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17 FEB 1966

(U) [Redacted]

[Redacted] ( unclassified upon removal of the basic report)

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BEST ENDORSEMENT on CG III MAF/NCC ltr 103/RPL/am Ser:00 10666  
of 28Jan66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

1. Forwarded.

*M. C. Dalby*  
M. C. DALBY  
By direction

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[Redacted]

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66 1113

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO, San Francisco,  
California 96601

UNCLASSIFIED

103/RPL/am  
28 JAN 1966

0010666

[REDACTED]

From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology(U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) CG FMFPac msg 251940Z Aug65

Encl: (1) III Marine Amphibious Force Command Chronology for November 1965

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is herewith submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

  
E.W. WALT

COPY NO 1 OF 6 COPIES

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## References

- UNCLASSIFIED**
- (a) Marine Division Command Chronology, November 1965
  - (b) 1st Marine Air Wing Command Chronology, November 1965
  - (c) Maps, Vietnam L701 Series, Scale 1:50,000 Sheets 6658, I II III IV; 6659, II III IV; 6756, I IV; 6757, II III; 6559 I II III IV; 6560, II III IV


## Enclosures

- Filed*
- (1) CG III MAF ltr 103/DEW/lpf Ser 0041765; Subj: Expansion of III MAF DANANG TAOR dated 25 Nov 1965
  - (2) COMUSMACV Letter of Instruction (LOI-4) dated 21 Nov 1965 (S)
  - (3) Force/MCC/I Corps Order 2740.1
  - (4) I Corps Monthly Evaluation Report for November 1965
  - (5) 7th Engineer Battalion Command Chronology, November 1965
  - (6) Force Logistics Support Group Command Chronology, November 1965
  - (7) Staff Study; results of Operation GOLDEN FLEECE
  - (8) Deployment Completion Report of Mobile Construction Battalion 3
  - (9) Operation Plan 106-66
  - (10) Proposed Table of Organization for Naval Component Commander, USMACV
  - (11) Viet Cong Order of Battle as of 30 November 1965

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III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

NOVEMBER 1965



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PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART TWO


SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART THREE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

PART FOUR

ENCLOSURES



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PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

III Marine Amphibious Force

Danang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam

LEWIS W. WALT

Major General United States Marine Corps

Commanding

Command Chronology for period 1 November - 30 November 1965

Chief of Staff	Col George C. AXTELL, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff	Col Howard E. WERTMAN, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Col Don W. GALBREATH, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Col Leo J. DULACKI, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col Edwin H. SIMMONS, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Col Harold A. HAYES, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	Maj Charles J. KETTER, USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6	Col Elmer G. GLIDDEN JR, USMC
Supply Officer	Col Howard G. TAFT, USMC
Force Engineer	LtCol Lester G. HARMON, USMC
Communications - Electronics Officer	Col Frederick C. DODSON
Adjutant	LtCol Burton L. LUCAS JR, USMC
Base Development Officer	LtCol Charles F. LANGLEY, USMC

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SUBORDINATE UNITS

- 3d Marine Division
- 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
- Force Logistics Support Group
- 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
- 7th Engineer Battalion
- 9th Motor Transport Battalion
- 5th Communications Battalion

COMMANDER

- MajGen Lewis W. WALT, USMC
- BGen Keith B. MCCUTCHEON, USMC
- Col Mauro J. PADALINO, USMC
- LtCol William F. DONAHUE JR, USMC
- LtCol Ermine L. MEEKER, USMC
- Maj Joseph F. JONES, USMC
- LtCol Hercules R. KELLY JR, USMC  
From 12 November

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Average Monthly Strength

USMC		USN		TOTAL
OFFICER	ENLISTED	OFFICER	ENLISTED	
2491	35,273	419	5,772	43955



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## PART TWO

## SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

A. General. During November 1965 III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was located at coordinates (AT 994757) which is 350 meters west of DANANG Air Base in the Republic of Vietnam, adjacent to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Post. All forces under operational control of III MAF were located in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and HMM 363 were attached to Field Forces Vietnam in II Corps Tactical Zone and an Air Surveillance Radar Team from MASS-2 was located at PLEIKU. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, returned to III MAF control and relocated at CHU LAI on 12 November and the Air Surveillance Radar Team returned to DANANG on 16 November. III MAF continued to grow as personnel strength increased from 43011 in October to 43955 in November. The DANANG TAOR was expanded as shown in enclosure (1). The 3d Marine Division Headquarters was moved from a position adjacent to III MAF Headquarters to the vicinity of coordinates (AT 954751) early in November.

B. Scope of Operation. COMUSMACV published a new letter of instruction (LOI) to III MAF on 21 November (Enclosure (2)) thereby enlarging the scope of operations from defensive/limited offensive to offensive. III MAF forces are now cleared to conduct operations not only against VC forces which place an immediate threat to established bases, but against remote base areas in order to eliminate the VC from the I Corps area. The specific mission and concept of the new LOI were:

1. Mission. The III MAF will conduct military operations in I ARVN Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) in support of and in coordination with CG, I ARVN Corps, and in other areas of RVN as directed by COMUSMACV, in order to assist the GVN to defeat the VC and extend GVN control over all of Viet Nam.

2. Concept. The III MAF will be deployed in I CTZ generally along RVN coast line with major base areas at HUE-PUU BAI, DANANG, and CHU LAI. III MAF will defend and secure these bases and will conduct search and destroy operations against VC forces and bases which pose an immediate threat to their security. In addition, III MAF will conduct search and destroy operations against more distant VC bases in order to destroy or drive the VC out. Clearing operations will be conducted in selected areas contiguous to major bases. III MAF will be prepared to conduct reserve/reaction or contingency operations in I CTZ or elsewhere in RVN as directed by COMUSMACV, to support the defense of critical bases, reinforce the defense of population centers and assist friendly forces in contact with the enemy.

C. Activities. Despite monsoon rains, III MAF offensive operations

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intensified to counter the increasing threat of Viet Cong activities. Civic Action and Psychological Warfare programs were also intensified during November.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ OPERATIONS

A. Major Operations. Two major offensive operations were conducted in November. These were search and destroy operations coordinated with ARVN forces.

1. BLACK FERRET. Operation BLACK FERRET (LIEN KET 12) was a coordinated search and destroy operation conducted from 3 to 6 November by 1st and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, two platoons of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 4th ARVN Regiment. Platoons of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion established blocking positions at (BS 5290) and (BS 5493) while two battalions of the 7th Marines swept the area bounded by coordinates (BS 5796)(BS 5242)(BS 5992) and the TRA BONG river. ARVN battalions swept the area bounded by (BS 4790)(BS 6091)(BS 6384) and (BS 4782). The VC casualties were 2 KIA, 21 VCC and 9 VCS while III MAF suffered 9 WIA. Miss Dickey CHAPELLE, feature writer for the National Observer, died of wounds inflicted by a booby trapped 81mm mortar shell while covering the operation.

2. BLUE MARLIN. This operation was a two phase, coordinated, amphibious search and destroy operation conducted by US and RVN forces.

a. Phase I. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7) and 3d Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Brigade (VMMB) made amphibious landings at (BS 3430) and (BT 3332) respectively on 10 November. The USMC force moved southeasterly while the VMMB force moved northeasterly until crossing highway #1 then turned southeasterly paralleling USMC forces. Very light resistance was encountered in this phase and it terminated at the northern edge of the CHU LAI TAOR at 121120H. The casualty results of phase I were: 2 VC KIA, 48 VCS, 3 VC weapons captured and 2 USMC WIA. Villagers in the assault stated that VC forces had departed the area two days before the landing. Phase I was significant in that it was the first coordinated US and RVN Marine amphibious assault.

b. Phase II. The second and final phase of BLUE MARLIN was launched on 16 November. Battalion Landing Team 3/3 landed over Orange Beach (BT 264438) at 160900H and swept between TRUONG GIANG and the coast northwestward to THU BON river, while the 39th and 11th ARVN Ranger Battalions; 5th Battalion, 4th Regiment APC; and 4 RF Companies from QUANG NAM Special Sector swept the area between route #1 and TRUONG GIANG from the line of departure (BT 170417)-(BT 217438) to the CAU LAU river. The operation terminated at 181240H with the final results shown in Table I. Details of November operations are reported in references (a) and (b).

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TABLE ICASUALTY RESULTS OF OPERATION BLUE MARLIN

	BY USMC	BY ARVN	BY RVNN	TOTAL
VC KIA	1	24		25
VCC		15		15
VCS	24	21	34	79
WFMS		9		9

B. I Corps Assistance. On two occasions during November, the Commanding General, I Corps, requested III MAF reinforcement of ARVN forces under attack by the VC. The first occasion was on 17 November when the VC overran HIEP DUC District Headquarters vicinity (AT 9124). III MAF helilifted the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 5th ARVN Regiment into the area while Marine aircraft from MAG-11 and MAG-12 provided close air support. The second occasion was on 22 November when VC forces of estimated regimental strength attacked an outpost near TEACH TRU, 30 miles south of QUANG NGAI, manned by the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion and two RF companies. Low ceilings and visibility hindered close air support efforts, but the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines was helilifted into the area to assist in repelling the attack.

C. Minor Operations. In November, III MAF conducted 7,997 small unit operations consisting of patrols, search and destroy operations, ambushes, listening posts and scout-sniper actions. Although this was more than twice the number of actions conducted in October, the number of III MAF contacts with VC forces decreased from 287 in October to 250 in November, indicating that the VC have responded to the increased vigilance by electing to avoid contact in the areas of Marine activity.

Table II shows the small unit actions, by type, for November. Table III shows the casualty results of III MAF operations. There was a decrease of 34 in VC casualties (VCS not counted) and a decrease of 168 in USMC casualties from October operations. The III MAF confirmed kill ratio for November was: 5.66:1.

TABLE IIIII MAF SMALL UNIT ACTIONS (COMPANY OR LESS), NOVEMBER 1965

<u>Patrols</u>	<u>Search and Destroy</u>	<u>Ambush</u>	<u>Listening Post</u>	<u>Scout Sniper</u>	<u>Total</u>
3,376	106	2,385	1,955	175	7,997

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TABLE III

CASUALTY RESULTS OF III MAF OPERATIONS, NOVEMBER 1965

<u>USMC</u>		<u>VC</u>	
KIA	24	KIA	126
DOW	11	KBA	72
WIA	222	WIA	33
MIA	4	VCC	22
		VCS	623

D. Air Support

1. Fixed Wing. III MAF provided fixed wing aircraft during November as indicated in Table IV.

TABLE IVIII MAF FIXED WING OPERATIONS - NOVEMBER 1965

	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>2D AD</u>	<u>TF 77</u>
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT	34	144	
HELICOPTER ESCORT	554		
LANDING ZONE PREPARATION	38		
TPQ-10	735		
SEARCH AND ATTACK	0		
PHOTO	64	636	
INTERDICTION	274		
AIR DEFENSE SCRAMBLE	0		
AIR DEFENSE COMBAT AIR PATROL	0		
SPECIAL (FIRE STRIKES RESCUE CAP)	26	195	
ELECTRONIC COUNTER-MEASURE		98	4
TOTAL	1725	1077	4

2. Helicopter. III MAF helicopters flew 20,332 sorties transporting 27,690 troops and 1,284 tons of cargo in support of III MAF and I Corps operations, during November.

E. Naval Gunfire. The lack of concentrated contact with VC forces reduced the requirement for naval gunfire support of III MAF during November; consequently only 308 rounds were fired. Naval gunfire was used very effectively in support of ARVN forces as reported in section X and enclosure (2).

F. Rotation. Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/3 arrived on 18 November and relieved BLT 2/3 on 20 November.

**G. Force Reconnaissance.** The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company established a forward base at the Special Forces Camp at BA TO (BS 567322) on 22 November. The detachment stationed there will conduct patrols to gather intelligence information on VC activities.

### III. INTELLIGENCE

**A. General.** VC activity during the month of November continued to emphasize small unit harassing tactics including ambushes, probes, sniper fire, the use of mines, both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel and the emplacement of booby traps. In the vicinity of the HUE-PHU BAI enclave an increase in insurgent small unit activity was reported. Within the Danang enclave the Viet Cong continued to manifest a strong reaction to incursion of Marine forces into areas normally under his control. Although small unit actions were frequent throughout the Danang enclave, the Viet Cong were particularly active in the southern portion of the area where they undertook determined efforts to counter the joint USMC-ARVN pacification program. A VC propaganda unit actively engaged in propaganda operations among the people of this area. The CHU LAI enclave was the scene of continuous VC small unit activity. Although frequent reports were received of enemy intentions to conduct attacks and suicide raids against the CHU LAI and DANANG Airfields, such activity did not materialize.

**B. VC Attacks.** Areas of I CTZ outside the Marine enclaves experienced an increase in attacks and harassment against GVN outposts. There were two regimental size VC attacks against GVN forces; one on 18 Nov against ARVN forces in HIEP DUC and a second on 22 Nov against ARVN forces in the THACH TRU (3) area. Throughout I CTZ the most significant aspect of Viet Cong operations was their continuous effort to destroy ARVN forces while avoiding large unit contact with Marine forces.

**C. Anti-Air.** The overall frequency of anti-air incidents and numbers of hits on aircraft showed no significant trend compared with the previous month except for a significant increase in the number of reports of fire and hits by .50 caliber (or 12.7mm) machine guns.

**D. Terrorism.** Although agents continued to report Viet Cong intentions to conduct acts of terrorism in DANANG, no terroristic activities were reported within the city proper. While a number of assassinations and kidnappings were reported in areas adjacent to the Marine enclaves, the terrorism incident rate was somewhat less than in the previous month.

**E. Demonstrations.** The VC inspired and directed demonstrations to "stop GVN artillery fire" and "return people from GVN controlled areas to VC controlled areas." VC agitation also manifested itself in the confiscation of national identification cards from villagers.

**F. Weather.** Weather for the month included several prolonged periods

of rain with attendant deterioration of roads and restriction of mobility and air operations. Table V shows the total rainfall in the three TAOR's during November.

TABLE V  
PRECIPITATION IN NOVEMBER 1965

<u>AREA</u>	<u>RAINFALL</u> (Inches)
DANANG	27.46
CHU LAI	30.55
PHU BAI	38.15

#### IV. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

A. Strength. The average personnel strength of III MAF increased from 42,011 to 43,955 in November as individual rotation personnel joined III MAF units.

B. Rest and Recreation. The MACV R&R program was expanded this month by the addition of TAIPEI and SAIGON as R&R areas. In-country R&R will be granted in addition to out-of-country R&R which means that many troops will have two R&R periods during their tour.

C. Postal Money Order Control. Force/NCC/SA I Corps Order 2740.1 (Enclosure (3)) established controls on the purchase of US postal money orders to prevent indirect purchase for the purpose of exchange rate manipulation and speculation.

D. Organization. The 5th Communications Battalion was formed on 12 November by merging the Communication Company (-)(Reinforced), 7th Communications Battalion, FMF, and the Communications Support Company, FMF.

#### V. LOGISTICS

A. General. Monsoon rains and heavy seas continued to hamper resupply activities during November. Vehicle traffic was limited to essential movement and port operations were curtailed at times.

B. Supply. Expediting supply action for "deadlined" combat equipment was a primary concern during the month. The "Red Ball" special air shipment of selected supply items system was used to improve the combat readiness of III MAF units.

C. Port Operations. During November, 66,569 M/T were offloaded at DANANG and 17,591 M/T at CHU LAI.

D. Construction

1. Roads. Work continued throughout the month in all three enclaves despite heavy rains. The increased production of crushed rock was a major factor in road improvement.

2. Ramps. Museum Ramp, one of the key DANANG offloading areas, located on the west side of the TOURANE river, was surfaced with crushed rock, thereby improving off-loading capabilities during rainy weather.

3. Bridges. High water resulting from rains necessitated modification of the 150 foot, 60 ton capacity, M4T6 floating bridge installed over the SONG TUY LOAN (river)(AT 946699). During the rains the river level rose to such heights that both bridge approaches were inundated. Accordingly, the approaches were removed and two 60 foot bridge extensions were installed; one on each river bank. These extensions were placed over a column and transom arrangement with the approach ends fixed to the banks and the other ends riding on the original 150 foot section allowing for the rise and fall of the bridge with the changing water level. The concept of this arrangement was proven valid during late November when heavy rains caused the river level to rise approximately 8 feet and the bridge adjusted as planned. A slight reduction in bridge capacity resulted, but it remained adequate to support required operational loads. MCB-10 completed construction of the timber bridge on the CHU LAI MSR in the vicinity of the 4th Marines CP. The M4T6 by-pass bridge in that area was then disassembled and relocated over the washout near the RMK yard. A second timber bridge is currently under construction at the latter site, and upon completion of that bridge, the M4T6 bridge will be returned to DANANG.

4. Airfields. MCB-10 continued repairs to the runway and taxiway of the CHU LAI expeditionary airfield. By 10 November, the laterite subgrade of the South 4000 feet of runway had been replaced with a sand-cement mixture and the matting relaid. The entire 8000 foot runway was then placed in operation. The subgrade of the parallel taxiway was completely restabilized, sealed with asphalt and the matting relaid on 25 November. Other isolated failures to the subgrade on the northern half of the runway necessitated occasional repairs during the hours of darkness to minimize interruptions in flight operations. MCB-10 continued to work on the northern helicopter parking apron for MAG-36 at CHU LAI. Essentially, all of the matting has been laid and both parking aprons are now being utilized. Current plans call for construction of a taxiway to connect both aprons.

5. Drainage Systems. On 11 November, the 7th Engineer Battalion commenced a major rehabilitation of the Force Logistic Support Group area on DANANG Air Base. A high water table following heavy rains, coupled with inadequate drainage in this large flat area, resulted in extensive flooding of roads and storage dumps. Small ditches and limited culvert facilities were inadequate to handle the heavy runoff and it was necessary to resort to large and lengthy canal-like ditches. Considerable fill in also required throughout the area. Work continues toward elimination of this problem.

6. FOL Storage. On 19 November the 7th Engineer Battalion commenced construction of earthen berms for the expeditionary FOL storage area at the North end of DANANG Air Base. Front end loaders and tractors could not be used to build the berms because of the flooding. Consequently, it became necessary to utilize draglines mounted on swamp pads to construct the berms and drainage ditches for the area. Work continues on this project at the close of the month.

E. Fiscal. During the month of November an additional 20,000,000 \$VN in AIK funds was received, and used to fund requirements generated by III MAF units since allocation of the 4th Quarter funds. COMUSMACV has forwarded the AIK documents and transferred the accounting responsibilities for III MAF AIK Funds to this Headquarters.

## VI. COMMUNICATIONS

A. General. During November, III MAF transmitted 54,509 messages, a decrease of 1,814 from October.

B. Circuit Trouble. On 20 November III MAF experienced its third major circuit outage in four months. Blasting in the area east of the Air Force Security Service Compound, DANANG, ruptured the Air Force O3 cable. DCS general purpose and dedicated III MAF circuits were completely severed. All link lines between III MAF switchboard and Falcon, Puma, and Quail local switchboards and covered control tone and teletype circuits to the GIU LAI area were severed. Torrential rains hindered splicing operations. Circuit restoration was completed on 22 November. During this period of prolonged outages, essential message traffic was couriered to NHA TRANG.

C. COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATIONS. Fixed plant communications center equipment installation was completed in III MAF, 3d MarDiv and 1st MAW communication centers during November enabling each of the three headquarters to establish separate centers and providing more efficient, reliable equipment.

## VII. CIVIC ACTION

A. Objectives. The basic objectives of III MAF Civic Action Program remained the same during November. Particular emphasis during the month was placed on improving civic action reporting procedures and coordination of assistance efforts by all agencies of the U. S. Mission and to insure that the assistance is integrated into the rural construction program of the Government of Vietnam.

B. Joint Coordinating Council. The council met each week during November and saw its most productive month since establishment. The most significant development was the appointment of a personal representative of CG I Corps to sit as a member of the council. In addition CG, 1st MAW

and Deputy CG, 3d MarDiv were designated as members in lieu of Deputy Chief of Staff III MAF. CG 1st MAW was elected chairman. The council abolished the Finance Committee and transferred the responsibility for supervising the payment of claims to the PsyWar Committee. Additionally, two new committees were formed:

1. The Port of DANANG Committee whose functions are to formulate a Port Development Program, to improve plans for the joint use of the existing port facilities and to consider personnel problems.

2. The Commodities Distribution Committee whose function is to determine that all commodities from private persons and charitable organizations are being distributed on an equitable basis throughout I Corps.

C. Joint Coordinating Council Committees. All the committees functioned during the month making studies in their respective fields. The Port of DANANG and Commodities Committees were formed and the Finance Committee was abolished. The Education Committee was given the assignment of studying the possibility of expanding the various English language programs.

D. Medical Assistance. Thirty-two III MAF units rendered 63,000 medical treatments to 48,000 VN citizens in 95 locations during the month of November. Treatments were as follows:

Miscellaneous ailments	32%
Skin diseases	28%
Injuries	9%
Respiratory infections	8%
Stomach ailments	7%
Headaches	6%
Dental conditions	4%
Diarrhea	4%
Fever	2%

The number of treatments by enclave were:

DANANG	32,467
CHU LAI	26,434
PHU BAI	4,524
TOTAL	63,524

In addition to the foregoing treatments, the III MAF Preventive Medicine Unit gave active assistance to the Government of Vietnam in handling outbreaks of communicable diseases throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone. During one three-day period this unit inoculated 15,000 Vietnamese in Quang Ngai Province for plague and cholera.

E. Project HANDCLASP. Approximately 60,000 lbs. of miscellaneous commodities were received during November through Project HANDCLASP.

These commodities were inventoried and distributed through III MAF units.

F. CARE Programs. During November III MAF units received 2,792 sewing kits, 675 school kits and 12 mid-wife replacement kits for distribution through III MAF Civic Action Program.

G. Other Programs. The other programs listed in the Command Chronology for August, 1965 continued to develop. Details of these programs are reported in reference (a).

#### VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A. General. Psychological Warfare became a special staff section under G-5 cognizance during November and an officer was assigned full time duty as the Psychological Warfare Officer.

B. Leaflets. A total of 280,000 leaflets were distributed throughout the three TAORs during November. Leaflet themes were:

1. Exploiting the VC defeat in Operation STARLITE.
2. Exploiting poor VC living conditions.
3. Warning civilians to clear areas when USMC/ARVN forces attack VC.
4. The GVN provides a better life.
5. The U. S. Forces are the friends of the Vietnamese people.

C. Audio Visual Teams. These teams made extensive use of audio/visual aids to appeal to the inhabitants of villages within the TAORs to avoid active or passive VC assistance, to support the GVN, and to trust the presence of U. S. Forces.

#### IX. COMBAT INFORMATION

A. Operations. During the reporting period the Escort Bureau of the CIB escorted 257 civilian correspondents throughout the three TAORs, enhancing the newsmen's ability to better tell the Marine Corps story in Vietnam. Among the more prominent newsmen operating from the DANANG Press Center were: Hanson BALDWIN, military specialist for New York Times; Tony PLATTNER, Aviation Week Magazine; a CBS TV crew for Philadelphia, Pa., doing a one-hour special color show of Marines in Vietnam; Zalen B. GRANT, Time Magazine; William TOUGHY, Newsweek Magazine; and Hedley DONOVAN, Editor-in-Chief, Time-Life Magazine. Forty-nine VIP visits were covered with press and photographic coverage by both civilian newsmen and CIB photo/writer teams during tours of III MAF units at HUE-PHU BAI, DANANG and CHU LAI

B. Photography. During November, 13,230 feet of motion picture film was exposed and forwarded by commercial air freight to CMO. Approximately 75% was operational, 10% civic action and 15% VIP's. Special projects covered include, Data Processing Installation, Hawk Missile Story, Sniper

Training, and Marine Corps Birthday celebrations. Operations BLUE MARLIN and BLACK FERRET are noteworthy among the operations covered.

## X. I CORPS ACTIVITY

A. General. For the second consecutive month the VC have initiated one or more multi-battalion attacks in the I Corps Tactical Zone. There was little change in the number of VC initiated incidents, but a decline from October occurred in ARVN battalion size or larger operations. This decline is attributed to poor weather conditions and the prolonged commitment of combat troops in existing operations.

B. Current Operations. I Corps (ARVN) conducted 44 battalion or larger unit operations during the month as compared to 58 in October. Of these 30 resulted in VC contact. ARVN conducted six operations in coordination with USMC forces during November, and eight airmobile operations were supported by USMC helicopters. The number of VC KIA increased from 792 in October to 1175 in November. The number of VGC decreased from 271 last month to 217 while total weapons captured increased to 419 (70 more than October). ARVN KIA increased from 152 to 205.

1. HIEP DUC Attack. During the early morning hours of 17 November, the VC overran HIEP DUC District Headquarters, 38 kilometers west of TAM KY. It was manned by two RF companies and ten PF platoons. The 3d Infantry Division (ARVN) committed the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 5th Regiment by USMC helicopters at noon the next day. The initial landing was heavily opposed by machine gun, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire. However, close air support and early seizure of high ground near the landing zone resulted in a rapid buildup of friendly fire superiority and reoccupation of the area. ARVN troops killed 141 VC and captured 79 weapons at a cost of 33 friendly KIA and 73 wounded. US advisors estimate another 300 VC were killed by air. However, 174 of 443 RF and PF troops located in the area prior to the attack are currently listed as missing. In addition, 315 of their weapons were reported lost to the VC.

2. THACH TRU Attack. A second significant action began just prior to daylight on 22 November when VC forces of estimated regimental strength attacked the 37th Ranger Battalion and two RF company-size outposts near THACH TRU, 30 kilometers south of QUANG NGAI City. Heavy cloud cover hindered close air support efforts; however, continuous naval gunfire had a devastating effect on the VC attack as the USS O'BRIEN fired over 48 tons of high explosives and white phosphorous rounds during the action. The enemy force was driven from the battlefield by noon and left 175 confirmed dead and 72 weapons behind. Another 225 were estimated by US advisors to have been killed by naval gunfire, air strikes, and artillery. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, reinforced the 37th Ranger Battalion by helicopter the same day. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines were relieved by the 11th Ranger Battalion on 24 November.

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3. Fire Support. US aircraft flew 1161 sorties and VNAF flew 314 in the I Corps Tactical Zone. This represents an increase of 228 sorties over last month which was significant in view of the monsoon-induced poor flying weather. Naval gunfire conducted 196 missions and expended 3770 rounds. ARVN artillery expenditures exceeded 40,900 rounds this month; an increase of 12,000 rounds over October.

