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COMMUNICATION CENTER  
 III Marine Amphibious Force  
 FPO San Francisco, California 96601

26 10 15 '65

C 011024Z  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO CG III MAF  
 BT

NOU

CONFIDENTIAL 38904  
 PERSONAL FOR MAJO GENERAL WALT FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND  
 SUBJECT: NEWS RELEASE  
 REFERENCE: YOUR MESSAGE, DTG 300536Z OCT 65

1. US MISSION-MACV POLICY IN THE CASE OF DAMAGE INFLICTED ON AIRFIELDS AS A RESULT OF ENEMY ACTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO MAKE A FACTUAL AND IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE.
2. OUR EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THIS AVOIDS PRESS SPECULATION AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF SUCH DAMAGE.
3. THIS INFORMATION IS CALLED OUT AS A MACV RELEASE ADDING

PAGE 2 RUMSMA G3L C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 CREDENCE AND INTEGRITY TO OUR POLICY.

4. INITIAL REPORTS FILED FROM DA NANG BY UPI STATED THAT ALMOST ALL THE PLANES (AT LEAST FIFTY) HAD BEEN DESTROYED. THIS WAS CORRECTED BY FIRST CALL OF OFFICIAL RELEASE.

5. FAST FACTUAL RELEASE ACTION DOES MUCH TO REMOVE WHAT CAN OFTEN EMERGE AS OVER-ALL CRITICISM OF OUR MILITARY EFFORT.

6. IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT ON 31 OCT, I AM HAVING A STUDY MADE TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF RELEASING THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION IN THE SAME MANNER AS CASUALTIES, THAT IS, LIGHT, MODERATE OR HEAVY, THEN GIVING ACTUAL FIGURES ON AN "OFF THE RECORD" BASIS. GP-4

BT

FOR BAK  
 01/19324 KTH

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C 011024Z/10p 65

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#26  
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**SECRET**

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// MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //

O 060502Z

FM CG FMFPAG

TO CG III MAF

**EXCLUSIVE**

SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE  
 CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. I AM SENDING YOU A NEWSPAPER PHOTOGRAPH PROTRAYING  
 A COLUMN OF VC PRISONERS FROM OPERATION BLACK SNAKE BEING  
 MOVED UNDER USMC GUARD. THEIR HANDS ARE TIED BEHIND THEIR  
 BACKS, WHICH IS OK. BEHIND THIS, HOWEVER, THEY ARE JOINED  
 BY A ROPE TIED AROUND EACH ONE'S THROAT. THE NECK NOOSE ON  
 THE LEADING ONE IS BEING PULLED BY A MARINE, AND THE LAST  
 ONE IN THE COLUMN, LAGGING BEHIND, IS OBVIOUSLY CHOKING.  
 I DON'T HAVE TO TELL YOU WHAT THE EFFECT HAS BEEN ALREADY.  
 HERE IS A PICTORIAL STORY OF MARINES DOING JUST WHAT WE  
 CRITICISE THE VC AND THE ARVN FOR DOING.

2. ENSURE THAT EVERY OFFICER IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND KNOWS  
THE RULES, THE REASONS FOR THE RULES AND THE PENALTIES FOR  
THEIR VIOLATION, AND THEN ACCEPT NO COMPROMISE AT ALL.

GP-4

TOR	WW2
070200H	AW

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For Order 01060.1 CH 2, 22 Oct 65  
 "Handling of Captured Personnel, Material, Documents"

O 060502Z/NOV 1965

*Black Snake (code name  
 not authorized) was a one-day  
 operation by 3/9 Casing companies  
 K&I) conducted on 1 Nov.  
 4 VC KIA, 5 VC captured.*

#17

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O 090402Z NOV

FM CG FMFPAC

TO CG III MAF

**EXCLUSIVE**

SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS  
 EYES ONLY.

