITS WILL CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS ON PROVIDING SUPPLY, EVACUATION, MAINTENANCE, AND SERVICE SUPPORT BETWEEN BASE DEPOT SUPPLY POINTS ON THE COAST AND THE DEPLOYED COMBAT TROOPS. COMMERCIAL TRUCKING AND ^{RR} ~~RR~~ WILL BE EMPLOYED AS THESE FACILITIES ARE RECONSTITUTED TO SUPPLEMENT ORGANIC MEANS AND TO FILL THE GAP AS MARINE UNITS MOVE OUTWARD FROM SEA COAST SUPPLY DEPOT SYSTEM.

4. IT IS RECOMMENDED: A. THAT THE CONCEPT OF A FIXED SUPPLY BASE OPERATED BY NAVSUPPORT AT DANANG, CHU LAI AND OTHER SEA SHORE BASES (LOTS), AS REQUIRED, BE MAINTAINED. B. THAT MAF ORGANIC LOGISTICS ORGANIZATIONS IN BEING OR TAILORED FOR THE SITUATION AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES BE PLANNED FOR AND BUDGETED TO SUPPORT III MAF AS THEY DEPLOY NORTH AND SOUTH ALONG THE LITTORAL OF I CORPS.

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Memorandum

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FROM: [Faint text]

SUBJECT: [Faint text]

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TO: COMUSMACV (COMMAND CIRCUIT)

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PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM MAJ GEN WALT
VISIT BY COMUSMACV
A. COMUSMACV 170131Z

PROPOSED ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS:

<u>200ct65</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
	Arrive/Visit QUANG NGAI	
	Enplane/enroute CHU LAI	
1255-1300	Arrive/deplane CHU LAI	Met by CG III MAF/NCC Dep CG III MAF/NCC and ADC CHU LAI
1300-1305	Enplane Helo/enroute "I" Co 3/3	By Helo
1305-1345	Lunch with "I" Co 3/3	
1345-1355	Enroute "B" Co 1/7	By Helo
1355-1415	Briefing/tour "B" Co 1/7	
1415-1425	Enroute MAG-12	By Helo
1425-1440	Briefing/tour MAG-12	Tour Flight Line
1440-1445	Enroute MAG-36	
1445-1505	Briefing/tour MAG-36	Observe construction work by CB's
1505-1510	Enroute "B" Med	By Helo
1510-1525	Tour "B" Med	
1525-1600	Enroute Danang. Land at "A" Co 1/9	By Helo

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<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1600-1620	Briefing/tour "A" Co 1/9	
1620-1625	Enroute "K" Co 3/9	By Helo
1625-1645	Briefing/tour "K" Co 3/9	
1645-1650	Enroute "M" Co 3/4 (Hill 41)	By Helo
1650-1710	Briefing/tour "M" Co 3/4	
1710-1720	Enroute I Corps Hq	By Helo
1720-1750	Call on BGen THI	
1750-1800	Enroute HOA VINH VILLAGE	By Helo
1800-1830	Visit HOA VINH VILLAGE	Meet Village Chief. Briefing on Civic Action Project HOA VINH Village by CO 2/3
1830-1840	Enroute Quarters at Hill Top Helo Pad	By Helo. COMUSMACV will RON w/CG III MAF/NCC. CO I Corps AdvGroup will RON with ADC
1840-1915	Free time in Quarters	
1915-1945	Refreshments	By invitation
1945-2030	Working dinner	By invitation
2030-	Briefing	G-2 Summary By Capt. DOMINIQUEZ. G-3 Briefing by Col. SIMONS. Civil Affairs Briefing by Maj. KEEVER. FMAW Briefing by G-3 FMAW. DC/S III MAF coordinate
<u>21 Oct 65</u>		
0630-0655	Breakfast with CG/III MAF/NCC	
0700-0740	Enroute 1st Div ARVN	By Helo. Land at HUE Football Stadium
0740-0810	Briefing 1st Div ARVN	
0810-0825	Enroute PK-17 (3d Regt CP)	By Helo. YCM 0825 1/D 653 278

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<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
0825-0845	Briefing 31RegtCP	
0845-0910	Enroute ASHAU Special Forces Camp	By Helo. YC490830
0910-0940	Briefing/tour Camp ASHAU	
0940-1000	Enroute Camp KHE SANH	By Helo. XD 842426
1000-1030	Briefing/tour Camp KHE SANH	
1030-1110	Enroute DONG DA Training Center HUE PHU BAI	By Helo. YD 825150
1110-1150	Briefing/tour DONG DA TraCen	
1150-1200	Enroute 3/4 CP	By Helo
1200-1250	Lunch with 3/4	
1250-1255	Enroute HUE PHU BAI Airfield	By Helo
1255-1300	Enplane T-39 Jet and depart for SAIGON	

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TO: CG FMFPAC

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//S E C R E T//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT
COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY

1. ELMER GLIDDEN REPORTS FROM SAIGON THAT THE WORKING GROUPS WILL BE MAKING THEIR PRESENTATIONS TO THE STEERING COMMITTEE ON 19 OCT. THEY WILL OFFER THE STEERING COMMITTEE TWO PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONS.

A. PROPOSAL ONE IS A CONTINUATION OF THE EXISTING MACV STRUCTURE WITH MINOR CHANGES.

B. PROPOSAL TWO WOULD REVISE THE EXISTING STRUCTURE TO PROVIDE FOR CONTROL OF U.S. ARMY TACTICAL ELEMENTS THROUGH U.S. ARMY VIETNAM.

2. NEITHER OF THESE PROPOSALS, AT LEAST AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM HERE, APPEAR INIMICAL TO MARINE CORPS INTERESTS. ELMER IS PUSHING THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE BUT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SECOND.

3. THE WORKING GROUPS CONSIDERED AND DISCARDED SEVERAL OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH FELL BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING TWO EXTREMES:

A. JOINT TASK FORCE IN EACH CORPS AREA.

B. DIVISION INTO AIR AND GROUND FUNCTIONAL COMMANDS.

4. ONE OF THE WORKING GROUPS IS CONTINUING TO WORK ON A PLAN TO SPLIT OUT THE ADVISORY EFFORT INTO A SEPARATE MAAG.

5. SEPARATE FROM THE WORK OF THE STUDY GROUP BUT DIRECTLY RELATED TO IT IS GEN WESTMORELAND'S DECISION TO CREATE AN ARMY TOC. THIS IS AN OUTGROWTH OF

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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OF A 2D AIR DIVISION STUDY (ALSO KNOWN AS THE MEYER REPORT) WHICH CONCLUDED THAT AN ARMY TOC WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE AIR/GROUND SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDED THAT, AS A MINIMUM, IT CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING:

- A. DATA PROCESSING GROUP.
- B. G-2/G-3 OPERATIONS ELEMENT.
- C. AVIATION ELEMENT.
- D. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT ELEMENT.
- E. FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT.
- F. TWO AIR DEFENSE ELEMENTS.