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## PART THREE

## CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 2 Nov - The following VIP's visited III MAF:  
 BGen Howard A. DAVIS USAF member USA/USAF coordinating team  
 BGen Edmund L. MUELLER USA member USA/USAF coordinating team  
 Mr Wilbur B. PAYNE, GS-18 member USA/USAF coordinating team
- 3 Nov - Operation BLACK FERRET commenced  
 - Rep George W. GRIDER, (Democrat-Tennessee) visited III MAF
- 5 Nov - The following VIP's visited III MAF  
 LtGen Alfred D. STARBIRD JR, USA, Director DCA  
 BGen Walter E. LOTZ, USA, USMACV J-6  
 - Operation BLACK FERRET concluded
- 8 Nov - The following VIP's visited III MAF  
 Governor John H. REED (Republican-Maine)  
 Governor Carl E. SANDERS (Democrat-Georgia)  
 Governor John H. CHAFFEE (Republican-Rhode Island)  
 Adm Phavil RAYANANON, Thailand Navy  
 LtGen "K" "Q" BUASIRISAPYA, Thailand Army  
 LtGen Kris SIWARA, Thailand Army  
 BGen Albert W. SCHINZ, USAF, Chief AF Advisory Group
- 9 Nov - The following VIP's visited III MAF:  
 Rep James D. MARTING (Republican-Alabama)  
 BGen William E. DEPUY, USA, MACV J-3
- 10 Nov - Phase I of Operation BLUE MARLIN commenced
- 11 Nov - BGen Andrew B. GALATIAN, USMC (Ret) visited III MAF
- 12 Nov - Phase I of Operation BLUE MARLIN concluded
- 13 Nov - The following VIP's visited III MAF:  
 Rep James C. CORMAN (Democrat-California)  
 Judge Harry PREGERSON  
 LtGen John A. HEINTGES, USA, Dep COMUSMACV
- 15 Nov - BGen Hal D. MCCOWN, USA visited III MAF
- 16 Nov - Phase II of Operation BLUE MARLIN commenced  
 - The following VIP's visited III MAF  
 Rep Charlotte REID (Republican-Illinois)  
 Rep John P. SAYLOR (Republican-Pennsylvania)  
 Rep Edmund A. EDMUNDSON (Democrat-Oklahoma)  
 - Claymore mines were installed in selected routes of entry to air-field perimeter wire

- 17 Nov - VC attacked HIEP DUC
- 18 Nov - Phase II of Operation BLUE MARLIN concluded
- 19 Nov - The following VIP's visited III MAF:  
 Rep Olin D. TEAGUE (Democrat-Texas)  
 Rep Emilio Q. DADDARIO (Democrat-Connecticut)  
 Rep Robert R. CASEY (Democrat-Texas)  
 Rep Torbert R. MACDONALD (Democrat-Massachusetts)  
 LtGen John A. HEINTGES, USA, Dep COMUSMACV
- 20 Nov - 1st Bn, 3d Marines replaced 2d Bn, 3d Marines in position west of DANANG  
 - The following VIP's visited III MAF:  
 Rep Lester L. WOLFE (Democrat-New York)  
 Rep Seymour HALPERN (Republican-New York)  
 Mr Hedley DONAVAN, Editor-Time-Life magazine
- 22 Nov - 3d Battalion, 7th Marines reinforced ARVN at THACH TRU  
 - The following VIP's visited III MAF:  
 MGen Sidney S. WADE, USMC, CG FMFPAC/I MAC (Fwd)  
 Brigadier Arengo J. A. JONES, British Army
- 23 Nov - DANANG TAOR extended as shown in enclosure (1)
- 24 Nov - Action against VC at THACH TRU concluded
- 26 Nov - RAdm Christopher C. KNAPP, USCG (COMWESTPAC Area) visited III MAF.
- 28 Nov - Bishop Arnold M. LEWIS, Episcopal Bishop to Armed Forces visited III MAF
- 29 Nov - Mr Samuel YORTY, Mayor of Los Angeles, visited III MAF  
 - 1st Force Reconnaissance Company established a base at the Special Forces Camp at BA TO (BS 567322)
- 30 Nov - Sen John G. TOWER, (Republican-Texas) visited III MAF

HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o PPO, San Francisco,  
California 96601

103/1004/10f  
Ser: 0041765  
25 Nov 1965

**SECRET**

From: Commanding General  
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, c/o PPO,  
San Francisco 96601  
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific/ I Marine Amphibious  
Corps (Forward), c/o PPO, San Francisco 96601  
Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: Expansion of the III Marine Amphibious Force Da Nang Tactical Area  
of Responsibility

Encl: (1) Overlay showing expansion of the III MAF Da Nang TAOB effective  
20 November 1965

1. By agreement between the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force and the Commanding General, I Corps the Da Nang Tactical Area of Responsibility is expanded as shown on enclosure (1).
2. The 3d Marine Division is authorized direct liaison with Quang Nam Province and Quang Nam Special Sector to insure the orderly expansion into this highly populated area.

H. W. SIMMONS  
by direction

G-2  
G-2/111

12-B-2

Group 4  
Downgraded at 3 years intervals;  
Declassified after 18 years.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

APO San Francisco 96243

Serial: 001032  
21 Nov 1965

MACJ322

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI-4) (U)

TO: Commanding General  
III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF)  
FPO San Francisco 96601

Ref: (a) Maps: Indochina and Thailand, series L509, 1:250,000. Sheets NE 4811, NE 4812, ND 4818, ND 4816, NE 4913, NE 484, ND 498, ND 4816, ND 491, ND 495, ND 499, ND 4913, NC 483, NC 484, NC 485, NC 486, NC 487, NC 488, NC 4810, NC 4815.

(b) MACV Directive 525-4, 17 Sep 65, Tactics and Techniques for Employment of U. S. Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. (U)

(c) MACV Directive 95-4, Aviation, Air Operations in RVN (U).

(d) MACV Directive 525-3, 7 Sep 65, Combat Operations, Minimizing Non-Combatant Battle Casualties. (U)

(e) MACV 15445, DTG 101440Z May 65 (C) NGFS in RVN (U).

(f) MACV Directive 381-1, 1 Jun 65, Military Intelligence/Visual Aerial Surveillance (U).

(g) MACV Directive 335-5, 11 Nov 65, Reports, Ground Force Commanders Daily Situation Report (SITREP) (MACV/RCS-J3/13). (U)

Task Organization: As assigned: CG, III MAF, will keep MACV informed of current task organization.

1. (S) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces. See current intelligence estimate.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 2d Air Division (USAF) provides air defense of Republic of Vietnam (RVN); maintains air supremacy and conducts operations against Viet Cong (VC); and supports ground actions in RVN as necessary.

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ENCLOSURE (2)

**SECRET**

21 November 1965

MACJ322

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI-4) (U)

(2) 1st Infantry Division (Reinf), in coordination with CG, III ARVN Corps; and CG, Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV), in coordination with CG, II ARVN Corps; defend specified US/Government of Vietnam (GVN) critical installations and facilities and conduct operations against the VC.

(3) Task Force 115 conducts anti-infiltration and interdiction operations in and over the waters contiguous to RVN and on certain major inland waterways.

(4) MACV Advisory Groups provide Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) with combat support and advice for counterinsurgency operations against the VC and perform a liaison role between US and RVNAF forces.

2. (C) MISSION: The III MAF will conduct military operations in I ARVN Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) in support of and in coordination with CG, I ARVN Corps, and in other areas of RVN as directed by COMUSMACV, in order to assist the GVN to defeat the VC and extend GVN control over all of Vietnam.

3. (S) EXECUTION:

a. Concept. The III MAF will be deployed in the I CTZ generally along the RVN coastline with major base areas at Hue-Phu Bai, Danang and Chu Lai. III MAF will defend and secure these bases and will conduct search and destroy operations against VC forces and bases which pose an immediate threat to their security. In addition, III MAF will conduct search and destroy operations against more distant VC base areas in order to destroy or drive the VC out. Clearing operations will be conducted in selected areas contiguous to major bases. III MAF will be prepared to conduct reserve/reaction or contingency operations in I CTZ or elsewhere in RVN as directed by COMUSMACV, to support the defense of critical bases, reinforce the defense of population centers and assist friendly forces in contact with the enemy (see reference b).

b. Deployments.

Hq III MAF: Danang.

Hq 3d Marine Div (Reinf): Danang.

Hq 1st MAW: Danang.

Hq FLSG: Danang.

Hq 30 NCR: Danang.

Hq FEG: Danang.

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PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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MACJ322

21 November 1965

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI-4) (U)

## c. Tasks.

## III MAF will:

(1) Secure and defend US bases at Hue-Phu Bai, Danang and Chu Lai and others that may be established, and defend or participate in the defense of other selected critical installations.

(2) Conduct search and destroy operations against VC forces and bases throughout I CTZ, in accordance with approved operational schedules, GVN/USMACV Campaign Plans and other directives.

(3) Conduct clearing operations in selected areas in accordance with the GVN/USMACV Campaign Plans and other directives, in support of the GVN Rural Construction Program. Participate in securing operations in areas contiguous to US bases.

(4) Conduct tactical air operations in accordance with reference c.

(5) Maintain and secure, as necessary, its land lines of communication.

(6) Participate in the air defense of RVN in accordance with pertinent instructions.

(7) Conduct as necessary, reserve/reaction operations in I CTZ to assist in the defense or relief of critical bases, selected population centers and to assist friendly forces in contact.

(8) Be prepared to conduct contingency operations anywhere in RVN on order of COMUSMACV.

(9) Be prepared to release one reinforced battalion to COMUSMACV on six hour notice for commitment as general reserve.

d. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Operations in I CTZ will be coordinated with the Commanding General, I ARVN Corps, or his designated representative.

(2) Coordination and cooperation procedures will be established between US units and I Corps Advisory Teams. During operations, I Corps Advisory Teams will perform combat liaison functions to I ARVN Corps units for III MAF.

(3) Maximum use will be made of competent Vietnamese (VN) liaison personnel during the conduct of operations in order to provide identification of friendly forces and as a means of contact with and identification of civilians.

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PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

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MACJ322

21 November 1965

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI-4) (U)

(4) Operations and all associated activities will be conducted in such a manner as to minimize non-combatant casualties and damage to civilian property (see reference d).

(5) With due regard to security, close coordination will be established with Province and District Chiefs through direct liaison and through US sector and sub-sector advisory personnel acting in their liaison role.

(6) Maximum effort will be made at all times to support the GVN and its effort to extend its control over the people and the land area of the RVN. To this end, CG, III MAF, will emphasize civic action projects and psychological operations. USOM and JUSPAO representatives assigned to I Corps will be used to the maximum extent in planning for and executing these activities. Civic action projects and psychological operations will be coordinated with CG, I ARVN Corps, or his designated representative.

(7) In so far as possible and in coordination with appropriate authorities, assist in the training of and render support to Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF).

(8) Procedures for obtaining naval gunfire support are contained in reference c.

(9) Artillery fire, naval gunfire and air strikes.

(a) In other than built up areas, artillery fire, naval gunfire and air strikes may be directed against VC forces in contact in accordance with normal procedures. When not in contact, unobserved fire will be directed only at targets or target areas declared hostile by GVN, VN liaison personnel, observers, or forward air controllers (FAC).

(b) Artillery fire, naval gunfire, and air strikes in RVN against known or suspected VC targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants are governed by the following criteria:

1 All attacks will be controlled by an airborne or ground FAC, forward observer, or RVNAF observer and will be executed only after US-GVN-RVNAF approval, as appropriate.

2 Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.

3 Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the

**SECRET**

PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

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MACJ322

21 November 1965

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI-4) (U)

movement of ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgment of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

(10) Procedures for planning for and obtaining visual aerial surveillance/visual reconnaissance are contained in reference f.

(11) In the event of civil disturbance, the nearest Vietnamese National Police establishment will be notified. III MAF units will take no action other than to defend themselves and property of the US.

(12) Reports in accordance with reference g.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Naval Component Commander provides logistical and administrative support to III MAF.

5. (S) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal. In accordance with current instructions.

b. Command.

(1) CG, III MAF, performs the additional functions of Naval Component Commander.

(2) COMUSMACV exercises operational command over III MAF.

(3) CG, III MAF, exercises operational control over the US Army Advisory Group assigned to I CTZ and is designated Senior Advisor to CG, I ARVN Corps.

(4) CG, III MAF, exercises operational control over USASF teams in I CTZ through the Deputy Senior Advisor, I Corps US Army Advisory Group.

(5) The basic concept underlying command relations between CG, III MAF and CG, I ARVN Corps, will be one of cooperation and coordination in the mutual interest of both commands.

(6) As a matter of US policy, US Forces will not be placed under the command or operational control of allied commanders. However, this restriction does not preclude temporary tactical direction of US forces by ARVN commanders under exceptional circumstances and by mutual agreement,

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PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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21 November 1965

MACJ322

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction (LOI-4) (U)

or the temporary direction of ARVN forces by US commanders under certain circumstances. Matters of this nature which cannot be resolved by subordinate US commanders will be referred to COMUSMACV.

(7) National unit integrity will be maintained at all levels.

WESTMORELAND  
General

DISTRIBUTION:

"A" PLUS:

III MAF (25)

FFORCEV (5)

1st Inf Div (Reinf) (5)

Dep SA, I CTZ (2)

Dep SA, II CTZ (2)

SA, III CTZ (2)


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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO, San Francisco  
California 96601

Force/NCC/SA I CORPS O 2740.1  
1/WKW/es  
24 November 1965

FORCE/NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND/SA I CORPS ORDER 2740.1

From: Commanding General/Naval Component Commander/Senior Advisor  
I Corps  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Control of Postal Money Orders

Ref: (a) MACV Directive 37-6 (NOTAL)  
(b) Force Order 7000.1  
(c) MACAG ltr of 25 Sep 1965 (NOTAL)  
(d) MACAG SP ltr of 13 Oct 1965 (NOTAL)  
(e) MACAG SP ltr of 9 Nov 1965 (NOTAL)  
(f) OPNAVINST #2700.14 (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Sample Copy of MACV Form 311 (MACAG-SP ltr 27Oct65), "Application for U. S. Postal Money Order"

1. Purpose. To establish limited controls on the purchasing of U. S. Postal Money Orders and to facilitate the monitoring of such purchases.

2. Background. As stated in references (a) and (b), the possession of any foreign currency, including U. S. currency, MPC's, dollar instruments or personal checks drawn in U. S. dollars by local Vietnamese Nationals, or other residents of the Republic of Vietnam, is strictly forbidden by Vietnamese law regardless of the type or form of currency. United States Postal Money Orders are dollar instruments. Despite the fact of such illegality, currency manipulation and speculation is being engaged in through the indirect purchase, by Vietnamese citizens and other civilian residents of Vietnam, of U. S. Postal Money Orders through U. S. military personnel. Accordingly, references (c), (d) and (e) direct certain **identification** procedures and a simple record keeping system to exercise necessary controls over the purchases of U. S. Postal Money Orders.

3. Instructions. Effective 1 December 1965, the following procedures will be implemented.

a. Each purchaser of a money order will be required to produce his identification card and a completed MACV Form 311 (See enclosure 1) prior to the postal clerk issuing such money order. One copy of the subject form is required for each money order purchased.

ENCLOSURE (3)

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Force/NCC/3A I CORPS O 2740.1

24 November 1965

b. Unit mail orderlies, when purchasing money orders as an agent for other members of his organization, will produce a letter signed by the unit commander or a commissioned or warrant officer of the organization concerned. This letter must contain the name, rank, service number and total dollar value of money orders the mail orderly is authorized to purchase for each member. One copy of this letter of authorization must be given to the postal clerk for post office files. Legible, hand-written letters of authorization are acceptable. For the purposes of this Order, each name listed on such an authorization is defined as a "primary purchaser". Additionally, one copy of MACV Form 311 will be submitted for each money order requested, as completed by the primary purchaser. Unit mail orderlies will maintain appropriate records as shown in sub-paragraph 311.5a of reference (f).

c. The postal clerk will print in ink in the appropriate space on each money order issued, the name and service number of the purchaser. If the purchaser is a civilian, the address on the ID card will be entered in lieu of the service number. When unit mail orderlies, acting as agents as described in 3b above, purchase money orders for other persons, the name and service number of the primary purchaser as shown on the letter of authorization will be entered on each money order. The postal clerk will carefully compare the ID card, or letter of authorization, against the completed MACV Form 311 prior to issuing money orders. The "Purchaser" line of the money order will be completed from the information contained on the MACV Form 311.

d. Agents making money order purchases for other personnel will insure that primary purchasers are authorized to use military postal facilities.

e. The MACV Forms 311 will be submitted by postal clerks, along with letters of authorization, to the appropriate Postal Officer with the daily money order reports. Postal Officers will retain letters of authorization in post office records, and promptly forward completed MACV Forms 311 to "Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: MACAG-SP), APO San Francisco 96243." Commands responsible for the operation of Military Post Offices will requisition forms directly from "Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: MACAG-AO), APO San Francisco 96243" on a sixty day basis.

#### 4. Action

a. All personnel under the command of the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force; Naval Component Commander; or Senior Advisor, I Corps are prohibited from purchasing U. S. Postal Money Orders for, at the request of, or for the benefit or use of Vietnamese citizens, citizens of any other nation, or any other civilian resident of Vietnam. The transfer of U.S. Postal Money Orders, dollar instruments, MPC's, U. S. Treasury checks or personal checks drawn on banks located in the United States or foreign branches of said banks, to the above listed persons is prohibited.

DECLASSIFIED

Force/NCC/SA I Corps O 2740.1  
24 November 1965

b. Unit commanders operating post offices will:

(1) Insure that the provisions of this Order are implemented on 1 December 1965, or as soon thereafter as MACV Forms 311 are available.

(2) Provide assistance and guidance to unit mail orderlies regarding sub-paragraph 8111.5a of reference (f).

(3) Post a copy of this Order at all post office money order windows.

c. All unit commanders will:

(1) Insure the widest possible dissemination of the contents of this Order, to include troop orientation and indoctrination of newly arrived personnel. The seriousness of purchasing U. S. Postal Money Orders for illegal purposes, and the procedures set forth in this Order will be explained.

(2) Advise all personnel of the availability and desirability of drawing U. S. Treasury checks in lieu of excess MPC's on paydays, stressing the ease of mailing such checks to their families or savings facilities.



H. E. WERTMAN  
Deputy Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Case 1 (Less B)  
Info copy  
Case 2

Force/NCC/SA I Corps O 2740.1  
24 November 1965

APPLICATION FOR US POSTAL MONEY ORDER

AMOUNT OF MONEY ORDER: \$ \_\_\_\_\_ (Date) \_\_\_\_\_

PAY TO: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Print or Type - Name & Address)

PURCHASER: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Print or Type - Last Name, First, MI)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Payroll Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Service Number) (Grade)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Organization) (APO)

APPLICANT TO SUBMIT ONE (1) FOR EACH MONEY ORDER DESIRED.

(POSTAL OFFICER- FORWARD COMPLETED FORM PROMPTLY TO HQ, MACAG, APO US FORCES 96243)

MACV FORM 311  
(MACAG-SP) 27 Oct 65

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

*P.R.*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP  
Advisory Team #1  
APO US Forces 96337

MACJN-ICOP

7 December 1965

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation Report (U)

THRU: Commanding General  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO San Francisco 96601

TO: See Distribution.

Attached hereto is Monthly Evaluation Report for the month of  
November 1965.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

*John O. Rowell, Jr.*  
JOHN O. ROWELL, JR.  
1st Lt, INF  
Admin Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

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US Consul Hue - cy 5  
SA, 1st Inf Div - cy 6  
SA, 2nd Inf Div - cy 7  
CG, III MAF - cys 8 & 9  
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CO, 23rd Air Base Gp - cy 11  
CO, Det C-1, 5th SF Gp (Abn) - cy 12  
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G3 Advisor, I Corps - cy 15  
SA, Quang Nam Special Sector - cy 16

Pg 1 of 1 pg

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Cy 2 of 16 cys

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ENCLOSURE (4)

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MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (November 1965) (U)

ANNEX A

I CORPS

1. (C) GENERAL: For the second consecutive month the VC have initiated one or more multi-battalion attacks in the I Corps Tactical Zone. There was little change in the number of VC initiated incidents, but a decline from October occurred in ARVN battalion size or larger operations. This decline is attributed to poor weather conditions and the prolonged commitment of combat troops in existing operations. Slight overall progress continues in rural construction efforts in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Province.
2. (C) CURRENT OPERATIONS: I Corps (ARVN) conducted 44 battalion or larger unit operations during the month as compared to 58 in October. Of these operations 30 made contact with the VC as opposed to 31 contacts the previous month. ARVN combined forces with the USMC to conduct six operations within the Corps Tactical Zone. Eight airmobile operations supported by USMC helicopters were conducted. The number of VC killed by ARVN rose sharply from 792 in October to 1175 for November, the largest monthly total thus far. The number of VC captured dropped from 271 last month to 213. ARVN captured 419 weapons (70 more than in October) while losing 211 (a sharp rise of 105 over October). There was an increase in ARVN battle deaths from 152 to 205. Two significant operations were conducted in the corps area, both of which were in reaction to VC initiated attacks. During the early morning hours of 17 November, the VC overran Hiep Duc District Headquarters, 38 kilometers west of Tam Ky. It was manned by two RF Companies and ten PF

Pg 1 of 5 pgsCy 9 of 16 cys

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FACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (November 1965)(U)

ANNEX A (Cont'd)

Platoons. The 2nd Infantry Division (ARVN) committed the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 5th Regiment by USMC helicopters at noon the next day. The initial landing was heavily opposed by machine gun, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire. However, close air support and early seizure of high ground near the landing zone resulted in a rapid buildup of friendly fire superiority and reoccupation of the area. ARVN troops killed 141 VC and captured 79 weapons at a cost of 33 friendly KIA and 73 wounded. US advisors estimate another 300 VC were killed by air. However 174 of 443 RF and PF troops located in the area prior to the attack are currently listed as missing. In addition, 315 of their weapons were reported lost to the VC. <sup>2</sup>LA second significant action began just prior to daylight on 22 November when VC forces of estimated regimental strength attacked the 37th Ranger Battalion and two RF company size outposts near Thach Tru, 30 kilometers south of Quang Ngai City. Heavy cloud cover hindered close air support efforts; however, continuous effective naval gunfire had a devastating effect on the VC attack as the USS O'Brien fired over 48 tons of high explosives and white phosphorous rounds during the action. The enemy force was driven from the battlefield by noon and left 175 confirmed dead and 72 weapons behind. Another 225 were estimated by US advisors to have been killed by naval gunfire, air strikes, and artillery. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines reinforced the 37th Ranger Battalion by

Pg 2 of 5 pgsCy 9 of 16 cys~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MACVN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (November 1965)(U)

CONFIDENTIAL

helicopter the same day. They were relieved by the 11th Ranger Battalion on 24 November. US aircraft flew 1161 sorties and VNAF flew 314 in the I Corps Tactical Zone. This represents an increase of 228 sorties over last month which was significant in view of poor flying weather due to the current monsoon season. Naval gun-fire conducted 196 missions and expended 3770 rounds. ARVN artillery expenditures exceeded 40,900 rounds this month, a sizeable increase of 12,000 rounds over October.

3. (C) VC ACTIVITIES: The VC initiated incident rate leveled off during November with 371 incidents reported as opposed to 373 during October. However, the number of attacks increased from 41 in October to 50 in November with two multi-battalion attacks in the Corps area. An analysis of captured documents, interrogation of a VCG, and a statement by a defector indicate that the 60th, 80th, and 90th VC Battalions of the 1st VC Regiment conducted the attack on Hiep Duc District Headquarters in their "setpiece" pattern. One battalion attacked the outpost and the other two with supporting weapons were in prepared positions to ambush the relief forces. VC forces which attacked the 37th Ranger Battalion at Thach Tru were possibly the 18th PAVN Regiment supported by heavy weapons from elements of the 45th VC Heavy Weapons Battalion. Two prisoners captured in the attack stated they were members of this battalion. Of particular interest in the attack is that the 7.62mm SKS carbine and the 7.62mm RPD light machine gun were captured for the first time in this Corps. VC initiated activity in the northern half of the Corps zone during the month was generally restricted to harassments

Pg 3 of 5 pgs

Cy 9 of 16 cys

MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (November 1965) (U)

of isolated outposts and interdiction of lines of communication. The VC retain the capability to launch a reinforced regimental size attack in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces at a time and place of their choosing. In Quang Nam Province, to include the Da Nang complex, the major threat continues to be company size raids utilizing specialized sapper teams against US and GVN installations.

4. (C) RURAL CONSTRUCTION: The Corps Rural Construction Program has shown slight improvement during the month despite an increase in VC activities to discourage pacification efforts. In Quang Nam Special Sector, the nine village pacification program in Hoa Vang District continues to progress at a slow but steady rate. Through the efforts of the Mobile Action Cadre, two villages, including 25 hamlets, have been pacified during the period. This pacification program, also known as the Ngu Hoanh Son (Five Mountains) Campaign, is progressing at a slower rate than anticipated; however, it is felt that the results of this campaign will establish guidelines for future pacification efforts. A concerted pacification effort has been made in Quang Ngai Province to capitalize on the recent gains in ARVN clearing efforts. The "Back to the Home Village" campaign continues to make inroads of progress in the refugee problem in Quang Ngai.
5. (C) PSYOPS/CA: Ground loudspeaker broadcasts, motion pictures, and printed media dissemination with face-to-face contact characterized the psywar effort for the month. Airborne leaflet drops increased over October, but airborne loudspeaker missions were reduced because of inoperable speaker equipment. Airborne operations were hampered

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MACTN-IC

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (November 1965)(U)

somewhat by unfavorable weather. Major themes of all media were GVN and allied victories, GVN presence and policies, rural construction, and Chieu Hoi. In general, the status of processing MILCAP indemnification claims in sectors remains excellent. Civic action was mostly on a small scale except for MEDCAP which treated approximately 65,000 patients.

6. (C) LOGISTICS: Resupply operations by air and convoy continued to be a major problem area in the 12th DTA. Highway 1 was closed from Da Nang to Quang Ngai during half of the month of November. This situation was caused by stepped up VC activity cutting the road and blowing bridges and by flood conditions provoked by seasonal rains. The primary method of resupplying units in the 12th DTA was by air. However, poor flying weather coupled with the removal of C-123's from the I CTZ for a three day period for emergency resupply elsewhere resulted in the virtual depletion of supplies in the I ALC depots in Quang Ngai and Tam Ky. A MILHAP team arrived in Quang Tri and one in Quang Ngai during the month and Province Medical Coordinating Committees have now been established in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai.