1. YOUR 061315/NOV 65 MAKES PLAIN THAT YOU ARE MORE THAN BUSY MAKING READY FOR THE STORM, WHICH I AGREE IS COMING, AND THE NEXT DARK-OF-THE MOON LOOKS LIKE A VERY LOGICAL TIME. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I TOO HAVE PUT A LOT OF THINKING INTO THE PROBLEM AND, FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH, WOULD LIKE TO OFF YOU SOME OF MY REFLECTIONS. I QUALIFY THEM, IN ADVANCE, BY SAYING THAT THEY ARE DERIVED FROM A NARROW-MINDED STUDY OF HOW THE VIETMINH PERFORMED AGAINST THE FRENCH. MY THEORY IS THAT SINCE THE SAME PEOPLE ARE RUNNING THIS WAR, AND SINCE THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL AGAINST THE FRENCH, THEY ARE GOING TO TRY THE SAME DRILL ON US UNTIL WE CONVINCE THEM THAT IT WON'T WORK.
2. FIRST OFF, THE VIETMINH MADE THEIR GREATEST SUCCESSES AGAINST THE FRENCH UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THEY COULD FORECAST, AND THUS PREPARE FOR, WHAT THE FRENCH WERE GOING TO DO. THE FRENCH REDOUBTS, THE FIXED POSTS ON KEY TERRAIN AND AT CANAL JUNCTIONS, ALL CAME IN FOR A BEATING BECAUSE THE REDS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THEM, AND TO PREPARE TO ATTACK THEM IN THE BEST WAY, WITH STRENGTH AND SKILL. THE FACT IS, ON A FRONT OF THE LENGTH THAT THE FRENCH WERE ENGAGED, FROM THE RED RIVER TO THE MEKONG, THEY COULD NOT BE STRONG EVERYWHERE; AND THE VIETMINH KNEW IT. IT WAS JUST A QUESTION OF STUDYING EACH TARGET, AND CONCENTRATING TO KNOCK IT OVER.
3. WHEN THE FRENCH WENT TO DIEN BIEN PHU, THE ORDERS WERE TO KEEP THE ENEMY AWAY FROM THE TWO AIRFIELDS BY VIGOROUS OFFENSIVE ACTION. THEY EVEN CHOSE GENERAL CASTRIES AS THE COMMANDER BECAUSE OF HIS CAVALRY BACKGROUND AND HIS ENTHUSIASM FOR THE OFFENSIVE AND FOR MANEUVER. AND MANEUVER HE DID - FOR AWHILE.
4. AS TIME PASSED, HOWEVER, THEY BECAME MORE AND MORE CONCERNED WITH DEFENSE OF THEIR CRITICAL AREAS, AND LESS AND LESS IMPELLED TOWARD OFFENSIVE EFFORTS TO EXPOSE THE ENEMY'S STRENGTH, TO PENALIZE HIM AND TO THROW HIM OFF BALANCE. THEY PUT A PRODIGIOUS EFFORT INTO DEVELOPING A DEFENSE SYSTEM BUILT AROUND TEN FORMIDABLE STRONG POINTS, AND TOOK COMFORT IN THE BELIEF THAT THEIR ARTILLERY AND MACHINE GUNS WOULD CUT THE VIETMINH TO PIECES AS THEY BANGED AGAINST THE FRENCH POSITIONS.

ONE  
 PAGE TWO OF THREE PAGES

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5. BUT THE FRENCH ERRED IN TWO WAYS. FIRST, THEY PERMITTED THE ENEMY TO BUILD UP HIS STRENGTH ALMOST UNDISTURBED; - AND HE DID SO - SOME FOUR DIVISIONS. SECOND, THEY GAVE HIM A CHANCE TO STUDY THE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN DETAIL, AND TO PREPARE A SCHEME FOR CRACKING EACH ONE OF THEM. AND THAT IS ULTIMATELY WHAT HAPPENED. - THE REDS, UNIMPEDED, FILTERED QUIETLY IN AROUND THE VITAL AREA. THEY WORKED UP PLANS FOR EACH TINY PHASE OF THE ATTACK. THEY LET FLY, AND DIEN BIEN PHU WAS DONE FOR. GENERAL GIAP SAID THE FRENCH LIKED THEMSELVES, AND I BELIEVE THEY DID - BY TAKING THE HEAT OFF THE ENEMY, AND PUTTING ALL OF THEIR RELIANCE IN THE DEFENSE WORKS.

6. I HAVE GONE THROUGH ALL OF THIS NOT TO SUGGEST THAT WE HAVE A SITUATION COMPARABLE TO DIEN BIEN PHU, OR THAT WE ARE IN DANGER OF FOLLOWING IN THE ERRONEOUS FOOTSTEPS OF THE FRENCH, BUT ONLY TO UNDERSCORE THE BELIEF THAT WHILE INTERNAL PROTECTION, LOCAL SECURITY AND A STRONG AND COORDINATED GENERAL DEFENSE ARE ALL ESSENTIAL, THEY ARE NOT GOING TO DO THE JOB ALONE. THEY HAVE TO BE COMPLEMENTED BY A POWERFUL, INTENSIVE, WIDE-RANGING OFFENSIVE EFFORT AIMED AT NOT JUST EXPOSING THE ENEMY, BUT ALL DESIGNED TO HURT HIS LOGISTICS, CAUSE HIM CASUALTIES AND GENERALLY BLUNT HIS BLADE.