6. THE REPORT ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE TOC SHOULD FUNCTION AS PRESCRIBED IN DA TRAINING CIRCULAR 101-2, SUBJECT, TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER, DATED 25 MAY 1960. WE DO NOT HOLD A COPY OF THIS REFERENCE AT DA NANG.

7. A MACV STUDY IS NOW UNDERWAY TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION, FACILITIES, AND PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE TOC.

8. AS YOU CAN SEE, THE PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION IS STILL IN THE FIRST STAGES. THE WORK OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY GROUP HAS TO BE MERGED WITH THE SEPARATE ACTION CONCERNING THE TOC. ALSO THE IDEAS OF THE MORE IMPORTANT J STAFF MEMBERS HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMMITTED TO PAPER. THE 19 OCTOBER MEETING OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE SHOULD BRING THE REAL AIMS OF VARIOUS INTERESTED PARTIES INTO SHARPER FOCUS.

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16 Oct. 1965

Memorandum for Col Axtell.

Subject: Command and Control Study

1. The working groups are wrapping up their work in preparation for a presentation to the Steering Committee on 19 October, 1965.
2. The Steering Committee meeting scheduled 15 October 65 has been rescheduled for 19 October, 1965 due to the non-availability of Gen Collins.
3. During the period between the first Working Group presentation (discussed in my previous memorandum) and the present, the working groups have managed to reduce the number of proposed organizations for COMUSMCV ~~organizational concepts were considered~~ to two. Neither of these in their present form are objectional in light of Marine Corps interests in SVN. Essentially, the two are: (a) the existing MACV structure with a few unimportant changes in areas not of concern to Marine Corps; and, (b) a revised organizational structure which would ~~be~~ *for Army Component Command* control, through the use of USARV, (to be designated the ACC) the necessary operations of the U. S. Army tactical elements in SVN. We (III MAF reps) are pushing for a status quo, although there is no strong objection to the second organization.
4. One of the working groups has also directed its efforts toward the reorganization of the Advisory effort into a separate MAAG that could fit into either of the above organizations.
5. In the process of arriving at two possible organizations, many other possible organizational concepts were considered. Many were definitely not in the best interests of the Marine Corps; however, by careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages, they were disregarded in favor of the two discussed briefly in para 3 above. The following are of the possible organizations considered: *(and discarded)*
 - a. Joint task forces in each Corps area. This would expand III MAF area influence by placing Air Force units in the I Corps area under OPCON of III MAF.
 - b. Organization for Land Warfare. This fragmented the Div/Wing team by giving OPCON of all air to AFCC and all ground forces to ACC.
 - c. Variations and modification of a and b above.
6. As stated in my prior memo, there is no apparent effort to disrupt the III MAF in the I CTZ. After a week of hassle and discussion, the ~~work~~ working group level of the command and control study group consensus is that the existing organization should be retained.
7. Separate from the work of the study group, but having a direct bearing upon it, and undoubtedly to be incorporated in the staff study at the 19Oct Steering Committee meeting, is the matter of an Army TOC for MACV. The following background is furnished relative to the TOC:

ε
a. The Mayer's study group conducted by 2d AD, Gen Meyers, to determine means of more effectively employing air support and to avoiding killing/injuring/damaging property concluded inter alia, "COMUSMACV does not have an Army TOC, which is considered an essential element of the Air/Ground system. The TACC has neither the resources nor the qualifications to fulfill this function. This represents a serious deficiency in the commands capability to coordinate air/ground operations."

b. As a result of the conclusions described in (a) above, the Study Group recommended inter alia that: "An Army TOC, with essential communications, be established as soon as possible. As a minimum, it should contain the following:

- (1) Data Processing Group
- (2) G-2/G-3 Operations element
- (3) Aviation element
- (4) Tactical Air Support element
- (5) Fire Support Element
- (6) Two Air Defense Elements.

The TOC should function as prescribed in DA Training Circular 101-2, subject: Tactical Operations Center, dated 25 May, 1960. The tactical air support element thereof should be co-located with the TACC. The TOC should be directly under the control of COMUSMACV with staff supervision provided by appropriate members of the J staff in their G staff roles."

c. When briefed on the Meyers report, Gen Westmoreland directed implementation of para b above. A study is now under way to determine the composition, facilities, and physical location of a TOC for COMUSMACV. This separate study ostensibly does not concern itself with the location of the TOC within the Command and Control structure of COMUSMACV. It is interesting to note that this study is being conducted by LtCol McCrystal, while the working groups of the Command and Control structures have as senior member, a LtCol Murray who is LtCol McCrystal's assistant.

8. The steering committee will have to consider both aspects - proposed organizational changes - and, the functional locations of the TOC - to determine the compatibility of the TOC with whatever MACV organization is recommended.



9. Summary. The pace of all work is very slow, perhaps due to the deadline of 1 November, 1965. 19 Oct steering committee should bring real aims of the study group into clear focus. If results of the 19 Oct meeting are not too startling, I believe Col Fisher can return to Danang 20 Oct. Will send a separate recommendation regarding FMFPAC representative, LtCol Owens.

NEW SUBJECT: Col Robichaud arrived today for the regular liaison visit with MACV...he plans to come up your way on the 19th for a few days liaison work - he will probably have to return to Saigon to represent FMFPAC in a DAGGER THRUST conference which, as of the moment, will go during the period 25-28 Oct.

17 Oct. 1965

Memorandum for Col Axtell:

1. Since writing the attached memo dated the 16 Oct., I had a long visit with Col Armstrong, of the J-5 MACV, who is one of the members of the steering committee. The following are some observations as a result of that meeting.
2. Regardless of what the committee on command and control comes up with, for this first go-around, COMUSMACV will have a new organization, or addition to the existing organization, which will operate to control the war effort throughout the country. Members of the MACV staff feel that Gen. Westmoreland should reorganize so that he can divest himself of his immediate concern with the war and devote his attention to the bringing into focus the many facets of the total US effort--political, military, MAP, advisory, etc., leaving the conduct of the war to someone else.
3. What this means is that, depending on what they can convince Gen Westmoreland of, either of the two following simplified organizations will be sent back to the working group for refinement following the steering committee meeting.



4. As you can see, the outcome of the reorganization is really in the early stages, and the work of the command and control group will have to be melded with not only the separate study regarding the TOC, but the ideas of the important J staff members who have not as yet put their ideas on paper. A lot should fall out of the steering committee meeting on the 19th.

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TO: CG PACPAC

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PERSONAL FOR LYGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT

CAM NE REHABILITATION

HAS BEEN SENT

A. YOUR 122122Z

1. REF A REQUESTED INFORMATION CONCERNING STATUS AND PLANS FOR REHAB OF CAM NE AND EXTENT OF MARINE CORPS INVOLVEMENT.

2. PLANS FOR REHAB OF CAM NE ARE BEING MADE BY GVN PROVINCE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE. DURING PAST FEW WEEKS, MARINE CORPS UNITS HAVE DESTROYED OR DRIVEN OFF ORGANIZED VIET CONG FORCES FROM NINE VILLAGES IN SAME GENERAL AREA AS CAM NE, OPENING UP MORE THAN TWENTY HAMLETS WITHIN WHICH GVN CAN NOW COMMENCE RECONSTRUCTION. QUANG NAM PROVINCE CHIEF IS FORMULATING PLANS FOR REHABILITATION OF ALL HAMLETS IN ALL VILLAGES NOW CLEARED, DESIGNING PLAN SO THAT MOST EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT PROGRAM CAN BE PUT INTO EFFECT. CAM NE WILL BE ONE PART OF THAT PLAN.