7. (C) PERSONNEL: The special promotion of 366 ARVN officers and 4476 enlisted men effective 1 November had a significant favorable effect on overall morale. Receipt of the announcement of the program for annual permanent promotions of Regional Force officers and NCO's later this year provided an additional boost to morale within these forces.

Pg 5 of 5 pgs

Cy 2 of 16 cys

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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO, San Francisco  
California 96601

103/DEW/rll  
3 DEC 1965

NOV 1 1965

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
Subj: Operation Golden Fleece

Encl: (1) Staff Study of LtCol D. A. CLEMENT 103/DAG/jfc of 26Nov65

1. Operation Golden Fleece was a program of cooperation between Marines and civil officials in order to deny as much rice as possible to the VC during the Summer/Fall 1965 rice harvest. It took place between 8 September and 27 October 1965. Enclosure (1) is a staff study prepared by a member of this command which examines the effectiveness of this operation. The staff study concludes that Operation Golden Fleece was an economic and psychological success and that an estimated 512,400 pounds of threshed rice was denied the enemy.
2. Consideration will be given the conclusions and recommendations contained in this staff study in developing guidance for Operation Golden Fleece II.
3. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for information.
4. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

*L.W. Walt*  
L.W. WALT

Copy to:  
CG 3dMarDiv

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (7)

DECLASSIFIED

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HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FIO, San Francisco,  
California 96601

103/DAC/jfc

26 NOV 1965

**From:** Lieutenant Colonel D. A. CLEMENT, USMC  
**To:** Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, III Marine Amphibious Force  
**Subj:** Staff Study to determine data on the USMC-assisted Summer/Fall 1965 rice harvest

**Encl:** (1) Documentary evidence from 1st Bn, 9th Marines  
(2) Documentary evidence from 2d Bn, 4th Marines  
(3) Documentary evidence from 2d Bn, 5d Marines  
(4) Documentary evidence from Hoa-Vang District  
(5) Documentation from the files of 3d MarDiv  
(6) CG, 3d MarDiv ltr 3120.1, Golden Fleece Operations, dtd 27Oct65  
(7) DivBul 5726 of 31Oct65, Subj: Protection of Vietnamese Nationals and the Rice Crop during the 1966 Harvest Season  
(8) Proposed letter of instruction concerning future rice harvests

I. Problem: Determine data on the USMC-assisted Summer/Fall 1965 rice harvest.

II. Background: USMC participation in denying the Summer/Fall 1965 rice harvest to the VC was not centrally coordinated and, consequently, statistical reports of the various programs have not been analyzed or consolidated at III MAF level. Interest in the overall statistical dimensions of this past program, in preparation for future harvests, requires that this be done.

III. Facts Bearing on the Problem:

1. Incompatible criteria were used by the various battalions and districts, thus consolidation is questionable. Quantities of rice were reported originally in pounds, bushels, helicopter and LVT loads - both threshed and unthreshed. The majority of the rice went out over the shoulders of the rice cutters.
2. Where specific and timely documentation of the rice harvested under Marine protection exists, claims by both USMC and civilian officials are modest. Where the results are available only in the form of delayed overall estimates, the claims by both are substantially higher.
3. Personal visits or calls were made to all participants in order to obtain documentary evidence of the situation and results of Operation Golden Fleece. The reader of this report can be confident that no other reliable

ENCLOSURE (7)

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independent evidence exists at any echelon. Figures by both military and civilian officials are presented, however the civilian estimates are used in the totals because they include also the rice carried out over the shoulders of the rice cutters themselves.

4. In one instance, a claim of 100,000 lbs of rice harvested was not adequately supported by journal entries. In order to build confidence in this report, this particular claim has been excluded.

IV. Discussion:

1. Operation Golden Fleece, the code name conceived by Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 9th Marines, and later adopted by higher headquarters, was a program of cooperation between Marines and civil officials in order to deny as much rice as possible to the VC during the Summer/Fall 1965 rice harvest. It took place between 8 Sept and 27 Oct 1965. The record shows that rice harvesting operations around Da Nang were confined largely to September and those at Chu Lai to October. None were reported from Phu Bai.

2. The only operations identifiable with Golden Fleece were by 1st Bn, 9th Marines, Enclosure (1); 2d Bn, 4th Marines, Enclosure (2); and 2d Bn, 3d Marines, Enclosure (3). In each case, the general pattern of actions was:

a. Planning conference of Marines, Village Chief and District Chief, at which would be decided the dates and places of harvest; number of cutters to be provided by the Village Chief and any transportation requirements for them; number of Popular Forces to be made available by the District Chief and any transportation requirements for them; and the plan for transportation and storage of the harvest.

b. Development of appropriate operation plans which not only provided security for the rice cutters participating in Operation Golden Fleece, but which were quite in consonance with the continuing mission of the unit.

c. Operations to deny VC access to the fields prior to the planned harvest, through use of patrols, ambushes and H & I fires.

d. Conduct of the operation.

3. The rice harvesting under Golden Fleece conditions was confined to the districts of Hoa-Vang, Hieu-Duc and Ly-Tin.

4. Difficulties encountered during Operation Golden Fleece were:

a. Rice cutters had to be returned to their homes for the night, thus creating a transportation problem to the remote rice paddies and losing much valuable time.

b. A prohibition commencing 26 Sep 1965 was placed on the use of all III MAF tactical vehicles for transporting rice.

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5. As for results, estimates are as follows:

- a. CO, 1/9: Makes no estimate on new rice unthreshed  
Encl (1) 38,000 lbs of rice, threshed
- b. CO, 2/4: 224,400 lbs of rice, threshed  
Encl (2)
- c. CO, 2/3: 19,500 lbs of new rice, unthreshed  
Encl (3) 8,000 lbs of rice, threshed  
1,000 lbs of peanuts
- d. Chief, Hoa-Vang District 188,000 lbs of rice threshed  
Encl (4) (1/9 & 2/3)
- e. Chief, Ly-Tin District 224,400 lbs of rice, threshed  
Verbal report of Chief of  
Ky Phu (2) Village (2/4)
- f. Chief, Hieu-Duc District 100,000 lbs of rice, threshed  
Verbal report (2/3)

6. Analysis of Operation Golden Fleece by CG, 3d MarDiv (Enclosure (6)) is supported by all available evidence. Planning guidance for Operation Golden Fleece II (Enclosure (7)) is sound and appropriate.

V. Conclusions:

- 1. That Operation Golden Fleece was an economic success and a psychological success, each being measurably important.
- 2. That the participation of Marines in the operation was across-the-board: all ground and air elements which could reasonably contribute, did so; and did so in proportion to the civilian capacity to do their part, i.e., out rice.
- 3. The only comprehensive estimate of the USMC-assisted rice harvest is that of the District Chiefs, who estimate that 512,400 lbs of rice, threshed, was denied the VC. At the accepted rate of 1.5 lbs per person per day, this could have subsisted 1900 VC's for the six months until next harvest.

VI. Recommendations:

- 1. That the conclusions listed above be approved and be utilized hereafter as the official III MAF statement of Operation Golden Fleece 1965.
- 2. That Enclosure (8) be prepared for signature.

D. A. CLEMENT

ENCLOSURE (7)

## STATEMENT OF COMMANDING OFFICER, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines

This Battalion began operating in the area south of Marble Mountain early in August 1965. Near the end of August the Battalion was able to get into this southeastern TACR of the DaNang enclave in some force, and better relations with the people and with the local governmental officials began to develop. An Area Security Council was formed, made up of officers of the Battalion, primarily the Battalion Commander, the S-2 and the Civil Affairs officer, and the four Village Chiefs who represented the local government in the TACR.

Near the end of August our Area Security Council reported that the VC were operating in some force along both sides of the Song Can Bien (River) to the south of Marble Mountain between grid lines BT 70 and 67. Our patrols tended to bear out this information, and on 29 August 1965 a Battalion (-) search and clear operation was made in this area. During the operation 12 VC were killed (body count) and 12 VC were captured. In addition, it was estimated that another 8 VC had been killed, based on the observation of Marines observing VC falling while under fire.

Two days later, on 31 August, our Area Security Council, having collected intelligence from secret agents in our area of operations, reported to the Battalion that we had killed 30 VC on 29 August. The Village Chiefs said at this time that the villagers were impressed with our efforts to clear the VC from this river valley, and asked if we would now protect their rice harvest from the VC.

We of course told the Area Security Council that we would start this harvest protection operation at once. The Battalion code-named this Operation Golden Fleece.

It is estimated that the Song Can Bien valley contains nearly 300 acres of rice land. Rice in this area was closer to maturity than other rice in the 1/9 TACR, and therefore Golden Fleece operations initially concentrated on this area.

The Area Security Council asked us to bring harvested rice in each evening, for safe storage in the Marble Mountain area which was the only reasonably secure hamlet area in the TACR. Plans were made to do this by hauling in the rice in LVTs. However, the Hoa Vangk District and our Village Chiefs were ill-prepared, it seemed to us, to receipt for the rice brought in from the fields, and to provide adequate secure and weather-proof storage for the grain. Therefore the Area Security Council was told that rather than to bring in the rice, our concept would be to operate and patrol vigorously around the rice valley, thus denying the VC access to the rice fields and access to the villagers. Under this plan, the villagers were to retain their own rice; Marines of 1/9 would work to keep the VC away from the fields and the villagers.

At about this time, patrols and ambushes conducted by the 1/9 forward companies began to click, and our VC toll began to mount. In one of the early and more significant contacts, a Company A ambush killed one VC political commissar and captured three guerrilla platoon members and a woman cadre member on 3 September. It was determined that this group had entered the

ENCLOSURE (1)  
5 (7)

hamlet where they were ambushed to attempt to retain control of the hamlet and to establish clandestine methods for collection of "rice tax."

On 9 September Village Chiefs of our Area Security Council reported to us that a VC battalion had moved into the area south of the Song Can Bien rice valley in an attempt to contest our Golden Fleece operations. Three companies of 1/9 immediately attacked into this area with Tanks, Amtracs and Ontos in support. Indications were that a VC Battalion in fact was located in the vicinity of Vlem Dong, in grid square BT0965. 1/9 forces met heavy opposition, including fire from 81mm mortars. Although the VC body count from this action was not high because the attack was started at about 1600 and the action terminated as the VC broke contact shortly after dark, Village Chiefs later reported to us, however, that we had killed 117 VC in this action, and that the Battalion, "with many casualties" had later passed through the Leper Hospital at the southeastern edge of our TACR, to get medical supplies, and then had withdrawn to the west. The casualty assessment came to the Village Chiefs from their secret agents in the area of the action.

This action against the VC Battalion seemed to break the back of well-organized VC activity in the 1/9 TACR, and the Golden Fleece operations continued throughout the remainder of the rice harvest season against more modest VC activities. Patrols and ambushes worked constantly in and around the villages and hamlets surrounding the rice fields, in an attempt to keep the VC away from the rice fields as well as the homes of the rice harvesters. Aerial observation was used to report on rice harvesting which appeared to be illegal (according to the harvest schedule established by ARVN authorities.)

Rice was brought in to Area Security Council Control in the Marble Mountain area only if large caches -- apparently stored for VC transport -- were located. During Golden Fleece operations, 1/9 patrols and sweeps located and returned to government storage approximately 16 tons of rice from caches of this sort. Other caches, amounting to about three tons, were destroyed by being burned or thrown into rivers in cases where it was not practical to recover the rice and transport it to the government-controlled area.

While it is entirely probable that the VC did get away with some rice from the 1/9 TACR during the Autumn 1965 harvest season, it is believed that Golden Fleece was most effective in cutting down the volume of rice that VC were able to gain. Another great benefit/derived from Golden Fleece was in good will which it earned for Marines from the Vietnamese people of our area. Golden Fleece related our efforts in a very concrete way to aid of the Vietnamese people at a very basic level. It showed them that we were in fact here to help them. An if the VC did get some rice, it was at least a greatly diminished volume as compared to past years. Likewise it was evident to the rice growers that all of our efforts were for them, since we did not take any of their rice for our own use--something which their culture might have expected us to do.

Extract from Command Chronology, 9th Marines, period 1-30 Sept 1965

(2) Operation GOLDEN FLEECE. (See 9th Marines Frag Order 36-65 and the 9th Marines Intelligence Summary #54 dated 1 September 1965)

(a) U.S. and RVN military intelligence sources and local governmental authorities indicated that the Viet Cong would make a major effort to gain a sizeable portion of the rice harvested in the 9th Marine TAOR. The Viet Cong wanted the rice for their own use and wanted to deny it to the local governmental agencies in order to increase the problems with the refugees in this area.

(b) An adequate supply of rice is essential to the sustenance of the Viet Cong through the winter months and is essential to their capability for future operations. The disastrous floods of November 1964 ruined some of the food stocks of the Viet Cong and made it imperative they acquire this year's harvest. The Viet Cong obtain their rice by taxation, purchase, and by confiscating it. Intelligence reports early in the month of September indicated a discernable influx into the 9th Marines TAOR of Viet Cong regular forces as well as Viet Cong controlled and directed harvest workers. The increased number of contacts with enemy forces by Marine patrols early in September bore out the validity of these reports.

(c) On 8 September 1965, the Commanding Officer, 9th Marines, directed the forward two battalions to provide aid and security for the harvest within the 9th Marines TAOR. The 1st Battalion had already begun using patrols to aid the HOA HAI Village Chief in his harvest and called these Golden Fleece patrols. Golden Fleece was adopted as the Regimental Operation code name. Operation GOLDEN FLEECE was conducted as an additional mission to Operation RICE-STRAW.

(d) Patrols and ambushes were used extensively during September to protect harvesters in the fields. Amtracs were used to carry the rice to secure hamlets where Marines provided security for the common storage areas. When Viet Cong rice caches were located, combat patrols were dispatched to either recover the caches or to destroy them. A curfew was imposed on civilians in the area to prevent harvesting at night. When suspicious persons were observed working in the paddies, Marine patrols would clear the fields and the suspicious persons would be taken to the village chiefs to be identified.

(e) Operation GOLDEN FLEECE was considered a great success. Because of the late monsoon this year and the protection afforded by the Marines, the local government was able to harvest much more rice than usual, while it is believed the Viet Cong have only gathered ten percent of their quota for this area. Over fifty-five tons of rice were harvested in the 3d Battalion's zone by refugees from the HOA CAM Training Center working under HOA VANG District Headquarters. This area, which includes the CAM NE Complex (AT 990680), was usually not harvested because it was controlled by the Viet Cong before the Marines secured it. The total amount of rice harvested in the 1st Battalion's zone will not be known until the village chiefs make their reports to HOA VANG District Headquarters during the second week of October.

ENCLOSURE (1)  
4 (7)

**HAPPIER HARVEST FOR VIET  
VILLAGERS LAID TO MARINES  
Da Nang, Vietnam (ISO)-**

In answer to a plea from Vietnamese villagers some 32 miles southeast of Da Nang, Marine infantrymen of the 1st Bn, 9th Marines, extended their protection to ward off threats of a Viet Cong attack.

According to Lt. Col. Verle E. Ludwig, of Fallbrook, Cal., battalion commander, the VC threatened to attack the villagers should they start harvesting their rice crops.

The operation, named Golden Fleece by the Marines, started two weeks ago. Last week, however, a battalion of VC were reported to be operating in the area south of Marble Mountain.

On a Saturday, A and D Cos. moved forward to strong points further south to deny this area to the VC, thus protecting the rice there.

Marines of A Co., commanded by Capt. Robert J. Driver Jr. of Flint, Mich., reinforced with a platoon from C Co., rode piggy-back atop M-48 tanks and LVFP5 amphibian tractors which were followed by the Marine Corps' tank-killing Ontos.

The armored column moved into the area near Tra Khe, close to the coast, and search-and-clear operations started as part of the company set up its perimeter around its new position.

Light casualties were inflicted when a booby trap exploded as Marines went through a gate to one of the villages. The wounded were evacuated by Marine UH-34D helicopters a few minutes later.

Several astracts then returned to pick up D Co., which in turn moved into an area

Vol. 21, No 266, 24Sept65

on the opposite side of the Cam Bien River.

Capt. M. J. Harris, of Kyogle, Australia, a member of the New South Wales Light Infantry, as an exchange officer commands D Co.

His company's job was to probe and patrol the area to see if the VC were still there. They were. Harris led his men into Khai Tay as the VC took the Marine infantrymen under fire. During the firefight that followed the VC fled.

A hysterical Vietnamese woman who refused to leave the village carried her baby out after the fire fight. Navy Hospitalman R. F. Guthrie Cheyenne, Wyo., one of D Co. hospital corpsmen, attended to a minor wound on the baby's neck.

As the 21-year-old "doc" aided the woman 2d Lt. Woodson E. Bennett of Salem, Ore., platoon commander, B Co., 1st Amphibian Tractor Bn., held the baby in his arms, trying to console it as if it were his own.

A short while later a Marine helicopter arrived to evacuate the mother and her child to a nearby field hospital.

Nearby a squad of Marines defending a small fort reported killing five VC during a firefight.

According to a village chief who reported the location of the VC battalion, the VC's mission was to get the rice from this area.

Their attempt was foiled by Marines of the 1st Bn., 9th Marines and its supporting units. It was nearly dusk but the villagers still reaped their "Golden Fleece."

ENCLOSURE (1)

↳ (7)

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HEADQUARTERS  
2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)  
3d Marine Division, FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif. 96601

23 Nov 65

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines

Subj: Results of Rice Harvest during Operations Harvest Moon I & II

Encl: (1) Operation Order 75-65  
(2) Operation Order 78-65

1. The village chief of Kyphu(2) informed us that his village harvested the following amounts of rice:

A. Operation Harvest Moon/Operation Order 75-65	40,000 Kilos
B. Operation Order 78-65	<u>62,000 Kilos</u>
TOTAL	<u>102,000 Kilos</u>

R. L. TREVINO

ENCLOSURE (2)  
L (7)

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OPERATION HARVEST MOON  
2ND BN, 4TH MARINES, CHU LAI

1. Concept of Operations. Company H, 2nd Bn, 4th Marines, Bn Scout Platoon and one company of Popular Forces outposted and ambushed area encompassed by GS 4102, 4501 to 4602, 4503 to enable villagers to harvest rice without VC interference.
2. Prior Preparations. A conference was conducted with the District Chief Ly Tin District, Popular Force Company Commander, 2/4 Bn Commander, Operations Officer and H Company Commander at which time it was determined that the operation would be conducted during the period 7 to 13 October 1965 in the following manner.
3. Mission's assigned:
  - a. H Company and one platoon Popular Forces helilifted into southwestern end of valley - screen, outpost and ambush flanks of rice harvesting area for a period of four days.
  - b. Bn Scout Platoon and Popular Force Company (-) patrol in vicinity of, ambush and defend rice harvest storage site at village (BG 460035).
  - c. One Popular Force Platoon escorted approximately 400 villagers daily to rice harvest area - villagers cut rice, returned rice to rice storage area nightly.
4. Summary:
  - a. On two occasions during the operation VC units were engaged in short fire fights at night during the rice harvest.
  - b. The Popular Force Company Commander stated that 40,000 kilos of rice were denied the VC.
  - c. Positive visual proof was displayed to the villagers, thus, convincing them we were there to protect them against VC encroachment.
  - d. Long lasting benefits were accrued because of the District Chief, Popular Force, Village and Marine Relationships.

J. R. FISHER

ENCLOSURE (2)  
L(7)

## Statement of Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines

Plans for aiding the civil officials in harvesting rice in insecure areas within 2/3's TAOR were begun in July when the Province Chief of Quang-Nam Province, the District Chief of Hoa-Vang District, and the Village Chief of Hoa-Thanh Village met in Hoa-Thanh with the Commanding Officer and Civil Affairs Officer of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. Subsequent meetings with District and Village Chiefs determined specific plans, while helicopter reconnaissance by a Village Chief determined the exact date. The plans: with Marines providing all-round security and transportation, and Popular Forces providing close in security, the Village Chief would provide rice cutters and supervise the cutting and accounting for rice. Pending D-Day, the ripening rice paddies would be interdicted by night with patrols, ambushes and H & I fires. In one area (Hoa-Minh), two cuttings were planned; in other areas (Pho Nam/Nam Yen and Truong-Dinh), only one cutting was deemed necessary. These plans were executed between 15 Sept and 5 Oct. A reasonable estimate of the harvest: 19,500 lbs of new rice, unthreshed; 8,000 lbs of old rice, threshed; and 1,000 lbs of peanuts. While this is not a great deal of food for the many people in 2/3's TAOR, it is a tremendous amount of food for the moderate number of VC guerrillas in the area who were depending on getting it. Furthermore, it demonstrated genuine concern for the welfare of the local people - in terms that are most meaningful to them. This rice is today still stored in a community bin, marked as to the area from which it came, and is distributed to refugees from that area. Thus it is a continuing symbol of American friendship for the oppressed peasant.



D. A. CLEMENT  
LtCol USMC

ENCLOSURE (3)  
E (7)

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Extracts from Civil Affairs/Civic Action Report #8,  
period 13-27 Sept 1965, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines

- 2.o.(3)(a). On 15 September 1965, Captain SILVA, the Battalion S-2, met with Captain Truong, the Hieu Duc District Chief, and discussed marine assistance in the harvesting of rice in the district. Helicopters were provided for a group of farmers from the Pho Nam - Nam Yen area in order for them to survey their crops. Future coordination between this battalion and Popular Forces from the Hieu Duc District in our TACK.
- 2.o.(3)(b). Captain SILVA and Mr. Nam (representative of the district chief) coordinated to effect final plans for the harvesting of rice in the Pho Nam - Nam Yen area. Captain Hoa, the Hoa Vang District Chief gave approval for the use of Popular Forces from Hoa Thanh, Hoa Lac, and Hoa Vinh to help marines provide security for the harvesters during the operation.
- 3.b.(1). Marines assisted the villagers of Hoa Minh to harvest their rice crops on the 16th and 17th of September. A total of 2000 pounds of rice was harvested and transported out by helicopter.
- 3.b.(2). On 19 and 20 September, former refugees from the Pho Nam - Nam Yen area were taken back by helicopters and amphibious tractors to harvest their crops. In addition to the transportation of the refugees and their crops, marines along with Popular Forces provided security for the harvesters. (See Enclosure (8))
- 5.c. On 17 September, the Battalion S-2 was present at a ceremony in which the villagers of Hoa Minh presented themselves to express their thanks and gratitude for marine assistance in helping them harvest their crops and move to Hoa Thanh.

ENCLOSURE (3)  
to (7)

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Tỉnh Quảng-Nam  
 Quận Hòa-Vang  
 Xã Hòa-Thanh

VIỆT-NAM CÔNG-HOÀ  
 \*\*\*\*\*

/-/0A - Thanh Ngày 20 Tháng II Năm 1965.

**10 - 0A**  
 \*\*\*\*\*

Ông Nguyễn-Đình-Ham. Chủ-Tịch Xã Hòa-Thanh. Đồng thời là  
 Khu-Trưởng, Khu-Tây Bắc Hòa-Vang.

Về mùa lúa Tháng 8 Năm 1965. Tại Khu Tây Bắc Quận  
 Hòa-Vang, và Hòa-Minh, Quận Hiếu-Duc,

I-XÃ HOA-MINH : (Quận Hiếu-Duc)

: Ngày 15-Ngày 16 Tháng 9 Năm 1965.

NGHĨA-QUÂN : I Trung-Đội Của Xã Hòa-Thanh.

THŨ-GAT : 90 Người

Số Lúa Đã Thu-Được : 3.000 Cân-Anh

Phương-Tiền Chuyên-Chở: Máy Bay trực-Thăng

BẢO VỆ AN-MINH : I Đại-Đội Thủy Quân Lục  
CHIẾN Chiến Hòa-Kỳ.

NGÀY 29/30/9/ 1965 :

NGHĨA-QUÂN : 2 Trung-Đội Xã Hòa-Lạc,  
 Quận Hiếu-Duc.

THŨ-GAT : 90 Người

SỐ LÚA THU ĐƯỢC : 6.000 Cân-Anh

PHƯƠNG TIỀN CHUYÊN CHỞ: Đồng-Bảo tự chuyên-Chở

BẢO-VỆ AN-MINH : 2 Đại-Đội Thủy Quân Lục  
 : Chiến Hòa-Kỳ

II/PHỐ-NAM VÀ NAM-YẾN : Thuộc Khu Tây Bắc Quận Hòa  
 : Vang

TỪ NGÀY 18 ĐẾN NGÀY 23 Tháng 9 Năm 1965

ENCLOSURE (3) 5 (7)

NGHIA-QUÂN : 2 Trung-Đội

:Thụ Gặt 178 Người, Thuở Ba Xã, Hòa-Thanh,  
:Hòa-Vinh, Hòa-Lộc.

SỐ LUA THU ĐƯỢC: Lúa Mỗi 4500 Cán-Anh  
: Lúa Cả 8000 Cán-Anh  
: Đạm 1000 Cán-Anh

BẢO-VỆ AN-NINH : 2 Đai-Đội Thủy-Quân Lực Chiến Hoa-Kỳ

PHƯƠNG TIỆN CHUYỂN CHỖ :Xe Lội Nước, và Máy Bay Trục-  
:Thăng.

III/TRƯỜNG-ĐINH KHU-TÂY BẮC: /-/OAGVANG

Ngày 04 và Ngày 05 Tháng 10 Năm 1965.

NGHIA-QUÂN :I Trung-Đội

Thụ-GẶT : 80 Người

Số Lúa Thu Được : 6.000 Cán-Anh


PHƯƠNG TIỆN CHUYỂN-CHỖ : Đồng Bào Tự Động chuyên-chở  
: bằng thuyền V.N.

BẢO VỆ AN-NINH : 2 Đai-Đội Thủy Quân Lực Chiến  
: Hoa-Kỳ

IV

NHẬN XÉT VỀ MÙA-LÚA

- A/ Đồng-Bào rất sung-sướng, mùa lúa gặt vừa qua.  
B/ Đồng Bào còn hối tiếc mùa lúa chưa gặt hết, và Thủy-  
Quân LỰC CHIẾN, Không Giúp phương tiện chuyên-chở chỉ  
thu được 2 phần 3 số lúa trong mùa vừa qua.  
C/ Đồng-Bào ước mong được sự giúp đỡ của Thủy Quân Lực  
Chiến Hoa-Kỳ, mùa gặt tới.  
D/ Đồng Bào trong vùng này, rất sung sướng, nhưng Việt-Cộng  
rất bất mãn, và một số đồng bào, thiên Cộng xuyên-tặc  
nói xấu cho Hoa-Kỳ và Chính Phủ Việt-Nam./.