7. WITH THIS IN MIND, I CERTAINLY APPLAUD OPERATIONS SUCH AS YOUR BLACK FERRETT IN THE CHU LAI AREA, AND I KNOW YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE A FINE TOOTI COMB EXPLORATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN BLUE MARLIN. WHILE THE VC RPT VC CAN CONCEAL QUITE A FEW SABOTEURS AND SUICIDERS FROM A PAINSTAKING SEARCH AND CLEAR EFFORT THEY WILL HAVE TROUBLE CONCEALING LARGE STOCKS OF SUPPLY OR LARGE FORCES FROM THE BLUE MARLIN FORCES. LIKEWISE, IF WE ACCOMPANY OUR DEEP GROUND PROBING OPERATIONS WITH HEAVY AIR INTERDICTION - DAY AND NIGHT - OF EVERY SUSPECTED AVENUE OF APPROACH, THE VC ARE GOING TO FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO PINPOINT OUR MLR POSITIONS, AND THUS MORE DIFFICULT TO ATTACK THEM EFFECTIVELY.

8. AND, LOOKING BACK ON THE WAY THE VIETMINH PINPOINTED THE FRENCH POSITIONS, YOU MAY RECALL THAT THEY TUNNELED, LABORIOUSLY, FOR MANY DAYS, UNDER ONE OF THEM, AND ULTIMATELY BLEW IT UP. I FEEL THAT THE SIDS SHOULD BE ABLE TO WARN US OF ANY SUCH ACTIVITY, IF USED IN A COORDINATED PROGRAM AROUND THE AIRFIELDS. LIKEWISE THE REDS HAD SANDTABLE MODELS OF THE KEY FRENCH DEFENSIVE LOCALITIES - SOMETHING WHICH THEY COULD NEVER HAVE BUILT, IF GENERAL CASTRIES HAD STUCK TO THE ORIGINAL OFFENSIVE CONCEPT, AND PREVENTED CLOSE RANGE OBSERVATION.

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9. I BELIEVE, WHEN THEY FEEL READY, THE VC WILL TRY TO DO THE FOLLOWING:

- A. BANG UP THE DANANG AND CHU LAI RUNWAYS, TO SCRUB OUR IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY. THIS WOULD BE AN ARTILLERY/MORTAR/SAPPER PROJECT.
- B. CONCURRENTLY TRY AND WRECK AIRCRAFT WITH ARTILLERY/MORTARS AND SUICIDE TEAMS.
- C. OVERRUN MLR STRONG POINTS, CAUSE US HEAVY CASUALTIES, AND GET TO THE AMMO DUMPS AND FUEL DUMPS; USING INFANTRY, SAPPERS, ARTILLERY AND MORTARS.
- D. ESTABLISH AMBUSHES TO TAKE ON FORCES REACTING FROM ALL THE FOREGOING.

10. IN ADDITION TO ALL YOU ARE DOING ALREADY (AND I KNOW IT IS CERTAINLY WISE AND INTENSIVE), HERE ARE SOME THOUGHTS ON ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT HELP:

- A. CONDUCT MAXIMUM NIGHT TPQ-10 MISSIONS ON SUSPECTED CONCENTRATION AREAS OR MOVEMENT ROUTES. ✓
- B. ESTABLISH COASTAL AND RIVER FRONT SURVEILLANCE OR COAST WATCHER TEAMS ON THE TOURANE RIVER AND ALONG THE BEACH FROM MONKEY MT. TO MARBLE MT. UTILIZING ANTPS-21 AND INFRA-RED. ✓
- C. PUT PRESSURE ON ADMIRAL WARD TO STEP UP, TIGHTEN UP, AND OTHERWISE DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE INSHORE PATROL OPPOSITE MONKEY MT. - MARBLE MT. PENINSULA AND ON THE TOURANE RIVER. EXTEND THE JUNK CURFEW TO THE COASTAL AREA, IF IT DOES NOT ALREADY APPLY. ESTABLISH A U.S. INSHORE PATROL AND COAST WATCHER SYSTEM AT CHU LAI. ✓
- D. INITIATE ACTION BY MACV TO PLACE B52 STRIKES ON THE HAPPY VALLEY AND ELEPHANT VALLEY SANCTUARIES FOLLOWING UP WITH BATTALION SIZE HELIBORNE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS. DO THE SAME ON THE APPROACHES TO DOXA. ✓
- E. ASK FOR TIGHTER AND MORE STRINGENT CONTROLS OVER RM KNUDSEN EMPLOYEES AT DANANG AIR BASE AND AT CHU LAI. ELIMINATE THE USE OF CIVILIAN LABOR BY THE SEABEES AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN AND ACCEPT SOME TIME-LAGS IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PROJECTS. ✓
- F. CHECK COMMUNICATIONS WITH TF 77, AGAINST THE MOMENT WHEN YOU MAY NEED SOME QUICK GAS FROM THE CARRIERS. (I PLAN TO SPEAK TO GINCPACFLT ON THIS). ✓