3. ~~MARINE CORPS~~ ^{III MAF} HAS OPERED AN AID STATION IN CAM NE AND IS ASSISTING GVN IN OPERATING IT, IS CONSTRUCTING PERMANENT ACCESS ROAD FOR VILLAGERS, HAS ACTIVELY ASSISTED GVN IN PROCESSING CLAIMS FOR BATTLE DAMAGE TO VILLAGERS PROPERTY, HAS ASSISTED GVN OFFICIALS IN CONDUCTING SURVEY TO DETERMINE WHAT WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE PLAN, HAS CONTINUALLY ASSISTED VILLAGE CHIEF AND GVN FORCES IN PROTECTING HAMLET FROM VIET CONG TERRORISM AND ATTACK, HAS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE VILLAGE CHIEF FOR HIS DISTRIBUTION, CLOTHING, FOOD AND SOME TOOLS.

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PERSONAL FROM MAJGEN WALT TO [REDACTED] LIGEN KRULAK. SUBJ. SPECIAL ITEM OF INTEREST DURING SENATOR BREWSTER'S VISIT.

DURING HIS VISIT SENATOR BREWSTER WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN DEADLINE RATES OF VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT AND SHORTAGES OF PARTS AND SUPPLIES IN VIETNAM. UNIT COMMANDERS WERE FACTUAL IN THEIR RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS. IN THE CASE OF MOTOR TRANSPORT, THE MT BN COMMANDER REPORTED THAT ON THE DATE OF THE SENATOR'S VISIT HE HAD 17 M-35'S OUT OF 45 ON DEADLINE AT DANANG. 5 OF 10 MIGHTY MITES WERE DEADLINED. THE AMTRAC BN COMMANDER REPORTED AS OF THAT DAY 48 OUT OF 170 TRACTORS WERE DEADLINED. FLSG REPORTED ON DEADLINES FOR 3RD ECHELON OR HIGHER MAINTENANCE BY CATEGORY, BY PERCENT, AS FOLLOWS:

	<u>DA-NANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>	<u>HUE PHU BAI</u>	<u>OVERALL</u>
MOTOR TRANSPORT	8.5	12.0	23.2	11.0
ELECTRICAL	11.8	12.1	9.0	11.8
ENGINEER	19.2	30.4	20.4	23.0
ORDNANCE	8.1	7.8	7.0	7.9

IN EACH CASE A RATIONALE FOR PROPER UNDERSTANDING TO MAINTAIN BALANCE WAS PROVIDED. FOR EXAMPLE: OUR M-35'S ARE APPROXIMATELY 10 YEARS OLD. HE CHECKED ONE VEHICLE AND FOUND IT BEGINNING ITS TENTH YEAR. HE WAS ADVISED OF THE PROGRAM TO REPLACE THIS VEHICLE. WHERE PERCENTAGES APPEARED HIGH THE REASONS FOR SAME WERE PROVIDED SUCH AS THE 30.4 PERCENT ENGINEER DEADLINE AT CHU LAI WHERE THE MAGNITUDE OF ENGINEER EFFORT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY SIZEABLE DUE TO AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION.

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IN NO CASE WERE FACTS PRESENTED IN A COMPLAINING MANNER. THE FACT THAT THE DIVISION AFTER BEING IN COMBAT FOR THIS PERIOD WAS COMBAT READY WAS STRESSED. PIPELINE AND CONTINUED NEED IN THE FUTURE FOR MOUNT OUT SUPPLIES TO BE MAINTAINED ON HAND AND IN THE BARN IN ADDITION TO NORMAL PEACETIME OPERATING STOCKS WAS STRESSED TO THE SENATOR.

HIS INDICATION OF CONCERN OVER LACK OF PARTS WAS BASED ON HIS HONEST DESIRE TO USE THESE PERCENTAGES IN AN EFFORT TO HELP THE MARINE CORPS. FULL APPRECIATION ON OUR PART WAS EXPRESSED FOR HIS SINCERE OFFER OF ASSISTANCE. HOWEVER, DURING A VERY FRANK DISCUSSION IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT HIS DESIRE TO ASSIST COULD WELL BE MISINTERPRETED AS AN INDICTMENT OF OUR MARINE CORPS SUPPLY SYSTEM. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT AMONG OTHER REASONS IT WAS BECAUSE WE HAVE OUR OWN SUPPLY SYSTEM WE HAD THE SUPPLIES THAT ENABLED THE DIVISION TO EXECUTE THE LANDINGS WHEN ORDERED AND TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS ASHORE. NAVY FURNISHED ITEMS SUCH AS CLASS II-A AND V-A WERE NOT DISCUSSED. AS A RESULT OF THE FOREGOING HE SAID HE HAD NOT CONSIDERED THIS ASPECT AND THAT HE CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WANT TO HURT THE MARINE CORPS IN ANY WAY AND THAT HE FULLY SUPPORTED THE MARINE CORPS IN ITS DESIRE TO MAINTAIN ITS OWN SUPPLY SYSTEM. FOR THIS REASON HE SAID HE WOULD REFRAIN FROM EMPHASIZING THE FACTUAL DATA THAT HE WAS PROVIDED.

IN SUMMARY, IN SENATOR BREWSTER WE HAVE A REAL FRIEND IN COURT AND AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME AND PLACE SUBJECT TO THE DISCRETION OF HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF RELATED MATTERS WITH THE SENATOR.

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3 OCTOBER 1965/rjr

CCN: 01

IMMEDIATE: 041421Z OCT

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: COMUSMACV

C O N F I D E N T I A L

NOT FOR COMUSMACV PASS TO MAJ GEN ROSSON (MACJ02)

PERSONAL FOR MAJ GEN ROSSON FROM MAJ GEN WALT

- A. YOUR MEMO OF 24 SEPT
- B. YOUR 161555Z AUGUST

1. I APPRECIATE YOUR BRINGING TO MY ATTENTION THE FEELINGS AND SPECIAL CONCERN BY GENERAL WESTERLAND OVER THE INCIDENTS ASSOCIATED WITH GARBAGE AND REFUSE DISPOSAL DUMPS. MAY I ASSURE YOU TOO THAT I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED. CONSIDERABLE EFFORT HAS BEEN EXPENDED TO WORK OUT A FOOLPROOF SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM FOR THE DANANG ENCLAVE.