ENCLOSURE (3) 607

DECLASSIFIED

Quang-Nam Province  
Hoa-Vang District  
Hoa-Thanh Village

THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
\*\*\*\*\*

Date: Hoa-Thanh, Nov. 20, 1965

REPORT  
\*\*\*\*\*

Mr. Nguyen-Dinh-Nam, Hoa-Thanh Village Chief and Northwest Zone Leader.

About the harvest on August 1965 in Northwest Zone of Hoa-Vang District and Hoa-Minh Village belongs to Hieu Due District.

I Hoa-Minh Village (Hieu Due District)  
Date: Sept. 15th and 16th, 1965

Popular Forces: 1 plt. of Hoa-Thanh Village

Cutters: 90

Rice: 3,000 lbs.

Transportation: Helicopters

Security: Assisted by 1 Co. of USMC

Date: Sept. 29th and 30th, 1965

Popular Forces: 2 Plts. of Hoa-Loc Village

Cutters: 90

Rice: 6,000 lbs.

Transportation: People moved rice by themselves

Security: Assisted by 2 Cos. of USMC

II Pho-Nam and Nam-Yen (belong to Hoa-Vang District, Northwest Zone)

Date: From Sept. 18th to 23rd, 1965

Popular Forces: 2 plts.

Cutters: 178 people belong to three villages: Hoa-Thanh, Hoa-Vinh and Hoa-Loc.

Rice: New rice: 4,500 lbs.

Old rice: 8,000 lbs.

Peanuts: 1,000 lbs.

ENCLOSURE (3)  
5 (7)

DECLASSIFIED

-2-

Security: 2 Cos. of USMC

Transportation: LVT's and Helicopters

III Truong-Dinh, Northwest Zone of Hoa-Vang

Date: Oct. 4th and 5th, 1965

Popular Forces: 1 plt.

Outters: 80

Rice: 6,000 lbs.

Transportation: People moved rice by local boats.

Security: 2 Cos. of USMC

IV Thoughts about the rice harvest.

- A/ People was very happy about the last harvest.
- B/ People regretted that much rice not harvested yet because Marine didn't help move the transportation. Therefor, harvested only 2/3 of rice of the last harvest.
- C/ People would like Marine's help in next harvest.
- D/ People of this area was very happy, but VC very displeased, and a number of people, who has VC spirit, said bad for USMC and Vietnamese Government.

Chief and Zone Leader

/s/ Nguyen-Dinh-Nom (seal)  
Nguyen-Dinh-Nom

ENCLOSURE (3)

6(7)

Enclosure (8) to 2nd Bn, 3rd Mar Civil Affairs/Civic Action Report #8,  
2/ART/tam over 5800 of 29 Sept. 1965

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**SUMMARY OF OPERATION HARVEST**  
19 Sept - 20 Sept 1965

On 19 September 1965, elements of 2nd Battalion, 3d Marines swept into the Pho Nam, Nam Yen and Trung Dinh areas again as they had done a month ago during "Operation Midnight".

On the Morning of 19 September 1965, 196 civilians from the villages of Hoa Thanh, Hoa Vinh, and Hoa Lac were transported by helicopters and amphibious tractors to the area to conduct harvesting operations and further moving of the former refugees' household effects.

During both days of the operation, 4500 pounds of new out rice was harvested and transported out. In addition, 1000 pounds of peanuts, 2000 pounds of miscellaneous household effects, and 8000 pounds of grain rice were transported from the area of operations to Hoa Lac by helicopters and tractors.

Twenty-three sorties were flown and numerous trips were made by amphibious tractors in support of the operation.

During the operation, LtCol CLEMENT, the Battalion Commander; Mr. Nam, the village chief of Hoa Thanh; and Sgt TOMESZEK, Battalion Civil Affairs NCO; along with about 25 harvesters were taken under fire from the bordering hill (coordinates 855865) by eight or nine VC. "F" Company deployed one platoon to cover the withdrawal of and help evacuate the harvesters. Another platoon was used to engage the Viet Cong. No prisoners were taken and no casualties sustained. VC positions were found and destroyed. A 106 mm recoilless rifle provided harassing fire and destroyed positions that were not easily accessible. After securing the area, "F" Company provided protection as the operation continued.

Mr. Nam, village chief of Hoa Thanh, and the Northwest Sector Commander were in charge of the harvesters during the operation. Mr. Lu, the village chief of Hoa Lac, and Mr. Toa, the village chief of Hoa Vinh assisted Mr. Nam in the operation. Village police were also used to help control the harvesters. Two Popular Forces platoons helped "F" Company provide protection for the workers.

The last of the agricultural products and household effects were delivered to Hoa Lac at 2300 on the 20th of September. The goods were left at the Hoa Lac market place for transporting to the refugees new homes during daylight hours. Trucks were used to transport villagers to their home that night.

The people expressed much gratitude for the opportunity to harvest their crops and pick up their remaining household effects.

ENCLOSURE (3)  
to (7)

B I Ê N - B Ả N H Ọ I - N G H Ị  
 Tổng kết kết-qua Công-tác "CHIẾN-DỊCH  
 TÂM-THƠM tại Quận Hòa-Vang, Quảng-Nam  
 trong giai-đoạn I

Hôm nay ngày 15 tháng 10 năm 1965 lúc 09 giờ, tại Văn-Phòng  
 Quận, có triệu-tập cuộc Hội-nghị, cắt đứt quyền chủ-tọa của Đại-Ủy Quận-Trưởng  
 và sự tham dự của các Ông :

- Hội-Đồng Hằng Tỉnh tại Hòa-Vang,
- Chi-Trưởng Cảnh-Sát Quốc-Gia Hòa-Vang,
- Chi-Trưởng X-Tê Hòa-Vang,
- Chi-Trưởng Chi Thông-Tin TLC Hòa-Vang,
- Chi-Trưởng, Chi Chiếu-Hối Hòa-Vang,
- Các Ông Chủ-Tịch Hội-Đồng Xã thuộc Quận,
- Các Ông Quan-Tri-Trưởng các kho lúa .
- Võ-Phát, nhân-viên Quận HC Hòa-Vang kiêm Thủ-ký  
 Ban Điều-Hành Chiến-dịch Tâm-thơm Thủ-ký,

Khai mạc Hội-nghị, Đại-Ủy Quận-Trưởng Chủ-Tịch Ban Điều-Hành  
 Chiến-Dịch Tâm-thơm tuyên-bố lý-do : Xét thấy tại các vùng mật an-ninh lúa đã  
 gặt xong, có một số dân-chúng ở vùng bất an đã tham-gia hưởng-ứng Chiến-dịch,  
 đem số lúa gặt được về gởi tại các tư-gia thuộc vùng có an-ninh, tránh sự tập  
 bọc của V.C. Lại thêm trời mưa gió, cán-bộ không có vì Tỉnh đã rút về, nên công-  
 tác này tạm ngưng, để tổng kết những kết-qua đã thực-hiện được trong giai-đoạn  
 I hoạt-dộng từ 12/9/1965 đến ngày 10/10/1965 .

KẾT QUẢ THẦU-HOẠCH ĐƯỢC :

1 - Kho lúa Miêu-Bông : (HÒA-PHƯỚC) -

- Lúa có chủ ở vùng mật an-ninh gặt đem về kho ..... 3.303 ang,
  - Nộp có chủ ở vùng mật an-ninh hiện để ở kho ..... 150 -
  - Lúa vô chủ xem như của VC ..... 150 -
- Cộng : 3.603 ang,

Ngoài số lúa do Công-tác GDTT Quận gặt, thầu đem về kho, Quận còn  
 cho cán-bộ kiểm-kê xác-phan số lúa của dân-chúng vùng mật an ninh gặt đem gởi tại  
 các tư-gia thuộc vùng có an-ninh kết-qua :

- Lúa gởi tại Ấp Miêu-Bông, Hòa-Phước : 7.458 ang,
  - Lúa gởi tại Xã Hòa-Thọ ... : 4.183 ang,
- Cộng .... 11.641 ang,

2 - Kho lúa Hòa-Lạc :

- Lúa có chủ ở vùng mật an-ninh gặt đem về kho : 1.067 ang,
- Lúa vô chủ không có ...

Vùng này hiện còn một số lúa tại Ấp Trường-Định, (Hòa-Lạc) chưa  
 gặt xong vì thiếu lực-lượng an-ninh yểm-trợ và lại trời mưa trở ngại sự vận  
 chuyển, nên công-tác Ban Quan-Tri vẫn còn tiếp-tục tiến-hành .

Còn lúa tại Nam-Yên, Phò-Nam (Hòa-Lạc) phần nhiều của các đồng-  
 bộ đã ty-nạn, đến cư-ngụ các nơi an-tồn cũng được giúp-đỡ phương-tiện và bao-  
 đảm an-ninh để trở về gặt rồi di-chuyển về nhà .

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ENCLOSURE (4)  
 to (7)

3 - Kho lúa Hòa-Long :

- Lúa có chủ ở vùng mật an-ninh gặt đem về kho không có,
- Lúa vô chủ xem như của VC do Quân-đội TQLC Hoa-Kỳ tịch-thu được tại vùng mật an-ninh có : 810 ang,

Trong số lúa 810 ang này, có khoản 300 ang có chủ đơn xin nhận, nhưng Chính-quyền địa-phương xác-nhận không rõ-ràng đích-xác, Quận còn cho giữ tại kho .

TÌNH-TRANG KHO LÚA :

a - Kho Miếu-Dông : Kho được khô ráo, không bị dột nước, khi mưa to nước chỉ tạt vào các diềm cửa thôi. Lúa đã vô bao sẵn-sàng, thuận-tiện cho vận-đề di-chuyển khi bị thiên tai.

Mặc dầu kho lúa này nằm ở khu-vực âm-thấp, hàng năm thường hay bị lụt, nhưng Ban Điều-Hành GDTT Quận xét thấy kho lúa này không cần phải di-chuyển đi nơi khác vì lẽ :

- Mỗi lần di-dịch thì số lúa đó bị thất-thoát, dân-chúng kêu nài, sau này khó giải-quyết :

- Lúa đã vô bao sẵn, gặp trường-hợp thiên-tai lụt lớn, Quận nhờ Quân-Đội TQLC Hoa-Kỳ giúp xe lội nước để kịp thời di-chuyển ngay. Còn lúa của dân-chúng gói ở ngoài tư-gia cũng sẽ được Quận giúp có phương-tiện di-chuyển khi bị lụt ngập, chứ không nên buộc họ phải tập-trung vào kho vì đã gói vùng có an-ninh .

- Tình-hình an-ninh :

Xét thấy kho lúa này nằm ngay giữa các trục giao-thông liên-hệ với các vùng mật an-ninh, nên không được bao-đảm .

b - Kho Hòa-Long : Kho này nằm ở vùng cao ráo, không có gì trở ngại về mùa mưa, lụt - Về an-ninh cũng được bao-đảm vì hiện giờ có nhiều đơn-vị TQLC Hoa-Kỳ trú đóng chung-quanh .

c - Kho Hòa-Lạc : Kho này nằm ở vùng cận sơn, cao ráo, không có gì trở ngại, về mùa mưa lụt . Về an-ninh cũng được bao-đảm vì nằm trong phạm-vi kiểm-soat của Quân-đội TQLC Hoa-Kỳ .

ĐIỀU-KIỆN XUẤT PHÁT :

1 - Lúa tại kho : Số lúa này đã ghi rõ-ràng trên phiếu thụ hàng ngày khi nhập kho, ngoài bao chứa lúa, có ghi tên, họ, địa-chỉ chủ lúa, để tránh mọi trở ngại về sau. Khi xuất Ban Quản-Trị kho phải lập biên-lai theo mẫu trong hồ-sơ kế-toán kho mà Ty Nông-Vấn Quảng-Nam đã cấp phát và hướng-dẫn trước đây .

Lúa chỉ được xuất ra cho những gia-đình có giấy Hội-Đông Xã chứng nhận và tùy theo nhân khẩu trong gia-đình để nhận số lúa ăn trong thời gian ấn-định là 15 ngày (10 ang cho mỗi gia-đình có 5 người ăn trong 15 ngày) -

2 - Lúa gói ngoài tư-gia : Ban Điều-Hành Chiến-Dịch Tâm-Thưm Quận lưu-ý hai Ông Chủ-Tịch Xã Hòa-Phước - Hòa-Thọ, nên thường-xuyên kiểm-soat số lúa dân-ông đã gói. Khi họ muốn nhận lại để tiêu gung, thì phải xin giấy chứng nhận của Hội-Đông xã tại, rồi trình Chính-quyền Xã nơi gói lúa làm phiếu xuất có chữ ký của người cho gói lúa và chủ lúa để tiện kiểm-soat, phiếu này giao người cho gói lúa giữ một bản làm bằng chứng khi cần .

3 - Lúa vô chủ xem như của VC : Chủ quyết-định của thượng-cấp .

4 - Thời-gian xuất : Kể từ ngày 15 tháng II năm 1965 trở đi .

TỔNG KẾT

Quận-Trưởng Chủ-Tịch Ban Điều-Hành Chiến-Dịch Tâm-Thưm nhắc nhở lưu ý các Ông Quản-Trị-Trưởng các kho lúa nên hết nể tình-thân trách-nhiệm, thường-xuyên kiểm-soat lúa có bị dột không nhất là khi trời mưa, phải để dềng

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ENCLOSURE (4)

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đề-dâng cho dân chúng trong lúc đèn nhện, lửa. Chủ-trương của kế-hoạch CHIẾN-DỊCH TÂM-THƠM là để bảo-vệ lúa gạo tài-sản cho dân ở vùng mất an-ninh, không để VC thụ-lũp, tránh mọi va chạm đến quyền tự-do của người dân trong quyền-lợi tư-sản của họ làm ra mà mất lòng dân.

Đ Ề - N G H Ị :

- Xin Ban Điều-Hành Chiến-dịch, Tâm-thơng Tỉnh bồi hoàn lại Quận số tiền 6.000/ - mai táng-phi cho 4 nhân-công ở Hòa-Khánh bị tử thương .
- Trợ-cấp tiền, gạo cho hai nhân-công Hòa-Hiệp bị thương, hiện còn điều-trị tại Bệnh-Xã Hòa-Vang để an-ủi -
- Thanh-t toán tôn-phi trang-bị các kho lúa tại Hòa-Long, Hòa-Phước, Hòa-Lạc là 10.000/00 (mười ngàn đồng) -
- Xin Tỉnh có giải-pháp nào giải-quyết cho các nhân-công gặt lúa bị thương mà sau này trở nên tàn-phê -

Cuối cùng, Đại-Ủy Quận-Trưởng Chủ-Tịch Ban Điều-Hành Chiến-Dịch Tâm-Thơng cảm-ơn tất cả Hội-Nghị đã tích-cực tham-giá ủng-ủng Chiến-Dịch, giúp-đỡ Ban Điều-hành Quận thâu-hoạch được nhiều kết-qua khả-quan .

Hội-nghị bế-mạc vào lúc 12 giờ cùng ngày, tháng năm trên ./ -

Thư-ký,  
Võ - Phát

CHỦ-TỊCH  
Đại-Ủy NGUYỄN-HÒA

Số 03832- /VP/CDTT/

S A O . G Ồ . I :


- Các Hội-đồng Xã thuộc Quận Hòa-Vang,
- Các Chi Sĩ, Trưởng trong Quận,
- Các Ban Quản-Trị kho lúa ,

{ "đề chiểu hành" }

Đồng kính gửi :

- Tòa HC Quảng-Nam, (Ban Điều-Hành CDTT)-
- Phòng Kế-Hoạch Tỉnh Quảng-Nam +
- Phòng Cơ-Văn Hoa-Kỳ tại Hòa-Vang .
- O. Hội-Đồng Hàng Tỉnh tại Hòa-Vang .

" kính tưng "



Hòa-Vang, ngày 15 tháng 10 năm 1965.  
QUẢN-TRƯỞNG QUẬN HÒA-VANG

*Mob*

ENCLOSURE (4)  
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-Rice (without owner) None  
This area still has a certain amount of rice at TRUONG DINH Hamlet (Hoa Lac) which has not been reaped yet due to lack of security and protection forces to a lot of rain making the transportation quite impossible; the Campaign is still going on in this area.

At Nam Yen, Tho Nam (Hoa Lac) most of the refugees presently settled down at secure areas have been provided transportation to reap their harvest and bring it back home.

3-Rice warehouse at HOA LONG

-Rice (with owner) at insecure areas None  
-Rice (without owner) considered to be VC's and confiscated by U.S.M.C. 810 vases

Amongst those 810 vases, about 300 vases are claimed by some people but as far as the District is concerned there was no definite proof about these claims; therefore this amount of rice is still kept by the District office.

Situation of the rice warehouses

a. At HIEU BONG The warehouses are kept in dry conditions; when it rains, what amount there may be, the water can't go through. The rice has been put in packages, suitable for moving out whenever necessary.

Though these warehouses are located in wet areas usually exposed to flood, the CDB still doesn't see fit to move them out because of the following reasons

- rice when moved will be scattered and lost thus we might expect complaints from the people
- rice having been packed, if there is flood will be moved out easily by the care of the USMC AMPHAC's. Rice presently kept in storage at inhabitants houses will be moved out by the care of the district.

The District can not force the people to gather rice in one place.

As for the security of these warehouses the fact that they are located right between the main roads leading to insecure areas, shows that they are not well protected.

b. At HOA LONG Located at high spots, we see no problem which might come from the rain. Good security conditions due to the presence of USMC units all around.

c. At HOA LAC Located near the Hills and mountains these warehouses are in good dry conditions. No problem as to flood and rain. Good security conditions due to the presence of USMC units all around.

Issuing requirements

1/ Rice presently kept at warehouses These rice have been filed on daily incoming records when stored. On the packages are written the name and address of the owner thus preventing further complications. When issuing the rice, the CDB will have to make a receipt by filling a form (included in accounting record) issued by the Agriculture Service of the Quang Nam Province. Rice will only be issued to family upon receipt certified

ENCLOSURE (4)  
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by village chief and according to the number of persons in the family, for use during a period of 15 days (10 vases to each family of 5 persons for a period of 15 days)

2/ Rice kept at inhabitants houses The CDB recommends the village chiefs of HOA PHUOC and HOA THO to permanently control the rice which is kept at those inhabitants houses. If the owner wants those rice back for use he has to apply for a certificate issued by local hamlet authorities then the village authorities where the rice is kept will endorse the certificate, issues an issuing receipt which must bear the signature of the rice owner and the house owner? (house where the rice is stored) One copy of the issuing receipt will be given to house owner for further identification if need be.

3/Rice without owner considered to be VC's Awaiting orders

4/Issuing time From 15 November 1965

Generalities

The chief of district acting as chairman of the CDB recommends the rice warehouses managers to fulfill their responsibilities and to tightly control the rice warehouses particularly when there is rain, to assist the people when they pull out their rice. The policy of the Campaign is to protect rice and properties of the people at insecure areas, to prevent VC from taking rice away, to avoid any conflicts which might damage the rights of the people.

It is proposed that

- 6000 Ps be given back to the CDB This money has been spent on funerals of the 4 workers at Hoa Khanh.
- Allowances in rice and money be given to 2 workers at Hoa Hiep presently hospitalized at the District Dispensary.
- Fund be given to the District for materials which have been consumed to build up warehouses at HOA LONG, HOA PHUOC and HOA LAC (100000 Ps)
- Instructions from the province of QN concerning the rice workers who might get wounded and disabled.

Finally the Chairman of the CDB thanks the members of the conference for having answered the campaign. The conference is ended at 1200 Hours.

Clerk

VO PHAT

/ 03832/VP/CDTP Copies to

- Chiefs of villages at HOA VANG Dt
- Different sections of the Dt
- The rice warehouses managers

Chairman  
Capt NGUYEN HOA

} for action

- The Province Chief of QN
- The project section of QN
- The Advisor section HOA VANG
- The District Council of HOA VANG

for info

HOA VANG THE 15 OCTOBER 1965

ENCLOSURE (4)

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## EXTRACTS FROM G-3 JOURNAL, 3D MARDIV

- 7 Sep PLANNING OPN GOLDEN FLEECE
- 8 Sep 1/9 CO A RECEIVED SA FIRE ONE (1) MAR WIA DESTROYED CHICOM GRENADE & AT MINE 1/9 CO MET W/VILLAGE CHIEFS OF THE THO SON, MIU KIM SON, MAN QUAN & TAN LIU TO DISCUSS INTRELL & PLANS FOR OPN GOLDEN FLEECE
- 8 Sep 1/9 PROVIDED SECURITY FOR CG ONE (1) ANTRAC USE TO TRANSPORT RICE
- 10 Sep 1/9 RECEIVED REPORT THAT VC COMP WAS TO HARVEST RICE. A PATROL INVEST SAME PROVIDED SEC FOR HARVEST W/CO A (-) & CO D (-) REIN W/TANKS & ONTOS TO DENY N&E ACCESS OF CAM BIEN RIVER
- 12 Sep PRESSURE CONT AGAINST VC W/DAY & NIGHT PATROLLING. CO A OF 1/9 REC'D FIVE (5) 81 MM MORTAR RDS W/ONE (1) KIA & SEVEN WIA (MARINES) ONE ARVN WIA. CO A DETONATED AN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE W/2 WIA & 1 ARVN WIA
- 14 Sep 1/9 CONT OF SUPPORT W/CO A PROVIDING A REGULAR PATROL W OF CAU DO RIVER 723 CIVILIANS WERE DISPLACED TO SUPPORT & PROVIDE PROTECTION, FED & GIVEN MEDICAL TREATMENT. SUPPLIED 6X6 W/TRAILERS TO SUPPORT GF
- 15 Sep CO D EXTENSIVELY PATROLLED AREA FOR GF. ENGAGED 6 VC IN A FIREFIGHT
- 16 Sep 2/3 SUPPORTED GF IN W SECTOR, ONE PLT FROM CO F & CO G PROVIDED SECURITY. HELICO TRANSPORTED TO VILLAGE (AT 9078). REC'D INFO VC PLAN TO MINE ROADS VIC TRA KHE. ONE PLT CO C REIN W/ENG TEAM, TWO LVTP-5'S, TWO ONTOS, & 3d PLT OF CO B CONDUCTING S & D MISSION. CO D CONDUCTING OPN GF IN RICE PADDIES VIC (BT 047671) 1/9 IN FURTHERANCE OF GF. THE BN WILL EMPLOY EXTENSIVE PATROLS AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY OVER THE NEXT 24 HOURS.
- 17 Sep DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD THE DIV CONTINUED TO PROTECT VILLAGERS FROM VC HARRASSMENT DURING THE RICE HARVEST. 9TH MARINES CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING WITH A SCREEN OF PROTECTION PROVIDED VILLAGERS HARVESTING THE AUTUMN CROP. 1/9 MAR CONTINUES OPERATION GOLDEN FLEECE
- 18 Sep DIVISION CONTINUES TO DISRUPT VC EFFORTS TO EXTRACT TRIBUTE ON THE HARVEST IN THE VICINITY OF DIV HELD TAORS. 2/3 WILL CONDUCT A SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATION TO ASSIST THE RVN GOVERNMENT DURING THE PERIOD 19-21 SEP BY PROVIDING FOR RICE HARVESTORS. 1/9 IN SUPPORT OF GF WILL EMPLOY 9 SQUAD SIZE COMBAT PATROLS.
- 19 Sep 2/3 TRANSPORTED 3 LVT'S LOAD OF RICE TO LE MY. 2/3 WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE AS SECONDARY MISSION SECURITY FOR RICE HARVESTORS. 1/9 CONTINUES OPERATION GOLDEN FLEECE

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- 20 Sep 2/3 CONTINUES TO PROVIDE SECURITY W/ CO F (-) REIN, 3D PLT G CO, 2 PLTS FF, & 1ST PLT B CO ANTRAC. D/1/9 SATURATED ITS AREA WITH DAY AND NIGHT PATROL. THE VILLAGERS HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE MARINES' ABILITY TO PROTECT THEM DURING THE HARVEST AND HAVE INDICATED THEIR DESIRES FOR THE MARINES TO CONTINUE TO PROTECT THEM. 1/9 WILL CONTINUE OPERATION GF.
- 21 Sep TWO OPERATIONS IN THE DA NANG TAOR KEPT THE VC OFF BALANCE AND ASSISTED THE LOCAL RICE HARVESTORS IN THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THEIR LABORS. D/1/9 OCCUPIES PLT PSMB AT BT 035667 AND BT 046669 IN PROTECTING RICE HARVESTORS UNDER OPERATION GOLDEN FLEECE. 1/9 CONTINUES OPERATION GF.
- 22 Sep DIC CONTINUES OPERATIONS TO ASSIST THE FARMERS AND THEIR FAMILIES DURING THE CRITICAL HARVEST SEASON. 1/9 CONTINUING PATROLS AND AMBUSHES AROUND RICE FIELDS IN CONTINUATION OF OPERATION GF. 1ST PLT B CO, BN 9-2, AND HOA DAMG VILLAGE CHIEF SEARCH BT 085676, TWO TONS OF RICE STALKS AND GRAIN WAS RECOVERED & BROUGHT TO BN CP AT BT 067714 FOR DELIVERY TO HOA VANG DISTRICT HQ. 1/9 PLANS TO USE TWO COMPANIES ON 23 SEP TO CLEAR THE RICE FIELDS NORTH OF GS (T65) IN ITS SECTOR.
- 23 Sep TWO EXTENSIVE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS. THESE OPERATIONS COUPLED WITH PATROL AND AMBUSHES SERVED TO FURTHER INSURE THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE LOCAL RICE HARVEST. 1/9 - OPERATION GOLDEN FLEECE WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE MAIN EFFORT.
- 24 Sep THIRD MARINES CONCLUDED ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE RICE HARVEST AT NAM IEN/PHO NAM. TRANSPORTED 342 RVN BY COPTER FROM VILLAGES TO RICE FIELDS. 4,500 POUNDS OF NEW RICE; 8,000 POUNDS OF GRAIN RICE; 1,000 POUNDS OF PLANTS AND 2,500 POUNDS OF REFUGEE PERSONAL EFFECTS WERE AMONG THE ITEMS TRANSPORTED. 1/9 OPERATION GF AND RICE STRAW CONTINUED.
- 25 Sep 1/9 CO A PROVIDED PROTECTION IN VIC BT 083697
- 26 Sep GF CONTINUED. CO A STILL IN VIC BT 083697 PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR HARVESTORS. 1/9 CONTINUES GF W/9 SQUAD SIZE PATROLS & ONE AMBUSH. ONE PLT COMBAT PATROLS TO LAST THREE DAYS.
- 27 Sep 1/9 - PLT FROM 'A' STARTED THREE DAY COMBAT PATROL
- 28 Sep 9TH MAR CONTINUES TO ASSIST IN PROTECTION OF RICE HARVESTING. 1ST PLT A CO MOVED SOUTH W/3 TANKS & 2 ONTOS FROM BT 072708 TO TRA KHE (1) AT BT 088675 ON COAST HY. THE HOA LONG VILLAGE CHIEF W/2 CIVILIAN BUSES WILL FOLLOW TO COLLECT RICE ON THE RETURN TRIP.
- 29 Sep 1/9 WILL CONTINUE OPERATION GOLDEN FLEECE. 2/3 WILL PROVIDE ONE PLT FROM F CO TO PROTECT RICE HARVESTING IN GS (AT 8677).
- 1 Oct SUPPORT CONTINUES FOR GF