11. CALL ME IF YOU THINK OF ANYTHING YOU NEED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

TOR | WW-2  
 10/0332H | AES

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PAGE THREE OF THREE PAGES

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//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

P 130535Z

FM CG FMFPAC

TO CG III MAF

CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL FOR MAUGEN WALT. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

A. YOUR 120630Z.

1. SEVERAL ASPECTS OF REF A IMPRESS ME.

2. FIRST, HERNDON'S REPORT OF DIMINISHED SECURITY FOR THE PEOPLE IS BELIED BY FACTS EMANATING FROM I CORPS, USMC, AND MACV. THE QUESTION THEN IS, WHO GAVE HERNDON THE IDEA? MY SUSPICION - SOMEBODY WHO DOES NOT LIKE MARINES.

3. NEXT IS THE MATTER OF REPORTED JUNIOR OFFICER DISSATISFACTION, AND REPUGNANCE AT THE ALLEGED CIVILIAN CARNAGE. YOU, THROUGH YOUR CHAIN OF COMMAND, CERTAINLY HAVE A BETTER FEEL THAN I FOR TH THIS. I CAN ONLY MAKE TWO OBSERVATIONS. - FIRST, I HAVE NOT DETECTED ANY OFFICER DISSATISFACTION AT ALL, ON ANY TRIP; NOR HAS ANY MEMBER OF MY STAFF. THE REVERSE HAS BEEN THE CASE. SECOND, I HAVE SEEN NO RESIGNATIONS OR REQUESTS FROM JUNIOR OFFICERS FOR RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY. THE QUESTION THEN IS, WHERE DID HERNDON GET THIS IDEA? MY SUSPICION - A DISGRUNTLED AND WHOLLY UNREPRESENTATIVE OFFICER OR MAN, OF WHOM THERE MUST ALWAYS BE A FEW.

4. THEN, ON THE QUESTION OF CASUALTIES TO CIVILIANS DUE TO OUR ACTIONS. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY SO, IN SOME DEGREE. THEY ARE CERTAINLY SQUARELY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE BATTLEFIELD, AND CANNOT ESCAPE INVOLVEMENT. WE HAVE CAUSED SOME CASUALTIES BY WEAPONS ERRORS, VEHICLES ETC. THE QUESTION IS, THOUGH, ARE THE PEOPLE BETTER OR WORSE OFF, ON THE WHOLE? WE KNOW THE ANSWER. GEN TH KNOWS THE ANSWER, AND HERNDON CAN GET THE FACTS TOO, IF HE WANTS THEM. WE HAVE BROUGHT PEACE TO A LOT OF PEOPLE, AND THERE ARE OTHERS WHO WILL SACRIFICE GREATLY TO HAVE THE SAME THING.

5. TRULY DISQUIETING IS THE REPORT ON WADE WHO, I SHOULD JUDGE, WOULD BE THE ONE TO ASSIST YOU, RATHER THAN JOIN IN A FRIVOLOUS ATTACK.

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#10

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6. I DOUBT IF WESTY WILL LIKE HEARING THAT THE OVERALL EFFORT IS FLOUNDERING, AND THUS HE MAY POSSIBLY BE OF SOME HELP TO YOU. MEANWHILE, AND COMPLETELY OFF THE RECORD, I AM SEEKING ADVICE AND HELP FROM BOB MILLER. MY POSITION WITH HIM IS THAT WE COULD NOT OBJECT TO HERNDON PRINTING THE TRUTH, BUT HIS ALLEGATIONS IN THIS CASE, ARE WRONG. NEVERTHELESS, IF THEY SEE PRINT, THERE HAS TO BE SOME RESIDUAL BAD EFFECT ON THE U.S. EFFORT, EVEN IF 99 PERCENT OF WHAT HE SAYS IS SUBSEQUENTLY PROVEN INCORRECT. I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. PLEASE DO THE SAME.  
 GP-4

