

<del>34.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>050900Z Nov</del>	<del>Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND Gen LOTT</del>
			<del>Subj: Notification of Gen STAMPER's departure</del>
35.	CG III MAF	061250Z Nov <i>gp - not shown</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: News Release
36.	CG III MAF	061315Z Nov <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: Gen GIBBENS's discussion of situation in I Corps
<del>37.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>060200Z Nov</del>	<del>Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND MGen WALT</del>
		<i>Removed, placed in TS folder</i>	<del>Subj: Handling of VC action</del>
38.	CG III MAF	060246Z Nov 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Exclusive for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: Treatment of captives
<del>39.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>060205Z Nov</del>	<del>Personal for MGen LARSEN from MGen WALT</del>
			<del>Subj: Air base change</del>
<del>40.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>101040Z Nov</del>	<del>Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND</del>
			<del>Subj: Blue Marlin</del>
<del>41.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>120630Z Nov</del>	<del>Personal for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT</del>
			<del>Subj: Box Number VPI</del>
42.	CG III MAF	160150Z Nov <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK from MGen WALT Subj: News photo
43.	CG III MAF	160604Z Nov <i>gp - not shown</i>	Personal from MGen WALT to BGen WILLIAMSON Subj: Congratulations to 173 ABN
<del>44.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>161700Z Nov</del>	<del>Personal for MGen DOUGLASS from MGen WALT</del>
		<i>Removed placed in TS folder</i>	<del>Subj: Capture of VC Co. order</del>
<del>45.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>171430Z Nov</del>	<del>Personal for MGen KIRKARD from MGen WALT</del>
			<del>Subj: Acceptance of invitation to lunch</del>
<del>46.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>181130Z Nov</del>	<del>Exclusive for MGen WILLIAMS from MGen WALT</del>
		<i>Removed placed in TS folder</i>	<del>Subj: Passing of personnel to CINCPAC and CINCPAC</del>
47.	CG III MAF	181140Z Nov <i>gp - not shown</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK Subj: Proposed R&R expansion
48.	CG III MAF	191400Z Nov <i>gp - not shown</i>	Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND Subj: OPNS in I Corp.
49.	CG III MAF	250522Z Nov 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK Subj: Improvement of PF
<del>50.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>050200Z Nov</del>	<del>Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND</del>
		<i>Removed placed in TS folder</i>	<del>Subj: Instructions to provide Reaction Forces in support of CG I Corp</del>
<del>51.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>251116Z Nov</del>	<del>Personal for LtGen KRULAK</del>
		<i>Removed placed in TS folder</i>	<del>Subj: Readiness of III MAF 250200Z Nov</del>
52.	CG III MAF	280006Z Nov 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Personal for LtGen KRULAK Subj: III MAF personnel status
53.	CG III MAF	290912Z Nov 65 <i>gp - 4</i>	Exclusive for LtGen KRULAK Subj: MCB requirements
<del>54.</del>	<del>CG III MAF</del>	<del>290000Z Nov</del>	<del>Personal for LtGen KRULAK</del>
			<del>Subj: Subordinate personnel</del>

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CON: 2278  
IMMEDIATE 290912Z NOV  
FROM: CG III MAF/NJC  
TO: CG FMFPAC

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MOB REQUIREMENTS (EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT)

1. AT THE PRESENT TIME, FOUR MOB BATTALIONS ARE IN COUNTRY ASSIGNED TO THE NJC FOR PERFORMANCE OF CONSTRUCTION TASKS. THE FY 1965 WORKLOAD ALREADY PLACED ON THESE UNITS TOTALS 417,500 MAN DAYS EXCLUSIVE OF ANY "SELF-HELP" GENERATED WITHIN THE GANTONMENT PROJECT. OF THIS WORK LOAD 271,500 MAN DAYS REMAINING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED.
2. FROM TABLE A, MY 1966 MCON PROGRAM APPROXIMATELY 132,000 MAN DAYS OF PROJECTS HAVE BEEN SELECTED FOR CB ACCOMPLISHMENT. FROM TABLES B AND C, A TOTAL OF 210,000 MAN DAYS IN PROJECTS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE CB TYPE OF WORK. PROJECTS SELECTED FOR CB ACCOMPLISHMENT WERE THOSE INVOLVING GANTONMENTS BECAUSE OF THE SELF-HELP FACTOR; ERECTION OF ABFC'S TO DEVELOP A BLANCED WORK LOAD; PROJECTS AT PHU BAI TO ELIMINATE NECESSITY FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTRACTOR'S CAMP AND MOBILIZATION OF EQUIPMENT AT THAT LOCATION; AND PROJECTS IN TACTICLA ZONES WHERE USE OF CIVILIANS IS NOT FEASIBLE.
3. NO ESTIMATE HAS BEEN INCLUDED FOR ANY REQUIREMENT FOR USE OF CB'S TO SUPPORT MARINE UNITS IN THEIR PHASE II ACTIVITIES BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE PRESENT ENCLAVES. USING A STANDARD 500 MAN MOB AS THE CRITERIA, 7500 MAN DAYS OF DIRECT LABOR CAN BE APPLIED TO PROJECTS PER MONTHS. THE 613,000 MAN DAYS WORKLOAD THEN EQUALS 80 BATTALION MONTHS OF EFFORT. WITH THE PRESENT 4 BATTALIONS AVAILABLE IT WOULD TAKE APPROXIMATELY 20 MONTHS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE PROJECTS.
4. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO REEXAMINE THE PROJECTS SELECTED FOR CB ACCOMPLISHMENT TO REDUCE THIS OVERLOAD BUT SUCH REDUCTION IS NOT LIKELY TO EXCEED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CB SUPPORT OF MARINE OPERATIONS IN PHASE II. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT ADDITIONAL ENGINEERING CAPABILITY BE PROVIDED THIS COMAND. THE PROVISION OF 6 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS, PROVIDING THAT SUCH UNITS ARRIVE IN COUNTRY BY 1 MAY (COINCIDING WITH BEST ESTIMATE OF WHEN MATERIAL WILL BE AVAILABLE), WOULD BE ABLE TO COMPLETE THE WORKLOAD BY 1 NOV 1965, WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE AND DESIRABLE IN VIEW OF THE ADVENT OF THE MONSOON SEASON. PROVISION OF ONLY FOUR ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS WOULD LENGTHEN THIS COMPLETION DATE UNTIL 1 JAN 1967 WITHOUT ANY ALLOWANCE FOR DELAY DUE TO THE MONSOON SEASON.
5. SHOULD ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS BE AUTHORIZED EXPEDITIOUS ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO OBTAIN AND SHIP COMPLETE CAMP COMPONENTS SINCE SUCH MATERIAL CAN NOT BE PROVIDED FROM CURRENT RESOURCES.
6. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION BE INITIATED TO PROVIDE THIS COMAND WITH AT LEAST 4 AND PREFERREDLY 6 ADDITIONAL MOB'S AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