ENCLOSURE (5)  
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- 2 Oct RICE HARVESTING & PACIFICATION OF REAR AREAS SUPPORTED BY UNITS IN S&W SECTORS OF DA NANG TAOR. 1/9 THREE 55 GALLON BARRELS OF RICE CAPTURED. 3/9 2 BUSHELS OF RICE FOUND IN A BURNED OUT HOUSE & FOUR BUSHELS FOUND BURIED VIC (AT 960648). 1/1 CO MET WITH CAPT TTUONG, DISTRICT CHIEF OF HIEU DUC & MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MARINE SECURITY TO HOA THINH DURING RICE HARVEST (AT 8970). ON 30SEP TWO COMPANIES PROVIDED SECURITY FOR 300 HARVESTORS FROM MY SON (AT 900797) & DA SON (AT 967764) DURING DAYS HARVEST OF 3000 KILOS OF RICE. AN THEIN (BT 577033) & LONG-PHU (BT 510030) WOULD BE LOANED A RICE THRESHING MACHINE.
- 3 Oct GF CONTINUES IN CONJUNCTION WITH EN CIVIL AFFAIRS PROGRAM
- 4 Oct RICE HARVESTING SUPPORTED IN S & W SECTORS OF DA NANG TAOR
- 5 Oct MARINE ELEMENTS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO RICE HARVESTING. 3/9 CO 1 CHECKPOINT AT MIEU DONG (BT 716685) CONFISCATED 19 LBS OF RICE.
- 6 Oct MAR UNITS CONT'D SECURITY TO RICE HARVESTORS. VC RICE STORAGE OF 300 BUSHELS DESTROYED BY BURNING DURING NIGHT OF 5 OCT.
- 7 Oct 2/4 PRESENTED A RICE THRESHING MACHINE TO VILLAGE OF LONG PHU (BT 510030)
- 8 Oct ABANDONED HOUSE USED FOR RICE STORAGE DISCOVERED, RICE TO BE RECOVERED 9 OCT, 2/4 COMMENCED 4 DAY OPERATION TO GUARD RICE IN W VALLEY (BT 4102) TO (BT 4502)
- 9 Oct AT CHU IAI, A REIN COMPANY FROM 2/4 WAS HELILIFTED INTO DANG CO VIL- LAGE TO PROTECT RICE HARVEST. 1/9 PATROL RECOVERED 600 LBS OF RICE (BT 084680) & DELIVERED SAME TO VILLAGE CHIEF FOR DISTRIBUTION. 2/4 CONTINUED SECOND DAY TO PROTECT RICE HARVEST.
- 10 Oct 1/9 3d PLY OF CO C DISCOVERED VIC (BT 059641) 3 TONS OF RICE, CON- FISCATED & DELIVERED TO MARBLE MT VILLAGE (BT 077707). 2/4 CO H W/ PF'S & HRS CO SCOUTS CONTINUE GUARDING RICE HARVEST.
- 11 Oct SECURITY TO RICE HARVESTORS PROVIDED BY MAR UNITS UNDER OPERATION GK 1/4 IN 4TH DAY OF PROTECTING HARVESTORS. 2/4 CO H W/PF CONTINUE TO GUARD RICE HARVEST.
- 12 Oct GF CONTINUES
- 13 Oct
- 14 Oct
- 15 Oct CO L 3/3 RECOVERED 9000 LBS OF RICE FROM VC CONTROLLED SOURCE DURING A 2 DAY OPERATION. MAXIMUM EFFORT CONT IN SUPPORT OF GF.

ENCLOSURE (5)  
to (7)

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- 16 Oct 1/4 DEMONSTRATION MADE OF MANUALLY OPERATED RICE THRESHER TO PEOPLE OF HAMLET OF AN TOY VIC (BT 518085) ATTITUDE OF PEOPLE REVERSED OVERNIGHT & THERE WAS NO DESIRE TO USE THE THRESHER (REASON GIVEN BY VILLAGE CHIEF) TOO MUCH WORK
- 17 Oct APPROXIMATELY 5 & 1/2 TONS OF RICE DELIVERED TO 210 FAMILIES OF AN TAY (BT 518085) & HOA MY (BT 483140). 1/4 DELIVERED 7000 LBS OF RICE TO VILLAGE CHIEF OF AN TY WHO IN TURN DISTRIBUTED IT TO 185 FAMILIES WHOSE HOMES WERE DESTROYED DURING A JULY OPERATION.
- 18 Oct
- 19 Oct

ENCLOSURE (5)  
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Extract from Command Chronology, month of Oct, 3d MarDiv

Civil Affairs/Civic Action

Operation Golden Fleece

This operation continued throughout the month of October and Marines were instrumental in the harvesting in excess of 200,000 lbs. of rice which without Marine Corps security would not have been harvested by pro-government Vietnamese. This operation provided not only physical security under which the harvest was conducted, but it was also supported by Marine Corps trucks, tractors and helicopters assisting in moving the rice to secure storerooms. This program will be repeated for 1966 and will be referred to as Golden Fleece II.

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
FPO San Francisco 96601

3:DFW:af  
3120.1  
27 Oct 1965

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Subj: GOLDEN FLEECE Operations

1. The following report is submitted on harvest protection and control conducted under the general name of GOLDEN FLEECE Operations.

2. GOLDEN FLEECE Operations commenced in early September 1965 in the coastal area of the DA NANG TAOR, when the 1st Bn, 9th Marines, in cooperation with local civil authorities, began military protection of harvesters who reported harassment and confiscation by Viet Cong elements. Patrol clashes with VC were encountered on 8 September 1965, with company and battalion size VC units encountered on 9 and 10 September.

3. By 13 September, all major VC units had been driven from the area and security was being provided by multiple squad and platoon size patrols. In addition, and again in coordination with civil authorities, special measures were taken on population control. Village sweeps and road check points were used to clear the area of unauthorized or suspect civilians. 723 civilians were interrogated on 13 September, and 33 apprehended as VCS. VC reaction to these moves was terrorist mining of ripened rice paddies from which they had been denied. This was first encountered on 16 September in the 1st Bn, 9th Marines area. One USMC LVT was damaged by a mine that day, and reports received that 20 VC were laying mines in the area. Platoon size patrols, with engineer personnel, began providing security and mine sweeps of roads and paddy lands. In spite of these efforts, several harvesters and RF/PP/PAT personnel were killed or injured in mined rice fields during the period 16-21 September.

4. On 18 September, because of reports that rice confiscated by the VC was being moved south by boat to avoid land patrols and check points, a series of river check points and night ambushes were established to deny the enemy this means of transportation.

5. By 19 September, the rice fields in the vicinity of the CA DE SONG, 3d Marines area, were ripening. GOLDEN FLEECE operations were extended to the CA DE SONG river basin, utilizing experience obtained in the coastal region. This, coupled with the generally less intense Viet Cong activity in the northern DA NANG sector, permitted highly effective harvest control measures throughout the period 19-30 September. In addition to an effective harvest of covered areas, friendly VN groups were transported to areas on the edge of the TAOR where they harvested large quantities of rice from their former fields under military protection. This harvest was transported back to a safe area by LVT and helicopter.

6. Villagers throughout the DA NANG area become confident of the protective measures developed and the period after 20 September saw an intensified and increasingly effective harvest.

7. As VC contacts were reduced by protective measures and aggressive patrolling,

ENCLOSURE (6) (7)

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operations were extended to locate the caches of rice previously seized by the VC and stored locally until it could be transported out of the area. Two tons of rice were found by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on 22 September and turned over to the HOA VANG District Headquarters for disposition. Another cache of three tons was found on 10 October. Other caches located included rice stored in 55 gallon drums, in houses of sympathizers, and in temporary shelters in the hill areas. Where these stores could be removed, they were turned over to local civil authorities. 300 bushels were destroyed in the hills by a Reconnaissance Battalion patrol on 6 October; smaller caches were destroyed by deep patrols south of the 9th Marines main positions.

9. By early October, harvest operations began in the CHU LAI area. 2d Battalion, 4th Marines provided a rifle company to cover the harvest of a valley area forward of the main positions. Over a four day period, the entire valley was harvested without incident, rice brought back to a central storage area protected by a local PF platoon. Patrols searched for and located VC rice caches, destroying them in place. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines turned over two tons of seized rice to local authorities on 14 October, and destroyed a large store of salt in place.

10. By mid-October, a psychological warfare effort was made to exploit the success of GOLDEN FLEECE operations. Oriented on the CHU LAI area, where harvest operations were principally in progress, the theme of comparing families under GVN and families under the VC under harvest conditions was developed and exploited by pamphlets and posters.

11. By the end of October, some GOLDEN FLEECE operations continued in the CHU LAI enclave, centered on the 4th Marines area. Harvesting had been largely completed in the DA NANG area. One company (E/2/4) maintained security over a harvest area beyond the main battle positions during the period 23-27 October, and the completion of this rice harvest essentially terminated GOLDEN FLEECE operations as a major effort.

12. The total amount of rice collected, or denied the Viet Cong, is not assessable on the Division level. Reports involving tonnage, bushels, amtrac or helicopter loads, cube and container, have been variously received. One composite estimate, received from the HOA VANG District Headquarters, reports 80,000 kilos of rice obtained through GOLDEN FLEECE operations in that District.

13. GOLDEN FLEECE is considered to have been a highly successful operation, producing benefits well beyond the amount of rice obtained. The VC were defeated and discredited in their unsuccessful efforts to obtain or disrupt the rice harvest. Cooperation between US, ARVN, and GVN elements, as well as with the general citizenry, was notable. The power and effectiveness of U. S. military forces was amply demonstrated, and U. S. concern for the welfare and protection of VN people will have a lasting effect in the area.

/s/ D. P. Wickoff  
D. P. WICKOFF  
By direction

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"2"

ENCLOSURE (6)  
to (7)

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HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO San Francisco 96601

DivBul 5726  
3:JRF:mbb  
31 October 1965

DIVISION BULLETIN 5726

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Protection of Vietnamese Nationals and the Rice Crop During the 1966  
Harvest Season

1. Purpose. To provide guidance to subordinate units concerning methods and procedures which were utilized during the 1965 rice harvesting season.

2. Background. To protect the local villagers and the rice crop during the main harvest seasons is to deny the VC valuable foodstuffs, stifle his control over the local populace and increase the VC logistical problems. Through experience, it has been determined that the most profitable echelon to coordinate rice harvesting procedures is at the Infantry Battalion and Village Chief level, thereby proving to the populace that the local Marine force is there to protect them against VC encroachment, and enhancing District, village, hamlet, and Marine relationships.

a. Principal Harvest Seasons

<u>Area</u>	<u>Season</u>
DA NANG	May and Sep-Oct
HUE-FHU BAI	Feb and Sep
CHU LAI	May and Oct

b. Methods, Tactics, and Procedures

(1) Patrols operating near the periphery of the TAOR coordinate patrol and ambush activities with local villagers to protect them while harvesting and transporting rice to a safe storage area.

(2) Marine and Popular Force units coordinate in search and clear operations. Upon conclusion of the search and clear operation, the Marine units establish outposts and ambushes, to safeguard the rice harvesting area, while popular forces escort the local people to and from the rice fields to harvest crops.

ENCLOSURE (7)  
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DivBul 5726  
31 Oct 1965

(3) Aggressive combat patrolling around the periphery of the rice fields provides a screen of protection for local villagers during the harvesting period, while Popular Forces guard the rice storage area.

(4) Extended search and clear operations outside of the TAOR allows sufficient time for helicopters to transport local village personnel to the area of operations, harvest the rice crop and then transport the rice back to a safe area.

(5) Village chiefs make arrangements to transport the rice harvested back to a safe area by bus or a sampan.

(6) Marine and ARVN units coordinate to patrol and ambush areas to protect the local people and the rice storage area during the harvest.

c. No set pattern is applicable to all rice harvesting areas. However, the long lasting benefits accruing from the protection of the rice harvest far outweigh the time and effort spent participating in this type program.

3. Action. Addressees prepare and plan for harvest protection during periods appropriate to their locality. All harvest protection measures during the 1966 seasons will be referred to generally as "GOLDEN FLEECE II" operations.

4. Self-cancellation. 1 May 1966.

/s/ D. W. Sherman  
D. W. SHERMAN  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

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CO, 3d Bn, 4th Marines (5)  
CO, 12th Marines (5)

HEADQUARTERS  
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
c/o FPO, San Francisco  
California 96601

From: Commanding General  
To: III Marine Amphibious Force  
Subj: Operation GOLDEN FLEECE II

1. Operation GOLDEN FLEECE, in which U. S. Marine Forces assisted civil officials in harvesting rice during the Summer/Fall 1965 season, was a significant contribution to the war effort. Accordingly, similar operations, utilizing both troops and equipment, are authorized and encouraged during the future harvests to the extent that terrain and the tactical situation permit.

2. Upon conclusion of each rice harvest, subordinate ground commanders will report pertinent data, to include at least:

- a. Preparations for the harvest. Planning conferences; Plans; Surveillance; and Estimates of the situation.
- b. Conduct of the harvest. Dates; areas; units; civilian participation; tactics; transportation; accountability; storage; and amounts.
- c. Civilian reaction to the program. Expressions from Village and District Chiefs of the economic and psychological impact of the program; clippings or copies of news articles.

NATIONS THAT  
RESISTED:  
DENMARK, BULGARIA  
FINLAND, ITALY

ENCLOSURE (8)  
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U. S. NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION THREE  
 PLANNING OFFICE  
 SAN FRANCISCO 96601

6-3  
 MCB3/S. 3:00n  
 3000

Sort: 1478

29 NOV 1965

From: Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion  
 THREE

To: Commander Naval Construction Battalions, Pacific

Subj: Deployment Completion Report; submission of

Ref: (a) COMCOPAC INST 5213.1B (NOFAL)

- Encl: (1) Narrative Report  
 (2) Construction Completion Report, Guam  
 (3) Final Labor Distribution Report, Guam  
 (4) Final Financial Report, Guam  
 (5) Progress and Performance Chart, Guam  
 (6) Project Photos, Guam  
 (7) Construction Completion Report, RVN  
 (8) Final Labor Distribution Report, RVN  
 (9) Final Financial Report, RVN  
 (10) Progress and Performance Chart, RVN  
 (11) Project Photos, RVN  
 (12) Personnel Breakdown during Deployment  
 (13) Viet-Nam Mountout Report

1. In accordance with reference (a), the completion report for the deployment of MCB THREE to Guam and Danang, RVN from October 1964 to September 1965 is submitted herewith as enclosures (1) through (13). The completion reports for operations conducted by MCB THREE in support of Operation Sailor Hat on Kahoolawe, Hawaii and construction completed in support of OICC Far East on the island of Iwo Jima on two occasions are covered in separate correspondence.

J. D. RUMBLE

Copy to:

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 MCB FOUR

MCB FIVE  
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ENCLOSURE (8)

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NARRATIVE REPORT

- Ref: (a) COMUSCVPAC OPRD 13-64 (NOTAL)  
 (b) COMUSCVPAC OPRD 14-65 (NOTAL)  
 (c) COMUSCVPAC MSG 030131Z DEC 64 (NOTAL)  
 (d) COMUSCVPAC OPRD 19-64 (NOTAL)  
 (e) COMUSCVPAC OPRD 21-64 (NOTAL)  
 (f) COMUSCVPAC OPRD 22-64 (NOTAL)  
 (g) COMUSCVPAC MSG 140007Z AUG 64 (NOTAL)  
 (h) COMUSCVPAC MSG 090032Z MAR 65 (NOTAL)  
 (i) BUDOCKS MSG 252255Z NOV 64 (NOTAL)  
 (j) COMUSCVPAC OPRD Exercise Busy Bee 1-65 (NOTAL)  
 (k) MCB THREE ltr Ser 500 of 26 MAR 65 (NOTAL)

1. General. In accordance with reference (a), MCB THREE Advance Party consisting of 9 Officers and 141 enlisted men was air-lifted to Guam, Marianas Islands, via VR-21 aircraft on 1, 5, 8, and 19 October 1964. The main body of MCB THREE departed Port Huensme, California on board USNS PATRICK on 15 October 1964, arriving in Guam and reporting under the operational control of Commander, Naval Forces Marianas on 30 October 1964. MCB THREE was assigned 17 construction and repair projects in support of various commands under COMNAVMAR, including one on the island of Chi Chi Jima and one in support of the CG Loran Station, Yap, Caroline Islands. A narrative of the construction accomplished is contained in enclosure (2) with supplementary information contained in enclosures (3) through (6). On 20 and 23 May 1965, MCB THREE in accordance with reference (b) deployed to Danang, RVN, on board U.S.S. POINT DEFIANCE (LSD-31) and U.S.S. BILLE GROVE (LSD-2) with 10 Officers and 321 enlisted men arriving and reporting for operational control to Commander, 30 Naval Construction Regiment on 26 and 30 May 1965. An advance party consisting of 1 Officer and 99 enlisted men reported to Danang on 18 May 1965 having been moved by USAF aircraft. While deployed to Vietnam, MCB THREE completed or worked on various construction projects as assigned by 30th NCR in support of the Naval Component Commander or the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force. The narrative of these projects is contained in enclosure (7) with supplementary information contained in enclosures (8) through (11). During the period 23 to 28 September MCB THREE, after having been relieved by MCB FIVE, returned to its homeport via six MATS aircraft having completed an 11½ month deployment.

2. Personnel. While deployed, the personnel breakdown of MCB THREE varied considerably. With detachments on Kahoolawe, Iwo Jima twice, well drilling teams, four Seabee Teams, EO/CM teams, project DEMO personnel, and rear echelon personnel as well as those personnel deployed to Yap and Chi Chi Jima, the battalion never was together as a whole unit at any one time during its entire deployment. A breakdown of personnel assigned by the months of deployment is contained in enclosure (12). The actual number of personnel on board the main body and the projects assigned, resulted in the cancellation by reference (c) of some projects originally assigned for the Guam deployment. During the entire 11½ month deployment, a shortage of EO and CM E-8 or E-9 supervisory personnel existed and hampered equipment operations and repairs. Supervisory personnel in all other rates was adequate. While deployed to RVN, lack of sufficient EO/CM

ENCLOSURE (1)

personnel in comparison to the projects assigned was overcome by assigning EO/CI personnel TAD to MCB THREE from MCB FIVE. Full utilization of all rates during the entire deployment, with the exception of UT and CE work in RVN was realized, lack of UT and CE work in RVN and necessary reassignment of their efforts else where did not result in a full utilization of their skills or capacity. The productivity and desire expressed and demonstrated by all rates was commendatory, but the skills and experience available to the average Group VIII rating in comparison to their World War II or Korean War counter part proved to be considerably less.

### 3. Detachments/STATS

a. Special Iwo Jima Construction Detail #1. In accordance with reference (d), MCB THREE deployed one (1) officer and 26 enlisted men to Iwo Jima on 18 September in support of requirements for the OICC Far East. This detail completed construction on the antennas guy wire anchors at the USCG Loren Station and rejoined the Battalion on 26 October 1964.

b. Operation Sailor Hat. In accordance with reference (e), MCB THREE deployed a detail consisting of 1 officer and up to 41 enlisted to Kahoolawe, Hawaii on 12 October 1964 in support of operation "Sailor Hat". This detail completed its construction and rejoined the battalion on 20 June 1965 in Danang, RVN.

c. Special Iwo Jima Construction Detail #2. In accordance with reference (f), MCB THREE deployed a detail consisting of 1 officer and 27 enlisted to Iwo Jima on 30 October 1964 in support of the requirements of OICC Far East. This detail completed construction of a transmitter building and rejoined the battalion in late December 1964.

d. STATS (Seabee Teams). STAT's 0303 and 0304 rejoined the battalion in early July 1965 after completing a 10 month deployment in Thailand. STAT 0305 and 0306 departed the battalion in late May 1965 in Guam to return to COMUS for training. Upon rejoining the battalion, STAT 0303 and 0304 members were reintegrated into the battalion organization. The petty officers proved to be effective leaders during the Vietnam portion of the deployment.

e. Well-drilling Teams. In accordance with reference (g) MCB THREE deployed two well drillers to Vietnam from August 1964 to February 1965, and in accordance with reference (h) MCB THREE deployed five well drillers to Vietnam from March 1965 to present. *Sep 65*

f. Project Demo. In accordance with reference (i) MCB THREE assigned nine personnel including one CPO TAD to CONGBLAN from December 1964 to September 1965.

g. Rear Echelon. MCB THREE averaged six men TAD to CEBU Port Huonans for rear echelon duties during its deployment.

h. Yap and Chi Chi Jima. Yap and Chi Chi Jima detachments are covered in enclosure (2).

7. Training

a. Military Training. A total of 4,087 man days were expended for military training during the deployment. During the Guam deployment each man averaged two full days of military training per month. Emphasis during the Guam deployment was placed on keeping intact the military posture gained during the previous Port Huencame training period. Training also consisted of one full battalion field exercise in April 1965. Formal military training was not carried out during the Vietnam deployment, but the experience gained during the Guam deployment and the previous Port Huencame deployment proved helpful in setting up the MCB THREE camp perimeter defense and security guard force.

b. Technical Training. 3,692 man days of formal technical training were conducted during the deployment on Guam. Emphasis was placed on training directly connected with the projects assigned on Guam. In addition, rotation of personnel from job to job to gain experience was emphasized at company level. Perhaps the largest gain in technical training realized was the improvement in senior petty officers in job planning and the carrying out of their plans. This training and experience gained on Guam helped considerably in Vietnam. No formal technical training was conducted in Vietnam.

c. Operation Busy Bee. In accordance with reference (j) MCB THREE conducted Operation Busy Bee, a full battalion mount-out exercise, from 26 February to 4 March 1965. A full report on this exercise was submitted in reference (k). The experience and training gained in this exercise proved to be invaluable during the mount out conducted to Vietnam in May 1965. In conjunction with exercise Busy Bee, but as a separate part, MCB THREE assigned 1 officer and 35 men TAD to MCB TEN in conjunction with Operation Silver Lance from 28 February to 1 April 1965. MCB TEN submitted a separate report on this exercise.

d. Disaster Recovery Training. In conjunction with COMNAVMAF, MCB THREE conducted a full battalion disaster recovery training. This training was later put to use on Guam on 4 February 1965 during a tidal wave alert for the island and on at least four other occasions while assisting COMNAVMAF in fighting island brush and forest fires.

e. Officer Training. A junior officer training course was established during the Guam deployment. Subsequent to the administrative inspection held in March 1964, this program was dropped in favor of a officer and petty officer leadership program held twice monthly. This program was continued in Vietnam.

f. Evaluation. The overall military posture of the battalion while deployed in Vietnam was considered excellent, and is attributed as a direct result of the continuous military training received by the battalion. The use of the Group VIII ratings in Vietnam pointed out that many of the Group VIII personnel lacked much of the technical experience which attributed to the Seabee reputation. This immediate built-in

handicap can be initially overcome by a vigorous can do attitude and eventually solved by continuous emphasis upon technical training and further experience in the individual areas of specialization.

8. Contingency Planning. Upon arrival on Guam, INCB THREE established a mount out control center (MOCC) which was actively and fully engaged during the whole Guam deployment. The COMCWPAC contingency library was inventoried and taken over from INCB TEN. INCB THREE assumed the position as Pacific Fleet Back-Up Battalion in October 1964. During Exercise Busy Bee the Battalion and the staff received a full exercise in mount-out and in carrying out its contingency planning. The final test of this training was the mount out of the battalion in May 1965 to Danang, Vietnam. This mount out was accomplished expeditiously within six days with few problems. A full report of this mount out is contained in enclosure (13). Movements of the battalion in all cases was directed by MOCC. The administrative move to Guam utilizing USIS PATRICK for the main body and VR-21 aircraft for the advance party was considered excellent. The move from Guam utilizing USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2), USS POINT DEFIANCE (LSD-31) and USS TALLADIXA (APA-208) with the advance party moving by 29 Tactical Air Command aircraft proceeded without any major problems and within the time frame allowed. The move was considered by the battalion to be excellent. The return home utilizing six Military Air Transport Service aircraft (3 C135, 2 C130 and 1 C124) was considered to be less than satisfactory. Absolutely no planning information or assistance was provided this command by MAPS, the schedule was unpredictable and time delays encountered were considered excessive. Return of the battalion organic equipment was accomplished by the SS FAIRWOOD, a chartered NCTS freighter.

## 9. Supply and Logistics

### a. Project Materials

(1) Guam. Project materials for the most part were procured in CONUS and shipped to Guam. The MTO and ordering of this material was accomplished for the major part by COMCWPAC DET ALFA in conjunction with the INCB THREE Operations Department planning group prior to deployment. Shipping and reorder where necessary was accomplished by DET ALFA. Some material, such as aggregate and ready mix concrete were purchased on Guam. With a few minor exceptions, project materials were received in sufficient time to allow orderly installation on each project. Where material was either delayed or required reordering, the speed with which DET ALFA responded precluded large construction delays. The cooperation, responsiveness, control of shipping, and information and planning data provided by DET ALFA (Now Code 50 of CDBU) was considered to be outstanding, and the accomplishment of 90.5% of the Guam projects is a direct result of their capable operation.