TOR	SAI
132245H	AW

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2 OF 3

P 130535Z/NOV 1965

#10

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**SECRET**

PRIORITY

150522Z

FROM: CG FMAW

TO CG TF SEVEN NINE

INFO CG FMFPAC

CG III MAF

CG I MAC FWD

CTG SEVEN EIGHT PT FIVE

BT

S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR MGEN FIELDS INFO LTGEN KRULAK, MGEN WADE, MGEN WALT,  
COL BURNETT FROM MC CUTCHEON

SLF HMM UH1E AUGMENTATION (U)

1. QUESTION OF AUGMENTING EMBARKED HELO SQUADRON WITH UH1E HELOS  
HAS BEEN REOPENED. BELIEVE ALCON AGREE THERE WILL BE TIMES WHEN  
SLF HAS REQUIREMENT FOR SMALL NUMBER OF UH1E'S FOR A LIMITED  
PERIOD OF TIME TO SUPPORT SPECIFIC OPERATION. FURTHER BELIEVE  
ALCON AGREE PREFERRED SOLUTION IS TO PROVIDE AUGMENTATION FROM  
FMAW RESOURCES. ALTHOUGH UH1E ASSETS ARE LIMITED AND FULLY  
EMPLOYED, WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE REQUISITE SUPPORT.

2. SINCE FMAW IS OPCON TO III MAF UNDER MACV, IT IS DESIRABLE  
TO INFORM MACV PRIOR TO SUCH AUGMENTATION AND GET HIS CONCURRENCE.  
FOLLOWING PROCEDURE RECOMMENDED:

A. CTG 78.5, AFTER COORDINATION WITH CTG 76.5 AND FMAW, INFORM  
TF 79 OF REQUIREMENT TO INCLUDE NUMBER, DURATION, PURPOSE AND  
DATE REQUIRED.

B. CTF 79 NOTIFY CG FMFPAC WHO WILL IN TURN NOTIFY CINCPACFLT.

C. CINCPACFLT TO STATE REQUIREMENT TO COMUSMACV INFO ALCON AND  
INDICATE FMAW CAN PROVIDE.

GP-4

BT

TOD	COURIER
16/0100H	AES

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P 150522/NOV

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#15  
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**SECRET**

RZ01507CZRCGPY0  
 PP RUMNMF  
 DF RUMSMA 3927U 3100415  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 120411Z  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMNMF/CG111 MAF  
 INFO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 BT

SECRET GRPQUY FROM MACO!

PERSONAL FOR MGEN MAIT FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND  
 REF GC CG 111 MAF MSG DTG 121000Z

1. I AM SURE YOU REALIZED OUR 10 AND NAVY LNO'S WERE  
 IN CHARGE OF SELECTION OF NEWS MEDIA REPS TO ACCOMPANY  
 OPERATION PRIOR TO ASSAULT LANDINGS. MACV 10 WAS ONLY TO  
 ASSIST IN MAKING A SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE AFTER BEING INFORMED  
 BY YOUR 10 THAT CONTACT HAD BEEN MADE.

2. PLAN APPROVED BY 10 PROVIDED FOR TELEVISION  
 NETWORKS TO BE PART OF SECOND PHASE OF OPERATION. I UNDERSTAND  
 THAT CBS DID COVER THIS OPERATION AND THAT NBC COULD HAVE  
 COVERED IF IT SO DESIRED BUT WAS GIVING CAMERA PROBLEMS ON  
 GP-4

TOR W-1  
 14/1730H ATH

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P 120411Z/NOV

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#16

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PRIORITY

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182136Z

// MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //

FM: CG FMFPAC

TO: CG III MAF

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK

1. WE NEED A SIMPLE WORD-CODE, TO MAKE OUR UNCLASSIFIED TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS MORE USEFUL. LET'S EACH OF US PUT A CARD IN HIS WALLET WITH A FEW KEY WORDS THAT WE MAY NEED. ADLY FOR CAMOUFLAGE SOME TIME.

2. AS A STARTER, MAKE THE LIST;

A. PLACES.

DANANG-WHISKEY  
 CHU LAI-DOG  
 PHU BAI-BUICK  
 MARBLE MOUNTAIN-KING

B. PEOPLE.

WESTY-RUM  
 GEN THI-SHOTGUN  
 AMBASSADOR-DANGER  
 ROSSON-TRACTOR  
 MOORE-HORSE  
 DEPUY-GAMBLER

C. UNITS.

III MAF-CADDILLAC  
 MACV-BLUEBELL  
 ARVN-BULL  
 RF-ACES  
 PF-QUEEN  
 I CORPS-ALASKA

D. MISCELLANEOUS.

ATTACK-SOUPBONE  
 DEFEND-HUNTER  
 KILLED-BAROMETER  
 WOUNDED-MERCURY

GP-4

TOR	NAVJOMOPNET
19/2243H	CEG

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P 182136Z/NOV

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R 180435Z  
 FM CG FMFR C /I MAC (FWD )