2. APPROXIMATELY FIVE MONTHS AGO, WHEN THE BASE LOADING AT DANANG STARTED ITS UPWARD SPIRAL IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE EXPANSION OF BASE FACILITIES, THE EXISTING TRASH FACILITY HAD TO BE RELOCATED TO HANDLE THE WORKLOAD. A SITE WAS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE AIRBASE PERIMETER IN ORDER TO CENTRALIZE ITS LOCATION AND TO RELEASE WITH RESPECT TO CUSTOMERS VALUABLE LAND NEEDED FOR THE EXPANSION OF FACILITIES WITHIN THE AIRFIELD COMPLEX. PROCEDURE WAS QUITE RESPONSIVE INITIALLY. SUBSEQUENTLY CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE VIETNAMESE POPULATION ^{SOMETIMES EXCEEDING FIVE HUNDRED IN NUMBER} ATTRACTED TO THE DUMP CREATED SITUATIONS THAT WERE DIFFICULT TO CONTROL BY U. S. PERSONNEL. THE NEXT STEP INITIATED TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM WAS SUB-CONTRACT THE TRASH DUMP OPERATION TO A LOCAL CIVILIAN. A CIVILIAN MANAGER WHO HAD THE MEANS TO SUCCESSFULLY OPERATE A DUMP OF THE MAGNITUDE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

No
CONFIDENTIAL
#14

CONFIDENTIAL

LOCATION FOR THE III AF, DANANG FORCES WAS LOCATED.

COMMUNICATION CENTER
CG III MAF

3. A CONTRACT WAS MADE AND THE CIVILIAN DUMP OPENED ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1965, FRANCISCO

I WAS REASSURED THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL COULD SURELY PREVENT HIS "OWN PEOPLE" FROM TRESPASSING PRIVATE PROPERTY AND CONTROL THE OPERATION. THIS CONCEPT IS IN KEEPING WITH ONE OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S SUGGESTIONS (REF B) NOT TO MENTION OFFERING ANOTHER BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY TO THE LOCAL COMMUNITY. FIVE DAYS AGO, THE NEW MANAGER CALLED UPON MY G-4 AND RELATED THAT HIS LIFE HAD BEEN THREATENED, HIS TRUCKS DAMAGED AND TIRES STOLEN BY JUVENILE GANGS INCITED BY VC ELEMENTS, HIS WORKMEN WERE BEATEN AND PREVENTED FROM ENTERING THE DUMP AREA, AND HE WAS FORCED TO ABANDON THE OPERATION.

4. AT THIS MOMENT WORKING WITH I CORPS STAFF TO SEE IF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION CAN BE POSITIVELY CONTROLLED BY RVN PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION ALL UNITS WILL BURN ALL BURNABLE ITEMS PRIOR TO DELIVERY TO THE DUMP.

5. ALL U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN TRASH DUMP OPERATION WHICH BRINGS THEM IN CONTACT WITH LOCAL POPULACE, ARE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. THE NECESSITY TO AVOID ALL CONTACTS AND SITUATIONS THAT CREATE SITUATIONS WHERE BODILY INJURY MAY OCCUR IS REPEATEDLY STRESSED WHEN PERSONNEL ARE BRIEFED FOR THESE OPERATIONS.

6. THE INCIDENT REFERENCED IN YOUR MEMO HAS BEEN INVESTIGATED AND THE RESULTING RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINARY ACTION COMPLETED. *THE MARINE TRIED AND SENTENCED BY SPECIAL COURT MARTIAL.* THE VICTIM, MR HO PHO HAS RECOVERED AND HAS NOT AS YET SUBMITTED ANY CLAIM. SHOULD A CLAIM BE FORTHCOMING, THE INVESTIGATION INCLUDED A RECOMMENDATION THAT IT BE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED. THERE HAS BEEN NO KNOWN ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION TO THIS INCIDENT.

7. I DESIRE TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM WITH OUT HAVING TO RESORT TO ONCE AGAIN RUNNING OUR OWN TRASH OPERATIONS. BE ASSURED THAT I HAVE LONG TAKEN THIS SUBJECT AS A MATTER OF PERSONAL INTEREST AND WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF OUR FUTURE PROGRESS.

GP-4

TOD W-2
050010H ATH

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COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES - MAF

RELEASED BY: *CG*

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

Copy 2 of 2

CONFIDENTIAL
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040340

OCT

CCN: 259
PRIORITY 040340Z
FROM: CG III MAP
TO: CG FMFPAC

DRAFTER
SECT 0-3 ONE 3
TRANS TO
CWO

//S E C R E T//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN BULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT

- A. CINCPAC 290719Z 0065
- B. CG III MAP 020200Z

1. FOLLOWING MSG WAS TRANSMITTED TO GEN WESTMORELAND IN RESPONSE TO A MESSAGE, REF A, FROM ADM SHARP PASSED TO ME. REF B CONTAINED THE ANSWERS TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS. THE REPLY TO REF A WAS CONSISTANT WITH THE CONTENTS OF REF B.

2. IN ANALYZING THE RECENT ATTACKS ON MARBLE MT (DANG EAST) AND CHU LAI A REVIEW OF STEPS INITIATED TO IMPROVE THE DEFENSIVE POSTURE OF THE ENGINEERS OVER THE PAST THREE AND ONE-HALF MONTHS IS FIRST NECESSARY.

A. ON 1 JUL DANANG AIRBASE WAS ATTACKED FROM THE SOUTH. AT THAT TIME THE DANANG TAOR COINCIDED WITH THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE AIRFIELD. UNTIL THE 1 JUL ATTACK, THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES WERE RELUCTANT TO EXTEND THIS BOUNDARY. OBVIOUSLY THIS LIMITATION HAD TO BE EXTENDED SOUTH, AT LEAST TO THE LIMIT OF MORTAR RANGE. THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN SUCCESSIVE STAGES UNTIL OUR PRESENT POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATELY 7000 METERS SOUTH OF THE AIRFIELD. IN ADDITION AN INFANTRY BATTALION IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME DUTY FOR AIRFIELD PERIMETER DEFENSE. FIELDS OF FIRE OUT TO 400 METERS HAVE BEEN CLEARED BY MOVING OVER 800 HOUSES. PATROLS ARE CONDUCTED 1500 METERS DEEP FROM DANANG AIRBASE, NIGHT AND DAY, AMBUSHES ARE SET, AND

13

DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ARE CHANGED DAILY. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO INTERNAL SECURITY PROVIDED FOR BY TENANT UNITS AND COORDINATED BY III MAF.

B. AT CON LAI, TWO COMPANIES ARE ASSIGNED TO THE PERIMETER DEFENSE OF THE AIRFIELD. INFANTRY COMPANIES ARE AUGMENTED BY A PROVISIONAL COMPANY FROM MARINE AIR GROUP 12. AGAIN, THIS IS IN ADDITION TO THE MIA (3-5000 YDS FROM AIRSTRIP) INTERNAL SECURITY AND DAMAGE CONTROL MEASURES.