(2) Vietnam. With exception of the camp materials and the PFC consumables brought to Danang by INCB THREE, all project materials were provided to INCB THREE by the 36th Naval Construction Regiment. Delays in project material delivery from CONUS caused numerous changes and delays

ENCLOSURE (1)

the construction schedule while in Danang. Some materials were locally procured such as lumber, sheet metal, sand, aggregate, and minor electrical and plumbing fixtures; however, these were available in only small amounts as they were considered to be of inferior quality to U.S. manufactured items. Completion of MTO's, fixing up of long range construction planning, and better delivery of COMUS materials had largely overcome the majority of these problems towards the end of the MCB THREE deployment.

b. Repair Parts. Repair parts support for the automotive and construction equipment for P25A and augment equipment on Guam was considered to be fair. Replenishment of stocks and delays in shipping of repair parts were realized, and availability of parts for military equipment on Guam were non-existent. While in Vietnam, MCB THREE experienced considerable delays in the repair of construction equipment due to non-availability of repair parts. At the time of return to COMUS, approximately 1900 requisitions were outstanding. The assistance from CB Center, Port Hueneme was considered outstanding in this area. Lack of transportation for shipment of the parts to MCB THREE caused the major delays.

c. Equipage and General Stores. No problems of major significance were realized in the procurement/replacement of battalion equipage or general store materials. The filling of 95% of the deficiencies in SOAP prior to deployment and an active program to procure insurance items prior to meant out to Vietnam overcame most problems in this area.

d. Berthing. During the Guam deployment MCB THREE was berthed in the Naval Station Barracks with the officers berthed in HQ-7. The material condition and comfort of the barracks and its facilities was considered excellent. While deployed to Vietnam, MCB THREE was berthed in strong backed 16 X 32 tents. While some of these tents were somewhat crowded, in view of the overall conditions, they were considered excellent.

e. Messing. While deployed to Guam, MCB THREE personnel messed at the Naval Station Mess. Food service was fair. NAS Agana provided noon meals to personnel working on projects located there, and this food service was considered outstanding. While deployed to Danang, MCB THREE subsisted in a temporary Galley/Mess Hall for three months and later in the permanent galley for 1 1/2 months. During one period the battalion experienced a dysentery breakout due to the fly problem. Installation of screens and increased insecticide spraying overcame the problem within one week. The service and quality of the food, considering the rations available, was excellent.

f. Funds. The final financial reports are contained in enclosures (4) and (9) for both the Guam and Vietnam deployment.

## 10. Equipment

a. General. While deployed on Guam, MCB THREE was assigned an average of 298 pieces of P25A and augment equipment. The initial condition of this equipment was fair to poor. Replacement of critical items by COMUSPAC

and the continued emphasis placed on the repairs and upkeep of this equipment resulted in its being in a better condition at the time of mount out. The average number of pieces deadlined during Guam was 35. While deployed to Vietnam MFCB THREE was assigned an average of 276 pieces of P25A and augment equipment. Although parts procurement was slow and effecting repairs generally difficult, the condition of the equipment was considered to be good. An average of 31 pieces were continually on deadline while deployed to Vietnam.

b. Facilities. The facilities for equipment repair in Guam were considered to be excellent. The storage and parking facilities adjacent to the water front where a continual salt spray existed were considered to be detrimental to the equipment. The facilities at Danang were improved daily.

c. Maintenance. Specifically MFCB THREE had major problems with the following equipment:

(1) Hough Front End Loaders, Code 4531. MFCB THREE experienced considerable difficulty with Hough front end loaders. Major difficulties were experienced with hoses, o-rings, and hydraulic drives. At no time during the deployment could the battalion depend on the availability of these four pieces of equipment. Had they, especially when fitted out with the brackets attachments, been available they would have been valuable pieces of equipment. It is felt that insufficient operator experience, the operation of this equipment in the hard coral of Guam, and inherent manufactured weaknesses of the machinery were the major causes of problems and breakdowns.

(2) Transit Mixers, Code 2420. MFCB THREE was assigned four transit mixers on Guam and in Vietnam. Only an average of two of these were in an "up" status during the whole deployment, even though two were subsequently replaced by CC-CBPAC. MFCB THREE was able to procure all its ready mix concrete delivered in Guam except for DAG 735. The unreliability of the TM's on this project with average pours of 40 to 50 cubic yards, caused major construction delays. In Vietnam where the availability of TM's was critical, the availability of only two during the whole MFCB THREE deployment also caused major construction delays. In addition, since the TM's were of commercial specifications, delivery of concrete to outlying areas during inclement weather became impossible. Since it is felt that the age of two of the MFCB THREE TM's was the major reason for their non-availability coupled with the poor parts support of the commercial equipment in Vietnam, their replacement with tactical vehicles is recommended.

(3) Cranes Crawler Code 4230. Upon arrival on Guam, MFCB THREE was assigned to drive piles 55 to 60 foot in length for DAG 771. The only crane available was the P25A IN725 with a 35 foot boom. Rental of a crane from P.C of a sufficient size was finally arranged, but only after considerable delay. It is recommended that in the future, when projects are assigned to a MFCB, that augment equipment of a sufficient size be assigned prior to the actual deployment in order to prevent construction delays.

(4) Tractors Wheel, MRS, Code 4892. NMCB THREE was assigned four wheeled tractors CODE 4892, manufactured by MRS. Upon arrival in Guam only one of these was operational. The age and general condition of this equipment was such that had not the runway overrun project at NAS Agana been cancelled, its completion would have been seriously affected; When NMCB THREE deployed to Vietnam, although six MRS's were available, their condition and age was such that upon completion of the deployment all six had to be sent to Okinawa for complete rehabilitation.

(5) Tractor Crawler, Code 4851. In Guam, NMCB THREE was assigned 8 TD24 bulldozers. The condition of all these was so poor that their total replacement was required within 4 months. D-5H's were assigned as replacements for these TD-24's and proved to be better machines even though they had cable w/c hydraulic blades. The only trouble experienced with them was failure of their superchargers soon after NMCB THREE's arrival in Vietnam. It is felt that this was the result of either normal wear or improper operation technique and is not an inherent problem. Lastly, while in Vietnam, NMCB THREE was assigned a TD-15 bulldozer. This machine proved to be highly versatile and very effective in the field.

(6) Dump Trucks, 5 Ton, Code 0557. On the average, NMCB THREE was assigned 16 military 6x6 type dump trucks. Non-availability of parts and almost continual operation in Vietnam resulted in an average of only 6 to 8 of these being available to the battalion. An increase of from 16 to 20 of these trucks is recommended.

(7) Motor Grader Code 4420. NMCB THREE was assigned four motor graders. One of these was lost in an accident in Vietnam. Prior to this loss the battalion only averaged an availability of 1 out of the 4. With the amount of road work assigned in Vietnam, the present age and condition of the battalion graders, and the non-availability of parts, an increase in allowance should be considered.

d. Evacuation. The general condition of the equipment upon the arrival of the battalion to Guam was so poor that a drop in the number of EO projects assigned to NMCB THREE was necessary. The EO effort was diverted to assist in the upgrading the condition of the P25A equipment. Although this move resulted in upgrading the condition of the equipment and subsequent better availability of it in Vietnam, it was at the expense of training equipment operators. In Vietnam the lack of good equipment operator technique resulted in slower completion of jobs and a large number of accidents.

11. Safety. The battalion had 28 lost time accidents during the deployment, an average of 2.6 lost time accidents per month. 20 of these occurred on the island of Guam with the remaining 8 occurring in Vietnam. The battalion had one fatality resulting from a vehicular accident in Vietnam. Over three quarters of all the accidents occurred during liberty hours or were the result of sports incurred injuries.

12. Medical and Dental. There were no major medical or dental problems

encountered during the deployment. Medical activity was primarily of a routine sick call nature. While in Guam, the medical officer utilized the naval station Dispensary facilities while the dental officer utilized the naval station Dental Clinic facilities. Both facilities were considered excellent. While deployed in Vietnam, a separate dispensary and dental clinic were maintained NMCB THREE. In comparison to surrounding units, the facilities were far above average.

13. PIO. The battalion engaged in an active PIO program both during the Guam and Vietnam deployment. Over 1583 news releases were made to news media. In addition, NMCB THREE published a battalion news paper. The THREE BEE BUZZ, on both Guam and in Vietnam.

#### 14. Morale Welfare and Recreation

a. Morale. Battalion morale was maintained at a generally good level during the deployment, with it being especially high on Guam. An active intra-mural program, company competition, the challenging work on Guam, and the manner in which the petty officers of the battalion carried out their tasks contributed greatly to this. In Vietnam, while the work was challenging and the living conditions incomparision to other units considered good, the lack of materials and a continually changing schedule worked to the detriment of maintaining high morale.

#### b. Welfare and Recreation

(1) Guam. The recreation facilities on Guam were considered excellent and they were actively utilized by battalion personnel. A continuous intramural program in basketball, football, softball, and other sports was established with a good participation and following by all battalion members. NMCB THREE basketball team placed third in island wide competition, and NMCB THREE had an active varsity softball team until mount-out.

(2) Vietnam. While in Vietnam intramural sports were limited to volleyball, horseshoes and card type tournaments. Recreation facilities were limited to beaches and their utilization by battalion personnel were dependent on work schedules. The battalion operated a NMCB THREE D' beer mess which proved to be a high morale factor.

#### c. Religious Activities

(1) Guam. While deployed on Guam, NMCB THREE had ample religious facilities provided all three faiths through the Naval Station. The battalion chaplain assisted the Naval Station Chaplain in providing Protestant religious services. A meditation room was also provided in the battalion barracks.

(2) Vietnam. While deployed to Vietnam, NMCB THREE Camp had Catholic and Protestant services each Sunday in Camp. Assistance from the 3rd MARDIV provided Catholic Services. The NMCB THREE Chaplain

provided assistance to the 3rd MARDIV for Protestant Services elsewhere in addition to those conducted at the Seabee Camp.

15. People to People Work. While on Guam, INCB THREE engaged in only a limited people to people program. Construction and repair assistance to the Chief Brody School, a school for retarded children, was provided on a voluntary basis by battalion personnel. In Vietnam the people to people program was more actively pursued, but it was limited by the small amount of free time of the men. Assistance was provided to an orphanage in the village of Le Ly in conjunction with the 3rd MARIENS. In addition, the battalion doctor and corpsman provided medical assistance to near by villages in conjunction with local doctors and U.S. Army personnel.

16. P25A and Organic Equipment. Except for specifically mentioned items in this report and previous minor changes recommended, the P25A tools and organic equipment served the battalion well. The inherent tools and equipment provided, were sufficient in most cases to allow for an orderly and rapid completion of all projects assigned.

17. Conclusion. The deployment of INCB THREE was varied as any deployment conducted by a Pacific Construction Force in recent years. The Guam deployment was both challenging and interesting. The deployment to Vietnam taxed the battalions skills and ingenuity to meet the many problems encountered there. The deployment proved to be long and saw many changes in the capability, training, skill and production of the battalion. The battalion reached its peak after approximately one half of the deployment. Changes in personnel, loss of trained key personnel, long used to battalion organization, and the length of stay overseas brought the battalion to its present status, where retraining and integration of replacements and new personnel during the home port period will serve to rejuvenate and build the battalion back up to its maximum operating peak.

Construction Completion Report, Guam1. Planning and Engineering

a. Predeployment Activity. Four months prior to the mount out of HMCB THREE to Guam, planning and engineering for the Guam deployment began. An operations department planning group consisting of the engineering officer and senior petty officers from the BU, CE, UT, and SW rates assisted by the battalion EA's was formed. This team visited the Guam construction sites while returning from the previous Okinawa deployment. In conjunction with COMBOPAC DET ALFA at CMC Port Hueneme, they performed MTO's, prepared shop drawings, prepared personnel requirements, and set up a critical path schedule for the upcoming Guam deployment. In addition they worked with DET ALFA in ordering project tools and materials for each DAG assigned. Although the original planning had to be changed, along with the PERT schedule developed, due to changes in the DAG's assigned, their work proved to be the key in the success of the Guam Deployment.

b. Construction Operations. While deployed in Guam the standard project officer organization contained in HAVDOCKS P315 was utilized. Both Charlie and Delta companies were designated the general construction companies on the major projects acting as "prime contractors". ALFA and BRAVO companies provided "subcontractor" service for utilities, earth moving and site preparation. Projects of a primarily earth moving, road work or of a utilities nature were performed by ALFA or BRAVO companies as prime contractors. Organization of Bravo Company was as a shops and utility company as approved by COMBOPAC early in the deployment. Material liaison with line companies, schedule updating, pour schedules, and material control was accomplished by the same planning group established in Port Hueneme.

c. Scheduling. The master PERT schedule established at Port Hueneme was utilized throughout the Guam deployment. Cancellation of certain projects required its rework, but this was accomplished rapidly. Each line company prepared and submitted individual monthly schedules based on this master schedule. Sub-contractors prepared their schedule in liaison with the prime contractors. The master schedule was updated as necessary.

2. Projects. HMCB THREE was assigned 17 projects while on the island of Guam. The following is a line item description of the work accomplished by each DAG Number.

a. DAG 726 Fleet Range Parking Lot, NAVSTA. This project consisted of paving approximately 24,000 feet square of a parking area on Orote Point. Base course was obtained from a pit on the Naval Station and 1 1/2 inch asphaltic concrete finish course was laid with stripping provided. The project took 69 man days to complete. It was started in April 1965 and completed and turned over to OICC Marianas in MAY 1965. No major problems were encountered. Use of pans to haul the base course decreased the man days estimated for the project.

b. DAG 735 Kindergarten and Nursery NAS Agana. This project consisted of erection of a 110' x 40' structure with reinforced concrete

ENCLOSURE (2)

deck, bents, roof and footings with CMU interior and exterior walls, complete with interior wiring, plumbing and cabinetry. The project was begun by the advance party soon after arrival on Guam. The last work was on Monday 17 May 1965. 80% of the project was completed. Work completed consisted of all foundations, bents, and roof concrete work; exterior CMU walls and 75% of interior walls; exterior water, electrical and sewage lines and utility work; interior rough plumbing and conduit work; and pre-fabrication of 75% of the cabinetry for the project.

(1) Problems encountered in this project were many. The actual funding allowed no contingency. In most cases PTO's were made without the normal 10% contingency which resulted in delay when breakage or shortages were found. Delays were encountered where shortage of funds made procurement of local material difficult. NAS Agana provided considerable assistance in overcoming many of these problems. Field changes, on occasion, had to be made in order to allow for orderly progression of work where certain shortages existed. In addition, since no contingency in concrete procurement was allowed, this required pick up of concrete using MICB THREE TMs to reduce costs. The unreliability of these TMs often delayed pours and a major change order in separate sectionized pours vice a monolithic pour of bents and roof had to be effected. The concrete work and steel work of the structure was extremely complicated and resulted in some delays where skills were lacking. Lastly the requirements for various detachments resulted in the loss of some key battalion personnel which again helped make orderly completion of this project difficult.

(2) This project was turned over to OICC on 16 May 1965.

c. DAG 738, Air Condition AUI Shop, NAS Agana. This project consisted of providing air conditioning to the AUI shop including duct work, installation of the 10 ton unit, fabrication of a condenser shed, installation of new wiring, and installation of sliding metal doors and CMU walls to isolate certain rooms.

(1) This project was started in early January and completed in early April. Existing conditions in the building and variance of the unit received in comparison to that ordered required redesign by the battalion. Instead of the condenser being a separate unit, it was a composite unit with the compressor and motor included together. Consequently a condenser shed had to be built outside the building. Late delivery of the doors also slowed early completion of the project. The project provided excellent UT work in air conditioning and SW work in duct fabrication and installation.

(2) The project was turned over to OICC, 100% complete on 11 May 1965.

d. DAG 754, Swimming Pool, NAS Agana. This project consisted of construction of a 60' x 80' swimming pool complete with underwater lighting, filter plant, patio, exterior lighting, and fencing in the EM barracks.

area. Excavation for the pool began in October 1964. After pouring of the foundations, the shallow end of the pool deck was poured first while awaiting the main pool drains. Some delay in the overall project resulted, but it was considered to be minor. Pouring of the walls was changed to a monolithic pour and breakdown of TMs resulted in two cold joints which were repaired by use of epoxy. The pool was 82% complete when turned over to OICC with only the promenade deck, installation of the filter plant, fencing, setting of light poles, and painting left to be completed.

(1) The project was turned over to OICC on 17 May 1965.

e. DAG 755, Perimeter Road, NAS Agana. This project consisted of repairs and single surface treatment to 9000 feet of single lane (12') road and repair of approximately 100 pot holes on the Naval Air Station, Agana. This project was started in December 1964 and completed in May 1965. A complete new base course using up to six inches of pit run core, obtained aboard the station, was placed along the entire 9000 feet of road broken into two segments. This 9000 feet was then single surface treated using MC-1 and 3/4 inch minus aggregate, with corners receiving double surface treatments. Close to 250 pot holes vice the 100 expected were repaired using cold mix. One culvert head wall was also installed. The project was 100% complete and provided the EO's excellent opportunity and training in road work utilizing varied pieces of equipment.

(1) This project was turned over to OICC on 11 May 1965.

f. DAG 758, Rewire Navy Exchange Warehouses NAVSTA. This project consisted of replacing all interior wiring and conduit in 28 Navy Exchange 100' x 40' elephant hut type warehouse buildings. Installation of new receptacles and light fixtures in certain buildings was also required. This project was started in January 1965 and completed in April 1965. No problems were encountered. The cooperation of Navy Exchange personnel was outstanding and contributed to the rapid progress of this work.

(1) This project was turned over to OICC on 11 May 1965.

g. DAG 759, Rehabilitate the Galley Reefers, Naval Station. This project consisted of complete rehabilitation of the galley reefers consisting of 8 rooms. Replacement of studding, insulation, plaster, certain doors, wiring, piping, controls, and machinery was required.

(1) This project was started in November 1964. NMCB THREE hooked up temporary reefers outside the galley to allow for continued operation of the galley and mess hall. Demolition revealed that 95% of all studding had to be replaced as well as all plates. One main reinforced concrete column was found damaged and part of a 12 EP53 pile from DAG 771 was utilized to replace it. Installation of studding, asbestos board and polystyrene foam insulation proved to be no problem, but lack of experience in plastering slowed this portion of the project somewhat. No problems were encountered in installing control cables or wiring even though III cable was utilized.

Delays in shipping of mechanical parts affected the project completion schedule. Installation of the compressors, receivers, piping, evaporators and condensers provided good UT experience. Final testing revealed that the compressors requested by the specifications were too small and at the turnover of the project were being reordered by PFC Guam.

(2) This project was turned over to OICC, 98% complete, on 11 May 1965.

h. DAG 760. PAD 5 Recreation Facilities, Naval Station. This project consisted of providing asphaltic paving for tennis, basketball and volleyball courts, stripping and fencing for these courts, and construction of a softball diamond including a backstop.

(1) This project was started in December 1964 and was 77% complete when turned over to OICC. Paving and stripping of the courts, installation of the backboards for the basketball court, and prefabrication of 75% of the backstop and fencing was completed. Hauling of topsoil and grading of the softball field was completed and was waiting to be seeded and fertilized. In addition NICE THREE provided assistance to SUBRON 15 in completing a beach facility near by which was related to this project.

(2) The major problem revealed in this project was that the battalion was assigned a project for planting and fertilizing an area with no equipment with which to accomplish the task. PFC equipment was not available and at the time of mount out arrangements were in the process to borrow equipment from the Department of Agriculture. It is recommended in the future that projects should not be assigned a battalion when there is not equipment to complete the project in a satisfactory manner.

(3) This project was turned over to OICC on 17 May 1965.

i. DAG 765. Repair Street Lights, Naval Station. This project consisted of repairs to the street lighting system in the barracks and including installation of 8000 feet of direct burial cable and replacement of certain standards, fixtures and arms.

(1) This project was started in late December 1964. It was discovered early in the project that existing conditions and those shown on the print differed considerably. This required the relocation of approximately 40% of the cable and the reordering of a considerable quantity of orangeburg duct. Those fixtures which had not been replaced and required resetting were in poor condition. Four of these eventually broke. PFC Guam provided good cooperation and assistance on this project. The project was completed except for minor repairs to the street curbs and side walks and replanting of grass where the cable was buried.

(2) This project was turned over to OICC, 95% complete, on 17 May 1965.

j. DAG 766. Repair Flood Lights, S, T, and U Harfs, Naval Station.

This project consisted of replacement of poles, cross arms, direct burial cable and fixtures on "S" Wharf, and replacement of cross arms, fixtures and wiring of the wharf lighting on "T" and "U" Wharf.

(1) This project was started in November 1964 and completed in May 1965. In addition to the specifications NIGB THREE replaced two additional poles and provided an extra circuit to a Coast Guard warning light. No major problems were encountered.

(2) This project was turned over to OICC, 100% complete, on 11 May 1965.

k. DAG 768, Repair Route #2 between Naval Station and Himitz Beach. This project consisted of repairs to 2700 feet of shoulder, scarifying and placing new base course over laid with 1½ inch asphaltic concrete on 2526 feet of road and repairing pot holes and single surface treating 4412 feet of road and shoulders.

(1) This project was started in late November 1964 and completed in April 1965. Procurement of base course from a pit at NAD saved considerable funds for this project. The condition of the last section of road, which required repairs to pot holes and single surface, was so poor that the majority of the road had to be double treated with some areas receiving triple surface treatment.

(2) The project was turned over to OICC, 100% complete on 11 May 1965.

l. DAG 771, Transit Shed, PAD 5, Naval Station. This project consisted of erection of a 90' x 196' prefabricated structural steel building with a sheet metal skin and a six foot reinforced concrete wainscot wall. The foundation rested on 48 12HP53 steel piles, their average length being 55 feet. The interior deck was asphaltic concrete except for office and wash room/lavatory areas. The project also included provision of interior lighting, plumbing, sewage, and sprinkler systems and ramps and entrances to the building.

(1) Site preparation for this project began in October 1964, with the advance party. Lack of a backhoe made excavation of the footings difficult. The battalion NW25 had insufficient boom length to drive the piles and a crane was rented from P.C. to preclude cutting and rewelding the piles. ENR formulas for pile driving proved to be useless in driving in coral. After driving the test piles to their full length, they were allowed to set up and test loaded. They fell well within the design criteria and all piles were driven to full length except one which met refusal at 33 feet. The boom size was increased and poured to earth to save time on the project. The structural steel for the building was received only primed and was painted by SRF laborers. No problems were encountered in erecting the building or installation of most utilities. Non-receipt of light hangers precluded completion of all lighting by

INCB THREE. In order to meet the BOD of this project and in view of the movement of the air detachment early to Vietnam, this project was turned over for contractor completion, 90% complete, on 19 May. INCB THREE had completed all but exterior paving, interior office and head work, final interior finish plumbing and minor sheet metal work on one end of the building.

(2) This project proved to be the best training project assigned. It provided excellent experience to BU, SM, CE and UT rates as well as the EO rate. The experience in pile driving and major steel erection was considered to be a rare experience for the battalion.

m. DAG 774, Rewire Building 3169, Naval Station. This project consisted of replacement of certain conduit and wiring in four bays and office spaces in Building 3169.

(1) This project was started in December 1964. Existing conditions required reordering of extra wire on 3 separate occasions, resulting in nearly four times as much wire being replaced as originally planned. In addition, INCB THREE provided extra wiring to an exterior lighting system for the customer.

(2) This project was turned over to OICG, 100% complete on 11 May 1965.

n. DAG 780, Repair Yap Road, CG LORETA, YAP. This project consisted of building up approximately 6.1 miles of road, then impassable, between the town of Colonia and the CG Loran Station on the island of Yap. On 4 January 1965, a detail consisting of 27 men and an officer in charge proceeded to Yap to carry out construction. While at Yap they were berthed and subsisted at the USCG Loran Station. The rock quarry originally designated for the project was not available when the detail arrived and another quarry had to be opened. Considerable difficulty was also encountered in moving the rock crusher to Yap from Okinawa delaying the project several weeks. The rock available was a chlorate form of schist, which when wet and when placed under loads broke down and contributed to producing a mucky road bed. Many mud pits had to be dug out and coral was dredged from the bay to fill these holes. This coral however, was silty, and the only way the road could be completed was by placing an extreme crown in the road and by providing deep side ditches. It was recommended to CGICG 14 that the road be further improved within a year and that it be continually graded in order to maintain the road produced.

(1) This project was turned over complete to the U.S. Coast Guard on 11 May 1965.

o. Chi Chi Jima Maintenance. This project consisted of providing maintenance, repair and improvement work to the Naval Facility, Chi Chi Jima, Bonin Islands, as directed by CO PFC, Guam.

(1) On 4 January a detail consisting of 13 men and a CPO in charge departed on Chi Chi Jima and returned to Guam on 5 May 1965. Work completed by the detail included providing tie downs for Navy housing and several other buildings on the Naval Facility; repair to the fish reefer shed; construction and wiring of pump houses for the wells; repair of the roof, building extension, and repairing of the interior of the RI Club; rewiring of the Admin Building & RI Club; providing new guy wires on radio antennae; installing gas tank and pump; and various water line installation. The detail returned to Guam and rejoined the battalion on 5 May 1965.

p. Other Projects. NMCB THREE was assigned completion of two projects started by NMCB TEN.

(1) DAG 732 and 733, Fleet Boat House and Landing Naval Station. This project consisted of completing the installation of approximately 50% of the wave curtains on the pier; installation of the false piles and fenders; installation of chocks and bits; completion of the waiting room including interior and exterior wiring and plumbing; paving in the area; and completion of the boat shed roof.

(a) Ambiguity in prints required NMCB THREE to take down the columns and girders for the waiting room and lower them four inches in order that the roof panels on the boat shed would fit. The roof of the shed and the waiting room were then completed. The close tolerance in the manufacture of the wave curtains required that many of them had to be re-made in order to fit into place. Placing them became time consuming and increased the original estimate for completion of the project. As the final fendering was being placed on the pier, a Navy tug with barge collided with the pier damaging the end of the pier. Repairs were to be accomplished by P&C and the project was turned over to OICC on 11 May 1965.

(2) DAG 741, Tun Tavern Pool, Naval Station. This project consisted of completion of the following items on the project started by NMCB TEN; completion of the promenade deck; painting pool; completion of the piping and wiring for the filter plant and pool; completion of the bath house including the roof; interior partitions, plumbing, wiring and cabinetry; erection of the fence around the pool and final grading of site and paving of utility cuts. This project progressed well with only minor problems. One change order was effected to increase the size of the pool promenade deck and the station special services accomplished seeding with prisoner labor. The project was completed and turned over to OICC on 20 January 1965.

3. Conclusion. While deployed to Guam, the 17 projects assigned to NMCB THREE and costing approximately  $\frac{1}{2}$  million dollars provided the battalion with a varied work load. In accomplishing 90.5% of those projects assigned, NMCB THREE provided its BU's, SU's, UT's, CE's and EA's with a variety of experience. The GI's carried an exceptionally heavy work load in up grading the P25A equipment. Although the EO's in the battalion had various road projects assigned as well as general support to the construction

companies, they received no experience in any major earth work. The battalion projects were all well scattered over the island, making full time supervision by Officers and Chief Petty Officers difficult. Therefore, the First and Second Class Petty Officers of the battalion gained an enormous amount of supervisory experience. They learned to plan their work and then work their plans, and even more important, they learned to think on their feet.