GP-4

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PERSONAL FOR LUTEN KEULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT

III MAF STAFF PERSONNEL STATUS

A. TELECON CG FMFPAC/CG III MAF 24NOV65

1. THIS RESPONDS TO REF A. AT PRESENT PERS ASSIGNED TO III MAF/NOG STAFF ON FULL TIME BASIS TOTALS 85 OFF 163 EML.

2. FOREGOING PERS PROVIDED BY 3D MARDIV AND 1STMAW AS FOL: (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

	CMD	OFF	EML
3D MARDIV		60(5 NAVY)	123(2 NAVY)
1ST MAW		25	40

3. AUGMENTATION AUTHORIZED AS RESULT OF CG FMFPAC MSG 210210Z JUN65 FOR SUPPORT III MAF/TF 79: (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

	CMD	OFF	EML
3D MARDIV		25	38
1ST MAW		29	42

4. BURDEN OF REPLACING ATTRITION AND ABSORBING ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS HAS REACHED LIMITS OF ACCEPTABILITY IN BOTH CMDS DUE TO SHORTAGES IN KEY RANKS AND MOS. 3D MARDIV IS ALSO BEING REQUESTED TO PROVIDE APPROXIMATELY 50 EML SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR HOUSEKEEPING, SECURITY AND MOTOR POOL REPLACEMENTS RESULTING FROM SHIFT OF 3D MARDIV OP AND THE ATTENDANT BURDEN IMPOSED ON 1ST MAW FOR PROVIDING SERVICE AND SUPPORT TO III MAF AND RESIDUAL OF DIV HQS THAT REMAINED IN TANGO SECTOR.

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5. CRITICAL III MAF STAFF SHORTAGES AT PRESENT AS FOL:

A. OFFICERS (READ IN FOUR COLUMNS)

1	COL	9910	ASST G-4
1	COL/LTCOL	ANY	SPEC SERV O
1	LTCOL/MAJ	0302	ASST PLANS C
2	MAJ	0302	BASE DEFENSE
1	LTCOL	7333/0202	ASST INTEL
1	MAJ	0302/0202	ASST INTEL
2	CAPT	0302/0202	ASST INTEL
2	CAPT/LT	0202	ASST INTEL
1	LTCOL	0802	G-3 SUPP ADMS
1	MAJ	2803	COMM ENG
1	MAJ/CDR	1302/5100	ASST BASE DEVEL/BOG
1	CAPT	3010	SUP O (SERV CO H&SEN)
1	LT	0130	S-1/ADJ (BN HQ H&SEN)
1	CAPT/LT	0130	ADMIN O (G-4)
1	LT/CDR/MAJ	1302	ASST FORCE ENG
18	TOTAL		

B. ENLISTED (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

10	E-5/E-4/E-3	0141
1	E-7/E-6	0211
2	E-5/E-4	0231
3	E-7/E-6	0239
1	E-7	0251
1	E-5	0631
1	E-6	1159
1	E-7	1371
1	E-4	1411
1	E-5	1441
1	E-6	1449
1	E-7	2181
2	E-7 AND E-3	3041
1	E-3/E-2	3531
1	E-7	3537
1	E-6	3611
3	E-7/E-6	8111 (ESCORT HQ FOR CIB)
34	TOTAL	

6. INCLUDED IN FOREROTAS IS AUSTERE NUCLEUS OF PERSON FOR ADVANCE PLANNING PURPOSES CONNECTED WITH SHIFT TO NEW III MAF CP SITE. REVISION INCREASING REQUIREMENT TO BUILD THIS STAFF IN ADMIN AND SERVICE CAPABILITIES BY 1 JAN TO 9 OFF AND 60 ENL.

PAGE TWO OF FOUR PAGES

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7. FOR MOVEMENT TO NEW CP ACROSS THE RIVER FOL ADD PERS WILL BE REQUIRED:

A. REMAINDER III MAF HQS:

11 OFF 0 ENL

B. REMAINDER MCG STAFF:

~~15-NAVY OFF~~  
5-NAVY OFF  
21 OFF TOTAL 23 ENL

C. ~~REMAINDER OF HQS~~ BE HQ AND HQ CO:

2 OFF 19 ENL

D. REMAINDER OF SERVICE CO HQS BE:

6 OFF 34 ENL

E. TOTAL:

40 OFF 126 ENL

8. IN TIME FRAME OF SHIFT OF CP TO NEW III MAF HQS AREA EXPECT THAT III MAF WILL BE SELF-SUFFICIENT ORGANIZATION. AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE STEP TO AID ALL COMMANDS CONCERNED RECOMMEND THAT IMMEDIATE ACTIVATION OF HQCO III MAF AS A SUB UNIT OF HQCO HQEN, 3D MARDIV. CURRENTLY ALL PERS SERVING WITH THE III MAF/MCG WHO ARE CARRIED ON THE ROLLS OF THE 3D MARDIV ARE CARRIED SEPARATELY IN SUB UNIT TRO, HQCO, HQEN, 3D MARDIV (EUC 43010). UPON ACTIVATION OF THE HQCO AS RECOMMENDED, THOSE PERS SERVING WITH III MAF NOT CARRIED ON ROLLS OF 1STMAW WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE HQCO. SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION WOULD PERMIT MONITORING OF PERS INTENT TO THE III MAF HQ. IF THIS IS DONE IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT PERS INTENDED FOR ASSIGNMENT TO MAF BE ORDERED TO 3D MARDIV FORDU WITH III MAF.

9. ACTION IS BEING TAKEN TO ACTIVATE MCG, REPLACING PNOCSA, WITH THE FIVE PERSONNEL PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO PNOCSA AND ANY OTHERS IN III MAF WHOSE FUNCTIONS FIT INTO THE PROPOSED MCG Y/O. ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE FORMULATED AS FUNCTIONAL AREAS ARE EVALUATED.