TO RUMNMF/CG THIRD MAF  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL - FOR MAJGEN WALT FROM MAJGEN WABE

1. HAVE SCHEDULED TWO DAY VISIT YOUR COMMAND ARRIVING 1200 LOCAL, 22 NOV AND DEPARTING 0800 LOCAL, 24 NOV. MY PARTY WILL INCLUDE 1 LTCOL, 1 MAJ, 1 CAPT, 1 SSGT AND 1 CPL. WILL HAVE LUNCH ABOARD AIRCRAFT ON 22 NOV.
2. DESIRE VISIT HEADQUARTERS DANANG, PHU BAI AND CHU LAI FOR INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. FOLLOWING TOPICS:
  - A. CURRENT ACTIVITIES.
  - B. PROBLEM AREAS IN WHICH MY HQ MAY ASSIST.

PAGE TWO RUABQL 020A C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. EFFECT OF COMUSMACV NEW R&R PROGRAM ON THE DANANG TRANSIENT FACILITY.

D. DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING SURFACE ROTATION DRAFTS FROM RVN IN THE FORTHCOMING MONTHS.

E. ROTATION OF HMM BETWEEN FUTEWA AND DANANG.

F. DISCUSS PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN ROTATION OF 1/3 AND 2/3.

GP-4  
 BT

TOD COURIER  
 211945H CEJ

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R 180435Z/NOV

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#14

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P 190046Z  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO DDKE/CG III MAF  
 BT

**S E C R E T**

PERSONAL FROM LTGEN KRULAK TO MGEN WALT  
 NSA DANANG LIGHTERAGE ASSETS (U)

1. VADM ROEDER HAS ADVISED ME THAT IN DEBRIEFING HIS LCU CREWS RETURNING FROM DANANG HE LEARNED OF A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION; NAMELY, MARINE USE OF NSA DANANG LCU ASSETS TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, APPARENTLY BASED ON OPERATION RED SNAPPER:

A. MARINES WERE LANDED ON A HOSTILE BEACH UNDER EXTREMELY ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS (15 FOOT SURF) WITH INADEQUATE

PAGE 2 YVNA 2477 **S E C R E T**

BEACH SURVEY AND NO PROVISION FOR SALVAGE.

B. IF SUCH OPERATIONS WERE CONTINUED, THEY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO EVEN GREATER RISK BECAUSE:

(1) THE NEW REPLACEMENT CREWS ARE INEXPERIENCED IN AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS.

(2) THE MATERIAL CONDITION OF THE LANDING CRAFT IS DEGENERATING UNDER HEAVY LIGHTERAGE SCHEDULES AND INADEQUATE UPKEEP.

2. HE CONSIDERS THAT ANY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE COGNIZANCE OF THE AMPHIBIOUS COMMANDER UTILIZING REGULAR AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS AND TECHNIQUES.

3. MY REACTION IS THAT WHEN THERE IS A NEED FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, OTHER THAN SHORE-TO-SHORE WITH OUR ORGANIC LVT'S, SEVENTHFLT SHOULD BE ASKED TO PROVIDE THE SUPPORT.?  
 GP-4

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#11

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//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

P 191944Z

FROM: CG FMFPAG

TO: CG III MAF

**EXCLUSIVE**

//SECRET//EXCLUSIVE

FOR MAJGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK

MOB REQUIREMENTS (U)

1. UNDERSTAND THAT THE CLIMATE MAY BE RIPE AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL FOR THE EXPANSION OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL MOBS TO PACOM. HOWEVER, THE PROJECT IS STALLED BECAUSE DETAILED JUSTIFICATION IS LACKING FROM GINCPACFLT.

2. PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR VIEWS AS TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL MOBS TO SUPPORT ADVANCED BASE CONSTRUCTION IN THE III MAF AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. TEMPER YOUR ESTIMATE WITH A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF CONTRACTOR EXPANSION CAPABILITIES AND THE FACT THAT AN EXPRESSION OF REQUIREMENTS WILL DOUBTLESS HAVE TO BE JUSTIFIED IN DETAIL.

GP-4

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191944Z/NOV65

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## RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ACTIVITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
	<i>[Signature]</i>	11/25/62

EX-1154

// TO BE DELIVERED TO  
MAJGEN WALT ONLY //

P 220850Z

//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

FROM: CG FMFPAC

TO: CG III MAF

//TOP SECRET/EXCLUSIVE, DELIVER ONLY TO MAUGEN WALT FROM  
LTGEN KRULAK.