C. AT THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN FACILITY, MARINE AIR GROUP 16 PROVIDES ITS OWN PERIMETER DEFENSE. THE 1ST BN 9TH MAR GP IS LOCATED APPROX 2300 METERS TO THE SOUTH OF THE FACILITY AND PROVIDES PATROLS THROUGHOUT THE MARBLE MT COMPLEX AT RANDOM INTERVALS. DEFENSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL CANTONMENTS OF MCB-8 MCB-9, USMH AND MAG-16 ARE COORDINATED BY CO MAG-16 FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING INTERFERENCE, FACILITATING EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, AND PROVIDING MUTUAL SUPPORT BY COORDINATING AND REINFORCING FIELDS OF FIRE AND BY ESTABLISHING SPECIAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

3. OF COURSE, THE MOVEMENT OF OUR FORCES OUTWARD FROM THE HARDENED BASE AREAS CREATES OTHER PROBLEMS WHICH YOU ARE FULLY AWARE. THE AREA BETWEEN THE COMBAT TROOPS ON THE EXTREMITIES OF THE ENCLAVE AND THE BASE AREA MUST BE PROVIDED SECURITY SO THAT THEY REMAIN PACIFIED AND SECURED. FOR THIS TASK WE MUST DEPEND ULTIMATELY UPON THE VIETNAMESE. A PROGRAM IS BEING ACTIVELY PURSUED TO ENHANCE THE POPULAR FORCES AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THEREBY STRENGTHENING THE STAND OF THE PEOPLE AND PERMITTING US TO DENY GREATER AREAS TO VIET CONG INFLUENCE.

4. ADDITIONAL MEASURES THAT ARE BEING TAKEN AS RESOURCES ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO IMPROVE OUR PRESENT SECURITY OF BASE AREAS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. DANANG: LONG PRIOR TO THE 28 OCTOBER ATTACK, A DOUBLE PERIMETER CYCLONE FENCE HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE BASE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. ADDITIONALLY, FENCES AND OBSTACLES IN BEING ARE BEING IMPROVED AS RAPIDLY AS MATERIAL BECOMES AVAILABLE. STEPS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY BEEN TAKEN TO EXPEDITE RECEIPT OF CONCERTINA AND BARBED WIRE. ADDITIONAL CLASS IV ITEMS ARE SCARCE BUT ON ORDER. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED AN ADVANCE SHIPMENT OF 30 SEISMIC INTRUSION DEVICES OUT OF A TOTAL OF 600 WE EXPECT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE FIRST 30 HAVE GONE TO THE AIRBASE DEFENSE BATTALION.

B. CMI IAI: PERMANENT PERIMETER FENCING IS BEING INVESTIGATED. PRESENT PERIMETER TACTICAL WIRE BARRIER IS BEING STRENGTHENED WITH MORE BARBED WIRE AND CONCERTINA AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

C. MARBLE MOUNTAIN COMPLEX: EVENTUALLY AS FACILITIES EXPAND AND INDIVIDUAL UNITS INCREASE IN SIZE, THE COMPLEX WILL BE ONE CONTIGUOUS AREA WHICH CAN BE MUCH MORE EASILY CONTROLLED AND DEFENDED THAN AT PRESENT. HOWEVER, FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, MAG-16 HAS DOUBLED THE 100 MAN PERIMETER DEFENSE WITH PERSONNEL FROM HISER OWN RESOURCES. THIS CAN ONLY BE MAINTAINED FOR A SHORT PERIOD AND IS AT THE EXPENSE OF OVERLOADING TECHNICAL PERSONNEL AS HOSPITAL AND USA FACILITIES ARE COMPLETED. IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO AUGMENT MARBLE MOUNTAIN COMPLEX WITH AS MUCH AS ONE INFANTRY BN.

5. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED, OF COURSE, WITH OUR DEFENSES ON THE SEAWARD SIDE. IN THIS RESPECT NAV SUPT ACT IS CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY OF DANANG HARBOR AND HAS ONE DD ASSIGNED FROM TG 70.8 ON PATROL OF OUTER HARBOR AREA AND SEVERAL SMALL BOAT PATROLS WITHIN HARBOR.

NAV ADV DETACHMENT PROVIDES OWN SECURITY AND OCCASIONALLY HAS SOME SWIFTS AVAILABLE FOR INTERCEPT OF UNIDENTIFIED OR HOSTILE VESSELS IN GENERAL DANANG AREA. CTF 115 MAINTAINS PATROLS OFF COAST WITH VARIOUS SHIPS. CTG 115.3 NORMALLY HAS 3 WPBS IN DANANG AT ANY ONE TIME. THEY HAVE BEEN MADE AVAIL UPON OCCASION. NAV ADV GROUP COORDINATES III MAF REQUIREMENTS FOR VNA JUNK FORCES SUPPORT. FOR THE FUTURE, WE TENTATIVELY PLAN TO USE NAVADVGRP AS SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT FOR EMERGENCY REQUESTS FOR SMALL BOAT PATROLS OUTSIDE HARBOR AND NAVSUPT ACT FOR PATROLS WITHIN HARBOR. NAVADVGRP PERS MAN COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CENTER ON 24 HOUR BASIS AND HAVE FACILITIES TO MAINTAIN RADIO COMM WITH ALL FRIENDLY FORCES AFLOAT. DURING MORNING OF 28 OCT ALL NAVAL FORCES IN AREA PROVIDED IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO OUR REQUESTS FOR AFLOAT PATROLS AND BLOCKING FORCES. WEAK AREAS STILL EXIST, PRIMARILY WITH RESPECT TO COMMAND AUTHORITY. WHAT IS NEEDED IS AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMAND OF ALL US FORCES IN AREA TO BE CHOPPED TO CG III MAF DURING EMERGENCY DEFENSE CONDITIONS.

6. FOR THE FUTURE, PHYSICAL BARRIERS AROUND OUR AIR BASES MUST BE IMPROVED. PERMANENT CYCLONE FENCING WITH CLEARED AND WELL LIGHTED FIELDS OF FIRE, COUNTER MORTAR RADAR, AND AMPLE ANTI INTRUSION DEVICES INCLUDING MINES SEEM TO OFFER THE BEST SECURITY WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE MANPOWER. ARMC0 REVENEMENTS ARE PLANNED AND PROGRAMMED FOR III MAF UNITS AT ALL THREE AIRFIELDS (AF HAS REVENEMENTS FOR 957 AT DANANG). PROGRAMMED AT PRESENT ARE 40 EACH FOR CHU LAI AND DANANG. ANOTHER 110 ARE PLANNED; 40 FOR CHU LAI, 70 FOR MARBLE MOUNTAIN. THE MATERIALS AND INSTALLATION COST OF ALL THIS WILL BE CONSIDERABLE; HOWEVER, AN ADEQUATE MEANS OF EQUATING LOSS OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND LIVES TO DOLLARS IS NOT POSSIBLE. I SHALL PURSUE THIS PROGRAM OF

IMPROVING OUR PHYSICAL SECURITY FROM HERE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.
WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRIVE TO IMPROVE COORDINATION BETWEEN MARINES,
OTHER US FORCES, AND VN ELEMENTS AT DANANG AIRBASE. AT PRESENT, I LACK
CLEARCUT AUTHORITY TO DIRECT ALL ELEMENTS ON THE BASE TO COMPLY WITH
BASE DEFENSE AND SECURITY DIRECTIVES AND CONTROL ACCESS OF PERSONNEL
TO ENTER BASE. THIS INCLUDES AUTHORITY TO CONTROL TRAFFIC MOVING ON
AND OFF THE AIRBASE. ANY ASSISTANCE THAT CAN BE PROVIDED WILL BE
GREATLY APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS. MAGEN WALT.