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10. RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN III MAF T/O AS MODIFIED BY CG FMFPAC FIRST  
END SER 0076965 OF 27 SEP BEING EVOLVED. SHAKING DOWN OF FUNCTIONS  
BETWEEN III MAF AND NCG TOGETHER WITH EXPANDING ROLE RESULTING FROM  
SA I CORPS, AREA COORDINATION AND NATURE OF MILITARY/POLITICAL/CIVIL  
INVOLVEMENTS MAY JUSTIFY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE OF T/O, PARTICULARLY  
IN G-2, G-3, G-5 (CIVIL AFFAIRS).

GP-4

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250522

Memorandum

From: Commanding General

To: C/S

Send copy to  
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Addressing personnel  
of TKC

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IMMEDIATE 250522Z

FROM: CG III MAF  
TO: CG FMFPAC

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJ GEN WALT

1. IN VIEW OF OUR MUTUAL CONCERN OVER THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE POPULAR FORCES I KNOW YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN RECENT PROGRESS HERE IN I CTZ.

2. SOME TIME AGO WE INITIATED LIAISON AT ALL LEVELS IN THE QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR TO IMPROVE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MARINES AND POPULAR FORCES. LIAISON STARTED WITH COL THANH, CHIEF OF STAFF I CORPS, AND CONTINUED ON TO COL YEU, QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR COMMANDER, LTCOL TUNG, PROVINCE CHIEF AND SOUTHERN SECTOR COMMANDER, AND LTCOL TU, NORTHERN SECTOR COMMANDER. IN EACH CASE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED THAT SOME POSITIVE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO BETTER COORDINATE MARINE AND POPULAR FORCE ACTIVITIES. FURTHER, SINCE OUR INITIAL PROJECTS INVOLVED HOA VANG DISTRICT THE DISTRICT CHIEF, CAPT HOA, WAS CONSULTED AND HIS RESPONSE WAS VERY FAVORABLE. GENERALLY OUR PROPOSALS WERE TO PLACE A MARINE SQUAD WITH <sup>CERTAIN</sup> ~~WITH~~ POPULAR FORCE PLATOONS, TO PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS, SUPPORTING ARMS, AND RESERVE FORCES, AND TO AUGMENT ~~WITH~~ POPULAR FORCE TRAINING CENTERS WITH ~~BY~~ MARINE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.

3. THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN A LETTER FROM GEN THI, WHICH I SHALL FORWARD TO YOU SEPARATELY, ENDORSING OUR PROPOSALS IN SOME DETAIL. IN VIEW OF THIS, I CAN SAY WITH ASSURANCE THAT WE HAVE FOCUSED ATTENTION ON THE POPULAR FORCES IN QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR AND, CONSIDERING GEN THI'S LETTER, GENERALLY THROUGHOUT I CORPS.

4. IMMEDIATE RESULTS HAVE BEEN THAT WITHIN THE PAST WEEK III MAF HAS BEEN ASSIGNED LIMITED OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF SEVEN POPULAR FORCE PLATOONS IN THE

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CONTROLLED BY THE AIR BASE DEFENSE BATTALION COMMUNICATION CENTER  
VILLAGE IN THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN AREA. THESE TWO TERMS ARE OF THE POPULAR FORCES  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
APO San Francisco, California 96601

GERN BECAUSE OF THE HIGH DENSITY OF POPULATION AND THE PROXIMITY OF OUR VITAL INSTALLATIONS.

5. THE MARINES AND POPULAR FORCES ARE NOW PARTNERING TOGETHER. AS SOON AS A FIRM RELATIONSHIP IS ESTABLISHED, PARTIES WILL BE PLACED WITHIN THEIR VILLAGES. FIRE SUPPORT, COMMUNICATIONS, AND RESERVE FORCES WILL BE PROVIDED. PROSPECTS ARE BRIGHT FOR RAPID PROGRESS IN THE AIR BASE DEFENSE BATTALION AREA. THESE SEVEN PLATOONS ARE ALMOST UP TO STRENGTH AND EQUIPPED BETTER THAN THE AVERAGE PF PLATOON. THIS IS NOT THE CASE IN HOA LANG VILLAGE. THE PLATOON ASSIGNED THERE IS, IN FACT, THE ONLY ONE IN THAT VICINITY AND HAS A STRENGTH OF EIGHT MEN. HOWEVER, FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATION, I'M CONFIDENT THERE IS A BASE TO RECRUIT FROM IN THAT AREA. IF WE CAN IMPROVE THE PRESTIGE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PLATOON, THEN ELIGIBLE MEN SHOULD BE ATTRACTED TO THE POPULAR FORCES.

6. THE BENEFITS PROMISED BY OUR PROGRAM ARE MANY. WHEN PF ACCOMPANY MARINES ON PATROL THE PROBLEM OF DETAINING INNOCENT PEOPLE IS LARGELY ELIMINATED. FURTHER, IT HAS A DESIRABLE EFFECT ON VILLAGERS TO SEE MARINES AND POPULAR FORCES WORKING TOGETHER. I'M CONFIDENT THAT AS THE PROGRAM EXPANDS IT WILL GREATLY ASSIST THE POPULAR FORCE RECRUITING EFFORT.

7. THIS PROGRAM IS A PILOT PROJECT IN THE DANANG AREA PATTERNED AFTER OUR SUCCESSFUL WORK IN PHU BAI. I'M CONFIDENT IT WILL EXPAND SOON TO BECOME A GENERAL PATTERN FOR PF THUS TO WORK WITH THE MARINES. UNFORTUNATELY NOT ALL OF THE PF PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL THAT CAN ~~ONLY~~ BE DONE AT THE GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL, <sup>SPECIFICALLY,</sup> ~~WITH REGARD TO~~ PAY, BENEFITS, UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, I UNDERSTAND THAT SOME POSITIVE ACTION IN THIS AREA CAN BE EXPECTED BY THE START OF THE YEAR. *VERY Respectfully, WALT*

GP-4

TOR NAVCOMOPNET  
251527H / JES

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0 191400Z NOV  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV

NOV

11/11/65  
[Handwritten initials]

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SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO  
PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM NGEN WALT  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
OPERATIONS IN I CORPS

1. YOUR LETTER AND J-3 MEMORANDUM DTD 15NOV65 ON THE SUBJECT OF  
OPERATIONS IN I CORPS HAS BEEN CAREFULLY STUDIED. THE LETTER  
EXPRESSED:

- A. CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE AREAS EXTERNAL TO  
THE MARINES ENCLEAVES IN I CORPS.
- B. THE DIFFICULTIES THE GVN IS EXPERIENCING IN GETTING ORGANIZED  
TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR PACIFICATION OPERATIONS BEHIND US/FW  
FORCES.
- C. THE STATEMENT THAT III MAF IS EXPERIENCING EXTREME DIFFICULTY  
IN PACIFYING AN AREA WHICH HAS LONG BEEN UNDER VC CONTROL.
- D. THAT ARVN MUST BE REINFORCED IN A SERIES OF OPERATIONS THROUGH-  
OUT THE CORPS ZONE DESIGNED TO ARREST VC PROGRESS, TO DEMONSTRATE THE  
STRENGTH OF US/GVN EFFORT, AND TO SEEK OUT AND DESTROY LARGER  
VC FORCES.
- E. YOUR DESIRE TO SEE A PROGRAM OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS EMPLOYING A  
TWO TO THREE BATTALION FORCE DURING AT LEAST TWO WEEKS OF EACH  
MONTH, TOGETHER WITH AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS.
- F. IN ADDITION YOU DESCRIBED THE RURAL CONSTRUCTION EFFORT  
IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DANANG AIRFIELD AS THE ONLY SERIOUS  
PACIFICATION EFFORT UNDER WAY IN ANY AREAS SECURED BY THE US OR FREE  
WORLD FORCES.

2. TO RESTATE THE OBVIOUS, THE GOAL OF US/FW FORCES IN RVN IS TO  
ASSIST THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES IN RESTORING THAT LEVEL  
OF SECURITY WHICH WILL ENABLE THE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE ITS  
FUNCTIONS AND THE PEOPLE OF RVN TO PURSUE THEIR DAILY ACTIVITIES  
WITHOUT HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION FROM UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES. GOAL IS  
TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE PEOPLE AND NOT THE CONTROL OF LAND PER SE.  
IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THIS GOAL, I COMPLETELY SUPPORT THE CONCEPT  
THAT WHEN SIGNIFICANT SIZE VC UNITS CAN BE IDENTIFIED AND LOCATED,  
THEY WILL BE SOUGHT OUT AND DESTROYED. PAST ACTIVITIES OF III MAF ARE  
IN CONSONANCE WITH THE FOREGOING.

3. CONCUR THERE HAS BEEN A BUILDUP AND CONSOLIDATION OF VC STRENGTH  
IN I CORPS AREA. OUR OWN ESTIMATES DIFFER SOMEWHAT FROM THOSE  
DESCRIBED IN THE LETTER.

A. MACV CONSIDERS ONLY CONFIRMED UNITS TO BE AN INDICATION OF THE  
THREAT. THE CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING UNITS AS CONFIRMED IS STRINGENT  
AND I UNDERSTAND THE NEED THEREFORE. NEVERTHELESS, IN VIEW OF THE  
PROBLEMS IN OBTAINING RAPID AND HARD INTELLIGENCE IN THE ENVIRONMENT,  
I BELIEVE IT IS PRUDENT TO CONSIDER BATTALIONS WHICH ARE IDENTIFIED BY  
VARIOUS INDICATORS THOUGH NOT MEETING PUBLISHED CRITERIA AS A PART  
OF THE THREAT. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE NO CONFIRMED BATTALIONS  
CURRENTLY ACCEPTED IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE DANANG TAOR BUT  
CERTAINLY THE RECENT ATTACK ON THE AIRFIELD AND OUR CONTACTS WITH  
VC IN THE AREA CONFIRM THE FACT THAT LOCAL FORCE "PROBABLE"  
BATTALIONS MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN ANY EVALUATION OF THE THREAT.  
IN ADDITION TO THE 15 CONFIRMED BATTALIONS, III MAF COB CARRIES 11  
PROBABLE BATTALIONS.

#480

B. THERE HAS BEEN A BUILD-UP AND CONSOLIDATION OF VC STRENGTH IN THE I CORPS AREA DURING RECENT MONTHS. BASED ON THE LARGE NUMBER OF REPORTS OF UNIT MOVEMENTS AND SIGHTINGS, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS MAY SOON BE APPEARING, I.E, THE 1ST VC REGIMENT MAY HAVE MOVED INTO THE AREA TO THE SOUTHWEST OF THE DANANG TAOR; THREE ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS MAY NOW BE IN THE QUANG TRI PROVINCES; THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT NEW UNITS ARE MOVING INTO QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES.

C. IN SUMMARY:

(1) THE THREAT IN I CORPS IS CONSIDERABLY GREATER THAN THAT REPRESENTED BY THE 15 CONFIRMED BATTALIONS AND THAT THE THREAT IS INCREASING.

(2) THE VC UNITS MOVE AND BIVOUAC IN SMALL UNITS, MASS ONLY FOR SPECIFIC OPERATIONS.

4. DESPITE THE APPARENT GROWTH IN VC UNITS, THE ARVN EFFORT THROUGHOUT I CORPS MANIFESTS AN INCREASING DEGREE OF AGGRESSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS, STARTING FROM THE DMZ AND WORKING SOUTHWARD ESTIMATES OF THE FRIENDLY SITUATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES: MILITARILY, THESE PROVINCES REFLECT UPWARD TREND IN RVN CONTROL. GEN CHUAN WITH THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION IS WAGING A SKILLFUL CAMPAIGN. 1ST ARVN DIV UNITS CONSISTENTLY DESTROY THE VC IN ALL SIGNIFICANT ENCOUNTERS. ASIDE FROM A PAVN ENTRY INTO THESE PROVINCES, THIS DIVISION SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONTROL AND IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN THESE PROVINCES.

B. QUANG NAM PROVINCE. QUANG NAM IS THE CORNERSTONE OF I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. ORGANIZATION OF QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR IMPROVED THE ORGANIZATION TO COORDINATE RVN AND US UNITS IN THIS PROVINCE. THE INTRODUCTION OF III MAF UNITS INTO THE PROVINCE FREED RVN UNITS THAT WOULD BE COMPELLED TO PROTECT THE DANANG COMPLEX. THE SPECIAL SECTOR HAS ONE REGIMENT PLUS THREE SEPARATE BATTALIONS TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND SWEEP FORAYS PLUS OTHER SPECIFIC OPERATIONS. III MAF UNITS ARE ALWAYS AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN COORDINATED OPERATIONS, PROVIDE RESERVES AND AUGMENTATION UNITS AS A SITUATION DEVELOPS.

C. QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES. AM NOT QUITE PREPARED TO ACCEPT STATEMENT BY J-3 THAT "THE QUANG NGAI AREA IS IN A PRECARIOUS STATE AND QUANG TIN IS A VC PROVINCE." IN COMPARISON TO THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION THE 2ND ARVN DIVISION HAS NOT BEEN AS ACTIVE. HOWEVER, GEN LAM'S DIVISION IS WILLING TO FIGHT AND DOES FIGHT. THE COASTAL REGION OF QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES ARE IN FAIRLY GOOD SHAPE AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE USE BY GVN FORCES OF HIGHWAY ONE FROM DANANG TO QUANG NGAI. IN ADDITION, THIS DIVISION IS UNDERTAKING LARGER SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS, AND ACTIVELY SEEKING THE VC WHEREVER HE CAN BE LOCATED.

SECRET

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FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV

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SECTION 1 FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM NGEN WALT  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
OPERATIONS IN I CORPS (CONT.)

5. I CONTINUE TO UNDERSTAND MY PRIMARY MISSION TO BE TO DEFEND THE ESTABLISHED BASES (AND MOST PARTICULARLY DANANG, CHU LAI AND MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR BASES), TO SUPPORT THE RVNAF EFFORT, AND TO PROVIDE A SECURITY SHIELD BEHIND WHICH THE ARVN CAN DEVELOP A RELIABLE RURAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. IN PURSUIT OF THIS MISSION, I BELIEVE OUR PRESENT DISPOSITION OF FORCES AND OUR TACTICS ARE ESSENTIALLY SOUND. YOU HAVE HEARD OUR TIMEPHASED FORECAST OF FUTURE OPERATIONS. I THINK YOU WILL

RECALL THAT WE POSTULATED A STRAIGHT LINE REQUIREMENT OF TEN BATTALIONS DEVOTED TO THE SECURING AND DEVELOPING OUR THREE MAJOR BASE AREAS. NOW THAT BLT 2/7 HAS BEEN RETURNED TO III MAF CONTROL AND BLUE MARLIN HAS BEEN COMPLETED, WE HAVE THE DESIRED POSTURE OF ONE BATTALION AT PHU BAI, SIX BATTALIONS AT DANANG, AND FIVE BATTALIONS AT CHU LAI. WITH THIS POSTURE

WE CAN HAVE ONE BATTALION AT CHU LAI AND THE BETTER PART OF ONE BATTALION AT DANANG AVAILABLE FOR MOBILE OPERATIONS. I SAY THE BETTER PART OF ONE BATTALION AT DANANG BECAUSE I HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO AUGMENT THE SECURITY OF THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN FACILITY WITH A RIFLE COMPANY. ACTUALLY, A BATTALION COULD BE USED PROFITABLY IN DEFENDING THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN COMPLEX INCLUDING THE HOSPITAL AND NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES.

6. THESE TWO BATTALIONS WILL NOT BE IDLE. WHEN NOT EMPLOYED ON MOBILE OPERATIONS, THEY WILL BE SENT TO FILL IN ON THE MLR AND TO GIVE DEPTH TO OUR REAR AREA SECURITY. AS I SEE IT, THERE ARE THREE TYPES OF APPROPRIATE MISSIONS FOR THESE MOBILE FORCES:

A. TO STRIKE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY. WE WILL HIT VC FORCES, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR CAPABILITY, WHEREVER AND WHENEVER THEY CAN BE LOCATED IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.

B. TO SUPPORT THE RVNAF. UPON ARVN REQUEST, WE WILL PROVIDE MOBILE RESERVES IN COORDINATION WITH RVNAF OPERATIONS, EITHER FOR REINFORCEMENT OR EXPLOITATION.

C. TO EXTEND AND EXPAND THE AREA OF GVN CONTROL AND INFLUENCE. PRIORITY OF EFFORT WILL CONTINUE TO BE GIVEN TO THE COASTAL REGION BETWEEN DANANG AND CHU LAI AND TO OTHER AREAS CONTIGUOUS TO THE THREE ENCLAVES.

7. I CONSIDER THIS TWO BATTALION FORCE TO BE THE MINIMUM SAFE MOBILE RESERVE AND THE MINIMUM FORCE THAT SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR STRIKING FORCE OPERATIONS. THEREFORE, THERE SHOULD BE NO DIVERSION OF III MAF COMBAT FORCES TO OTHER CORPS AREA EXCEPT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES OF EXTREME MILITARY NECESSITY.

8. FOLLOWING YOUR GUIDANCE GIVEN ME DURING YOUR 20 OCTOBER VISIT WE ARE VIGOROUSLY PURSUING AN INTEGRATION OF III MAF AND SPECIAL FORCES EFFORT. THE NEW CAMPS SCHEDULED FOR THE PIEDMONT AREA, AS YOU STATED, CAN SERVE AS EYES AND EARS FOR III MAF AS WELL AS READY-MADE ADVANCED COMBAT BASES. OUR PLANNING IS BEING PURSUED ALONG THREE LINES: FIRST, THE USE OF THESE CAMPS FOR RECONNAISSANCE PURPOSE; SECOND, CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THE RELIEF OR REINFORCEMENT OF THESE CAMPS AND THIRD, THEIR USE AS ADVANCE COMBAT BASES. I HAVE ORDERED A PLATOON OF THE FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY TO TRA BONG. THIS MOVE WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY ENDORSED BY LTCOL ROSS AND BY CAPT

#42(3)

FAZEKAS, THE AUSTRALIAN WHO COMMANDS THE SPECIAL FORCES DETACHMENT AT TRA BONG. THIS PLATOON WILL GIVE ADDED AMERICAN PRESENCE TO THE CAMP, WILL CONDUCT DEEP RECONNAISSANCE OF LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH TO CHU LAI, AND WILL BE CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING HELICOPTER MOVEMENT AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. IN EVENT OF CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENT OF MARINE ELEMENTS TO TRA BONG OR ITS ENVI

ONS, THEY WOULD SERVE AS PATHFINDERS AND GUIDES. EGEN PLATT AND THE TWO

REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS AT CHU LAI HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO VISIT TRA BONG AND BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE CAMP AGAINST THE TIME WHEN WE WOULD WANT TO PUT A MARINE FORCE INTO THE AREA.