(YD 0940), 806TH BN VIC (YD 1832) AND 808TH BN VIC (YD 2533) 804TH BN VIC (YD 1443) AND A POSSIBLE PAVN BN HAVE ALL BEEN REPORTED IN THIS AREA AT SOME RECENT TIME.

E. ANOTHER WAY TO LOCK ON WITH THE VC MIGHT BE TO TRY AND ENGINEER SOME FORM OF ENTRAPMENT, ENTICING THE VC, BY INTELLIGENCE LEAKS, TO COME DOWN AND ATTACK US OR THE ARVN IN A POSITION THAT WE HAVE LOADED FOR BEAR. PERHAPS A TRAP MIGHT BE LAID AT A PLACE LIKE HIEP DUC, WHICH IS NEAR ENOUGH TO BRING ALL OF OUR POWER TO BEAR.

F. OPERATIONS IN HAPPY VALLEY MIGHT BE FRUITFUL. THE DANANG INDEPENDENT BATTALION IS SUPPOSED TO BE LOCATED VIC (ZC 9868). SUCH A THRUST MIGHT HAVE A SPOILING EFFECT RELATED TO THE NAVY REPORTED ATTACKS PENDING AGAINST OUR AIRFIELDS. OTHER POSSIBLE SPOILING ACTIONS COULD BE AGAINST THE U/I BN WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE AROUND (BT 0966), ON THE 7TH BN VIC (AT 9953) OR THE FORCES WHICH MAY BE IN THE VICINITY OF HAI VAN PASS.

G. ANOTHER AREA WHICH MIGHT CONCEIVABLY GIVE PROMISE AS A PONTENTIAL OBJECTIVE LIES SOUTHWEST OF THE CONFLUENCE OF THE SONG VA GAI AND SONG THU BON RIVERS. A SIZEABLE FORCE LANDED ALONG A LINE FROM ABOUT (AT 835540) TO (AT 870508) COULD DRIVE NORTHEAST INTO THE CUL-DE-SAC FORMED BY THE RIVERS, AND JUST POSSIBLY TRAP SOME VC. THERE IS AN UNIDENTIFIED BATTALION AND SEVERAL SMALLER UNITS SUPPOSED TO BE IN THIS VICINITY.

H. IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING CONTACT IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DANANG TAOR, ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY. BY PLANNING AN OPERATION IN THE HOI-AN AREA, WHERE PHASE II OF BLUE MARLIN WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED. AN OVERLAND MOVEMENT OF A BLOCKING FORCE FROM THE NORTH MIGHT BE COMBINED WITH A HELICOPTER MOVEMENT INTO POSITIONS ON THE WEST THE HLZ'S COULD BE ALONG THE VENH DIEN RIVER, SOUTH TO THE SONG VU GIA RIVER HOPING TO TRAP THE VC INSIDE THE AREA BOUNDED BY RIVERS AND SEA AND THE BLOCKING FORCE. VARIATIONS OF THIS COULD BE (1) THE SAME PLAN WITHOUT THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, BUT USING LVT'S IN A SHORE-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT, OR (2) THE SAME PLAN WITHOUT A SEA LANDED FORCE, SWEEPING FROM INLAND TO THE SEA.

I. I NOTE THAT YOUR ORDERS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS, SINCE THE ATTACKS OF 28 OCTOBER, HAVE REFERRED TO LIMITING PATROLS-EXCEPT BY RECON UNITS-TO SOME 2000 METERS FORWARD OF UNIT POSITIONS. I AM SURE YOU INTEND THAT THIS RESTRICTION SHALL LAST FOR ONLY THE TIME NECESSARY TO STRENGTHEN YOUR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND THAT YOU PLAN TO RESTORE THE CONCEPT OF DEEP INCURSIONS, BOTH LARGE AND SMALL, IN ORDER TO KEEP THE VC FROM MOVING HIS STRENGTH CLOSER TO OUR CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS.