## DECLASSIFIED

FINAL LABOR DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY  
 GUAM DEPLOYMENT  
 1 September 1964 to 26 May 1965

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>MAN DAYS</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
DIRECT	DAG PROJECTS	20626	
	fill in projects 90jt0	87	
	TOTAL DIRECT	20715	26.70
INDIRECT	X01 Const. Equip Repair	6332	
	X02 Operations & Engineering	2131	
	X03 Project Supervision	2456	
	X04 Project Material Expediting	121	
	X05 Mobile & Demobile	3308	
	X06 CTR & Parts Issue	806	
	X07 Supply (Const Support Only)	863	
	X08 Motor Pool (Const Support Only)	904	
	X09 Location Moving	688	
	X10 Incident Weather	115	
	TOTAL INDIRECT	17724	22.81
MILITARY	MT1 Military Training	4087	
	MT2 Disaster Control Training	143	
	MT3 Technical Training	3692	
	MT4 Safety Training	53	
	MT6 Quarters & P.T.	741	
	MT8 Mobility Preparation	11735	
	TOTAL MILITARY	21047	27.07
TOTAL PRODUCTIVE		59486	
ADMIN	Y01 Personnel and Admin	5002	
	Y02 Medical & Dental	832	
	Y04 Disbursing & Supply	1022	
	Y05 Commissary	2582	
	Y06 Camp Upkeep & Repair	4773	
	Y07 Security	525	
	Y08 Special Services	542	
	TOTAL ADMIN	15278	19.57
MISC	Z01 Leave, Liberty & Recreation	1978	
	Z02 Masts, Courts, Confinements	80	
	Z03 Sick Call, Dental, Hospital	679	
	Z04 Personal Affairs	221	
	Z05 TAD	16369	
	Z06 Air & Sealift	6290	
TOTAL MISC	2958*	3.85	
TOTAL OVERHEAD		42895	

TOTAL ALL LABOR AVAILABLE 77722 --- Total Over time including above man days  
 420 --- Length of Normal Work Day (Hours) 8.5 IRS. --- \*(Does not include Air,  
 Sealift or TAD)

ENCLOSURE (2)

DECLASSIFIED

FINAL FINANCIAL REPORT GUAM  
STATUS AS OF 31 MAY 1965

BUDGET PROJECT 63

(a) Total OPTAR received	\$184,200.00
(b) Total expenditure	\$ 46,909.04
(c) Total outstanding obligations	\$104,370.94
(d) Unobligated balance	\$ 32,920.02

BUDGET PROJECT 64

(a) Total OPTAR received	\$139,000.00
(b) Total expenditure	\$ 7,416.18
(c) Total outstanding obligations	\$120,933.24
(d) Unobligated balance	\$ 10,650.58

BUDGET PROJECT 47207

(a) Total OPTAR received	\$129,000.00
(b) Total expenditure	\$115,830.78
(c) Total outstanding obligations	\$ 13,575.42
(d) Unobligated balance	- \$ 406.20 **

BUDGET PROJECT 0122/008

(a) Total OPTAR received	\$ 600.00
(b) Total expenditure	\$ 00.00
(c) Total outstanding obligations	\$ 535.88
(d) Unobligated balance	\$ 64.12

\*\*Credit not received as of 31 May 1965. Reference HIGB THREE ltr Ser 512 of 31 March 1965 NOTAL

## CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION REPORT, RVN

1. Planning and Engineering. Five weeks prior to the arrival of the main body at Danang, ENGINEER BATTALION THREE dispatched a planning group to Vietnam consisting of three officers and three enlisted men. This planning group in conjunction with a planning group from ENGINEER BATTALION NINE and under the direction of 30th NCR staff performed the necessary engineering tasks, made MTO's and ordered materials for various projects. Upon arrival of ENGINEER BATTALION THREE in-country, this planning group rejoined ENGINEER BATTALION THREE. 30th NCR continued, in conjunction with the battalion, to make MTO's and order material on jobs assigned after that date. Projects were assigned by job order to the battalion, designs were made by the battalion where necessary, and MTO's revised as necessary. All planning and engineering was closely coordinated with the 30th NCR Staff and many projects became a joint effort.

2. Construction Logistics. All material ordered for projects in Vietnam were ordered by the 30th NCR. Processing and issue of material was accomplished thru a central yard operated by personnel from 30th NCR and ENGINEER BATTALIONS THREE and NINE. Delays in arrival of material through most of the ENGINEER BATTALION THREE deployment slowed projects considerably. These materials included lumber, especially 4x4's, 2x6's or larger, bolts and nuts, wire mesh, electrical fittings and wire, pipe, soil pipe and fittings, oxygen and acetylene, and plywood. Lack of a sufficient quantity and quality of sand and aggregate not only slowed projects but resulted in poorer grades of concrete being obtained. Beach sand, although of a poor grade since it was especially fine, was later used. The amount of aggregate being produced by the quarry was only sufficient for roads and for a good while, a poorly graded variety of river run gravel was used. In the latter part of the deployment, aggregate was being procured from HEAVY ENGINEERING CONTRACTORS through OPERATIONS OFFICER. To overcome lack of 4x4's and 2x6's, laminated 2x4's and 1x6's were used. Local bolts were available in small quantities and bamboo was used in place of wire mesh. Minor amounts of local wire and electrical fittings were also used where available.

3. Construction Operations. While deployed in RVN construction operations were conducted similarly to that on Guam. Projects were assigned to individual companies with subcontractor companies providing assistance as required. Material liaison with the companies, scheduling, and material control within the battalion was controlled through the OPERATIONS OFFICERS OFFICE.

4. Scheduling. The jobs assigned to ENGINEER BATTALION THREE were many. Their priority differed dependent on the tactical requirements of the III MAF. Materials were quite often either lacking or were only partially available. Often the entire scope of each project was not fully defined, making a critical path schedule impossible. Jobs were directly assigned to the various line companies by the OPERATIONS OFFICER dependent on their priority, material availability, man-power availability and rate requirements. As priorities changed or the scope of the project changed, adjustments were made within the battalion with additional assistance

ENCLOSURE (7)

being provided the particular company assigned the project by the Operations Officer.

5. Projects. Projects were assigned INCB THREE by Commander 30th Naval Construction Regiment in the form of job orders. A general outline or scope of the work was provided along with a contact officer and priority of the project. The following is a listing of the projects INCB THREE worked on while deployed. DAG numbers were assigned for general categories. Those projects without job orders were worked on prior to a job order number system.

a. DAG 1105 INCB CANTONMENT. This project originally consisted of construction of a two battalion camp. Relocation of INCB NINE to Danang East changed it to a one battalion camp prior to their arrival in late June. Construction began with the air detachment on 22 May and the temporary camp was essentially completed on 1 July. Erection of more permanent facilities began during June and continued throughout the deployment. Construction included: approximately 9 strong back tents of which 13 were modified with tin roofs; shower and lat facilities; a temporary galley and messhall; a permanent galley which replaced the temporary galley; a generator shed to house two 30 KW and one 100 KW generators; electrical distribution system; a 40' x 100' element hut for Supply storage; temporary automotive and construction equipment shops; construction of temporary repair and spare parts storage shed; installation of a 100 ft and 120 ft deep wells which produced a total of 50 gpm; construction of a 100000L water storage tank and water distribution system; construction of two slabs for butler buildings for automotive and construction equipment shops; installation of a batch plant; grading and preparation of a project storage yard; grading and preparation of an equipment storage yard; construction of security fencing and bunkers; construction of a temporary HI Club; and other minor projects.

b. DAG 1104-105 MAG 11 Cantonment. This project consisted of constructing a 1600 man galley/messhall, 241 strong back tents, heads, sanitary facilities camp utilities and a road network for the housing of Marine Air Group 11. INCB THREE completed 85% of the galley which was a wood framed building on a concrete slab including louvois, screening, drainage, piping, lighting, and a grease trap sanitary system. An MTO of the camp utilities was completed and material ordered. INCB THREE personnel instructed MAG 11 personnel in the erection of tent frames and approximately 150 tent frames were completed. Layouts of the camp and road network were accomplished by INCB THREE and initial road work was completed utilizing MAG 11 graders and operators. This project was turned over to INCB FIVE on 27 September 1965 with the project 40% complete.

c. DAG 1104-103 3RD Med Batt Cantonment. This project consisted of constructing 84 strong backed tents, four 8 hole pit latrines, one shower building, a modified 500 man galley/messhall, and three quonset huts. INCB THREE completed strong backing 23 tents in operative area and began preparation of the building pads for the three quonset huts. This project was turned over to INCB FIVE for completion on 23 September 1965

with the project 20% complete.

d. DAG 1104-103 III Recon Battalion Cantonment. Project consisted of constructing 46 strong backed tents, one 500 man galley/messhall, two 8 hole pit latrines, and 1 shower building. INCB THREE completed planning, and estimating and camp layout and turned over the project to INCB FIVE on 23 September.

e. DAG 1004-109 7th Marine Engineer Assistance. This project consisted of providing assistance to the 7th Engineer Battalion including hauling sand aggregate, operation of the batch plant and delivery of ready mix concrete to their construction sites. INCB THREE delivered approximately 30% of the requirements. Inclement weather delayed completion of this project, and it was turned over to INCB FIVE on 23 September.

f. DAG 1104-110 III MARDIV CP Well. Project consisted of constructing a well providing piping and erecting two 10000 BBL storage tanks. The well had reached a depth of approximately 50 feet when the project was turned over to INCB FIVE on 23 September 1965.

g. DAG 1104 - Miscellaneous Projects. INCB THREE also worked on other miscellaneous projects including erection of 8 strong backed tents of III MAF; modifications to III MAF headquarters in preparation for new conference room; design of sewage system for III MAF HQ; camp layout and grading for FLSG cantonment; repair of various water problems at III MAF HQ; erection of modified tent frame building for FLSG; construction of galley slabs for RLT 3; and other minor projects in support of various marine units.

h. DAG 1301 Emergency Water Line. This project consisted of installing 2.7 miles of 6 inch expeditionary water line between the Danang Air Base and the Tourane River south of the Air Base. This line was installed by INCB THREE and pumps were ordered. Both ends of the line were capped off, awaiting pumps.

i. DAG 1401 Museum Wharf Pier Facility. Work accomplished by INCB THREE on this project consisted of design of a pier and LST ramp; construction of three camel/gangways for reefer barge; with assistance of shore party demolition of the marine railway; and the cut tins of a new hasty small boat ramp. Completion of this project was turned over to contractor in mid-September.

j. DAG 1401 Tourane River Bridge. INCB THREE assisted INCB NINE in replacing 280' of bridge crossing the Tourane River between Danang and Danang East. Sections replaced were similar to Bailey Bridge sections. This project was completed in early September.

k. DAG 1402 LST and Small Boat Ramp Danang. This project, located near the bridge causeway consisted of three phases. The first phase

consisted of construction of a berm of laterite and filling the enclosed area with fill by dredge. The second phase consisted of constructing a LST and small boat ramp area. The third phase was to be an expansion of the over all project. The plans for the overall expansion of the overall project were developed jointly by MCB THREE and 30th NGR Staff. The first phase of construction was a joint effort by MCB THREE, Vietnamese Army and USQI. MCB THREE provided technical assistance and supervision with some direct labor effort on the berm, while the Vietnamese Army hauled the laterite fill. USQI provided and operated the dredge for the project. This project began in early June and ARVN trucks continued hauling until 10 August completing all but 40 yards of the berm. The berm was closed by MCB THREE and the area behind it filled by the dredge. This project was turned over to MCB EIGHT for completion on 20 September, the first portion being approximately 85% complete.

1. DAG 1501 Covered Storage Danang.

(1) Navy Exchange Warehouse Hiring. This project consisted of wiring 20 Butler buildings being erected by a civilian contractor by HSAS for use by the Navy Exchange. Materials were furnished by HSAS. Project was completed and turned over to HSAS on 8 September 1965.

(2) Marine Field Exchange Building. This project consisted of erecting a 40' x 100' butler building for the Marine Exchange. MCB THREE completed construction of the building pad, and access road, the bent foundations and 50% of the concrete deck. Project was turned over to MCB FIVE on 23 September awaiting delivery of the building.

m. DAG 1601-002 POL Storage Tanks. This project consisted of erection of two 10,000 BBL bolted steel tanks on the Danang Air Base for use as POL storage facilities. Project also included installation of a POL transfer pump and lines. MCB THREE completed construction of the tanks, installation of the POL transfer pump and 30% of the berm surrounding the tanks. Project was turned over to USN MCB FIVE 95% complete on 23 September 1965.

n. DAG 1601 Other POL Projects. MCB THREE also installed a 6 inch POL line at Road Deanch One, made emergency POL line repairs to the off shore line; and made various POL line road cuts and repairs during the deployment.

o. DAG 1701 Roads Danang Area.

(1) Hill 327 Road. This project consisted of developing a present pioneer road in to a 16' road bed with a paved 12' lane and 2' stabilized shoulders from the base to the top of Hill 327, a length of 14,500 feet. Project also included installation of culverts, head walls, turn-outs and grouted ditches. Maximum grades on the road were limited to 15%. Construction on this project began in June, but was halted several times due to higher priority work. In mid-July augment of 90 MCB FIVE

(2) MAG 11 Supply Building. This project was construction of a 40' x 100' butler building in Danang Air Base including the building pad and slab and wiring of the building. The project was started on 15 July and completed on 26 August 1965.

(3) RLT 3 Supply Building. This project consisted of erection of a 40' x 100' butler building at RLT 3 CP including construction of the building pad, slab and wiring. Project commenced on 24 July and was completed on 31 August.

r. DAG 1926 Quarry and Crusher Operations. This project consisted of development and mining of a quarry and the operation of its associated rock crusher consisting of a primary and secondary unit (75 TON per hour rated). INCB THREE developed the quarry and operated the crusher on a 24 hour basis from early June until the early part of September when the primary unit was down for major repairs. Aggregate produced included 3 inch and 3/4 inch minus which were used as road bed and seal coat material. Average daily production when in full operation was approximately 400 to 500 TONS of 3 inch minus and 100 to 200 TONS of 3/4 inch minus.

s. Other. INCB THREE also accomplished many other projects of a minor nature as an assistance to nearby Marine units including building an ice machine, help in construction of galley and III buildings, construction of mortar ditches, grading, tent erection, technical assistance, and other small projects. In addition INCB THREE was assigned other various jobs on which work was not initiated and which were turned over to INCB FIVE for completion on 23 September 1965.

5. Problem Areas. INCB THREE faced problems in lack of material and spare parts for equipment which delayed project completion or the starting of many projects during its Vietnam deployment. Changes in schedules and priorities of projects made full or maximum utilization of personnel difficult. As pointed out before, lack of sufficient UT and CE work also precluded full utilization of their capabilities. Inclement weather was not a problem until the later part of the deployment.

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FINAL LABOR DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY  
 VIETNAM DEPLOYMENT  
 26 May 1965 to 24 September 1965

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>MANDAYS</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
DIRECT	Project	27123	
	TOTAL DIRECT	27123	45.49
INDIRECT	X01 Const. Equip Repair	6669	
	X02 Operations and Engineering	526	
	X03 Project Supervision	2636	
	X04 Project Material Expediting	214	
	X05 Mobile & Demob	183	
	X06 OTR & Parts Issue	712	
	X07 Supply (Const Support only)	2269	
	X08 Motor Pool (Const Support only)	3113	
	X09 Location Moving	193	
	X10 Inconvenient Weather	624	
	TOTAL INDIRECT	17139	28.58
MILITARY	MT1 Military Training	58	
	MT3 Technical Training	142	
	MT4 Safety Training	30	
	MT6 Quarters & P.T.	991	
	MT7 Inspections	35	
	MT8 Mobility Preparation	3225	
	TOTAL MILITARY	4481	7.34
	TOTAL PRODUCTIVE	21620	
ADMIN	Y01 Personnel & Admin	2502	
	Y02 Medical & Dental	1062	
	Y04 Disbursing & Supply	298	
	Y05 Commissary	2155	
	Y06 Camp Upkeep & Repair	198	
	Y07 Security	3894	
	Y08 Special Services	231	
	TOTAL ADMIN	10280	17.07
MISC	Z01 Leave, Liberty, Recreation	382	
	Z02 MASTS, Courts, Confinements	16	
	Z03 Sickcall, Dental, Hospital	150	
	Z04 Personal Affairs	54	
	Z05 TAD	17009	
	Z06 Airlift	2443	
	TOTAL MISC	602*	1.01
	TOTAL OVERHEAD	10882*	

Total All Labor Available 59625 -- Length of Normal Workday 8.5 hours  
 \*(Does not include airlift or TAD)

ENCLOSURE (8)

FINAL FINANCIAL REPORT VIETNAM  
Status as of 30 September 1965

BUDGET PROJECT 63

a. Total OPTAR received	\$42,500.00
b. Total expenditure	\$ 631.47
c. Total outstanding obligations	\$41,427.50
d. Unobligated balance	\$ 441.03

BUDGET PROJECT 64

a. Total OPTAR received	\$45,100.00
b. Total expenditure	\$ 0.00
c. Total outstanding obligations	\$42,382.00
d. Unobligated balance	\$ 2,718.00

BUDGET PROJECT 47207

a. Total OPTAR received	\$129,000.00
b. Total expenditure	\$117,279.16
c. Total outstanding obligations	\$ 12,729.27
d. Unobligated balance	-\$ 1,008.43 **

BUDGET PROJECT 01225/B

a. Total OPTAR received	\$ 150.00
b. Total expenditure	\$ 0.00
c. Total outstanding obligations	\$ 150.00
d. Unobligated balance	\$ 0.00

BUDGET PROJECT 98.60(109)

a. Total OPTAR received	\$30,000.00
b. Total expenditure	0.00
c. Total outstanding obligations	\$29,999.93
d. Unobligated balance	\$ .07

BUDGET PROJECT 98.60(110)

a. Total OPTAR received	\$36,000.00
b. Total expenditure	\$ 345.07
c. Total outstanding obligations	\$34,491.20
d. Unobligated balance	\$ 1,163.73

\*\*Credit not received as of 30 November 1965  
Reference INCB 3 ltr Ser 51 of 31 March 1965 NOTAL

ENCLOSURE (9)

## DECLASSIFIED

## AVERAGE PERSONNEL BREAKDOWN DURING DEPLOYMENT

MONTH	NR. OF PERS ATTACHED	NR. OF PERS AT DEPLOY. SITE	NR. OF OFFICERS ASSIGNED	NR. OF OFFICERS AT DEPLOY. SITE
OCT 1964	565	439	18	19
NOV 1964	579	458	19	13
DEC 1964	577	473	20	17
JAN 1965	579	436*	20	14
FEB 1965	581	446*	22	18
MAR 1965	586	445*	22	18
APR 1965	575	450*	21	14
MAY 1965	556	501*	21	18
JUN 1965	568	485	21	17
JUL 1965	556	501	21	18
AUG 1965	524	424	18	15
SEP 1965	679	374	23	15

\* Does not include Yap or Chi Chi Jima Detachments.

ENCLOSURE (12)

DECLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

U.S. NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION THREE MOUNT OUT  
SCHEDULE OF EVENTS 1965

Saturday 8 May Received CHEAC msg for 75-man Air Detachment to deploy South-east Asia. Request for airlift sent by msg and CINPACFLT referred COMNAVMAR to Chief Western Transportation Office (CMTO) for aircraft requirements.

Sunday 9 May Msg released to CMTO requesting 17 aircraft for 75-man Air Detachment on priority T.O for 435,000 pounds of men, vehicles, and equipment.

Monday 10 May Received CHEAC msg for MCB THREE to deploy to Vietnam on first available shipping. Earliest shipping appeared from messages to be approximately mid-June at this point.

Wednesday 11 May Seven aircraft arrived Guam for initial phase of airlift including two 124's and five 130's. Three of the planes remained overnight but all departed Guam by 0800. Thursday with total of 175,200 pounds of vehicles, and equipment with 33 men.

Thursday 12 May Five aircraft arrived Guam, loaded, and departed this date with 28 men and 143,600 pounds of equipment and vehicles.

Friday 13 May Last phase of requested airlift arrived Guam (5 C-130's) and departed with 1 officer, 12 men, and 104,675 pounds of equipment. This completed original 75-man Air Detachment with 32 vehicles and 445,000 total pounds of cargo. Authority was received to purchase construction consumables for Air Detachment to use, so additional 13 C-130's were requested this date from CMTO for men and material. Message was received indicating first ship available would be USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) on 21 May. Other surface transportation to be available approximately mid-June.

Sunday 16 May Four aircraft arrived Guam on initial phase of second lift. All planes were loaded and departed with a total of 85,900 pounds of construction material and 11 passengers.

MONDAY 17 May

1. Message was received indicating USS TALLIEDGA (APA-208) would arrive in Apra Harbor 18 May available for a partial load.
2. Three aircraft arrived Guam, loaded a total of 107,175 pounds of construction material, and departed F.S. Agaña with 13 men.
3. Message was received indicating USS POINT DEFENCE (LSD-31) would be available at Guam 19 May for loading.

ENCLOSURE (3)

DECLASSIFIED

4. The decision was made to follow the loading plans as established for each LSD, and concentration of mobile loading and staging of vehicles was now focused on equipment for USS POINT DEFIANCE.

5. Final concrete placement at the roof of the Kindergarten and Nursery building (DAG 735) was made, thus essentially completing the last contribution to the Guam construction effort by an HCB for the foreseeable future.

Tuesday 18 May

Final five aircraft arrived Guam, loaded and departed with 11 passengers and a total load of 92,425 pounds. Thus Advance Party was complete with 1 Officer and 99 men, 32 vehicles, and a total of 690,000 pounds of construction material, PFCO gear, and vehicles sufficient for two air detachments. This cargo was airlifted on 29 planes (27 C-130's and 2 C-124's) for an average 23,800 pounds each.

0800

USS TALLEGA (APA-208) arrived Apra Harbor. Commanding Officer and Embarkation Officer boarded ship to effect liaison for loading and embarkation of HCB THREE material. First drums of asphalt were lifted aboard and placed in #1 hold for shipment at 1030. Asphalt loading crew secured at 1800 having placed 553 drums aboard.

Wednesday 19 May

0700

USS POINT DEFIANCE (LSD-31) arrived Apra Harbor, Guam, HCB THREE officers boarded and plans were made to commence loading vehicles at 1300 from staging area at Sierra Pier.

0800

Loading asphalt on APA resumed in #1 hold, and #5 lower hold opened to receive general cargo. Loading crews on both holds secured at 2000.

1300

Commenced loading vehicles on LSD as scheduled. Lifting vehicles aboard well deck and super deck continued through the night.

Thursday 20 May

0730

Loaded last vehicle aboard LSD-31, and Naval Magazine trucks standing by for lifting ammo onto ship to be mobile loaded into positioned vehicles. The job required four hours.

0800

APA loading continued on holds #1 and #5. A total of 960 drums of asphalt were placed in #1 hold (first platform) and hatches were closed. Remaining 130 drums of asphalt were placed in lower hold #5 with general cargo (PFCO), hatches secured; and cargo loading commenced on upper hold #5 at 1115.

1245

General Cargo (CFR gear and 26 designated consx boxes) commenced loading on mezzanine deck of LSD-31.

## DECLASSIFIED

- 1500 Five officers and 184 men mustered with gear and boarded POINT DEFIANCE for embarkation.
- 2120 Last lift of general cargo placed aboard LSD-31.
- 2130 USS POINT DEFIANCE (LSD-31) departed Guam carrying 189 passengers, 107 mobile loaded vehicles and 133 short tons of general cargo for a total sealtift of 1128 short tons.

Friday 21 May~~0800~~

USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) arrived Apra Harbor.

~~0830~~

USS TALLEDEGA (APA-208) departed Guam with no passengers and 390 short tons of cargo including 1090 drums of asphalt.

~~0900~~

Commenced lifting mobile loaded vehicles onto LSD-2 well-deck and superdeck with floating crane and ship's starboard crane respectively.

~~0930~~

POL loading on after end of superdeck commenced using dockside cranes. All three cranes operating simultaneously to load LSD.

~~1300~~

POL loading completed on superdeck.

~~1500~~

Vehicle loading on superdeck completed. Lifting of mobile loaded vehicles for storage in well deck continued.

Saturday 22 May~~0800~~

Last vehicle lifted aboard LSD-2, and loading crews secured.

~~0830~~

Commenced loading general cargo which was placed on superdeck of LSD-2 and lashed to vehicles in the well deck. These lifts were integrated with ship's cargo requirements which took approximately 6 hours.

~~1930~~

General cargo loading completed.

Sunday 23 May~~0600~~

Five Officers and 137 men mustered and boarded USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) departed Guam with 97 mobile loaded vehicles and 37 short tons of general cargo (including 140 drums of POL) for a total sealtift of 1062 short tons.

Wednesday 26 May~~1230~~

USS POINT DEFIANCE (LSD-31) arrived Toumane Harbor.

1430

First load of equipment and personnel arrived ashore. MCB THREE Commanding Officer and main body of battalion proceeded to Camp Davis. One EOC placed in charge of equipment off-loading from ship and a UTC placed in charge of beach off-loading operation. Both chiefs had working parties of drivers and cargo handlers. Unloading operation continued through the night and all equipment was ferried across the Tourane River and proceeded to Camp.

Thursday 27 May  
1530

Last load of equipment/vehicles arrived ashore from POINT DEFIANTOIE.

Friday 28 May  
1200

USS TALLEDEGA (APA-206) arrived Tourane Harbor.

1330

First load of cargo (asphalt drums) arrived ashore. MCB THREE cargo handlers assigned to both ship and shore operations as off-loading continued.

Saturday 29 May  
1200

Completed off loading of all material from USS TALLEDEGA.

Sunday 30 May  
1500

USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) Arrived Tourane Harbor.

1700

First load of equipment and personnel arrived ashore and MCB THREE Executive Officer, Staff Officers, and men proceeded to Camp. Off-loading operation continued through the night using the same procedure established for the previous LSD.

Monday 31 May  
1200

Last load of equipment and vehicles arrived ashore from USS BELLE GROVE. Mount out of MCB THREE complete with in-country strength of 142 Officers and men. Total sea and airlift loads were 2925 short tons including 308 pieces of USN vehicles/equipment (P-25A; augment, and PPCO), construction consumables and class I, III, and V materials.