9. NOW TO ADDRESS YOUR REQUEST FOR A PROGRAM OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC OPERATIONS ARE CURRENTLY BEING PLANNED.

A. A BATTALION SIZE OPERATION IN CONCERT WITH THE SPECIAL FORCES DETACHMENT AND CIDG FORCE AT TRA BONG.

B. A BATTALION OR LARGER SIZE OPERATION IN "HAPPY VALLEY" WEST OF DANANG TAOR, VIC (ZC 1466). CONSIDERABLE INTELLIGENCE, INCLUDING THAT DEVELOPED BY DEEP RECONNAISSANCE PATROL TRAIL BLAZER, INDICATED THIS AREA IS A MAJOR STAGING AND TRAINING BASE FOR VC ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST DANANG.

C. A BATTALION OR LARGER SIZE OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF HA NHA (AT 7954). THERE ARE INCREASING INDICATIONS THAT ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST VC REGIMENT ARE REGROUPING IN THIS GENERAL AREA.

10. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, WE OF COURSE WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN OUR READINESS TO RESPOND TO TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY OR TO CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE OR COOPERATION FROM THE ARVN. AS OUR PLANS MATURE, I WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED. WITHIN OBVIOUS LIMITATIONS I WILL ENDEAVOR TO KEEP YOU PROVIDED WITH A TIMETABLE OF PROJECTED OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, I WOULD NOT LIKE TO COMMIT III MAF TO A RIGID SCHEDULE AS THE SITUATION OUTSIDE THE MARINE TAORS, AS YOUR LETTER ITSELF UNDERSCORES, IS MOST FLUID AND WE MUST BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO BOTH THE BEST AND THE WORST THAT CAN HAPPEN. IN ANY EVENT, I ASSURE YOU THAT ALL MARINE FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO BE USED PROFITABLY AND WITH PURPOSE. TRUST THAT ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS IN CONSONANCE WITH YOUR WISHES AND MEETS WITH YOUR APPROVAL. MOST RESPECTFULLY, WALT.

SECRET

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TO: CG FMFPAC

/ C O N F I D E N T I A L /

R&R

A. CINCPAC 050034Z

B. CG FMFPAC 140049Z

C. TELECON G-1 FMFPAC W/G-1 III MAF OF 13 NOV 65

**HAS BEEN SENT**

PERSONAL FOR LTJEN V. R. KRULAK

1. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE PROPOSED R&R EXPANSION CONTAINED IN REF A WILL NOT REACH ITS ULTIMATE GOAL OF 13,500 FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. ACCORDINGLY, YOUR REQ CONTAINED IN REF B IS GREATLY APPRECIATED ~~BY THE III MAF~~ IN THAT OKI R&R IS <sup>PROGRAM</sup> CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN PRESENT RATE OF PERS TO R&R FOR MORALE PURPOSES. ANY <sup>SIGNIFANT</sup> ~~LAJOR~~ DECREASE WOULD CERTAINLY BE DETRIMENTAL TO HIGH MORALE NOW ENJOYED.
2. JOINT CONF ON R&R HELD IN SCN 10 NOV 1965 INCLUDED VERBAL STATEMENT FR MACV HSP THAT OKI R&R MUST TERMINATE BY 1DEC65. SUMMARY OF THIS MEETING BEING FWD SEPARATELY. FURTHER, MACV HSP CPT STATED THAT THERE IS MUCH PRESSURE FR OKI TO DISCONTINUE SUBJ PROGRAM.
3. BY REF C G-1 III MAF INFORMED <sup>G-1</sup> FMFPAC OF REQUIREMENT LEVIED ON THIS HQ TO PROV WINTER OUTFR GARMENT FOR IN-FLT COMFORT TO <sup>PERS</sup> R&R BOUND FOR TOKYO AND TAIPEI. PRESENT INTENTION IS TO REQUISITION 1000 FIELD JACKETS FROM OKI.

MAJGEN L. W. WALY

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182750H / 3EJ

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DRAFTER JEM  
LECT GND BRIG PHONE 205  
TRANS TO  
GJO

CGH: 1104

PRIORITY 160601Z

FROM: CG III MAF  
TO: CG 173D ABN BRIG

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PERSONAL FROM MAJGEN WALT TO BOB WILLIAMSON  
MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE  
173D BRIGADE OVER YOUR DECISIVE SUCCESS IN LOCATING AND DEFRATING  
THE BUNKY. THE EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE OF YOUR PARATROOPERS PROVES  
ONCE AGAIN THAT THE VINEY COMB WILL BE DEFRATED WHEREVER AND WHENEVER  
WE CAN CONTACT THEM, AND I WISH YOU CONTINUED GOOD LUCK.  
KINDLY REGARDS, MAJG W WALT.

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ENCRYPTER L. W. WALT  
SHOT CG PHONE 6100  
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXHIBIT 1601502

FROM: CG ILL MAJ  
TO: CG EMPAC

**HAS BEEN SENT**

// S E C R E T //

PERSONAL FOR LT GEN KNUKAK FROM MAJ GEN WALT  
NEWSPAPER PHOTO

1. IN AMPLIFICATION OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY ME 060616Z IN RESPONSE TO  
YOUR 060502Z <sup>OK</sup> VLT COMG PRISONERS OF WAR, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS  
SUBMITTED. I HAD THIS MATTER LOOKED INTO BY THE CGS AND HERE ARE THE FACTS  
AS BEST THEY CAN ASCERTAIN. THE PICTURE IN QUESTION WAS TAKEN BY A MR.  
BARNETT ZAUGG OF HOMETOWN FEATURES. MR. ZAUGG TOOK THIS PICTURE ON "OPERATION  
PIRANHA" SOME TIME AROUND THE 7TH OF SEPTEMBER. THE UNIT IS "B" COMPANY,  
1ST BN, 7TH MARINES. THE PICTURE WAS SENT BY MR. ZAUGG TO SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS  
IN THE UNITED STATES, WAS REJECTED AND RETURNED TO MR. ZAUGG. MR. ZAUGG  
WAS ON OPERATION "BLACK FERRY" WHEN DICKEY CHAPMAN WAS KILLED. MR. ZAUGG  
TOOK HIS FILM OF THE "BLACK FERRY" OPERATION WITH HIS FILM OF DICKEY  
RECEIVING THE LAST NOTES FROM A CHAPMAN TO SARGON AND SOLD THEM TO UPI.  
UPI HAD A BLASPHMY ON DICKEY'S DEATH AS THEIR TEAM HAD RETURNED TO DA WANG  
THE NIGHT BEFORE. AT THE TIME ZAUGG SOLD HIS FILM ON DICKEY'S DEATH TO UPI  
HE ALSO SOLD THE PICTURE IN QUESTION. THE CAPTION OF THE PICTURE AT THE  
TIME ZAUGG SOLD IT TO UPI WAS "VLT COMG PRISONERS ARE MARCHED IN SMALL  
GROUPS LABELED TOGETHER WITH THEIR HANDS BEHIND THEIR BACKS, TO DA WANG  
BY U. S. MARINES DURING A SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION."