//PAGE ONE OF TWO PAGES//

No

# 27

4. THESE ARE JUST IDEAS - NOTHING MORE - WHICH I OFFER FOR YOU TO CONSIDER. YOU DO NOT HAVE TO AGREE WITH ME. I WILL REALIZE THAT IT IS YOU WHO HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY, AND WHATEVER YOU DO GETS MY 100 PERCENT BACKING. NEVERTHELESS, I WOULD BE DOING LESS THAN MY BEST IF I DID NOT TRY AND MEASURE THE OVERALL CLIMATE FOR YOU, AND TELL YOU HONESTLY HOW IT LOOKS TO ME; AND THE WAY IT LOOKS IS THAT UNLESS WE REGISTER SOME SUBSTANTIAL OFFENSIVE ACTION WE MAY SUFFER IN THE PHASE II DEPLOYMENT PICTURE. WARMEST REGARDS.  
GP-4

TOR NAVJOMOPNET  
25/0309H GVB

EXCISE

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COPY 1 OF 1 COPY.....MAJGEN WALT

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SECRET MAC 5906

PERSONAL FOR LGEN KULAK HAWAII, INFO FOR MGEN WALT CG III MAF  
ROMGEN WESTMORELAND SAIGON.

REF: III MAF MESSAGE DTG 142300Z SEP 65, SUBJECT: "LOGISTIC SUPPORT  
OR FUTURE OPERATIONS."

A CHECK OF PENDING ACTIONS REVEALED THAT BACKCHANNEL CITE MAC 5133  
TG 130400Z OCT WAS APPARENTLY LOST ENROUTE AND NOT RECEIVED BY YOU.  
SUBJECT MESSAGE QUOTED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: 1. REFERENCE MESSAGE RESPONDED TO MY REQUEST FOR PRIORITY  
STUDY BY CG, III MAF OF NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT  
MAF LOGISTICALLY AT A LEVEL PREDICATED ON:

A. ONE REGIMENTAL-SIZE OPERATION EACH WEEK FOR AN INDEFINITE  
PERIOD.

B. PROGRESSIVE INCREASE IN BATTALION AND SMALLER UNIT OPERATIONS  
ASSOCIATED WITH SECURITY OF AND PACIFICATION WITHIN III MAF AREA.

C. INCREASING SCALE OF AIR OPERATIONS RELATED TO A AND B ABOVE,  
NO TO PARTICIPATION IN OVERALL MACV AIR PROGRAM.

D. CONTINUOUS FULFILLMENT OF LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED  
TO NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND.

2. YOU WILL RECALL THAT ON OCCASION OF OUR CONVERSATION IN VIETNAM  
20 AUGUST WE DISCUSSED ADEQUACY OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF III MAF. IT  
WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU LOOKED WITH FAVOR ON A STUDY ALONG LINES  
PREDICATED ABOVE TO PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR POSSIBLE ACTION TO  
STRENGTHEN LOGISTIC SUPPORT CAPABILITY.

3. IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING, WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS.

4. BEST REGARDS. GP-4 UNQUOTE:

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

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230005Z NOV 65

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FM SSO MACV

TO CG III MAF

ZEN

SECRET MAC 5045

PERSONAL FOR MAJ GEN WALT III MAF FROM GEN WESTMORELAND SAIGON

1. I HAVE READ YOUR MESSAGE IN ANSWER TO MY LETTER ON EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF III MAF OPERATIONS IN I CORPS. I CONSIDER THAT YOUR PROPOSED PROGRAM IS REALISTIC AND MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

2. AFTER THE ATTACK IN MO DUC DISTRICT, I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT WE MUST OPERATE AGGRESSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE CORPS AREA AND THAT BY SO DOING WE WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE VC TO MARSHAL THEIR FORCE FOR SUCH ATTACKS, ALTHOUGH I REALIZE THAT THE AREA TO BE COVERED IS LARGE AND THEIR SKILL IN ASSEMBLING FOR THESE ATTACKS IS VERY HIGH.

3. I WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH YOU REACTED IN THIS OPERATION AND I WOULD HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO WORK OUT WITH I CORPS A FORM OF PURSUIT AFTER SUCH ATTACKS AIMED AT INTERCEPTING AND DESTROYING THE ATTACKING FORCE.

4. YOUR NEW LETTER OF INSTRUCTION INDICATES MORE CLEARLY THAN BEFORE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ASSISTING THE I CORPS COMMANDER IN DEFENDING GOVERNMENTAL CENTERS AND IN RELIEVING OR REINFORCING ARVN UNITS UNDER ATTACK.

5. I AM CONVINCED FROM THE THRUST OF YOUR MESSAGE THAT YOU UNDERSTAND FULLY MY INTEREST AND DESIRES IN RESPECT TO YOUR OPERATIONS AND I LOOK FORWARD TO MY NEXT VISIT AT WHICH TIME I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW WITH YOU THOSE AREAS WHICH YOU CONSIDER MOST PRODUCTIVE, INCLUDING THOSE WHICH YOU HAVE ITEMIZED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

WARM REGARDS, GP-1

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