GF-4

RELEASED BY _____

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATION CENTER
CG III MAF
c/o FPO, San Francisco

DRAFTED BY JULIAKAT
SECTION 6-2 PAGE 2

PRIORITY 031456Z

FM: CG III MAF
TO: CG MAF PAC

SPECOP
//CONFIDENTIAL//

HAS BEEN SENT

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL KRULAK

1. ON THE EVENING OF 30 SEP, III MAF RECEIVED REPORT FROM DANANG GENERAL RECEIPTERY DETACHMENT (GRD) (704TH INTC OL DES) THAT VILLAGERS AT BT 105640 STATED AN AMERICAN WAS IN CUSTODY OF 3 VC. ADDITIONAL INFO WAS REQUESTED.
2. ON 1 OCT GRD PASSED TO III MAF FOLLOW-UP INFO RECEIVED FROM TWO SERRAVALLE AGENTS. INFO INDICATED THAT A USMC JUMP HAD BEEN STOPPED SOUTH OF MARBLE MTN VIC BT 098670; JUMP BURIED; MARINE TAKEN CAPTIVE. LAST KNOWN LOCATION OF CAPTIVE WAS CAE HAI VILLAGE (BT 105640) AT 301000H. PLATOON OF B/1/9 WAS OPERATING IN AREA AT THAT TIME; REPORTED CONTACT WITH SEPARATED VC COMPANY (III MAF SIGREP #153); NEGATIVE INFO ON CAPTIVE. GROUND AND AERIAL RECON ET SEARCH FOR BURIED VC WERE PRODUCED NEGATIVE RESULTS.
3. ON EVENING OF 1 OCT GRD REPORTED INFO THAT CAPTIVE WAS BEING HELD IN AREA OF BT 050645. TWO PLATOONS WERE DEPLOYED IN BLOCKING POS. AIRBORNE REPORTED LOSS OF SMALL AMOUNT OF AREA HOLD BY ADDITIONAL PFC PLATOONS FOLLOWING SEARCHING WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. SEVEN VCS TAKEN IN AREA INDICATE NO KNOWLEDGE OF CAPTIVE IN AREA.
4. GRD HAS ADVISED AGENTS IN HOI AN AREA THAT REWARD OF 100,000 PIASTERS WOULD BE PAID FOR RETURN OF REPORTED CAPTIVE ALIVE.
5. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT VC DO HAVE MARINE IN CUSTODY. A PRIVATE ROBERT ROBERT GARWOOD, 2059669, USMC WAS REPORTED MISSING FROM SVC CO HUS 3RD BATTALION ON 23 SEP (CG 3RD BATTALION REPORT OF MISSING 301510Z SEP TO SECURITY INFO CENTER). GARWOOD LAST SEEN AT 1800 23 SEP WHEN HE WAS DISPATCHED FROM TFS BT 101000H TO DIVISION HQ. WAS DRIVING M-427 (HIGHWAY 173) WHICH IS IN THE VIC. INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

TOD
03/1056Z

SECRET
AS DEPT-SENT.

DD FORM 162-2 (1-64)
FM CG
TO CG FM/AC

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT
SUBJ: COMBAT OPERATIONS CONTROL STRUCTURE FOR USMACV (U)

1. COMUSMACV HAS CONVENED ON RATHER SHORT NOTICE A STUDY GROUP TO DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE OPTIMUM STRUCTURE FOR USMACV FOR THE COMMAND, ALLOCATION, COORDINATION, AND METHOD OF CONTROL OF US AND US SUPPORTED COMBAT OPERATIONS IN RVN. ACCORDING TO THE PRECEPT, THE STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING AREA

S

OF INTEREST:

A. CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF COMBAT OPERATIONS OF MAJOR SUBORDINATE US/THIRD COUNTRY ELEMENTS.

B. DIRECTION AND COORDINATION OF COMBINED US/THIRD COUNTRY -- RVNAF COMBAT OPERATIONS.

C. ALLOCATION, COORDINATION AND METHOD OF CONTROL, IN SUPPORT OF US/THIRD COUNTRY AND RVNAF COMBAT OPERATIONS, OF:

(1) NAVAL SUPPORT TO IN

C

LIDE NAVAL GUNFIRE, NAVAL AIR

, AND

ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS LIFT.

(2) TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT

TO INCLUDE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY ARMY AVIATION.

(3) ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT AND OTHER FORMS OF COMBAT SUPPORT SUCH AS ENGINEER AND CHEMICAL.

(4) AIRLIFT, BOTH AIR FORCE AND ARMY, AND OTHER MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT.

(5) COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT.

(6) INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.

2. PRECEPT FOR THE STUDY RECEIVED 30 SEP (COPY BEING AIRMAILED). THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE STUDY WILL BE A STEERING COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY BRIG GEN COLLINS REPRESENTING MACV J-3 AND SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF VARIOUS STAFF AGENCIES AND COMMANDS INCLUDING III MAF. THE STEERING COMMITTEE WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THREE WORKING GROUPS.

10(1)

3. LEARNED ON 1 OCT BY TELEPHONE THAT THE STEERING COMMITTEE HAD CONVENED FOR ITS FIRST MEETING. A LETTER CALLING THE MEETING DEPARTED SAIGON 27 SEPTEMBER. BUT HAS NOT YET REACHED US.

4. STEINKRAUS IS IN THE HOSPITAL AND ED HARPER WAS NOT AVAILABLE SO WE WERE REPRESENTED AT THIS FIRST MEETING. AS WE LEARNED SUBSEQUENTLY, BY CAPT ALLEN, HERAS ASSISTANT, NOTHING SUBS

ANTIVE, HOWEVER, WAS TRANSACTED; THIS

WAS JUST A LET'S-GET-STARTED MEETING.

5. IN ADDITION TO REPRESENTATION ON THE STEERING COMMITTEE, WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO PROVIDE A MAJOR OR LIEUTENANT COLONEL TO ONE OF THE

HOBBENANGABAWISABWE BOJOTORAV LIEUTENANT COLONEL WHO IS SUFFICIENTLY ADRIFT IN THESE MATTERS TO HOLD UP THE MARINE CORPS END. THEREFORE, I AM SENDING DOWN THELL FISHER EVEN THOUGH HE IS A COLONEL AND WILL OUTFRANK THE GROUP CHAIRMAN. THELL AS DIVISION INSPECTOR IS JUST GETTING UNDERWAY. A VIGORO IS

INSPECTION PROGRAM, HIS ABSENCE FOR THIRTY DAYS OR SO WILL HURT US. HOWEVER, THIS IS SOMETHING I AM PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY.

6. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE THREE GROUPS, WHICH GO TO WORK 4 OCT, WILL HAVE ABOUT 14 DAYS TO PRODUCE THEIR RESPECTIVE PRODUCTS BEFORE THE STEERING COMMITTEE RECONVENES. BY THAT TIME ELMER GLIDDEN SHOULD BE BACK FROM HONOLULU. HE IS AN OBVIOUS CHOICE FOR THE STEERING COMMITTEE. WITH ELMER AND THELL IN SAIGON WE SHOULD HAVE A GOOD BALANCE OF MATURE MARINE AIR AND GROUND EXPERIENCE. ALSO BOTH HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT HIGH LEVEL STAFF DUTY TO UNDERSTAND AND COPE WITH THE IMPLICIT PROBLEMS.

7. JUST WHAT RESPECTIVE AREAS WILL BE ASSIGNED WHICH WORKING GROUPS IS NOT YET KNOWN SO WE DON'T EVEN KNOW IS OUR WORKING MEMBER WILL BE STRATEGICALLY LOCATED. HOWEVER, I HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THELL WILL MAKE HIS INFLUENCE FELT ACROSS THE BOARD.

8. AS I HAVE INDICATED, WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS STUDY FROM OUR OWN RESOURCES. HOWEVER, IF YOU WISH TO PROVIDE A WELL QUALIFIED WORKING MEMBER IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

GP-4

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SECRET #1062

SSO Channel
39N-384

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CCN: 0301592
PRIORITY 0302002 OCT65

DRAFTER _____
SECT G-3 PHONE 3
TRANS TOD _____
CWO _____

TO

FROM: CG III MAF
~~INFO. COMUSMACV~~
//SECRET//
GEN WESTMOORELAND
PERSONAL FOR ~~ADJUTANT~~ FROM MAJ GEN WALT

~~INFO FOR GEN WESTMOORELAND~~

A. GINCPAC 290719Z OCT65

1. ~~YOUR PERSONAL REF A, HAS BEEN PASSED TO ME BY GENERAL WESTMOORE~~
IN RESPONSE TO **FOLLOWING SUBMITTED FOR YOUR**
CONSIDERATION

2. IN ANALYZING THE RECENT ATTACKS ON MARBLE MT (DANANG EAST) AND CHU LAI A REVIEW OF STEPS INITIATED TO IMPROVE THE DEFENSIVE POSTURE OF THE ENCLAVES OVER THE PAST THREE AND ONE-HALF MONTHS IS FIRST NECESSARY.

A. ON 1 JUL DANANG AIRBASE WAS ATTACKED FROM THE SOUTH. AT THAT TIME THE DANANG TACR COINCIDED WITH THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE AIRFIELD. UNTIL THE 1 JUL ATTACK, THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES WERE RELUCTANT TO EXTEND THIS BOUNDARY. OBVIOUSLY THIS LIMITATION HAD TO BE EXTENDED SOUTH, AT LEAST TO THE LIMIT OF MORTAR RANGE. THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN SUCCESSIVE STAGES UNTIL OUR PRESENT POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATELY 7000 METERS SOUTH OF THE AIRFIELD. IN ADDITION AN INFANTRY BATTALION IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME DUTY FOR AIRFIELD PERIMETER DEFENSE. FIELDS OF FIRE OUT TO 400 METERS HAVE BEEN CLEARED BY MOVING OVER 800 HOUSES. PATROLS ARE CONDUCTED 1500 METERS DEEP FROM DANANG AIRBASE, NIGHT AND DAY, AMBUSHES ARE SET, AND DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ARE CHANGED DAILY. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO INTERNAL SECURITY PROVIDED FOR BY TENANT UNITS AND COORDINATED BY **III MAF**

9

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Channel
250-114

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

[Faint, mostly illegible text follows, appearing to be a list of items or a detailed report. Some legible fragments include:]

- 1. *[illegible]*
- 2. *[illegible]*
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- 20. *[illegible]*

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SSD Chumell

B. AT CHU LAI, TWO COMPANIES ARE ASSIGNED TO THE PERIMETER DEFENSE OF THE AIRFIELD. INFANTRY COMPANIES ARE AUGMENTED BY A PROVISIONAL COMPANY FROM MARINE AIR GROUP 12. AGAIN, THIS IS IN ADDITION TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND DAMAGE CONTROL MEASURES.

THE MLR (3-5000 YDS OUT FROM AIRSTRIP)

C. AT THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN FACILITY, MARINE AIR GROUP 16 PROVIDES ITS OWN PERIMETER DEFENSE. THE 1ST BN 9TH MAR CP IS LOCATED APPROX 2300 METERS TO THE SOUTH OF THE FACILITY AND PROVIDES PATROLS THROUGHOUT THE MARBLE MT COMPLEX AT RANDOM INTERVALS. DEFENSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL CANTONMENTS OF MCB-8, MCB-9, USMH AND MAG-16 ARE COORDINATED BY CO MAG-16 FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING INTERFERENCE, FACILITATING EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, AND PROVIDING MUTUAL SUPPORT BY COORDINATING AND REINFORCING FIELDS OF FIRE AND BY ESTABLISHING SPECIAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

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A. DANANG: LONG PRIOR TO THE 28 OCTOBER ATTACK, A DOUBLE PERIMETER CYCLONE FENCE HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE BASE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. ADDITIONALLY, FENCES AND OBSTACLES IN BEING ARE BEING

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

300 Channel

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

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SSO Channel

CONTINUOUSLY

IMPROVED AS RAPIDLY AS MATERIAL BECOMES AVAILABLE. STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO EXPEDITE RECEIPT OF CONCERTINA AND BARBED WIRE. ADDITIONAL **ARE SCARCE BUT** GLASS TY ITEMS ARE ON ORDER. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED AN ADVANCE SHIPMENT OF 30 SEISMIC INTRUSION DEVICES OUT OF A TOTAL OF 600 WE EXPECT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE FIRST 30 HAVE GONE TO THE AIRBASE DEFENSE BATTALION.

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AS HOSPITAL AND NSA FACILITIES ARE COMPLETED

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

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SSO Channel

THE FUTURE, WE TENTATIVELY PLAN TO USE NAVADVGRP AS SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT FOR EMERGENCY REQUESTS FOR SMALL BOAT PATROLS OUTSIDE HARBOR AND NAVSUPT ACT FOR PATROLS WITHIN HARBOR. NAVADVGRP PERS MAN COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CENTER ON 24 HOUR BASIS AND HAVE FACILITIES TO MAINTAIN RADIO COMM WITH ALL FRIENDLY FORCES AFLOAT. DURING MORNING OF 28 OCT ALL NAVAL FORCES IN AREA PROVIDED IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO OUR REQUESTS FOR AFLOAT PATROLS AND BLOCKING FORCES. WEAK AREAS STILL EXIST, PRIMARILY WITH RESPECT TO COMMAND AUTHORITY. WHAT IS NEEDED IS AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMAND OF ALL US FORCES IN AREA TO BE CHOPPED TO CG III MAF DURING EMERGENCY DEFENSE CONDITIONS.