PAGE ONE OF TWO PAGES

COPY 2 OF 3

#42  
**SECRET**

UPI OFFICE IN SAIGON WAS CALLED AND THEY WERE AT A COMPLETE LOSS TO EXPLAIN HOW THE CAPTION WAS SO BADLY CARRIED IN THE NEWSPAPER CLIPPING YOU SENT/ME. THEY WERE ALSO VERY APOLOGETIC OVER RELEASING A PICTURE IN NOVEMBER THAT WAS TAKEN IN SEPTEMBER. THEY FURTHER STATED THEY WOULD QUERY BOTH TOKYO AND NEW YORK ON HOW THE CAPTION CAME OUT THE WAY IT DID. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING FURTHER FROM THEM AT THIS WRITING. UPI SAID THEY WOULD SEND YOU A TELEGRAM EXPLAINING AND APOLOGIZING FOR THIS GROSS ERROR. THEY FURTHER STATED THEY WOULD BUY NO MORE PICTURES FROM MR. ZAUGG. IT IS APPARENT TO ME WE WERE A VICTIM OF AN UNSCRUPULOUS REPORTER AND THAT UPI WAS DUPED. I HAVE DIRECTED THIS OIC TO KEEP A CLOSE EYE ON THIS MR. ZAUGG AND HAVE INFORMED THE INFORMATION OFFICE COMUSMACV OF THIS UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT. WITH RESPECT TO THE INCIDENT THAT PROVIDED THE OCCASION FOR THE PICTURE, THE COMPANY AND BATTALION COMMANDERS CORRECTED THE SITUATION AS SOON AS THE METHOD OF HANDLING VC PRISONERS BY THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE PATROL WAS BROUGHT TO THEIR ATTENTION. IN ADDITION, COMMANDING OFFICERS AT ALL LEVELS HAVE BEEN PERSONALLY COUNSELED BY ME ON THIS SUBJECT. THE DIVISION HAS THIS AS ONE OF THE SUBJECTS THAT INSTRUCTIONS ARE REPEATEDLY GIVEN TO THE TROOPS. ~~SECRET~~ Very Respectfully

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~~Priority~~ 080846 NOV 65

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FM: CG III MAF  
TO: CG FMFPAC

EXCLUSIVE

// SECRET //

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM NGEN WALT. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG FMFPAC 060502Z

1. NEEDLESS TO SAY I AM DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE FACTS REPORTED BY REF. A. THE SITUATION DESCRIBED BY THE PHOTOGRAPH IS IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF FORCE AND DIVISION DIRECTIVES. IN ADDITION, I HAVE REPEATEDLY COUNSELED MY COMMANDERS ON THIS SUBJECT. TROOPS AND TROOP LEADERS ARE CONTINUOUSLY COUNSELED ON THE RULES AND THE PENALTIES FOR THEIR VIOLATION.
2. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE FORCE ORDER SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITS THE VERY TYPE OF TREATMENT DESCRIBED, TO WIT, CAPTIVES WILL BE BLIND FOLDED AND BOUND ONLY TO THE DEGREE NECESSARY TO PREVENT ESCAPE. BINDINGS WILL NOT BE PLACED AROUND THE NECK OR HEAD OR USED IN ANY MANNER WHICH WILL CUT OFF BLOOD CIRCULATION TO ANY PART OF THE BODY OR IN SUCH A MANNER THAT RESULTS IN AN UNNATURAL POSITIONING OF THE BODY. UNQUOTE
3. THIS INCIDENT IS BEING INVESTIGATED AND DISCIPLINARY ACTION WILL BE INITIATED.

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TO: CB FMPPAC

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*[Handwritten initials and signatures]*  
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PERSONAL FROM MAJ GEN WALT

I HAVE JUST FINISHED READING YOUR MESSAGE TO GENERAL GREENE IN WHICH YOU EVALUATED AND DISCUSSED THE SITUATION HERE IN I CORPS AND I THINK IT IS OUTSTANDING. WE HAVE DONE A LOT OF SOUL SEARCHING DURING THE LAST WEEK AND HAVE REEVALUATED OUR TACTICAL POSTURE. I HAVE HAD A LONG DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL THI ON THE SECURITY OF THESE AREAS AS A RESULT OF WHICH HE IS TIGHTENING UP ON HIS FORCES MORE SO THAN HE HAS EVER DONE BEFORE. HE IS ALSO HELPING ME TO TRY TO GET AUTHORITY TO CONTROL THE TRAFFIC ON AND OFF THE AIRFIELD. WE HAVE FOUR ARVN COMPANIES WORKING CLOSELY WITH 9TH MARINES AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT THIS IS GOING TO BE A VERY PRODUCTIVE EXERCISE. THE BATTALION COMMANDER SEEMS TO BE A VERY CAPABLE INDIVIDUAL AND ENTHUSED ABOUT THE JOB THAT LIES AHEAD OF HIM. HE AND THE 9TH MARINES ARE WORKING VERY CLOSELY IN THIS PACIFICATION EFFORT.