*Cmd Chronology*  
*6-3*

SECRET

Copy No. 75 of 90 Copies  
III MAF/NCC/SA I Corps  
Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam  
Ser: 0037865  
160800 Nov65

Operation Plan 106-66 Short Title: DOUBLE TIME (U)

- Ref: (a) MAP, VIETNAM AMS 1:50,000 Series L701; Sheet numbers to be promulgated separately  
 (b) COMUSMACV LOI of 5 May 65  
 (c) Force Order 8410.1  
 (d) Force Order 080251.1  
 (e) Force Order P02000.1  
 (f) COMUSMACV CEI of 15 Jul 65  
 (g) COMUSMACV CEI of 14 Nov 63

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A

1. SITUATION. As stated in reference (b), part of this command's mission is to render combat support to RVNAF. This is accomplished through unilateral and coordinated operations and through actions of a mobile reserve. This plan provides basic guidance for the planning of actions of the mobile reserve against the enemy in support of ARVN operations. Generally these operations will be emergency in nature. A separate Annex W will be issued for each operation to be executed under the provisions of this Plan.
  - a. Enemy Forces. To be issued with Annex W.
  - b. Friendly Forces
    - (1) US Forces:
      - (a) COMUSMACV is the overall US commander in RVN and exercises operational control over all assigned US Forces in-country.
      - (b) Commander, 2d Air Division/MACV Air Force Component Commander, provides Air Force reconnaissance, interdiction, close air support, airlift and anti-air defense in support of III MAF upon request, and as approved by COMUSMACV.
      - (c) US Army, Vietnam provides fixed wing visual aerial reconnaissance and limited helicopter support of III MAF upon request, and as approved by COMUSMACV.
      - (d) Commander 7th FLT provides naval air, naval gunfire, amphibious shipping, beach and hydrographic reconnaissance upon request, and as approved by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (9)

SECRET

- (e) CTF 115 (Commander Coastal Surveillance Force) conducts surveillance, visit and search, naval gunfire, psychological warfare, combat support of U. S. and RVN forces, and other operations as directed in order to secure the coastal regions and major rivers as part of the overall effort to defeat the Communist insurgency in Vietnam.
- (2) Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) (See Annex A for ARVN Order of Battle within ICTZ.)
- (a) Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) provides close air support, aerial reconnaissance and limited fixed wing and helicopter support to RVNAF.
  - (b) 1st Division I Corps conducts operations throughout QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN provinces with the Division Headquarters in HUE.
  - (c) 2d Division I Corps conducts operations throughout QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI provinces with the Division Headquarters in QUANG NGAI.
  - (d) QUANG NAM Special Sector (QNSS) is responsible for RVNAF operations conducted within that province. QNSS headquarters is located in HOI AN.
  - (e) Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) are located throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). These forces are controlled by the Province Chiefs.
  - (f) Vietnamese Navy (VNN) Junk Forces supports the Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and maintains counter-infiltration screens along the coast. Locations of VNN Junk division headquarters are contained in Annex C.

c. Assumptions

- (1) That the CG I Corps may request III MAF assistance.
  - (2) That COMUSMACV will approve the above request and direct assistance be provided.
  - (3) That, if required, the 2d Air Division will provide the necessary fixed wing air transport to airlift one reinforced infantry battalion to the airfield nearest the objective area.
2. MISSION. III MAF conducts mobile reserve operations anywhere within ICTZ in support of ARVN operations upon request of CG I Corps and as approved by COMUSMACV.

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## 3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of operations. Annex D.
- b. 3d Marine Division
  - (1) Be prepared to commit up to one reinforced infantry battalion on 12 hours notice to support ARVN operations in ICTZ.
  - (2) Be prepared to conduct, on order, coordinated planning with I Corps units to be designated.
- c. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
  - (1) Be prepared to provide maximum close air support, aerial reconnaissance and helo support, consistent with other currently assigned missions, to support III MAF forces and/or ARVN forces.
- d. Other III MAF Units
  - (1) Be prepared to provide support as requested.
- e. I Corps Advisory Group
  - (1) Keep III MAF informed on the progress of all ARVN operations.
  - (2) Notify III MAF immediately, if it appears as if III MAF assistance may be requested.
  - (3) Inform III MAF of locations of all friendly ARVN, RF, PF, SF, etc., operating in or near the area of operations.
- f. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) This plan is effective upon receipt for planning within III MAF/I Corps Adv Group only.
  - (2) Direct liaison is authorized among III MAF/I Corps Advisory Group units.
  - (3) Direct liaison is authorized between III MAF forces and ARVN forces, as necessary, upon issuance of Annex W or upon order.
  - (4) Every effort will be made during operations to minimize non-combatant casualties and damage to civil and public property in accordance with the provisions of ref (c) and (d).
  - (5) Where possible during operations, civil police actions such as arrests of suspected VC, checking identification cards, house-to-house searches, etc, will be conducted by National Police, ARVN, RF, PF, or other duly constituted Vietnamese authorities.

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The above does not prohibit US forces from accomplishing the above functions if authorized Vietnamese personnel are not available.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. Normal logistics support procedures will prevail.
- b. Requirements for logistic support beyond the capabilities of III MAF subordinate units will be addressed to this headquarters.
- c. Logistic support for RVNAF will be provided through normal RVNAF logistic channels.
- d. Requests from RVNAF units for logistic support from III MAF will normally be directed to this Headquarters through the I Corps Advisory Group liaison officer to III MAF.

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

- a. CP Locations
  - (1) USMC - No change.
  - (2) ARVN - Annex B.
  - (3) VNN - Annex C.
- b. Command relationships to be announced but anticipated to be generally in accordance with ref (b).
- c. Communications. In accordance with ref (a) through (g).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

  
G. C. AXTELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

## ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - ARVN Order of Battle, ICTZ
- C - VNN Junk Fleet OOB, ICTZ
- D - Concept of Operations
- E - Special Forces
- W - Operations (To be issued)
- Z - Distribution

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 Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam  
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Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 106-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: HOTEL

## III Marine Amphibious Force

Headquarters

Base Defense Command

7th Engr Bn (Rein)

9th Motor Transport Bn(-)

1st Force Recon Co(-)

3d Marine Division (Rein)

Hq Bn (Rein)

3d Marines

4th Marines

7th Marines

9th Marines

12th Marines (Rein)

3d Bn, 11th Marines (Rein)

3d Recon Bn (Rein)

3d AT Bn (Rein)

3d Engr Bn (Rein)

3d Med Bn (Rein)

3d MT Bn (Rein)

1st AmTrac Bn (Rein)

3d Tank Bn (Rein)

3d 155mmGun Btry

1st 8" How Btry

MajGen L. W. WALT

Maj A. J. PALONIS

Col G. W. CARRINGTON

LtCol E. L. MEEKER

Maj J. F. JONES

Maj M. C. GAFFEN

MajGen L. W. WALT

Maj J. E. WATSON

Col N. R. NICKERSON

Col J. F. McCLANAHAN

Col O. P. PEATROSS

Col J. E. GORMAN

Col J. M. CALLENDER

LtCol W. H. PECK

LtCol R. R. VAN CLEVE

LtCol B. A. HEFLIN

LtCol W. I. DENNIS

Cndr A. C. WILSON, USN

Maj F. J. BAKER

LtCol W. D. POMEROY

LtCol M. L. RAPHAEL

Capt R. H. MOORE

Maj P. E. WILSON

## CONFIDENTIAL

## 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

## MWHG-1

H&amp;HS-1

1st LAAM Bn

2d LAAM Bn

MACS-7

MASS-2

## MAG-11

H&amp;MS-11

MABS-11

VMFA-115

VMFA-542

VMCJ-1 (-)

## MAG-12

H&amp;MS-12

MABS-12

MACTU-67

VMA-214

VMA-224

VMA-311

VMA-211

## MAG-16

H&amp;MS-16

MABS-16

VMO-2

HMM-161

BGen K. B. MCCUTCHEON

Col E. I. LUPTON

Maj C. A. LIDDIE

Maj G. G. LONG

Maj E. F. PENICO

LtCol R. R. MILLER

Maj R. L. CUNNINGHAM

Col E. O. ANGLIN

LtCol W. H. BORTZ

LtCol E. E. PEARCY

LtCol C. R. JARETT

LtCol R. A. SAVAGE

LtCol F. C. OPEKA

Col L. E. BROWN

LtCol J. W. KIRKLAND

Maj J. W. PARCHEN

Capt J. F. KEANE

LtCol K. O'KEEFE

LtCol T. E. MULVIHILL

LtCol B. J. STENDER

Maj W. E. GARMAN

Col T. J. O'CONNOR

LtCol J. L. GOEBEL

LtCol T. E. VERNON

Col G. F. BAUMAN

LtCol R. C. DENNY

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HMM-361	LtCol L. F. CHILDERS
HMM-263	LtCol J. C. CLARK
MAG-36	Col W. G. JOHNSON
H&MS-36	LtCol T. G. MOONEY
MAES-36	Maj J. A. KENNEDY
HMM-362	LtCol J. ALDWORTH
HMM-364	LtCol W. R. LUCAS
VMO-6	LtCol R. J. ZITNIK
Force Logistics Support Group	Col M. J. PADALINO
Force Logistics Support Unit #1	LtCol W. L. NELSON
Force Logistics Support Unit #2	Maj D. W. RITTER
I Corps Advisory Group	Col ST CLAIR
1st Div Adv	Col D. A. BISSET Jr.
2d Div Adv	Col B. B. JONES
Quang Nam Special Sector Adv	LtCol G. G. COADY

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WALT

  
 G. C. AXTELL  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Chief of Staff

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Annex B (ARVN Order of Battle) to Operation Plan 106-66

Time Zone: HOTEL

UNIT	HEADQUARTERS LOCATION	COMMANDER	ADVISOR	ADVISOR TELEPHONE	
				DY/PH	Qrts Ph
I Corps	Da Nang	MGen N.C. THI	Col H.B. ST CLAIR USA	Falcon 6211	Falcon 6169
G-3	-do-	LtCol H. N. LANG	LtCol J.J. ONDISHKO USA	Falcon 6362	Puma 173
1st Division	Hue	BGen N. V. CHUAN	Col D. A. BISSET Jr. USA	Eagle 66	Eagle 106
1st Regt	La Vang	LtCol N. AM	Maj F. A. RUMSEY USA	Wolf 1	Wolf 1
2d Regt	Dong Ha	LtCol T.T. KHIEU	Maj W.M. STEVENSON USA	Wolf 1	Wolf 1
3d Regt	Giap Tu	LtCol L.V. KHUY	Maj J.J. JOHNSON USA	Eagle 34	Eagle 34
2d Division	Quang Ngai	BGen H. Y. LAM	Col B.B. JONES USA	Catbird 38	Catbird 4
4th Regt	Quang Ngai	LtCol N.T. TOAI	Maj A.P. SCHOLL USA	Catbird 7	Catbird 7A
5th Regt	Tuan Nuong	Maj P.V. HUNG	Maj J.J. CAULEY Jr USA	Catbird 7	Catbird 7A
6th Regt	Tam Ky	LtCol H.D. THO	Maj J. HYSINGER USA	Catbird 7	Catbird 7A
Quang Tri Sector	Quang Tri	Maj P. B. HOA	LtCol R.W. STORM USA	Wolf 1	Wolf 1
Thud Thien Sector	Hue	LtCol P.V. KHOA	Maj W.L. MARTIN USA	Eagle 15	Eagle 34
Quang Tin Sector	Tam Ky	Maj N.N. NGHIA	Maj J.R. RANDOLPH USA		
Quang Ngai Sector	Quang Ngai	Maj L.B. KHIEU	LtCol J. A. SADLER USA	Catbird 6	Catbird 3
51st Regiment	Dien Ban	LtCol N.T. LAP	Maj S. H. JOPLING USA		

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Annex C (VNN, Coastal Force (Junk Fleet) Order of Battle) to Operation Plan 106-66

Ref: (a) MAPS Indochina and Thailand 1:250,000 Series L509, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13, NE 49-1, ND 49-5  
 (b) CTF 115 Operation Order 10-65

1. The primary mission of the VNN Junk Fleet is to prevent infiltration by sea by inshore patrols. The coastal force has in the past assisted in land operations by preventing exfiltration by sea and during river operations by acting as blocking forces and/or waterborne checkpoints.
2. Current locations and patrol areas for VNN Coastal Forces in CTZ follow:

JUNK DIVISION	Ho	Patrol Area	
		From	To
11	BR 520117	BT 235499	BS 798850
12	YD 838318	YD 550520	YD 990210
13	ZD 117102	YD 990210	AT 960917
14	BT 205570	AT 960917	BT 235499
15	BT 520117	BT 235499	BT 571043
16	BS 337738	BS 798850	BS 935131
CD	DANANG	NONE	NONE

3. The VNN ships, junks and patrol craft are marked by a large yellow square with a red X from corner to corner, usually painted on the upper-most flat surface of the vessel. The Vietnamese flag (yellow rectangle with 3 parallel red stripes) only signifies a vessel claims to be of Republic of Vietnam registry. See Ref (b) for further details.

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Annex D (Concept of Operations) to Operation Plan 106-66

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam AMS 1:50,000 Series L701 Sheets numbers to be promulgated in Annex W.  
 (b) COMUSMACV LOI of 5 May 1965

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION. III MAF conducts mobile reserve action anywhere within I CTZ in support of ARVN operations upon request of the CG I CTZ as approved by COMUSMACV
2. CONCEPT
  - a. This plan provides for III MAF reinforcement or striking force actions to relieve enemy pressure against ARVN forces in I CTZ.
  - b. Upon receipt of a request for assistance from the CG I Corps, and upon subsequent approval by COMUSMACV, III MAF will deploy up to one reinforced infantry battalion as a relief force, or in a subsidiary attack to relieve pressure on I Corps Forces.
  - c. III MAF forces may move to the area of operation by foot, motorized/mechanized column, helolift, fixed wing aircraft, amphibious craft, or by any combination of the above. The exact means of movement will be dependent on the area of operations, the tactical situation, and the means available at that time.
  - d. Information on the specific operations to be conducted under this plan will be contained in a separate Annex W which will be promulgated via the fastest secure means. The warning order for an operation under this plan may be verbal in order to facilitate planning by subordinate units. All oral orders will be confirmed in writing.
  - e. Subordinate units will prepare unilateral preliminary plans prior to issuance of an Annex W, in order to reduce response time to a minimum.
  - f. The sequence of events envisioned under this plan is:
    - (1) III MAF will monitor ARVN operations through liaison with the I Corps Advisory Group.
    - (2) When the situation in an ARVN operation deteriorates to the point that it appears likely that III MAF may be requested for assistance, subordinate commands will be so notified.

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- (3) Subordinate commands will review plans and determine modifications necessary to meet the current situation.
  - (4) Upon receipt of a request for assistance III MAF will:
    - (a) Issue warning order indicating size of forces to be committed.
    - (b) Request approval from COMUSMACV.
    - (c) Request, if required, airlift/sealift forces be made available or placed on standby pending approval from COMUSMACV.
    - (d) Augment liaison with I Corps.
  - (5) Upon approval of COMUSMACV, III MAF will:
    - (a) Issue Annex W.
    - (b) Confirm required airlift/sealift
    - (c) Conduct joint planning with subordinate units and I Corps to develop an operation plan.
- g. Exact command relationships must be determined at the time of the operation; however, for planning purposes they will be in accordance with the provisions of reference (b).

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Annex E (Special Forces) to Operation Order 106-66

Ref: Maps Vietnam AMS 1:50,000 series L701

1. Special Forces installations are generally more remote than other ARVN installations. As such, they are particularly susceptible to VC attack.
2. There are currently 8 Special Forces camps in I Corps with an additional 6 camps in various planning stages. Information on currently established camps is as follows:

CAMP NAME	LOCATION	US ADVISOR	CALL SIGN
a. KHE SANH (1) HLZ (2)	(XD842426) XD 842427 (8 helicopters) XD850420	Capt Waghelstein	Envious 11 Length Runway: 3200 X 66 ft (psp)
b. ASHAU (1) HLZ (2)	(YC490830) YC486837 (6 helicopters) YC496858 (6 Helicopters)	Lt Reed	Envious 12 Length Runway: 4200 X 50 ft (psp)
c. ALUOI (1) HLZ (2)	(YC383996) YC384993 YD378004	Capt Jennings	Envious 13 Length Runway: 3500 X 50 ft (psp)
d. GIA VUC (1) HLZ (2) (3) (4)	(BS378270) BS374270 BS388267 BS377286 BS375243	Capt Hicks	Envious 14 Length Runway: 3432 X 100 ft (psp)
e. KHAMDUC (1) HLZ (2) (3) (4) (5)	(ZC004078) ZC013095 ZC004095 YC988090 ZC006081 ZC001080	Capt Bahsen-	Envious 16 Length Runway: 3950 X 98 ft (asphalt) (-200 ft because of washout)
f. BATO (1) HLZ (2) (3) (4)	(BS567322) BS560302 BS557327 BS572330 BS575347	Capt Patton	Envious 17 Length Runway: 1420 X 115 ft (compact earth and laterite)

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CAMP NAME	LOCATION	US ADVISOR	CALL SIGN
g. HA THANH (1) HLZ (2)	(BS386704) BS391707 BS338879	Capt Suhosky	Envious 15 Length Runway: 1250 X 50 ft (dirt)
h. TRA BONG (1) HLZ	(BS338878) BS338879	Capt Fazekas	Envious 18 Length Runway: 1300 X 60 ft (laterite)

Note: Unless otherwise stated HLZs will accommodate a minimum of 6 helicopters.

3. Information on additional camps will be promulgated as the camps are established.

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CINCPACFLT	2
COMSEVENTHFLT	2
COMUSMACV	5
CG 2d Air Div	2
CTF 115	2
CTF 78	2
CTF 79	2
CG FFORCEV	2
CG 1st MarDiv	2
CG 3d MarDiv	12
CG 1st MAW	12
CO FLSG	5
CO I Corps Adv Grp	3
HQ III MAF/NCC	12
Command Chronology	1
Extra	15

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC  
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, 96601

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21 OCT 1965

G-3

*No Signature*

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet  
(2) Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code H01)

Subj: Table of Organization for Naval Component Commander,  
USMACV; recommendation for (u)

Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT 050057Z/JUN65  
(b) COMUSMACV ltr Ser: 0923 of 13 July 1965

Encl: (1) Table of Organization for the Naval Component  
Commander, USMACV  
(2) COMUSMACV ltr Ser: 0923 of 13 July 1965

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the Naval Component Commander, (NCC) USMACV has been assigned the responsibility for the operation of ports, beaches and depots from Quang Ngai to the DMZ. In fulfilling this responsibility, the NCC is required to provide military logistic operations using Navy resources at ports and beaches for the support of U. S. forces and attached third country forces in the area from Quang Ngai to the DMZ. Included are such tasks as:

a. The conduct of U. S. military port operations to include the development of required military ports and beach facilities, and the loading and unloading of ships.

b. The establishment and operation of necessary supply depots and water terminals, to include port clearance at such depots.

c. The receipt, storage, maintenance, control and issue of common items previously provided by Headquarters, Support Activity Saigon (HSAS).

d. Providing for the operation of POL terminals, to include storage and issue of bulk POL. This includes operation and maintenance of tankage and pipelines to complement in-country commercial resources.

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e. Providing for movement of incoming and outgoing cargo between terminal storage areas and ships or craft.

f. The establishment of a Class I depot at Danang.

g. Supervising, coordinating and directing the activities of the Naval Support Activity Danang and the Naval Construction Regiment.

2. The Commanding General, III MAF has been designated as the Naval Component Commander, USMACV, and in order to fulfill this assigned responsibility and perform the tasks enumerated in references (a) and (b), an advisory staff is required. Based on the current assigned mission and tasks of the NCC, the programmed force structure of U. S. and third country forces in I Corps, and the tempo of operations in SVN, the personnel plus specialties contained in the proposed table of organization are considered adequate to discharge the functions of the NCC staff. However, any major alterations in the areas of responsibility of the NCC will require changes in the proposed staffing.

3. It is requested that the proposed table of organization contained in enclosure (1) be approved for the Naval Component Commander, USMACV staff, and that personnel allocations and assignment to the NCC USMACV staff be based on this personnel planning document.

  
V. H. KRULAK

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NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND  
VIETNAM

1. MISSION. Plan, direct and coordinate the employment of Naval Component Forces.

2. ORGANIZATION.

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
COMMAND SECTION	4	6	1	1
N-1 SECTION	1	2		
N-3 SECTION	4	5	5	6
N-4 SECTION	1	3	3	2
N-6 SECTION	2	2	3	3
SUPPLY SECTION	1		3	5
TOTAL	13	18	15	17

3. ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITIES. Not capable of self-administration. Marine personnel administrative support will be provided by the III Marine Amphibious Force and the administrative support of Naval personnel will be provided by the Naval Support Activity, Danang.

4. LOGISTICAL CAPABILITIES. Has no organic logistic capability. Logistic support for the Naval Component Commander staff will be provided by the Naval Support Activity, Danang.

Enclosure (1)

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USMC T/O

LINE	BILLET DESCRIPTION	RANK	MOS.	S	P	AUTHORIZED			W	OFF	ENL
						NA/STV	AS/OFF	ENL			
1	COMMAND SECTION										
2	COMMANDER	MGEN	9903				1				
3	AIDE	CAPT	9910				1				
4	AIDE	LT	9910				1				
5	CHIEF STEWARD	SSGT	3619					1			
6	STEWARD ATTENDANT	SGT	3613					1			
7	STENOGRAPHER	SGT	8241					1			
8	DRIVER	SGT	3531					1			
9							3	4			
10	CHIEF OF STAFF SEC										
11	CHIEF OF STAFF	CAPT	1100	A					1		
12	DEP C/S	COL	9906	B			1				
13	ADMIN MAN	YN1	0000							1	
14	DRIVER ORDERLY	LCPL	3531					1			
15	ADMIN MAN	LCPL	0141					1			
16							1	2	1	1	
17	N-1 SECTION										
18	AC/S N-1	MAJ	0102				1				
19	ADMIN CHIEF	GSGT	0141					1			
20	ADMIN MAN	LCPL	0141					1			
21							1	2			
22	N-3 SECTION										
23	AC/S N-3	CAPT	1100						1		
24	ASS'T N-3	LCOL	9910				1				
25	ASS'T N-3 OPS	CMDR	1150						1		
26	ASS'T N-3 MOVEMENT OFF	CMDR	1150						1		
27	ASS'T N-3 PLANS/POLICY	CMDR	1150						1		
28	ASS'T N-3 PLANS/POLICY	LCOL	9910				1				
29	ASS'T MOVEMENT OFF AIR	MAJ	9912			1					
30	ASS'T MOVEMENT O SURFACE	LCDR	1100						1		
31	ADMIN OFF	CAPT	0130				1				
32	LOG CHIEF	MSGT	0441					1			
33	ADMIN CHIEF	YNC	0000							1	
34	BOATSWAIN'S	BMC	0114							1	
35	LOG MAN	SSGT	0141					1			
36	QUARTERMASTER	QM2	0000							1	
37	YEOMAN	YN3	0000								3
38	ADMIN MAN	CPL	0141					1			
39	LOG MAN/DRIVER	CPL	0141					1			
40	ADMIN MAN/DRIVER	LCPL	0141					1			
41							1	3	5	5	6

USMC T/O

Enclosure (1)

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USMC T/O

LINE	BILLET DESCRIPTION	RANK	MOS	M	P	AUTHORIZED			W	OFF	ENL
						NAVY	AS	ENL			
42	N-4 SECTION										
43	AC/S N-4	COL	9906				1				
44	ASS'T N-4 PLANS/POLICY	CMDR	1100						1		
45	ASS'T N-4 EQUIP/MAINT	LCDR	1100						1		
46	ASS'T N-4 BASE MAINT	LCDR	5100						1		
47	LOG CHIEF	GSQT	0441				1				
48	LOG MAN	SSQT	0441				1				
49	YEOMAN	YN2	0000								2
50	ADMIN MAN	CPL	0141				1				
51							1	3	3	2	
52	N-6 SECTION										
53	AC/S N-6 BASE DEVEL	CAPT	1100						1		
54	ASS'T N-6 AID BASES	LCOL	9912			1					
55	ASS'T N-6 PORT FAC	CMDR	1100						1		
56	ASS'T N-6 BASE FAC	LCOL	9911				1				
57	ASS'T N-6 REAL ESTATE	LCDR	1100						1		
58	ADMIN CHIEF	YMC	0000								1
59	ADMIN MAN	SQT	0141				1				
60	YEOMAN	YN3	0000								2
61	ADMIN MAN	LCPL	0141				1				
62						1	1	2	3	3	
63	SUPPLY SECTION										
64	SUPPLY OFFICER	CAPT	3100						1		
65	ASS'T SUPPLY OFF	LCDR	3100						1		
66	ASS'T SUPPLY OFF	CAPT	3002				1				
67	ASS'T SUPPLY OFF	LT	3100						1		
68	SUPPLY CHIEF	SKC	0000								1
69	SUPPLY MAN	SK1	0000								1
70	SUPPLY MAN	SK2	0000								3
71							1		3	5	
72	TOTALS					2	11	18	15	17	
73	FOOTNOTES:										
74	A - BILLET CAN BE FILLED BY NAVY OR MARINE OFFICER										
75	B - IF LINE 11 IS NAVAL OFFICER, THIS BILLET SHOULD BE FILLED BY MARINE OFFICER OR VICE VERSA										

USMC T/O

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

III MAF ORDER OF BATTLE HAS ACCEPTED THE FOLLOWING NEWLY IDENTIFIED UNITS IN I CTZ

UNIT	STRENGTH	RATING	LOCATION	DATE
18TH REGT (PAVN)	UNK	PROB	BS 6347	25NOV
U/I REGT	UNK	POSS	QTRI PROV	14NOV
U/I BN	UNK	POSS	BS 6347	25NOV
6TH BN	390	PROB	YC 9094	28NOV
7TH BN	UNK	PROB	QTRI PROV	28NOV
8TH BN	400	PROB	YD 1640	28NOV
U/I BN	UNK	PROB	AT 8560	7NOV
307 BN	380	POSS	BS 5080	14NOV
278TH SAPPER CO. (AKA SONG DA)	140	PROB	AT 8480	3NOV

ORDER OF BATTLE WITHIN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AS OF 1 DECEMBER IS AS FOLLOWS:

CONFIRMED

MILITARY REGION HQS

1 REGT HQS

18 BNS

32 COMPANIES

PROBABLE

1 REGT (PAVN)

1 REGT HQS

11 BNS

6 COMPANIES

POSSIBLE

1 REGT HQS

8 BNS

7 COMPANIES

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (11)