6. FOR THE FUTURE, PHYSICAL BARRIERS AROUND OUR AIR BASES MUST BE IMPROVED. PERMANENT CYCLONE FENCING WITH CLEARED AND WELL LIGHTED FIELDS OF FIRE, COUNTER MORTAR RADAR, AND AMPLE ANTI INTRUSION DEVICES INCLUDING MINES SEEM TO OFFER THE BEST SECURITY WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE MANPOWER. ARMCO REPLETMENTS ARE PLANNED AND PROGRAMMED FOR ALL THREE AIRFIELDS. III MAF UNITS AT (CAF HAS REPLETMENTS FOR B-57S AT DANANG) PROGRAMMED AT PRESENT ARE 40 EACH FOR CHU LAI AND DANANG.

ANOTHER 110 ARE PLANNED; 40 FOR CHU LAI, 70 FOR MARBLE MOUNTAIN. THE MATERIALS AND INSTALLATION COST OF ALL THIS WILL BE CONSIDERABLE; HOWEVER, AN ADEQUATE MEANS OF EQUATING LOSS OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND LIVES TO DOLLARS IS NOT POSSIBLE. I SHALL PURSUE THIS PROGRAM OF IMPROVING OUR PHYSICAL SECURITY FROM HERE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRIVE TO IMPROVE COORDINATION BETWEEN MARINES, OTHER US FORCES, AND VN ELEMENTS AT DANANG AIRBASE. AT PRESENT, I LACK CLEARCUT AUTHORITY TO DIRECT ALL ELEMENTS ON THE BASE TO COMPLY WITH BASE DEFENSE AND SECURITY DIRECTIVES, AND TO CONTROL ACCESS OF PERSONNEL TO ENTER BASE. THIS INCLUDES AUTHORITY TO CONTROL TRAFFIC MOVING ON AND OFF THE AIRBASE. ANY ASSISTANCE FROM THAT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : *[Faint text]* DATE: *[Faint text]*

FROM : *[Faint text]*

SUBJECT: *[Faint text]*

[Faint body text]

[Handwritten notes]

[Handwritten initials]

CAN BE PROVIDED

YOU IN ANY OF THIS WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS.

J
MAGEN WALT.

GP-4

RELEASED BY *R. [Signature]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

CONFIDENTIAL

HAS BEEN SENT

S S O CHANNEL

SSO
OCN: _____

TOP
20/0649Z

DRAFTER _____ EHS
SECT G-3 PHONE 3
TRANS TOD _____
CWO _____

IMMEDIATE O 20 06 50 Z

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TOP: 20/0600Z
oct 08

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG FMFPAC
CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)

//CONFIDENTIAL//

PERSONAL FOR LINGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT
COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY

A. CG III MAF PERSONAL 182305Z

1. THE STEERING COMMITTEE MET AS SCHEDULED AT 191430H. THE TWO PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONS, PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED IN REF A, WERE PRESENTED; THAT IS, (A) RETAIN CURRENT STRUCTURE, OR (B) EMPLOY ARMY COMPONENT COMMAND TO EXERCISE CONTROL OF US ARMY FORCES. ALSO PRESENTED WAS PLAN TO ESTABLISH MAAG UNDER DEPUTY C/S FOR ADVISORY EFFORT. THIS LAST PLAN WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH EITHER (A) OR (B).

2. OTHER AREAS AND ORGANIZATIONS DISCUSSED INCLUDED:

A. JOINT TASK FORCES FOR EACH CORPS AREA. AF OBJECTED STRONGLY BECAUSE THIS WOULD SPLIT OFF OPCON OF AF WINGS/SQUADRONS.

B. LAND FORCE COMMANDER. USMC OBJECTED BECAUSE IT WOULD FRAGMENT III MAF.

3. ELMER GLIDDEN ATTEMPTED TO INTERJECT MACV TOC AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR STUDY GROUP'S CONSIDERATION. GEN COLLINS REPLY WAS THAT BASIC ORGANIZATION MUST BE SETTLED FIRST AND THEN III MAF WOULD BE CONSULTED CONCERNING TOC.

4. GENERAL CONSENSUS WAS THAT CURRENT ORGANIZATION IS MOST DESIRABLE. WITH DETAILED POLICING UP IN THE AREA OF US ARMY VIETNAM FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION AND BY REDUCING COMUSMACV'S SPAN OF CONTROL BY DEVELOPING A JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE GROUP AND AMALGAMATING NAG AND TF 115, IT COULD BE PRESENTED AS

8

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P 010734Z
FM CG 111 MAF
TO CG FMFPAC

TOD
41/47512
RB

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT

1. STAFF FMFPAC HAS BY TELCON SUGGESTED THAT WE USE CODE NAMES FOR COMPANY SIZE OPERATIONS. THIS WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH COMUSMACV POLICY WHICH LIMITS USE OF CODE NAMES TO OPERATIONS OF THREE COMPANY SIZE OR LARGER. MACV J-3 ADVISES THAT A FORTH-COMING DIRECTIVE ON SIT REPS WILL RE-PUBLISH THIS POLICY AND WILL ALSO ASSIGN BLOCKS OF INITIAL LETTERS TO ALL MAJOR COMMANDS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO WORD CODE NAMES. WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO USE CODE WORDS TO COVER ON-GOING PROJECTS; FOR EXAMPLE, THE USE OF GOLDEN FLEECE AS AN ALL INCLUSIVE CODE WORD COVERING PROTECTION OF THE RICE HARVEST. IN ADDITION, ALL OPERATIONS WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY REVIEWED TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF CONSOLIDATING OPERATIONS WITH THE SAME GENERAL PURPOSE OR DIFFERENT UNITS OPERATING IN CONTIGUOUS AREAS INTO ONE GENERAL OPERATION SO THAT THE MACV CRITERIA FOR CODE NAMES IS MET.

2. THE STAFF THOROUGHLY UNDERSTANDS THE USEFULNESS OF CODE NAMES TO IDENTIFY OPERATIONS AND TO PREPARE REPORTS WHICH MANIFEST OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE MAF IN ATTAINING THE DESIRED DEGREE OF PACIFICATION AND DESTROYING VC UNITS WHEN THEY CAN BE IDENTIFIED AND FIXED.

GP-4

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6

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FPO San Francisco, California 96601

DRAFTER: NAH
SECT: G-2 III MAFPHONE: 4
31 OCTOBER 1965/dlp

CCN: 01

PRIORITY: 010153Z OCT

FROM: CG III MAF/MOC
TO: COMUSMACV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *a*

// CONFIDENTIAL //
FOR BRIG GEN GSO-LEY FROM MAJ GEN WALT

HAS BEEN SENT

LARCS (C)

A. IR 291150Z

1. CONCUR COMPLETELY WITH YOUR SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO EMPLOYMENT OF SUBJECT VEHICLES, WITH 10 LARCS MAINTAINED IN AN OPERATIONAL STATUS AT ALL TIMES AND AIR FORCE A/C REQUIREMENTS ASWORB NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED, OFFLOADING OF SPECIAL EXPRESS CAN BE EFFECTED WITHOUT THE AF LCM-6'S. *DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR COOPERATION. WARM REGARDS*

GP-4

ACC
RELEASED BY: *[Signature]*

TOD MACV
01/1124H ATH

DIST: COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES - FILE
COPIES 2-4 OF 4 COPIES - MAF

P 010153Z/OCT

4 of 4

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