I HAVE DECIDED THAT I CANNOT AFFORD TO SHORTEN MY MLR IN ORDER TO GAIN MORE TROOPS FOR REAR AREA SECURITY BECAUSE WE HAVE TOLD THE VILLAGERS BEHIND OUR MLR THAT WE ARE THERE TO STAY. AT THE SAME TIME, I FEEL THAT I MUST TIGHTEN UP THE MLR AS A PART OF THE OVERALL SECURITY PICTURE FOR ALL THE AIRBASES DURING THIS NEXT SIX WEEKS, WHICH I BELIEVE IS THE CRITICAL PERIOD. IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THIS I HAVE DIRECTED MY MLR REGIMENTS TO LIMIT THEIR PATROLS FORWARD TO 2,000 METERS AND TO HAVE THEIR MLR WELL COVERED WITH AMBUSHES BOTH DAY AND NIGHT. I PLACED THE FORCE RECON COMPANY UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF 3RD RECON BATTALION AND HAVE MADE THE RECON FORCES RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL DEEP PATROLLING. I BELIEVE THEY HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF GIVING OUR FRONT ADEQUATE COVERAGE. I AM ACCELERATING THE EFFORT ON WIRE LAYING AND MINE FIELDS AROUND THE AMMUNITION DUMPS, THE AIRFIELDS AND, EVENTUALLY, THE NAVAL HOSPITAL AND NSA AREAS AS RAPIDLY AS RESOURCES BECOME AVAILABLE. GENERAL THI IS HAVING ALL THE VILLAGES IN THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN/DANANG EAST AREAS CAREFULLY CHECKED AND HE SAYS IF HE HAS ANY QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE VC ARE USING THEM AS BASES OF OPERATION HE WILL HAVE THEM MOVED FROM THE PENINSULA. HE HAS ALSO INTENSIFIED HIS POLICE EFFORTS IN THE DANANG AREA AND, AS A RESULT, HAS PICKED UP SEVERAL VC AGENTS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. WE HAVE REPORTS OF MORTARS, RECKLESS WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BEING MOVED INTO CERTAIN HAMLETS. TODAY WE ARE STARTING AN

EFFORT TO LOCATE THESE WEAPONS. ALL OF THESE HAMLETS ARE WITHIN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIRFIELD AREA.

I THINK THE SID'S ARE GOING TO PROVE VERY VALUABLE TO US. WE HAVE THIRTY OF THEM IN USE NOW AND HAVE JUST RECEIVED THREE HUNDRED MORE. I INTEND TO GIVE THE AIRFIELDS PRIORITY ON THESE ITEMS. RELATIVE TO THE RECENT ATTACK ON THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIRFIELD WE RECEIVED A COMMUNICATION LAST NIGHT FROM THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHICH STATES THAT VC LOSSES INFLECTED IN THAT ATTACK CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING: 25 MISSING IN ACTION, 20 SERIOUSLY WOUNDED AND CARRIED OUT, 14 SLIGHTLY WOUNDED AND 20 KILLED IN ACTION BURIED IN HOA HAI VILLAGE. THE REPORT OF 25 MISSING, OF COURSE, FOLLOWS VERY CLOSELY TO OUR ACCOUNT OF 17 DEAD AND 5 CAPTURED. THIS WOULD INDICATE THAT WE HURT THEM MORE THAN WE CLAIMED.

WE RECEIVED WORD THIS MORNING THROUGH THE USUALLY RELIABLE RESOURCE THAT THE BIG ATTACK ON THE AIRFIELD IS TO BE MADE BETWEEN 20 AND 25 NOVEMBER (DARK OF THE MOON). IT WILL BE IN THE FORM OF MORTAR ATTACK AND SUICIDE DEMOLITIONS SQUADS. GENERAL THI HAD GIVEN ME SIMILAR INFORMATION WHEN I TALKED TO HIM A FEW DAYS AGO. I FEEL THAT WE MUST BE ESPECIALLY ON OUR TOES FROM NOW UNTIL THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. I AM MOVING A SECOND COMPANY OF 3/3 FROM CHU LAI TO MARBLE MOUNTAIN THIS AFTERNOON. I ALREADY HAVE MOVED M-3-3 HERE TO GUARD THE AMMO DUMP. WARM REGARDS. LEW

GP-4

+ 36 (2)

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FROM: CG III MAF  
TO: CG FMFPAC

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PERSONAL FOR LTJEN KRULAK FM MGRW WALT

// SECRET //

1. COMUSMACV HAS UNDERGONE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FM OTHER COMPONENT COMMANDERS AND MAJOR U. S. FIELD COMMANDERS TO THESE COMDS THE SAME NEWS REL AUTH AS NOW POSSESSED BY III MAF. WHEN REL AUTH WAS GRANTED CG III MAF FOR I CORPS AREA, THE BULK OF U. S. FOR IN VIETNAM WERE THE MARINE CORPS FOR IN I CORPS AND THOSE LOC IN THE SAIGON AREA. AS U. S. STR INCREASED IN OTHER CORPS AREA, THE COMDS INVOLVED REQ SIMILAR REL AUTH FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE COMDS. COMUSMACV FACED A DILEMMA IN THAT HE DESIRED TO CONTINUE DELEGATION OF AUTH TO III MAF BUT DID NOT DESIRE TO FURTHER DELUTE REL AUTH IN THE FIELD OF PUB INFO. IN ORDER TO FRACLADE FURTHER DELEGATION OF AUTH AND PLACATE OTHER COMDS, COMUSMACV IS POSTING THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INFO, SAIGON TO BE THE HEAD OF THE PRESS CENTER AT DANANG. THIS OFFICER, JACOB BILRHORN, USAF WILL ACT IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MACOI AND HAVE REL AUTH FOR ALL NEWS AS WELL AS PHOTO.

2. AS THE HEAD OF THE PRESS CENTER, THE MACV REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE THE REL AUTH FOR ALL NEWS MATTERS PERTAINING TO I CORPS BUT WILL HAVE NO OPERATIONAL CONTROL OR ADMIN RESP FOR III MAF CIB. THIS

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ARRANGEMENT APPEARS TO BE WORKABLE, BUT OVER THE LONG PULL COULD VARY WITH PERSONALITIES OF MACV REPRESENTATIVES. HARMONIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN OIC OF THE CIB AND THE HEAD OF THE PRESS CENTER WILL PROVIDE SAT SOLUTIONS TO ANY PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT ARISE.

3. IF WE DO NOT ACCEPT THIS ARRANGEMENT, REL AUTH WILL PROBABLY BE RESCINDED. IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT THE FOREGOING ARRANGEMENT PRESENTED BY MACV IS SAT.

4. WILL ADVISE IF THIS ARRANGEMENT HAS ANY DETERIOUS EFFECT ON THE CIB.

*A. CG*  
RELEASED BY *[Signature]*

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